








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bader, R. G. (2012). CFC legislation in the European Union and the alternative CSC concept. [n.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.






CFC Legislation in the European Union and the 










































CFC Legislation in the European Union and the 











Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan Tilburg University, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, 
prof.dr. Ph. Eijlander, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een 
door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie 
in zaal DZ1 van de Universiteit 
 




Robert Gebhard Bader 








     
     















































Copyright: Robert Gebhard Bader, 2012 







CFC Legislation in the European Union and the 











Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan Tilburg University, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, 
prof.dr. Ph. Eijlander, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een 
door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie 
in zaal DZ1 van de Universiteit 
 




Robert Gebhard Bader 








     
     















































Copyright: Robert Gebhard Bader, 2012 
Thesis Tilburg University, the Netherlands 
 
    
 








Part I - Introduction                            Page        
 
1.  Introduction                                                  1 
1.1.               Motivation for the Study           1 
1.2.  Definition of the Problem           1 
1.3.  Methodology             2 
   
Part II - General Aspects                               
 
2.  Economic Principles in International Taxation                 5                              
2.1.  Introduction                       5             
2.2.  The Economic Principle of Capital Export Neutrality                 5 
2.2.1.  Capital Export Neutrality                     5 
2.2.2.  National Neutrality                      8 
2.3.  The Economic Principle of Capital Import Neutrality                 9 
2.4.  Capital Export Neutrality vs. Capital Import Neutrality               10 
2.4.1.  Direct Investments                    12  
2.4.2.  Portfolio Investments                   15 
2.4.3.  Investments in Tangible and Intangible Property               17 
2.4.4.  Hybrid Investments                                                                              18 
2.4.5.  The Basic Interest Component                  21 
2.5.  Application of the Principles to Hybrid Investments           
  and other Intra-Group Activities                  30 
2.5.1. Production Activities                   30 
2.5.2. Service Activities                    30 
2.5.3. Intra-Group Transfer and Use of Tangible and  
Intangible Property                    32 
2.5.4. The Interest Component of Capital                 33 
2.5.4.1. The Interest Component of Capital and Direct  
  Investments                     33 
2.5.4.2. The Interest Component of Capital and Intra-Group 
Finance Activities                    36 
2.5.4.3. The Interest Component of Capital and Portfolio 
Activities                      47 
2.5.4.4. The Interest Component of Capital and the Use of 
Tangible and Intangible Property                  49 







    








Prof.dr. E.C.C.M. Kemmeren 
 
 
Overige leden van de Promotiecommissie: 
 
Prof.dr.dr.h.c. M. Lang 
Prof.dr. E. Reimer 
Prof.dr. P.H.J. Essers 
























    
 








Part I - Introduction                            Page        
 
1.  Introduction                                                  1 
1.1.               Motivation for the Study           1 
1.2.  Definition of the Problem           1 
1.3.  Methodology             2 
   
Part II - General Aspects                               
 
2.  Economic Principles in International Taxation                 5                              
2.1.  Introduction                       5             
2.2.  The Economic Principle of Capital Export Neutrality                 5 
2.2.1.  Capital Export Neutrality                     5 
2.2.2.  National Neutrality                      8 
2.3.  The Economic Principle of Capital Import Neutrality                 9 
2.4.  Capital Export Neutrality vs. Capital Import Neutrality               10 
2.4.1.  Direct Investments                    12  
2.4.2.  Portfolio Investments                   15 
2.4.3.  Investments in Tangible and Intangible Property               17 
2.4.4.  Hybrid Investments                                                                              18 
2.4.5.  The Basic Interest Component                  21 
2.5.  Application of the Principles to Hybrid Investments           
  and other Intra-Group Activities                  30 
2.5.1. Production Activities                   30 
2.5.2. Service Activities                    30 
2.5.3. Intra-Group Transfer and Use of Tangible and  
Intangible Property                    32 
2.5.4. The Interest Component of Capital                 33 
2.5.4.1. The Interest Component of Capital and Direct  
  Investments                     33 
2.5.4.2. The Interest Component of Capital and Intra-Group 
Finance Activities                    36 
2.5.4.3. The Interest Component of Capital and Portfolio 
Activities                      47 
2.5.4.4. The Interest Component of Capital and the Use of 
Tangible and Intangible Property                  49 







    








Prof.dr. E.C.C.M. Kemmeren 
 
 
Overige leden van de Promotiecommissie: 
 
Prof.dr.dr.h.c. M. Lang 
Prof.dr. E. Reimer 
Prof.dr. P.H.J. Essers 
























    
 
4.2.1.1.8.   The Cadbury Schweppes Case                106 
4.2.1.1.9.   The Columbus Container Case                107 
4.2.1.1.10.   The Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) Case                109      
4.2.1.2.   Economic Activity and the Freedom of Establishment            109 
4.2.1.2.1.   Economic Activity and Indirect Taxation              110 
4.2.1.2.2.   Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Indirect  
  Taxation                    116 
4.2.1.2.3.   Economic Activity and Direct Taxation                 117 
4.2.1.2.4.   Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Direct Taxation      119 
4.2.1.3.   Fixed Establishment and the Freedom of Establishment            119 
4.2.2.    Conclusions Regarding the Freedom of Establishment            122 
4.2.3.    The Freedom to Provide Services               124 
4.2.3.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice              124 
4.2.3.1.1.   The Gebhard Case                 124 
4.2.3.1.2.   The Eurowings Case                 125 
4.2.4.   Conclusions Regarding the Freedom to Provide Services            125 
4.2.5.   The Free Movement of Capital                126 
4.2.5.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice              129 
4.2.5.1.1.   The Verkooijen Case                 129 
4.2.5.1.2.   The Cases Lenz, Manninen and Meilicke              131 
4.2.6.   Conclusions Regarding the Free Movement of Capital            133 
4.2.7.   The Simultaneous Application of the Basic Freedoms            133 
4.2.7.1.   The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Free Movement of  
  Capital                   133 
4.2.7.2.   The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Freedom to Provide  
  Services                   140 
4.2.7.3.   The Freedom to Provide Services vs. the Free Movement of 
      Capital                   141 
4.2.8.   The Basic Freedoms and the Investment in Non-Member  
  States                   143 
4.2.9.   The Abuse of the Basic Freedoms               145 
4.2.10.   Justifications for a Restriction on the Basic Freedoms             148 
4.2.10.1.   General Aspects                  148 
4.2.10.2.   Justifications Stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
               the European Union                 149 
4.2.10.3.   Justifications under the Rule of Reason              150 
4.2.10.3.1.   Justification Based on the Cohesion of the Tax System            151 
4.2.10.3.2.   Justification Based on the Loss of Tax Revenue and the  
  Erosion of the Tax Base                 155 
4.2.10.3.3.   Justification Based on the General Compensation for  
  Advantages                  157 
4.2.10.3.4.   Justification Based on a Different Taxation in Another Member 
  State                   157 
4.2.10.3.5.   Justification Based on the Principle of Territoriality              160 
4.2.10.3.6.   Justification Based on the Protection of a Balanced Allocation 
    of the Power to Impose Taxes between Member States            161 





    
 
3.  Legal Principles in International Taxation                55 
3.1. Introduction                     55  
3.2. The Legal Principle of Equity                  55  
3.2.1. Taxpayer Equity                    55    
3.2.1.1. Individual and Corporate Taxpayer Equity                55    
3.2.1.2. Equality Aspects                                 56   
3.2.2. Inter-Nation Equity                    59   
3.2.3. Equity and Direct Investments                  59   
3.2.4. Equity and Portfolio Investments                  64 
3.2.5. Equity and the Use of Tangible and Intangible  
Property                     65          
3.2.6. Equity and Hybrid Investments                  65   
3.2.6.1. Finance, Leasing and Similar Activities                 65     
3.2.6.2. Portfolio Activities                    78 
3.2.6.3. The Consequences of Equity and Hybrid Investments 
for Individual and Corporate Taxpayers                 79 
3.3. General Aspects of the OECD Model Tax Convention              85     
3.3.1. The Prevention of International Double Taxation               85 
3.3.1.1. International Juridical Double Taxation                 85 
3.3.1.2. International Economic Double Taxation                86   
3.3.2. The Prevention of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion                87         
3.3.3. Allocation of Taxing Rights According to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention                   87     
3.3.3.1. Business Profits                    87 
3.3.3.2. Dividends                     87 
3.3.3.3. Interest                     88  
3.3.3.4. Royalties                     88 
3.3.3.5. Capital Gains                    89 
3.3.3.6. Other Income                    89 
3.3.4. The OECD Model Tax Convention and the Methods of 
Avoiding International Double Taxation                 89 
3.3.5. The OECD Model Tax Convention and Hybrid                                 
Investments                     90 
3.4.  Conclusions                     91 
 
4.    European Union Law                   95 
4.1.    Introduction                     95          
4.2.    Primary European Union Law - The Basic Freedoms              95  
4.2.1.    The Freedom of Establishment                  95  
4.2.1.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice                96 
4.2.1.1.1.   The Daily Mail Case                   96  
4.2.1.1.2.   The Factortame Case and the Jaderow Case                97  
4.2.1.1.3.   The Gebhard Case                   99  
4.2.1.1.4.   The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Case              100    
4.2.1.1.5.   The Baars Case                  101     
4.2.1.1.6.   The Überseering Case                 103 






    
 
4.2.1.1.8.   The Cadbury Schweppes Case                106 
4.2.1.1.9.   The Columbus Container Case                107 
4.2.1.1.10.   The Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) Case                109      
4.2.1.2.   Economic Activity and the Freedom of Establishment            109 
4.2.1.2.1.   Economic Activity and Indirect Taxation              110 
4.2.1.2.2.   Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Indirect  
  Taxation                    116 
4.2.1.2.3.   Economic Activity and Direct Taxation                 117 
4.2.1.2.4.   Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Direct Taxation      119 
4.2.1.3.   Fixed Establishment and the Freedom of Establishment            119 
4.2.2.    Conclusions Regarding the Freedom of Establishment            122 
4.2.3.    The Freedom to Provide Services               124 
4.2.3.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice              124 
4.2.3.1.1.   The Gebhard Case                 124 
4.2.3.1.2.   The Eurowings Case                 125 
4.2.4.   Conclusions Regarding the Freedom to Provide Services            125 
4.2.5.   The Free Movement of Capital                126 
4.2.5.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice              129 
4.2.5.1.1.   The Verkooijen Case                 129 
4.2.5.1.2.   The Cases Lenz, Manninen and Meilicke              131 
4.2.6.   Conclusions Regarding the Free Movement of Capital            133 
4.2.7.   The Simultaneous Application of the Basic Freedoms            133 
4.2.7.1.   The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Free Movement of  
  Capital                   133 
4.2.7.2.   The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Freedom to Provide  
  Services                   140 
4.2.7.3.   The Freedom to Provide Services vs. the Free Movement of 
      Capital                   141 
4.2.8.   The Basic Freedoms and the Investment in Non-Member  
  States                   143 
4.2.9.   The Abuse of the Basic Freedoms               145 
4.2.10.   Justifications for a Restriction on the Basic Freedoms             148 
4.2.10.1.   General Aspects                  148 
4.2.10.2.   Justifications Stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of 
               the European Union                 149 
4.2.10.3.   Justifications under the Rule of Reason              150 
4.2.10.3.1.   Justification Based on the Cohesion of the Tax System            151 
4.2.10.3.2.   Justification Based on the Loss of Tax Revenue and the  
  Erosion of the Tax Base                 155 
4.2.10.3.3.   Justification Based on the General Compensation for  
  Advantages                  157 
4.2.10.3.4.   Justification Based on a Different Taxation in Another Member 
  State                   157 
4.2.10.3.5.   Justification Based on the Principle of Territoriality              160 
4.2.10.3.6.   Justification Based on the Protection of a Balanced Allocation 
    of the Power to Impose Taxes between Member States            161 





    
 
3.  Legal Principles in International Taxation                55 
3.1. Introduction                     55  
3.2. The Legal Principle of Equity                  55  
3.2.1. Taxpayer Equity                    55    
3.2.1.1. Individual and Corporate Taxpayer Equity                55    
3.2.1.2. Equality Aspects                                 56   
3.2.2. Inter-Nation Equity                    59   
3.2.3. Equity and Direct Investments                  59   
3.2.4. Equity and Portfolio Investments                  64 
3.2.5. Equity and the Use of Tangible and Intangible  
Property                     65          
3.2.6. Equity and Hybrid Investments                  65   
3.2.6.1. Finance, Leasing and Similar Activities                 65     
3.2.6.2. Portfolio Activities                    78 
3.2.6.3. The Consequences of Equity and Hybrid Investments 
for Individual and Corporate Taxpayers                 79 
3.3. General Aspects of the OECD Model Tax Convention              85     
3.3.1. The Prevention of International Double Taxation               85 
3.3.1.1. International Juridical Double Taxation                 85 
3.3.1.2. International Economic Double Taxation                86   
3.3.2. The Prevention of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion                87         
3.3.3. Allocation of Taxing Rights According to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention                   87     
3.3.3.1. Business Profits                    87 
3.3.3.2. Dividends                     87 
3.3.3.3. Interest                     88  
3.3.3.4. Royalties                     88 
3.3.3.5. Capital Gains                    89 
3.3.3.6. Other Income                    89 
3.3.4. The OECD Model Tax Convention and the Methods of 
Avoiding International Double Taxation                 89 
3.3.5. The OECD Model Tax Convention and Hybrid                                 
Investments                     90 
3.4.  Conclusions                     91 
 
4.    European Union Law                   95 
4.1.    Introduction                     95          
4.2.    Primary European Union Law - The Basic Freedoms              95  
4.2.1.    The Freedom of Establishment                  95  
4.2.1.1.   Case Law of the European Court of Justice                96 
4.2.1.1.1.   The Daily Mail Case                   96  
4.2.1.1.2.   The Factortame Case and the Jaderow Case                97  
4.2.1.1.3.   The Gebhard Case                   99  
4.2.1.1.4.   The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Case              100    
4.2.1.1.5.   The Baars Case                  101     
4.2.1.1.6.   The Überseering Case                 103 






    
 
6.   The Various Types and the Specific Elements of                        
  European CFC and FIF Legislation               213   
6.1. Introduction                   213   
6.2. The Transactional Approach                213   
6.2.1. The Various Types of Tainted Income               214   
6.2.1.1. Rental Income from Immovable Property              214   
6.2.1.2. Leasing and Rental Income from Movable Property             216   
6.2.1.3. Interest Income                  217   
6.2.1.4. Royalty Income                  219 
6.2.1.5. Dividend Income                  221 
6.2.1.6. Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares               222 
6.2.1.7. Other Capital Gains                 223 
6.2.1.8. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                223 
6.2.1.9. Preliminary Conclusions                 226 
6.2.2. Base Company Income                 228 
6.2.2.1. General Aspects                   228 
6.2.2.2. Income Subject to CFC Taxation under the Base Company           
  Rules                    229 
6.2.2.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                234 
6.2.2.4. Preliminary Conclusions                 235 
6.2.3.  Conclusions Regarding the Transactional Approach             236 
6.3. The Entity Approach                 237 
6.3.1. The Various Exemptions under the Entity Approach                         239 
6.3.1.1. Exemption Based on the Activity of the CFC              239 
6.3.1.2. Exemption Based on a Motive Test               243 
6.3.1.3. Exemption Based on an Acceptable Distribution Policy            243 
6.3.1.4. Exemption for Publicly Traded Companies              244 
6.3.1.5. Exemption Based on a Certain Threshold              245 
6.3.1.6. Exemption Based on an Excluded Country List             245 
6.3.2.  Concepts Similar to Entity Approach CFC Legislation             246 
6.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                247 
6.3.4.  Conclusions Regarding the Entity Approach              250 
6.4. The Low-Taxation Requirement                251 
6.4.1. General Aspects                   251 
6.4.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                254 
6.4.3.  Conclusions Regarding the Low-Taxation Requirement            256 
6.5. The Ownership Requirement                257 
6.5.1. Ownership and Similar Rights                 257 
6.5.2. Indirect Ownership                   260 
6.5.3. Constructive Ownership Rules                261 
6.5.4.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                262 





    
 
4.2.10.3.8.   Justification Based on the Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance         164 
4.2.10.3.9.   Justification Based on Administrative Inconvenience            166   
4.2.10.4.   Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States            167 
4.2.10.5.   The Principle of Proportionality                 169 
4.2.11.   Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for a Restriction on  
    the Basic Freedoms                 169           
4.3.    Secondary European Union Law                 170   
4.3.1.    The Parent-Subsidiary Directive               171  
4.3.2.    Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive            173  
4.4.    Conclusions                  173   
 
Part III - CFC and FIF Legislation in the European Union and the  
Alternative CSC Concept                
                     
5.  General Aspects of CFC and FIF Legislation             179 
5.1  Introduction                   179   
5.2.  The Current Taxation of CFC Income               180  
5.3.  The Basic Requirements for the Application of CFC Rules            180   
5.4.   The Main Differences between CFC and FIF Rules             181   
5.5.  The Policy Rationale for CFC Rules               182   
5.6.  The Concept of Deferral                 183   
5.6.1.  General Aspects                   183   
5.6.2.  Deferral and the OECD Methods of Avoiding Double  
  Taxation                   187 
5.7. Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules              187 
5.7.1. Thin-Capitalisation Rules                 188 
5.7.2. Transfer Pricing Rules                 188 
5.7.3. Residence Test                  189 
5.7.4. General Anti-Avoidance Rules                190 
5.7.5. Restriction on the Participation Exemption              190 
5.7.6. Restriction on the Deduction of CFC-Related Business 
Expenses                   191 
5.7.7. Imposition of Withholding Taxes on CFC-Related Payments            191 
5.7.8. Information Reporting Rules and Exchange of Information            192 
5.7.9. Conclusions Regarding the Alleged Alternative Measures for   
CFC Rules                   192 
5.8. CFC Rules and the Ability-To-Pay Principle              193 
5.9. CFC Rules and the Taxation of Permanent Establishments 
and Partnerships                  197 
5.10. Harmful Tax Competition - The OECD and EU Approach            203 
5.10.1. The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition             203 
5.10.2. The EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation             206 
5.10.3. The Main Differences between the OECD Report on Harmful 
Tax Competition and the EU Code of Conduct              207 
5.10.4. CFC Rules and Harmful Tax Competition      208 







    
 
6.   The Various Types and the Specific Elements of                        
  European CFC and FIF Legislation               213   
6.1. Introduction                   213   
6.2. The Transactional Approach                213   
6.2.1. The Various Types of Tainted Income               214   
6.2.1.1. Rental Income from Immovable Property              214   
6.2.1.2. Leasing and Rental Income from Movable Property             216   
6.2.1.3. Interest Income                  217   
6.2.1.4. Royalty Income                  219 
6.2.1.5. Dividend Income                  221 
6.2.1.6. Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares               222 
6.2.1.7. Other Capital Gains                 223 
6.2.1.8. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                223 
6.2.1.9. Preliminary Conclusions                 226 
6.2.2. Base Company Income                 228 
6.2.2.1. General Aspects                   228 
6.2.2.2. Income Subject to CFC Taxation under the Base Company           
  Rules                    229 
6.2.2.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                234 
6.2.2.4. Preliminary Conclusions                 235 
6.2.3.  Conclusions Regarding the Transactional Approach             236 
6.3. The Entity Approach                 237 
6.3.1. The Various Exemptions under the Entity Approach                         239 
6.3.1.1. Exemption Based on the Activity of the CFC              239 
6.3.1.2. Exemption Based on a Motive Test               243 
6.3.1.3. Exemption Based on an Acceptable Distribution Policy            243 
6.3.1.4. Exemption for Publicly Traded Companies              244 
6.3.1.5. Exemption Based on a Certain Threshold              245 
6.3.1.6. Exemption Based on an Excluded Country List             245 
6.3.2.  Concepts Similar to Entity Approach CFC Legislation             246 
6.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                247 
6.3.4.  Conclusions Regarding the Entity Approach              250 
6.4. The Low-Taxation Requirement                251 
6.4.1. General Aspects                   251 
6.4.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                254 
6.4.3.  Conclusions Regarding the Low-Taxation Requirement            256 
6.5. The Ownership Requirement                257 
6.5.1. Ownership and Similar Rights                 257 
6.5.2. Indirect Ownership                   260 
6.5.3. Constructive Ownership Rules                261 
6.5.4.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                262 





    
 
4.2.10.3.8.   Justification Based on the Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance         164 
4.2.10.3.9.   Justification Based on Administrative Inconvenience            166   
4.2.10.4.   Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States            167 
4.2.10.5.   The Principle of Proportionality                 169 
4.2.11.   Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for a Restriction on  
    the Basic Freedoms                 169           
4.3.    Secondary European Union Law                 170   
4.3.1.    The Parent-Subsidiary Directive               171  
4.3.2.    Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive            173  
4.4.    Conclusions                  173   
 
Part III - CFC and FIF Legislation in the European Union and the  
Alternative CSC Concept                
                     
5.  General Aspects of CFC and FIF Legislation             179 
5.1  Introduction                   179   
5.2.  The Current Taxation of CFC Income               180  
5.3.  The Basic Requirements for the Application of CFC Rules            180   
5.4.   The Main Differences between CFC and FIF Rules             181   
5.5.  The Policy Rationale for CFC Rules               182   
5.6.  The Concept of Deferral                 183   
5.6.1.  General Aspects                   183   
5.6.2.  Deferral and the OECD Methods of Avoiding Double  
  Taxation                   187 
5.7. Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules              187 
5.7.1. Thin-Capitalisation Rules                 188 
5.7.2. Transfer Pricing Rules                 188 
5.7.3. Residence Test                  189 
5.7.4. General Anti-Avoidance Rules                190 
5.7.5. Restriction on the Participation Exemption              190 
5.7.6. Restriction on the Deduction of CFC-Related Business 
Expenses                   191 
5.7.7. Imposition of Withholding Taxes on CFC-Related Payments            191 
5.7.8. Information Reporting Rules and Exchange of Information            192 
5.7.9. Conclusions Regarding the Alleged Alternative Measures for   
CFC Rules                   192 
5.8. CFC Rules and the Ability-To-Pay Principle              193 
5.9. CFC Rules and the Taxation of Permanent Establishments 
and Partnerships                  197 
5.10. Harmful Tax Competition - The OECD and EU Approach            203 
5.10.1. The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition             203 
5.10.2. The EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation             206 
5.10.3. The Main Differences between the OECD Report on Harmful 
Tax Competition and the EU Code of Conduct              207 
5.10.4. CFC Rules and Harmful Tax Competition      208 







    
 
7.  CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions             329   
7.1.  Introduction                   329   
7.2.  Case Law Related to CFC Legislation and Double 
  Tax Conventions                  329 
7.2.1.  The A Oyj Abp Case (Finland)                329   
7.2.2.  The Schneider Case (France)      334   
7.2.3.  The Bricom Holdings Case (The United Kingdom)   342 
7.2.4.  The Captive Insurance Cases (Sweden)    345  
7.2.5.  Excursion: Non-European Case Law     347 
7.2.6.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      349 
7.3.  The Requirement of a Specific Preservation of CFC Rules 
  in Double Tax Conventions      350 
7.3.1.  The OECD Perspective       350 
7.3.2.  Additional Aspects        354 
7.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      359 
7.4.  CFC Income in the Context of the OECD Model Tax 
  Convention         360 
7.4.1. Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    360 
7.4.2. Article 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    366 
7.4.3. Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  371 
7.4.4.  Article 6 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    382 
7.4.5.  Article 13 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    384 
7.4.6.  Article 21 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    384 
7.4.7.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      385 
7.5.  The Different Approaches of CFC Income Taxation and 
  Double Tax Conventions       386 
7.5.1.  Entity Approach vs. Transactional Approach    386 
7.5.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      387 
7.6.  The Circumvention of Double Tax Conventions through 
  CFC Legislation?         387 
7.6.1.  General Aspects        387 
7.6.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      389 
7.7.  Review of Important Aspects and Examination of the    
  Principles Derived from Previous Chapters    390 
7.8.  Conclusions         394 
 
8.  CFC Legislation and European Union Law    401   
8.1.  Introduction         401   
8.2.  CFC Legislation and Primary European Union Law   401  
8.2.1.  CFC Legislation and the Freedom of Establishment   401  
8.2.1.1. Economic Activity                  402   





    
 
6.6. The Computation and Characterisation of CFC Income            265 
6.6.1.  General Aspects                  265 
6.6.2.  The Deemed Dividend Approach                266 
6.6.3.  The Piercing the Veil Approach                266 
6.6.4.  The Re-Valuation Approach                267 
6.6.5.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                268 
6.6.6.  Conclusions Regarding the Computation and      
Characterisation of CFC Income                 269 
6.7. Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares     269 
6.7.1. Subsequent Dividends                 269 
6.7.2. Subsequent Disposal of Shares                273 
6.7.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
Derived from Previous Chapters                275 
6.7.4.  Conclusions Regarding Subsequent Dividends and Disposal 
of Shares                   276 
6.8. Negative Income and CFC Rules                                                      277 
6.8.1. General Aspects                  277 
6.8.1.1. Negative Income in Countries with an Entity Approach            277 
6.8.1.2. Negative Income in Countries with a Transactional Approach          279 
6.8.2. Specific Aspects                  281 
6.8.2.1. The Exclusion and the Limitation of Negative CFC Income            281 
6.8.2.2. Negative Income of the Shareholder and CFC Income            283 
6.8.2.3. Time Limit for Subsequent Dividends               284 
6.8.2.4. Time Limit for Subsequent Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares      285 
6.8.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                285 
6.8.4.  Conclusions Regarding Negative Income and CFC Rules            288 
6.9. Relief for Foreign Taxes                 289 
6.9.1. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Country               289 
6.9.2. Taxes Imposed by Third Countries               290 
6.9.3. Taxes Imposed by the Residence Country of the Shareholder         292 
6.9.4. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Rules of another Country            293 
6.9.5.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                293 
6.9.6.  Conclusions Regarding the Relief for Foreign Taxes             295 
6.10. Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules   295 
6.10.1. The Indirect Participation in a CFC               295 
6.10.2. The Multiple Application of CFC Rules and Similar Measures          296 
6.10.2.1. The General Recognition of the Lower Tier CFC Rules            297 
6.10.2.2. Problems Caused by the Multiple Application of CFC Rules 
and Similar Measures                 298 
6.10.2.3. Cases of Possible Double Taxation Caused by the  
Multiple Application of CFC Rules and Similar Measures            303 
6.10.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
Derived from Previous Chapters                320      
6.10.4. Conclusions Regarding Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules      321 





    
 
7.  CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions             329   
7.1.  Introduction                   329   
7.2.  Case Law Related to CFC Legislation and Double 
  Tax Conventions                  329 
7.2.1.  The A Oyj Abp Case (Finland)                329   
7.2.2.  The Schneider Case (France)      334   
7.2.3.  The Bricom Holdings Case (The United Kingdom)   342 
7.2.4.  The Captive Insurance Cases (Sweden)    345  
7.2.5.  Excursion: Non-European Case Law     347 
7.2.6.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      349 
7.3.  The Requirement of a Specific Preservation of CFC Rules 
  in Double Tax Conventions      350 
7.3.1.  The OECD Perspective       350 
7.3.2.  Additional Aspects        354 
7.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      359 
7.4.  CFC Income in the Context of the OECD Model Tax 
  Convention         360 
7.4.1. Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    360 
7.4.2. Article 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    366 
7.4.3. Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  371 
7.4.4.  Article 6 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    382 
7.4.5.  Article 13 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    384 
7.4.6.  Article 21 of the OECD Model Tax Convention    384 
7.4.7.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      385 
7.5.  The Different Approaches of CFC Income Taxation and 
  Double Tax Conventions       386 
7.5.1.  Entity Approach vs. Transactional Approach    386 
7.5.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      387 
7.6.  The Circumvention of Double Tax Conventions through 
  CFC Legislation?         387 
7.6.1.  General Aspects        387 
7.6.2.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      389 
7.7.  Review of Important Aspects and Examination of the    
  Principles Derived from Previous Chapters    390 
7.8.  Conclusions         394 
 
8.  CFC Legislation and European Union Law    401   
8.1.  Introduction         401   
8.2.  CFC Legislation and Primary European Union Law   401  
8.2.1.  CFC Legislation and the Freedom of Establishment   401  
8.2.1.1. Economic Activity                  402   





    
 
6.6. The Computation and Characterisation of CFC Income            265 
6.6.1.  General Aspects                  265 
6.6.2.  The Deemed Dividend Approach                266 
6.6.3.  The Piercing the Veil Approach                266 
6.6.4.  The Re-Valuation Approach                267 
6.6.5.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                268 
6.6.6.  Conclusions Regarding the Computation and      
Characterisation of CFC Income                 269 
6.7. Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares     269 
6.7.1. Subsequent Dividends                 269 
6.7.2. Subsequent Disposal of Shares                273 
6.7.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
Derived from Previous Chapters                275 
6.7.4.  Conclusions Regarding Subsequent Dividends and Disposal 
of Shares                   276 
6.8. Negative Income and CFC Rules                                                      277 
6.8.1. General Aspects                  277 
6.8.1.1. Negative Income in Countries with an Entity Approach            277 
6.8.1.2. Negative Income in Countries with a Transactional Approach          279 
6.8.2. Specific Aspects                  281 
6.8.2.1. The Exclusion and the Limitation of Negative CFC Income            281 
6.8.2.2. Negative Income of the Shareholder and CFC Income            283 
6.8.2.3. Time Limit for Subsequent Dividends               284 
6.8.2.4. Time Limit for Subsequent Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares      285 
6.8.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                285 
6.8.4.  Conclusions Regarding Negative Income and CFC Rules            288 
6.9. Relief for Foreign Taxes                 289 
6.9.1. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Country               289 
6.9.2. Taxes Imposed by Third Countries               290 
6.9.3. Taxes Imposed by the Residence Country of the Shareholder         292 
6.9.4. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Rules of another Country            293 
6.9.5.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters                293 
6.9.6.  Conclusions Regarding the Relief for Foreign Taxes             295 
6.10. Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules   295 
6.10.1. The Indirect Participation in a CFC               295 
6.10.2. The Multiple Application of CFC Rules and Similar Measures          296 
6.10.2.1. The General Recognition of the Lower Tier CFC Rules            297 
6.10.2.2. Problems Caused by the Multiple Application of CFC Rules 
and Similar Measures                 298 
6.10.2.3. Cases of Possible Double Taxation Caused by the  
Multiple Application of CFC Rules and Similar Measures            303 
6.10.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
Derived from Previous Chapters                320      
6.10.4. Conclusions Regarding Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules      321 





    
 
8.4.  The Dilemma of the Member States     465 
8.5.  The Reaction of Member States to Comply With European 
  Union Law         467 
8.5.1.  Finland         467 
8.5.2.  France         468 
8.5.3.  Germany         469 
8.5.4.  Italy          472 
8.5.5.  The United Kingdom       473 
8.5.6.  Denmark         480 
8.5.7.  Sweden         481 
8.6.  Limitation to European Union and European Economic 
  Area States?         482 
8.7.  The Council Resolution on Coordination of the CFC Rules 
  within the European Union      482 
8.8.  The “Limited” Capital Export Neutrality Approach   483 
8.8.1.  General Aspects        483 
8.8.2.  The Necessary Differentiation       485 
8.9.  Conclusions         488 
 
9.  Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation  495   
9.1.  Introduction         495   
9.2.  The Anti-Avoidance Aspects      495   
9.2.1.  Income Related to the Activity Component    496  
9.2.2.  Income Related to the Risk Component     497 
9.2.3.  Income Related to the Basic Interest Component   501 
9.3.  The Elements of an Alternative Concept to CFC Legislation  502 
9.3.1.  The Basic Interest Taxation      502 
9.3.2.  The Requirement of a Non-Discriminatory Approach   502 
9.3.3.  The Separation of Activities       504 
9.3.3.1. Financing Activities        504 
9.3.3.2. Licensing Activities        505 
9.3.3.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property  505 
9.3.3.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 506 
9.3.3.5. Other Activities Related to Capital Services    507 
9.3.3.6. Other Service Activities and Trading Activities     507 
9.3.3.7. The Combination of Different Activities     508 
9.3.4.  The Role of Transfer Pricing Principles     508 
9.3.5.  The Separation of Income       510 
9.3.5.1. The Basic Interest Component      510 
9.3.5.1.1. General Aspects        510 
9.3.5.1.2. The Appropriate Benchmark      511 
9.3.5.2. The Risk Component (Related to the Capital Investment)  512 
9.3.5.3. The Activity Component (Related to the Services)   513 
9.3.6.  The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income  513 
9.3.7.  The Application to Permanent Establishments and Transparent  
  Entities?         515 





    
 
8.2.1.1.2. Investment Management Activity vs. Economic Activity?  403   
8.2.1.1.3. Inter-Company Activities       403  
8.2.1.2. The Separation from Wholly Artificial Arrangements   406 
8.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment in Another Member State    411 
8.2.1.4. The Shareholding in the CFC      412 
8.2.1.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      413 
8.2.1.6. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom 
  of Establishment        414 
8.2.2.  CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide Services  416 
8.2.2.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      418 
8.2.2.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom 
  to Provide Services        419 
8.2.3.  CFC Legislation and the Free Movement of Capital   419 
8.2.3.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      422 
8.2.3.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Free 
  Movement of Capital       422 
8.2.4.  Additional Examinations       424 
8.2.4.1. Restrictions Caused by the Application of CFC Legislation  424 
8.2.4.2. The Pair of Comparison - Vertical and Horizontal Comparison? 429 
8.2.4.3. “Most-Favoured Nation” Treatment for CFC Investments?  437 
8.2.4.4. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      437 
8.2.5.  Justifications for Restrictions Caused by CFC Legislation  438 
8.2.5.1. The Cohesion of the Tax System      438 
8.2.5.2. The Loss of Tax Revenue and the Erosion of the Tax Base  439 
8.2.5.3. The Lower Taxation in the CFC Country    439 
8.2.5.4. The Principle of Territoriality      441 
8.2.5.5. The Protection of a Balanced Allocation of the Power to  
  Impose Taxes between Member States     442 
8.2.5.6. The Effectiveness of Fiscal Supervision     442 
8.2.5.7. The Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance     443 
8.2.5.8. The Principle of World-Wide Taxation     450 
8.2.5.9. Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States  453 
8.2.5.10. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      455 
8.2.5.11. Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for Restrictions  
  Caused by CFC Legislation      456 
8.3.  CFC Legislation and Secondary European Union Law  458 
8.3.1.  The Parent-Subsidiary Directive      458 
8.3.2.  The Interest and Royalty Directive     461 
8.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles   
  Derived from Previous Chapters      463 
8.3.4.  Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 






    
 
8.4.  The Dilemma of the Member States     465 
8.5.  The Reaction of Member States to Comply With European 
  Union Law         467 
8.5.1.  Finland         467 
8.5.2.  France         468 
8.5.3.  Germany         469 
8.5.4.  Italy          472 
8.5.5.  The United Kingdom       473 
8.5.6.  Denmark         480 
8.5.7.  Sweden         481 
8.6.  Limitation to European Union and European Economic 
  Area States?         482 
8.7.  The Council Resolution on Coordination of the CFC Rules 
  within the European Union      482 
8.8.  The “Limited” Capital Export Neutrality Approach   483 
8.8.1.  General Aspects        483 
8.8.2.  The Necessary Differentiation       485 
8.9.  Conclusions         488 
 
9.  Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation  495   
9.1.  Introduction         495   
9.2.  The Anti-Avoidance Aspects      495   
9.2.1.  Income Related to the Activity Component    496  
9.2.2.  Income Related to the Risk Component     497 
9.2.3.  Income Related to the Basic Interest Component   501 
9.3.  The Elements of an Alternative Concept to CFC Legislation  502 
9.3.1.  The Basic Interest Taxation      502 
9.3.2.  The Requirement of a Non-Discriminatory Approach   502 
9.3.3.  The Separation of Activities       504 
9.3.3.1. Financing Activities        504 
9.3.3.2. Licensing Activities        505 
9.3.3.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property  505 
9.3.3.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 506 
9.3.3.5. Other Activities Related to Capital Services    507 
9.3.3.6. Other Service Activities and Trading Activities     507 
9.3.3.7. The Combination of Different Activities     508 
9.3.4.  The Role of Transfer Pricing Principles     508 
9.3.5.  The Separation of Income       510 
9.3.5.1. The Basic Interest Component      510 
9.3.5.1.1. General Aspects        510 
9.3.5.1.2. The Appropriate Benchmark      511 
9.3.5.2. The Risk Component (Related to the Capital Investment)  512 
9.3.5.3. The Activity Component (Related to the Services)   513 
9.3.6.  The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income  513 
9.3.7.  The Application to Permanent Establishments and Transparent  
  Entities?         515 





    
 
8.2.1.1.2. Investment Management Activity vs. Economic Activity?  403   
8.2.1.1.3. Inter-Company Activities       403  
8.2.1.2. The Separation from Wholly Artificial Arrangements   406 
8.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment in Another Member State    411 
8.2.1.4. The Shareholding in the CFC      412 
8.2.1.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      413 
8.2.1.6. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom 
  of Establishment        414 
8.2.2.  CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide Services  416 
8.2.2.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      418 
8.2.2.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom 
  to Provide Services        419 
8.2.3.  CFC Legislation and the Free Movement of Capital   419 
8.2.3.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      422 
8.2.3.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Free 
  Movement of Capital       422 
8.2.4.  Additional Examinations       424 
8.2.4.1. Restrictions Caused by the Application of CFC Legislation  424 
8.2.4.2. The Pair of Comparison - Vertical and Horizontal Comparison? 429 
8.2.4.3. “Most-Favoured Nation” Treatment for CFC Investments?  437 
8.2.4.4. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      437 
8.2.5.  Justifications for Restrictions Caused by CFC Legislation  438 
8.2.5.1. The Cohesion of the Tax System      438 
8.2.5.2. The Loss of Tax Revenue and the Erosion of the Tax Base  439 
8.2.5.3. The Lower Taxation in the CFC Country    439 
8.2.5.4. The Principle of Territoriality      441 
8.2.5.5. The Protection of a Balanced Allocation of the Power to  
  Impose Taxes between Member States     442 
8.2.5.6. The Effectiveness of Fiscal Supervision     442 
8.2.5.7. The Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance     443 
8.2.5.8. The Principle of World-Wide Taxation     450 
8.2.5.9. Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States  453 
8.2.5.10. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles 
  Derived from Previous Chapters      455 
8.2.5.11. Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for Restrictions  
  Caused by CFC Legislation      456 
8.3.  CFC Legislation and Secondary European Union Law  458 
8.3.1.  The Parent-Subsidiary Directive      458 
8.3.2.  The Interest and Royalty Directive     461 
8.3.3.  The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles   
  Derived from Previous Chapters      463 
8.3.4.  Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and 





    
 
Part IV - Concluding Observations                              
 
10.  Summary and Conclusions                603                        
10.1.  Purpose of the Study                 603      
10.2.   Economic Principles in International Taxation    604   
10.3.  Legal Principles in International Taxation    608 
10.4.  European Union Law       610 
10.5.  General Aspects of CFC and FIF Legislation    614 
10.6.  The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European 
  CFC and FIF Legislation       616 
10.7. CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions    621 
10.8. CFC Legislation and European Union Law    626 
10.9. Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation   632 
 
 
Table of Case Law of the European Court of Justice      643 
 


































    
 
9.3.8.1. The Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding    518 
9.3.8.2. The Non-Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding   519 
9.3.8.3. The Application of a Financial Threshold    521 
9.3.8.4. The Related Parties to the Shareholder     521 
9.3.8.5. Constructive Ownership Rules      523 
9.4.  The Anti-Avoidance Concept of Capital Service Company  
(CSC) Legislation        524 
9.4.1.  The Determination of the Basic Interest Rate    524 
9.4.2.  The Determination of the Tax Base     524 
9.4.2.1. The Determination of the Calculation Basis of the Property  524 
9.4.2.1.1. Financing Activities        526 
9.4.2.1.2. Licensing Activities        527 
9.4.2.1.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property  530 
9.4.2.1.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 534 
9.4.2.1.5. Other Activities        535 
9.4.2.2. Possible Limitations and the Determination of the Net  
  Calculation Basis        535 
9.4.3.  Permanent Establishments and Transparent Entities   540 
9.4.4.  The Percentage of Shareholding or Voting Rights in the CSC 540 
9.4.5.  The Allocation of Income to the Shareholder    544 
9.4.6.  Limitation of the Income Tax Rate?     544 
9.4.7.  The Tax Credit System       546 
9.4.8.  The Treatment of Subsequent Profit Distributions   562 
9.4.9.  The Treatment of a Subsequent Disposals of Shares   565 
9.4.10. Exemptions from CSC Taxation      569 
9.4.10.1. Exemption Based on a Property-Ratio     569 
9.4.10.2. Exemption Based on an Income-Ratio     570 
9.4.10.3. Exemption Based on the Classification of the Service Recipients 570 
9.4.10.4. Exemption Based on a General Financial Threshold   571 
9.4.10.5. Exemption Based on Income Taxation at Source   571 
9.4.10.6. One Step Further: Exemption for Cases in which the State of  
  Source is Identical to the State of Residence?    572 
9.4.10.7. Other Exemption Provisions      577 
9.4.11. The Litmus Test: CSC Legislation, Internal Market and EU Law 578 
9.4.11.1. The Compliance with the Concept of an Internal Market  578 
9.4.11.2. The Compliance with Primary European Union Law   578 
9.4.11.3. The Compliance with Secondary European Union Law  581 
9.4.12. CSC Legislation and the OECD Model Tax Convention   582 
9.4.12.1. CSC Taxation and Non-Transparent Entities    582 
9.4.12.2. CSC Taxation and Permanent Establishments    582 
9.4.13. CSC Legislation vs. CFC Legislation     584 
9.4.13.1. CSC Legislation vs. Transactional Approach Income Allocation 584 
9.4.13.2. CSC Legislation vs. Entity Approach Income Allocation  586 
9.4.13.3. The Abolition of the Low-Taxation Requirement   588 
9.4.13.4. The Income Allocation and Tax Credit System              588 
9.4.13.5. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income            590 
9.4.13.6. Once Again: Effectiveness and Anti-Avoidance Legislation            590 
9.5.  Conclusions                   592 




    
 
Part IV - Concluding Observations                              
 
10.  Summary and Conclusions                603                        
10.1.  Purpose of the Study                 603      
10.2.   Economic Principles in International Taxation    604   
10.3.  Legal Principles in International Taxation    608 
10.4.  European Union Law       610 
10.5.  General Aspects of CFC and FIF Legislation    614 
10.6.  The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European 
  CFC and FIF Legislation       616 
10.7. CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions    621 
10.8. CFC Legislation and European Union Law    626 
10.9. Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation   632 
 
 
Table of Case Law of the European Court of Justice      643 
 


































    
 
9.3.8.1. The Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding    518 
9.3.8.2. The Non-Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding   519 
9.3.8.3. The Application of a Financial Threshold    521 
9.3.8.4. The Related Parties to the Shareholder     521 
9.3.8.5. Constructive Ownership Rules      523 
9.4.  The Anti-Avoidance Concept of Capital Service Company  
(CSC) Legislation        524 
9.4.1.  The Determination of the Basic Interest Rate    524 
9.4.2.  The Determination of the Tax Base     524 
9.4.2.1. The Determination of the Calculation Basis of the Property  524 
9.4.2.1.1. Financing Activities        526 
9.4.2.1.2. Licensing Activities        527 
9.4.2.1.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property  530 
9.4.2.1.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 534 
9.4.2.1.5. Other Activities        535 
9.4.2.2. Possible Limitations and the Determination of the Net  
  Calculation Basis        535 
9.4.3.  Permanent Establishments and Transparent Entities   540 
9.4.4.  The Percentage of Shareholding or Voting Rights in the CSC 540 
9.4.5.  The Allocation of Income to the Shareholder    544 
9.4.6.  Limitation of the Income Tax Rate?     544 
9.4.7.  The Tax Credit System       546 
9.4.8.  The Treatment of Subsequent Profit Distributions   562 
9.4.9.  The Treatment of a Subsequent Disposals of Shares   565 
9.4.10. Exemptions from CSC Taxation      569 
9.4.10.1. Exemption Based on a Property-Ratio     569 
9.4.10.2. Exemption Based on an Income-Ratio     570 
9.4.10.3. Exemption Based on the Classification of the Service Recipients 570 
9.4.10.4. Exemption Based on a General Financial Threshold   571 
9.4.10.5. Exemption Based on Income Taxation at Source   571 
9.4.10.6. One Step Further: Exemption for Cases in which the State of  
  Source is Identical to the State of Residence?    572 
9.4.10.7. Other Exemption Provisions      577 
9.4.11. The Litmus Test: CSC Legislation, Internal Market and EU Law 578 
9.4.11.1. The Compliance with the Concept of an Internal Market  578 
9.4.11.2. The Compliance with Primary European Union Law   578 
9.4.11.3. The Compliance with Secondary European Union Law  581 
9.4.12. CSC Legislation and the OECD Model Tax Convention   582 
9.4.12.1. CSC Taxation and Non-Transparent Entities    582 
9.4.12.2. CSC Taxation and Permanent Establishments    582 
9.4.13. CSC Legislation vs. CFC Legislation     584 
9.4.13.1. CSC Legislation vs. Transactional Approach Income Allocation 584 
9.4.13.2. CSC Legislation vs. Entity Approach Income Allocation  586 
9.4.13.3. The Abolition of the Low-Taxation Requirement   588 
9.4.13.4. The Income Allocation and Tax Credit System              588 
9.4.13.5. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income            590 
9.4.13.6. Once Again: Effectiveness and Anti-Avoidance Legislation            590 
9.5.  Conclusions                   592 




       
 




1.1. Motivation for the Study 
 
Working in the field of international taxation, questions related to CFC legislation1 are 
of great practical relevance. International investments and restructurings can become 
less attractive - or even unattractive - just because of the application of CFC regimes. 
This is not only true for the generation of typical “passive” income like interest and 
royalties, but also for the relocation of group operations to other states which may 
lead to “base company income.” It is therefore apparent that the application of CFC 
regimes can have a major impact on the international activities of a taxpayer. It is 
equally apparent, in my opinion, that it is unacceptable that the state of the 
shareholder taxes all of the income derived through a foreign entity on a current 
basis. One has to keep in mind that the income usually also encompasses elements 
of income which are produced in the CFC state or where the CFC takes over 
substantial risks. Moreover, in an EU context it is obvious, based on the case law of 
the European Court of Justice, that Member States cannot - at least not without 
justification - restrict the foreign activities of their residents. The outcome of the 
Cadbury Schweppes case clearly shows that this is also of great importance for the 
application of CFC regimes.  
 
The fact that a number of Member States still follow the “typical” CFC regimes makes 
the research in the European context particularly interesting. This became already 
clear when I was working on my Master thesis at the European Tax College in 
Leuven, which was mainly focused on the comparison of European CFC regimes. 
From my perspective, it is obvious that the typical CFC regimes are “outdated” and 
not ready for an application in an internal market. The CFC regimes require 
alternatives which accept the (limited) necessity of an anti-deferral approach but 
which are, at the same time, acting within certain legal and economic parameters. 
With this PhD thesis I would like contribute to the ongoing discussion on the changes 
or even the abolition of CFC regimes and would like to provide an alternative concept 
to the existing regimes.   
 
1.2. Definition of the Problem 
 
One of the decisive questions in this context is the question whether the principle of 
capital import neutrality or the principle of capital export neutrality should be the 
prevailing principle in the taxation of foreign source income. If one comes to the 
conclusion that the principle of capital import neutrality should be the prevailing 
principle not only for the taxation of income from direct investments but also for 
income from portfolio investments, there is an obvious conflict with the excessive 
current taxation of income under most of the existing CFC regimes. The problem, 
though, is the fact that the OECD-MTC, as one of the most important international 
patterns for the conclusion of double tax conventions, is fostering the residence-
based taxation of certain passive and base company income. Such an approach is 
therefore rather supporting the relocation of certain capital intensive activities to 
states and territories which provide for a lower taxation of income. Thus, the general 
                                            
1 The term “CFC” covers also the foreign investment fund (FIF) rules. However, in cases where it is important to 
make a distinction between CFC and FIF legislation, the rules are mentioned and described separately.  
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In Part III (Chapter 5 to 9 - CFC and FIF Legislation in the European Union and the 
Alternative CSC Concept) the general aspects of CFC and FIF legislation, the various 
types and the specific elements of European CFC and FIF legislation and the impact 
of double tax conventions will be verified. Further, the CFC legislation will be tested 
against EU law and, finally, an alternative concept will be presented.  
 
In Chapter 5 I will outline the general aspects of the current taxation of income, the 
policy rationale of CFC legislation and the concept of deferral. I will describe the 
alleged alternative measures for CFC legislation and will go into detail of the ability-
to-pay principle. I will further describe the differences and similarities to the taxation 
of permanent establishments and (transparent) partnerships. Finally, I will verify the 
OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition and the EU Code of Conduct. 
 
In Chapter 6 I will concentrate on the various types and the specific elements of 
European CFC and FIF legislation. The different types of transactional approach and 
entity approach regimes will be presented, compared and tested to the principles 
derived from previous chapters.  
 
The interrelation between CFC rules and double tax conventions will be in the focus 
of Chapter 7. Here, I will deal with international case law and the OECD perspective. 
Furthermore, I will focus on the question how CFC income should be seen in the light 
of the OECD-MTC. The outcome of the examination will be again tested to the 
principles derived from previous chapters.  
 
Chapter 8 will be focused on CFC legislation and Primary and Secondary EU law. 
The findings will be tested to the principles derived form previous chapters and the 
conclusions from the examination shall be the basis - from an EU law perspective - 
for an alternative concept.  
  
In Chapter 9 I will develop and present a concept for an alternative to the existing 
CFC regimes. The concept shall be in line, as much as possible, with the conclusions 
derived from the previous chapters.  
 
Part IV (Chapter 10 - Concluding Observations) concludes this study. The outcome 

















       
 
acceptance of the principle of capital import neutrality does not necessarily mean that 
there is no need for a “limited” taxation according to the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, not all of the income components have to be treated identically, 
since not all of them have to be safeguarded from a competitiveness point of view. It 
is quite important, under the circumstances outlined above, to deviate from the 
existing transactional and entity based CFC regimes towards a new concept which is 
much more linked to the principle of capital import neutrality and the aim of fostering 
competitiveness. It is apparent, in my opinion, that this cannot be achieved by a mere 
horizontal separation of income, like in case of the transactional regimes, but 
requires, in addition, a vertical separation of income. In order to determine such a 
new concept, it is important to identify and to determine the economic and legal 
basis, the possibilities and limits from an EU law perspective and the basic 
requirements from an anti-avoidance point of view. It is also important to examine the 
various types and the specific elements of the existing CFC rules as well as the 
interrelation with double tax conventions.    
 
1.3. Methodology  
 
The study is divided into four parts. In Part I (Chapter 1 - Introduction) the motivation 
for the study, the definition of the problem and the methodology will be described.  
 
Part II (Chapter 2 to 4 - General Aspects) will deal with economic principles in 
international taxation, legal principles in international taxation and EU law - always 
related to policy considerations and principles which are of importance in the context 
of this study and the application of CFC rules.  
 
In Chapter 2 the general economic principles in international taxation, the capital 
export neutrality and the capital import neutrality will be described and examined with 
a view to direct investments, portfolio investments, investments in tangible and 
intangible property, and “hybrid” investments. It will be examined, from an economic 
perspective, to which extent a horizontal and vertical separation of income is 
necessary.  
 
In Chapter 3 the legal principle of equity will be verified. Similar to the previous 
chapter, this will be made in relation to direct investments, portfolio investments, 
investments in tangible and intangible property, and “hybrid” investments. The 
horizontal and vertical separation of income will be examined from this angle as well. 
Moreover, some of the general aspects of the OECD-MTC will be outlined, such as 
the question of international juridical double taxation vs. international economic 
double taxation, the prevention of tax avoidance and tax evasion, and the allocation 
of taxing rights. 
 
In Chapter 4 the basic freedoms which may be of importance for this study will be 
examined based on the case law of the European Court of Justice. This will 
encompass the scope of the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide 
services and the free movement of capital. I will also deal with the simultaneous 
application of basic freedoms as well as the possible justifications under the rule of 
reason for restrictions of the latter freedoms. Moreover, the possible impact of the 
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Part II - General Aspects 
 




In general, tax systems can be divided into two main systems, the taxation of 
residents according to the principle of worldwide taxation1 and the taxation based on 
the principle of territoriality.2 Pursuant to the first principle, the principle of worldwide 
taxation, a state taxes the domestic and foreign income of its residents.3 The system 
itself is based on the economic principle of capital export neutrality (CEN). Under the 
second principle, a state does not tax the foreign income of its residents but limits its 
taxing power to the income derived in its territory by residents and non-residents.4 
Such system is economically based on the principle of capital import neutrality (CIN). 
Both tax policies are in practice often applied parallel to each other and embedded in 
one uniform tax system, and certain varieties and deviations are possible. For 
example, pure territorial systems - which do not tax the foreign income of its residents 
at all - are rather uncommon.5 It is often a partial territorial system which is applied 
and which exempts from tax some, but not all, of the foreign income of its residents. 
The importance of these two basic systems and the fact that they are based on two 
different economic principles makes it necessary to have a closer look at those 
underlying economic policies.  
 
2.2. The Economic Principle of Capital Export Neutrality  
 
2.2.1. Capital Export Neutrality 
 
Pursuant to Peggy Musgrave, international tax neutrality toward investment may be 
defined as a situation in which the pattern of taxation does not interfere with or affect 
the taxpayer’s choice between investing at home and investing in foreign countries.6 
                                            
1 A residence-based system of taxation.  
2 A source-based system of taxation.  
3 See, inter alia, Bühler, Prinzipien des Internationalen Steuerrechts, Amsterdam 1964, page 165; Engelschalk / 
Flick et al.., Steuern auf ausländische Einkünfte, München 1985; Schulze-Brachmann, Totalitäts- oder 
Territorialitätsprinzip, StuW 1964, page 589 et seq.; Vogel, Die Besteuerung von Auslandseinkünften, in: Vogel, 
Grundfragen des internationalen Steuerrechts, Köln 1985, page 3 et seq. (page 17 et seq.); Schindel / 
Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, pages 58 to 
72. 
4 See, inter alia, Wassermeyer, Die beschränkte Steuerpflicht, in: Vogel, Grundfragen des internationalen 
Steuerrechts, Köln 1985, page 49 et seq.; Bellstedt, Die Besteuerung international verflochtener Gesellschaften, 
3. Auflage Köln 1973, page 17 et seq.; Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their 
principles, General Report, IFA 2005, pages 73 to 79. 
5 According to the IFA Report 2005, very few countries follow a pure territorial system. Within the group of 
countries that submitted branch reports to the 2005 IFA congress, it is only Uruguay (see Schindel / 
Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, pages 26 
and 40). See also Figueroa who lists Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Singapore and Uruguay as the only countries that tax income exclusively on a 
source basis (Figueroa, Doble Tributación Internacional. Inmovilismo o Adecuación a la Nueva Realidad 
Mundial, X Congreso Tributario, CPCECABA, Buenos Aires (2003), cited in General Report, IFA 2005, page 
40 (Footnote 58)). 
6 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), page 
109. See also Peggy Richman, Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, An Economic Analysis (1963) and 
Richard Musgrave, Criteria For Foreign Tax Credit, Taxation and Operations Abroad, Symposium (1960).  
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capital would be invested in the country with the higher pre-tax return since the taxes 
on the investment income will not play any role in the decision.  
 
In the following, the example can be amended by exchanging the tax rates of country 
A and country B, i.e. the tax rate of country A would be 20 percent and the tax rate of 
country B 35 percent. The result is basically similar to the example above if the tax 
system of country A allows a reimbursement of the excess tax credit. This would 
mean that country A taxes the income of 15 Euro with 3 Euro (20 percent) and has to 
give a foreign tax credit (or a reimbursement) of 5.25 Euro (35 percent) if the investor 
decides to invest in country B. Overall, country A will end up with a negative amount 
of 2.25 Euro and country B with a positive amount of 5.25 Euro. This is the 
consequent application of the CEN principle and would therefore place the investor in 
a situation which is similar to what was outlined above in the first example. It is 
obvious that tax jurisdictions are often not willing to follow a tax policy which provides 
for such excess foreign tax credit or a refund of such taxes.15 Of course, this is due to 
revenue concerns which often take precedence over efficiency aspects. Moreover, 
there could be a strong temptation for country B to tax investments made by 
investors from country A more heavily since the extra burden would have to be borne 
by the tax administration of country A and not by the investor itself.16 However, 
without a full credit for taxes paid to the source country B the investor resident in 
country A will be influenced by tax considerations. If the pre-tax return of the 
investment in country A and country B is the same the investor has a strong incentive 
to invest in his home country and would be reluctant to invest in a country with a 
higher tax burden. From an efficiency perspective, too little capital will end up in high 
tax country B.17 
 
Pursuant to the proponents of the CEN principle, the allocation of capital across 
countries will not be distorted by the system described in the examples above 
provided that a full tax credit exists. However, in a model outlined by Rosanne 
Altshuler investors had to make two decisions: (1) how much to save and (2) how to 
allocate these savings across locations.18 The underlying model considers two 
countries (A and B) with different tax rates. The tax rate in country A is higher than 
the tax rate in country B. Pursuant to Altshuler, the savings decision will be 
influenced by the different tax rates. The residents of the country with the lower tax 
                                            
15 See also Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, General Report, 
IFA 2005, pages 41, 42. There are, of course, exceptions to this approach. For example, the Directive on taxation 
of savings income in the form of interest payments provides for an excess credit of withholding tax deducted by 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria. Those Member States will introduce a system of information reporting at the 
end of a transitional period, during which they will levy a withholding tax at a rate of 15 percent for the first 
three years, 20 percent for the following three years, and 35 percent thereafter. 75 percent of the withholding tax 
will be transferred to the residence state of the investor. In turn, the residence state of the investor is obliged to 
credit the withholding tax deducted in those Member States and to provide for a reimbursement of an excess 
credit (see Council Directive 2003/48/EC of June 3, 2003, and Council Decision 2004/587/EC of July 19, 2004). 
16 Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, Blueprint For Reform, 
Institute For International Economics (1992), page 52. It has to be added that the additional tax burden is not to 
be borne directly by the investor but only - to a lesser degree - indirectly. This would encourage the investment 
in country B since the higher taxation should have some impact on the infrastructure etc. in country B. See also 
Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, Tax Notes International, 
April 30, 1990, pages 18-49.  
17 See in this respect also Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 52. 
18 Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (257, 
258).  
   
 
The idea is that without any public interference7 capital will flow to the place where 
productivity is highest and therefore ensures efficiency in investment location 
decisions. This, in turn, has the effect of maximising global economic welfare (if the 
policy is not restricted to national neutrality). The centre of this economic principle is 
therefore the concept of efficiency. Export neutrality should in theory be achieved 
where the investor pays the same total tax8 whether he receives a given investment 
income from foreign or from domestic sources.9 Consequently, export neutrality 
implies a system of worldwide taxation plus foreign tax credit.10 CEN requires that the 
same rules are applied to measure both foreign and domestic income, by allowing 
the same investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation for foreign investment 
and domestic investment.11 It should be clear that the principle of capital export 
neutrality requires the current taxation of foreign source income received by an 
investor. The reason is very simple: the deviation from the principle of current 
taxation of foreign source income allows the deferral of such income which can have 
much the same effect as the exemption of income and therefore actually leads to a 
difference in taxation.12 However, this is only of relevance in cases where the 
subsidiary is lower taxed. I will go into more detail on the question of deferral later on.  
 
The principle of CEN and the way it is implemented in international taxation by way of 
taxing investment income according to the principle of worldwide taxation is far from 
being completely neutral. This can be illustrated by the following examples. 
Supposing an investor can earn a pre-tax return of 15 percent in its residence country 
A and the same pre-tax return in country B. In both cases an investment of 100 Euro 
results in a pre-tax return of 15 Euro. In the first alternative the residence country A 
applies a tax rate of 35 percent on the respective investment income and country B 
applies a tax rate of 20 percent. The after tax return of the investment in country A is 
therefore 9.75 percent.13  The investment in country B yields in the same after-tax 
return since the investment income would be taxed in country A according to the 
same tax principles and the same tax rate would be applied to domestic and foreign 
income, i.e. the additional tax burden of 3 Euro in country B is to be credited against 
the 5.25 Euro of country A so that the total tax burden remains 5.25 Euro.14 In this 
example, the investment decision would in general not be influenced by tax 
considerations and the allocation of capital would theoretically be efficient. That 
means if the pre-tax return in one of the two countries is higher than in the other, the 
                                            
7 This is, of course, not restricted to taxation. But tax policy is assessed isolated from a variety of other policies 
that might distort the location of investment. For example, protective tariffs, buy-national public procurement, 
and capital grants to firms can all tilt plant location decisions. Pursuant to the CEN school, these other policies 
should be corrected on their own turf (see Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of 
International Income, Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 49, 50).  
8 That means domestic plus foreign tax.  
9 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), 
pages 109, 110.  
10 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (311).  
11 Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, Blueprint For Reform, 
Institute For International Economics (1992), page 50.  
12 See in this respect also Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 57; Altshuler, Recent Developments in 
the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (258).  
13 15 Euro pre-tax result minus 5.25 Euro tax (35 percent) = 9.75 Euro.  
14 Country B receives a tax of 3 Euro (20 percent) and country A receives a tax of 2.25 Euro (5.25 Euro minus 3 
Euro tax credit).  
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capital would be invested in the country with the higher pre-tax return since the taxes 
on the investment income will not play any role in the decision.  
 
In the following, the example can be amended by exchanging the tax rates of country 
A and country B, i.e. the tax rate of country A would be 20 percent and the tax rate of 
country B 35 percent. The result is basically similar to the example above if the tax 
system of country A allows a reimbursement of the excess tax credit. This would 
mean that country A taxes the income of 15 Euro with 3 Euro (20 percent) and has to 
give a foreign tax credit (or a reimbursement) of 5.25 Euro (35 percent) if the investor 
decides to invest in country B. Overall, country A will end up with a negative amount 
of 2.25 Euro and country B with a positive amount of 5.25 Euro. This is the 
consequent application of the CEN principle and would therefore place the investor in 
a situation which is similar to what was outlined above in the first example. It is 
obvious that tax jurisdictions are often not willing to follow a tax policy which provides 
for such excess foreign tax credit or a refund of such taxes.15 Of course, this is due to 
revenue concerns which often take precedence over efficiency aspects. Moreover, 
there could be a strong temptation for country B to tax investments made by 
investors from country A more heavily since the extra burden would have to be borne 
by the tax administration of country A and not by the investor itself.16 However, 
without a full credit for taxes paid to the source country B the investor resident in 
country A will be influenced by tax considerations. If the pre-tax return of the 
investment in country A and country B is the same the investor has a strong incentive 
to invest in his home country and would be reluctant to invest in a country with a 
higher tax burden. From an efficiency perspective, too little capital will end up in high 
tax country B.17 
 
Pursuant to the proponents of the CEN principle, the allocation of capital across 
countries will not be distorted by the system described in the examples above 
provided that a full tax credit exists. However, in a model outlined by Rosanne 
Altshuler investors had to make two decisions: (1) how much to save and (2) how to 
allocate these savings across locations.18 The underlying model considers two 
countries (A and B) with different tax rates. The tax rate in country A is higher than 
the tax rate in country B. Pursuant to Altshuler, the savings decision will be 
influenced by the different tax rates. The residents of the country with the lower tax 
                                            
15 See also Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, General Report, 
IFA 2005, pages 41, 42. There are, of course, exceptions to this approach. For example, the Directive on taxation 
of savings income in the form of interest payments provides for an excess credit of withholding tax deducted by 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria. Those Member States will introduce a system of information reporting at the 
end of a transitional period, during which they will levy a withholding tax at a rate of 15 percent for the first 
three years, 20 percent for the following three years, and 35 percent thereafter. 75 percent of the withholding tax 
will be transferred to the residence state of the investor. In turn, the residence state of the investor is obliged to 
credit the withholding tax deducted in those Member States and to provide for a reimbursement of an excess 
credit (see Council Directive 2003/48/EC of June 3, 2003, and Council Decision 2004/587/EC of July 19, 2004). 
16 Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, Blueprint For Reform, 
Institute For International Economics (1992), page 52. It has to be added that the additional tax burden is not to 
be borne directly by the investor but only - to a lesser degree - indirectly. This would encourage the investment 
in country B since the higher taxation should have some impact on the infrastructure etc. in country B. See also 
Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, Tax Notes International, 
April 30, 1990, pages 18-49.  
17 See in this respect also Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 52. 
18 Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (257, 
258).  
   
 
The idea is that without any public interference7 capital will flow to the place where 
productivity is highest and therefore ensures efficiency in investment location 
decisions. This, in turn, has the effect of maximising global economic welfare (if the 
policy is not restricted to national neutrality). The centre of this economic principle is 
therefore the concept of efficiency. Export neutrality should in theory be achieved 
where the investor pays the same total tax8 whether he receives a given investment 
income from foreign or from domestic sources.9 Consequently, export neutrality 
implies a system of worldwide taxation plus foreign tax credit.10 CEN requires that the 
same rules are applied to measure both foreign and domestic income, by allowing 
the same investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation for foreign investment 
and domestic investment.11 It should be clear that the principle of capital export 
neutrality requires the current taxation of foreign source income received by an 
investor. The reason is very simple: the deviation from the principle of current 
taxation of foreign source income allows the deferral of such income which can have 
much the same effect as the exemption of income and therefore actually leads to a 
difference in taxation.12 However, this is only of relevance in cases where the 
subsidiary is lower taxed. I will go into more detail on the question of deferral later on.  
 
The principle of CEN and the way it is implemented in international taxation by way of 
taxing investment income according to the principle of worldwide taxation is far from 
being completely neutral. This can be illustrated by the following examples. 
Supposing an investor can earn a pre-tax return of 15 percent in its residence country 
A and the same pre-tax return in country B. In both cases an investment of 100 Euro 
results in a pre-tax return of 15 Euro. In the first alternative the residence country A 
applies a tax rate of 35 percent on the respective investment income and country B 
applies a tax rate of 20 percent. The after tax return of the investment in country A is 
therefore 9.75 percent.13  The investment in country B yields in the same after-tax 
return since the investment income would be taxed in country A according to the 
same tax principles and the same tax rate would be applied to domestic and foreign 
income, i.e. the additional tax burden of 3 Euro in country B is to be credited against 
the 5.25 Euro of country A so that the total tax burden remains 5.25 Euro.14 In this 
example, the investment decision would in general not be influenced by tax 
considerations and the allocation of capital would theoretically be efficient. That 
means if the pre-tax return in one of the two countries is higher than in the other, the 
                                            
7 This is, of course, not restricted to taxation. But tax policy is assessed isolated from a variety of other policies 
that might distort the location of investment. For example, protective tariffs, buy-national public procurement, 
and capital grants to firms can all tilt plant location decisions. Pursuant to the CEN school, these other policies 
should be corrected on their own turf (see Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of 
International Income, Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 49, 50).  
8 That means domestic plus foreign tax.  
9 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), 
pages 109, 110.  
10 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (311).  
11 Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, Blueprint For Reform, 
Institute For International Economics (1992), page 50.  
12 See in this respect also Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 57; Altshuler, Recent Developments in 
the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (258).  
13 15 Euro pre-tax result minus 5.25 Euro tax (35 percent) = 9.75 Euro.  
14 Country B receives a tax of 3 Euro (20 percent) and country A receives a tax of 2.25 Euro (5.25 Euro minus 3 
Euro tax credit).  
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after-tax return of the investment in country B for the resident of country A is 
therefore 7.8 Euro, whereas the investment in country A would lead to an after-tax 
return of 9.75 Euro.23 Or from another perspective: the investment in country B must 
lead to a pre-tax return of 18.75 Euro (compared to 15 Euro in country A) in order to 
end up with the same after-tax result of 9.75 Euro.24 Of course, in such a system 
there is a strong incentive to invest in the residence country. Only in cases where the 
foreign investment yields relatively higher - depending on the tax rate of the foreign 
source country - the resident investor would be willing to invest abroad.25 This 
distortion of the location decision is basically inherent. Such a policy ignores the fact 
that other countries - which are affected by such tax policy - would be likely to react 
and change their own policies, with the effect that all countries (including country A) 
would experience a loss in economic welfare.26  
 
Economic efficiency is, without any doubt to me, an aim which should be pursued on 
a global scale and not on a national scale, i.e. with the aim of maximising global 
welfare. However, it is obvious to me that in practice the aim of neutrality is difficult - 
if not impossible - to achieve.27  
 
2.3. The Economic Principle of Capital Import Neutrality 
 
The basic reasoning behind the principle of capital import neutrality (CIN) is 
competitiveness. Import neutrality means that capital funds originating from various 
countries should compete at equal terms in the capital market of any country.28 A 
company resident in a high-tax country which expands its business activities to a low-
tax country would have a real competitive disadvantage if the income received from 
these activities were taxed at the rate of the residence country. The reason is quite 
simple and can be illustrated by an example: If a resident company of country A (with 
a tax rate of 35 percent) expands its business activities to country B (with a tax rate 
of 20 percent) by incorporating a subsidiary or by creating a permanent 
establishment, the resident company of country A will have to compete with local 
firms and subsidiaries of multinational companies situated in other (third) countries. 
Supposing the foreign investment is taxed according to the principle of worldwide 
                                                                                                                                         
22 35 percent tax of the tax base of 12 Euro.  
23 15 Euro minus 5.25 Euro tax (35 percent tax in country A).  
24 18.75 Euro minus 3.75 Euro additional business expenses (20 percent tax in country B) lead to a tax base of 15 
Euro in country A and therefore to an after-tax result of 9.75 Euro.  
25 The increase in the return on investment corresponds to the tax rate of the foreign source country. 
26 Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, Tax Notes International, 
April 30, 1990, pages 18-49; Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 57. Both, Frisch and Hufbauer, call it a 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policy and according to Frisch the “rejection of national neutrality as part of a formal or 
informal cooperative outcome is likely to be the best way to maximize the U.S.’s economic interests.” Thomas 
Horst considered three categories: “capital-export neutrality”, “capital-import neutrality” and “international 
double taxation.”  The latter occurs “when both countries tax international investment income at the same rate as 
domestic investment income, but one country (e.g. the capital exporting country) allows a deduction for taxes 
paid to the other government.” (see Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment 
Income, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4 (June 1980), pages 793-798 (794). According to 
Lehner, national neutrality can now be considered  to a large extent meaningless (“mittlerweile weitgehend 
bedeutungslose National neutrality”), (see Lehner, Wettbewerb der Steuersysteme im Spiegel europäischer und 
US-amerikanischer Steuerpolitik, StuW 2/1998, page 159 et seq. (165).  
27 However, any departure from neutrality is consequently called “non-neutrality.” 
28 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (311); Richard Musgrave, Criteria For Foreign Tax Credit, Taxation and 
Operations Abroad, Symposium (1960). 
   
 
rate (country B) receive a higher after-tax return on their savings than the investors 
resident in the country with the higher tax rate (country A). As a result, the residents 
of the latter country save too little, while those in the country with lower taxation save 
too much. The savings decisions are therefore distorted and welfare would be 
increased if returns from savings were transferred from the low-tax country to the 
high-tax country. Even though the capital allocation as such is not distorted, the 
system will not be neutral if the savings decision is taken into consideration.19 In 
other words, the different tax rates in country A and B lead to distortions even if both 
countries apply a residence-based taxation.  
 
Moreover, it should be clear that even if the effect of the savings decision is put 
aside, neutrality requires - in my opinion - that the residence-based taxation is 
generally applied to all existing relationships of the respective states. Any deviation 
from the principle of CEN and the residence-based taxation should consequently 
lead to non-neutrality. The same is true for other distorting factors apart from 
taxation.20 A system can only be “neutral” or “non-neutral,” i.e. if a distorting factor 
exists, the system will be non-neutral - even where the taxation follows the principle 
of worldwide taxation. I will go into more detail below.  
  
2.2.2. National Neutrality 
 
In contrast to the aim of enhancing worldwide efficiency and therefore maximising 
global welfare, the supporters of the principle of national neutrality focus on 
maximising national welfare. In the 21st century with an ongoing economic 
globalisation it seems to me that the principle of national neutrality cannot seriously 
be considered to be an alternative to inter-national neutrality. From a tax policy point 
of view, a country following the principle of national neutrality does not credit a 
foreign tax paid on the respective income but rather allows the deduction from the 
domestic tax base. This has the effect that the foreign tax is treated in the same way 
as other business expenses. In the aforementioned first example with a tax rate of 35 
percent in country A and 20 percent in country B and a return of investment of 15 
Euro the outcome would be as follows: country A, applying the principle of national 
neutrality, taxes an amount of 12 Euro21 which results in a tax of 4.20 Euro.22 The 
                                            
19 Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (257, 
258). 
20 Pursuant to Hubbard, “(t)he theoretical model in which capital export neutrality results in worldwide 
efficiency in the allocation of capital resources is a fairly simple model. In its simplest form, savings in every 
country is in fixed supply and is not responsive to market opportunities. As a result, each dollar of foreign direct 
investment by a domestic resident results in one less dollar of domestic investment. The model makes a number 
of simplifications, but, even so, capital export neutrality leads to worldwide efficiency only if all countries follow 
a tax system imposing capital export neutrality. As noted earlier, in practice a substantial number of major 
trading partners of the United States (...) exempt active foreign source income from taxation. In such a case, an 
attempt by the United States to maintain capital export neutrality does not necessarily improve either worldwide 
efficiency or U.S. well-being. A well-know economic theorem shows that when there is more than one departure 
from economic efficiency, correcting only one of them may not be an improvement. Unilateral imposition of 
capital export neutrality by the United States may fail to advance both worldwide efficiency and U.S. well-being 
(see the Statement of R. Glenn Hubbard, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing 
on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness, June 30, 1999). The economic theorem 
mentioned by Hubbard is the general theorem in the theory of second best. The general theorem for the second 
best optimum states that if a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions is 
introduced into a general equilibrium system, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in 
general, no longer desirable (Lipsey / Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 1956, Review of 
Economic Studies, pages 11-32).  
21 15 Euro minus 3 Euro additional business expenses (20 percent tax in country B). 
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after-tax return of the investment in country B for the resident of country A is 
therefore 7.8 Euro, whereas the investment in country A would lead to an after-tax 
return of 9.75 Euro.23 Or from another perspective: the investment in country B must 
lead to a pre-tax return of 18.75 Euro (compared to 15 Euro in country A) in order to 
end up with the same after-tax result of 9.75 Euro.24 Of course, in such a system 
there is a strong incentive to invest in the residence country. Only in cases where the 
foreign investment yields relatively higher - depending on the tax rate of the foreign 
source country - the resident investor would be willing to invest abroad.25 This 
distortion of the location decision is basically inherent. Such a policy ignores the fact 
that other countries - which are affected by such tax policy - would be likely to react 
and change their own policies, with the effect that all countries (including country A) 
would experience a loss in economic welfare.26  
 
Economic efficiency is, without any doubt to me, an aim which should be pursued on 
a global scale and not on a national scale, i.e. with the aim of maximising global 
welfare. However, it is obvious to me that in practice the aim of neutrality is difficult - 
if not impossible - to achieve.27  
 
2.3. The Economic Principle of Capital Import Neutrality 
 
The basic reasoning behind the principle of capital import neutrality (CIN) is 
competitiveness. Import neutrality means that capital funds originating from various 
countries should compete at equal terms in the capital market of any country.28 A 
company resident in a high-tax country which expands its business activities to a low-
tax country would have a real competitive disadvantage if the income received from 
these activities were taxed at the rate of the residence country. The reason is quite 
simple and can be illustrated by an example: If a resident company of country A (with 
a tax rate of 35 percent) expands its business activities to country B (with a tax rate 
of 20 percent) by incorporating a subsidiary or by creating a permanent 
establishment, the resident company of country A will have to compete with local 
firms and subsidiaries of multinational companies situated in other (third) countries. 
Supposing the foreign investment is taxed according to the principle of worldwide 
                                                                                                                                         
22 35 percent tax of the tax base of 12 Euro.  
23 15 Euro minus 5.25 Euro tax (35 percent tax in country A).  
24 18.75 Euro minus 3.75 Euro additional business expenses (20 percent tax in country B) lead to a tax base of 15 
Euro in country A and therefore to an after-tax result of 9.75 Euro.  
25 The increase in the return on investment corresponds to the tax rate of the foreign source country. 
26 Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, Tax Notes International, 
April 30, 1990, pages 18-49; Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), page 57. Both, Frisch and Hufbauer, call it a 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policy and according to Frisch the “rejection of national neutrality as part of a formal or 
informal cooperative outcome is likely to be the best way to maximize the U.S.’s economic interests.” Thomas 
Horst considered three categories: “capital-export neutrality”, “capital-import neutrality” and “international 
double taxation.”  The latter occurs “when both countries tax international investment income at the same rate as 
domestic investment income, but one country (e.g. the capital exporting country) allows a deduction for taxes 
paid to the other government.” (see Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment 
Income, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 94, No. 4 (June 1980), pages 793-798 (794). According to 
Lehner, national neutrality can now be considered  to a large extent meaningless (“mittlerweile weitgehend 
bedeutungslose National neutrality”), (see Lehner, Wettbewerb der Steuersysteme im Spiegel europäischer und 
US-amerikanischer Steuerpolitik, StuW 2/1998, page 159 et seq. (165).  
27 However, any departure from neutrality is consequently called “non-neutrality.” 
28 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (311); Richard Musgrave, Criteria For Foreign Tax Credit, Taxation and 
Operations Abroad, Symposium (1960). 
   
 
rate (country B) receive a higher after-tax return on their savings than the investors 
resident in the country with the higher tax rate (country A). As a result, the residents 
of the latter country save too little, while those in the country with lower taxation save 
too much. The savings decisions are therefore distorted and welfare would be 
increased if returns from savings were transferred from the low-tax country to the 
high-tax country. Even though the capital allocation as such is not distorted, the 
system will not be neutral if the savings decision is taken into consideration.19 In 
other words, the different tax rates in country A and B lead to distortions even if both 
countries apply a residence-based taxation.  
 
Moreover, it should be clear that even if the effect of the savings decision is put 
aside, neutrality requires - in my opinion - that the residence-based taxation is 
generally applied to all existing relationships of the respective states. Any deviation 
from the principle of CEN and the residence-based taxation should consequently 
lead to non-neutrality. The same is true for other distorting factors apart from 
taxation.20 A system can only be “neutral” or “non-neutral,” i.e. if a distorting factor 
exists, the system will be non-neutral - even where the taxation follows the principle 
of worldwide taxation. I will go into more detail below.  
  
2.2.2. National Neutrality 
 
In contrast to the aim of enhancing worldwide efficiency and therefore maximising 
global welfare, the supporters of the principle of national neutrality focus on 
maximising national welfare. In the 21st century with an ongoing economic 
globalisation it seems to me that the principle of national neutrality cannot seriously 
be considered to be an alternative to inter-national neutrality. From a tax policy point 
of view, a country following the principle of national neutrality does not credit a 
foreign tax paid on the respective income but rather allows the deduction from the 
domestic tax base. This has the effect that the foreign tax is treated in the same way 
as other business expenses. In the aforementioned first example with a tax rate of 35 
percent in country A and 20 percent in country B and a return of investment of 15 
Euro the outcome would be as follows: country A, applying the principle of national 
neutrality, taxes an amount of 12 Euro21 which results in a tax of 4.20 Euro.22 The 
                                            
19 Altshuler, Recent Developments in the Debate on Deferral, Tax Notes, April 2000, page 255 et seq. (257, 
258). 
20 Pursuant to Hubbard, “(t)he theoretical model in which capital export neutrality results in worldwide 
efficiency in the allocation of capital resources is a fairly simple model. In its simplest form, savings in every 
country is in fixed supply and is not responsive to market opportunities. As a result, each dollar of foreign direct 
investment by a domestic resident results in one less dollar of domestic investment. The model makes a number 
of simplifications, but, even so, capital export neutrality leads to worldwide efficiency only if all countries follow 
a tax system imposing capital export neutrality. As noted earlier, in practice a substantial number of major 
trading partners of the United States (...) exempt active foreign source income from taxation. In such a case, an 
attempt by the United States to maintain capital export neutrality does not necessarily improve either worldwide 
efficiency or U.S. well-being. A well-know economic theorem shows that when there is more than one departure 
from economic efficiency, correcting only one of them may not be an improvement. Unilateral imposition of 
capital export neutrality by the United States may fail to advance both worldwide efficiency and U.S. well-being 
(see the Statement of R. Glenn Hubbard, Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Hearing 
on Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness, June 30, 1999). The economic theorem 
mentioned by Hubbard is the general theorem in the theory of second best. The general theorem for the second 
best optimum states that if a constraint which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian conditions is 
introduced into a general equilibrium system, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in 
general, no longer desirable (Lipsey / Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 1956, Review of 
Economic Studies, pages 11-32).  
21 15 Euro minus 3 Euro additional business expenses (20 percent tax in country B). 
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“non-neutral.”34 Even if one agrees with the argument that tax policy should be 
assessed isolated from other policies that might distort the location of investment and 
that these distortions should be corrected on their own turf,35 it cannot be ignored that 
a tax policy which follows the principle of worldwide taxation cannot be efficient if 
other distorting policies exist. Even if in such a situation the capital allocation were 
not be distorted by the tax system,36 it would be distorted by several other factors. A 
tax policy which is directed at fostering efficiency but which remains basically 
unsuccessful can have particular negative consequences if the tax policy has, at the 
same time, the effect of hampering competition of resident companies which pursue 
activities in foreign markets.37  
 
Moreover, it should be clear that any state with a low-tax system, or just a tax system 
with a lower taxation than in the residence state, will attract capital (and therefore the 
exercising of functions and the taking over of risks). Even if an international company 
refrains from investing in this particular state because of a residence-based taxation 
in the state of the headquarter company, the low-tax state will attract capital from 
other countries, especially from countries which provide for an exemption of the low-
taxed foreign income. Companies from those countries will step in and create the 
functions which could not be relocated by the companies with residence-based 
taxation. At the end, the international company will either refrain from investing in the 
foreign country completely and will exercise the functions in the headquarter country 
– with a competitive disadvantage – or will use the services provided by the 
companies which stepped in. If the international company chose the second option, 
there would not be an efficient allocation of capital but a distortion of 
competitiveness. The choice for the second option will only be made where the 
outsourcing of the respective functions (and risks) is in total more advantageous for 
the international company in comparison to the exercising of the functions by the 
headquarter company. This could be the case where the payments for the third party 
services are below the comparable costs including the appropriate risk premium for 
the respective functions. It is therefore not only the difference in direct expenses 
which can be derived directly from the profit and loss account but also the risks 
connected to those functions. Even if the third party payments are slightly higher than 
the comparable expenses, an outsourcing can be more attractive where the 
difference does not adequately cover the risk connected to those functions. This is 
especially true for functions which can be easily separated.  
 
Therefore, the tax rate can indirectly still be the decisive factor. But in comparison to 
the direct investment, the international company would have a disadvantage 
compared to those competitors who can directly take advantage of the lower taxation, 
                                            
34 See Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (313): „It is, so I understand, the basic idea of neutrality that taxes should be 
imposed in such a way that economic processes continue to operate as if no taxes at all were levied (or more 
realistically, that they are distorted as little as possible). If this understanding is correct, I cannot see how the 
concept could be divided. Neutrality applied only to certain economic processes, to a selection out of the totality, 
like capital export or import, would always be less than full neutrality; it would be non-neutral.”  See also 
Vogel, Which Method Should the European Community Adopt for the Avoidance of Double Taxation?, IBFD 
Bulletin 2002, page 4 et seq. (5): “If neutrality means the absence of all (or nearly all) external influences, the 
absence of certain influences only, while other influences are upheld, is no neutrality.” 
35 See in this respect Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 49, 50. 
36 With respect to the savings decision see above. 
37 See also The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Report and 
Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington, D.C.,(December 15, 2001), pages 12-14.  
   
 
taxation,29 a pre-tax profit of 100 Euro would be taxed in country A with a credit for 
the taxes paid in country B. This results in a total tax burden of 35 Euro (20 Euro tax 
in country B and an additional tax of 15 Euro in country A). In comparison to the local 
firms in country B and the subsidiaries of multinational companies resident in third 
countries which do not tax foreign investment according to the principle of worldwide 
taxation, the investment made by the resident company of country A has a 
competitive disadvantage of 15 Euro which equals 15 percent of the taxable profits. 
Or from another perspective: the investor resident in country A with business 
activities in country B has to earn a pre-tax profit of more than 123 Euro in order to 
end up with the same after tax result of 80 Euro.30 The tax burden can basically be 
seen as an additional cost factor of the business activity in country B. But in contrast 
to his competitors the additional tax burden is only levied on the profits of the investor 
of country A. The investor will therefore not be able to reduce the “business 
expenses” in the same way as other competitors can do and will therefore suffer a 
considerable disadvantage. Any measures directed to improve the efficiency of the 
business activities will be less effective - compared to similar measures carried out by 
his competitors. This is especially problematic where the investor does not use the 
infrastructure of country A in order to carry out the business in country B and 
consequently does not receive any corresponding advantage for the additional tax 
burden which could - at least partly - improve his position.31 The lower profit has the 
effect that the company is less attractive for (potential) investors and will therefore 
have negative consequences regarding the valuation of the company. Moreover, the 
“tax gap” cannot be used to finance new investments which would then have to be 
refinanced - more costly - by external financial means.32 
 
Looking at this simplified example, one is tempted to agree in general with the 
position of the CIN proponents. However, the question is more complicated and 
complex and the type of activity has to be verified in more detail.  
 
2.4. Capital Export Neutrality vs. Capital Import Neutrality  
 
Whether CEN or CIN should be the underlying economic principle for taxing foreign 
source income can be restricted to a large extent to the question of whether the 
concept of efficiency should prevail over the argument of competitiveness, or vice 
versa.33 However, since it is obvious that complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the 
question arises whether one should give preference to a system which in practice 
cannot lead to an efficient allocation of factors, and which will therefore always be 
                                            
29 Under the assumption that no deferral is possible for the investment made via a subsidiary in country B.  
30 A taxable profit of 123.08 Euro would trigger a tax of 43.08 Euro (35 percent) in country A and a tax of 24.62 
Euro (20 percent) in country B - which can be credited against the tax of country A. The after-tax result would 
be 80 Euro. A local firm would be able to achieve the same after tax result with a pre-tax profit of 100 Euro.  
31 Under the assumption that the level of taxation corresponds to the degree to which public goods are provided 
(see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (312); Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus Kapitalimportneutralität, 
7 Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Mainz (1983)).  
32 See in this respect also Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus Kapitalimportneutralität, 7 Aufsätze zur 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Mainz (1983), page 12.  
33 See - for example - The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Report 
and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 5: „Because the 
principles of neutrality and competitiveness conflict in a world where countries have unequal tax rates, 
policymakers must strike a balance between these principles.“  See with respect to competitiveness also Sanden, 
Taxing Foreign Source Income: A Businessman’s View, New York Tax Foundation, 1977; Stanley S. Surrey, 
Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 1956, Columbia Law Review, pages 850-853.  
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“non-neutral.”34 Even if one agrees with the argument that tax policy should be 
assessed isolated from other policies that might distort the location of investment and 
that these distortions should be corrected on their own turf,35 it cannot be ignored that 
a tax policy which follows the principle of worldwide taxation cannot be efficient if 
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not be distorted by the tax system,36 it would be distorted by several other factors. A 
tax policy which is directed at fostering efficiency but which remains basically 
unsuccessful can have particular negative consequences if the tax policy has, at the 
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the comparable expenses, an outsourcing can be more attractive where the 
difference does not adequately cover the risk connected to those functions. This is 
especially true for functions which can be easily separated.  
 
Therefore, the tax rate can indirectly still be the decisive factor. But in comparison to 
the direct investment, the international company would have a disadvantage 
compared to those competitors who can directly take advantage of the lower taxation, 
                                            
34 See Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (313): „It is, so I understand, the basic idea of neutrality that taxes should be 
imposed in such a way that economic processes continue to operate as if no taxes at all were levied (or more 
realistically, that they are distorted as little as possible). If this understanding is correct, I cannot see how the 
concept could be divided. Neutrality applied only to certain economic processes, to a selection out of the totality, 
like capital export or import, would always be less than full neutrality; it would be non-neutral.”  See also 
Vogel, Which Method Should the European Community Adopt for the Avoidance of Double Taxation?, IBFD 
Bulletin 2002, page 4 et seq. (5): “If neutrality means the absence of all (or nearly all) external influences, the 
absence of certain influences only, while other influences are upheld, is no neutrality.” 
35 See in this respect Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 49, 50. 
36 With respect to the savings decision see above. 
37 See also The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Report and 
Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington, D.C.,(December 15, 2001), pages 12-14.  
   
 
taxation,29 a pre-tax profit of 100 Euro would be taxed in country A with a credit for 
the taxes paid in country B. This results in a total tax burden of 35 Euro (20 Euro tax 
in country B and an additional tax of 15 Euro in country A). In comparison to the local 
firms in country B and the subsidiaries of multinational companies resident in third 
countries which do not tax foreign investment according to the principle of worldwide 
taxation, the investment made by the resident company of country A has a 
competitive disadvantage of 15 Euro which equals 15 percent of the taxable profits. 
Or from another perspective: the investor resident in country A with business 
activities in country B has to earn a pre-tax profit of more than 123 Euro in order to 
end up with the same after tax result of 80 Euro.30 The tax burden can basically be 
seen as an additional cost factor of the business activity in country B. But in contrast 
to his competitors the additional tax burden is only levied on the profits of the investor 
of country A. The investor will therefore not be able to reduce the “business 
expenses” in the same way as other competitors can do and will therefore suffer a 
considerable disadvantage. Any measures directed to improve the efficiency of the 
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burden which could - at least partly - improve his position.31 The lower profit has the 
effect that the company is less attractive for (potential) investors and will therefore 
have negative consequences regarding the valuation of the company. Moreover, the 
“tax gap” cannot be used to finance new investments which would then have to be 
refinanced - more costly - by external financial means.32 
 
Looking at this simplified example, one is tempted to agree in general with the 
position of the CIN proponents. However, the question is more complicated and 
complex and the type of activity has to be verified in more detail.  
 
2.4. Capital Export Neutrality vs. Capital Import Neutrality  
 
Whether CEN or CIN should be the underlying economic principle for taxing foreign 
source income can be restricted to a large extent to the question of whether the 
concept of efficiency should prevail over the argument of competitiveness, or vice 
versa.33 However, since it is obvious that complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the 
question arises whether one should give preference to a system which in practice 
cannot lead to an efficient allocation of factors, and which will therefore always be 
                                            
29 Under the assumption that no deferral is possible for the investment made via a subsidiary in country B.  
30 A taxable profit of 123.08 Euro would trigger a tax of 43.08 Euro (35 percent) in country A and a tax of 24.62 
Euro (20 percent) in country B - which can be credited against the tax of country A. The after-tax result would 
be 80 Euro. A local firm would be able to achieve the same after tax result with a pre-tax profit of 100 Euro.  
31 Under the assumption that the level of taxation corresponds to the degree to which public goods are provided 
(see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (312); Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus Kapitalimportneutralität, 
7 Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Mainz (1983)).  
32 See in this respect also Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus Kapitalimportneutralität, 7 Aufsätze zur 
Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der Universität Mainz (1983), page 12.  
33 See - for example - The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, Report 
and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 5: „Because the 
principles of neutrality and competitiveness conflict in a world where countries have unequal tax rates, 
policymakers must strike a balance between these principles.“  See with respect to competitiveness also Sanden, 
Taxing Foreign Source Income: A Businessman’s View, New York Tax Foundation, 1977; Stanley S. Surrey, 
Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 1956, Columbia Law Review, pages 850-853.  
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taxes should be paid according to the principles and the tax rates of the source 
country and not the residence country.40  
 
The distortion which is caused by the additional domestic tax burden of the parent 
company (or headquarter) on the foreign source income has to be compensated in 
one way or another. That means the parent company (or headquarter) has to level 
out a disadvantage which is clearly allocable to the foreign investment and which is 
therefore a competitive disadvantage for the activities in the respective foreign 
market. Whether the company is able to compensate the permanent disadvantage 
caused by the immediate taxation or not is a completely different question. In order to 
end up with the same after-tax result of the foreign investment, the company in theory 
has to be more successful in the respective foreign market or to accept a lower after-
tax result. However, the latter would immediately result in additional competitive 
distortions since the “profit gap” cannot be used for further investments and leads 
consequently to a lower valuation of the activities (and therefore of the company 
itself). 
 
In a study41 of the U.S. Treasury published in the year 2000 it was concluded that 
multinational competitiveness,42 i.e. the ability of U.S.-owned multinationals to 
compete with foreign-owned multinationals, is an amalgam of many factors, only a 
few of which relate to taxes. The U.S. Treasury cited the global survey of the Institute 
for Management Development of the year 2000 which studied 290 separate factors, 
14 of which related to taxes.43 The U.S. Treasury pointed out that it was questionable 
whether any single feature of a tax system is likely to have a significant effect on 
multinational competitiveness.44 Of course, competitiveness is influenced by a great 
number of factors, but in my opinion taxation is not a minor factor in this respect. In 
its Executive Opinion Survey (2003) of the World Economic Forum executives were 
                                            
40 See in this respect also The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 
Report and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 12: “While the 
competitive impact of a heavier corporate tax burden is difficult to quantify, it should be clear that a company 
that pays higher taxes suffers a disadvantage vis-a-vis its more lightly taxed competitors. That disadvantage may 
ultimately take the form of a decreased ability to engage in price competition, or to invest funds in the research 
and capital investment needed to build future profitability, or in the ability to raise capital by offering an 
attractive after-tax rate of return on investment.”  
41 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax 
Policy, Department of the Treasury (December 2000).  
42 The U.S. Treasury differentiates between trade competitiveness, standard of living competitiveness, and 
multinational competitiveness. The latter measures competitiveness by examining the ability of U.S. firms 
headquartered in the United States with production facilities abroad to compete in foreign markets with residents 
of the host country and other multinational firms based elsewhere (see The Deferral of Income Earned Through 
U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury 
(December 2000), page 55; Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Factors Affecting the International 
Competitiveness of the United States, Scheduled for Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means on 
June 4-6 and 18-20 and July 16-18, 1991, 7-8 (1991).  
43 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax 
Policy, Department of the Treasury (December 2000), page 56; International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD), 2000 World Competitiveness Yearbook. In its 2004 Yearbook IMD defined even 323 
criteria to measure competitiveness. The rankings of competitiveness criteria was as follows: economic 
performance (83 criteria), government efficiency (77 criteria), business efficiency (69 criteria), and infrastructure 
(94 criteria).  
44 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax 
Policy, Department of the Treasury (December 2000), page 56. 
   
 
i.e. who are currently not taxed according to a residence-based taxation. Thus, in a 
world where tax rates differ considerably from country to country a residence-based 
taxation cannot be expected to lead to an efficient allocation of capital. Especially 
where the difference in tax rates is high, it can be assumed that the tax advantage 
will find its way - directly or indirectly - to a potential investor.  
 
On the other hand, even though the principle of CIN fosters competitiveness it is not 
self-evident that this is equally relevant for all kinds of investment in the foreign 
market. It is therefore necessary to have a closer look at the argument of 
competitiveness and to verify foreign direct investments separately from foreign 
portfolio investments and other types of investment.  
 
2.4.1. Direct Investments  
 
As already outlined above, the argument of competitiveness plays a significant role in 
the context of foreign direct investments. Foreign direct investment is considered to 
be an entrepreneurial activity in another country which is not only temporary or just a 
transient activity. Mere sales activities or the provision of services without a transfer 
of capital factors with a certain duration cannot be considered a direct investment in 
the foreign country. In such a case the foreign country simply provides a market for 
carrying out the activities but it does not lead to a capital transfer.38 The legal form of 
the investment is not decisive, i.e. it can be an entrepreneurial activity in the form of a 
legal entity (subsidiary) or a branch (which is then typically described to be a 
permanent establishment).  
 
It seems to be clear that such foreign direct investment can only be successful in the 
foreign market if the cost structure - including taxes - is comparable to those of the 
local competitors, irrespective whether the competitors are local firms or subsidiaries 
and permanent establishments of other multinational companies headquartered 
elsewhere. Any deviation from the comparable cost structure which does not result in 
a corresponding advantage affects the competitiveness of the investing company in 
the respective market. Taxes which are levied by the residence country of the parent 
company based on the profits of the foreign subsidiary or permanent establishment 
are typically not compensated by a corresponding advantage since the subsidiary or 
permanent establishment (in a typical case) does not take advantage of the 
infrastructure or other possible benefits of the parent companies residence country. If 
it is true that the level of taxation in any country is likely to correspond to the degree 
to which public goods and services are provided,39 the parent company – together 
with the subsidiary or permanent establishment – will theoretically pay (indirectly) for 
goods and services which were never provided. It is therefore rather obvious that 
                                            
38 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (315).  
39 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (312); Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus 
Kapitalimportneutralität, 7 Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der 
Universität Mainz (1983). Even though there probably always exists - at least to a certain degree - an 
“unproductive” or “wasteful” spending which can lead to an imbalance of taxes and corresponding public goods 
and services (see for possibilities to measure the “wasteful” spending in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2003) of the World Economic Forum, Chapter 1.1., The Growth Competitiveness Index: Analyzing Key 
Underpinnings of Sustained Economic Growth, page 6 et seq.).   
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end up with the same after-tax result of the foreign investment, the company in theory 
has to be more successful in the respective foreign market or to accept a lower after-
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14 of which related to taxes.43 The U.S. Treasury pointed out that it was questionable 
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number of factors, but in my opinion taxation is not a minor factor in this respect. In 
its Executive Opinion Survey (2003) of the World Economic Forum executives were 
                                            
40 See in this respect also The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 
Report and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 12: “While the 
competitive impact of a heavier corporate tax burden is difficult to quantify, it should be clear that a company 
that pays higher taxes suffers a disadvantage vis-a-vis its more lightly taxed competitors. That disadvantage may 
ultimately take the form of a decreased ability to engage in price competition, or to invest funds in the research 
and capital investment needed to build future profitability, or in the ability to raise capital by offering an 
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43 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax 
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44 The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations, A Policy Study, Office of Tax 
Policy, Department of the Treasury (December 2000), page 56. 
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world where tax rates differ considerably from country to country a residence-based 
taxation cannot be expected to lead to an efficient allocation of capital. Especially 
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of capital factors with a certain duration cannot be considered a direct investment in 
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the investment is not decisive, i.e. it can be an entrepreneurial activity in the form of a 
legal entity (subsidiary) or a branch (which is then typically described to be a 
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It seems to be clear that such foreign direct investment can only be successful in the 
foreign market if the cost structure - including taxes - is comparable to those of the 
local competitors, irrespective whether the competitors are local firms or subsidiaries 
and permanent establishments of other multinational companies headquartered 
elsewhere. Any deviation from the comparable cost structure which does not result in 
a corresponding advantage affects the competitiveness of the investing company in 
the respective market. Taxes which are levied by the residence country of the parent 
company based on the profits of the foreign subsidiary or permanent establishment 
are typically not compensated by a corresponding advantage since the subsidiary or 
permanent establishment (in a typical case) does not take advantage of the 
infrastructure or other possible benefits of the parent companies residence country. If 
it is true that the level of taxation in any country is likely to correspond to the degree 
to which public goods and services are provided,39 the parent company – together 
with the subsidiary or permanent establishment – will theoretically pay (indirectly) for 
goods and services which were never provided. It is therefore rather obvious that 
                                            
38 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (315).  
39 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (312); Gandenberger, Kapitalexportneutralität versus 
Kapitalimportneutralität, 7 Aufsätze zur Wirtschaftspolitik, Forschungsinstitut für Wirtschaftspolitik an der 
Universität Mainz (1983). Even though there probably always exists - at least to a certain degree - an 
“unproductive” or “wasteful” spending which can lead to an imbalance of taxes and corresponding public goods 
and services (see for possibilities to measure the “wasteful” spending in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(2003) of the World Economic Forum, Chapter 1.1., The Growth Competitiveness Index: Analyzing Key 
Underpinnings of Sustained Economic Growth, page 6 et seq.).   
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and subsidiaries of multinational companies located elsewhere. Deferral is therefore 
commonly used and recognised as a way to foster competitiveness. The result is the 
elimination of the (potential) additional tax burden - at least in the first step49 - and to 
create equal conditions from a tax point of view. In such an environment the 
improvement of competitiveness is no longer hampered by differences in taxation 
between the country of source and the country of residence.   
 
2.4.2. Portfolio Investments  
 
Foreign portfolio investment is an investment which is made without establishing an 
enterprise. Such an investment can be made by granting a loan to a foreign company 
or by acquiring a share of equity capital in a foreign company.50 The portfolio investor 
does not benefit directly from the public goods and services supplied by the country 
in which the investment was made but only indirectly through the payment of portfolio 
dividends and the interest receipts. In case of a portfolio loan it is important to 
consider the position of the debtor, since the debtor - in the same way as the 
subsidiary and the permanent establishment outlined above - has to compete on the 
foreign market, is the direct recipient of public goods and services, and has to pay 
taxes according to the level of the foreign country. Neutrality with respect to a 
portfolio loan can therefore only be achieved if taxation does not change the market 
conditions subject to which the debtor’s enterprise operates.51 However, the market 
conditions can in theory be influenced by the taxes imposed on the interest income 
received by the creditor in the residence country. For example, this could be the case 
where the great majority of capital exporting countries imposes a higher tax on the 
interest income received by the portfolio investors (i.e. where the portfolio investors 
are taxed according to the principle of worldwide taxation). The part of the tax 
increase which could theoretically be shifted to the debtor52 by increasing the interest 
rates depends first of all on the functioning of the capital markets. If there is a 
sufficient number of investors available (from other - lower taxed - countries) which 
step in when the high tax investors step out (or as soon as the interest rates start to 
increase), nothing or only a small part of the tax increase will be shifted to the debtor. 
If this is not the case, i.e. where the majority of investors is affected by the tax 
increase, a substantial part of the tax increase will have to be borne by the debtor. 
Since the creditor states are often high tax countries which apply a system of 
residence-based taxation, it can be assumed that a considerable part of the tax on 
portfolio interest is passed on to the debtor.53 Pursuant to Vogel, the shifting will be 
even more important to the extent to which interest includes a premium for an 
unusual risk in certain countries.54 Since the investor will only invest in the particular 
country if the additional risk is compensated by the risk premium, this requires 
                                            
49 Depending on the respective tax system the subsequent distribution can be taxable in the residence state of the 
shareholder. This will be discussed later on in more detail.  
50 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (315). According to Vogel the better term would be “non-entrepreneurial 
investment.”  
51 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of 
Models, page 79.  
52 In order to receive the same after-tax return before and after the tax increase.  
53 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of 
Models, page 79. 
54 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316).  
   
 
asked to select the five most problematic factors - from a list of 14 factors45 - for 
doing business in their country and to rank them. Respondents of the top-four 
ranking countries of the Growth Competitiveness Index46 considered tax rates or tax 
regulations to be by far the most problematic factors for doing business.47 Surely, in 
lower ranking countries other problems gain more significance, but it shows that in a 
highly competitive environment taxation is considered to be of great importance.48 
 
Moreover, there is one very important distinction which has to be made between the 
argument of competitiveness and the concept of efficiency. The distortion caused by 
the current taxation of foreign source income will always have a negative effect on 
competitiveness. The company is always forced to balance out the negative impact 
caused by the immediate (additional) taxation. Even if the company is able to 
compensate the impact completely, it will still hamper the activities since it will lead to 
a lower after-tax result (even for the most successful companies the additional 
taxation remains a kind of “cost factor”). On the other hand, the efficient allocation of 
capital is distorted by several other factors and the investor will take all distorting 
effects into consideration in his decision where to invest. Even in an unrealistic case 
where the tax policy will not cause any distortion, it will be caused by other policies 
and the capital will flow to the place where it is most advantageous for the investor 
(which will not necessarily be the most productive place). The result of all distorting 
factors will be decisive and not each of the separate factors by itself. In a world of 
globalisation and a world of different tax rates and tax systems it seems to me that 
the creation of an environment which fosters competitiveness, i.e. a tax policy which 
allows companies to compete on equal terms in a respective market, would probably 
be the best and most realistic way to maximise global welfare. In other words: in a 
world where complete neutrality cannot be achieved the aim should be to foster 
competitiveness.  
 
This can be done - and is most often done - by exempting the profit of a foreign 
permanent establishment from taxation in the headquarter country and by allowing 
the deferral of income of a foreign subsidiary, which can basically have the effect of 
an exemption of the residence country taxation. Irrespective of the way how the 
residence country taxes a subsequent profit distribution, it is - from the perspective of 
competitiveness - important to open the possibility for the re-investment of funds 
which are taxed on the level of the subsidiary in the same way as other local firms 
                                            
45 The 14 factors were tax rates, tax regulations, restrictive labour regulations, inefficient bureaucracy, access to 
financing, poor work ethic, policy instability, inadequately educated workforce, foreign currency regulations, 
inadequate infrastructure, inflation, crime and theft, corruption, government instability/coups.  
46 Order of the Growth Competitiveness Index rankings (2003 top-four ranking countries): Finland (1), the 
United States (2), Sweden (3), Denmark (4) (Source: World Economic Forum).  
47 The respondents in the top-ranking country Finland considered tax rates with more than 30 percent of 
responses to be the most problematic factor for doing business, followed by restrictive labour regulations (2), tax 
regulations (3), inefficient bureaucracy (4) and access to financing (5). In the United States, tax regulations were 
considered to be the most problematic factor, directly followed by inefficient bureaucracy (2), restrictive labour 
regulations (3), tax rates (4) and policy instability (5). In Sweden, tax rates (1) and tax regulations (2) together 
accounted for more than 40 percent of the responses, followed by restrictive labour regulations (3), inefficient 
bureaucracy (4), access to financing (5) and policy instability (6). In Denmark, tax rates (1) and tax regulations 
(2) accounted together for significantly more than 50 percent of the responses and were therefore considered 
clearly to be the most problematic factors for doing business. They were followed by access to financing (3), 
inadequately educated workforce (4), restrictive labour regulations (5) and inefficient bureaucracy (6) (Source: 
World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2003)).  
48 In Taiwan (no. 5) policy instability and government instability are considered the most problematic factors for 
doing business. 
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and subsidiaries of multinational companies located elsewhere. Deferral is therefore 
commonly used and recognised as a way to foster competitiveness. The result is the 
elimination of the (potential) additional tax burden - at least in the first step49 - and to 
create equal conditions from a tax point of view. In such an environment the 
improvement of competitiveness is no longer hampered by differences in taxation 
between the country of source and the country of residence.   
 
2.4.2. Portfolio Investments  
 
Foreign portfolio investment is an investment which is made without establishing an 
enterprise. Such an investment can be made by granting a loan to a foreign company 
or by acquiring a share of equity capital in a foreign company.50 The portfolio investor 
does not benefit directly from the public goods and services supplied by the country 
in which the investment was made but only indirectly through the payment of portfolio 
dividends and the interest receipts. In case of a portfolio loan it is important to 
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foreign market, is the direct recipient of public goods and services, and has to pay 
taxes according to the level of the foreign country. Neutrality with respect to a 
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increase, a substantial part of the tax increase will have to be borne by the debtor. 
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residence-based taxation, it can be assumed that a considerable part of the tax on 
portfolio interest is passed on to the debtor.53 Pursuant to Vogel, the shifting will be 
even more important to the extent to which interest includes a premium for an 
unusual risk in certain countries.54 Since the investor will only invest in the particular 
country if the additional risk is compensated by the risk premium, this requires 
                                            
49 Depending on the respective tax system the subsequent distribution can be taxable in the residence state of the 
shareholder. This will be discussed later on in more detail.  
50 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (315). According to Vogel the better term would be “non-entrepreneurial 
investment.”  
51 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of 
Models, page 79.  
52 In order to receive the same after-tax return before and after the tax increase.  
53 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of 
Models, page 79. 
54 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (316).  
   
 
asked to select the five most problematic factors - from a list of 14 factors45 - for 
doing business in their country and to rank them. Respondents of the top-four 
ranking countries of the Growth Competitiveness Index46 considered tax rates or tax 
regulations to be by far the most problematic factors for doing business.47 Surely, in 
lower ranking countries other problems gain more significance, but it shows that in a 
highly competitive environment taxation is considered to be of great importance.48 
 
Moreover, there is one very important distinction which has to be made between the 
argument of competitiveness and the concept of efficiency. The distortion caused by 
the current taxation of foreign source income will always have a negative effect on 
competitiveness. The company is always forced to balance out the negative impact 
caused by the immediate (additional) taxation. Even if the company is able to 
compensate the impact completely, it will still hamper the activities since it will lead to 
a lower after-tax result (even for the most successful companies the additional 
taxation remains a kind of “cost factor”). On the other hand, the efficient allocation of 
capital is distorted by several other factors and the investor will take all distorting 
effects into consideration in his decision where to invest. Even in an unrealistic case 
where the tax policy will not cause any distortion, it will be caused by other policies 
and the capital will flow to the place where it is most advantageous for the investor 
(which will not necessarily be the most productive place). The result of all distorting 
factors will be decisive and not each of the separate factors by itself. In a world of 
globalisation and a world of different tax rates and tax systems it seems to me that 
the creation of an environment which fosters competitiveness, i.e. a tax policy which 
allows companies to compete on equal terms in a respective market, would probably 
be the best and most realistic way to maximise global welfare. In other words: in a 
world where complete neutrality cannot be achieved the aim should be to foster 
competitiveness.  
 
This can be done - and is most often done - by exempting the profit of a foreign 
permanent establishment from taxation in the headquarter country and by allowing 
the deferral of income of a foreign subsidiary, which can basically have the effect of 
an exemption of the residence country taxation. Irrespective of the way how the 
residence country taxes a subsequent profit distribution, it is - from the perspective of 
competitiveness - important to open the possibility for the re-investment of funds 
which are taxed on the level of the subsidiary in the same way as other local firms 
                                            
45 The 14 factors were tax rates, tax regulations, restrictive labour regulations, inefficient bureaucracy, access to 
financing, poor work ethic, policy instability, inadequately educated workforce, foreign currency regulations, 
inadequate infrastructure, inflation, crime and theft, corruption, government instability/coups.  
46 Order of the Growth Competitiveness Index rankings (2003 top-four ranking countries): Finland (1), the 
United States (2), Sweden (3), Denmark (4) (Source: World Economic Forum).  
47 The respondents in the top-ranking country Finland considered tax rates with more than 30 percent of 
responses to be the most problematic factor for doing business, followed by restrictive labour regulations (2), tax 
regulations (3), inefficient bureaucracy (4) and access to financing (5). In the United States, tax regulations were 
considered to be the most problematic factor, directly followed by inefficient bureaucracy (2), restrictive labour 
regulations (3), tax rates (4) and policy instability (5). In Sweden, tax rates (1) and tax regulations (2) together 
accounted for more than 40 percent of the responses, followed by restrictive labour regulations (3), inefficient 
bureaucracy (4), access to financing (5) and policy instability (6). In Denmark, tax rates (1) and tax regulations 
(2) accounted together for significantly more than 50 percent of the responses and were therefore considered 
clearly to be the most problematic factors for doing business. They were followed by access to financing (3), 
inadequately educated workforce (4), restrictive labour regulations (5) and inefficient bureaucracy (6) (Source: 
World Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey (2003)).  




   
 
based taxation would avoid the aforementioned distortions. There would be no 
different treatment in the state of residence. However, as long as the residence state 
of the investor follows a residence-based taxation with exceptions for certain 
institutional investors, an increase in the income taxation in the source country would 
have an impact on the investment decision of those investors. Similar aspects apply 
to the situation where a tax loss carry forward is available to a substantial number of 
investors. As long as positive foreign income can be offset against this tax loss carry 
forward, the decision where to invest is influenced by the tax rate in the foreign 
country. Again, an approach which strictly focuses on a source-based taxation would 
lead to a different outcome. 
 
What is outlined above with respect to the portfolio investment in bonds is in general 
also true for portfolio investments in share capital. If the portfolio investment in share 
capital becomes less attractive, the raising of share capital as well as the debt 
financing will be influenced negatively. That means, companies operating in the 
foreign market will not only have to pay a higher interest rate for loan amounts but will 
also receive less amounts of capital for the issuing of new shares.  
 
Therefore, the residence-based taxation and the source-based taxation can both 
influence the market conditions in the country where the debtor carries out his 
activities. However, given the fact that creditor states are often high tax states, the 
distortions caused by the residence-based taxation will most certainly be greater than 
those caused by the source-based taxation. From a competitiveness point of view the 
changing of market conditions in the debtors’ country caused by the distortions 
outlined above will most certainly have a different impact on equity investments 
compared to financing activities and the investment in bonds. The overall impact on 
competitiveness will also depend upon whether the company is part of an 
international group located outside of the respective market and the dependence on 
external financing compared to internal financing. It can therefore be concluded that 
a residence-based taxation of portfolio investments has a negative impact on 
competitiveness and that a source-based taxation is in general to be preferred.   
 
2.4.3. Investments in Tangible and Intangible Property 
 
The consideration paid for the use of tangible and intangible property (and therefore 
the income derived from the exploitation of the tangible and intangible property) has 
to be subdivided since it contains elements which have to be treated differently. It is 
therefore convincing to separate leasing and royalty payments for the use of tangible 
and intangible property into four different parts: a compensation for write-offs of the 
property concerned, a compensation for maintaining the property, a compensation for 
bearing the risks, and an interest component.58 The whole transaction could be 
compared with a purchase of tangible or intangible property which is financed by loan 
amounts. In such a case the source of the income earned by the seller is in the 
country where the economic activity is carried out by the seller (and producer).59 The 
purchaser, on the other hand, has to bear the consideration for the maintenance and 
the risk related to the property which also encompasses the decrease in value over 
                                            
58 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 82. See also Vogel who 
subdivides the payments into three parts since he considers the compensation for maintaining the property and 
for bearing the risk to be one single part (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and 
Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (318). 
59 In case the seller and the producer are different companies (and countries) it would have to be split up.  
   
 
theoretically that the tax on the risk premium is passed on to the debtor (or at least 
most of the tax). If this is not possible, the investor will choose an alternative 
investment where the after-tax risk premium is fully equivalent to the additional risk or 
where it is almost a full net-compensation.55 The residence-based taxation of portfolio 
interest income can therefore not be considered neutral where the tax on risk 
premiums is shifted to the debtor and where the capital markets are dominated by 
high tax countries. It could be neutral where the residence-based taxation is limited to 
a risk-free yield, i.e. where the risk premium is not included in the tax base, and 
where at the same time sufficient loan capital is available from countries which do not 
tax on a worldwide basis.56 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that a source-based taxation is without any 
influence on the market conditions of the debtor. One should be aware of the fact that 
portfolio investments are to a significant extent made by institutional investors which 
are often subject to special tax treatment in their residence country, e.g. pension 
funds and life insurance companies. It is not the insurance company as such which is 
treated differently but the receipts of the special business property held by the 
insurance companies and which is related to – for example - life assurance contracts. 
Another important group are companies with tax loss carry forwards. This can be an 
especially important factor in economically difficult times. All of these investors would 
prefer a residence-based taxation since the income is either exempt from taxation, 
lower taxed, or – in the latter case – can be offset against an existing tax loss carry 
forward.57 This has a much greater effect on portfolio investments compared to direct 
investments. The latter investments are typically based on entrepreneurial and 
strategic decisions with a certain permanence. However, an investment company 
would replace a publicly listed corporate bond immediately if – for whatever reason – 
the investment became unfavourable compared to a corporate bond of another 
company with a comparable rating in another country. For example, if certain 
corporate bonds in country A - within a certain rating category - yield an interest rate 
of 7 percent and country A decides to introduce a tax of 25 percent on interest 
income of foreigners, this would have an immediate effect on the aforementioned 
investors. Those investors would only invest in corporate bonds in country A if the 
interest rate went up to 9.33 percent, which would then lead to an after-tax return of 7 
percent. Alternatively, they would concentrate on comparable bonds in other 
countries. The source-based taxation would therefore change the market conditions 
in country A if foreign investors who benefit from a special tax treatment played such 
an important role. Of course, in the aforementioned example it is the combination of 
specific tax rules in the residence-country together with the source-country taxation 
which can lead to a distortion. From a theoretical point of view, the question could be 
raised whether those institutional investors should be treated differently from any 
other investors in the state of residence. And in fact, a strict limitation to a source-
                                            
55 In my opinion, the investor will not in all cases claim an after-tax risk premium which is a full equivalent of 
the additional risk. For example, a high-risk junk bond investor considers the possibility that the bond will not be 
repaid by the company. If the investor has the possibility to deduct the complete loss of the investment and to 
offset the loss with other positive income in the residence country he will not necessarily require a full risk 
compensation since the losses will be shared with the residence state. That means the taxes paid on the risk 
premium which cannot be shifted to the debtor can be considered a kind of loss compensation insurance (paid to 
the tax authorities of the residence country).  
56 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (317).  
57 See in this respect Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 65, 66.  
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based taxation would avoid the aforementioned distortions. There would be no 
different treatment in the state of residence. However, as long as the residence state 
of the investor follows a residence-based taxation with exceptions for certain 
institutional investors, an increase in the income taxation in the source country would 
have an impact on the investment decision of those investors. Similar aspects apply 
to the situation where a tax loss carry forward is available to a substantial number of 
investors. As long as positive foreign income can be offset against this tax loss carry 
forward, the decision where to invest is influenced by the tax rate in the foreign 
country. Again, an approach which strictly focuses on a source-based taxation would 
lead to a different outcome. 
 
What is outlined above with respect to the portfolio investment in bonds is in general 
also true for portfolio investments in share capital. If the portfolio investment in share 
capital becomes less attractive, the raising of share capital as well as the debt 
financing will be influenced negatively. That means, companies operating in the 
foreign market will not only have to pay a higher interest rate for loan amounts but will 
also receive less amounts of capital for the issuing of new shares.  
 
Therefore, the residence-based taxation and the source-based taxation can both 
influence the market conditions in the country where the debtor carries out his 
activities. However, given the fact that creditor states are often high tax states, the 
distortions caused by the residence-based taxation will most certainly be greater than 
those caused by the source-based taxation. From a competitiveness point of view the 
changing of market conditions in the debtors’ country caused by the distortions 
outlined above will most certainly have a different impact on equity investments 
compared to financing activities and the investment in bonds. The overall impact on 
competitiveness will also depend upon whether the company is part of an 
international group located outside of the respective market and the dependence on 
external financing compared to internal financing. It can therefore be concluded that 
a residence-based taxation of portfolio investments has a negative impact on 
competitiveness and that a source-based taxation is in general to be preferred.   
 
2.4.3. Investments in Tangible and Intangible Property 
 
The consideration paid for the use of tangible and intangible property (and therefore 
the income derived from the exploitation of the tangible and intangible property) has 
to be subdivided since it contains elements which have to be treated differently. It is 
therefore convincing to separate leasing and royalty payments for the use of tangible 
and intangible property into four different parts: a compensation for write-offs of the 
property concerned, a compensation for maintaining the property, a compensation for 
bearing the risks, and an interest component.58 The whole transaction could be 
compared with a purchase of tangible or intangible property which is financed by loan 
amounts. In such a case the source of the income earned by the seller is in the 
country where the economic activity is carried out by the seller (and producer).59 The 
purchaser, on the other hand, has to bear the consideration for the maintenance and 
the risk related to the property which also encompasses the decrease in value over 
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theoretically that the tax on the risk premium is passed on to the debtor (or at least 
most of the tax). If this is not possible, the investor will choose an alternative 
investment where the after-tax risk premium is fully equivalent to the additional risk or 
where it is almost a full net-compensation.55 The residence-based taxation of portfolio 
interest income can therefore not be considered neutral where the tax on risk 
premiums is shifted to the debtor and where the capital markets are dominated by 
high tax countries. It could be neutral where the residence-based taxation is limited to 
a risk-free yield, i.e. where the risk premium is not included in the tax base, and 
where at the same time sufficient loan capital is available from countries which do not 
tax on a worldwide basis.56 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that a source-based taxation is without any 
influence on the market conditions of the debtor. One should be aware of the fact that 
portfolio investments are to a significant extent made by institutional investors which 
are often subject to special tax treatment in their residence country, e.g. pension 
funds and life insurance companies. It is not the insurance company as such which is 
treated differently but the receipts of the special business property held by the 
insurance companies and which is related to – for example - life assurance contracts. 
Another important group are companies with tax loss carry forwards. This can be an 
especially important factor in economically difficult times. All of these investors would 
prefer a residence-based taxation since the income is either exempt from taxation, 
lower taxed, or – in the latter case – can be offset against an existing tax loss carry 
forward.57 This has a much greater effect on portfolio investments compared to direct 
investments. The latter investments are typically based on entrepreneurial and 
strategic decisions with a certain permanence. However, an investment company 
would replace a publicly listed corporate bond immediately if – for whatever reason – 
the investment became unfavourable compared to a corporate bond of another 
company with a comparable rating in another country. For example, if certain 
corporate bonds in country A - within a certain rating category - yield an interest rate 
of 7 percent and country A decides to introduce a tax of 25 percent on interest 
income of foreigners, this would have an immediate effect on the aforementioned 
investors. Those investors would only invest in corporate bonds in country A if the 
interest rate went up to 9.33 percent, which would then lead to an after-tax return of 7 
percent. Alternatively, they would concentrate on comparable bonds in other 
countries. The source-based taxation would therefore change the market conditions 
in country A if foreign investors who benefit from a special tax treatment played such 
an important role. Of course, in the aforementioned example it is the combination of 
specific tax rules in the residence-country together with the source-country taxation 
which can lead to a distortion. From a theoretical point of view, the question could be 
raised whether those institutional investors should be treated differently from any 
other investors in the state of residence. And in fact, a strict limitation to a source-
                                            
55 In my opinion, the investor will not in all cases claim an after-tax risk premium which is a full equivalent of 
the additional risk. For example, a high-risk junk bond investor considers the possibility that the bond will not be 
repaid by the company. If the investor has the possibility to deduct the complete loss of the investment and to 
offset the loss with other positive income in the residence country he will not necessarily require a full risk 
compensation since the losses will be shared with the residence state. That means the taxes paid on the risk 
premium which cannot be shifted to the debtor can be considered a kind of loss compensation insurance (paid to 
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56 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (317).  
57 See in this respect Hufbauer, assisted by Joanna M. van Rooij, U.S. Taxation of International Income, 
Blueprint For Reform, Institute For International Economics (1992), pages 65, 66.  
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However, the situation here is a bit more complex than the situation described earlier 
with respect to direct investments. It is not only the direct competition of one service 
centre with another service centre but it is the competition of functions and therefore 
cost factors. Whereas in the simple example of a direct investment in a foreign 
market the requirement to provide for equal conditions is fulfilled by exempting the 
foreign income from domestic taxation (or to allow the deferral of income of a foreign 
subsidiary), the scope now has to be widened and is not limited to a certain market. It 
is more or less the competition between multinational companies as a whole. For 
example, if a parent company in country A with subsidiaries in countries B, C and D 
establishes a group service centre in country E (which provides services to the group 
companies A, B, C and D), it is, of course, relevant from a competitiveness point of 
view whether the profit of the foreign service centre is currently taxed in country A or 
not - compared to a parent company in country F with subsidiaries in countries B, C 
and D and a comparable group service centre in country E which is not currently 
taxed. In this example, the multinational company in country A would not be able to 
benefit in the same way from relocation or centralisation of functions as the 
multinational company in country F. The question arises whether there is an 
economic “justification” for a different treatment compared to the direct investment 
outlined above. One reason could be that the argument of competitiveness does not 
play an equally important role. I do not think that this is the case. The existing 
possibilities to transfer functions to group companies in other countries definitely lead 
to a competition of cost factors. The immediate taxation by the residence country of 
profits derived by the business units abroad would increase the costs related to these 
functions and therefore make the group as such less competitive. Similar to what was 
said with respect to the direct investment, it is important to provide for equal 
conditions instead of artificially distorting the activities. Of course, the service centre 
in the example often does not provide services to customers in the market where the 
company is established. But this is rather typical when functions are allocated to a 
place where it is most advantageous from a group perspective and several other 
international group companies take advantage of the services. There is no 
convincing argument to allow the distortion of competitiveness just because of the 
fact that a group of companies structures its activities by “international function 
allocation,” with the consequence that the service provider and the recipient of the 
services are typically related parties. It is therefore important to recognise that a 
company must be able to freely decide - without any restrictions - to transfer 
 
















   
 
the economic lifetime of the property. Clearly, the source of the latter components 
would be the place where the purchaser exercises his activities. In contrast, if the 
property is leased out, the maintenance risk and the risk related to the property - 
together with the economic depreciation of the property - will have to be borne by the 
lessor. Therefore, the income has to be split up and the aforementioned components 
are allocable to the place of the economic activity of the lessor. For the interest 
component, however, the same principles apply which were already outlined above 
with respect to portfolio investments, i.e. the interest payment should be taxed in the 
source country, which is the country where the lessee carries out his income-
producing activities.  
 
2.4.4. Hybrid Investments  
 
With the ongoing globalisation and the disappearance of cross-border restrictions it 
becomes much easier for companies to invest abroad. One of the best examples is 
certainly the development within the European Union and the abolition of all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The 
unrestricted access to other markets and the possibility of an unhindered 
establishment of companies in other Member States will increase the number of 
cross-border activities. Even medium-sized companies are able - and perhaps even 
forced - to invest in other countries. The typical multinational company of the past - 
most often huge international groups and conglomerates - will be accompanied by 
medium-sized companies with activities throughout the European Union and other 
parts of the world. However, it is not only the typical direct investment which is 
described above, i.e. a foreign investment in order to expand the existing activities to 
a new market, but also the relocation of existing activities and the separation of 
business activities. It is much easier for companies to allocate business functions to 
other countries in order to achieve the most favourable result. Again, the decision for 
any relocation will be made by considering all factors relevant to business - most 
often cost factors. For example, the decision to establish a group service centre in 
another country will certainly be influenced by several aspects. Labour costs can play 
a role as well as legal aspects, office rents and other related expenses, and perhaps 
also language skills of the respective employees. Due to the difference in tax rates 
and tax systems, the total tax burden can be of importance for such a decision, too.60 
The typical structure in which a parent company provides headquarter-functions to 
subsidiary companies will certainly be replaced more and more by service and 











                                            
60 However, see - for example - The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st 
Century, Report and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 7: “(...) 
the basic suggestion that tax motives are what drive U.S.-based companies into the international marketplace is 
seriously antiquated in the context of the global economy.”  
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However, the situation here is a bit more complex than the situation described earlier 
with respect to direct investments. It is not only the direct competition of one service 
centre with another service centre but it is the competition of functions and therefore 
cost factors. Whereas in the simple example of a direct investment in a foreign 
market the requirement to provide for equal conditions is fulfilled by exempting the 
foreign income from domestic taxation (or to allow the deferral of income of a foreign 
subsidiary), the scope now has to be widened and is not limited to a certain market. It 
is more or less the competition between multinational companies as a whole. For 
example, if a parent company in country A with subsidiaries in countries B, C and D 
establishes a group service centre in country E (which provides services to the group 
companies A, B, C and D), it is, of course, relevant from a competitiveness point of 
view whether the profit of the foreign service centre is currently taxed in country A or 
not - compared to a parent company in country F with subsidiaries in countries B, C 
and D and a comparable group service centre in country E which is not currently 
taxed. In this example, the multinational company in country A would not be able to 
benefit in the same way from relocation or centralisation of functions as the 
multinational company in country F. The question arises whether there is an 
economic “justification” for a different treatment compared to the direct investment 
outlined above. One reason could be that the argument of competitiveness does not 
play an equally important role. I do not think that this is the case. The existing 
possibilities to transfer functions to group companies in other countries definitely lead 
to a competition of cost factors. The immediate taxation by the residence country of 
profits derived by the business units abroad would increase the costs related to these 
functions and therefore make the group as such less competitive. Similar to what was 
said with respect to the direct investment, it is important to provide for equal 
conditions instead of artificially distorting the activities. Of course, the service centre 
in the example often does not provide services to customers in the market where the 
company is established. But this is rather typical when functions are allocated to a 
place where it is most advantageous from a group perspective and several other 
international group companies take advantage of the services. There is no 
convincing argument to allow the distortion of competitiveness just because of the 
fact that a group of companies structures its activities by “international function 
allocation,” with the consequence that the service provider and the recipient of the 
services are typically related parties. It is therefore important to recognise that a 
company must be able to freely decide - without any restrictions - to transfer 
 
















   
 
the economic lifetime of the property. Clearly, the source of the latter components 
would be the place where the purchaser exercises his activities. In contrast, if the 
property is leased out, the maintenance risk and the risk related to the property - 
together with the economic depreciation of the property - will have to be borne by the 
lessor. Therefore, the income has to be split up and the aforementioned components 
are allocable to the place of the economic activity of the lessor. For the interest 
component, however, the same principles apply which were already outlined above 
with respect to portfolio investments, i.e. the interest payment should be taxed in the 
source country, which is the country where the lessee carries out his income-
producing activities.  
 
2.4.4. Hybrid Investments  
 
With the ongoing globalisation and the disappearance of cross-border restrictions it 
becomes much easier for companies to invest abroad. One of the best examples is 
certainly the development within the European Union and the abolition of all 
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. The 
unrestricted access to other markets and the possibility of an unhindered 
establishment of companies in other Member States will increase the number of 
cross-border activities. Even medium-sized companies are able - and perhaps even 
forced - to invest in other countries. The typical multinational company of the past - 
most often huge international groups and conglomerates - will be accompanied by 
medium-sized companies with activities throughout the European Union and other 
parts of the world. However, it is not only the typical direct investment which is 
described above, i.e. a foreign investment in order to expand the existing activities to 
a new market, but also the relocation of existing activities and the separation of 
business activities. It is much easier for companies to allocate business functions to 
other countries in order to achieve the most favourable result. Again, the decision for 
any relocation will be made by considering all factors relevant to business - most 
often cost factors. For example, the decision to establish a group service centre in 
another country will certainly be influenced by several aspects. Labour costs can play 
a role as well as legal aspects, office rents and other related expenses, and perhaps 
also language skills of the respective employees. Due to the difference in tax rates 
and tax systems, the total tax burden can be of importance for such a decision, too.60 
The typical structure in which a parent company provides headquarter-functions to 
subsidiary companies will certainly be replaced more and more by service and 











                                            
60 However, see - for example - The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st 
Century, Report and Analysis, National Foreign Trade Council, Washington (December 15, 2001), page 7: “(...) 
the basic suggestion that tax motives are what drive U.S.-based companies into the international marketplace is 
seriously antiquated in the context of the global economy.”  
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Figure 2 shows a direct investment of company A (state A) in state B and state C. 
However, all or part of the financial means which are invested through capital 
increase in state C are finally flowing to state B - and are utilised for the production of 
income in the latter state. Essentially, instead of providing the financial means directly 
to company B (e.g. by capital increase or loan amount), company C is interposed for 
the transformation of the financial means from equity investment to portfolio 
investment. Thus, even though the investment is to be seen - from the perspective of 
state A - as a foreign direct investment, the intra-group structure creates portfolio-
type elements - within the group - and can therefore be seen, in total, as a hybrid 
investment. 
 
In other words, such hybrid investments result in the relocation of functions and risks 
which are mainly related to capital-intensive services - with a separable interest 
component - and which are utilised by another (related) party, i.e. the capital is not 
directly employed for an income-producing activity of the subsidiary, but for an 
income-producing activity of the recipient of the services. The latter can also be the 
parent company. The subsidiary, of course, realises income from providing capital, 
but not from the direct utilisation of capital in an income-producing process (of the 
subsidiary). One has to keep in mind that those structures and the newly created 
services may emerge from an existing headquarter-activity, and that the appearance 
of the group towards customers might not even be affected, i.e. may be unchanged 
(before and after the re-structuring). The fact that one of the income elements is a 
separable interest component may be of particular importance in the context of this 
study. The reason is that it might be justifiable, or even required, to treat (all or part 
of) the interest component differently from any other income components which are 
related to the carrying out of the functions and the taking over of risks by the service 
provider. This will be clarified in the following. First, however, it seems to be 
necessary to have a closer look at the interest component itself.  
 
2.4.5. The Basic Interest Component 
 
I fully agree with the position that capital cannot by itself create income. It does not 
matter in which form an investment is made, by granting a loan to a company or by 
participating in a company through an equity investment, it is always necessary for 
someone to be “active” in order to produce “new” income. In case of a loan 
agreement it is the debtor who adds value to the invested money and part of the 
added value is passed on to the creditor.63 And even though the capital factor is an 
inevitable prerequisite for the production of interest this does not mean that interest is 
produced by capital.64 However, capital can exist in different forms, and the most 
fungible form of capital is money. If one has capital available in the form of money, or 
changes another form of capital into money, it offers the possibility - without much 
effort - to invest this money and to receive a certain return. For example, an investor 
could simply lend the money to the United States Federal Government by purchasing 
Treasury Bills, Treasury Notes or Treasury Bonds. The investment would produce 
income in the form of interest on a yearly basis until maturity. This would require a 
one-time effort of the investor which is relatively small. The interest income received 
would contain different components:65  
                                            
63 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 432.  
64 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 433. 
65 See, for example, Ruby, The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates, which can be found in the internet 
under http://www.digitaleconomist.com/int_4020.html.  
   
 
functions or to create new functions outside of the national territory.61 Each function 
transferred or created has to be measured and the profit attributable to the respective 
function is to be taxed in the country where the function is exercised, i.e. normally 
where the subsidiary or permanent establishment is located. This is of utmost 
importance from a competitiveness point of view. If one agrees that direct 
investments should be taxed where the business is carried on, the same must be true 
for business activities which are split up over different countries. The different 
functions added together are to be seen as the complete business activity of the 
group.  
 
In addition to all the business functions and risks there is, in my opinion, one feature 
which has to be considered and should not be overlooked: the interest component of 
capital. The aforementioned intra-group separation of functions and risks may result 
in the establishing of services which are mainly based on the provision of capital, 
such as financing services, leasing services, and licensing services. As a 
consequence thereof, inter-company income streams are created which include a 
separable interest component related to the capital provided and this interest 
component is one of the most important components of the overall compensation. 
For this reason, I consider the creation of capital-intensive inter-company services by 
allocating those functions and risks to separate legal entities to be a “hybrid 
investment.” It is called hybrid investment because it combines the elements of a 
direct investment - by incorporating  a subsidiary (service) company in another state - 
and the elements of an indirect investment (portfolio investment) - by focusing on the 
provision of capital in return for (indirect) interest payments. Of course, a direct 
foreign investment remains a direct foreign investment, but the intra-group structure - 
as a whole - contains important portfolio type elements. Such a “mixture” can be 
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61 Of course, a transfer of functions can reveal some transfer pricing question, e.g. where a know-how transfer is 
involved.   
62 Theoretically, the recipient of the loan amount can also be the parent company. It shall be assumed, however,  
that the financial means are utilised by the recipient for the production of income (in the state of the recipient) 
and is not just a “circle” transfer of financial means.  
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Figure 2 shows a direct investment of company A (state A) in state B and state C. 
However, all or part of the financial means which are invested through capital 
increase in state C are finally flowing to state B - and are utilised for the production of 
income in the latter state. Essentially, instead of providing the financial means directly 
to company B (e.g. by capital increase or loan amount), company C is interposed for 
the transformation of the financial means from equity investment to portfolio 
investment. Thus, even though the investment is to be seen - from the perspective of 
state A - as a foreign direct investment, the intra-group structure creates portfolio-
type elements - within the group - and can therefore be seen, in total, as a hybrid 
investment. 
 
In other words, such hybrid investments result in the relocation of functions and risks 
which are mainly related to capital-intensive services - with a separable interest 
component - and which are utilised by another (related) party, i.e. the capital is not 
directly employed for an income-producing activity of the subsidiary, but for an 
income-producing activity of the recipient of the services. The latter can also be the 
parent company. The subsidiary, of course, realises income from providing capital, 
but not from the direct utilisation of capital in an income-producing process (of the 
subsidiary). One has to keep in mind that those structures and the newly created 
services may emerge from an existing headquarter-activity, and that the appearance 
of the group towards customers might not even be affected, i.e. may be unchanged 
(before and after the re-structuring). The fact that one of the income elements is a 
separable interest component may be of particular importance in the context of this 
study. The reason is that it might be justifiable, or even required, to treat (all or part 
of) the interest component differently from any other income components which are 
related to the carrying out of the functions and the taking over of risks by the service 
provider. This will be clarified in the following. First, however, it seems to be 
necessary to have a closer look at the interest component itself.  
 
2.4.5. The Basic Interest Component 
 
I fully agree with the position that capital cannot by itself create income. It does not 
matter in which form an investment is made, by granting a loan to a company or by 
participating in a company through an equity investment, it is always necessary for 
someone to be “active” in order to produce “new” income. In case of a loan 
agreement it is the debtor who adds value to the invested money and part of the 
added value is passed on to the creditor.63 And even though the capital factor is an 
inevitable prerequisite for the production of interest this does not mean that interest is 
produced by capital.64 However, capital can exist in different forms, and the most 
fungible form of capital is money. If one has capital available in the form of money, or 
changes another form of capital into money, it offers the possibility - without much 
effort - to invest this money and to receive a certain return. For example, an investor 
could simply lend the money to the United States Federal Government by purchasing 
Treasury Bills, Treasury Notes or Treasury Bonds. The investment would produce 
income in the form of interest on a yearly basis until maturity. This would require a 
one-time effort of the investor which is relatively small. The interest income received 
would contain different components:65  
                                            
63 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 432.  
64 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 433. 
65 See, for example, Ruby, The Risk and Term Structure of Interest Rates, which can be found in the internet 
under http://www.digitaleconomist.com/int_4020.html.  
   
 
functions or to create new functions outside of the national territory.61 Each function 
transferred or created has to be measured and the profit attributable to the respective 
function is to be taxed in the country where the function is exercised, i.e. normally 
where the subsidiary or permanent establishment is located. This is of utmost 
importance from a competitiveness point of view. If one agrees that direct 
investments should be taxed where the business is carried on, the same must be true 
for business activities which are split up over different countries. The different 
functions added together are to be seen as the complete business activity of the 
group.  
 
In addition to all the business functions and risks there is, in my opinion, one feature 
which has to be considered and should not be overlooked: the interest component of 
capital. The aforementioned intra-group separation of functions and risks may result 
in the establishing of services which are mainly based on the provision of capital, 
such as financing services, leasing services, and licensing services. As a 
consequence thereof, inter-company income streams are created which include a 
separable interest component related to the capital provided and this interest 
component is one of the most important components of the overall compensation. 
For this reason, I consider the creation of capital-intensive inter-company services by 
allocating those functions and risks to separate legal entities to be a “hybrid 
investment.” It is called hybrid investment because it combines the elements of a 
direct investment - by incorporating  a subsidiary (service) company in another state - 
and the elements of an indirect investment (portfolio investment) - by focusing on the 
provision of capital in return for (indirect) interest payments. Of course, a direct 
foreign investment remains a direct foreign investment, but the intra-group structure - 
as a whole - contains important portfolio type elements. Such a “mixture” can be 
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capital in a currency with a relatively high inflation rate, the inflation premium will be 
higher than in case of an investment in a currency with a relatively low inflation rate. If 
the investor decides to invest in a long-term high-risk corporate bond, this will not 
only affect the inflation premium (because of the expected inflation for the period of 
investment), but also the liquidity premium and, of course, the risk premium related to 
the debtor. In my opinion, it makes some sense, in the context of this study and in the 
light of the hybrid investments which were outlined above, to make a further (general) 
categorisation of the interest elements. It is absolutely clear that any investment 
decision which is based on expectations contains elements of risk. If a decision has 
to be made in advance for a certain period of time, e.g. the stipulation of an interest 
rate for one month, there is the risk that the expectation at the moment when the 
decision was made does not match with the actual rates determined afterwards 
(retrospectively). The risk can be limited, however, by reducing the period for which 
the evaluation has to be made, i.e. the shorter the period of time, the higher the 
likelihood that the expectation matches with the actual rates. This is foremost due to 
the fact that the number of events which may finally result in a deviation (in 
comparison to the expectation) are theoretically limited because of the shorter period 
of time. The basis for making an estimation is therefore in the latter situation more 
reliable than in case of a longer period of time. But even the limitation to a very short 
period of time does not completely eliminate the risks. The only possibility to 
eliminate the risks for the investor (and therefore logically also the chances of an 
investment) is a completely flexible investment - without credit risks - which 
permanently adjusts the real interest rate and the inflation premium on an actual 
basis and not based on expectations, i.e. a variable interest rate which is linked to 
the changes in the inflation rate (a “rolling” interest rate). If this is the case, the 
investor receives a real interest rate which permanently reflects the market conditions 
and an inflation premium which covers the actual inflation rate. Essentially, the wealth 
of the investor who provides the capital will be increased by the permanently adjusted 
real interest rate of a variable investment, because the inflation premium which is 
included in the basic interest component covers, in this situation, exactly the actual 
devaluation of money.69 In my opinion, the “rolling” real interest rate and the “rolling” 
inflation premium can be seen, in combination, as the “basic interest component” (it 
can also be called the “basic interest rate” or the “basic interest income”). In other 
words, the basic interest component reflects the result of the actual real interest rate 
and the actual inflation premium, but without encompassing any additional elements 
which are based on expectations, such as the differences in rates for an investment 
which is not a completely flexible investment, the liquidity premium, and the (credit) 
risk premium. The latter risk elements can be seen as the “risk component” of the 
(total) interest income. The combination of the basic interest component and the risk 










                                            
69 The increase in wealth (of the creditor) is caused by the debtor, because the latter produces the income. 
   
 
 
- The real interest rate: it is to be considered the compensation, over and above 
inflation, that the investor wants to achieve for lending the money (the desired 
rate of return). Since capital is a resource which can be borrowed, the 
borrower pays the lender for the use of the capital. When money is loaned the 
lender defers consumption or use of the money for a specific period of time.66  
 
- The inflation premium: a part of the interest rate is the compensation for the 
inflation the investor expects and the risk that the expectation could be wrong. 
The latter is especially relevant in case of long term investments.  
 
- The liquidity premium: the liquidity premium represents the amount of 
compensation required by a lender for a long term investment. Bounding 
capital for a longer period of time is typically accompanied by a higher degree 
of uncertainty compared to a short term investment. Apart from the risk of 
inflation which is already included above in the inflation premium, there are, 
inter alia, political and economic uncertainties which typically have to be 
compensated.67  
 
- The risk premium: the risk premium reflects the credit risk involved in a 
particular investment and is related to the borrower and his activities. 
Depending on the borrower, there is a different degree of probability that the 
borrower is able to regularly make the interest payments and to repay the 
principal amount of debt in whole or in part. It is generally said that the United 
States Federal Government debts outlined above do not contain such a credit 
risk. The borrower will be able to properly service the debt and repay the 
principal at all times, because the United States Federal Government can 
always borrow new funds at whatever rate of interest necessary to pay 
existing interest obligations or to repay any existing debt. Moreover, the United 
States Federal Government has the sources of tax revenue and the power to 
establish or perhaps create the currency necessary to meet its existing 
obligations. However, even though - in my opinion - there can be a theoretical 
risk involved in long term bonds which is not covered by the liquidity premium, 
it can certainly be said that the credit risk connected with the United States 
Federal Government Treasury Bills, Treasury Notes or Treasury Bonds is 
close to zero or even zero (in case of a short-term investment).68 
 
The interest income which can be derived from the provision of capital encompasses 
the aforementioned elements. It is clear, however, that the interest rate is strongly 
dependent on the investment decision. If the investor decides to invest the amount of 
                                            
66 See to the concept of interest - in general - Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and 
Relation to Credit, Interest, and Crises (1922) and Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience 
to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It (1930).  
67 See with respect to liquidity risk (and liquidity premium) van Deventer / Imai / Mesler, Advanced Financial 
Risk Management: Tools and Techniques for Integrated Credit Risk and Interest Rate Risk Management (2005) 
and Crockford, An Introduction to Risk Management (1986).  
68 This, however, is not true for a great number of other governments. With respect to developments on a larger 
scale and the remaining risks involved see William J. Bernstein, The Societal Risk Premium, which can be found 
in the internet under http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/901/society.htm. See with respect to credit risk also 
Bluhm / Overbeck / Wagner, An Introduction to Credit Risk Modeling (2002); Duffie / Singleton, Credit Risk: 
Pricing, Measurement, and Management (2003); de Servigny / Renault, The Standard & Poor’s Guide to 
Measuring and Managing Credit Risk (2004); Lando, Credit Risk Modeling: Theory and Applications (2004).  
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capital in a currency with a relatively high inflation rate, the inflation premium will be 
higher than in case of an investment in a currency with a relatively low inflation rate. If 
the investor decides to invest in a long-term high-risk corporate bond, this will not 
only affect the inflation premium (because of the expected inflation for the period of 
investment), but also the liquidity premium and, of course, the risk premium related to 
the debtor. In my opinion, it makes some sense, in the context of this study and in the 
light of the hybrid investments which were outlined above, to make a further (general) 
categorisation of the interest elements. It is absolutely clear that any investment 
decision which is based on expectations contains elements of risk. If a decision has 
to be made in advance for a certain period of time, e.g. the stipulation of an interest 
rate for one month, there is the risk that the expectation at the moment when the 
decision was made does not match with the actual rates determined afterwards 
(retrospectively). The risk can be limited, however, by reducing the period for which 
the evaluation has to be made, i.e. the shorter the period of time, the higher the 
likelihood that the expectation matches with the actual rates. This is foremost due to 
the fact that the number of events which may finally result in a deviation (in 
comparison to the expectation) are theoretically limited because of the shorter period 
of time. The basis for making an estimation is therefore in the latter situation more 
reliable than in case of a longer period of time. But even the limitation to a very short 
period of time does not completely eliminate the risks. The only possibility to 
eliminate the risks for the investor (and therefore logically also the chances of an 
investment) is a completely flexible investment - without credit risks - which 
permanently adjusts the real interest rate and the inflation premium on an actual 
basis and not based on expectations, i.e. a variable interest rate which is linked to 
the changes in the inflation rate (a “rolling” interest rate). If this is the case, the 
investor receives a real interest rate which permanently reflects the market conditions 
and an inflation premium which covers the actual inflation rate. Essentially, the wealth 
of the investor who provides the capital will be increased by the permanently adjusted 
real interest rate of a variable investment, because the inflation premium which is 
included in the basic interest component covers, in this situation, exactly the actual 
devaluation of money.69 In my opinion, the “rolling” real interest rate and the “rolling” 
inflation premium can be seen, in combination, as the “basic interest component” (it 
can also be called the “basic interest rate” or the “basic interest income”). In other 
words, the basic interest component reflects the result of the actual real interest rate 
and the actual inflation premium, but without encompassing any additional elements 
which are based on expectations, such as the differences in rates for an investment 
which is not a completely flexible investment, the liquidity premium, and the (credit) 
risk premium. The latter risk elements can be seen as the “risk component” of the 
(total) interest income. The combination of the basic interest component and the risk 
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- The real interest rate: it is to be considered the compensation, over and above 
inflation, that the investor wants to achieve for lending the money (the desired 
rate of return). Since capital is a resource which can be borrowed, the 
borrower pays the lender for the use of the capital. When money is loaned the 
lender defers consumption or use of the money for a specific period of time.66  
 
- The inflation premium: a part of the interest rate is the compensation for the 
inflation the investor expects and the risk that the expectation could be wrong. 
The latter is especially relevant in case of long term investments.  
 
- The liquidity premium: the liquidity premium represents the amount of 
compensation required by a lender for a long term investment. Bounding 
capital for a longer period of time is typically accompanied by a higher degree 
of uncertainty compared to a short term investment. Apart from the risk of 
inflation which is already included above in the inflation premium, there are, 
inter alia, political and economic uncertainties which typically have to be 
compensated.67  
 
- The risk premium: the risk premium reflects the credit risk involved in a 
particular investment and is related to the borrower and his activities. 
Depending on the borrower, there is a different degree of probability that the 
borrower is able to regularly make the interest payments and to repay the 
principal amount of debt in whole or in part. It is generally said that the United 
States Federal Government debts outlined above do not contain such a credit 
risk. The borrower will be able to properly service the debt and repay the 
principal at all times, because the United States Federal Government can 
always borrow new funds at whatever rate of interest necessary to pay 
existing interest obligations or to repay any existing debt. Moreover, the United 
States Federal Government has the sources of tax revenue and the power to 
establish or perhaps create the currency necessary to meet its existing 
obligations. However, even though - in my opinion - there can be a theoretical 
risk involved in long term bonds which is not covered by the liquidity premium, 
it can certainly be said that the credit risk connected with the United States 
Federal Government Treasury Bills, Treasury Notes or Treasury Bonds is 
close to zero or even zero (in case of a short-term investment).68 
 
The interest income which can be derived from the provision of capital encompasses 
the aforementioned elements. It is clear, however, that the interest rate is strongly 
dependent on the investment decision. If the investor decides to invest the amount of 
                                            
66 See to the concept of interest - in general - Fisher, The Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and 
Relation to Credit, Interest, and Crises (1922) and Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by Impatience 
to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It (1930).  
67 See with respect to liquidity risk (and liquidity premium) van Deventer / Imai / Mesler, Advanced Financial 
Risk Management: Tools and Techniques for Integrated Credit Risk and Interest Rate Risk Management (2005) 
and Crockford, An Introduction to Risk Management (1986).  
68 This, however, is not true for a great number of other governments. With respect to developments on a larger 
scale and the remaining risks involved see William J. Bernstein, The Societal Risk Premium, which can be found 
in the internet under http://www.efficientfrontier.com/ef/901/society.htm. See with respect to credit risk also 
Bluhm / Overbeck / Wagner, An Introduction to Credit Risk Modeling (2002); Duffie / Singleton, Credit Risk: 
Pricing, Measurement, and Management (2003); de Servigny / Renault, The Standard & Poor’s Guide to 
Measuring and Managing Credit Risk (2004); Lando, Credit Risk Modeling: Theory and Applications (2004).  
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by not taking risks” is, of course, a consequence of such a decision. However, what is 
necessarily required for deriving the basic interest component is capital. Without the 
provision of capital for an income-producing activity there is no possibility whatsoever 
for deriving the basic interest income. For this reason, the basic interest component 
is a component which is, in my opinion, strongly connected to the capital itself, even 
though it must be produced - in the same way as any other element included in the 
interest income - by the debtor.  
 
In principle, the basic interest component can be seen isolated as a component to 
derive a minimum rate of return and as a necessary element embedded in the total 
amount of interest income. Here, the differentiation becomes important. For example, 
if an investor decides to invest in a long-term corporate bond with a fixed interest 
rate, he takes over all of the risks which were outlined above and which have to be 
covered by the amount of interest income. What is decisive, however, is the fact that 
those risks have to be covered by all of the elements “beyond” the basic interest 
component, i.e. by the difference between the total amount of interest and the basic 
interest component at the moment when the decision is made. In other words, all of 
the expectations of the investor - and therefore the uncertainties which have to be 
seen, in this case, as potential risks - have to be implemented in the risk elements. 
Those risks  are caused by the fact that the investor has to decide in advance on the 
acceptability of an interest rate stipulated for a certain period of time. The risk 
elements have to cover, inter alia, the expected change of inflation and the real 
interest rate during that period, the possible non-disposability of the investment 
during that period,  and, of course, the credit risk of the debtor. A very good example 
which supports the approach of a (theoretical) separation between the basic interest 
component and additional risk elements in the total amount of interest income is the 
provision of a guarantee. Even though the guarantee does not necessarily cover all 
of the risks involved - and therefore the complete risk component - it may cover 
substantial risks, especially those related to the debtor. The guarantor does not 
provide the capital which is the basis for deriving the interest income, but only 
provides the guarantee which influences the interest rate (if the guarantee is provided 
to the debtor in favour of the creditor).71 I will come back to that aspect later on. What 
is of importance here, however, is the fact that the decision for taking additional risks 
in order to derive a higher income can have serious consequences for the investor. In 
theory, there should be an acceptable balance between the (potential) amount of 
income and the risks taken for deriving this income. Again, it must be clear that the 
basic interest income is not part of this “risk balance” but a separate component. Of 
course, this does not mean that the investing of capital and the taking over of 
substantial risks does not affect the basic interest component. If, in the example 
above, the corporation is not in a position to pay the yearly interest, the investor will 
neither derive the income which is related to the risk elements nor the basic interest 
                                            
71 Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivatives which are designed  to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income 
products between parties. CDS can be used to hedge an investment position for a certain period of time and, 
therefore, to transfer the default risk to another party (or parties) for a certain fee. One of the models to 
determine the price of a CDS is the so-called ‘no-arbitrage’ model. Without going into detail of the pricing itself, 
it is important to note that a certain risk-free rate is taken into account as an important element. For Hull and 
White the US Treasuries are reflecting the risk free element (Hull / White, Valuing Credit Default Swaps I: No 
Counterparty Default Risk, which can be found in the internet under http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-
hull/DownloadablePublications/CredDefSw1.pdf; Hull / White, Valuing Credit Default Swaps II: Modeling 
Default Correlations, http://www.smartquant.com/references/SWAP/swap2.pdf). For Duffie it is the LIBOR 
which - in the model - is considered the risk free rate (Duffie / Singleton, Credit Risk: Pricing, Measurement, and 
Management (2003)).  
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(1) The basic interest component reflects the actual real interest rate and the actual inflation rate at the 
moment of the fixing of the total interest rate. 
(2) The expected development of the basic interest component is covered by a premium on the actual 
basic interest component (in case of an expected increase) or a reduction from the actual basic 
interest component (in case of an expected decrease). The figure shows an expected increase over 
the period of investment. 
(3) The liquidity premium is a risk element which is related to the period of investment.  
(4) The (credit) risk premium is related to the risk of the debtor and his activities.  
 
In my opinion, it is quite important to understand the differences between the basic 
interest income, as a separate component, and the interest income which contains 
both components, i.e. including the risk component and the basic interest 
component. Theoretically, the decision for deriving only the basic interest income is a 
decision which eliminates the investment risks in favour of deriving a minimum 
income. It is absolutely clear that such a decision does not exclude the uncertainty 
about the question how the interest rates will develop and whether the inflation rate 
will increase or decrease in the future. But uncertainty is not necessarily the same as 
risk (in this context). In this respect, the basic interest component can be seen as “the 
status quo on a rolling basis”, i.e. it will always reflect the existing situation. If the 
inflation rate increases, the basic interest component increases. If the inflation rate 
decreases, the basic interest component decreases. The same is true for the real 
interest rate: if the real interest rate increases, the basic interest component 
increases, et cetera. The mechanism is quite simple and not very spectacular.70 The 
decision for deriving interest income which does only reflect the basic interest income 
is therefore a decision with very limited consequences. The “forgiving of opportunities 
                                            
70 This can easily be achieved by variable (or floating) rates and bonds which are, for example, inflation linked 
(“inflation indexed”).  
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by not taking risks” is, of course, a consequence of such a decision. However, what is 
necessarily required for deriving the basic interest component is capital. Without the 
provision of capital for an income-producing activity there is no possibility whatsoever 
for deriving the basic interest income. For this reason, the basic interest component 
is a component which is, in my opinion, strongly connected to the capital itself, even 
though it must be produced - in the same way as any other element included in the 
interest income - by the debtor.  
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interest rate during that period, the possible non-disposability of the investment 
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which supports the approach of a (theoretical) separation between the basic interest 
component and additional risk elements in the total amount of interest income is the 
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of the risks involved - and therefore the complete risk component - it may cover 
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provides the guarantee which influences the interest rate (if the guarantee is provided 
to the debtor in favour of the creditor).71 I will come back to that aspect later on. What 
is of importance here, however, is the fact that the decision for taking additional risks 
in order to derive a higher income can have serious consequences for the investor. In 
theory, there should be an acceptable balance between the (potential) amount of 
income and the risks taken for deriving this income. Again, it must be clear that the 
basic interest income is not part of this “risk balance” but a separate component. Of 
course, this does not mean that the investing of capital and the taking over of 
substantial risks does not affect the basic interest component. If, in the example 
above, the corporation is not in a position to pay the yearly interest, the investor will 
neither derive the income which is related to the risk elements nor the basic interest 
                                            
71 Credit default swaps (CDS) are derivatives which are designed  to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income 
products between parties. CDS can be used to hedge an investment position for a certain period of time and, 
therefore, to transfer the default risk to another party (or parties) for a certain fee. One of the models to 
determine the price of a CDS is the so-called ‘no-arbitrage’ model. Without going into detail of the pricing itself, 
it is important to note that a certain risk-free rate is taken into account as an important element. For Hull and 
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Default Correlations, http://www.smartquant.com/references/SWAP/swap2.pdf). For Duffie it is the LIBOR 
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moment of the fixing of the total interest rate. 
(2) The expected development of the basic interest component is covered by a premium on the actual 
basic interest component (in case of an expected increase) or a reduction from the actual basic 
interest component (in case of an expected decrease). The figure shows an expected increase over 
the period of investment. 
(3) The liquidity premium is a risk element which is related to the period of investment.  
(4) The (credit) risk premium is related to the risk of the debtor and his activities.  
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both components, i.e. including the risk component and the basic interest 
component. Theoretically, the decision for deriving only the basic interest income is a 
decision which eliminates the investment risks in favour of deriving a minimum 
income. It is absolutely clear that such a decision does not exclude the uncertainty 
about the question how the interest rates will develop and whether the inflation rate 
will increase or decrease in the future. But uncertainty is not necessarily the same as 
risk (in this context). In this respect, the basic interest component can be seen as “the 
status quo on a rolling basis”, i.e. it will always reflect the existing situation. If the 
inflation rate increases, the basic interest component increases. If the inflation rate 
decreases, the basic interest component decreases. The same is true for the real 
interest rate: if the real interest rate increases, the basic interest component 
increases, et cetera. The mechanism is quite simple and not very spectacular.70 The 
decision for deriving interest income which does only reflect the basic interest income 
is therefore a decision with very limited consequences. The “forgiving of opportunities 
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However, it is also possible that a percentage of real interest rate and inflation 
premium is stipulated within the fixed interest rate which is below the (actual) basic 
interest component. Such a negative difference may exist if a decrease in the 
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Supposing the fixed interest rate contains a positive difference between the (actual) 
basic interest component - at the time of stipulating the fixed interest rate - and the 
   
 
income. In a worst case scenario he will even lose the principal amount of investment 
which was provided to the debtor. In a typical case the risk component in the interest 
income should be sufficient to cover the risks and should result in an appropriate 
return on investment - otherwise the investor would not be willing to take over the 
risks. But this is a different question: the fact that the taking over of risks may also 
affect other elements, apart from the risk elements, and even the property which is 
the basis for deriving interest income, does not influence the aforementioned 
classification. 
 
On the other hand, the debtor will usually accept, in principle, the existence of the 
elements described above and will accept the necessity of compensating these 
elements. This, at least, is true in a market without significant distortions in favour of 
one of the two parties. Theoretically, the basic interest component, i.e. the 
compensation of the actual real interest rate and actual inflation rate, can be seen as 
the most objective component. The reason is that these elements can be measured 
in time (on an “actual” basis). The risk component is based on expectations and is 
therefore more difficult to determine. The development of - for example - the real 
interest rate, the inflation rate or the risk related to the debtor might be estimated 
differently by the creditor and the debtor. Hence, depending on the situation (e.g. 
whether a rating of the debtor exists or not), the determination of the appropriate risk 
component can be extremely difficult. In other words, the fact that the elements, in 
principle, must be compensated should be obvious for the creditor and the debtor, 
but this does not solve the (practical) problem of finding an appropriate interest rate. 
 
As already mentioned above, it is likely that a difference exists between the (actual) 
basic interest component - at the time of stipulating the fixed interest rate - and the 
expected average basic interest component over the period of investment. The 
expectation may result in a positive or negative deviation from the (actual) basic 
interest component. The deviation is positive, i.e. should lead to a premium within the 
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interest rate, the inflation rate or the risk related to the debtor might be estimated 
differently by the creditor and the debtor. Hence, depending on the situation (e.g. 
whether a rating of the debtor exists or not), the determination of the appropriate risk 
component can be extremely difficult. In other words, the fact that the elements, in 
principle, must be compensated should be obvious for the creditor and the debtor, 
but this does not solve the (practical) problem of finding an appropriate interest rate. 
 
As already mentioned above, it is likely that a difference exists between the (actual) 
basic interest component - at the time of stipulating the fixed interest rate - and the 
expected average basic interest component over the period of investment. The 
expectation may result in a positive or negative deviation from the (actual) basic 
interest component. The deviation is positive, i.e. should lead to a premium within the 
























   
 
the purpose of covering additional (separate) risks (e.g. the risks related to the 
debtor, the non-disposability of the investment). Of course, the taking over of risks 
provides - at the same time - additional chances. In the best case, a positive premium 
is stipulated within the fixed interest rate, but the actual basic interest component 
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The aforementioned issue does not exist if the investment is completely flexible, e.g. 
if the investment is repayable at any time and the interest rate is variable instead of 
fixed. Of course, the investment would still require a risk premium in order to cover 
the risks related to the debtor and the possibility that the debtor will be unable to 
repay all or part of the investment (and the interest). But it is not required to provide 
for a premium which covers the risk related to the future development of the real 
interest rate and the inflation rate if the increase (or decrease) of the rates finds 
expression in a permanently adjusted interest rate, i.e. if these risks (and the chances 
involved) are shifted to the debtor.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the interest income encompasses two very different 
types of components: the basic interest component, which can only be derived 
because of the provision of capital - and which is therefore strongly connected to the 
capital itself - and the risk component, which has to cover all of the potential risks 
which are caused by the debtor and the period of investment. The risk component, 
however, may theoretically be “stripped,” at least partly, from the provision of capital, 
e.g. through a guarantee which covers the debtor’s risks. The question arises 
whether these conclusions are of any relevance from an economic perspective. Here, 
   
 
expected average basic interest component over the period of investment. At first 
glance, it seems that a strict differentiation between the risk component and the basic 
interest component, without any overlapping over the period of investment, can only 
be guaranteed if the latter component is static - and not determined on a rolling 
basis. However, it has to be noted in this respect that the premium (and the taxation 
of the premium) and the actual development of the risks (and the treatment of such 
risks for tax purposes) are two different subjects. I will come to that aspect later on in 
more detail. The actual basic interest component over the period of investment may - 
in an extreme case - go up to an amount which might even exceed the total amount 
of fixed interest (not only the expected premium).72 In turn, it is also possible that the 
actual basic interest component stays below the original level.73 Both scenarios show 
that the actual development is obviously different from the expectations which found 
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It is very important, however, to recognise that it is the additional risk premium related 
to the differences in real interest rate and inflation rate which covers exactly the risk 
that the (actual) basic interest component might increase over the period of 
investment - and might even exceed the expectations. The other risk elements have 
                                            
72 For example, the basic interest component is determined with 2 percent, the risk component with 3 percent, i.e. 
the total amount of fixed interest is 5 percent. Theoretically, the actual (“rolling”) basic interest component - 
over a certain period of time - might go up to 6 percent and is higher than the total amount of fixed interest 
(which, in this example, is 5 percent).  
73 For example, the basic interest component is determined with 2 percent, but the actual (“rolling”) basic interest 
component is - in average over the period of investment - only 1 percent.  
74 In general, what is true for a positive difference is also true for a negative difference. Here, there is the 
potential risk that the basic interest component increases (and not decreases) during the period of investment. 
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view which is equally relevant for intra-group production activities and intra-group 
service activities. The intra-group functions allocated to foreign subsidiaries should - 
from an economic standpoint - be taxed in the country where the functions are 
exercised. As already outlined earlier, any restriction of foreign investment caused by 
a residence-based taxation would not lead to an efficient allocation of capital but to a 
distortion of competitiveness. This is especially true when the residence-based 
taxation is applied to investments where the difference in tax rates between the 
residence country and the source country is relatively high. In such a case it is rather 
likely that other investors will step-in and create the functions in the respective foreign 
country. If the company refrains from investing directly in the lower-tax country 
because of the residence-based taxation but instead uses the services of third party 
suppliers, no efficient allocation of capital takes place. Instead, the company has a 
real disadvantage in comparison to companies which can directly take advantage of 
the lower tax rate in the foreign country.  
 
For example, a parent company established in country A provides certain 
headquarter services to the subsidiary company B. The tax rates in country A and 
country B are both 35 percent of the taxable income. The consideration for the 
services provided by parent company A amounts to 105 Euro. The personnel and 
other expenses related to those services are 100 Euro, i.e. the profit realised in 
country A is 5 Euro. Suppose the after-tax result of 3.25 Euro is exactly the amount 
which covers the function and the risks related to those services. The overall after-tax 
result on a group level related to the services is -65 Euro (or a tax reduction of 35 
Euro).75 Assuming that there is a possibility to relocate the services to country C 
without any relevant disadvantages and the tax rate in country C is only 10 percent, 
the overall tax burden could be reduced by 1.25 Euro.76 From a competitiveness 
point of view it would make sense to transfer the functions in question to country C. 
However, this is not true if the taxable result in country C is currently taxed in country 
A. The result would be the same and therefore the parent company would not be 
willing to take over the burden connected with the incorporation of a new subsidiary 
(or permanent establishment) in a foreign country. In case the services can be 
rendered by companies outside of the group it is likely that local companies in 
country C or subsidiaries of multinational companies which are not taxed on a current 
basis take over those functions. Because of the fact that the functions and risks are 
covered with an after-tax result of 3.25 Euro the local companies are able to offer the 
services at a price of 3.61 Euro (or a bit higher).77 Depending on the function itself 
and the importance within the group it could make sense to outsource the function to 
a company in country C. The business expenses of the subsidiary company B will be 
                                            
75 The business expenses of 105 Euro in country B lead to a tax reduction of 36.75 Euro and therefore to after-tax 
expenses of 68.25 Euro. The taxable profit in country A amounts to 5 Euro (105 minus 100) and consequently to 
an after-tax profit of 3.25 Euro. The overall after-tax result is therefore -65 Euro (-68.25 Euro + 3.25 Euro).  
76 Under the assumption that the services are still charged with 105 Euro and the expenses related to those 
services are still 100 Euro, i.e. the taxable profit derived in country C is 5 Euro. An effective tax rate of 10 
percent improves the after-tax result from 3.25 Euro (in country A) to 4.5 Euro (in country C).  
77 The exact amount depends on the treatment at the time when the deferred income is distributed - for example - 
to a parent company in country D. If the distribution is tax exempt, the price of 3.61 Euro is realistic In the 
example it is assumed that the functions and risks are covered with an after tax result of 3.25 Euro (taking into 
account a tax rate of 35 percent). The reduction of the tax rate from 35 percent to 10 percent makes it possible to 
reduce the price for the services from 105 Euro to approximately 103.61 Euro. The net income before tax of 3.61 
Euro will lead to an after-tax result of 3.25 Euro (3.61 Euro minus 0.36 Euro (10 percent) income tax). If the 
distribution is taxed in country D with a rate of 35 percent (combined with a foreign tax credit of 10 percent), the 
price will be higher than 3.61 Euro but below 5 Euro - depending on the planned deferral of income in country 
C.  
   
 
it seems to be important to make a differentiation between a source-based taxation of 
interest income and a residence-based taxation of interest income. 
 
a.) The source-based taxation of interest income (“optimal scenario”) 
 
The previous examinations show that the source-based taxation of interest income is, 
from an economic perspective, the preferred solution. It can therefore be considered 
the optimal scenario. If the respective tax system provides for such a source-based 
taxation of the total amount of interest income, there is no reason for any separation 
of the aforementioned components. 
 
b.) The residence-based taxation of interest income (“non-optimal scenario”) 
 
The situation is different if the interest income is subject to a residence-based 
taxation instead of a source-based taxation. It is more than questionable whether 
such a non-optimal scenario must necessarily be accepted by all of the states which 
are somehow involved in the investment activities. For example, in those cases 
where interest streams are created on an intermediate level, like in case of the hybrid 
investments outlined above, the question arises whether the result of a residence-
based taxation of the interest income (on the intermediate level) should be accepted 
by the state of the parent company. Such a structure - in combination with a 
residence-based taxation - does not lead to an optimal economic result. In this 
respect, it seems to be necessary to provide for a differentiation which is based on 
the basic interest component and the risk component. I will go into detail of this 
aspect in the following.  
 
2.5. Application of the Principles to Hybrid Investments and other Intra-Group 
Activities  
 
2.5.1. Production Activities 
 
The relocation of production activities to countries with lower production costs is very 
often connected with an extensive capital transfer to the other country. In many cases 
the production activities are restricted to intra-group transfers, i.e. the foreign 
subsidiary produces parts only for the supply of the parent company or other group 
companies without any sales activities towards third parties. Everything that was 
outlined above with respect to direct investments is equally relevant in this situation. 
The income produced by the foreign subsidiary with regard to the production 
activities is allocable to the respective country. Of course, in practice problems with 
respect to transfer pricing will come up but this has nothing to do with the general 
economic conclusion. Even in the context of controlled foreign company legislation 
the production activities are most often not targeted, with the effect that the proposed 
economic conclusion is generally in line with international tax practice.  
 
2.5.2. Service Activities  
 
In contrast to the relocation of production activities, the relocation of service activities 
is not always accompanied by extensive capital transfers and investments in the 
foreign country. The relocation of functions to other countries is, in my opinion and as 
already described above, to be treated in exactly the same manner as the relocation 
of production activities. This is, first of all, required from a competitiveness point of 
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view which is equally relevant for intra-group production activities and intra-group 
service activities. The intra-group functions allocated to foreign subsidiaries should - 
from an economic standpoint - be taxed in the country where the functions are 
exercised. As already outlined earlier, any restriction of foreign investment caused by 
a residence-based taxation would not lead to an efficient allocation of capital but to a 
distortion of competitiveness. This is especially true when the residence-based 
taxation is applied to investments where the difference in tax rates between the 
residence country and the source country is relatively high. In such a case it is rather 
likely that other investors will step-in and create the functions in the respective foreign 
country. If the company refrains from investing directly in the lower-tax country 
because of the residence-based taxation but instead uses the services of third party 
suppliers, no efficient allocation of capital takes place. Instead, the company has a 
real disadvantage in comparison to companies which can directly take advantage of 
the lower tax rate in the foreign country.  
 
For example, a parent company established in country A provides certain 
headquarter services to the subsidiary company B. The tax rates in country A and 
country B are both 35 percent of the taxable income. The consideration for the 
services provided by parent company A amounts to 105 Euro. The personnel and 
other expenses related to those services are 100 Euro, i.e. the profit realised in 
country A is 5 Euro. Suppose the after-tax result of 3.25 Euro is exactly the amount 
which covers the function and the risks related to those services. The overall after-tax 
result on a group level related to the services is -65 Euro (or a tax reduction of 35 
Euro).75 Assuming that there is a possibility to relocate the services to country C 
without any relevant disadvantages and the tax rate in country C is only 10 percent, 
the overall tax burden could be reduced by 1.25 Euro.76 From a competitiveness 
point of view it would make sense to transfer the functions in question to country C. 
However, this is not true if the taxable result in country C is currently taxed in country 
A. The result would be the same and therefore the parent company would not be 
willing to take over the burden connected with the incorporation of a new subsidiary 
(or permanent establishment) in a foreign country. In case the services can be 
rendered by companies outside of the group it is likely that local companies in 
country C or subsidiaries of multinational companies which are not taxed on a current 
basis take over those functions. Because of the fact that the functions and risks are 
covered with an after-tax result of 3.25 Euro the local companies are able to offer the 
services at a price of 3.61 Euro (or a bit higher).77 Depending on the function itself 
and the importance within the group it could make sense to outsource the function to 
a company in country C. The business expenses of the subsidiary company B will be 
                                            
75 The business expenses of 105 Euro in country B lead to a tax reduction of 36.75 Euro and therefore to after-tax 
expenses of 68.25 Euro. The taxable profit in country A amounts to 5 Euro (105 minus 100) and consequently to 
an after-tax profit of 3.25 Euro. The overall after-tax result is therefore -65 Euro (-68.25 Euro + 3.25 Euro).  
76 Under the assumption that the services are still charged with 105 Euro and the expenses related to those 
services are still 100 Euro, i.e. the taxable profit derived in country C is 5 Euro. An effective tax rate of 10 
percent improves the after-tax result from 3.25 Euro (in country A) to 4.5 Euro (in country C).  
77 The exact amount depends on the treatment at the time when the deferred income is distributed - for example - 
to a parent company in country D. If the distribution is tax exempt, the price of 3.61 Euro is realistic In the 
example it is assumed that the functions and risks are covered with an after tax result of 3.25 Euro (taking into 
account a tax rate of 35 percent). The reduction of the tax rate from 35 percent to 10 percent makes it possible to 
reduce the price for the services from 105 Euro to approximately 103.61 Euro. The net income before tax of 3.61 
Euro will lead to an after-tax result of 3.25 Euro (3.61 Euro minus 0.36 Euro (10 percent) income tax). If the 
distribution is taxed in country D with a rate of 35 percent (combined with a foreign tax credit of 10 percent), the 
price will be higher than 3.61 Euro but below 5 Euro - depending on the planned deferral of income in country 
C.  
   
 
it seems to be important to make a differentiation between a source-based taxation of 
interest income and a residence-based taxation of interest income. 
 
a.) The source-based taxation of interest income (“optimal scenario”) 
 
The previous examinations show that the source-based taxation of interest income is, 
from an economic perspective, the preferred solution. It can therefore be considered 
the optimal scenario. If the respective tax system provides for such a source-based 
taxation of the total amount of interest income, there is no reason for any separation 
of the aforementioned components. 
 
b.) The residence-based taxation of interest income (“non-optimal scenario”) 
 
The situation is different if the interest income is subject to a residence-based 
taxation instead of a source-based taxation. It is more than questionable whether 
such a non-optimal scenario must necessarily be accepted by all of the states which 
are somehow involved in the investment activities. For example, in those cases 
where interest streams are created on an intermediate level, like in case of the hybrid 
investments outlined above, the question arises whether the result of a residence-
based taxation of the interest income (on the intermediate level) should be accepted 
by the state of the parent company. Such a structure - in combination with a 
residence-based taxation - does not lead to an optimal economic result. In this 
respect, it seems to be necessary to provide for a differentiation which is based on 
the basic interest component and the risk component. I will go into detail of this 
aspect in the following.  
 
2.5. Application of the Principles to Hybrid Investments and other Intra-Group 
Activities  
 
2.5.1. Production Activities 
 
The relocation of production activities to countries with lower production costs is very 
often connected with an extensive capital transfer to the other country. In many cases 
the production activities are restricted to intra-group transfers, i.e. the foreign 
subsidiary produces parts only for the supply of the parent company or other group 
companies without any sales activities towards third parties. Everything that was 
outlined above with respect to direct investments is equally relevant in this situation. 
The income produced by the foreign subsidiary with regard to the production 
activities is allocable to the respective country. Of course, in practice problems with 
respect to transfer pricing will come up but this has nothing to do with the general 
economic conclusion. Even in the context of controlled foreign company legislation 
the production activities are most often not targeted, with the effect that the proposed 
economic conclusion is generally in line with international tax practice.  
 
2.5.2. Service Activities  
 
In contrast to the relocation of production activities, the relocation of service activities 
is not always accompanied by extensive capital transfers and investments in the 
foreign country. The relocation of functions to other countries is, in my opinion and as 
already described above, to be treated in exactly the same manner as the relocation 
of production activities. This is, first of all, required from a competitiveness point of 
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This could be compared to a situation where a parent company has developed an 
intangible asset and instead of using the asset within the group the parent company 
decides to sell the intangible asset to an unrelated party. At the same time, a 
subsidiary company purchases a different intangible asset which is to be used within 
the group and which shall therefore be made available to other group companies. In 
this example, the profit realised by the disposal of the asset is completely allocable to 
the parent company. The acquisition of the new intangible asset (from a third party) is 
now allocable to the subsidiary company which bears the risks and exercises all the 
functions which are connected to the intangible asset. It should be clear that the 
respective components (at least the first three components outlined above) are now 
connected to the subsidiary and the profit should therefore be attributed to the 
subsidiary. The fourth component - the interest component - is left open since it will 
be discussed separately in the following.  
 
2.5.4. The Interest Component of Capital  
 
In all intra-group transactions (and, of course, also in third-party transactions) the 
interest component plays a more or less important role: The relocation of production 
activities as well as the relocation of tangible and intangible property is often 
accompanied by large capital transfers from one country to another country. The 
same can be true with respect to service agreements where substantial amounts of 
capital are involved. All of these transactions contain to a certain extent an interest 
component. The interest component must be seen from the perspective that capital 
can either be used alternatively or - in case the investment has to be re-financed by a 
third party (e.g. bank) - cannot be used free of charge, i.e. interest has to be paid. 
The interest component should find expression in the prices for goods and services. 
Where a large amount of capital is necessary to produce a certain product or to 
render a certain service, the interest component should encompass a greater part of 
the total price for goods and services than in a situation where less capital 
investments are necessary. Of course, this is not always true since prices are 
determined by market factors and in some situations not all components calculated in 
the sales price can be shifted to the purchaser. However, this situation will 
consequently lead to an insufficient return on investment. Therefore, to be successful 
in the long run a company must be able to adequately cover all cost and risk factors 
and therefore also the interest for the capital employed.  
 
In the following, it is important to make an additional differentiation between the 
general conclusion that the employment of capital has consequently always an 
interest effect on “the input side” and the fact that the exercising of certain functions 
contains separable financing elements and therefore an interest component on “the 
output side.” The separable interest component is particularly relevant in case of all 
types of financing services and therefore also the hybrid investments which were 
described earlier.   
 
2.5.4.1. The Interest Component of Capital and Direct Investments  
 
Suppose a holding company established in country A (company A) is the sole 
shareholder of a subsidiary in country B (company B). The business activity of 
company A is mainly limited to the holding of shares in the subsidiary company. 
Company B is engaged in the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of 
goods to customers in country B. The economic activity of company B is carried on in 
   
 
reduced from 105 Euro to 103.61 Euro. Even though the parent company A will not 
receive the positive income connected to the rendering of the services the after-tax 
expenses will only increase from -65 Euro to -67.35 Euro.78 In other words, the 
outsourcing of the services does not result in an after-tax reduction of income of 3.25 
Euro (which would be equal to the functions and risks) but only to a reduction of 2.35 
Euro. From an economic point of view the outsourcing could make sense, especially 
if it is related to auxiliary functions. However, if the capital allocation was not efficient 
in case of the planned direct investment, it will not be efficient in case of the 
outsourcing. Therefore, it would be better from a competitiveness point of view to not 
restrict the investment of the parent company A in country C by a residence-based 
taxation but instead to allow the deferral of income (in case of a subsidiary). This is 
not only true for the allocation of key functions but in the same way for less 
substantial functions. Outsourcing should not be more attractive compared to a direct 
investment just because of the application of a residence-based taxation. The 
outcome of the example would even be the same when both - company A and the 
third party service provider - were able to reduce the costs connected with those 
services from 100 to 95 Euro in case of a relocation to country C.79 Therefore, the 
difference in tax rates combined with the application of a residence-based taxation 
will not lead to an efficient allocation of capital but rather to a distortion of 
competitiveness.  
 
2.5.3. Intra-Group Transfer and Use of Tangible and Intangible Property 
 
The intra-group transfer of tangible and intangible goods from a group company (e.g. 
parent company) to another group company (e.g. subsidiary) should be treated in the 
same way as the sale of property to an unrelated party. The gain realised is therefore 
attributable and taxable in the country of the seller. The subsequent income received 
by the purchaser from the making available of the property to other group companies 
is treated in the same way as outlined above with respect to the first three 
components, i.e. the compensation for write-offs of the property concerned, a 
compensation for maintaining the property, and a compensation for bearing the risks. 
These three components are now attributable to the purchaser. The original 
connection to the seller (e.g. parent company) does not exist any longer. To a certain 
extent it can be seen as a mixture of the aforementioned relocation of production 
activities and service activities. First, the transfer of property is accompanied by a - 
more or less extensive - capital transfer. Second, the property is made available to  
group companies by an agreement which encompasses the service functions of the 
subsidiary. In my opinion, the fact that the property is transferred within a group of 
companies followed by an intra-group service agreement is not to be treated 
differently from a third party transaction. The leasing out of tangible property or the 
exploitation of rights is not necessarily to be made by the group company which 
originally purchased or produced the property or developed the right. However, this is 
only true where the voluntary transfer of property is exercised on an arm’s length 
basis. This requires that the estimated earnings of the right are taken into 
consideration for the determination of the sales price, e.g. by applying the discounted 
cash flow method. In this case, the seller and the purchaser receive the profit share 
which reflects the new structure and therefore the new functional allocation within the 
group of companies.  
                                            
78 103.61 Euro minus 36.26 Euro tax reduction (35 percent).  
79 Under the assumption that the third party reduces the price to a level where the after-tax result in country C is 
equal to the function and risks connected to those services - which is very likely.  
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by the purchaser from the making available of the property to other group companies 
is treated in the same way as outlined above with respect to the first three 
components, i.e. the compensation for write-offs of the property concerned, a 
compensation for maintaining the property, and a compensation for bearing the risks. 
These three components are now attributable to the purchaser. The original 
connection to the seller (e.g. parent company) does not exist any longer. To a certain 
extent it can be seen as a mixture of the aforementioned relocation of production 
activities and service activities. First, the transfer of property is accompanied by a - 
more or less extensive - capital transfer. Second, the property is made available to  
group companies by an agreement which encompasses the service functions of the 
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differently from a third party transaction. The leasing out of tangible property or the 
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78 103.61 Euro minus 36.26 Euro tax reduction (35 percent).  
79 Under the assumption that the third party reduces the price to a level where the after-tax result in country C is 
equal to the function and risks connected to those services - which is very likely.  
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It is quite obvious that the expectations of an equity investor and a loan investor may 
be different. Suppose company A invests in the equity of company B (alternative 1). 
The expectations regarding the return on investment in the form of dividend 
payments or subsequent capital gains on the disposal of shares reflect the risks and 
therefore the possibilities of the activity of company B itself. It is therefore not only a 
risk-free rate of return which is expected but an appropriate premium which covers 
the increased risks inherent in the activity of company B. The mere provision of loan 
amounts to company B (alternative 2) - in this example without any parallel equity 
investment of company A in company B - may lead to a different outcome. Similar to 
the equity investor, company A requires a certain minimum rate of return (risk-free 
rate of return). In addition thereto, a credit risk premium must be included in the 
interest payments in order to cover the risks related to the activity of company B. 
Depending on the circumstances the credit risk premium can be similar to the 
expectations of an equity investor. This would be the case, for example, where 
company A is the only creditor of company B, where the amount of equity in company 
B is relatively low, and where no hidden reserves and goodwill are included in the 
assets and the business activities of company B. In such a case, the risk position of a 
creditor becomes comparable to the risk position of a theoretical equity investor, and 
this would require a comparable expectation regarding the return on investment. 
However, apart from this rather extreme case, e.g. where company A is not the only 
investor and company B has sufficient equity, the risk premium included in the 
interest rate is lower than the expected risk premium of the equity investor. The 
income which is the basis for subsequent dividend payments (or which will be 
retained in state B) and the subsequent interest payments is, in both cases, “created” 
by an economic activity carried on in state B. It is therefore consistent, as already 
outlined above, to tax this newly created income in state B. Such a strict source-










   
 
country B only. The shares held in company B and the financial means on the bank 
account of company A are financed by equity. Company A decides to increase the 
share capital of company B by 10 million Euro in order to enable company B to 
purchase a new and highly sophisticated machine to improve the manufacturing 
process.  
 
This is a typical situation of direct investment. Based on the principles outlined above 
the expenses related to the machine (write-off of the machine, maintaining the 
machine) as well as the savings which can be realised by the new machine will be 
taxed in country B. From an economic perspective, the amount of capital in the form 
of financial means will be converted into a tangible asset - and perhaps auxiliary 
expenses. From a competitiveness point of view there is no other alternative - in my 
opinion - than to tax the profit realised by this investment in the source country B.  
 
If in an alternative scenario the amount of 10 million Euro is re-financed by a bank 
loan (i.e. company A pays interest to the bank for the amount of capital increase in 
company B), the interest expenses are economically connected to the business 
activities in country B. From an economic standpoint, the expenses should not 
reduce the taxable result in country A but should be deducted from the income in 
country B.80 However, most often this economic requirement is not in line with 
international tax practice, i.e. the interest expenses incurred in country A (by 
company A) cannot be deducted from the taxable result in country B (by company B).  
 
Another alternative could be for company A to grant an inter-company loan to 
company B instead of increasing the share capital. Consequently, a source-based 
taxation would result in the same overall tax burden as if the amount were transferred 
by capital increase. This is not true with respect to the taxation of the legal entities 
involved since the taxable income of company B is reduced by the amount of interest 
paid and the taxable income of company A (in country B) is increased by the 
equivalent amount, but this does not matter from an economic point of view. What 
actually matters here is the fact that the overall tax burden is the same since it is 

















                                            
80 See also Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part 
II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (320); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking 
of Models, page 79. 
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It is quite obvious that the expectations of an equity investor and a loan investor may 
be different. Suppose company A invests in the equity of company B (alternative 1). 
The expectations regarding the return on investment in the form of dividend 
payments or subsequent capital gains on the disposal of shares reflect the risks and 
therefore the possibilities of the activity of company B itself. It is therefore not only a 
risk-free rate of return which is expected but an appropriate premium which covers 
the increased risks inherent in the activity of company B. The mere provision of loan 
amounts to company B (alternative 2) - in this example without any parallel equity 
investment of company A in company B - may lead to a different outcome. Similar to 
the equity investor, company A requires a certain minimum rate of return (risk-free 
rate of return). In addition thereto, a credit risk premium must be included in the 
interest payments in order to cover the risks related to the activity of company B. 
Depending on the circumstances the credit risk premium can be similar to the 
expectations of an equity investor. This would be the case, for example, where 
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B is relatively low, and where no hidden reserves and goodwill are included in the 
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creditor becomes comparable to the risk position of a theoretical equity investor, and 
this would require a comparable expectation regarding the return on investment. 
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by an economic activity carried on in state B. It is therefore consistent, as already 
outlined above, to tax this newly created income in state B. Such a strict source-
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opinion - than to tax the profit realised by this investment in the source country B.  
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loan (i.e. company A pays interest to the bank for the amount of capital increase in 
company B), the interest expenses are economically connected to the business 
activities in country B. From an economic standpoint, the expenses should not 
reduce the taxable result in country A but should be deducted from the income in 
country B.80 However, most often this economic requirement is not in line with 
international tax practice, i.e. the interest expenses incurred in country A (by 
company A) cannot be deducted from the taxable result in country B (by company B).  
 
Another alternative could be for company A to grant an inter-company loan to 
company B instead of increasing the share capital. Consequently, a source-based 
taxation would result in the same overall tax burden as if the amount were transferred 
by capital increase. This is not true with respect to the taxation of the legal entities 
involved since the taxable income of company B is reduced by the amount of interest 
paid and the taxable income of company A (in country B) is increased by the 
equivalent amount, but this does not matter from an economic point of view. What 
actually matters here is the fact that the overall tax burden is the same since it is 

















                                            
80 See also Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part 
II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (320); Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking 
of Models, page 79. 
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to the risk inherent in the loan amount granted to company B (due to the fact that 
there are no other activities carried out by company C and the loan amount granted 
to company B is the only substantial asset), the interest payment should be identical 





                    7% interest (loan A-C) 
 
 






From an economic perspective, the total amount of income related to the interest 
payment is produced in state B and should therefore be taxed in state B.82 The 
interposition of company C does not lead to any other economic conclusion. If the 
underlying system does not provide for a source-based taxation but a residence-
based taxation, the income will be taxed in state A. The reason is that state B, in this 
situation, normally provides for a deduction of the complete amount of interest 
expenses for income tax purposes. The same will be true in state C, where the 
interest paid to state A will be deducted from the interest income derived from state 
B. Thus, in such a scenario, the complete amount of interest will be taxed in the 
hands of company A in state A. This is only true to the extent that a possible 
withholding tax is not taken into account. This would otherwise lead to a limited 
taxation at source. It must be repeated, however, that the residence-based taxation is 
not the preferred solution (non-optimal scenario).  
 
The outcome can be different where the finance company C carries out additional 
functions. If, for example, the finance company C is in a position to split-up the 
amount and to invest in different loan amounts of borrowers in state B with the effect 
that the overall risk of investment is reduced, albeit each amount of investment bears 
a comparable amount of risk, the additional functions of the finance company C have 
to be taken into account. It should either lead to a reduction of the interest amount 
payable to company A or to a service fee charged to company A. In any case, 
finance company C derives income which is allocable to the exercising of asset 
management functions. The overall risk of the loan investment of company A is 







                                            
81 This case would lead to additional tax related questions and may therefore be quite theoretical. However, the 
alternative is nonetheless useful to clarify the economic aspects. 
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2.5.4.2. The Interest Component of Capital and Intra-Group Finance Activities  
 
In the following alternatives, which are an extension of the basic scenario outlined 
above, shareholder A - an individual who is resident in country A - holds all of the 
shares in holding company A which, in turn, is the sole shareholder of two subsidiary 
companies in countries B and C. The business activity of company A encompasses 
the holding of shares in the subsidiary companies. Company B is engaged in the 
manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods to customers in country B 
whereas company C is responsible for the intra-group financing, which is - for 
reasons of simplification - in the alternatives mentioned limited to the financing of the 
activities of company B. The income tax rate in county C is lower than the income tax 
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
financing activities. 
(4) Loan agreement between the companies A and C.  
(5) Loan agreement between the companies C and B. 
 
It is assumed in the following that the loan amount granted by company A to 
company C is exactly as high as the loan amount granted by company C to company 
B. In general, the principles outlined earlier are equally relevant. However, it might be 
interesting to have a closer look at some of the possible scenarios. For example, if it 
is further assumed, for theoretical purposes, that finance company C does not 
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to the risk inherent in the loan amount granted to company B (due to the fact that 
there are no other activities carried out by company C and the loan amount granted 
to company B is the only substantial asset), the interest payment should be identical 
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From an economic perspective, the total amount of income related to the interest 
payment is produced in state B and should therefore be taxed in state B.82 The 
interposition of company C does not lead to any other economic conclusion. If the 
underlying system does not provide for a source-based taxation but a residence-
based taxation, the income will be taxed in state A. The reason is that state B, in this 
situation, normally provides for a deduction of the complete amount of interest 
expenses for income tax purposes. The same will be true in state C, where the 
interest paid to state A will be deducted from the interest income derived from state 
B. Thus, in such a scenario, the complete amount of interest will be taxed in the 
hands of company A in state A. This is only true to the extent that a possible 
withholding tax is not taken into account. This would otherwise lead to a limited 
taxation at source. It must be repeated, however, that the residence-based taxation is 
not the preferred solution (non-optimal scenario).  
 
The outcome can be different where the finance company C carries out additional 
functions. If, for example, the finance company C is in a position to split-up the 
amount and to invest in different loan amounts of borrowers in state B with the effect 
that the overall risk of investment is reduced, albeit each amount of investment bears 
a comparable amount of risk, the additional functions of the finance company C have 
to be taken into account. It should either lead to a reduction of the interest amount 
payable to company A or to a service fee charged to company A. In any case, 
finance company C derives income which is allocable to the exercising of asset 
management functions. The overall risk of the loan investment of company A is 







                                            
81 This case would lead to additional tax related questions and may therefore be quite theoretical. However, the 
alternative is nonetheless useful to clarify the economic aspects. 
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2.5.4.2. The Interest Component of Capital and Intra-Group Finance Activities  
 
In the following alternatives, which are an extension of the basic scenario outlined 
above, shareholder A - an individual who is resident in country A - holds all of the 
shares in holding company A which, in turn, is the sole shareholder of two subsidiary 
companies in countries B and C. The business activity of company A encompasses 
the holding of shares in the subsidiary companies. Company B is engaged in the 
manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods to customers in country B 
whereas company C is responsible for the intra-group financing, which is - for 
reasons of simplification - in the alternatives mentioned limited to the financing of the 
activities of company B. The income tax rate in county C is lower than the income tax 
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
financing activities. 
(4) Loan agreement between the companies A and C.  
(5) Loan agreement between the companies C and B. 
 
It is assumed in the following that the loan amount granted by company A to 
company C is exactly as high as the loan amount granted by company C to company 
B. In general, the principles outlined earlier are equally relevant. However, it might be 
interesting to have a closer look at some of the possible scenarios. For example, if it 
is further assumed, for theoretical purposes, that finance company C does not 
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difference between the interest received from company B and the interest paid to 
company A. 
 
Again, in an intra-group relationship it is certainly possible to reduce the economic 
activity of an intermediate finance company to a relatively low level.84 Nonetheless, it 
is clear that even minor services (functions) carried out by company C require - from 
a transfer pricing perspective - an appropriate compensation. These (minor) services 
may be charged separately, e.g. on the basis of comparable uncontrolled prices or - 
due to the lack of such information - based on a cost-plus system. Often, the service 
recipients will be the companies receiving the financial means, but it is also possible 
that the services are provided towards the parent company. The latter depends on 
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In this alternative, a residence-based system (non-optimal scenario) normally results 
in a taxation of 4 percent interest income in state A. The difference of 3 percent in 
state C encompasses the risk component which was described earlier and which 
includes the following elements: the expected differences in real interest rate and 
inflation rate with respect to a long term investment, the liquidity premium and, of 
course, the credit risk related to company B. It is obvious that those risks may directly 
affect the tax base of company C: if the development of the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate was not properly estimated, the variable interest rate of the loan A-C will 
increase more than expected and will reduce the interest spread (since the 7 percent 
interest rate of the loan C-B is fixed). In addition, the capital invested in the loan 
amount C-B cannot be used for any other activities. It may be difficult to transfer the 
loan receivable to any other party and to request an earlier repayment. This, of 
course, can also lead to difficulties for finance company C, e.g. in case a more 
expensive refinancing is required for another (parallel) investment. Furthermore, it is 
the risk related to the borrower which may have a significant impact on the tax base 
of company C, especially if company B is unable to repay the principal amount of 
investment. The latter situation can lead to a significant loss for company C. These 
risks will not have any direct impact on company A since the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate will be permanently adjusted. A possible default of company B - and 
subsequently company C - will not affect, at least not directly, the income of company 
A, because the loan investment is secured by the guarantee provided in favour of the 
                                            
84 The question of “minimum activity” will be discussed later on in more detail. 
85 It is obvious that the spread is - to a substantial part - caused by the state guarantee. The exact percentage 
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In principle, the total amount of interest related to the loan between company C and 
the borrowers in state B must be created in state B through the economic activity 
carried on in the latter state. However, it cannot be ignored that the asset 
management functions of company C lead to additional income which is allocable to 
state C (if it is assumed that the economic activity is carried on in state C). The “net 
income” created economically is 6.50 percent in state B and 0.50 percent in state C. 
A source-based taxation in an optimal economic scenario would therefore require the 
taxation in those two countries according to the income produced.83 Again, and in 
contrast thereto, a residence-based taxation (without considering a possible 
withholding tax) would lead to a taxation in state C (0.50 percent) and state A (6.50 
percent). 
 
One could even go one step further and assume, just for theoretical purposes, that 
the loan amount of company A is provided on a variable basis, i.e. the interest rate is 
subject to permanent adjustments, and can be requested for repayment at any time. 
It shall further be assumed that finance company C receives a state guarantee in 
favour of company A for the full repayment of the principal amount of loan including 
pro rata interest (at any time) and that the credit risk is therefore eliminated. It shall 
be assumed, in this example, that the state guarantee is provided free of charge, i.e. 
that the state is supporting the activity. It is clear, of course, that the guarantee which 
eliminates the credit risk would usually require a compensation. However, the latter 
aspect does not change the conclusion related to the basic interest component and 
the conclusion related to the comparison between a loan investment and an equity 
investment. In my opinion, such an assumption simplifies the comparison and makes 
the relevant aspects more visible. The variable loan agreement shall reflect, for 
theoretical purposes, the basic interest component. Finance company C invests the 
amount provided by company A in a long-term loan granted to company B (only) with 
a fixed interest rate of 7 percent. In this alternative, the activities of finance company 
C do not lead to any substantial economic output in state C, i.e. no additional asset 
management functions are performed in state C. Moreover, it shall be assumed that 
the very limited functions carried on in state C are compensated separately, e.g. 
through service fees, and that the structure is not to be considered abusive or leads 
to any other similar conclusion (because of the fact that there is no substantial activity 
carried on in state C). Theoretically, under the aforementioned assumptions the 
compensation for the state guarantee would encompass a substantial part of the 
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difference between the interest received from company B and the interest paid to 
company A. 
 
Again, in an intra-group relationship it is certainly possible to reduce the economic 
activity of an intermediate finance company to a relatively low level.84 Nonetheless, it 
is clear that even minor services (functions) carried out by company C require - from 
a transfer pricing perspective - an appropriate compensation. These (minor) services 
may be charged separately, e.g. on the basis of comparable uncontrolled prices or - 
due to the lack of such information - based on a cost-plus system. Often, the service 
recipients will be the companies receiving the financial means, but it is also possible 
that the services are provided towards the parent company. The latter depends on 
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In this alternative, a residence-based system (non-optimal scenario) normally results 
in a taxation of 4 percent interest income in state A. The difference of 3 percent in 
state C encompasses the risk component which was described earlier and which 
includes the following elements: the expected differences in real interest rate and 
inflation rate with respect to a long term investment, the liquidity premium and, of 
course, the credit risk related to company B. It is obvious that those risks may directly 
affect the tax base of company C: if the development of the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate was not properly estimated, the variable interest rate of the loan A-C will 
increase more than expected and will reduce the interest spread (since the 7 percent 
interest rate of the loan C-B is fixed). In addition, the capital invested in the loan 
amount C-B cannot be used for any other activities. It may be difficult to transfer the 
loan receivable to any other party and to request an earlier repayment. This, of 
course, can also lead to difficulties for finance company C, e.g. in case a more 
expensive refinancing is required for another (parallel) investment. Furthermore, it is 
the risk related to the borrower which may have a significant impact on the tax base 
of company C, especially if company B is unable to repay the principal amount of 
investment. The latter situation can lead to a significant loss for company C. These 
risks will not have any direct impact on company A since the real interest rate and the 
inflation rate will be permanently adjusted. A possible default of company B - and 
subsequently company C - will not affect, at least not directly, the income of company 
A, because the loan investment is secured by the guarantee provided in favour of the 
                                            
84 The question of “minimum activity” will be discussed later on in more detail. 
85 It is obvious that the spread is - to a substantial part - caused by the state guarantee. The exact percentage 
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In principle, the total amount of interest related to the loan between company C and 
the borrowers in state B must be created in state B through the economic activity 
carried on in the latter state. However, it cannot be ignored that the asset 
management functions of company C lead to additional income which is allocable to 
state C (if it is assumed that the economic activity is carried on in state C). The “net 
income” created economically is 6.50 percent in state B and 0.50 percent in state C. 
A source-based taxation in an optimal economic scenario would therefore require the 
taxation in those two countries according to the income produced.83 Again, and in 
contrast thereto, a residence-based taxation (without considering a possible 
withholding tax) would lead to a taxation in state C (0.50 percent) and state A (6.50 
percent). 
 
One could even go one step further and assume, just for theoretical purposes, that 
the loan amount of company A is provided on a variable basis, i.e. the interest rate is 
subject to permanent adjustments, and can be requested for repayment at any time. 
It shall further be assumed that finance company C receives a state guarantee in 
favour of company A for the full repayment of the principal amount of loan including 
pro rata interest (at any time) and that the credit risk is therefore eliminated. It shall 
be assumed, in this example, that the state guarantee is provided free of charge, i.e. 
that the state is supporting the activity. It is clear, of course, that the guarantee which 
eliminates the credit risk would usually require a compensation. However, the latter 
aspect does not change the conclusion related to the basic interest component and 
the conclusion related to the comparison between a loan investment and an equity 
investment. In my opinion, such an assumption simplifies the comparison and makes 
the relevant aspects more visible. The variable loan agreement shall reflect, for 
theoretical purposes, the basic interest component. Finance company C invests the 
amount provided by company A in a long-term loan granted to company B (only) with 
a fixed interest rate of 7 percent. In this alternative, the activities of finance company 
C do not lead to any substantial economic output in state C, i.e. no additional asset 
management functions are performed in state C. Moreover, it shall be assumed that 
the very limited functions carried on in state C are compensated separately, e.g. 
through service fees, and that the structure is not to be considered abusive or leads 
to any other similar conclusion (because of the fact that there is no substantial activity 
carried on in state C). Theoretically, under the aforementioned assumptions the 
compensation for the state guarantee would encompass a substantial part of the 
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neither connected to any income-production in state C nor does it reflect any risk 
compensation element in the relationship C-B. In fact, I do not see any (other) 
economic reason - in such a situation - for a preferred taxation of the basic interest 
income in state C. The income which is related to the basic interest component 
should therefore be taxed - in the absence of an optimal scenario - in the residence 
state of the company which provides the capital in return for interest payments. Of 
course, the question can be raised whether any adjustment of the variable interest 
rate should be treated differently, because any increase or decrease in the variable 
rate is (theoretically) part of the expected risk which is included in the fixed interest 
rate of the loan amount granted to company B. However, I do not think that this is 
required: in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation of interest income 
it is consistent to tax any type of risk premium in state C and to allow for a reduction 
of the tax base for all types of actual risks related to the risk component. This is not 
only true for the risks related to the liquidity premium and the credit risk premium, but 
is equally true for an increase in the real interest rate and the inflation rate (and 
therefore an increase in the interest rate of the loan amount A-C). In turn, the actual 
amount of interest which is deducted from the tax base in state C should be taxed in 
state A as interest income. The same would be true, of course, in an alternative 
scenario where the loan amount A-C does not only encompass the (actual) basic 
interest component, but also risk elements. The latter elements would have to be 
taxed in state A.89 Again, this is merely the consequence of a consistent application 
of the system of a residence-based taxation of interest income (non-optimal 
scenario). Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn from the alternatives above: 
 
- the interest income should be taxed in the state in which the income is 
produced, namely in state B (optimal scenario); 
 
- the income which is produced in state C, e.g. from asset management 
activities, should be taxed in state C (optimal scenario); 
 
- in case of a residence-based taxation of interest income, the income spread in 
state C which is related to the taking over of the investment risks should be 
taxed in the state in which the risk is taken directly (state C). The same 
principle applies to a possible income spread included in the interest income of 
state A (non-optimal scenario); 
 
- in case of a residence-based taxation of interest income, the basic interest 
component should be taxed in the residence state of the company which 
provides the capital in return for interest payments (non-optimal scenario). 
 
 The question arises whether the economic result should be different in a situation 
where company A does not grant a loan to company C but transfers the necessary 







                                            
89 Which, however, is not the case in this example. 
   
 
latter company.86 In the absence of an optimal economic situation - which would 
require the taxation in state B - the question arises whether, from a merely economic 
perspective, the aforementioned allocation is an acceptable - but still non-optimal - 
scenario. In this regard, it is essential to recognise that all of the risk elements which 
lead to the positive income spread in state C can equally result in negative income in 
state C. Theoretically, there should be a balance between the compensation for 
taking the risks, on the one hand, and the likelihood of negative consequences 
caused by such risks as well as the possible impact of such risks, on the other hand. 
In other words, the higher the risks, the higher the compensation (and therefore the 
spread in state C). Based on the previous conclusions, the current taxation of the 
income spread (the risk spread!) in state A can negatively affect the competitiveness 
of the group. Even though the income is not produced in state C (but in state B) the 
group structure results in the allocation of (part of) the risks of the activities to state C 
- through the provision of a loan amount. If this results in the taxation of the positive 
income in state C - due to the double tax convention concluded between state B and 
state C - it is required that the negative income is taken into account in state C, too. 
The (additional) current taxation of the income spread in state A at a higher rate can 
take away part of the profits which are required for a (subsequent) loss compensation 
on a group level. It would have similar effects as the current taxation of income 
produced in state B. Therefore, if the taxation of the risk elements cannot take place 
in the state in which the risk elements are produced (state B), the “second best” 
solution is the taxation in the state to which the elements were shifted according to 
the existing double tax convention, because the “risks remain risks” - even in case 
they are partly shifted to another state.  
 
The conclusion is different, though, for the interest income related to the loan amount 
A-C which shall be equal to the basic interest component. Even though the loan 
amount was transferred to company B - and is therefore “indirectly involved” in the 
activities which are subject to an increased risk - it should be recognised that the 
compensation for the loan amount A-C is not a compensation to cover those 
increased risks. The interest income includes the compensation for the (actual) real 
interest rate and the (actual) inflation rate. Such compensation is required for the 
“lending of money” (real interest rate) and the “maintaining” of the capital (inflation 
premium). Thus, as long as the capital is “used” by company C - for whatever activity 
- the latter company has to pay “the lending rate and the maintenance fee” for the 
provision of capital. The question whether the capital is utilised for a successful or an 
unsuccessful activity is, at least in this example, not directly relevant for company A. 
Eventually, the interest income which is paid by company B to company C, and by 
company C to company A, must be produced in state B. An optimal scenario would 
therefore require the taxation in state B. However, if the double tax conventions 
involved are based on the OECD-MTC, the interest income of company A will finally 
be taxed in state A.87 Of course, there may be a taxation of the interest in state B and 
state C, but the taxation is limited.88  
 
In my opinion, this is - under the given circumstances of a residence-based taxation - 
an acceptable outcome. There is no preference, in my opinion, for a taxation of the 4 
percent interest income in state C instead of state A. The 4 percent interest income is 
                                            
86 Leaving aside any consequences in relation to the (parallel) shareholding. 
87 Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC. 
88 Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC provides for a taxation of the interest which shall not exceed 10 percent of 
the gross amount of interest.  
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neither connected to any income-production in state C nor does it reflect any risk 
compensation element in the relationship C-B. In fact, I do not see any (other) 
economic reason - in such a situation - for a preferred taxation of the basic interest 
income in state C. The income which is related to the basic interest component 
should therefore be taxed - in the absence of an optimal scenario - in the residence 
state of the company which provides the capital in return for interest payments. Of 
course, the question can be raised whether any adjustment of the variable interest 
rate should be treated differently, because any increase or decrease in the variable 
rate is (theoretically) part of the expected risk which is included in the fixed interest 
rate of the loan amount granted to company B. However, I do not think that this is 
required: in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation of interest income 
it is consistent to tax any type of risk premium in state C and to allow for a reduction 
of the tax base for all types of actual risks related to the risk component. This is not 
only true for the risks related to the liquidity premium and the credit risk premium, but 
is equally true for an increase in the real interest rate and the inflation rate (and 
therefore an increase in the interest rate of the loan amount A-C). In turn, the actual 
amount of interest which is deducted from the tax base in state C should be taxed in 
state A as interest income. The same would be true, of course, in an alternative 
scenario where the loan amount A-C does not only encompass the (actual) basic 
interest component, but also risk elements. The latter elements would have to be 
taxed in state A.89 Again, this is merely the consequence of a consistent application 
of the system of a residence-based taxation of interest income (non-optimal 
scenario). Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn from the alternatives above: 
 
- the interest income should be taxed in the state in which the income is 
produced, namely in state B (optimal scenario); 
 
- the income which is produced in state C, e.g. from asset management 
activities, should be taxed in state C (optimal scenario); 
 
- in case of a residence-based taxation of interest income, the income spread in 
state C which is related to the taking over of the investment risks should be 
taxed in the state in which the risk is taken directly (state C). The same 
principle applies to a possible income spread included in the interest income of 
state A (non-optimal scenario); 
 
- in case of a residence-based taxation of interest income, the basic interest 
component should be taxed in the residence state of the company which 
provides the capital in return for interest payments (non-optimal scenario). 
 
 The question arises whether the economic result should be different in a situation 
where company A does not grant a loan to company C but transfers the necessary 
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latter company.86 In the absence of an optimal economic situation - which would 
require the taxation in state B - the question arises whether, from a merely economic 
perspective, the aforementioned allocation is an acceptable - but still non-optimal - 
scenario. In this regard, it is essential to recognise that all of the risk elements which 
lead to the positive income spread in state C can equally result in negative income in 
state C. Theoretically, there should be a balance between the compensation for 
taking the risks, on the one hand, and the likelihood of negative consequences 
caused by such risks as well as the possible impact of such risks, on the other hand. 
In other words, the higher the risks, the higher the compensation (and therefore the 
spread in state C). Based on the previous conclusions, the current taxation of the 
income spread (the risk spread!) in state A can negatively affect the competitiveness 
of the group. Even though the income is not produced in state C (but in state B) the 
group structure results in the allocation of (part of) the risks of the activities to state C 
- through the provision of a loan amount. If this results in the taxation of the positive 
income in state C - due to the double tax convention concluded between state B and 
state C - it is required that the negative income is taken into account in state C, too. 
The (additional) current taxation of the income spread in state A at a higher rate can 
take away part of the profits which are required for a (subsequent) loss compensation 
on a group level. It would have similar effects as the current taxation of income 
produced in state B. Therefore, if the taxation of the risk elements cannot take place 
in the state in which the risk elements are produced (state B), the “second best” 
solution is the taxation in the state to which the elements were shifted according to 
the existing double tax convention, because the “risks remain risks” - even in case 
they are partly shifted to another state.  
 
The conclusion is different, though, for the interest income related to the loan amount 
A-C which shall be equal to the basic interest component. Even though the loan 
amount was transferred to company B - and is therefore “indirectly involved” in the 
activities which are subject to an increased risk - it should be recognised that the 
compensation for the loan amount A-C is not a compensation to cover those 
increased risks. The interest income includes the compensation for the (actual) real 
interest rate and the (actual) inflation rate. Such compensation is required for the 
“lending of money” (real interest rate) and the “maintaining” of the capital (inflation 
premium). Thus, as long as the capital is “used” by company C - for whatever activity 
- the latter company has to pay “the lending rate and the maintenance fee” for the 
provision of capital. The question whether the capital is utilised for a successful or an 
unsuccessful activity is, at least in this example, not directly relevant for company A. 
Eventually, the interest income which is paid by company B to company C, and by 
company C to company A, must be produced in state B. An optimal scenario would 
therefore require the taxation in state B. However, if the double tax conventions 
involved are based on the OECD-MTC, the interest income of company A will finally 
be taxed in state A.87 Of course, there may be a taxation of the interest in state B and 
state C, but the taxation is limited.88  
 
In my opinion, this is - under the given circumstances of a residence-based taxation - 
an acceptable outcome. There is no preference, in my opinion, for a taxation of the 4 
percent interest income in state C instead of state A. The 4 percent interest income is 
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However, one should be careful to avoid mixing up the result of intra-group legal 
structures with purely economic questions. Vogel pointed out that if it were correct 
that tax neutrality requires exclusive taxation of the profits derived by the country of 
the investment, then it would be non-neutral to deduct interest paid or deemed paid 
to the parent company or home enterprise from the gross income of the subsidiary or 
branch and to add it to the income of the head enterprise. The juridical cloak 
assigned to a transfer of money as debt rather than equity cannot change this 
economic reasoning.92 However, if complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the focus 
must be - in my opinion and from an economic point of view - on competitiveness. 
Here we have an important difference between the residence-based taxation (without 
deferral of income) in general, and the limitation of a residence-based taxation to the 
amount which equals the basic interest component included in the respective income. 
The first form is a system which affects competitiveness in a - from my point of view - 
non-acceptable way since it leads to the outcome that the whole foreign income is 
taxed according to the tax system of the residence country and which therefore also 
comprises the functions and risks exercised abroad. If the taxation in the residence-
country is significantly higher, the taxation will lead to a distortion of competitiveness 
and the group theoretically will pay for goods and services which were never 
provided. The second form concentrates the residence-based taxation on income 
solely derived from the use of capital. However, it is not the actual yield which can be 
derived by finance company C which matters here (otherwise it would be equally 
distorting competitiveness), but the yield which could be derived as a minimum 
compensation by utilising the existing capital.  
 
Taking the aforementioned arguments into consideration, it can be said that 
safeguarding competitiveness is especially relevant in two situations. First, where an 
international company operates in a foreign market and has therefore to compete 
with local companies and subsidiaries of other multinational companies in the 
respective market and, second, where an international company separates and 
relocates functions and risks to other foreign companies. The latter is quite similar to 
the first situation but is basically related to the overall competitiveness on a group 
level. Therefore, I feel that the focus should clearly be on the safeguarding of 
competitiveness with respect to functions exercised and risks taken. In both cases it 
is important that the profits related to the functions and risks are not taxed more 
heavily in comparison to third party activities in the foreign market. The source-based 
taxation is a way to avoid that the companies pay for goods and services which were 
never provided.  
 
If the outcome of a residence-based taxation (non-optimal scenario) is now compared 
to the outcome of a source-based taxation (optimal scenario), it is obvious that state 
B does not receive the share which is considered to be optimal from an economic 
perspective. In fact, the income which is taxable in state B can even be zero - in the 
absence of a withholding taxation or any other kind of source-based taxation (e.g. 
regular tax assessment). In contrast thereto, state C receives - pursuant to the non-
optimal system of a residence based taxation - the taxing rights for the total amount 
of interest income.  It is obvious, however, that the amount of interest income is not 
equal to the compensation for the exercise of functions and the taking over of risks. 
Of course, a minor part of the interest income might be seen - depending on the 
                                            
92 See Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), 
Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (320). 
 




                 A 






                                       equity investment (3) 
 
 




                                        loan agreement 
                               






(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
financing activities. 
(4) Loan agreement between the companies C and B.  
 
In this alternative, there is just an intra-group loan financing between companies C 
and B but not between companies A and C. In principle, the lender will not be able to 
achieve a higher interest rate compared to the aforementioned example. The whole 
amount of income is economically “created” in state B. A source-based taxation leads 
to the result that the income produced by company B is to be taxed in state B 
(optimal scenario). Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that - in this situation - the 
strict source-based taxation is not the typical solution provided for in double tax 
conventions which are based on the OECD-MTC.90 The majority of OECD-countries 
apply a residence-based taxation of interest income, even though sometimes 
accompanied by a withholding tax on the interest payments.91 According to this 
common treaty practice, the total amount of interest income is taxed in the residence 
country of the finance company C and not in the source country B. The optimal result 
from an economic point of view cannot be achieved - in the same way as in the 
alternative above. The question could therefore be raised whether, in this non-
optimal scenario, state A should have the equal right to tax part of the interest income 
or whether state C should have the preferred and exclusive right to tax the income 
received by the finance company.  
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However, one should be careful to avoid mixing up the result of intra-group legal 
structures with purely economic questions. Vogel pointed out that if it were correct 
that tax neutrality requires exclusive taxation of the profits derived by the country of 
the investment, then it would be non-neutral to deduct interest paid or deemed paid 
to the parent company or home enterprise from the gross income of the subsidiary or 
branch and to add it to the income of the head enterprise. The juridical cloak 
assigned to a transfer of money as debt rather than equity cannot change this 
economic reasoning.92 However, if complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the focus 
must be - in my opinion and from an economic point of view - on competitiveness. 
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The first form is a system which affects competitiveness in a - from my point of view - 
non-acceptable way since it leads to the outcome that the whole foreign income is 
taxed according to the tax system of the residence country and which therefore also 
comprises the functions and risks exercised abroad. If the taxation in the residence-
country is significantly higher, the taxation will lead to a distortion of competitiveness 
and the group theoretically will pay for goods and services which were never 
provided. The second form concentrates the residence-based taxation on income 
solely derived from the use of capital. However, it is not the actual yield which can be 
derived by finance company C which matters here (otherwise it would be equally 
distorting competitiveness), but the yield which could be derived as a minimum 
compensation by utilising the existing capital.  
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optimal system of a residence based taxation - the taxing rights for the total amount 
of interest income.  It is obvious, however, that the amount of interest income is not 
equal to the compensation for the exercise of functions and the taking over of risks. 
Of course, a minor part of the interest income might be seen - depending on the 
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of total tax burden - required by economic considerations in an optimal scenario. In 
my opinion, it could even be contrary to the aim pursued. The lower taxation could 
not only lead to an inefficient allocation of capital but would also lead to a competitive 
advantage which may be diametrical to the optimal economic solution - at least 
where the lower taxation also encompasses the basic interest component. In other 
words, if the income produced by a theoretical group of companies (group 1) is 
subject to a strict source-based taxation, the overall tax burden of a comparable 
group (group 2) which is subject to a non-optimal income taxation should not be 
subject to a considerably higher or lower overall taxation. Both situations, the higher 
and the lower overall taxation, would have a distorting effect on competitiveness. In 
essence, the fostering of a lower taxation would in this situation solely have the effect 
of safeguarding tax incentives and tax advantages.  
 
Thus, there is, in my opinion, no economic requirement for an exclusive taxation of 
the basic interest component in state C. As a consequence thereof, there is no 
economic necessity to refrain from taxing the basic interest component in state A. 
The decisive question is, however, whether the taxation of the basic interest 
component in state A should be limited to the percentage which was existent at the 
moment when the decision in favour of a fixed interest rate was taken (by company 
C) or whether any increase or decrease should be included in the tax base in state A, 
too. It was outlined earlier that the basic interest component is, in principle, to be 
determined on a rolling basis. However, the decision of company C for the 
acceptance of a fixed interest rate (instead of a variable interest rate) leads to 
additional risks assumed by the latter company. The reason is that the expected 
development is stipulated within the fixed interest rate - without any possibility for a 
further adjustment. It is therefore clear that any premium which compensates for the 
expected deviation from the existing basic interest component should be taxed in 
state C (in the absence of a taxation in state B).  
 
On the other hand, the basic interest component is considered to be the component 
which can be achieved without taking investment risks, i.e. without the assumption of 
credit risks and without the necessity of stipulating elements which are solely based 
on expectations. From the perspective of state A it is therefore the actual basic 
interest rate - similar to the situation of the variable loan amount - which should be 
included in the domestic tax base. The fact that company C takes over additional 
risks should not lead to another outcome (at least not as long as the actual income is 
as high as the basic interest component - I will come to that aspect below). The 
reason is that company C provides services which contain a (theoretically) separable 
interest component and this component is not produced in state C. State A should 
therefore have the right, from an economic perspective, to tax the basic interest 
income and the increase or decrease over the period of investment. 
 
One might argue that this results in a kind of “overlapping” of the taxation of the basic 
interest component and the risk component. However, in this respect it is important to 
note that any premium included in the (fixed) interest rate in order to cover such a 
risk is, in principle, only taxed in the state of the service company. The fact that any 
increase or decrease in the basic interest component is subject to current taxation in 
the state of the shareholder does not influence the taxation of the premium. 
Moreover, it has to be accepted that - with regard to the basic interest component - 
there are two different perspectives: the perspective of the state of the service 
company, where the expected increase or decrease has to be stipulated within the 
   
 
alternative - as the coverage of functions carried out in state C, e.g. if an asset 
management activity is carried on in state C and if such an activity produces 
additional income in the latter state. But if this is not the case, the interest income 
encompasses the basic interest component and the risk component - which are both 
produced in state B. It is obvious from the previous conclusions that state C should  
receive the share which is related to the income produced and the risks taken in state 
C. The question can be raised, therefore, whether state C should have - in the 
absence of an optimal scenario - the exclusive right to tax the basic interest 
component. It is merely the legal structure and the allocation of taxing rights under 
the double tax convention concluded between states B and C which leads to the 
taxation of the total amount of interest income in the latter state. It is therefore 
legitimate and important to clarify whether there is any economic preference for an 
exclusive taxation of the basic interest component in state C or whether the basic 
interest component may also be taxed in state A. As already outlined above, if 
complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the focus must be on the safeguarding of 
competitiveness. Of course, the income which is produced in state C should not be 
taxed more heavily than the income produced by any other market participant in state 
C. The basic interest component, however, is not produced in state C but in state B. 
This is clear from the alternatives outlined above and this economic fact cannot be 
changed by the alternative legal structures. Consequently, the income-producing 
activity in state B should not be taxed more heavily than those of the competitors 
operating in the same market, either. It should therefore be clear that even in this 
non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation in state C - or alternatively state 
A - the tax burden related to the basic interest component should not exceed the 
overall tax burden theoretically levied on the income produced in state B. This is not 
the case with respect to the low-tax state C. However, in case of income taxation in 
the high-tax state A, the tax levied on the income produced in state B should 
theoretically be restricted to the comparable income tax rate applicable in the latter 
state. Otherwise, the international group of companies consisting of companies A, B 
and C would suffer a competitive disadvantage.  
 
Of course, one could even go one step further and ask whether the lower taxation of 
the basic interest component in state C should be preferred, because it would lead to 
a lower taxation compared to countries A and B and therefore to a competitive 
advantage. However, one has to be very careful in this respect. If the starting point is 
the optimal result from an economic perspective, and it turns out that this would be a 
strict source-based taxation of the income produced in the respective countries, the 
question which company should be taxed is, in my opinion, only secondary. It is 
important to separate the income produced and to allocate the income to those 
countries where it is actually produced. In the alternatives above, the income is 
produced in country B (and in country C if an asset management activity is carried 
on). However, what is decisive in this respect is the fact that this economic allocation 
decision is, at the same time, a decision with respect to the applicable income tax 
rate. This is, of course, especially important from a competitiveness point of view. 
Again, the shifting of taxable income from state B to state C cannot be corrected in 
favour of state B (which would theoretically be necessary). In order to achieve the tax 
result on a group level which - in total - reflects the optimal result, the income portion 
of state B shifted to state C should not be taxed more heavily than in state B. 
However, whether the actual taxation is levied in state A or state C is not decisive 
since it cannot lead to the optimal result in either case. A competitive advantage 
which may be achieved through a lower taxation in state C exceeds what is - in terms 
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C) or whether any increase or decrease should be included in the tax base in state A, 
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acceptance of a fixed interest rate (instead of a variable interest rate) leads to 
additional risks assumed by the latter company. The reason is that the expected 
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further adjustment. It is therefore clear that any premium which compensates for the 
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state C (in the absence of a taxation in state B).  
 
On the other hand, the basic interest component is considered to be the component 
which can be achieved without taking investment risks, i.e. without the assumption of 
credit risks and without the necessity of stipulating elements which are solely based 
on expectations. From the perspective of state A it is therefore the actual basic 
interest rate - similar to the situation of the variable loan amount - which should be 
included in the domestic tax base. The fact that company C takes over additional 
risks should not lead to another outcome (at least not as long as the actual income is 
as high as the basic interest component - I will come to that aspect below). The 
reason is that company C provides services which contain a (theoretically) separable 
interest component and this component is not produced in state C. State A should 
therefore have the right, from an economic perspective, to tax the basic interest 
income and the increase or decrease over the period of investment. 
 
One might argue that this results in a kind of “overlapping” of the taxation of the basic 
interest component and the risk component. However, in this respect it is important to 
note that any premium included in the (fixed) interest rate in order to cover such a 
risk is, in principle, only taxed in the state of the service company. The fact that any 
increase or decrease in the basic interest component is subject to current taxation in 
the state of the shareholder does not influence the taxation of the premium. 
Moreover, it has to be accepted that - with regard to the basic interest component - 
there are two different perspectives: the perspective of the state of the service 
company, where the expected increase or decrease has to be stipulated within the 
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additional income in the latter state. But if this is not the case, the interest income 
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C. The question can be raised, therefore, whether state C should have - in the 
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component. It is merely the legal structure and the allocation of taxing rights under 
the double tax convention concluded between states B and C which leads to the 
taxation of the total amount of interest income in the latter state. It is therefore 
legitimate and important to clarify whether there is any economic preference for an 
exclusive taxation of the basic interest component in state C or whether the basic 
interest component may also be taxed in state A. As already outlined above, if 
complete neutrality cannot be achieved, the focus must be on the safeguarding of 
competitiveness. Of course, the income which is produced in state C should not be 
taxed more heavily than the income produced by any other market participant in state 
C. The basic interest component, however, is not produced in state C but in state B. 
This is clear from the alternatives outlined above and this economic fact cannot be 
changed by the alternative legal structures. Consequently, the income-producing 
activity in state B should not be taxed more heavily than those of the competitors 
operating in the same market, either. It should therefore be clear that even in this 
non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation in state C - or alternatively state 
A - the tax burden related to the basic interest component should not exceed the 
overall tax burden theoretically levied on the income produced in state B. This is not 
the case with respect to the low-tax state C. However, in case of income taxation in 
the high-tax state A, the tax levied on the income produced in state B should 
theoretically be restricted to the comparable income tax rate applicable in the latter 
state. Otherwise, the international group of companies consisting of companies A, B 
and C would suffer a competitive disadvantage.  
 
Of course, one could even go one step further and ask whether the lower taxation of 
the basic interest component in state C should be preferred, because it would lead to 
a lower taxation compared to countries A and B and therefore to a competitive 
advantage. However, one has to be very careful in this respect. If the starting point is 
the optimal result from an economic perspective, and it turns out that this would be a 
strict source-based taxation of the income produced in the respective countries, the 
question which company should be taxed is, in my opinion, only secondary. It is 
important to separate the income produced and to allocate the income to those 
countries where it is actually produced. In the alternatives above, the income is 
produced in country B (and in country C if an asset management activity is carried 
on). However, what is decisive in this respect is the fact that this economic allocation 
decision is, at the same time, a decision with respect to the applicable income tax 
rate. This is, of course, especially important from a competitiveness point of view. 
Again, the shifting of taxable income from state B to state C cannot be corrected in 
favour of state B (which would theoretically be necessary). In order to achieve the tax 
result on a group level which - in total - reflects the optimal result, the income portion 
of state B shifted to state C should not be taxed more heavily than in state B. 
However, whether the actual taxation is levied in state A or state C is not decisive 
since it cannot lead to the optimal result in either case. A competitive advantage 
which may be achieved through a lower taxation in state C exceeds what is - in terms 
Chapter 2
46
   
 
The situation of a finance company in state C which supports the business activities 
of company A is much clearer from an economic perspective and especially 
important in the context of this study. If the financial means are transferred as equity 
to company C which, in turn, transfers the amount back to the parent company A, the 
income should be taxed in state A. This, however, is only true to the extent that the 
income-producing activity is carried on in state A (and not in a third country). The 
taxation in state C must be limited to additional functions exercised which may lead to 
an additional value created in this state (e.g. cash pooling services, asset 
management services). This is completely in line with the general principles outlined 
earlier.  
 
2.5.4.3. The Interest Component of Capital and Portfolio Activities   
 
A similar situation exists where a company (company C) is interposed to invest liquid 
funds of the parent company A into the stock or bond market (portfolio investments) 
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(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is the intra-group cash 
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(fixed) interest rate, and the state of the shareholder which focuses on the taxation of 
the risk free component of the capital investment (minimum taxation). Both 
perspectives have to be recognised and accepted.    
 
However, it is important to note that - in contrast to the example above - no inter-
company loan relationship exists between company A and company C, and there is 
consequently no deduction of the interest payments from the tax base in the latter 
state. This requires the crediting of the taxes levied in state C on the basic interest 
income and theoretically even the reimbursement of exceeding taxes in order to 
avoid any double taxation. Depending on the situation, a possible withholding tax 
deducted in state B must also be taken into account in state A - to the extent that it 
has not been taken into consideration in state C. It is important, however, that the 
overall tax imposed on this income does not exceed the theoretical tax burden in 
state B. Moreover, such an approach requires that any income attribution is strictly 
limited to the actual amount of positive net income derived in state C. Any other 
approach would result in the taxation of income “which is not existent.” For example, 
if 7 percent income is created in state B and transferred by way of interest payments 
to state C, but the expenses in the latter country exceed the 7 percent interest 
income, e.g. because of the actual risks related to the investment, no positive income 
is derived in state B and state C (in total). In this situation, no current taxation of the 
basic interest component should take place in state A. However, if the interest 
income of 7 percent results in a net profit in state C of 2 percent (e.g. because of the 
revaluation of the loan receivable or the interest receivable), the current taxation of 
the basic interest component should be limited to the remaining 2 percent positive net 
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if the finance company taxes the dividends and capital gains with a relatively low 
income tax, this will not justify any current taxation in state A. Even in case of 
portfolio investments in shares one could theoretically think about a basic interest 
component. However, in contrast to the interest income the taxation of the underlying 
business profits actually occurred “at the right place” from a competitiveness point of 
view, i.e. in the country where the business activities are carried on. This is true for 
the whole profit generated and there is - in my opinion - no room and no necessity to 
calculate any theoretical interest component in this situation.  
 
2.5.4.4. The Interest Component of Capital and the Use of Tangible and 
Intangible Property  
 
Another alternative could be that company C is not a finance company but has the 
function of a leasing company. In this scenario, the holding company A decides to 
increase the share capital of company C by 10 million Euro in order to enable 
company C to purchase a new and highly sophisticated machine which will be 
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Also in this case, company A does not receive any direct interest income from the 
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Similar to the example above, the residence-based taxation of interest income in 
country C - for example from listed bonds - is a non-optimal result from an economic 
point of view and I do not see any distortion of competitiveness where country A 
taxes the basic interest component on a current basis. In the same way as outlined 
above, the taxes imposed in country C and non-credited taxes imposed in third 
countries have to be taken into account. Equally to what was outlined above, a 
differentiation has to be made: In an optimal scenario the complete interest payment 
from listed bonds would have to be taxed in the country in which the income-
producing activity is carried on. In a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation in country C a separation of the tax base between country A and country C is 
required. The income related to the functions exercised and risks taken in country C 
is allocable to country C, e.g. the asset management activities themselves. This is 
based on the principles outlined above with respect to direct investments. The same 
is true for the risk elements included in the interest payments which are treated in a 
similar way. However, the basic interest component itself can equally be taxed in 
country A as long as the taxes imposed do not exceed the taxes which would 
theoretically be imposed in the source country in which the income-producing activity 
is carried on.  
 
The situation with respect to portfolio dividends and capital gains realised by the 
disposal of portfolio investments in shares is different.93 In contrast to interest income 
the general question arises whether dividends and capital gains should be taxed at 
all, i.e. whether taxation should be limited to a taxation of the company which 
produces the income.94 If one follows the approach that the income should be taxed 
only once on the level of the company which produces the income, the subsequent 
taxation of the shareholder is - again - a non-optimal result from an economic point of 
view. As already outlined earlier, there are convincing arguments for a source-based 
taxation of portfolio income in general. However, a source-based taxation of 
dividends and capital gains does not mean that it is taxed on the level of the 
company which produces the income and subsequently again by the source-state 
(which is typically the same state). Any taxation in the aforementioned sense is to be 
seen as a strict limitation to a one-time taxation of the state where the income is 
produced, i.e. regularly the state of residence of the company or - in case of a 
permanent establishment - where the income producing activity is carried out.95  
 
However, a different conclusion has to be drawn for the residence-based taxation of 
interest income compared to the residence-based taxation of dividends and capital 
gains. The interest income requires a one-time taxation which should preferably take 
place in the state in which the income is produced (optimal scenario). If this is not the 
case, the income related to the carrying out of functions and the assumption of risks 
should be taxed in the state of the finance company (non-optimal scenario). The 
basic interest component, however, may be taxed in state A. In case of dividends and 
capital gains, the underlying profit is already taxed in the source state. Economically, 
there is no room for any additional taxation in the residence state. That means, even 
                                            
93 The underlying assumption in this example is that the company in which the portfolio investment is made is an 
“active” company which exercises functions comparable to those of company B.  
94 The capital gain itself does not necessarily reflect the amount of retained profits. Depending on the prospects 
of the business it will often contain future profit elements, i.e. profits which will be produced in future periods 
and which can only be subject to a theoretical dividend payment in the future.  
95 However, this could be different when the corporate income tax rate for retained profits is below the “normal” 
tax rate and the full taxation only occurs when the earnings are distributed to the shareholders. If this is the case, 
the taxation takes place in two steps instead of a one-time taxation of the company.   
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if the finance company taxes the dividends and capital gains with a relatively low 
income tax, this will not justify any current taxation in state A. Even in case of 
portfolio investments in shares one could theoretically think about a basic interest 
component. However, in contrast to the interest income the taxation of the underlying 
business profits actually occurred “at the right place” from a competitiveness point of 
view, i.e. in the country where the business activities are carried on. This is true for 
the whole profit generated and there is - in my opinion - no room and no necessity to 
calculate any theoretical interest component in this situation.  
 
2.5.4.4. The Interest Component of Capital and the Use of Tangible and 
Intangible Property  
 
Another alternative could be that company C is not a finance company but has the 
function of a leasing company. In this scenario, the holding company A decides to 
increase the share capital of company C by 10 million Euro in order to enable 
company C to purchase a new and highly sophisticated machine which will be 
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of holding company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
leasing activities. 
(4) Leasing agreement between the companies B and C.  
 
Also in this case, company A does not receive any direct interest income from the 
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Similar to the example above, the residence-based taxation of interest income in 
country C - for example from listed bonds - is a non-optimal result from an economic 
point of view and I do not see any distortion of competitiveness where country A 
taxes the basic interest component on a current basis. In the same way as outlined 
above, the taxes imposed in country C and non-credited taxes imposed in third 
countries have to be taken into account. Equally to what was outlined above, a 
differentiation has to be made: In an optimal scenario the complete interest payment 
from listed bonds would have to be taxed in the country in which the income-
producing activity is carried on. In a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation in country C a separation of the tax base between country A and country C is 
required. The income related to the functions exercised and risks taken in country C 
is allocable to country C, e.g. the asset management activities themselves. This is 
based on the principles outlined above with respect to direct investments. The same 
is true for the risk elements included in the interest payments which are treated in a 
similar way. However, the basic interest component itself can equally be taxed in 
country A as long as the taxes imposed do not exceed the taxes which would 
theoretically be imposed in the source country in which the income-producing activity 
is carried on.  
 
The situation with respect to portfolio dividends and capital gains realised by the 
disposal of portfolio investments in shares is different.93 In contrast to interest income 
the general question arises whether dividends and capital gains should be taxed at 
all, i.e. whether taxation should be limited to a taxation of the company which 
produces the income.94 If one follows the approach that the income should be taxed 
only once on the level of the company which produces the income, the subsequent 
taxation of the shareholder is - again - a non-optimal result from an economic point of 
view. As already outlined earlier, there are convincing arguments for a source-based 
taxation of portfolio income in general. However, a source-based taxation of 
dividends and capital gains does not mean that it is taxed on the level of the 
company which produces the income and subsequently again by the source-state 
(which is typically the same state). Any taxation in the aforementioned sense is to be 
seen as a strict limitation to a one-time taxation of the state where the income is 
produced, i.e. regularly the state of residence of the company or - in case of a 
permanent establishment - where the income producing activity is carried out.95  
 
However, a different conclusion has to be drawn for the residence-based taxation of 
interest income compared to the residence-based taxation of dividends and capital 
gains. The interest income requires a one-time taxation which should preferably take 
place in the state in which the income is produced (optimal scenario). If this is not the 
case, the income related to the carrying out of functions and the assumption of risks 
should be taxed in the state of the finance company (non-optimal scenario). The 
basic interest component, however, may be taxed in state A. In case of dividends and 
capital gains, the underlying profit is already taxed in the source state. Economically, 
there is no room for any additional taxation in the residence state. That means, even 
                                            
93 The underlying assumption in this example is that the company in which the portfolio investment is made is an 
“active” company which exercises functions comparable to those of company B.  
94 The capital gain itself does not necessarily reflect the amount of retained profits. Depending on the prospects 
of the business it will often contain future profit elements, i.e. profits which will be produced in future periods 
and which can only be subject to a theoretical dividend payment in the future.  
95 However, this could be different when the corporate income tax rate for retained profits is below the “normal” 
tax rate and the full taxation only occurs when the earnings are distributed to the shareholders. If this is the case, 
the taxation takes place in two steps instead of a one-time taxation of the company.   
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neutrality. In general, this is not only true for foreign direct investments but also for 
portfolio investments.  
 
2.) In my opinion, the safeguarding of competitiveness is especially relevant in two 
cases. First, where an international company operates in a foreign market and has 
therefore to compete with local companies and subsidiaries of other multinational 
enterprises and, second, where an international company separates and relocates 
functions and risks to other foreign companies. In both cases it is important that the 
profits related to those functions and risks are not taxed more heavily in comparison 
to third party activities in the respective foreign market.  
 
3.) The latter case of a relocation of functions and risks may result in the establishing 
of services which are mainly based on the provision of capital such as financing 
services, leasing services, and licensing services. As a consequence thereof, inter-
company income streams are created which include a separable interest component 
related to the capital provided and this interest component is one of the most 
important components of the overall compensation. For this reason, I consider the 
creation of capital-intensive inter-company services by allocating those functions and 
risks to separate legal entities to be a kind of “hybrid investment.” It is called hybrid 
investment because it combines the elements of a direct investment - by 
incorporating a subsidiary (service) company in another state - and the elements of 
an indirect investment (portfolio investment) - by focusing on the provision of capital 
in return for (indirect) interest payments. In other words, such investments lead to a 
relocation of functions and risks which are mainly related to capital-intensive services 
- with a separable interest component - and which are utilised by another  party, i.e. 
the capital is not directly employed for an income-producing activity of the subsidiary, 
but for an income-producing activity of the recipient of the services (which can be a 
related or unrelated party). The subsidiary, of course, realises income from the 
provision of capital, but not from the direct utilisation of capital in an income-
producing process (of the subsidiary).  
 
4.) Also in case of hybrid investments, the general conclusion should be that the 
interest income is to be taxed in the state in which the latter is produced. However, 
this is very often not the case, especially where the double tax convention between 
the state of the service company and the state of the recipient of the services is 
based on the OECD-MTC. In such a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation the question arises whether all or part of the interest component included in 
the income should be taxed in the residence-state of the subsidiary (service) 
company or whether it could be equally taxed in the residence-state of the parent 
company. This question does not arise for additional functions exercised and risks 
taken by the respective parties. The income related thereto is clearly allocable - from 
an economic point of view - to the respective company which exercises the functions 
and which takes over the risks directly. The income which is related to the separable 
financing element, however, has to be split up into a basic interest component and a 
risk component.  
 
5.) The basic interest component consists of the actual real interest rate and the 
actual inflation rate on a “rolling” basis, i.e. on the basis of permanent adjustments. In 
my opinion, the basic interest component is the minimum interest rate which can be 
achieved by an investor. It reflects a totally flexible investment which does not include 
any expectations and any risks related to the debtor and the time of investment. The 
   
 
from the investment of 10 million Euro will not be taxed within its jurisdiction - at least 
not directly.96 It is assumed that the terms of the leasing agreement between the 
companies B and C will be on an arm’s length basis. The payments received by 
company C include all elements outlined above: a compensation for the write-off of 
the machine, a compensation for maintaining the machine, and a compensation for 
bearing the risk. Also included in the arm’s length price is an interest component. The 
interest component covers the fact that a considerable amount of capital is invested 
by company C, with the financial means made available by company A. At the end of 
the day, the total profit derived from the business activities of company C will not only 
encompass the allocable profit according to the functions exercised by company C 
but also a profit which is due to the interest component.  
 
From the perspective of company B, some additional functions are transferred to the 
service provider for a certain fee which is included in the leasing payments. The 
expenses of company B in relation to the leasing agreement should find expression, 
at least theoretically, in the sales prices determined by company B.97 Again, the first 
three components should be taxed in country C where the leasing company carries 
out its activities, and the interest component should be taxed in the country where 
company B pursues its business activities. Similar to what was outlined with respect 
to the finance company this is most often not true where the double tax conventions 
are based on the OECD-MTC. Typically, the interest component is not separated 
from the aggregate income flows and the taxing right for the income received is 
allocable to the residence-state of the leasing company.98 Therefore, what was 
described above with respect to the interest income of the finance company is 




1.) From an economic point of view, the basic question is whether the principle of 
capital export neutrality should prevail over the principle of capital import neutrality, 
i.e. the concept of efficiency over the argument of competitiveness, or vice versa. 
Based on what was outlined above, it can be concluded that the efficient allocation of 
capital is distorted by several factors and it seems to be obvious that complete 
neutrality cannot be achieved. Therefore, the principle of export neutrality not only 
fails to achieve complete neutrality but does also have a negative effect on 
competitiveness. In a world of globalisation and of different tax rates and tax systems 
it seems to me that the creation of an environment which clearly fosters 
competitiveness, i.e. a tax policy which allows companies to compete at equal terms 
in a respective market, would probably be the best and most realistic way to 
maximise global welfare. Such an environment can be achieved by following the 
principle of capital import neutrality and the application of a source-based taxation - in 
contrast to a residence-based taxation which reflects the principle of capital export 
                                            
96 Indirectly, country A could participate in the interest saved in country C either by higher dividend distributions 
or by an increase in the value of the shares in company C. However, this is only true under the assumption that 
the distribution and the subsequent disposal of shares is a taxable event in country A (and – in case of a tax credit 
– if the creditable tax in country C is not higher than the tax applied in country A).  
97 Of course, this is not always the case. Especially where the market is dominated by a great number of 
competitors and a relatively small number of potential customers. The question is whether the market actually 
allows the prices to be determined according to business management principles.  
98 The leasing activities are typically covered by Articles 5 and 7 of the OECD-MTC and royalty payments for 
the use of intangible property by Article 12 of the OECD-MTC. See in this respect also Kemmeren, Principle of 
Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, pages 82 and 451 et seq.   
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neutrality. In general, this is not only true for foreign direct investments but also for 
portfolio investments.  
 
2.) In my opinion, the safeguarding of competitiveness is especially relevant in two 
cases. First, where an international company operates in a foreign market and has 
therefore to compete with local companies and subsidiaries of other multinational 
enterprises and, second, where an international company separates and relocates 
functions and risks to other foreign companies. In both cases it is important that the 
profits related to those functions and risks are not taxed more heavily in comparison 
to third party activities in the respective foreign market.  
 
3.) The latter case of a relocation of functions and risks may result in the establishing 
of services which are mainly based on the provision of capital such as financing 
services, leasing services, and licensing services. As a consequence thereof, inter-
company income streams are created which include a separable interest component 
related to the capital provided and this interest component is one of the most 
important components of the overall compensation. For this reason, I consider the 
creation of capital-intensive inter-company services by allocating those functions and 
risks to separate legal entities to be a kind of “hybrid investment.” It is called hybrid 
investment because it combines the elements of a direct investment - by 
incorporating a subsidiary (service) company in another state - and the elements of 
an indirect investment (portfolio investment) - by focusing on the provision of capital 
in return for (indirect) interest payments. In other words, such investments lead to a 
relocation of functions and risks which are mainly related to capital-intensive services 
- with a separable interest component - and which are utilised by another  party, i.e. 
the capital is not directly employed for an income-producing activity of the subsidiary, 
but for an income-producing activity of the recipient of the services (which can be a 
related or unrelated party). The subsidiary, of course, realises income from the 
provision of capital, but not from the direct utilisation of capital in an income-
producing process (of the subsidiary).  
 
4.) Also in case of hybrid investments, the general conclusion should be that the 
interest income is to be taxed in the state in which the latter is produced. However, 
this is very often not the case, especially where the double tax convention between 
the state of the service company and the state of the recipient of the services is 
based on the OECD-MTC. In such a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation the question arises whether all or part of the interest component included in 
the income should be taxed in the residence-state of the subsidiary (service) 
company or whether it could be equally taxed in the residence-state of the parent 
company. This question does not arise for additional functions exercised and risks 
taken by the respective parties. The income related thereto is clearly allocable - from 
an economic point of view - to the respective company which exercises the functions 
and which takes over the risks directly. The income which is related to the separable 
financing element, however, has to be split up into a basic interest component and a 
risk component.  
 
5.) The basic interest component consists of the actual real interest rate and the 
actual inflation rate on a “rolling” basis, i.e. on the basis of permanent adjustments. In 
my opinion, the basic interest component is the minimum interest rate which can be 
achieved by an investor. It reflects a totally flexible investment which does not include 
any expectations and any risks related to the debtor and the time of investment. The 
   
 
from the investment of 10 million Euro will not be taxed within its jurisdiction - at least 
not directly.96 It is assumed that the terms of the leasing agreement between the 
companies B and C will be on an arm’s length basis. The payments received by 
company C include all elements outlined above: a compensation for the write-off of 
the machine, a compensation for maintaining the machine, and a compensation for 
bearing the risk. Also included in the arm’s length price is an interest component. The 
interest component covers the fact that a considerable amount of capital is invested 
by company C, with the financial means made available by company A. At the end of 
the day, the total profit derived from the business activities of company C will not only 
encompass the allocable profit according to the functions exercised by company C 
but also a profit which is due to the interest component.  
 
From the perspective of company B, some additional functions are transferred to the 
service provider for a certain fee which is included in the leasing payments. The 
expenses of company B in relation to the leasing agreement should find expression, 
at least theoretically, in the sales prices determined by company B.97 Again, the first 
three components should be taxed in country C where the leasing company carries 
out its activities, and the interest component should be taxed in the country where 
company B pursues its business activities. Similar to what was outlined with respect 
to the finance company this is most often not true where the double tax conventions 
are based on the OECD-MTC. Typically, the interest component is not separated 
from the aggregate income flows and the taxing right for the income received is 
allocable to the residence-state of the leasing company.98 Therefore, what was 
described above with respect to the interest income of the finance company is 




1.) From an economic point of view, the basic question is whether the principle of 
capital export neutrality should prevail over the principle of capital import neutrality, 
i.e. the concept of efficiency over the argument of competitiveness, or vice versa. 
Based on what was outlined above, it can be concluded that the efficient allocation of 
capital is distorted by several factors and it seems to be obvious that complete 
neutrality cannot be achieved. Therefore, the principle of export neutrality not only 
fails to achieve complete neutrality but does also have a negative effect on 
competitiveness. In a world of globalisation and of different tax rates and tax systems 
it seems to me that the creation of an environment which clearly fosters 
competitiveness, i.e. a tax policy which allows companies to compete at equal terms 
in a respective market, would probably be the best and most realistic way to 
maximise global welfare. Such an environment can be achieved by following the 
principle of capital import neutrality and the application of a source-based taxation - in 
contrast to a residence-based taxation which reflects the principle of capital export 
                                            
96 Indirectly, country A could participate in the interest saved in country C either by higher dividend distributions 
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company in hybrid structures could have a distorting effect on the allocation of 
capital. In theory, this requires the basic interest income to be taxed in the hands of 
the low-tax company at a rate which is as high as the comparable tax rate in the 
source-country. If this is not the case, the higher taxation in the state of the parent 
company can have a positive effect with regard to the efficient allocation of capital 
and therefore also on competitiveness in general. However, this requires the 
limitation of the taxation of the basic interest component in the state of the parent 
company to the rate applicable in the source country. In addition, the state of the 
parent company has to provide for a crediting of the taxes levied on the income of the 
subsidiary company in order to avoid any double taxation. Thus, any taxation of the 
basic interest component in the state of the parent company may therefore be 
regarded as a partial and strictly limited application of the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, such a current taxation in the state of the parent company - in 
addition to the taxation in the state of the intermediate service company - should not 
result in an “over-taxation” of income. For this reason, there should be a strict 
limitation to the actual income derived from the respective activities in the state of the 
intermediate service company (as a maximum). For example, if the (net) interest 
income from the financing activity of the service company is only 2 percent, e.g. 
because of the revaluation of the loan receivable or the interest receivable, the 
maximum amount of current taxation should be 2 percent - even if the basic interest 
component is 4 percent. If the activity results in a negative income, nothing should be 
allocated. 
 
9.) The basic interest component should be taxed in the state of the shareholder 
(parent company) on a “rolling” basis, i.e. not just the basic interest rate which is 
applicable at the moment of making the investment (or the stipulation of a fixed 
interest rate) but also any subsequent increase or decrease. Of course, any 
subsequent development is part of the risk which is covered by the risk component 
and one might argue that this results in a kind of “overlapping” of the taxation of the 
basic interest component and the risk component. However, in this respect it is 
important to note that any premium included in the (fixed) interest rate in order to 
cover such a risk is, in principle, only taxed in the state of the service company. The 
fact that any increase or decrease in the basic interest component is subject to 
current taxation in the state of the shareholder does not influence the taxation of the 
premium. Moreover, it has to be accepted that - with regard to the basic interest 
component - there are two different perspectives: the perspective of the state of the 
service company, where the expected increase or decrease has to be stipulated 
within the (fixed) interest rate, and the state of the shareholder which focuses on the 
taxation of the risk free component of the capital investment (minimum taxation). Both 
perspectives have to be recognised and accepted. However, it is important, as 
already outlined above, that (i) the taxation in the state of the (subsidiary) service 
company and the state of the shareholder (parent company) is limited to the tax rate 
applicable in the state in which the interest income is produced and (ii) that any 
current taxation of the basic interest income is limited to the amount of actual income 
derived in the state of the (subsidiary) service company.    
 
10.) It has to be emphasised that a distinction is to be made between functions where 
the interest component can be considered to be a separable part of the activity, e.g. 
finance and leasing activities, and functions where the interest component is only 
theoretically included in the overall economic output. In the latter case, the interest 
component is just a part of a - more or less - complex process of exercising a certain 
   
 
basic interest component is strongly connected to the capital itself, even though it 
must be produced - just like any other income - by the recipient of the capital 
investment. Essentially, this component increases the wealth of the investor by the 
permanently adjusted real interest rate of a variable investment, because the inflation 
premium covers, in this situation, exactly the devaluation of money. In general, the 
basic interest component can be seen as an isolated component or as a component 
which is embedded in the total amount of interest income (together with the risk 
component). 
 
6.) The risk component encompasses the elements which are based on expectations, 
e.g. the premium for an expected increase in the real interest rate and the expected 
increase in the inflation rate (in case of an investment which binds the investor for a 
certain period of time and where the interest rate is fixed). In case of an expected 
decrease in the latter elements, this may  result in a reduction of the existing basic 
interest component (within the fixed interest rate). The risk component also includes 
the liquidity premium and the premium which is required to cover the risks related to 
the debtor. Theoretically, there should be a balance between the risks assumed by 
the investor and the compensation for those risks included in the interest income. 
The coverage of the risk does not necessarily require the direct connection to the 
capital investment, i.e. the risk coverage could theoretically be separated (or 
“stripped”) from the latter investment. This is particularly true for the risks which are 
related to the debtor, e.g. by way of a guarantee.  
 
7.) Overall, it can be concluded that the interest income encompasses two very 
different types of components: the basic interest component, which can only be 
derived because of the provision of capital - and which is therefore strongly 
connected to the capital itself - and the risk component, which has to cover all of the 
potential risks which are caused by the debtor and the period of investment. 
 
8.) The risk component included in the interest income is to be treated in the same 
way as other functions and risks and is therefore - in the non-optimal scenario - 
allocable to the company which takes over the risks directly and should therefore be 
taxed in the respective state. In contrast thereto, the basic interest component 
included in the income is strongly connected to the capital itself. Thus, there is no 
preference whatsoever for a taxation of the basic interest component in the residence 
state of the finance or leasing company from an economic point of view. The 
residence state of the shareholder (parent company) should therefore, from an 
economic perspective, have the right to currently tax the basic interest component. In 
the absence of a strict source-based taxation, the safeguarding of competitiveness 
requires that the overall tax burden does not exceed the result which would 
theoretically be achieved in an optimal economic scenario. The taxes imposed on the 
basic interest component should therefore be restricted to the theoretical tax burden 
in the income-producing state. Of course, the allocation of taxing rights deviates from 
the optimal economic scenario and this cannot be corrected. However, the overall tax 
burden on a group level - not on the level of the separate legal entity - would be 
comparable and would therefore not worsen the position of the group from a 
competitiveness perspective. In my opinion, there is no economic necessity to 
provide for a lower taxation of the basic interest component than the taxation in an 
optimal economic scenario of a source-based taxation. Such a lower taxation would 
even exceed what is actually required by the argument of competitiveness. One 
could even go one step further: the low-taxation on the level of an intermediate 
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company in hybrid structures could have a distorting effect on the allocation of 
capital. In theory, this requires the basic interest income to be taxed in the hands of 
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source-country. If this is not the case, the higher taxation in the state of the parent 
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regarded as a partial and strictly limited application of the principle of capital export 
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current taxation in the state of the shareholder does not influence the taxation of the 
premium. Moreover, it has to be accepted that - with regard to the basic interest 
component - there are two different perspectives: the perspective of the state of the 
service company, where the expected increase or decrease has to be stipulated 
within the (fixed) interest rate, and the state of the shareholder which focuses on the 
taxation of the risk free component of the capital investment (minimum taxation). Both 
perspectives have to be recognised and accepted. However, it is important, as 
already outlined above, that (i) the taxation in the state of the (subsidiary) service 
company and the state of the shareholder (parent company) is limited to the tax rate 
applicable in the state in which the interest income is produced and (ii) that any 
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the interest component can be considered to be a separable part of the activity, e.g. 
finance and leasing activities, and functions where the interest component is only 
theoretically included in the overall economic output. In the latter case, the interest 
component is just a part of a - more or less - complex process of exercising a certain 
   
 
basic interest component is strongly connected to the capital itself, even though it 
must be produced - just like any other income - by the recipient of the capital 
investment. Essentially, this component increases the wealth of the investor by the 
permanently adjusted real interest rate of a variable investment, because the inflation 
premium covers, in this situation, exactly the devaluation of money. In general, the 
basic interest component can be seen as an isolated component or as a component 
which is embedded in the total amount of interest income (together with the risk 
component). 
 
6.) The risk component encompasses the elements which are based on expectations, 
e.g. the premium for an expected increase in the real interest rate and the expected 
increase in the inflation rate (in case of an investment which binds the investor for a 
certain period of time and where the interest rate is fixed). In case of an expected 
decrease in the latter elements, this may  result in a reduction of the existing basic 
interest component (within the fixed interest rate). The risk component also includes 
the liquidity premium and the premium which is required to cover the risks related to 
the debtor. Theoretically, there should be a balance between the risks assumed by 
the investor and the compensation for those risks included in the interest income. 
The coverage of the risk does not necessarily require the direct connection to the 
capital investment, i.e. the risk coverage could theoretically be separated (or 
“stripped”) from the latter investment. This is particularly true for the risks which are 
related to the debtor, e.g. by way of a guarantee.  
 
7.) Overall, it can be concluded that the interest income encompasses two very 
different types of components: the basic interest component, which can only be 
derived because of the provision of capital - and which is therefore strongly 
connected to the capital itself - and the risk component, which has to cover all of the 
potential risks which are caused by the debtor and the period of investment. 
 
8.) The risk component included in the interest income is to be treated in the same 
way as other functions and risks and is therefore - in the non-optimal scenario - 
allocable to the company which takes over the risks directly and should therefore be 
taxed in the respective state. In contrast thereto, the basic interest component 
included in the income is strongly connected to the capital itself. Thus, there is no 
preference whatsoever for a taxation of the basic interest component in the residence 
state of the finance or leasing company from an economic point of view. The 
residence state of the shareholder (parent company) should therefore, from an 
economic perspective, have the right to currently tax the basic interest component. In 
the absence of a strict source-based taxation, the safeguarding of competitiveness 
requires that the overall tax burden does not exceed the result which would 
theoretically be achieved in an optimal economic scenario. The taxes imposed on the 
basic interest component should therefore be restricted to the theoretical tax burden 
in the income-producing state. Of course, the allocation of taxing rights deviates from 
the optimal economic scenario and this cannot be corrected. However, the overall tax 
burden on a group level - not on the level of the separate legal entity - would be 
comparable and would therefore not worsen the position of the group from a 
competitiveness perspective. In my opinion, there is no economic necessity to 
provide for a lower taxation of the basic interest component than the taxation in an 
optimal economic scenario of a source-based taxation. Such a lower taxation would 
even exceed what is actually required by the argument of competitiveness. One 
could even go one step further: the low-taxation on the level of an intermediate 
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In this chapter the legal principle of equity will be outlined in the context of this study. 
It will be examined whether equity aspects require a residence-based taxation rather 
than a source-based taxation or vice versa. This will be done separately for direct 
investments, portfolio investments and the use of tangible and intangible assets. 
Moreover, the equity aspects and the conclusions drawn from the examination of 
direct and portfolio investments will be verified in the situation of a hybrid investment.  
 
In addition, the general aspects of the OECD-MTC will be outlined briefly. This 
encompasses the question of international juridical and economic double taxation, 
the allocation of taxing rights according to the OECD-MTC, the methods of avoiding 
double taxation, and the outcome in case of a hybrid investment.  
 
3.2. The Legal Principle of Equity 
 
The question of how foreign income should be treated in comparison to domestic 
income and which state should have the right to tax certain amounts of income is 
strongly connected to the principle of equity. In general, the principle of equity can be 
divided into taxpayer equity and the so-called inter-nation equity.1 Taxpayer equity 
requires the equal treatment of taxpayers in similar circumstances (horizontal equity) 
and concerns the taxation of persons in accordance with their ability to pay (vertical 
equity).2 In contrast, inter-nation equity deals with the division of tax revenues among 
states instead of focusing on the individual taxpayer.3  
 
3.2.1. Taxpayer Equity  
 
3.2.1.1. Individual and Corporate Taxpayer Equity  
 
A question which has to be answered in this context is the question whether taxpayer 
equity can only be relevant for individuals (individual equity) or whether there can be 
a kind of taxpayer equity on a corporate level (corporate equity). In this respect, it is 
sometimes referred to the difference between an integrated individual-corporate 
income tax system and a non-integrated system where the corporation is treated as a 
completely separate taxable entity. In an integrated individual-corporate income tax 
system, the corporation is viewed merely as a “conduit” for channelling investment 
income to the individual shareholder and the corporation income tax as a means of 
reaching retained earnings under the individual income tax,4 or, as it is described by 
Arnold, a means for currently taxing the undistributed income of a corporation.5 
However, irrespective of the fact whether a state follows an integrated system or a 
                                            
1 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), page 
121 et seq.; Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments 
(Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (394).  
2 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 52. The ability-to-pay principle will be discussed later on. 
3 Typically between states of source and states of residence.  
4 Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), 
pages 122 and 123.  
5 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 53.  
   
 
function. A theoretical separation of the interest component and a partial allocation to 
a parent company is therefore economically not justifiable and not required. The 
interest component in the latter case is a necessary element to “create” the services 
or produce a certain amount of income but it is not a separable part of the services 
itself. The portion of income which is theoretically related to the basic interest 
component is - in this particular case - produced in the state of the intermediate 
(service) company. In other words, the income produced by the exercising of 
functions should be taxed in the respective state. Any other solution would negatively 
influence competitiveness. This is irrespective of the “way” how the income is created 
and the elements which are necessary to produce the income. 
 
11.) In case of portfolio dividends and capital gains of portfolio investments in shares 
the taxation should be limited to the taxation of the underlying profit realised by the 
foreign company which produces the income. Any deviating residence-based taxation 
of a foreign intermediate company does not justify a residence-based taxation of the 
shareholders in the intermediate company on a current basis. In contrast to interest 
income, the underlying income is already taxed in the source state and there should 
be no additional taxation in the residence state. In other words, even if the 
intermediate company taxes the dividends and capital gains with a relatively low 
income tax, this will not justify any additional taxation on a current basis. Moreover, 
the idea of a “basic interest component” does not play any role in this context. In 
contrast to the taxation of interest income the taxation of the underlying business 
profits actually occurred “at the right place” from a competitiveness point of view, i.e. 
in the country where the business activities are carried on. This is true for the whole 
profit generated and there is - in my opinion - no room and no necessity to calculate 
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In this chapter the legal principle of equity will be outlined in the context of this study. 
It will be examined whether equity aspects require a residence-based taxation rather 
than a source-based taxation or vice versa. This will be done separately for direct 
investments, portfolio investments and the use of tangible and intangible assets. 
Moreover, the equity aspects and the conclusions drawn from the examination of 
direct and portfolio investments will be verified in the situation of a hybrid investment.  
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121 et seq.; Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments 
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2 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 52. The ability-to-pay principle will be discussed later on. 
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function. A theoretical separation of the interest component and a partial allocation to 
a parent company is therefore economically not justifiable and not required. The 
interest component in the latter case is a necessary element to “create” the services 
or produce a certain amount of income but it is not a separable part of the services 
itself. The portion of income which is theoretically related to the basic interest 
component is - in this particular case - produced in the state of the intermediate 
(service) company. In other words, the income produced by the exercising of 
functions should be taxed in the respective state. Any other solution would negatively 
influence competitiveness. This is irrespective of the “way” how the income is created 
and the elements which are necessary to produce the income. 
 
11.) In case of portfolio dividends and capital gains of portfolio investments in shares 
the taxation should be limited to the taxation of the underlying profit realised by the 
foreign company which produces the income. Any deviating residence-based taxation 
of a foreign intermediate company does not justify a residence-based taxation of the 
shareholders in the intermediate company on a current basis. In contrast to interest 
income, the underlying income is already taxed in the source state and there should 
be no additional taxation in the residence state. In other words, even if the 
intermediate company taxes the dividends and capital gains with a relatively low 
income tax, this will not justify any additional taxation on a current basis. Moreover, 
the idea of a “basic interest component” does not play any role in this context. In 
contrast to the taxation of interest income the taxation of the underlying business 
profits actually occurred “at the right place” from a competitiveness point of view, i.e. 
in the country where the business activities are carried on. This is true for the whole 
profit generated and there is - in my opinion - no room and no necessity to calculate 




























   
 
approaches with respect to the treatment of foreign taxes. The proponents of 
international equity allow the crediting of the foreign taxes whereas the proponents of 
the national equity concept follow the principle that foreign taxes should be deducted 
as costs of doing business abroad. The reasons for rejecting the latter concept are 
similar to those outlined with respect to national neutrality. It is in my opinion an 
antiquated system which should not be followed in a world of ongoing globalisation.  
 
In contrast, states which follow the principle of territoriality, and therefore a source-
based taxation, focus on the equal treatment of income received by foreign and 
domestic investors within a certain market, i.e. equality with respect to the treatment 
of income irrespective of the place of residence of the investor. It was especially 
Vogel who pointed out that the taxpayer who receives income from foreign 
investment must be compared not only to the neighbours in his state of residence, 
but to his competitors in the state of investment, the source state, as well.8 In cases 
where the tax rates are lower in the state of source than in the state of residence, 
taxation in the state of residence according to its higher tax rates destroys equality in 
the state of source. This is true even when the state of residence grants a credit for 
foreign taxes.9 In addition, and based on the benefit theory,10 it can be assumed that 
the state of source which applies a lower tax rate provides less public goods and 
services compared to the high tax state. This argument is therefore equally important 
for neutrality and equity considerations and cannot be put aside. A high level of 
public goods and services provided by the state requires a greater share of financial 
contributions which have to be borne by residents and non-residents which pursue 
an income-producing activity in that state, typically by paying a higher percentage of 
taxes on the respective income. Such a high level environment improves the working, 
living, and business conditions in that state and provides (directly or indirectly) the 
basis for receiving a higher income. At least, this should be true where public 
spending is efficient, i.e. where the degree of wasteful or unproductive spending is 
relatively low. In such a case, a resident or non-resident taxpayer with business 
activities only in that state would pay a relatively “fair share” for the public goods and 
                                            
8 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (396). 
9 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (396). 
10 In general, it has to be distinguished between the benefit theory and the sacrifice theory. Pursuant to the 
benefit theory, taxation should be related to the benefits received from publicly provided goods and services, i.e. 
a taxpayer who receives a greater number of public goods and services should make a greater contribution than a 
taxpayer who receives no or very few public goods and services. Since taxes are paid individually and public 
goods and services are provided collectively, taxation cannot be considered to be a direct consideration for 
public goods and services. However, according to Vogel it can be argued that taxes are a consideration paid for 
the totality of state services by all taxpayer taken together (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income 
- A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (395); see also Mill, 
Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 2, at 354 (1848); von Stein, Lehrbuch der Finanzwissenschaft, 5th edn., 
Zweiter Teil, Erste Abteilung (1885)). In contrast, the sacrifice theory is unrelated to any benefits received and 
requires the taxpayer to contribute equally to the community system of the respective state. However, the 
sacrifice theory is - in my opinion - not an appropriate approach in an international context. In my opinion, there 
is no convincing reason why the residence state of the individual taxpayer should have a preferred right of a 
“sacrifice” which prevails over the state in which - for example - a company is established. Theoretically, the 
latter state could derive claims which are based on any kind of “sacrifice,” too. Vogel outlined that “(...) the 
sacrifice theory, if it ever was an acceptable, is no longer acceptable today” (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source 
Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. 
(394, 395); see also Vogel, Rechtfertigung der Steuern: eine vergessene Vorfrage, 25 Der Staat (1986), page 481 
et seq.).  
   
 
non-integrated system, it is likely that a state in both cases stipulates a dependency 
between the income taxation of a resident corporation and the income taxation of a 
resident shareholder. Of course, this is particularly clear in case of an imputation 
system where the tax rate of the individual shareholder is imposed on the profit 
distribution and the corporate income tax is credited against the income tax of the 
individual shareholder. But even in case of a classical system, the corporate income 
tax and the treatment of the distribution in the hands of the individual shareholders 
are not independent from each other, e.g. through the stipulation of an appropriate 
corporate income tax rate and, for example, the application of a half-income tax 
principle for subsequent profit distributions to individual shareholders. However, as 
long as the system provides for a treatment which considers the corporation as a 
separate taxpayer, there may be a possibility to take advantage from the fact that the 
“final” tax burden may be deferred through the retaining of income on the corporate 
level and the non-distribution of profits. Such an advantage may exist in case of  
investments in resident and non-resident corporations, because in both situations 
there can be a substantial difference between the income taxation of the corporation 
and the income taxation of the individual shareholder. Of course, the spread of tax 
rates can be increased by investing in corporations which are established in low-tax 
countries and tax havens. In the latter case, the interposition of a corporation may - in 
combination with the possibility of a deferral of domestic taxation - lead to significant 
advantages compared to an investment which is made without such interposition. 
This will be shown later on in more detail. However, if a comparison is required 
between resident taxpayers, it should either be limited to the comparison of 
individuals or the comparison of corporations, but should not be made between 
resident individuals and resident corporations. A comparison between resident 
individual taxpayers and resident corporate taxpayers can only lead to an appropriate 
result where the differences between the treatment of resident individuals and 
resident corporations are taken into account. It should be clear, however, that an 
approach which is restricted to the comparison of the treatment in the state of 
residence is not necessarily the approach which is to be preferred. This will be 
examined in the following.  
 
3.2.1.2. Equality Aspects 
 
Equality aspects encompass the relationship of taxpayers towards each other. It must 
be decided with whom the respective taxpayer should be treated equally. Is it the 
resident of a state who derives foreign income and who should be treated in the 
same way as his neighbour of the same state with domestic income, or is it the 
resident of a state who derives foreign income and who should be treated in the 
same way as a resident of the state from where he derives his foreign income and 
who derives domestic income from that state?   
 
In a system of worldwide or residence-based taxation6 the question is effectively 
resolved in a way that residents who are taxable on their worldwide income should be 
treated equally.7 Residents with foreign income are therefore consequently treated in 
the same way as residents with domestic income. Similar to the discussion with 
respect to capital export neutrality and national neutrality there are different 
                                            
6 The same is true for the taxation based on citizenship, e.g. in case of the United States.  
7 See Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), 
page 122; Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian 
Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 53. 
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9 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
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non-integrated system, it is likely that a state in both cases stipulates a dependency 
between the income taxation of a resident corporation and the income taxation of a 
resident shareholder. Of course, this is particularly clear in case of an imputation 
system where the tax rate of the individual shareholder is imposed on the profit 
distribution and the corporate income tax is credited against the income tax of the 
individual shareholder. But even in case of a classical system, the corporate income 
tax and the treatment of the distribution in the hands of the individual shareholders 
are not independent from each other, e.g. through the stipulation of an appropriate 
corporate income tax rate and, for example, the application of a half-income tax 
principle for subsequent profit distributions to individual shareholders. However, as 
long as the system provides for a treatment which considers the corporation as a 
separate taxpayer, there may be a possibility to take advantage from the fact that the 
“final” tax burden may be deferred through the retaining of income on the corporate 
level and the non-distribution of profits. Such an advantage may exist in case of  
investments in resident and non-resident corporations, because in both situations 
there can be a substantial difference between the income taxation of the corporation 
and the income taxation of the individual shareholder. Of course, the spread of tax 
rates can be increased by investing in corporations which are established in low-tax 
countries and tax havens. In the latter case, the interposition of a corporation may - in 
combination with the possibility of a deferral of domestic taxation - lead to significant 
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between resident taxpayers, it should either be limited to the comparison of 
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individual taxpayers and resident corporate taxpayers can only lead to an appropriate 
result where the differences between the treatment of resident individuals and 
resident corporations are taken into account. It should be clear, however, that an 
approach which is restricted to the comparison of the treatment in the state of 
residence is not necessarily the approach which is to be preferred. This will be 
examined in the following.  
 
3.2.1.2. Equality Aspects 
 
Equality aspects encompass the relationship of taxpayers towards each other. It must 
be decided with whom the respective taxpayer should be treated equally. Is it the 
resident of a state who derives foreign income and who should be treated in the 
same way as his neighbour of the same state with domestic income, or is it the 
resident of a state who derives foreign income and who should be treated in the 
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resolved in a way that residents who are taxable on their worldwide income should be 
treated equally.7 Residents with foreign income are therefore consequently treated in 
the same way as residents with domestic income. Similar to the discussion with 
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6 The same is true for the taxation based on citizenship, e.g. in case of the United States.  
7 See Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), 
page 122; Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian 
Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 53. 
Chapter 3
58
   
 
foreign income at the same rates as domestic income, this can be concluded 
convincingly only with regard to that part of the foreign income that has been 
repatriated to the state of residence.13   
 
3.2.2. Inter-Nation Equity 
 
Inter-nation equity deals with the question of how a certain amount of foreign income 
should be divided between the source country and the residence country, i.e. which 
country should have the right to tax all or part of the foreign income from an equity 
point of view.14 If one follows the aforementioned benefit theory, it would make sense 
to take the benefits received in the respective countries into account.15 That means, 
the countries involved should receive part of the allocable taxable profit based on the 
goods and services provided and actually received by the taxpayer in order to 
produce a certain amount of income. Of course, the benefit theory is open for 
criticism, especially in a domestic environment, since taxes are paid individually and 
public goods and services are provided collectively. In an international context, 
however, where – in the most extreme case – the income of a resident is produced 
only in the foreign state, the benefits received for the production of income in 
question are clearly allocable to the foreign state. What remains are the benefits 
received - typically for an individual taxpayer - with respect to all other aspects of life 
apart from the foreign business activities. In the following, equity considerations are 
verified separately according to the different types of investment.  
 
3.2.3. Equity and Direct Investments  
 
What is outlined above is of particular relevance for direct investments in foreign 
countries. In my opinion, there are basically six elements which can be distinguished 
and which are of importance in case of a foreign investment: (a.) the capital transfer 
from the residence country to the source country, (b.) the exercising of functions, (c.) 
the basic interest component of capital, (d.) the taking over of risks, (e.) the providing 
of a market to earn the income, and (f.) the redistribution of income to the residence 
country.  
 
a.) The capital transfer from the residence country to the source country 
 
A question which has to be answered in this context is whether the residence country 
has – from an equity point of view – the right to tax income which is related to the 
capital export from the residence country to the source country. Possible justifications 
for such a taxing right of the residence country could theoretically be derived from the 
fact that the capital is owned by a resident of that country or the fact that the capital is 
an accumulation of (after-tax) income earned in the residence country by the 
taxpayer himself or another person who is a resident of that country.16 However, such 
                                            
13 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (396). 
14 See in this respect Richard and Peggy Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup, 
1972, page 63; Flick, Die Begrenzung der Fiskalsouveränität, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 1964, Fach 2, 
page 131.  
15 However, see with respect to benefits received also Peggy B. Musgrave, United States Taxation of Foreign 
Investment Income, Issues and Arguments (1969), pages 130, 131.  
16 In case the capital is transferred to the investor as a gift or by inheritance. According to Kemmeren, “(…) 
capital lent out is, in principle, accumulated produced income not consumed or disposed of. If the capital was 
acquired through a gift, in a wide meaning, then the same reasoning is valid. The only difference is that such 
   
 
services received.11 However, if the taxpayer derives nearly all of his income from 
activities carried out in a foreign country without using the domestic infrastructure and 
without receiving public goods and services in the residence country - but only goods 
and services in the source country to produce the foreign income - it is highly 
questionable whether the higher tax burden leads to the “appropriate” tax burden in 
the residence country. Similar to what was outlined above with respect to neutrality 
this approach would hamper the business activities of the taxpayer in the foreign 
country and would therefore strongly influence the competitiveness in the foreign 
market. And - what is important here - could hardly be considered an equal treatment 
of taxpayers. In effect, the taxpayer deriving foreign income would partly bear the tax 
burden which should be borne by other taxpayers who take advantage of the 
domestic infrastructure and the public goods and services. In other words, the public 
goods and services are financed by a source which does not receive and does not 
require any of the advantages provided - in the most extreme case. Of course, the 
resident individual will always receive goods and services in the residence country 
which are unconnected to the production of income but which are related to other 
aspects of life. The resident individual has therefore - without doubt - to contribute in 
one way or another to the system which provides those benefits. I will go into more 
detail below, where direct investment is discussed separately from other kinds of 
investment.  
 
An argument which is closely connected to the aforementioned argument is that an 
investment in a foreign country with a lower taxation can be accompanied by a higher 
risk in the respective market, especially in developing countries. A higher risk 
connected to a particular investment requires a higher return on investment to 
balance out and cover the additional risk. A residence-based taxation has the effect 
that the (higher) profit which covers the increased risk is partly transferred to the 
residence country in the form of income tax. This could be acceptable to a certain 
degree where a loss incurred in the foreign market can be transferred to the 
residence country and can be offset with other - positive - income. However, in a 
situation where the foreign income encompasses the greatest part of the total income 
this is most often not the case. Even though it is true that the amount of public goods 
and services received as well as the degree of risk taken by the investor could also 
vary within a single country, a differentiation between those domestic differences and 
the differences related to foreign investment has to be made. The domestic 
differences - as described by Vogel - are incidental whereas those related to foreign 
investments are typical, and it is commonly acknowledged that equality may 
disregard differences that are incidental, but must take into account those that are 
typical.12 
 
Moreover, Vogel puts forward another argument which refers to the difference 
between profits retained and reinvested in the foreign country and profits which are 
remitted to the residence country. The profits so reinvested remain connected to the 
foreign country and are therefore still subject to the higher risk. Of course, as long as 
the profits derived in the foreign market are reinvested in the foreign business 
activities the tax burden should be kept on the level of the foreign country. Vogel 
concluded that even if a case could be made on equality grounds for taxing certain 
                                            
11 It can only be “relatively fair.” Taxes are paid individually and public goods and services are provided 
collectively - this can lead to distortions.  
12 Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), 
Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (396). 
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foreign income at the same rates as domestic income, this can be concluded 
convincingly only with regard to that part of the foreign income that has been 
repatriated to the state of residence.13   
 
3.2.2. Inter-Nation Equity 
 
Inter-nation equity deals with the question of how a certain amount of foreign income 
should be divided between the source country and the residence country, i.e. which 
country should have the right to tax all or part of the foreign income from an equity 
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to take the benefits received in the respective countries into account.15 That means, 
the countries involved should receive part of the allocable taxable profit based on the 
goods and services provided and actually received by the taxpayer in order to 
produce a certain amount of income. Of course, the benefit theory is open for 
criticism, especially in a domestic environment, since taxes are paid individually and 
public goods and services are provided collectively. In an international context, 
however, where – in the most extreme case – the income of a resident is produced 
only in the foreign state, the benefits received for the production of income in 
question are clearly allocable to the foreign state. What remains are the benefits 
received - typically for an individual taxpayer - with respect to all other aspects of life 
apart from the foreign business activities. In the following, equity considerations are 
verified separately according to the different types of investment.  
 
3.2.3. Equity and Direct Investments  
 
What is outlined above is of particular relevance for direct investments in foreign 
countries. In my opinion, there are basically six elements which can be distinguished 
and which are of importance in case of a foreign investment: (a.) the capital transfer 
from the residence country to the source country, (b.) the exercising of functions, (c.) 
the basic interest component of capital, (d.) the taking over of risks, (e.) the providing 
of a market to earn the income, and (f.) the redistribution of income to the residence 
country.  
 
a.) The capital transfer from the residence country to the source country 
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has – from an equity point of view – the right to tax income which is related to the 
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for such a taxing right of the residence country could theoretically be derived from the 
fact that the capital is owned by a resident of that country or the fact that the capital is 
an accumulation of (after-tax) income earned in the residence country by the 
taxpayer himself or another person who is a resident of that country.16 However, such 
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services received.11 However, if the taxpayer derives nearly all of his income from 
activities carried out in a foreign country without using the domestic infrastructure and 
without receiving public goods and services in the residence country - but only goods 
and services in the source country to produce the foreign income - it is highly 
questionable whether the higher tax burden leads to the “appropriate” tax burden in 
the residence country. Similar to what was outlined above with respect to neutrality 
this approach would hamper the business activities of the taxpayer in the foreign 
country and would therefore strongly influence the competitiveness in the foreign 
market. And - what is important here - could hardly be considered an equal treatment 
of taxpayers. In effect, the taxpayer deriving foreign income would partly bear the tax 
burden which should be borne by other taxpayers who take advantage of the 
domestic infrastructure and the public goods and services. In other words, the public 
goods and services are financed by a source which does not receive and does not 
require any of the advantages provided - in the most extreme case. Of course, the 
resident individual will always receive goods and services in the residence country 
which are unconnected to the production of income but which are related to other 
aspects of life. The resident individual has therefore - without doubt - to contribute in 
one way or another to the system which provides those benefits. I will go into more 
detail below, where direct investment is discussed separately from other kinds of 
investment.  
 
An argument which is closely connected to the aforementioned argument is that an 
investment in a foreign country with a lower taxation can be accompanied by a higher 
risk in the respective market, especially in developing countries. A higher risk 
connected to a particular investment requires a higher return on investment to 
balance out and cover the additional risk. A residence-based taxation has the effect 
that the (higher) profit which covers the increased risk is partly transferred to the 
residence country in the form of income tax. This could be acceptable to a certain 
degree where a loss incurred in the foreign market can be transferred to the 
residence country and can be offset with other - positive - income. However, in a 
situation where the foreign income encompasses the greatest part of the total income 
this is most often not the case. Even though it is true that the amount of public goods 
and services received as well as the degree of risk taken by the investor could also 
vary within a single country, a differentiation between those domestic differences and 
the differences related to foreign investment has to be made. The domestic 
differences - as described by Vogel - are incidental whereas those related to foreign 
investments are typical, and it is commonly acknowledged that equality may 
disregard differences that are incidental, but must take into account those that are 
typical.12 
 
Moreover, Vogel puts forward another argument which refers to the difference 
between profits retained and reinvested in the foreign country and profits which are 
remitted to the residence country. The profits so reinvested remain connected to the 
foreign country and are therefore still subject to the higher risk. Of course, as long as 
the profits derived in the foreign market are reinvested in the foreign business 
activities the tax burden should be kept on the level of the foreign country. Vogel 
concluded that even if a case could be made on equality grounds for taxing certain 
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accompanied by higher margins and typically require more benefits from the country 
in which they are exercised. In contrast, functions which are less substantial include 
lower margins and most often do not require the same extent of public goods and 
services. Even though this is a very general conclusion - and exceptions are likely - it 
seems to be a feasible possibility to divide the taxable income of business activities 
between different countries and to comply with the principle of equity. This requires, 
however, the strict application of the arm’s length principle, i.e. it must be analysed 
how much profit is allocable to a certain function. Underlying information like payroll, 
property or other indices of economic activity can give an indication for the 
importance of the function in question, but they are not sufficient as an allocation key 
by themselves. In addition, it seems to be appropriate - also from an equity point of 
view - for a certain threshold to exist with respect to the activity in a certain country. 
Not every single temporary activity should lead to an allocation of profits but only 
activities which are exercised with a certain permanence. It seems to me that this 
could be very well in line with the idea of a permanent establishment as it is outlined 
in the OECD-MTC.21  
 
c.) The basic interest component of capital  
 
In principle, there are differences between capital intensive investments and non-
capital intensive investments insofar as, inter alia, the first-mentioned investments 
theoretically require a higher portion of interest which must be included in the sales 
price of the products, the services rendered, or the profit allocable according to arm’s 
length considerations (e.g. in case of a permanent establishment). This means an 
interest component should theoretically find expression in the determination of the 
value of functions exercised by, for example, a subsidiary company. This should lead 
to the conclusion that functions exercised by a certain number of personnel which are 
- from an intellectual perspective - comparable in case of a capital intensive activity 
and a non-capital intensive activity, are to be compensated differently. Based on the 
earlier conclusions - which will be further explained in the subsequent examples - one 
could raise the question whether there should be a difference in treatment between 
the income related to the exercising of functions (and the taking over of risks) in the 
state where the income-producing activity is carried on and the basic interest 
component. The latter component is connected to the capital itself and is theoretically 
also included in the income derived from these activities. In general, such a 
theoretical approach might only be based on the fact that a certain percentage of 
interest may be alternatively received - at any time - without taking additional risks. 
From the perspective of the residence state of the investor, it could be argued - 
based on the principle of equity - that even though the income-producing activity is 
carried on in the state of the subsidiary (the source state) a certain minimum 
percentage related to the capital invested should be allocable to the residence state. 
This would lead to an equal treatment of the basic interest income in the hands of the 
resident taxpayer which invests abroad and a resident taxpayer which invests in the 
residence state.  
 
However, I do not think that this is the appropriate approach from an equity 
perspective. What is very important and should not be overlooked in all these 
considerations is the fact that the total income derived in the foreign country is 
derived from activities carried out in the foreign country - including the basic interest 
                                            
21 Article 5 and Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
an argumentation indicates that an accumulated amount of (after-tax) income once 
earned in the country of residence remains connected to that country even if it is 
afterwards transferred and invested abroad.17 I do not think that equity considerations 
require such a “permanent connection” in case the capital is actually invested abroad 
and produces totally new income based on that capital. Even though it seems to be 
obvious that the income would not be produced without the capital investment, this 
does not - by itself - provide an argument for a residence-based taxation of the total 
income and a permanent connection to the residence country.18 In my opinion, there 
is no “original right” to tax the foreign income based on those arguments in general.19 
However, what should be considered in more detail below is the question whether a 
taxing right for the residence country can be derived from the concept of a basic 
interest component of capital.  
 
b.) The exercising of functions   
 
The exercising of functions related to the business activities usually demands the 
utilisation and the provision of public goods and services in the country where the 
activities are carried out. Therefore, it is typically the source country which provides 
most or all of the benefits which are relevant for the production of income. Without 
those benefits, the investor would not be able to produce the income in the 
respective source country.20 As a consequence, it seems to be obvious that the 
country which offers those benefits, and in which the investor actually takes 
advantage of those benefits, should have the right to tax the income in question. Of 
course, the extent of how much benefits are actually utilised depends to a certain 
degree on the kind of business activity and the functions itself. However, this should 
not influence the general conclusion that the country in which the functions are 
exercised should have a preferred right to tax the income produced. The capital so 
invested in the source country is employed to exercise the respective functions which 
subsequently produce income or which will be part of a process which produces the 
income. It is clear that the functions exercised and the arm’s length consideration - or 
profit which is allocable to those functions - do not necessarily correspond to the 
benefits received. Even though an allocation of the taxing rights which is based on 
the benefits received seems to be an appropriate formula, it would be difficult to 
measure and therefore hardly realisable. Therefore, an apportionment based on the 
functions exercised and arm’s length considerations should be the underlying 
principle. In general, it can be assumed that complex functions are normally 
                                                                                                                                         
capital will have been taxed in the pre-capital phase with another person than the beneficiary of the gift” 
(Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 433).  
17 The same is basically true for income earned through a foreign subsidiary which was subsequently distributed 
and accumulated in the residence country.  
18 “(...) the legislature may choose either to tax income produced once and for all or to postpone part of its 
taxation and to make up for this later by taxing the returns on a reinvestment. If the legislature decides in favour 
of the first option, the taxpayer who paid the requisite taxes on his income is free to reinvest the after-tax 
balance abroad, and even to leave the country with all his wealth, without any claim to further taxation of his 
income from capital following him or his capital into the foreign country. (...) As a matter of fact, no state has 
ever chosen the second option” and “(t)o phrase it more generally, the fact that capital has been produced in a 
state is not a justification in and of itself for taxing the foreign proceeds of this capital (Vogel, Worldwide vs. 
Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et 
seq. (399, 400)).  
19 See in this respect also Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (398). 
20 See also Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part 
III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (398). 
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accompanied by higher margins and typically require more benefits from the country 
in which they are exercised. In contrast, functions which are less substantial include 
lower margins and most often do not require the same extent of public goods and 
services. Even though this is a very general conclusion - and exceptions are likely - it 
seems to be a feasible possibility to divide the taxable income of business activities 
between different countries and to comply with the principle of equity. This requires, 
however, the strict application of the arm’s length principle, i.e. it must be analysed 
how much profit is allocable to a certain function. Underlying information like payroll, 
property or other indices of economic activity can give an indication for the 
importance of the function in question, but they are not sufficient as an allocation key 
by themselves. In addition, it seems to be appropriate - also from an equity point of 
view - for a certain threshold to exist with respect to the activity in a certain country. 
Not every single temporary activity should lead to an allocation of profits but only 
activities which are exercised with a certain permanence. It seems to me that this 
could be very well in line with the idea of a permanent establishment as it is outlined 
in the OECD-MTC.21  
 
c.) The basic interest component of capital  
 
In principle, there are differences between capital intensive investments and non-
capital intensive investments insofar as, inter alia, the first-mentioned investments 
theoretically require a higher portion of interest which must be included in the sales 
price of the products, the services rendered, or the profit allocable according to arm’s 
length considerations (e.g. in case of a permanent establishment). This means an 
interest component should theoretically find expression in the determination of the 
value of functions exercised by, for example, a subsidiary company. This should lead 
to the conclusion that functions exercised by a certain number of personnel which are 
- from an intellectual perspective - comparable in case of a capital intensive activity 
and a non-capital intensive activity, are to be compensated differently. Based on the 
earlier conclusions - which will be further explained in the subsequent examples - one 
could raise the question whether there should be a difference in treatment between 
the income related to the exercising of functions (and the taking over of risks) in the 
state where the income-producing activity is carried on and the basic interest 
component. The latter component is connected to the capital itself and is theoretically 
also included in the income derived from these activities. In general, such a 
theoretical approach might only be based on the fact that a certain percentage of 
interest may be alternatively received - at any time - without taking additional risks. 
From the perspective of the residence state of the investor, it could be argued - 
based on the principle of equity - that even though the income-producing activity is 
carried on in the state of the subsidiary (the source state) a certain minimum 
percentage related to the capital invested should be allocable to the residence state. 
This would lead to an equal treatment of the basic interest income in the hands of the 
resident taxpayer which invests abroad and a resident taxpayer which invests in the 
residence state.  
 
However, I do not think that this is the appropriate approach from an equity 
perspective. What is very important and should not be overlooked in all these 
considerations is the fact that the total income derived in the foreign country is 
derived from activities carried out in the foreign country - including the basic interest 
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an argumentation indicates that an accumulated amount of (after-tax) income once 
earned in the country of residence remains connected to that country even if it is 
afterwards transferred and invested abroad.17 I do not think that equity considerations 
require such a “permanent connection” in case the capital is actually invested abroad 
and produces totally new income based on that capital. Even though it seems to be 
obvious that the income would not be produced without the capital investment, this 
does not - by itself - provide an argument for a residence-based taxation of the total 
income and a permanent connection to the residence country.18 In my opinion, there 
is no “original right” to tax the foreign income based on those arguments in general.19 
However, what should be considered in more detail below is the question whether a 
taxing right for the residence country can be derived from the concept of a basic 
interest component of capital.  
 
b.) The exercising of functions   
 
The exercising of functions related to the business activities usually demands the 
utilisation and the provision of public goods and services in the country where the 
activities are carried out. Therefore, it is typically the source country which provides 
most or all of the benefits which are relevant for the production of income. Without 
those benefits, the investor would not be able to produce the income in the 
respective source country.20 As a consequence, it seems to be obvious that the 
country which offers those benefits, and in which the investor actually takes 
advantage of those benefits, should have the right to tax the income in question. Of 
course, the extent of how much benefits are actually utilised depends to a certain 
degree on the kind of business activity and the functions itself. However, this should 
not influence the general conclusion that the country in which the functions are 
exercised should have a preferred right to tax the income produced. The capital so 
invested in the source country is employed to exercise the respective functions which 
subsequently produce income or which will be part of a process which produces the 
income. It is clear that the functions exercised and the arm’s length consideration - or 
profit which is allocable to those functions - do not necessarily correspond to the 
benefits received. Even though an allocation of the taxing rights which is based on 
the benefits received seems to be an appropriate formula, it would be difficult to 
measure and therefore hardly realisable. Therefore, an apportionment based on the 
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exercised according to the principles outlined above. A completely different question 
is whether the providing of a market itself should give the country where the 
recipients of the sales and services are resident (the “sales country”) a right to tax 
part of the income received. Of course, the question is only of relevance if the sales 
country is different from the source country where the direct investment is made. 
Without doubt, the existence of a market to earn income is an important prerequisite 
for any successful business activity and it should also be clear that the goods and 
services provided by the sales country influence the market conditions and can 
increase the number of potential customers and clients. However, the supply of 
goods and services to customers in a foreign market does not require a permanent 
link to that country, i.e. the relevant business functions are exercised outside of the 
foreign market and the activities within the market are transitory or just auxiliary and 
preparatory activities. But even if a function is exercised within the foreign country 
which can be considered to be a permanent establishment, this will only lead to the 
result that the foreign country is granted a right to tax which is limited to the (arm’s 
length) profit related to the respective function and will not lead to a “compensation” 
for the providing of a market. However, in order to avoid mixing up the taxation of 
profits according to the functional allocation - which should be neutral - and any other 
approach which is not directed towards “a benefits received approach” with respect to 
the investment, but rather with respect to a more general “providing of a market,” I 
would rather consider another link to be more appropriate. Even though a taxing right 
for the sales country seems to be justifiable from an equity point of view, the (net) 
income earned within a certain market should not be the basis for taxation of the 
sales country.23 In my opinion, a sales tax or a value added tax which is applicable to 
each single transaction is more appropriate than an income tax on the profits - 
applied by the sales country - which would only incidentally lead to a proper result.  
 
(f) The redistribution of income to the residence country  
 
Pursuant to the items listed above, it is quite obvious - from my point of view - that 
the taxation of the direct investment should take place solely in the country where the 
functions are exercised and the risks are taken as long as the income derived in the 
foreign country is reinvested and therefore retained in the source country. The 
situation can be different where the income is subsequently distributed to the 
residence country. The reason is that even though the resident individual does not 
receive any benefits from the residence country (or at least less benefits compared to 
the source country) he will nevertheless take advantage from the goods and services 
provided by the residence country which are unconnected to the production of 
income in order to produce the foreign source income. From an equality point of view 
it seems to be appropriate that the resident individual contributes part of his wealth to 
cover the costs for the public goods and services received in the residence country. 
One of the solutions typically provided is the taxation of the profit distribution.  
 
However, in my opinion the income which is taxed in the source country based on the 
profits allocable according to the functional analysis should not be taxed again in the 
residence country - and I do not think that this is required by equity considerations. 
The focus should rather be on the subsequent use of the distributed income which 
can be, amongst others, the reinvestment of the financial means or the consumption. 
In the first case, the residence country would receive taxes from the newly produced 
                                            
23 Of course, apart from the taxation of the profits based on the functional analyses outlined above.  
   
 
component. The income (including the basic interest component) must be actually 
produced, i.e. not a single component included in the income is existent just because 
of the fact that a certain amount of capital is invested. In a typical situation, the capital 
transferred to the source country as financial means will be transformed into tangible 
and intangible assets in order to exercise the functions and to carry out the business 
activities in the foreign country. The income so produced consists - in its totality - of 
values integrated into the economy of the source country and is subject to the source 
country’s sovereignty.22 This economic reality and the fact that the whole “new” 
income is produced in the source state should also be relevant from an equity point 
of view. In my opinion, these factors should prevail over the concept of a basic 
interest component, i.e. the basic interest component - which is theoretically included 
in the total amount of income received - should be taxed, under these circumstances, 
in the country in which the income is produced in order to comply with the principle of 
equity. Thus, an equal treatment of resident taxpayers in a way that the basic interest 
component included in the foreign investment and the domestic investment are both 
taxed in the state of residence is not in line with the principle of equity. This, however, 
might be slightly different in case of hybrid investments which will be outlined below 
in some detail. 
 
d.) The taking over of risks 
 
The taking over of risks can be relevant in different situations: it can relate to the risks 
involved in the exercising of a certain function, which is then a question of 
appropriate measuring and allocating profits to the respective function as outlined 
above, or it can relate - very generally - to the risks involved in the direct investment 
made in a particular market. A higher risk in the foreign market requires a higher 
profit derived in this particular market in order to compensate the risk, i.e. a profit 
which exceeds the purely functional margin of the activity. Especially in cases where 
the tax rate in the source country is lower than in the residence country it is important 
that the exceeding profit is subject to tax in the source country and not in the 
residence country. Any other solution would limit the possibility of the company to 
compensate for the increased market risk and would bring the investor into a position 
which is less advantageous in comparison to other market participants who are not 
subject to a residence-based taxation. Thus, it can be concluded that it is necessary 
from an equity perspective to tax the income related to the entrepreneurial risk and 
the market risk in the source country only. This leads to an equal treatment of foreign 
and domestic investments in the source state and avoids income being subject to  
taxation in the country of residence which might otherwise weaken the position of the 
foreign investor and reduce the possibility to compensate for those risks. In principle, 
the aforementioned strict limitation to a source-based taxation is not only required if 
the income taxation in the state of residence is higher than in the state of source, but 
is equally required if the income taxation is lower. 
 
e.) The providing of a market to earn the income 
 
The providing of a market has to be separated from the exercising of certain 
functions, e.g. sales functions. The exercising of a sales function and the respective 
profit related to such a function is to be taxed in the country where the function is  
                                            
22 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 
Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. (398). 
 
Legal Principles in International Taxation
63
   
 
exercised according to the principles outlined above. A completely different question 
is whether the providing of a market itself should give the country where the 
recipients of the sales and services are resident (the “sales country”) a right to tax 
part of the income received. Of course, the question is only of relevance if the sales 
country is different from the source country where the direct investment is made. 
Without doubt, the existence of a market to earn income is an important prerequisite 
for any successful business activity and it should also be clear that the goods and 
services provided by the sales country influence the market conditions and can 
increase the number of potential customers and clients. However, the supply of 
goods and services to customers in a foreign market does not require a permanent 
link to that country, i.e. the relevant business functions are exercised outside of the 
foreign market and the activities within the market are transitory or just auxiliary and 
preparatory activities. But even if a function is exercised within the foreign country 
which can be considered to be a permanent establishment, this will only lead to the 
result that the foreign country is granted a right to tax which is limited to the (arm’s 
length) profit related to the respective function and will not lead to a “compensation” 
for the providing of a market. However, in order to avoid mixing up the taxation of 
profits according to the functional allocation - which should be neutral - and any other 
approach which is not directed towards “a benefits received approach” with respect to 
the investment, but rather with respect to a more general “providing of a market,” I 
would rather consider another link to be more appropriate. Even though a taxing right 
for the sales country seems to be justifiable from an equity point of view, the (net) 
income earned within a certain market should not be the basis for taxation of the 
sales country.23 In my opinion, a sales tax or a value added tax which is applicable to 
each single transaction is more appropriate than an income tax on the profits - 
applied by the sales country - which would only incidentally lead to a proper result.  
 
(f) The redistribution of income to the residence country  
 
Pursuant to the items listed above, it is quite obvious - from my point of view - that 
the taxation of the direct investment should take place solely in the country where the 
functions are exercised and the risks are taken as long as the income derived in the 
foreign country is reinvested and therefore retained in the source country. The 
situation can be different where the income is subsequently distributed to the 
residence country. The reason is that even though the resident individual does not 
receive any benefits from the residence country (or at least less benefits compared to 
the source country) he will nevertheless take advantage from the goods and services 
provided by the residence country which are unconnected to the production of 
income in order to produce the foreign source income. From an equality point of view 
it seems to be appropriate that the resident individual contributes part of his wealth to 
cover the costs for the public goods and services received in the residence country. 
One of the solutions typically provided is the taxation of the profit distribution.  
 
However, in my opinion the income which is taxed in the source country based on the 
profits allocable according to the functional analysis should not be taxed again in the 
residence country - and I do not think that this is required by equity considerations. 
The focus should rather be on the subsequent use of the distributed income which 
can be, amongst others, the reinvestment of the financial means or the consumption. 
In the first case, the residence country would receive taxes from the newly produced 
                                            
23 Of course, apart from the taxation of the profits based on the functional analyses outlined above.  
   
 
component. The income (including the basic interest component) must be actually 
produced, i.e. not a single component included in the income is existent just because 
of the fact that a certain amount of capital is invested. In a typical situation, the capital 
transferred to the source country as financial means will be transformed into tangible 
and intangible assets in order to exercise the functions and to carry out the business 
activities in the foreign country. The income so produced consists - in its totality - of 
values integrated into the economy of the source country and is subject to the source 
country’s sovereignty.22 This economic reality and the fact that the whole “new” 
income is produced in the source state should also be relevant from an equity point 
of view. In my opinion, these factors should prevail over the concept of a basic 
interest component, i.e. the basic interest component - which is theoretically included 
in the total amount of income received - should be taxed, under these circumstances, 
in the country in which the income is produced in order to comply with the principle of 
equity. Thus, an equal treatment of resident taxpayers in a way that the basic interest 
component included in the foreign investment and the domestic investment are both 
taxed in the state of residence is not in line with the principle of equity. This, however, 
might be slightly different in case of hybrid investments which will be outlined below 
in some detail. 
 
d.) The taking over of risks 
 
The taking over of risks can be relevant in different situations: it can relate to the risks 
involved in the exercising of a certain function, which is then a question of 
appropriate measuring and allocating profits to the respective function as outlined 
above, or it can relate - very generally - to the risks involved in the direct investment 
made in a particular market. A higher risk in the foreign market requires a higher 
profit derived in this particular market in order to compensate the risk, i.e. a profit 
which exceeds the purely functional margin of the activity. Especially in cases where 
the tax rate in the source country is lower than in the residence country it is important 
that the exceeding profit is subject to tax in the source country and not in the 
residence country. Any other solution would limit the possibility of the company to 
compensate for the increased market risk and would bring the investor into a position 
which is less advantageous in comparison to other market participants who are not 
subject to a residence-based taxation. Thus, it can be concluded that it is necessary 
from an equity perspective to tax the income related to the entrepreneurial risk and 
the market risk in the source country only. This leads to an equal treatment of foreign 
and domestic investments in the source state and avoids income being subject to  
taxation in the country of residence which might otherwise weaken the position of the 
foreign investor and reduce the possibility to compensate for those risks. In principle, 
the aforementioned strict limitation to a source-based taxation is not only required if 
the income taxation in the state of residence is higher than in the state of source, but 
is equally required if the income taxation is lower. 
 
e.) The providing of a market to earn the income 
 
The providing of a market has to be separated from the exercising of certain 
functions, e.g. sales functions. The exercising of a sales function and the respective 
profit related to such a function is to be taxed in the country where the function is  
                                            
22 See in this respect Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of 




   
 
3.2.5. Equity and the Use of Tangible and Intangible Property  
 
As already outlined earlier in the context of neutrality, rental income and royalty 
income have to be subdivided into four different components: a compensation for 
write-offs of the property concerned, a compensation for maintaining the property, a 
compensation for bearing the risks, and an interest component.26 Consequently, the 
principles just described with respect to direct and portfolio investments have to be 
applied. The first three components should be allocable to the country in which the 
leasing or renting activity is carried on.. In contrast thereto, the interest component 
should be allocable to the country in which the property is actually used for the 
income-producing activity. Of course, the separation may be difficult from a practical 
point of view. Pursuant to Kemmeren, a fixed part of the payments (percentage) 
could be classified as interest. This could be settled by protocol or mutual agreement 
between the two states or, alternatively, a standard could be included in the double 
tax convention.27 
 
3.2.6. Equity and Hybrid Investments  
 
3.2.6.1. Finance, Leasing and Similar Activities  
  
The conclusions outlined above with respect to direct and portfolio investments and 
the principles derived from those conclusions have to be applied to the so-called 
“hybrid investments.” As already described earlier with respect to neutrality, I 
consider the creation of capital intensive inter-company services by allocating those 
functions and risks to a separate legal entity as a hybrid investment, because it 
combines the elements of a direct investment with the elements of an indirect 
investment. A hybrid investment contains a separable interest component which, at 
the same time, is one of the most important components within the income of the 
respective entity.28 The hybrid investments were of some importance in the context of 
competitiveness, and will be of similar importance with respect to equity 
considerations. The principle of equity clearly requires the taking into account of inter-
company transactions where the legal structure provides a shifting of taxing rights 
from one country to another. For example, a foreign direct (equity) investment can be 
judged differently from a comparable investment where the capital (equity) stream is 
routed through a foreign finance company which is interposed in another (third) 
country. In the latter case, the capital stream is transformed within the legal structure 
into a debt stream. Even though the ultimate purpose of the investment remains the 
same, the separation and relocation of functions and risks to an additional entity and 
the outcome in terms of allocation of taxing rights cannot remain unconsidered for 
equity reasons. This can be explained best by the simplified inter-company structure 
which was already used in the previous chapter and which will be illustrated in the 
following. Even though the alternatives deal with finance and leasing companies, the 
                                            
26 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 82. See also Vogel who 
subdivides the payments into three parts since he considers the compensation for maintaining the property and 
for bearing the risk to be one single part (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and 
Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (318) and (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, 
page 393 et seq. (401).  
27 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 453, 
28 The hybrid investments are outlined in chapter 2 in more detail. 
   
 
income if the financial means are invested domestically. In the second case, the 
residence country should participate in the consumption by levying a consumption 
tax. In other words: the resident individual should at least contribute to the costs of 
the infrastructure of the country which offers him the possibility to consume his 
wealth.24 This seems to me the most appropriate way to cover the costs for the public 
goods and services received in the residence country which are not related to the 
production of income. This solution provides for an income taxation which takes into 
account the circumstances in the foreign country and a subsequent taxation of the 
consumption in the state where the investor is resident.25  
 
3.2.4. Equity and Portfolio Investments  
 
Even though the conclusions outlined above with respect to inter-nation equity and 
direct investments are generally also true for portfolio investments, the perspective is 
a bit different. In case of an investment in bonds - for example - the recipient of the 
benefits will be directly the debtor in the source country and only indirectly the 
investor (creditor) in the residence country. Similar to the conclusion that the 
business profits derived in the source country should be taxed in the source country, 
this applies equally to interest income. That means, the interest paid to the creditor 
should be taxed in the source state. The reason is that the income produced (which 
also comprises the interest in the first step) requires the providing of goods and 
services by the source country as described above. The subsequent interest 
payment to the creditor reduces the tax base of the debtor in the source country and 
if it does not - to the same extent - increase the tax base of the creditor in the source 
country (!), the latter country will consequently loose taxing rights which go beyond 
the allocable profit according to the principles outlined above with respect to direct 
investment. However, if the extent of benefits received for the production of income in 
the residence country is comparable in case of direct investments and portfolio 
investments, the result with respect to the allocation of taxing rights to the source 
country or the residence country should be the same.  From the perspective of inter-
nation equity, the taxing rights with respect to income from portfolio investments 
should be allocable to the source country in the same way as it is the case for income 
derived from direct investments.  
 
With respect to taxpayer equity, it has to be taken into consideration that interest 
payments are actually transferred from the source country to the residence country. 
The situation is therefore different from an investment - for example in a foreign 
subsidiary - where the income received in the source country is reinvested and 
therefore remains connected to the higher risk in the foreign market. Here, the 
income is transferred to the creditor and - at the moment when the creditor receives 
the income - it is comparable to domestic portfolio investments. In addition, the 
portfolio investor is not in the same way integrated in the foreign country as the direct 
investor. Nevertheless, the interest paid to the resident investor from the foreign 
investment is in its totality dependent on the conditions which exist in the foreign 
market and only at the moment when it is actually transferred to the residence 
country the income becomes comparable to domestic income. Up to this point in 
time, the situation is different and I think that equality considerations therefore do not 
necessarily require the taxation in the residence country. This is especially true 
where both - taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity - are taken into account.  
                                            
24 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 432. 
25 Of course, under the assumption that the income is consumed in the residence state.  
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3.2.5. Equity and the Use of Tangible and Intangible Property  
 
As already outlined earlier in the context of neutrality, rental income and royalty 
income have to be subdivided into four different components: a compensation for 
write-offs of the property concerned, a compensation for maintaining the property, a 
compensation for bearing the risks, and an interest component.26 Consequently, the 
principles just described with respect to direct and portfolio investments have to be 
applied. The first three components should be allocable to the country in which the 
leasing or renting activity is carried on.. In contrast thereto, the interest component 
should be allocable to the country in which the property is actually used for the 
income-producing activity. Of course, the separation may be difficult from a practical 
point of view. Pursuant to Kemmeren, a fixed part of the payments (percentage) 
could be classified as interest. This could be settled by protocol or mutual agreement 
between the two states or, alternatively, a standard could be included in the double 
tax convention.27 
 
3.2.6. Equity and Hybrid Investments  
 
3.2.6.1. Finance, Leasing and Similar Activities  
  
The conclusions outlined above with respect to direct and portfolio investments and 
the principles derived from those conclusions have to be applied to the so-called 
“hybrid investments.” As already described earlier with respect to neutrality, I 
consider the creation of capital intensive inter-company services by allocating those 
functions and risks to a separate legal entity as a hybrid investment, because it 
combines the elements of a direct investment with the elements of an indirect 
investment. A hybrid investment contains a separable interest component which, at 
the same time, is one of the most important components within the income of the 
respective entity.28 The hybrid investments were of some importance in the context of 
competitiveness, and will be of similar importance with respect to equity 
considerations. The principle of equity clearly requires the taking into account of inter-
company transactions where the legal structure provides a shifting of taxing rights 
from one country to another. For example, a foreign direct (equity) investment can be 
judged differently from a comparable investment where the capital (equity) stream is 
routed through a foreign finance company which is interposed in another (third) 
country. In the latter case, the capital stream is transformed within the legal structure 
into a debt stream. Even though the ultimate purpose of the investment remains the 
same, the separation and relocation of functions and risks to an additional entity and 
the outcome in terms of allocation of taxing rights cannot remain unconsidered for 
equity reasons. This can be explained best by the simplified inter-company structure 
which was already used in the previous chapter and which will be illustrated in the 
following. Even though the alternatives deal with finance and leasing companies, the 
                                            
26 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 82. See also Vogel who 
subdivides the payments into three parts since he considers the compensation for maintaining the property and 
for bearing the risk to be one single part (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and 
Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (318) and (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, 
page 393 et seq. (401).  
27 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 453, 
28 The hybrid investments are outlined in chapter 2 in more detail. 
   
 
income if the financial means are invested domestically. In the second case, the 
residence country should participate in the consumption by levying a consumption 
tax. In other words: the resident individual should at least contribute to the costs of 
the infrastructure of the country which offers him the possibility to consume his 
wealth.24 This seems to me the most appropriate way to cover the costs for the public 
goods and services received in the residence country which are not related to the 
production of income. This solution provides for an income taxation which takes into 
account the circumstances in the foreign country and a subsequent taxation of the 
consumption in the state where the investor is resident.25  
 
3.2.4. Equity and Portfolio Investments  
 
Even though the conclusions outlined above with respect to inter-nation equity and 
direct investments are generally also true for portfolio investments, the perspective is 
a bit different. In case of an investment in bonds - for example - the recipient of the 
benefits will be directly the debtor in the source country and only indirectly the 
investor (creditor) in the residence country. Similar to the conclusion that the 
business profits derived in the source country should be taxed in the source country, 
this applies equally to interest income. That means, the interest paid to the creditor 
should be taxed in the source state. The reason is that the income produced (which 
also comprises the interest in the first step) requires the providing of goods and 
services by the source country as described above. The subsequent interest 
payment to the creditor reduces the tax base of the debtor in the source country and 
if it does not - to the same extent - increase the tax base of the creditor in the source 
country (!), the latter country will consequently loose taxing rights which go beyond 
the allocable profit according to the principles outlined above with respect to direct 
investment. However, if the extent of benefits received for the production of income in 
the residence country is comparable in case of direct investments and portfolio 
investments, the result with respect to the allocation of taxing rights to the source 
country or the residence country should be the same.  From the perspective of inter-
nation equity, the taxing rights with respect to income from portfolio investments 
should be allocable to the source country in the same way as it is the case for income 
derived from direct investments.  
 
With respect to taxpayer equity, it has to be taken into consideration that interest 
payments are actually transferred from the source country to the residence country. 
The situation is therefore different from an investment - for example in a foreign 
subsidiary - where the income received in the source country is reinvested and 
therefore remains connected to the higher risk in the foreign market. Here, the 
income is transferred to the creditor and - at the moment when the creditor receives 
the income - it is comparable to domestic portfolio investments. In addition, the 
portfolio investor is not in the same way integrated in the foreign country as the direct 
investor. Nevertheless, the interest paid to the resident investor from the foreign 
investment is in its totality dependent on the conditions which exist in the foreign 
market and only at the moment when it is actually transferred to the residence 
country the income becomes comparable to domestic income. Up to this point in 
time, the situation is different and I think that equality considerations therefore do not 
necessarily require the taxation in the residence country. This is especially true 
where both - taxpayer equity and inter-nation equity - are taken into account.  
                                            
24 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 432. 
25 Of course, under the assumption that the income is consumed in the residence state.  
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(and not in country A) and the activities are subject to the market risk of that country. 
It is therefore assumed that the public goods and services for producing the income 
are mainly or even solely provided by country B. The same should generally be true 
when the direct investment in the form of equity transfer is accompanied by a loan 
financing between company A and company B.  
 
Nothing different should be true for the service functions exercised by company C. 
Even though the functions are less substantial and not comparable to those 
exercised by company B, they are part of the overall business activities of the group 
and therefore part of an income producing activity. The public benefits received for 
the exercising of these functions are less - compared to the functions exercised in 
country B - but certainly limited to country C. That means if the functions are only 
exercised in country C, the taxation of the income received should be restricted to the 
income taxation of country C. However, this result can only be true with respect to the 
service functions. As already outlined above, the interest income from the financing 
activity should generally be allocable to the country in which the income-producing 
activity is carried on. The same is basically true in an alternative scenario where the 
activity of company C comprises the leasing or renting out of tangible property with 
respect to the interest component included in the payments received. If this were the 
case, it would be in line with the general principles outlined above with respect to 
direct investments and portfolio investments.  
 
The outcome is different, however, if the interest income (alternatively: the leasing 
and rental income) is subject to a residence-based taxation instead of a source-
based taxation. In this case, the interest on the loan amount granted to company B 
(and the interest included in the leasing and rental payments) would be completely 
allocable to state C, i.e. the latter state has the right to tax the interest income. At 
least, this is the outcome for the interest income which is not separated from the 
leasing and rental payments if the double tax convention between countries B and C 
is based on the OECD-MTC.30 For the interest income on the loan amount, the 
OECD-MTC theoretically provides for a limited taxation at source.31 However, apart 
from the possibility of a limited taxation at source, the residence-based taxation leads 
to a deviation from the conclusions above and this might have consequences with 















                                            
30 The leasing and renting out of movable property is qualified as business income and therefore taxable in the 
state in which the business activity is carried on (Article 7 of the OECD-MTC).  
31 Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
principles regarding hybrid investments are equally relevant for any other rental and 
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                                        equity investment (3) 
 
 












(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of holding company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B.  
(3)  Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
cash pooling and financing activities (alternatively: leasing or renting out of tangible assets). 
(4) Loan agreement (alternatively: leasing or rental agreement) between the companies B and C.  
 
The situation in the example can basically be described as follows: Instead of limiting 
the foreign investment and the business activities to country B, the holding company 
A decided to split up the business activities and therefore the functions over two 
different countries and subsidiaries (whereas the main functions are exercised by 
company B) and to establish an intra-group debt financing between company C and 
company B (alternatively: a leasing or rental agreement). Of course, the underlying 
assumption in the example is that no abuse of law or similar legal aspects are 
involved according to which company C should not be considered to exercise the 
respective functions by itself.  
 
Based on the equity considerations outlined above, the taxing rights for the income 
generated from the business activities of subsidiary B should be allocable to country 
B. The main reason is that the income-producing activity is carried on in country B 
                                            
29 However, the renting out of land and real estate is - based on the OECD-MTC - typically subject to a source-
based taxation (Article 6 of the OECD-MTC). This, of course, reduces the problem. See in this respect also 
Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, 
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(and not in country A) and the activities are subject to the market risk of that country. 
It is therefore assumed that the public goods and services for producing the income 
are mainly or even solely provided by country B. The same should generally be true 
when the direct investment in the form of equity transfer is accompanied by a loan 
financing between company A and company B.  
 
Nothing different should be true for the service functions exercised by company C. 
Even though the functions are less substantial and not comparable to those 
exercised by company B, they are part of the overall business activities of the group 
and therefore part of an income producing activity. The public benefits received for 
the exercising of these functions are less - compared to the functions exercised in 
country B - but certainly limited to country C. That means if the functions are only 
exercised in country C, the taxation of the income received should be restricted to the 
income taxation of country C. However, this result can only be true with respect to the 
service functions. As already outlined above, the interest income from the financing 
activity should generally be allocable to the country in which the income-producing 
activity is carried on. The same is basically true in an alternative scenario where the 
activity of company C comprises the leasing or renting out of tangible property with 
respect to the interest component included in the payments received. If this were the 
case, it would be in line with the general principles outlined above with respect to 
direct investments and portfolio investments.  
 
The outcome is different, however, if the interest income (alternatively: the leasing 
and rental income) is subject to a residence-based taxation instead of a source-
based taxation. In this case, the interest on the loan amount granted to company B 
(and the interest included in the leasing and rental payments) would be completely 
allocable to state C, i.e. the latter state has the right to tax the interest income. At 
least, this is the outcome for the interest income which is not separated from the 
leasing and rental payments if the double tax convention between countries B and C 
is based on the OECD-MTC.30 For the interest income on the loan amount, the 
OECD-MTC theoretically provides for a limited taxation at source.31 However, apart 
from the possibility of a limited taxation at source, the residence-based taxation leads 
to a deviation from the conclusions above and this might have consequences with 
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principles regarding hybrid investments are equally relevant for any other rental and 
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of holding company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B.  
(3)  Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is limited to intra-group 
cash pooling and financing activities (alternatively: leasing or renting out of tangible assets). 
(4) Loan agreement (alternatively: leasing or rental agreement) between the companies B and C.  
 
The situation in the example can basically be described as follows: Instead of limiting 
the foreign investment and the business activities to country B, the holding company 
A decided to split up the business activities and therefore the functions over two 
different countries and subsidiaries (whereas the main functions are exercised by 
company B) and to establish an intra-group debt financing between company C and 
company B (alternatively: a leasing or rental agreement). Of course, the underlying 
assumption in the example is that no abuse of law or similar legal aspects are 
involved according to which company C should not be considered to exercise the 
respective functions by itself.  
 
Based on the equity considerations outlined above, the taxing rights for the income 
generated from the business activities of subsidiary B should be allocable to country 
B. The main reason is that the income-producing activity is carried on in country B 
                                            
29 However, the renting out of land and real estate is - based on the OECD-MTC - typically subject to a source-
based taxation (Article 6 of the OECD-MTC). This, of course, reduces the problem. See in this respect also 
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by company C. Taking into account a residence-based taxation in countries A and C, 
the interest income of 7 percent minus the service fees (including the fees for the 
guarantee) of 3 percent will be subject to tax in country A, i.e. 4 percent of the 
nominal amount of loan investment per year. If the double tax convention between 
the countries A and B is based on the OECD-MTC, a limited taxation at source is 
provided for in country B. The service company C derives income from the rendering 
of services to company A of 3 percent and has to pay fees for the re-insurance of the 
credit risk of 2.8 percent. The net income which is subject to tax in state C is 0.2 
percent. The latter percentage reflects the net income which covers the service 
functions and the risks inherent in the activity of company C. Overall, the residence-
based taxation leads to the result that, depending on the alternative, an amount 
which is at least as high as the basic interest component is taxed in state A and the 
service income of company C is taxed in state C. In case of a withholding taxation in 
state B, a tax credit has to be granted in state A in order to avoid a possible double 
taxation of income. The tax treatment of the re-insurance company as well as other 
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(1) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(2) Company C grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent.  
(3) The risks related to the loan amount and the interest payments are covered by a third party (re-
insurance company). Company C has to pay a yearly fee of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of the 
loan for the third party guarantee. It shall be assumed that the guarantee completely eliminates the 
credit risk, i.e. the financial standing of the ultimate guarantor (re-insurance company) is to be 
considered extraordinarily good. 
 
The example is now slightly amended. Instead of granting the loan directly to 
company B, the parent company A chooses to increase the share capital of the 
service company C which, in turn, transfers the financial means to company B. 
Legally, company C does not act as the service provider for company A anymore but 
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(1) Company A grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent.  
(2) Company C provides services to company A which are related to the loan investment. This 
encompasses, inter alia, the provision of a guarantee for the repayment of the loan and a guarantee 
for the payment of the interest. For theoretical purposes, it shall be assumed that the guarantee 
prevents company A from any potential credit risk included in the loan agreement between companies 
A and B. Company A has to pay a yearly fee of 3 percent of the nominal amount of the loan for the 
services / guarantee provided by company C.  
(3) The risks related to the loan amount and the interest payments are covered by a third party (re-
insurance company). Company C has to pay a yearly fee of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of the 
loan for the third party guarantee. It shall be assumed that the guarantee completely eliminates the 
credit risk, i.e. the financial standing of the ultimate guarantor (re-insurance company) is to be 
considered extraordinarily good. 
 
In this alternative, company A wants to achieve a stable and continuous interest 
income without taking substantial risks. In fact, the contractual arrangements 
eliminate the risk related to the borrower (credit risk) which is now shifted to company 
C (and indirectly to the re-insurance company). If the loan amount is structured as a 
non-flexible investment with a fixed interest rate, the remaining risk is influenced by 
the investment period. If it is just a short-term loan, the risk is relatively moderate and 
encompasses the risk that the actual development deviates form the expected 
development of the real interest rate and the inflation rate. Of course, the longer the 
period of investment, the higher the risk of a deviation between the actual rates and 
the expected rates. In contrast thereto, if the loan amount is structured as a 
completely flexible investment with a variable interest rate which is permanently 
adjusted - depending on the development of the real interest rate and the inflation 
rate - the net interest income should encompass the actual real interest rate and the 
actual inflation rate (the basic interest component).32 In this situation, the investment 
can - under the given circumstances - be considered a risk-free investment. It is also 
clear from the explanations that all services in relation to the investment are provided 
                                            
32 It is unlikely that investor A would accept an amount of net interest income which is lower than the basic 
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by company C. Taking into account a residence-based taxation in countries A and C, 
the interest income of 7 percent minus the service fees (including the fees for the 
guarantee) of 3 percent will be subject to tax in country A, i.e. 4 percent of the 
nominal amount of loan investment per year. If the double tax convention between 
the countries A and B is based on the OECD-MTC, a limited taxation at source is 
provided for in country B. The service company C derives income from the rendering 
of services to company A of 3 percent and has to pay fees for the re-insurance of the 
credit risk of 2.8 percent. The net income which is subject to tax in state C is 0.2 
percent. The latter percentage reflects the net income which covers the service 
functions and the risks inherent in the activity of company C. Overall, the residence-
based taxation leads to the result that, depending on the alternative, an amount 
which is at least as high as the basic interest component is taxed in state A and the 
service income of company C is taxed in state C. In case of a withholding taxation in 
state B, a tax credit has to be granted in state A in order to avoid a possible double 
taxation of income. The tax treatment of the re-insurance company as well as other 
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(1) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(2) Company C grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent.  
(3) The risks related to the loan amount and the interest payments are covered by a third party (re-
insurance company). Company C has to pay a yearly fee of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of the 
loan for the third party guarantee. It shall be assumed that the guarantee completely eliminates the 
credit risk, i.e. the financial standing of the ultimate guarantor (re-insurance company) is to be 
considered extraordinarily good. 
 
The example is now slightly amended. Instead of granting the loan directly to 
company B, the parent company A chooses to increase the share capital of the 
service company C which, in turn, transfers the financial means to company B. 
Legally, company C does not act as the service provider for company A anymore but 
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(1) Company A grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent.  
(2) Company C provides services to company A which are related to the loan investment. This 
encompasses, inter alia, the provision of a guarantee for the repayment of the loan and a guarantee 
for the payment of the interest. For theoretical purposes, it shall be assumed that the guarantee 
prevents company A from any potential credit risk included in the loan agreement between companies 
A and B. Company A has to pay a yearly fee of 3 percent of the nominal amount of the loan for the 
services / guarantee provided by company C.  
(3) The risks related to the loan amount and the interest payments are covered by a third party (re-
insurance company). Company C has to pay a yearly fee of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of the 
loan for the third party guarantee. It shall be assumed that the guarantee completely eliminates the 
credit risk, i.e. the financial standing of the ultimate guarantor (re-insurance company) is to be 
considered extraordinarily good. 
 
In this alternative, company A wants to achieve a stable and continuous interest 
income without taking substantial risks. In fact, the contractual arrangements 
eliminate the risk related to the borrower (credit risk) which is now shifted to company 
C (and indirectly to the re-insurance company). If the loan amount is structured as a 
non-flexible investment with a fixed interest rate, the remaining risk is influenced by 
the investment period. If it is just a short-term loan, the risk is relatively moderate and 
encompasses the risk that the actual development deviates form the expected 
development of the real interest rate and the inflation rate. Of course, the longer the 
period of investment, the higher the risk of a deviation between the actual rates and 
the expected rates. In contrast thereto, if the loan amount is structured as a 
completely flexible investment with a variable interest rate which is permanently 
adjusted - depending on the development of the real interest rate and the inflation 
rate - the net interest income should encompass the actual real interest rate and the 
actual inflation rate (the basic interest component).32 In this situation, the investment 
can - under the given circumstances - be considered a risk-free investment. It is also 
clear from the explanations that all services in relation to the investment are provided 
                                            
32 It is unlikely that investor A would accept an amount of net interest income which is lower than the basic 










   
 
restricted to the (mere) provision of a loan amount to company B.35 Company C (by 
way of services provided to company A) carried out all activities which are related to 
the loan amount granted from company A to company B (e.g. the arranging of the re-
insurance). In the second alternative, company A did not grant the loan (directly) to 
company B, but instead increased the equity in company C. The activities of 
company C are now carried out in the context of its “own” financing activities and no 
longer in the context of services provided to company A. However, the functions 
carried out by the personnel of company C in the second alternative are almost the 
same as in the first alternative.36 That means the personnel of company C will, to a 
large extent, carry out the same activities, the infrastructure might be identical or 
almost identical and the service providers which are required in the context of the 
activity will be the same or almost the same (e.g. legal services, re-insurance 
company). The significant increase in the income of company C in the second 
alternative can therefore, in my opinion, not be explained by an increase in the 
economic output created by the personnel in state C, because this is not the case. 
Moreover, the benefits received from state C should be identical or almost identical 
and therefore cannot “justify” the significant increase in the income tax base in state 
C, either. In fact, it is the interest income related to the loan amount which is 
responsible for the increased income of company C and the increased tax base in 
state C. The decisive question is whether there is a significant risk transfer from 
company A to company C (and from state A to state C) which explains (and 
“justifies”) the increase in income which can be taxed in state C. 
 
In order to examine the risk transfer to state C it can be useful to make a 
differentiation between the situation where the loan agreement is a non-flexible 
agreement with a fixed interest rate, on the one hand, and the situation where the 
loan agreement is a completely flexible agreement (repayable at any time) with a 
variable interest rate, on the other hand. In the first situation - and based on the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter - the interest income should encompass 
the following elements: 
 
- the (credit) risk premium (which, however, is covered by the guarantee); 
 
- the liquidity premium (only in case the loan amount is not provided on a short-
term basis); 
 
- the expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation rate over the period of 
investment; 
 
- the basic interest component (as defined in the previous chapter); 
 
The first three elements are clearly risk elements. However, due to the fact that the 
credit risk is covered by the guarantee, only the risks which are related to the period 
of investment (liquidity risk, expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation rate) 
                                            
35 The examination just focuses on the loan amount and the activities in this context. Company A may, of course, 
carry out additional functions which, however, do not play a role in this example. The same is basically true for 
company C.  
36 It is “almost” identical because there will be, in any event, small differences which are caused by the change of 
the activity from a provider of services to company A towards a provider of loan amounts to company B. For 
example, there will be no invoicing of services anymore to company A, the re-insurance agreement will be 
concluded directly with company C instead of company A et cetera.  
   
 
exercised by company C are not substantially different from the alternative above 
(preparation and finalisation of all steps necessary for the investment - including the 
third party re-insurance). Furthermore, it can be assumed that company C does not 
require more benefits from the state in which the company carries on its activities 
than in the example above. It is just the decision of company A to increase the share 
capital of company C instead of granting the loan directly to company B. It shall be 
assumed that the provision of the loan is not to be considered more burdensome 
than the increase in the share capital, and vice versa. However, a residence-based 
taxation in the states A and C leads to a different outcome regarding the income 
derived in this structure. In contrast to the situation above, the residence state of the 
parent company A is not in a position to tax the interest income. Instead, it is state C 
which taxes the complete amount of income, i.e. 4.2 percent (7 percent interest 
income minus 2.8 percent fees for the guarantee). Thus, the income does not only 
encompass the 0.2 percent spread which covers the functions exercised in relation to 
the investment and the guarantee but also the complete amount of interest which 
was originally allocable to the state of the parent company A. In other words, the 
slight amendment of the structure leads to the outcome that the taxing rights related 
to the interest income are transferred from state A to state C.  
 
It should be clarified whether the decision of company A to invest in the share capital 
of company C leads to a substantial difference in comparison to the loan investment 
in company B. In case of the loan investment, company A is in a position to derive 4 
percent interest income on a yearly basis and an additional income from the equity 
investment in the service company C of 0.2 percent through subsequent profit 
distributions and / or capital gains from the disposal of the shares (if the profit is not 
distributed or not completely distributed).33 In contrast thereto, the mere equity 
investment does not provide for a permanent interest income. However, the profit 
realised by company C encompasses the original spread of 0.2 percent plus the 
interest income of 4 percent. In total, the profit derived by company C includes both 
components and is theoretically available for subsequent dividend distributions and / 
or increases the value of the participation and therefore the potential capital gains 
from the disposal of the shares (if the profit is not distributed or not completely 
distributed).34 Leaving aside the corporate income tax, the same amount of income is 
available either through a combination of interest income and dividends (and / or 
capital gains) or solely through dividends (and / or capital gains). A possible 
withholding tax on the interest income would be deducted in both cases, i.e. from the 
interest payments to company A or the interest payments to company C. In the first 
case, the withholding tax has to be credited against the corporate income tax in state 
A and in the second case against the corporate income tax in state C. In both cases, 
it will not have a direct or indirect negative effect on company A (under the 
assumption that the withholding tax is lower than the corporate income tax in the 
states A and C). 
 
As already mentioned above, if the functions carried out by companies A and C in the 
first alternative are compared to the functions carried out by companies A and C in 
the second alternative, it seems that the changes are not significant from an 
economic point of view. In the first alternative, the activity of company A was 
                                            
33 The corporate income tax imposed on the 0.2 percent income in country C has to be taken into account and 
will therefore reduce the amount which is available for distribution and the potential capital gains, respectively. 
34 The corporate income tax imposed on the 4.2 percent income in country C has to be taken into account and 
will therefore reduce the amount which is available for distribution and the potential capital gains, respectively. 
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restricted to the (mere) provision of a loan amount to company B.35 Company C (by 
way of services provided to company A) carried out all activities which are related to 
the loan amount granted from company A to company B (e.g. the arranging of the re-
insurance). In the second alternative, company A did not grant the loan (directly) to 
company B, but instead increased the equity in company C. The activities of 
company C are now carried out in the context of its “own” financing activities and no 
longer in the context of services provided to company A. However, the functions 
carried out by the personnel of company C in the second alternative are almost the 
same as in the first alternative.36 That means the personnel of company C will, to a 
large extent, carry out the same activities, the infrastructure might be identical or 
almost identical and the service providers which are required in the context of the 
activity will be the same or almost the same (e.g. legal services, re-insurance 
company). The significant increase in the income of company C in the second 
alternative can therefore, in my opinion, not be explained by an increase in the 
economic output created by the personnel in state C, because this is not the case. 
Moreover, the benefits received from state C should be identical or almost identical 
and therefore cannot “justify” the significant increase in the income tax base in state 
C, either. In fact, it is the interest income related to the loan amount which is 
responsible for the increased income of company C and the increased tax base in 
state C. The decisive question is whether there is a significant risk transfer from 
company A to company C (and from state A to state C) which explains (and 
“justifies”) the increase in income which can be taxed in state C. 
 
In order to examine the risk transfer to state C it can be useful to make a 
differentiation between the situation where the loan agreement is a non-flexible 
agreement with a fixed interest rate, on the one hand, and the situation where the 
loan agreement is a completely flexible agreement (repayable at any time) with a 
variable interest rate, on the other hand. In the first situation - and based on the 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter - the interest income should encompass 
the following elements: 
 
- the (credit) risk premium (which, however, is covered by the guarantee); 
 
- the liquidity premium (only in case the loan amount is not provided on a short-
term basis); 
 
- the expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation rate over the period of 
investment; 
 
- the basic interest component (as defined in the previous chapter); 
 
The first three elements are clearly risk elements. However, due to the fact that the 
credit risk is covered by the guarantee, only the risks which are related to the period 
of investment (liquidity risk, expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation rate) 
                                            
35 The examination just focuses on the loan amount and the activities in this context. Company A may, of course, 
carry out additional functions which, however, do not play a role in this example. The same is basically true for 
company C.  
36 It is “almost” identical because there will be, in any event, small differences which are caused by the change of 
the activity from a provider of services to company A towards a provider of loan amounts to company B. For 
example, there will be no invoicing of services anymore to company A, the re-insurance agreement will be 
concluded directly with company C instead of company A et cetera.  
   
 
exercised by company C are not substantially different from the alternative above 
(preparation and finalisation of all steps necessary for the investment - including the 
third party re-insurance). Furthermore, it can be assumed that company C does not 
require more benefits from the state in which the company carries on its activities 
than in the example above. It is just the decision of company A to increase the share 
capital of company C instead of granting the loan directly to company B. It shall be 
assumed that the provision of the loan is not to be considered more burdensome 
than the increase in the share capital, and vice versa. However, a residence-based 
taxation in the states A and C leads to a different outcome regarding the income 
derived in this structure. In contrast to the situation above, the residence state of the 
parent company A is not in a position to tax the interest income. Instead, it is state C 
which taxes the complete amount of income, i.e. 4.2 percent (7 percent interest 
income minus 2.8 percent fees for the guarantee). Thus, the income does not only 
encompass the 0.2 percent spread which covers the functions exercised in relation to 
the investment and the guarantee but also the complete amount of interest which 
was originally allocable to the state of the parent company A. In other words, the 
slight amendment of the structure leads to the outcome that the taxing rights related 
to the interest income are transferred from state A to state C.  
 
It should be clarified whether the decision of company A to invest in the share capital 
of company C leads to a substantial difference in comparison to the loan investment 
in company B. In case of the loan investment, company A is in a position to derive 4 
percent interest income on a yearly basis and an additional income from the equity 
investment in the service company C of 0.2 percent through subsequent profit 
distributions and / or capital gains from the disposal of the shares (if the profit is not 
distributed or not completely distributed).33 In contrast thereto, the mere equity 
investment does not provide for a permanent interest income. However, the profit 
realised by company C encompasses the original spread of 0.2 percent plus the 
interest income of 4 percent. In total, the profit derived by company C includes both 
components and is theoretically available for subsequent dividend distributions and / 
or increases the value of the participation and therefore the potential capital gains 
from the disposal of the shares (if the profit is not distributed or not completely 
distributed).34 Leaving aside the corporate income tax, the same amount of income is 
available either through a combination of interest income and dividends (and / or 
capital gains) or solely through dividends (and / or capital gains). A possible 
withholding tax on the interest income would be deducted in both cases, i.e. from the 
interest payments to company A or the interest payments to company C. In the first 
case, the withholding tax has to be credited against the corporate income tax in state 
A and in the second case against the corporate income tax in state C. In both cases, 
it will not have a direct or indirect negative effect on company A (under the 
assumption that the withholding tax is lower than the corporate income tax in the 
states A and C). 
 
As already mentioned above, if the functions carried out by companies A and C in the 
first alternative are compared to the functions carried out by companies A and C in 
the second alternative, it seems that the changes are not significant from an 
economic point of view. In the first alternative, the activity of company A was 
                                            
33 The corporate income tax imposed on the 0.2 percent income in country C has to be taken into account and 
will therefore reduce the amount which is available for distribution and the potential capital gains, respectively. 
34 The corporate income tax imposed on the 4.2 percent income in country C has to be taken into account and 
will therefore reduce the amount which is available for distribution and the potential capital gains, respectively. 
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component which, by itself, does not require the carrying out of functions in state A or 
state C (but in state B) and which cannot be seen as a compensation for the 
assumption of risks in state A or state C. This, of course, is of importance from an 
equity perspective. 
 
If the alternative in which the loan amount is provided by company A (first alternative) 
is compared to the alternative in which the loan amount is provided by company C 
(second alternative), it becomes obvious that the second alternative can be 
considered a kind of “worst case scenario” for state A. In contrast to the first 
alternative, where 4 percent interest income can be taxed on a yearly basis (taking 
into account a possible withholding tax deducted in state B), the outcome of the 
second alternative depends on the treatment of dividends and capital gains in state 
A. If the dividends of company C or a possible capital gain realised are exempt from 
taxation, state A will not be in a position to end up with a comparable tax result, i.e. 
state A will actually lose 4 percent income on the nominal amount of investment as a 
taxable result (minus the impact of a withholding tax credit) on a domestic corporate 
level. However, even if the dividends of company C or a possible capital gain are 
subject to tax in state A, the outcome is by no means comparable to the first 
alternative. For example, if state A provides for the elimination of a double taxation by 
way of a tax credit, the corporate income tax imposed by state A will be reduced by 
the corporate income tax of state C. If it is assumed that the corporate income tax in 
state C is comparable to the corporate income tax of state A, nothing will be gained, 
i.e. the additional corporate income tax might be zero. If state C is a low-tax country - 
and this is rather likely in this structure and is generally assumed in the examples - 
the result is mainly influenced by the period of time between the realisation of the 
income in state C and the distribution to state A (respectively disposal of shares). The 
effect which is commonly known as “deferral” is outlined in some more detail in the 
following chapters. However, what is absolutely clear is that the deferral of the 
domestic taxation of foreign income may have a similar effect as the exemption of 
income taxation. The longer the period of deferral, the higher the theoretical discount 
on the future income taxation in state A. Thus, it can be concluded that the second 
alternative may have a disastrous effect on the tax balance of state A without gaining 
anything in exchange. Of course, one could argue that an alternative equity 
investment in state B (instead of a loan investment) would have a similar impact on 
the tax balance of state A. However, it is quite obvious that an equity investment in 
state B is totally different from the second alternative. In such a case, the non-
existence of interest payments will increase the income of company B in state B. The 
taxation in state B is exactly the result which is considered an optimal scenario from 
an economic perspective and from a legal perspective, whereas the second 
alternative is only optimal to the extent that it is related to the 0.2 percent of the 
nominal amount of investment. 
 
The perspective of state A is of particular importance in the context of this study. The 
decisive question from an equity perspective is therefore whether state A should 
have the right to tax the income which is - pursuant to the structure in the second 
alternative - allocable to state C. In my opinion, the income which is related to the 
functions exercised and the risks taken in the latter state should not be attributable to 
state A on a current basis, neither in the first nor in the second alternative. Thus, it is 
clear is that the 0.2 percent of the nominal amount of investment should not be 
subject to tax in state A - because the 0.2 percent are directly related to the carrying 
out of functions in state C. In my opinion, equality aspects require that a resident of 
   
 
might directly influence the income of company C. That means any misjudgement of 
the future situation by company C, e.g. with respect to the development of the real 
interest rate, the development of the inflation rate, or the disposability of the loan 
amount granted to company B, can have positive or negative consequences for 
company C. It is obvious that the assumption of risks requires - from an equity 
perspective - that the respective premium is subject to taxation in state C if it cannot 
be taxed - based on the double tax conventions concluded - in state B. This would 
result in a balance between taxing the positive risk premium and taking into account 
the (possible) negative effects of such an assumption of risks. However, as already 
outlined in chapter 2, the basic interest component - at the time when the investment 
decision is made - is not part of the risk balance. Instead, the latter component 
reflects the existing real interest rate and the existing inflation rate. I have already 
made it clear that, in my opinion, both elements can be derived without taking any 
risk and without making any estimation with respect to the future development of 
those elements. Theoretically, company C has the possibility to derive the basic 
interest income as a separate component (on a rolling basis) or, alternatively, as a 
component which is included in the loan amount granted to company B. In the latter 
case, the basic interest component becomes part of a fixed interest rate (increased or 
decreased by an amount which reflects the expectation of the future development). 
 
In the alternative scenario of a completely flexible loan agreement - combined with a 
variable interest rate - the situation is different: the total interest rate neither includes 
a liquidity premium nor a premium which covers the expected development of the 
real interest rate and the inflation rate, because it shall be assumed that the interest 
rate will be permanently adjusted in order to reflect any increase or decrease in the 
latter elements. However, since the credit risk is covered by the guarantee, the 
interest income can be identical to the basic interest component (if the premium for 
the third party guarantee as well as the element which is related to functions carried 
out by company C are eliminated).  
 
If the non-flexible agreement is compared to the flexible agreement, it seems that it is 
the stipulation of the liquidity premium and the stipulation of the expected deviation in 
real interest rate and inflation rate which makes the difference - and which might 
have consequences for the investor who makes the decision. For example, if the 
inflation rate was expected to be constant and it turns out that the inflation rate has 
been increased dramatically over the period of investment, the interest rate (in a non-
flexible agreement) was effectively too low. This, of course, has a negative impact on 
the wealth of the investor. The provision of a flexible loan amount has no comparable 
consequences. Clearly, even the provision of a loan amount which effectively reflects 
the basic interest component requires a decision. However, if the decision is made in 
favour of the basic interest component (only), the investor can derive an income 
component which does not entail any risks. Of course, the investor may lose the 
possibility to derive higher income (by accepting risks), but this does not really matter 
for the conclusion. What is important is the fact that the investor - be it company A or 
company C - may derive a (minimum) compensation without the involvement of risks. 
If the investor wants to earn more than the basic interest component, a decision has 
to be made which requires the taking over of risks (and / or the carrying out of 
additional functions). The non-flexible agreement is therefore - in contrast to the 
flexible agreement - a combination of risk-free elements and risk elements. The 
deriving of the basic interest component may be restricted, in the latter situation, by 
the assumption of risks. However, it is obvious that the basic interest component is a 
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component which, by itself, does not require the carrying out of functions in state A or 
state C (but in state B) and which cannot be seen as a compensation for the 
assumption of risks in state A or state C. This, of course, is of importance from an 
equity perspective. 
 
If the alternative in which the loan amount is provided by company A (first alternative) 
is compared to the alternative in which the loan amount is provided by company C 
(second alternative), it becomes obvious that the second alternative can be 
considered a kind of “worst case scenario” for state A. In contrast to the first 
alternative, where 4 percent interest income can be taxed on a yearly basis (taking 
into account a possible withholding tax deducted in state B), the outcome of the 
second alternative depends on the treatment of dividends and capital gains in state 
A. If the dividends of company C or a possible capital gain realised are exempt from 
taxation, state A will not be in a position to end up with a comparable tax result, i.e. 
state A will actually lose 4 percent income on the nominal amount of investment as a 
taxable result (minus the impact of a withholding tax credit) on a domestic corporate 
level. However, even if the dividends of company C or a possible capital gain are 
subject to tax in state A, the outcome is by no means comparable to the first 
alternative. For example, if state A provides for the elimination of a double taxation by 
way of a tax credit, the corporate income tax imposed by state A will be reduced by 
the corporate income tax of state C. If it is assumed that the corporate income tax in 
state C is comparable to the corporate income tax of state A, nothing will be gained, 
i.e. the additional corporate income tax might be zero. If state C is a low-tax country - 
and this is rather likely in this structure and is generally assumed in the examples - 
the result is mainly influenced by the period of time between the realisation of the 
income in state C and the distribution to state A (respectively disposal of shares). The 
effect which is commonly known as “deferral” is outlined in some more detail in the 
following chapters. However, what is absolutely clear is that the deferral of the 
domestic taxation of foreign income may have a similar effect as the exemption of 
income taxation. The longer the period of deferral, the higher the theoretical discount 
on the future income taxation in state A. Thus, it can be concluded that the second 
alternative may have a disastrous effect on the tax balance of state A without gaining 
anything in exchange. Of course, one could argue that an alternative equity 
investment in state B (instead of a loan investment) would have a similar impact on 
the tax balance of state A. However, it is quite obvious that an equity investment in 
state B is totally different from the second alternative. In such a case, the non-
existence of interest payments will increase the income of company B in state B. The 
taxation in state B is exactly the result which is considered an optimal scenario from 
an economic perspective and from a legal perspective, whereas the second 
alternative is only optimal to the extent that it is related to the 0.2 percent of the 
nominal amount of investment. 
 
The perspective of state A is of particular importance in the context of this study. The 
decisive question from an equity perspective is therefore whether state A should 
have the right to tax the income which is - pursuant to the structure in the second 
alternative - allocable to state C. In my opinion, the income which is related to the 
functions exercised and the risks taken in the latter state should not be attributable to 
state A on a current basis, neither in the first nor in the second alternative. Thus, it is 
clear is that the 0.2 percent of the nominal amount of investment should not be 
subject to tax in state A - because the 0.2 percent are directly related to the carrying 
out of functions in state C. In my opinion, equality aspects require that a resident of 
   
 
might directly influence the income of company C. That means any misjudgement of 
the future situation by company C, e.g. with respect to the development of the real 
interest rate, the development of the inflation rate, or the disposability of the loan 
amount granted to company B, can have positive or negative consequences for 
company C. It is obvious that the assumption of risks requires - from an equity 
perspective - that the respective premium is subject to taxation in state C if it cannot 
be taxed - based on the double tax conventions concluded - in state B. This would 
result in a balance between taxing the positive risk premium and taking into account 
the (possible) negative effects of such an assumption of risks. However, as already 
outlined in chapter 2, the basic interest component - at the time when the investment 
decision is made - is not part of the risk balance. Instead, the latter component 
reflects the existing real interest rate and the existing inflation rate. I have already 
made it clear that, in my opinion, both elements can be derived without taking any 
risk and without making any estimation with respect to the future development of 
those elements. Theoretically, company C has the possibility to derive the basic 
interest income as a separate component (on a rolling basis) or, alternatively, as a 
component which is included in the loan amount granted to company B. In the latter 
case, the basic interest component becomes part of a fixed interest rate (increased or 
decreased by an amount which reflects the expectation of the future development). 
 
In the alternative scenario of a completely flexible loan agreement - combined with a 
variable interest rate - the situation is different: the total interest rate neither includes 
a liquidity premium nor a premium which covers the expected development of the 
real interest rate and the inflation rate, because it shall be assumed that the interest 
rate will be permanently adjusted in order to reflect any increase or decrease in the 
latter elements. However, since the credit risk is covered by the guarantee, the 
interest income can be identical to the basic interest component (if the premium for 
the third party guarantee as well as the element which is related to functions carried 
out by company C are eliminated).  
 
If the non-flexible agreement is compared to the flexible agreement, it seems that it is 
the stipulation of the liquidity premium and the stipulation of the expected deviation in 
real interest rate and inflation rate which makes the difference - and which might 
have consequences for the investor who makes the decision. For example, if the 
inflation rate was expected to be constant and it turns out that the inflation rate has 
been increased dramatically over the period of investment, the interest rate (in a non-
flexible agreement) was effectively too low. This, of course, has a negative impact on 
the wealth of the investor. The provision of a flexible loan amount has no comparable 
consequences. Clearly, even the provision of a loan amount which effectively reflects 
the basic interest component requires a decision. However, if the decision is made in 
favour of the basic interest component (only), the investor can derive an income 
component which does not entail any risks. Of course, the investor may lose the 
possibility to derive higher income (by accepting risks), but this does not really matter 
for the conclusion. What is important is the fact that the investor - be it company A or 
company C - may derive a (minimum) compensation without the involvement of risks. 
If the investor wants to earn more than the basic interest component, a decision has 
to be made which requires the taking over of risks (and / or the carrying out of 
additional functions). The non-flexible agreement is therefore - in contrast to the 
flexible agreement - a combination of risk-free elements and risk elements. The 
deriving of the basic interest component may be restricted, in the latter situation, by 
the assumption of risks. However, it is obvious that the basic interest component is a 
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In general, the question whether the basic interest component should be taxed on a 
“rolling” basis also arises in the context of the principle of equity. In my opinion, the 
aspects which have been outlined in the previous chapter are equally relevant from 
an equity point of view. Therefore, chapter 2 can be referred to in this regard. The 
basic interest component is to be seen as the risk-free (minimum) income which can 
be derived by the shareholder and it is therefore an acceptable and preferable 
approach to tax this income on a rolling basis instead of focusing on any fixed rate. 
 
Theoretically, there can be several possibilities to ensure the taxation in state A. One 
possibility could be the implementation of tax accounting rules which focus on the 
yearly revaluation of the investment in company C (“mark-to-market”). This, however, 
would lead to an income taxation which is not (necessarily) identical to the basic 
interest component. Another possibility might be the taxation of subsequent 
dividends (instead of an exemption). But such an approach does not solve the 
problem of deferral. In my opinion, the approach which should be preferred is the 
current taxation of the basic interest component in state A on a yearly basis. It is 
clear, however, that any approach for a current taxation of the basic interest 
component must provide for a complete elimination of double taxation of income and 
should theoretically be limited to a comparable taxation in state B. This should not 
only be true for the (direct) interest income from the loan agreement between 
company A and company B, but should be equally true for any current taxation of 
income in state A (I will go into more detail of that aspect below). Moreover, it should 
also be clear that any current attribution of income is to be limited (as a maximum) to 
the positive income derived by the intermediate company. As a general rule, the 
current taxation must not result in the taxation of income which is not existent on the 
intermediate level. The principles outlined in the previous chapter are equally relevant 
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state A who derives foreign income from state B should not be taxed more heavily 
than a resident of state B who derives domestic income from that state. The same is, 
of course, true for the relationship between states A and C, i.e. a resident of state A 
who derives foreign income from state C should not be taxed more heavily than a 
resident of state C who derives income from the latter state. In my opinion, if one 
follows the benefit theory, no other conclusion is possible than to concentrate on the 
state in which the income-producing activity is actually carried on, no matter how 
many states are legally interposed in the transaction. An interposition may only be 
relevant to the extent that additional income is produced in this state. Unfortunately, a 
residence-based taxation does not lead to such a result.  
 
Thus, the conclusion in a non-optimal scenario should be - in my opinion - to tax the 
0.2 percent in state C only (as outlined above). The taxation of the difference of 4 
percent depends on the respective scenario: if the amount encompasses any risk 
elements (e.g. in case of a non-flexible investment), the risk elements should be 
taxed in state C and not in state A. However, this requires that any negative income 
which is created by the assumption of losses through company C is taken into 
account in state C, too. The basic interest component is unconnected to any 
functions carried out in state A and state C and is also unconnected to any risks 
assumed in state A and state C. Based on the rules of allocating taxing rights 
between the states involved, it is quite simple to transfer the right to tax the basic 
interest component from one state to another. If the allocation of taxing rights follows 
the principles stipulated in the OECD-MTC, the basic interest component simply 
follows the transfer of functions and / or the transfer of risks to state C. This, 
however, is the decisive point: why should state A forgive the possibility to tax the 
basic interest component just because of the fact that functions and risks (and the 
respective income) - which are not directly related to the basic interest component - 
are transferred to another state?  
 
One has to keep in mind that - in contrast to a direct investment in state B - the 
financing through company C allows the (theoretical) subdivision of the elements 
included in the interest income. Of course, if the actual risks exceed the premium 
stipulated in the total interest rate, this will also affect the basic interest component 
(and might even affect the principal amount of investment). But this is not the 
decisive point: the risk component - and not the basic interest component - shall 
cover the risks involved. Therefore, if state A does not tax the basic interest 
component in the first alternative and the second alternative, it might foster the 
interposition of companies in low-tax states to shelter such income from domestic 
taxation (in state A) without supporting the optimal economic result. This, however, 
would definitely not be in line with the principle of equity.37 Again, it is obvious that 
such an approach is far from an optimal scenario of a strict source-based taxation, 
but it is - in my opinion - the most preferable result within a structure where 
residence-based taxation prevails. In other words, the basic interest component 
should be subject to income taxation in state A and the risk elements (credit risk 
premium, liquidity premium, the expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation 
rate) should be subject to income taxation in state C (if they cannot be taxed in state 
B). 
 
                                            
37 See in this respect also Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, 
General Report, IFA 2005, pages 44, 45. 
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In general, the question whether the basic interest component should be taxed on a 
“rolling” basis also arises in the context of the principle of equity. In my opinion, the 
aspects which have been outlined in the previous chapter are equally relevant from 
an equity point of view. Therefore, chapter 2 can be referred to in this regard. The 
basic interest component is to be seen as the risk-free (minimum) income which can 
be derived by the shareholder and it is therefore an acceptable and preferable 
approach to tax this income on a rolling basis instead of focusing on any fixed rate. 
 
Theoretically, there can be several possibilities to ensure the taxation in state A. One 
possibility could be the implementation of tax accounting rules which focus on the 
yearly revaluation of the investment in company C (“mark-to-market”). This, however, 
would lead to an income taxation which is not (necessarily) identical to the basic 
interest component. Another possibility might be the taxation of subsequent 
dividends (instead of an exemption). But such an approach does not solve the 
problem of deferral. In my opinion, the approach which should be preferred is the 
current taxation of the basic interest component in state A on a yearly basis. It is 
clear, however, that any approach for a current taxation of the basic interest 
component must provide for a complete elimination of double taxation of income and 
should theoretically be limited to a comparable taxation in state B. This should not 
only be true for the (direct) interest income from the loan agreement between 
company A and company B, but should be equally true for any current taxation of 
income in state A (I will go into more detail of that aspect below). Moreover, it should 
also be clear that any current attribution of income is to be limited (as a maximum) to 
the positive income derived by the intermediate company. As a general rule, the 
current taxation must not result in the taxation of income which is not existent on the 
intermediate level. The principles outlined in the previous chapter are equally relevant 
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state A who derives foreign income from state B should not be taxed more heavily 
than a resident of state B who derives domestic income from that state. The same is, 
of course, true for the relationship between states A and C, i.e. a resident of state A 
who derives foreign income from state C should not be taxed more heavily than a 
resident of state C who derives income from the latter state. In my opinion, if one 
follows the benefit theory, no other conclusion is possible than to concentrate on the 
state in which the income-producing activity is actually carried on, no matter how 
many states are legally interposed in the transaction. An interposition may only be 
relevant to the extent that additional income is produced in this state. Unfortunately, a 
residence-based taxation does not lead to such a result.  
 
Thus, the conclusion in a non-optimal scenario should be - in my opinion - to tax the 
0.2 percent in state C only (as outlined above). The taxation of the difference of 4 
percent depends on the respective scenario: if the amount encompasses any risk 
elements (e.g. in case of a non-flexible investment), the risk elements should be 
taxed in state C and not in state A. However, this requires that any negative income 
which is created by the assumption of losses through company C is taken into 
account in state C, too. The basic interest component is unconnected to any 
functions carried out in state A and state C and is also unconnected to any risks 
assumed in state A and state C. Based on the rules of allocating taxing rights 
between the states involved, it is quite simple to transfer the right to tax the basic 
interest component from one state to another. If the allocation of taxing rights follows 
the principles stipulated in the OECD-MTC, the basic interest component simply 
follows the transfer of functions and / or the transfer of risks to state C. This, 
however, is the decisive point: why should state A forgive the possibility to tax the 
basic interest component just because of the fact that functions and risks (and the 
respective income) - which are not directly related to the basic interest component - 
are transferred to another state?  
 
One has to keep in mind that - in contrast to a direct investment in state B - the 
financing through company C allows the (theoretical) subdivision of the elements 
included in the interest income. Of course, if the actual risks exceed the premium 
stipulated in the total interest rate, this will also affect the basic interest component 
(and might even affect the principal amount of investment). But this is not the 
decisive point: the risk component - and not the basic interest component - shall 
cover the risks involved. Therefore, if state A does not tax the basic interest 
component in the first alternative and the second alternative, it might foster the 
interposition of companies in low-tax states to shelter such income from domestic 
taxation (in state A) without supporting the optimal economic result. This, however, 
would definitely not be in line with the principle of equity.37 Again, it is obvious that 
such an approach is far from an optimal scenario of a strict source-based taxation, 
but it is - in my opinion - the most preferable result within a structure where 
residence-based taxation prevails. In other words, the basic interest component 
should be subject to income taxation in state A and the risk elements (credit risk 
premium, liquidity premium, the expected deviation in real interest rate and inflation 
rate) should be subject to income taxation in state C (if they cannot be taxed in state 
B). 
 
                                            
37 See in this respect also Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of their principles, 
General Report, IFA 2005, pages 44, 45. 
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(1) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(2) Company C provides leasing / rental services to company B. The movable assets are employed for 
an income-producing activity in country B.  
 
In principle, the aforementioned aspects equally apply to the leasing and rental 
services carried on in state C and provided to company B. Clearly, the leasing and 
rental activities are more complex than the simple provision of loan amounts, but the 
conclusion regarding the interest income included as a part of the leasing and rental 
income remains the same. The compensation for the write-off of the asset, the 
compensation for maintaining the asset, and the compensation for bearing the risk 
are allocable to the state in which the leasing and rental activities are carried on. In 
this respect, the economic conclusion is fully in line with the conclusions regarding 
the principle of equity. The interest income should theoretically be allocable to state 
B. However, in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation the interest 
income is subject to tax in state C, i.e. the state in which the leasing activity is carried 
on. In contrast to the example of a finance company, the OECD-MTC does not 
provide for a limited taxation at source of the interest income since the leasing and 
rental payments are not subdivided into the different components. However, the 
interest income contains, in the same way as the interest income in the alternative 
above, a risk component which covers the risks involved and a basic interest 
component which is unconnected to such risks. Following the concept above, the 
first-mentioned component should be taxed in state C. The second-mentioned 














   
 
(2) Company C grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent. The credit 
risk related to company B is directly covered by company C (no re-insurance contract is concluded 
with a third party).  
 
The credit risk is now completely borne by company C itself and not by the re-
insurance company. The additional income of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of 
investment is the compensation for the risk related to the borrower and a portion 
which was originally included as a profit element of the re-insurance company. That 
means if the borrower is unable to repay all (or part) of the inter-company loan, 
company C has to write-off the loan granted to company B. If it is assumed that the 
credit risk premium included in the interest payment covers exactly the risk involved, 
there is no necessity to currently tax this portion of income in country A.38 However, it 
should be clear that a possible write-off of the loan amount must, in turn, be 
deductible from the tax base in state C. Any current taxation in state A would 
systematically require a possible loss related to the loan amount to be deductible 
from the domestic tax base in state A on a current basis, too. This, however, is often 
not the case. Again, I do not see the necessity to tax the 2.8 percent in state A since 
it is related to a risk directly taken over by company C. The same is true for any other 
risk element included in the amount of interest (liquidity premium, expected deviation 
in real interest rate and inflation rate). Again, it must be underlined that this is the 
preferred solution within a non-optimal situation of a residence-based taxation. Only 
under these circumstances can the taking over of risks be compared to the exercising 
of regular business functions where the appropriate compensation covers not only 
the actual expenses but also the risks related to the activity. It is absolutely clear that 
the income which is related to the risk component is economically created in country 
B. In an alternative scenario, where the loan is granted directly from company A to 
company B (without the guarantee), the risk component would fulfil the same 
purpose. It would, inter alia, cover the risk of writing-off the loan amount and 
therefore the risk of a direct impact on the domestic tax base of company A. Very 
generally, it can be concluded that in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation the amount of income which is neither a compensation for the exercising of a 
certain function nor a compensation for a risk taken in the respective state should be 
taxed in the state of the parent company A. Any limitation to an income taxation on 
an intermediate level would not be in line with the principle of equity. This will be 
shown in more detail below. In other words, what remains taxable in the residence-
state of the parent company is an interest amount which can be derived without 













                                            
38 The same is true for the small profit element which is theoretically included in the (original) activities of the 
re-insurance company and which is now included in the income of company C. 
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(1) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(2) Company C provides leasing / rental services to company B. The movable assets are employed for 
an income-producing activity in country B.  
 
In principle, the aforementioned aspects equally apply to the leasing and rental 
services carried on in state C and provided to company B. Clearly, the leasing and 
rental activities are more complex than the simple provision of loan amounts, but the 
conclusion regarding the interest income included as a part of the leasing and rental 
income remains the same. The compensation for the write-off of the asset, the 
compensation for maintaining the asset, and the compensation for bearing the risk 
are allocable to the state in which the leasing and rental activities are carried on. In 
this respect, the economic conclusion is fully in line with the conclusions regarding 
the principle of equity. The interest income should theoretically be allocable to state 
B. However, in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation the interest 
income is subject to tax in state C, i.e. the state in which the leasing activity is carried 
on. In contrast to the example of a finance company, the OECD-MTC does not 
provide for a limited taxation at source of the interest income since the leasing and 
rental payments are not subdivided into the different components. However, the 
interest income contains, in the same way as the interest income in the alternative 
above, a risk component which covers the risks involved and a basic interest 
component which is unconnected to such risks. Following the concept above, the 
first-mentioned component should be taxed in state C. The second-mentioned 














   
 
(2) Company C grants a loan amount to company B. The market interest rate is 7 percent. The credit 
risk related to company B is directly covered by company C (no re-insurance contract is concluded 
with a third party).  
 
The credit risk is now completely borne by company C itself and not by the re-
insurance company. The additional income of 2.8 percent of the nominal amount of 
investment is the compensation for the risk related to the borrower and a portion 
which was originally included as a profit element of the re-insurance company. That 
means if the borrower is unable to repay all (or part) of the inter-company loan, 
company C has to write-off the loan granted to company B. If it is assumed that the 
credit risk premium included in the interest payment covers exactly the risk involved, 
there is no necessity to currently tax this portion of income in country A.38 However, it 
should be clear that a possible write-off of the loan amount must, in turn, be 
deductible from the tax base in state C. Any current taxation in state A would 
systematically require a possible loss related to the loan amount to be deductible 
from the domestic tax base in state A on a current basis, too. This, however, is often 
not the case. Again, I do not see the necessity to tax the 2.8 percent in state A since 
it is related to a risk directly taken over by company C. The same is true for any other 
risk element included in the amount of interest (liquidity premium, expected deviation 
in real interest rate and inflation rate). Again, it must be underlined that this is the 
preferred solution within a non-optimal situation of a residence-based taxation. Only 
under these circumstances can the taking over of risks be compared to the exercising 
of regular business functions where the appropriate compensation covers not only 
the actual expenses but also the risks related to the activity. It is absolutely clear that 
the income which is related to the risk component is economically created in country 
B. In an alternative scenario, where the loan is granted directly from company A to 
company B (without the guarantee), the risk component would fulfil the same 
purpose. It would, inter alia, cover the risk of writing-off the loan amount and 
therefore the risk of a direct impact on the domestic tax base of company A. Very 
generally, it can be concluded that in the non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation the amount of income which is neither a compensation for the exercising of a 
certain function nor a compensation for a risk taken in the respective state should be 
taxed in the state of the parent company A. Any limitation to an income taxation on 
an intermediate level would not be in line with the principle of equity. This will be 
shown in more detail below. In other words, what remains taxable in the residence-
state of the parent company is an interest amount which can be derived without 













                                            
38 The same is true for the small profit element which is theoretically included in the (original) activities of the 
re-insurance company and which is now included in the income of company C. 
Chapter 3
78
   
 
the fact that state C taxes the dividends or capital gains, too. In addition, if state C 
taxes the dividend income with a lower rate than the state of source and allows a tax 
credit, there is - from the perspective of state A and with respect to equity 
considerations - no important difference in comparison to a direct holding of the 
respective shares, i.e. without an interposition of the finance company, apart from the 
fact that the dividend income (or the proceeds from the disposal of portfolio 
investments) can be “locked in” in state C. However, the latter can be of some 
relevance with respect to the subsequent employment of the financial means and the 
newly created income (see the conclusions above with respect to interest income) 
but it should be of no relevance for the taxation of the dividends or the proceeds from 
the disposal of shares itself.  
 
3.2.6.3. The Consequences of Equity and Hybrid Investments for Individual and 
Corporate Taxpayers 
 
It is obvious from the examinations above that any current taxation of the basic 
interest component (or the risk-free interest component) in the state of residence of 
the parent company A does not lead to an optimal result. What is particularly 
important in this respect is the fact that not the state which provides the benefits 
receives the tax levied on the interest component but another state, namely the state 
of residence of the companies A and C. However, in such a non-optimal scenario it is 
important to concentrate on an equal treatment in the residence-state of the investor. 
If a residence-based taxation is given as a fact in the relationship between the states 
A, B and C, the focus must be on an equal treatment with respect to the basic 
interest component. As already outlined above, the current taxation in state A is 
theoretically required to be limited to the tax level applied in the source state B. Still, 
this would not improve the tax position of state B, but it would definitely improve the 
position of the group of companies with respect to competitiveness (if the taxation in 
state A were theoretically higher). Moreover, such an approach would lead - within a 
non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation - to an equal treatment of direct 
loan investments (company A to company B) and indirect loan investments (company 
C to company B). In both cases, the basic interest component is subject to tax in 
state A. The latter, however, is only true as long as the tax rate is in both cases - the 
direct loan investment and the indirect loan investment - limited to the theoretical tax 
rate of state B. In addition, the limitation in state A to the theoretical tax rate of state B 
would result in a tax burden imposed on the basic interest component which is as 
high as the tax burden imposed in state B on the comparable amount of income in 
case of an equity investment in company B. In other words, the investor in state A 
would be treated in the same way (with respect to the overall tax burden imposed on 
the basic interest component but not with respect to the countries imposing the 
income taxes) no matter whether the financial means are provided through a direct 
loan investment, an indirect loan investment (via company C) or an equity investment 
in company B. In my opinion, this is - from an equity perspective - the most preferable 
result within a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation. In this respect, 
one has always to keep in mind the alternative to a non-taxation of the basic interest 
component on a current basis in state A: there will be no taxation based on the 
benefit theory and - in case of an intermediate investment in a low-tax country - the 
resident investors are treated differently with respect to the basic interest component. 
Another aspect which has to be clarified is the question whether and in which 
situation the individual investor should be subject to current taxation. I will come to 
that aspect below. 
   
 
3.2.6.2. Portfolio Activities  
 
The example can now be extended to an asset management activity where the 
finance company invests liquid funds into the bond and stock market (portfolio 
investments).  
 
Figure 6:  
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of holding company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is the intra-group cash 
pooling and financing activities.  
(4) Subsidiary C is responsible for portfolio investments (cash management) and the intra-group 
financing of company B.  
 
The principles described above for inter-company loan agreements and leasing 
agreements apply equally to the investment in bonds. In a non-optimal scenario, the 
interest income derived by company C is to be separated for tax purposes in the 
same way as outlined above.  
 
In case of dividends and capital gains derived from portfolio investments in shares, 
the taxation should in general be limited to the source state. In my opinion, this is not 
only true from a competitiveness point of view but also from an equity perspective. A 
dividend or capital gains taxation in the state of the intermediate finance company 
deviates from this general theoretical conclusion. However, this deviation does not 
justify any immediate residence-based taxation of the dividend income (or income 
from capital gains) in state A. From my perspective, no argument exists which can be 
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the fact that state C taxes the dividends or capital gains, too. In addition, if state C 
taxes the dividend income with a lower rate than the state of source and allows a tax 
credit, there is - from the perspective of state A and with respect to equity 
considerations - no important difference in comparison to a direct holding of the 
respective shares, i.e. without an interposition of the finance company, apart from the 
fact that the dividend income (or the proceeds from the disposal of portfolio 
investments) can be “locked in” in state C. However, the latter can be of some 
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but it should be of no relevance for the taxation of the dividends or the proceeds from 
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important to concentrate on an equal treatment in the residence-state of the investor. 
If a residence-based taxation is given as a fact in the relationship between the states 
A, B and C, the focus must be on an equal treatment with respect to the basic 
interest component. As already outlined above, the current taxation in state A is 
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state A were theoretically higher). Moreover, such an approach would lead - within a 
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rate of state B. In addition, the limitation in state A to the theoretical tax rate of state B 
would result in a tax burden imposed on the basic interest component which is as 
high as the tax burden imposed in state B on the comparable amount of income in 
case of an equity investment in company B. In other words, the investor in state A 
would be treated in the same way (with respect to the overall tax burden imposed on 
the basic interest component but not with respect to the countries imposing the 
income taxes) no matter whether the financial means are provided through a direct 
loan investment, an indirect loan investment (via company C) or an equity investment 
in company B. In my opinion, this is - from an equity perspective - the most preferable 
result within a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation. In this respect, 
one has always to keep in mind the alternative to a non-taxation of the basic interest 
component on a current basis in state A: there will be no taxation based on the 
benefit theory and - in case of an intermediate investment in a low-tax country - the 
resident investors are treated differently with respect to the basic interest component. 
Another aspect which has to be clarified is the question whether and in which 
situation the individual investor should be subject to current taxation. I will come to 
that aspect below. 
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(1) Individual A is the sole shareholder of holding company A.  
(2) Direct investment of company A in country B through a subsidiary company. The business 
activities of company B encompass the manufacturing, the marketing and the distribution of goods in 
country B. 
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. The purpose of subsidiary C is the intra-group cash 
pooling and financing activities.  
(4) Subsidiary C is responsible for portfolio investments (cash management) and the intra-group 
financing of company B.  
 
The principles described above for inter-company loan agreements and leasing 
agreements apply equally to the investment in bonds. In a non-optimal scenario, the 
interest income derived by company C is to be separated for tax purposes in the 
same way as outlined above.  
 
In case of dividends and capital gains derived from portfolio investments in shares, 
the taxation should in general be limited to the source state. In my opinion, this is not 
only true from a competitiveness point of view but also from an equity perspective. A 
dividend or capital gains taxation in the state of the intermediate finance company 
deviates from this general theoretical conclusion. However, this deviation does not 
justify any immediate residence-based taxation of the dividend income (or income 
from capital gains) in state A. From my perspective, no argument exists which can be 










   
 
companies A1 and A2 in a comparable position. However, from a theoretical 
perspective, the tax rate in state A should be limited in both alternatives to the tax 
rate applied in state B (30 percent). The situation would not be different if a 
withholding tax of 10 percent were deducted in state B. In alternative 1, the 
withholding tax of 10 percent should be credited against the corporate income tax 
imposed in state A. In alternative 2, the withholding tax should normally be credited 
against the corporate income tax in state C. Nonetheless, the corporate income tax of 
state C is taken into account in the state of the parent company A. At the end of the 
day, this would lead to complete crediting of withholding tax (in state C) and a 
crediting of the corporate income tax in state A, which leads to a consistent 
elimination of double taxation. In this example, the allocation of the basic interest 
component to company A2 leads to an equal treatment of both companies. 
 
The example can now be extended to the level of the ultimate shareholder, i.e. the 
comparison shall be made between an individual who provides a loan amount to a 
non-resident company and an individual who structures the investment in the 
aforementioned manner by interposing a holding company in state D and a finance 
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(1) Individual shareholder A grants a loan to company B1. The tax rate in country A is 35 percent. 
(2) The corporate tax rate in country D is 25 percent.  
(3) Direct investment of company D in country C. 
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(1) Company A1 grants a loan to company B1. 
(2) Direct investment of company A2 in country C. 
(3) Company C grants a loan to company B2.  
 
The situation of company A1 and A2 is comparable with respect to the basic interest 
component. This is not true, however, with respect to the risks involved in the loan 
agreement. In alternative 1, the risks are taken directly by company A1. For example, 
if a write-off of the loan amount (and the outstanding interest) is required, the 
residence-based taxation should lead to a reduction of the tax base in state A. In 
contrast thereto, the write-off in alternative 2 will directly influence the tax base in 
state C and not the tax base in state A. The fact that the overall value of the 
investments is reduced in both alternatives is a different question. The basic interest 
component is, in principle, free from those risks and should therefore be taxed in an 
equal manner. In the absence of a source-based taxation in state B, the basic 
interest component should be allocable to state A in order to provide for an equal 
treatment of A1 and A2. If a possible withholding tax is left aside for the verification, 
the basic interest component is taxed in state A - in alternative 1 - at a rate of 35 
percent. The tax base in state B is reduced by the interest payments to company A1 
(which leads to a reduction in state B of 30 percent). In contrast thereto, and in the 
absence of a current taxation of income in state A, the interest income in alternative 2 
would only be taxed at a rate of 10 percent in state C (which also leads to a reduction 
in state B of 30 percent). From the perspective of state A, the treatment of the 
corporations A1 and A2 is different. This different treatment is, in my opinion, not 
justified with respect to the basic interest component (as already outlined above). 
Therefore, I consider it necessary to provide for a current taxation of the basic 
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companies A1 and A2 in a comparable position. However, from a theoretical 
perspective, the tax rate in state A should be limited in both alternatives to the tax 
rate applied in state B (30 percent). The situation would not be different if a 
withholding tax of 10 percent were deducted in state B. In alternative 1, the 
withholding tax of 10 percent should be credited against the corporate income tax 
imposed in state A. In alternative 2, the withholding tax should normally be credited 
against the corporate income tax in state C. Nonetheless, the corporate income tax of 
state C is taken into account in the state of the parent company A. At the end of the 
day, this would lead to complete crediting of withholding tax (in state C) and a 
crediting of the corporate income tax in state A, which leads to a consistent 
elimination of double taxation. In this example, the allocation of the basic interest 
component to company A2 leads to an equal treatment of both companies. 
 
The example can now be extended to the level of the ultimate shareholder, i.e. the 
comparison shall be made between an individual who provides a loan amount to a 
non-resident company and an individual who structures the investment in the 
aforementioned manner by interposing a holding company in state D and a finance 
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(1) Individual shareholder A grants a loan to company B1. The tax rate in country A is 35 percent. 
(2) The corporate tax rate in country D is 25 percent.  
(3) Direct investment of company D in country C. 
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(1) Company A1 grants a loan to company B1. 
(2) Direct investment of company A2 in country C. 
(3) Company C grants a loan to company B2.  
 
The situation of company A1 and A2 is comparable with respect to the basic interest 
component. This is not true, however, with respect to the risks involved in the loan 
agreement. In alternative 1, the risks are taken directly by company A1. For example, 
if a write-off of the loan amount (and the outstanding interest) is required, the 
residence-based taxation should lead to a reduction of the tax base in state A. In 
contrast thereto, the write-off in alternative 2 will directly influence the tax base in 
state C and not the tax base in state A. The fact that the overall value of the 
investments is reduced in both alternatives is a different question. The basic interest 
component is, in principle, free from those risks and should therefore be taxed in an 
equal manner. In the absence of a source-based taxation in state B, the basic 
interest component should be allocable to state A in order to provide for an equal 
treatment of A1 and A2. If a possible withholding tax is left aside for the verification, 
the basic interest component is taxed in state A - in alternative 1 - at a rate of 35 
percent. The tax base in state B is reduced by the interest payments to company A1 
(which leads to a reduction in state B of 30 percent). In contrast thereto, and in the 
absence of a current taxation of income in state A, the interest income in alternative 2 
would only be taxed at a rate of 10 percent in state C (which also leads to a reduction 
in state B of 30 percent). From the perspective of state A, the treatment of the 
corporations A1 and A2 is different. This different treatment is, in my opinion, not 
justified with respect to the basic interest component (as already outlined above). 
Therefore, I consider it necessary to provide for a current taxation of the basic 
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(1) Individual shareholder A grants a loan to company B1. The tax rate in country A is 35 percent. 
(2) The corporate tax rate in country A is 25 percent.  
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(4) Company C grants a loan to company B2.  
 
It was outlined earlier that a comparison between a resident corporation (in this case 
company A) and a resident individual (A) cannot be made without taking into account 
the existing differences in taxation. However, if the focus is limited to the basic 
interest component, i.e. the risk-free component which is directly related to the capital 
investment, it can be argued that the current attribution to company A still leads - in 
the same way as in case of company D - to a sheltering of the risk-free interest 
component of capital. The fact that the income is now attributed to a resident 
company instead of a non-resident company, and the fact that the domestic system 
of corporate income taxation and individual income taxation may be somehow linked 
and may be dependent on each other, does not really solve the problem of an 
unequal treatment. In other words, the basic interest component which can be 
identified in this hybrid structure requires an equal treatment in the hands of the 
ultimate domestic investor. Such an equal treatment, however, can only be achieved 
if the basic interest component - and nothing else - is currently attributed to the 
individual investor who provides the capital. The attribution of other income 
components would not support an equal treatment of resident individual taxpayers, 
because the other income components are either related to functions carried out by 










   
 
Following the principles outlined above, the basic interest rate should be allocated to 
state D and taxed at the domestic tax rate of 25 percent (a tax credit must be granted 
- see above). It is not required from an equity perspective to apply the higher 
corporate income tax rate of state B. However, in order to end up with a taxpayer 
equity on the level of the individual investor in state A, it is required to allocate the 
income related to the basic interest component in the same way to the individual 
shareholder A. Again, the tax rate on the level of the ultimate shareholder should be 
restricted to the tax rate applicable in state B, i.e. 30 percent, even though the regular 
tax rate in state A is higher (35 percent). This should consequently apply to the direct 
interest income and the indirect income via the shareholding in company D. In 
addition, it should be clear that the corporate income tax deducted in state D (25 
percent) is to be credited in state A. Otherwise, a double taxation of income would 
not be avoided. The decisive question is now whether the allocation of the basic 
interest component should be limited to cases where the holding company D is rather 
“inactive” (i.e. limited to the holding of shares without any additional activity) or 
whether such an allocation is generally required, i.e. also in those cases where the 
holding company carries on additional business activities. In my opinion, the latter 
should be true. The reason is that the whole discussion is concentrated on the basic 
interest component related to the capital invested. Taxpayer equity requires that this 
component is treated equally. If the intermediate holding company carries on 
additional activities, those activities have to be remunerated separately. But from a 
tax perspective, the basic interest component is produced in state B (but not taxed in 
state B) and is related to the capital provided by the ultimate shareholder. The equal 
treatment in the state of the individual shareholder requires therefore - in this non-
optimal scenario - a comparable taxation. The question arises whether the outcome 
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(1) Individual shareholder A grants a loan to company B1. The tax rate in country A is 35 percent. 
(2) The corporate tax rate in country A is 25 percent.  
(3) Direct investment of company A in country C. 
(4) Company C grants a loan to company B2.  
 
It was outlined earlier that a comparison between a resident corporation (in this case 
company A) and a resident individual (A) cannot be made without taking into account 
the existing differences in taxation. However, if the focus is limited to the basic 
interest component, i.e. the risk-free component which is directly related to the capital 
investment, it can be argued that the current attribution to company A still leads - in 
the same way as in case of company D - to a sheltering of the risk-free interest 
component of capital. The fact that the income is now attributed to a resident 
company instead of a non-resident company, and the fact that the domestic system 
of corporate income taxation and individual income taxation may be somehow linked 
and may be dependent on each other, does not really solve the problem of an 
unequal treatment. In other words, the basic interest component which can be 
identified in this hybrid structure requires an equal treatment in the hands of the 
ultimate domestic investor. Such an equal treatment, however, can only be achieved 
if the basic interest component - and nothing else - is currently attributed to the 
individual investor who provides the capital. The attribution of other income 
components would not support an equal treatment of resident individual taxpayers, 
because the other income components are either related to functions carried out by 










   
 
Following the principles outlined above, the basic interest rate should be allocated to 
state D and taxed at the domestic tax rate of 25 percent (a tax credit must be granted 
- see above). It is not required from an equity perspective to apply the higher 
corporate income tax rate of state B. However, in order to end up with a taxpayer 
equity on the level of the individual investor in state A, it is required to allocate the 
income related to the basic interest component in the same way to the individual 
shareholder A. Again, the tax rate on the level of the ultimate shareholder should be 
restricted to the tax rate applicable in state B, i.e. 30 percent, even though the regular 
tax rate in state A is higher (35 percent). This should consequently apply to the direct 
interest income and the indirect income via the shareholding in company D. In 
addition, it should be clear that the corporate income tax deducted in state D (25 
percent) is to be credited in state A. Otherwise, a double taxation of income would 
not be avoided. The decisive question is now whether the allocation of the basic 
interest component should be limited to cases where the holding company D is rather 
“inactive” (i.e. limited to the holding of shares without any additional activity) or 
whether such an allocation is generally required, i.e. also in those cases where the 
holding company carries on additional business activities. In my opinion, the latter 
should be true. The reason is that the whole discussion is concentrated on the basic 
interest component related to the capital invested. Taxpayer equity requires that this 
component is treated equally. If the intermediate holding company carries on 
additional activities, those activities have to be remunerated separately. But from a 
tax perspective, the basic interest component is produced in state B (but not taxed in 
state B) and is related to the capital provided by the ultimate shareholder. The equal 
treatment in the state of the individual shareholder requires therefore - in this non-
optimal scenario - a comparable taxation. The question arises whether the outcome 




























   
 
 
Another aspect which is of importance in the context of taxpayer equity and the 
current taxation of income is the ability-to-pay principle. From the perspective of the 
individual taxpayer D it makes a difference whether the income is actually received 
as an interest payment or whether it is retained on the level of company C in state C. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the current taxation is solely limited to the 
basic interest component. Due to the fact that this component is free from additional 
risks in state C (where it is accumulated), and due to the fact that any current taxation 
of the basic interest component shall not exceed the actual income derived by 
company C, a corresponding increase in the net asset value of the shares in 
company C should be the result. In this respect, the ability-to-pay principle may, in 
general, not be an obstacle for a current taxation of the basic interest component and 
the principle of equity. However, the ability-to-pay principle will be examined in more 
detail later on.  
 
3.3. General Aspects of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
3.3.1. The Prevention of International Double Taxation  
 
Due to the fact that states most often do not follow a pure territorial approach but 
rather a system which combines both, aspects of residence-based taxation and 
source-based taxation, it is rather common that an overlapping of taxing rights exists. 
Such an overlapping can consequently lead to a double taxation of income where 
states exercise the taxing rights embedded in their national tax law without giving a 
unilateral relief of the taxes levied on the same income in the other state (typically the 
source state). Such double taxation can - at least partially - be avoided by 
agreements among states, normally on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In 
international taxation, two types of double taxation have to be distinguished: the 
international juridical double taxation and the international economic double taxation. 
For the purpose of this study and in the context of double tax conventions it is 
relevant to differentiate between these two types of double taxation.   
 
3.3.1.1. International Juridical Double Taxation 
 
International juridical double taxation is in general defined as “the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the 
same subject matter and for identical periods.”41 It is quite obvious that this type of 
double taxation can have a particularly harmful effect on cross border investments. 
The removing of these obstacles and therefore the avoidance or the relief from 
juridical double taxation is therefore considered to be the main purposes of double 
tax conventions.42 Among the five elements43 which are included in the definition 
there are two elements which are of particular interest in the context of this study. 
First, the requirement of “the same taxpayer” and second the requirement of “the 
same subject matter.”44  
                                            
41 Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraph 1; see also Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax 
Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 12 and the references in footnote 4.  
42 Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraphs 2 and 3.  
43 The five elements are: (1.) comparable taxes (2.) which are imposed in two (or more) states (3.) on the same 
taxpayer (4.) in respect of the same subject matter and (5.) for identical periods.  
44 The element of “identical periods” basically also needs further clarification. The requirement seems to be very 
restrictive. According to Kemmeren it should not be taken too literally. He even suggests that the element should 
   
 
In addition, the question can be raised whether, in general, the outcome should be 
dependent on the degree of influence of the individual shareholder on the activities of 
the holding company and the lower tier subsidiaries. In order to answer this question, 
it may be helpful to briefly review the basic principles which were outlined earlier in 
this chapter. The decision of taxing the basic interest component is not based on the 
conclusion that there should be, in general, a taxation based on the principle of 
capital export neutrality for a specific part of income which was produced in another 
state. The contrary is true: it was my clear proposal to strictly follow the principle of 
capital import neutrality, no matter whether the investment is a direct investment or a 
portfolio investment.39 However, in certain situations - namely in case of hybrid 
structures - the income is not (or not sufficiently) taxed in the state in which it is 
produced (state B), but in the state of an intermediate (finance) company (state C). It 
was concluded that, in the latter situation, the non-current taxation of the basic 
interest component in state A might foster the interposition of (finance) companies - 
especially in low-tax states in order to shelter such income from taxation in state A - 
without supporting the optimal economic result. It was further concluded that, in such 
a situation, the sheltering of the basic interest component in low-tax states would 
clearly not be in line with the principle of equity. The basic interest component is 
directly connected to the amount of capital investment and is not influenced by the 
degree of participation. Thus, if one follows such an argumentation, there is - from an 
equity perspective - no reason and no necessity to make a differentiation based on 
the percentage of shareholding.40  
                                            
39 See with respect to the question of equity and direct / portfolio investments Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source 
Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. 
Vogel concluded - with respect to income from direct investments - that “in summary, both considerations of 
efficiency and equity, as a rule, support exclusive taxation by the source state. In other words, in general 
preference should be given to a territorial system of taxation. This is true in particular for income from direct 
investment (…).” With respect to income from portfolio investments the income should be taxed “(…) 
exclusively by the state into which the investment has been made, as far as it can be assumed that creditor 
countries for the most part are high-taxing, while debtor countries low-taxing” (see pages 401, 402). See also  
Kemmeren, who proposes that tax jurisdiction on dividends and capital gains on shares should be assigned - 
under the principle of origin - to the state in which the profits have been produced. The shareholder’s state 
should refrain from taxing the profits of the company, the capital gains on its shares, and the dividend received. 
(see Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 543). However, it is 
apparent that the residence-based taxation is still the predominant system and very few countries tax income on 
the basis of the pure source principle (see Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of 
their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, page 26 - see also the respective branch reports). The resident 
individual A (in the example) is very often taxed on the income received from dividends and capital gains. This 
is usually independent from the percentage of shareholding in the company. However, a differentiation in 
treatment is sometimes made on the basis of the percentage of shareholding (e.g. the German income tax system 
(until the end of 2008) provided an exemption from capital gains taxation if the shareholding was less than one 
percent in the company and the shares were held for more than one year. In contrast thereto, the disposal of 
shares which conferred a participation of at least one percent was, in general, subject to income taxation). 
Theoretically, the strict focus on the concept of capital import neutrality and the taxation in the state in which the 
income is produced makes a differentiation in the state of residence - based on the percentage of shareholding 
and in this context - obsolete.          
40 The current taxation of the basic interest component is only justified (and necessary) in case of a non-optimal 
scenario where the taxation does not (or not sufficiently) take place in the state in which the income is produced 
but in another (third) state. It is therefore a limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality 
(because it only refers to the basic interest component) in certain (limited) situations. The concept cannot be 
based, as outlined above, on the (general) principles of capital export neutrality - any references would therefore 
be misleading. However, from an equity perspective, the concept should ensure that the basic interest component 
is taxed in the hands of the resident investor in the same way as the basic interest component included in a loan 
amount granted by a resident investor to the legal entity (in a non-optimal scenario). The degree of influence is 
not decisive. In this respect, a differentiation based on the percentage of participation in the legal entity cannot 
be based on equity reasons, but may only be based on administrative reasons.  
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Another aspect which is of importance in the context of taxpayer equity and the 
current taxation of income is the ability-to-pay principle. From the perspective of the 
individual taxpayer D it makes a difference whether the income is actually received 
as an interest payment or whether it is retained on the level of company C in state C. 
However, it should be kept in mind that the current taxation is solely limited to the 
basic interest component. Due to the fact that this component is free from additional 
risks in state C (where it is accumulated), and due to the fact that any current taxation 
of the basic interest component shall not exceed the actual income derived by 
company C, a corresponding increase in the net asset value of the shares in 
company C should be the result. In this respect, the ability-to-pay principle may, in 
general, not be an obstacle for a current taxation of the basic interest component and 
the principle of equity. However, the ability-to-pay principle will be examined in more 
detail later on.  
 
3.3. General Aspects of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
3.3.1. The Prevention of International Double Taxation  
 
Due to the fact that states most often do not follow a pure territorial approach but 
rather a system which combines both, aspects of residence-based taxation and 
source-based taxation, it is rather common that an overlapping of taxing rights exists. 
Such an overlapping can consequently lead to a double taxation of income where 
states exercise the taxing rights embedded in their national tax law without giving a 
unilateral relief of the taxes levied on the same income in the other state (typically the 
source state). Such double taxation can - at least partially - be avoided by 
agreements among states, normally on a bilateral or multilateral basis. In 
international taxation, two types of double taxation have to be distinguished: the 
international juridical double taxation and the international economic double taxation. 
For the purpose of this study and in the context of double tax conventions it is 
relevant to differentiate between these two types of double taxation.   
 
3.3.1.1. International Juridical Double Taxation 
 
International juridical double taxation is in general defined as “the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the 
same subject matter and for identical periods.”41 It is quite obvious that this type of 
double taxation can have a particularly harmful effect on cross border investments. 
The removing of these obstacles and therefore the avoidance or the relief from 
juridical double taxation is therefore considered to be the main purposes of double 
tax conventions.42 Among the five elements43 which are included in the definition 
there are two elements which are of particular interest in the context of this study. 
First, the requirement of “the same taxpayer” and second the requirement of “the 
same subject matter.”44  
                                            
41 Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraph 1; see also Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax 
Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 12 and the references in footnote 4.  
42 Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraphs 2 and 3.  
43 The five elements are: (1.) comparable taxes (2.) which are imposed in two (or more) states (3.) on the same 
taxpayer (4.) in respect of the same subject matter and (5.) for identical periods.  
44 The element of “identical periods” basically also needs further clarification. The requirement seems to be very 
restrictive. According to Kemmeren it should not be taken too literally. He even suggests that the element should 
   
 
In addition, the question can be raised whether, in general, the outcome should be 
dependent on the degree of influence of the individual shareholder on the activities of 
the holding company and the lower tier subsidiaries. In order to answer this question, 
it may be helpful to briefly review the basic principles which were outlined earlier in 
this chapter. The decision of taxing the basic interest component is not based on the 
conclusion that there should be, in general, a taxation based on the principle of 
capital export neutrality for a specific part of income which was produced in another 
state. The contrary is true: it was my clear proposal to strictly follow the principle of 
capital import neutrality, no matter whether the investment is a direct investment or a 
portfolio investment.39 However, in certain situations - namely in case of hybrid 
structures - the income is not (or not sufficiently) taxed in the state in which it is 
produced (state B), but in the state of an intermediate (finance) company (state C). It 
was concluded that, in the latter situation, the non-current taxation of the basic 
interest component in state A might foster the interposition of (finance) companies - 
especially in low-tax states in order to shelter such income from taxation in state A - 
without supporting the optimal economic result. It was further concluded that, in such 
a situation, the sheltering of the basic interest component in low-tax states would 
clearly not be in line with the principle of equity. The basic interest component is 
directly connected to the amount of capital investment and is not influenced by the 
degree of participation. Thus, if one follows such an argumentation, there is - from an 
equity perspective - no reason and no necessity to make a differentiation based on 
the percentage of shareholding.40  
                                            
39 See with respect to the question of equity and direct / portfolio investments Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source 
Taxation of Income - A Review and Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part III), Intertax 1988/11, page 393 et seq. 
Vogel concluded - with respect to income from direct investments - that “in summary, both considerations of 
efficiency and equity, as a rule, support exclusive taxation by the source state. In other words, in general 
preference should be given to a territorial system of taxation. This is true in particular for income from direct 
investment (…).” With respect to income from portfolio investments the income should be taxed “(…) 
exclusively by the state into which the investment has been made, as far as it can be assumed that creditor 
countries for the most part are high-taxing, while debtor countries low-taxing” (see pages 401, 402). See also  
Kemmeren, who proposes that tax jurisdiction on dividends and capital gains on shares should be assigned - 
under the principle of origin - to the state in which the profits have been produced. The shareholder’s state 
should refrain from taxing the profits of the company, the capital gains on its shares, and the dividend received. 
(see Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 543). However, it is 
apparent that the residence-based taxation is still the predominant system and very few countries tax income on 
the basis of the pure source principle (see Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration of 
their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, page 26 - see also the respective branch reports). The resident 
individual A (in the example) is very often taxed on the income received from dividends and capital gains. This 
is usually independent from the percentage of shareholding in the company. However, a differentiation in 
treatment is sometimes made on the basis of the percentage of shareholding (e.g. the German income tax system 
(until the end of 2008) provided an exemption from capital gains taxation if the shareholding was less than one 
percent in the company and the shares were held for more than one year. In contrast thereto, the disposal of 
shares which conferred a participation of at least one percent was, in general, subject to income taxation). 
Theoretically, the strict focus on the concept of capital import neutrality and the taxation in the state in which the 
income is produced makes a differentiation in the state of residence - based on the percentage of shareholding 
and in this context - obsolete.          
40 The current taxation of the basic interest component is only justified (and necessary) in case of a non-optimal 
scenario where the taxation does not (or not sufficiently) take place in the state in which the income is produced 
but in another (third) state. It is therefore a limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality 
(because it only refers to the basic interest component) in certain (limited) situations. The concept cannot be 
based, as outlined above, on the (general) principles of capital export neutrality - any references would therefore 
be misleading. However, from an equity perspective, the concept should ensure that the basic interest component 
is taxed in the hands of the resident investor in the same way as the basic interest component included in a loan 
amount granted by a resident investor to the legal entity (in a non-optimal scenario). The degree of influence is 
not decisive. In this respect, a differentiation based on the percentage of participation in the legal entity cannot 
be based on equity reasons, but may only be based on administrative reasons.  
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taxation. In my opinion, the fact that only the problems related to partnerships were 
covered in the report and subsequently implemented in the Commentary does not 
give any basis for a general application to economic double taxation. It is even 
questionable for the explicitly outlined partnership issues.49 
 
3.3.2. The Prevention of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion 
 
Another purpose of double tax conventions - apart from the prevention of 
international juridical double taxation - is the prevention of tax avoidance and tax 
evasion.50 The prevention of tax avoidance and tax evasion will be discussed in the 
context of CFC legislation later on and will therefore not be discussed in this chapter.  
 
3.3.3. Allocation of Taxing Rights According to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention 
  
In the following, the allocation of taxing rights according to the OECD-MTC will be 
outlined briefly with respect to income, which is of particular relevance in the context 
of this study. The preceding examinations have shown clearly that the allocation rules 
are of importance with respect to equity aspects. I will not go into too much detail but 
instead give a short overview of the principles included in the OECD-MTC.  
 
3.3.3.1. Business Profits 
 
The allocation of taxing rights with respect to business profits is governed by Article 7 
(1) of the OECD-MTC which outlines that “(t)he profits of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on 
business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated 
therein. If the enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise 
may be taxed in the other State but only so much of them as is attributable to that 
permanent establishment.”51 Therefore, the business profits of an enterprise are 
solely taxable in the country of residence as long as the company does not carry on 
an activity in another state which fulfils the criteria of a permanent establishment.52 
The transfer of business functions and risks from a company in one state to a 
company in another state (and therefore a different taxpayer) is typically 
accompanied by a transfer of taxing rights related to the income connected to those 
business functions and risks. This, of course, is only true as long as the activities are 
carried out in the other state and no permanent establishment exists in the first-
mentioned state. Here, Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC will be applicable to another 




The treatment of dividends is stipulated in Article 10 of the OECD-MTC which states 
that “(d)ividends paid by a company which is a resident of a Contracting State to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.”53 Paragraph 
                                            
49 See, inter alia, the observations and reservations by the Netherlands, France, and Portugal (Commentary on 
Article 1, paragraphs 27.1 to 27.3). 
50 Commentary on Article 1, paragraph 7.  
51 Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
52 See in this respect Article 5 of the OECD-MTC.  
53 Article 10 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
The requirement of “the same taxpayer” limits the scope of possible situations 
considerably. Intra-group double taxation which involves, for example, a parent 
company and a subsidiary company is therefore out of the scope of the juridical 
double taxation since there are clearly two different taxpayers. The same should be 
true where a partnership is considered to be transparent in one state but non-
transparent in another. Both treaty states consider a different person to be subject to 
tax, i.e. the partners of the partnership in one case and the partnership itself in the 
other.  
 
The requirement of “the same subject matter” is more difficult. Of course, perfect 
identity does most often not exist. In my opinion, it is rather the general subject 
matter which must be taken into account in more than one state without being 
completely identical, e.g. in determining the tax base. This encompasses, inter alia, 
situations in which one contracting state determines the income of a taxpayer in 
dependence of the income of a different taxpayer in another state. This should even 
be true where the state first mentioned determines the income of its taxpayer 
according to domestic rules and consequently ends up with a different result. In such 
a situation there is a strong economic link between the domestic tax base and the 
income of the other taxpayer, with the result that the requirement of “the same 
subject matter” should be fulfilled.  
 
3.3.1.2. International Economic Double Taxation  
 
In contrast to the international juridical double taxation, the international economic 
double taxation does not require the imposition of taxes on the same taxpayer. It is 
therefore defined as “the imposition of taxes in two (or more) states on the same 
economic transaction, item of income or capital during the same period, but in the 
hands of different taxpayers.”45 The scope is therefore much wider and encompasses 
a variety of other double taxation conflicts which are related to different taxpayers. 
 
However, pursuant to the OECD Commentary the scope of the OECD-MTC is limited 
to juridical double taxation and does not encompass international economic double 
taxation.46 It is therefore confusing that the OECD report on partnerships,47 which 
explicitly deals with the problems related to qualification conflicts in case of 
partnerships and therefore a typical form of economic double taxation, was 
implemented in the OECD Commentary48 despite the clear focus on juridical double 
                                                                                                                                         
be waived at all, because of its lack of distinguishing capacity (Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax 
Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 13).  
45 See Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 14 and the references 
in footnote 11.  
46 See Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraph 1, where international double taxation is 
defined. Paragraph 3 outlines that “(t)his is the main purpose of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital, which provides a means of settling on a uniform basis the most common problems that arise in 
the field of international juridical double taxation.” See also the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B 
concerning the elimination of double taxation which state that “these Articles deal with the so-called juridical 
double taxation where the same income of capital is taxable in the hands of the same person by more than one 
State. This case has to be distinguished especially from the so-called economic double taxation, i.e. where two 
different persons are taxable in respect of the same income or capital. If two States wish to solve problems of 
economic double taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations” (Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, 
paragraphs 1 and 2).  
47 The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Partnerships, OECD, Paris 1999.  
48 See, e.g. Commentary on Article 1, paragraphs 2-6.7 and Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraphs 
32.1 - 32.7.  
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The requirement of “the same taxpayer” limits the scope of possible situations 
considerably. Intra-group double taxation which involves, for example, a parent 
company and a subsidiary company is therefore out of the scope of the juridical 
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true where a partnership is considered to be transparent in one state but non-
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dependence of the income of a different taxpayer in another state. This should even 
be true where the state first mentioned determines the income of its taxpayer 
according to domestic rules and consequently ends up with a different result. In such 
a situation there is a strong economic link between the domestic tax base and the 
income of the other taxpayer, with the result that the requirement of “the same 
subject matter” should be fulfilled.  
 
3.3.1.2. International Economic Double Taxation  
 
In contrast to the international juridical double taxation, the international economic 
double taxation does not require the imposition of taxes on the same taxpayer. It is 
therefore defined as “the imposition of taxes in two (or more) states on the same 
economic transaction, item of income or capital during the same period, but in the 
hands of different taxpayers.”45 The scope is therefore much wider and encompasses 
a variety of other double taxation conflicts which are related to different taxpayers. 
 
However, pursuant to the OECD Commentary the scope of the OECD-MTC is limited 
to juridical double taxation and does not encompass international economic double 
taxation.46 It is therefore confusing that the OECD report on partnerships,47 which 
explicitly deals with the problems related to qualification conflicts in case of 
partnerships and therefore a typical form of economic double taxation, was 
implemented in the OECD Commentary48 despite the clear focus on juridical double 
                                                                                                                                         
be waived at all, because of its lack of distinguishing capacity (Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax 
Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 13).  
45 See Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 14 and the references 
in footnote 11.  
46 See Commentary to the OECD-MTC, Introduction, paragraph 1, where international double taxation is 
defined. Paragraph 3 outlines that “(t)his is the main purpose of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income 
and on Capital, which provides a means of settling on a uniform basis the most common problems that arise in 
the field of international juridical double taxation.” See also the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B 
concerning the elimination of double taxation which state that “these Articles deal with the so-called juridical 
double taxation where the same income of capital is taxable in the hands of the same person by more than one 
State. This case has to be distinguished especially from the so-called economic double taxation, i.e. where two 
different persons are taxable in respect of the same income or capital. If two States wish to solve problems of 
economic double taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations” (Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, 
paragraphs 1 and 2).  
47 The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Partnerships, OECD, Paris 1999.  
48 See, e.g. Commentary on Article 1, paragraphs 2-6.7 and Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraphs 
32.1 - 32.7.  
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3.3.3.5. Capital Gains  
 
Article 13 of the OECD-MTC, which deals with capital gains, stipulates a separation 
according to the property concerned. The alienation of immovable property may be 
taxed in the state where the immovable property is situated.60 The same is true for 
the disposal of shares when the total value is mainly based on immovable property 
situated in the other contracting state.61 The disposal of movable property forming 
part of the business property of a permanent establishment may be taxed in the state 
of the permanent establishment,62 and the disposal of ships and similar property is 
connected to the effective management of the enterprise.63 However, what is more 
important is Article 13 (5) of the OECD-MTC: “Gains from the alienation of any 
property, other than referred to in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, shall be taxable only in 
the Contracting State of which the alienator is a resident.”64 This covers, inter alia, all 
tangible and intangible assets of a resident company without a permanent 
establishment in the other contracting state, e.g. the tangible and intangible assets 
which are the basis for the leasing and royalty income.  
 
3.3.3.6. Other Income  
 
Pursuant to Article 21 of the OECD-MTC, the items of income of a resident of a 
contracting state not dealt with in the other articles of the Model Tax Convention shall 
be taxable only in the state of residence - with the exception of income effectively 
connected to a permanent establishment in the other contracting state.65  
 
3.3.4. The OECD Model Tax Convention and the Methods of Avoiding 
International Double Taxation  
 
The OECD-MTC in general provides two leading methods of avoiding international 
double taxation, namely the exemption method66 and the credit method.67 Under the 
exemption method, the state of residence does not tax the income which according to 
the convention may be taxed in the other state.68 The principle of exemption may be 
applied by two main methods: the “full exemption” according to which the state of 
residence does not take the income into consideration at all and the “exemption with 
progression” according to which the foreign income is taken into consideration for the 
determination of the applicable domestic tax rate.69 In contrast, under the credit 
method the state of residence calculates its tax on the taxpayer’s total income 
including the foreign income which, according to the convention, may be taxed in the 
other state. The state of residence allows a deduction from its own tax for the tax 
paid in the other state.70 In general, this can be structured as a “full credit” or an 
“ordinary credit.”71 The latter is restricted to the tax levied on the foreign income in 
                                            
60 Article 13 (1) of the OECD-MTC. 
61 Article 13 (4) of the OECD-MTC.  
62 Article 13 (2) of the OECD-MTC. 
63 Article 13 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
64 Article 13 (5) of the OECD-MTC.  
65 Article 21 (1), (2) of the OECD-MTC.  
66 Article 23 A of the OECD-MTC. 
67 Article 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
68 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraph 13. 
69 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraph 14.  
70 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraph 15.  
71 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraph 16.  
   
 
2 of Article 10 offers a limited taxation at source which shall not exceed 5 percent of 
the gross amount of the dividends in case the recipient is a company with a 
shareholding of at least 25 percent, and which shall not exceed 15 percent of the 
gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.54 
 
3.3.3.3. Interest  
 
According to Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC the “(i)nterest arising in a Contracting 
State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other 
State.”55 However, the source state may tax the interest payment pursuant to Article 
11 (2) of the OECD-MTC, but the tax shall not exceed 10 percent of the gross 
amount of interest. Very generally said, the residence-based taxation of interest 
income pursuant to Article 11 of the OECD-MTC, with a very limited taxation at 
source, clearly provides the possibility for a taxpayer to shift income from one country 
to another by switching from equity financing into debt financing and vice versa. This 
typically leads – in the same way as outlined above with respect to business profits – 
to a shifting of taxing rights from one country to another. The taxing rights regarding 
the interest income encompass not only the risk component but also the basic 




What was stated with respect to interest income is - to a large extent - also true for 
royalties. However, it is important to note that Article 12 of the OECD-MTC does not 
provide for a limited taxation at source (in contrast to Article 11 of the OECD-MTC) 
but grants the taxing rights completely to the residence state of the beneficial 
owner.56 As already described earlier, the royalty payments in theory contain different 
elements such as the compensation for write-offs of the property concerned, a 
compensation for maintaining the property, a compensation for bearing the risks, and 
an interest component.57 Of course, in the context of the OECD-MTC and the Articles 
7 and 11 it seems to be consistent to allocate the taxing rights to the residence state 
of the beneficial owner or to give the source state only a limited right to tax. The 
same aspects apply to the leasing of tangible property. The leasing of equipment is 
covered by Article 7 of the OECD-MTC after the amendment of Article 12 (2) of the 
OECD-MTC in 1992.58 In the latter case, the total income - encompassing all four 
elements outlined above - is allocable to the state in which the leasing company is 
resident.59 The result of taxing the complete income derived from the licensing and 
leasing out of property in the residence state of the beneficial owner is - again - not in 




                                            
54 Article 10 (2) of the OECD-MTC.  
55 Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
56 Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC. With the exception in case of a permanent establishment (Article 12 (3) of 
the OECD-MTC).  
57 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions, A Rethinking of Models, page 82. See also Vogel who 
subdivides the payments into three parts since he considers the compensation for maintaining the property and 
for bearing the risk to be one single part (see Vogel, Worldwide vs. Source Taxation of Income - A Review and 
Re-Evaluation of Arguments (Part II), Intertax 1988/10, page 310 et seq. (318). 
58 Vogel / Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Kommentar, 4. Auflage (2003), Art. 7, Rz. 9.  
59 In the absence of a permanent establishment.  
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The arguments would be even stronger if the services of company C were not only 
directed towards company B but also towards the parent company A, i.e. in cases 
where the parent company - for example - makes an equity investment in company C 
and receives, subsequently, a loan from the subsidiary company in order to finance 
its own activities.74 Such a structure would directly influence the domestic tax base in 
country A. Also in this situation, the interest paid to company C would be taxable in 
state C and would only be subject to a limited withholding tax in state A.  
 
Overall, the provisions of the OECD-MTC, especially with respect to business profits, 
interest income and royalty income, give enough leeway for a group structure which 
can lead - from the perspective of the state of the parent company - to an additional 
capital outflow towards foreign companies in order to supply inter-company services. 
This has the consequence of a limitation of taxing rights and can even have the effect 
of a permanent erosion of the domestic tax base. If one takes into account that 
according to a report issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) about 80 percent of royalty payments worldwide are made 
between related parties, it seems to be rather obvious that hybrid structures will play 




1.) Equity aspects require a source-based taxation rather than a residence-based 
taxation of direct investments. The same should be true with respect to portfolio 
investments.  
 
2.) The OECD-MTC generally provides for a residence-based taxation of dividend 
income, interest income and royalty income. In case of dividend and interest income 
the OECD-MTC provides for a limited taxation at source. Business profits are taxable 
in the residence state as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other 
contracting state.  
 
3.) The allocation of taxing rights based on the OECD-MTC supports, in my view, the 
creation of hybrid structures in which service companies of any type are implemented 
in an international group structure. Those service companies are often incorporated 
in low-tax countries, i.e. the international group can take advantage of the lower level 
of taxation which is generally possible because of the residence-based taxation in the 
low-tax country and the limited source-based taxation in the high-tax country. Those 
service companies should in general be taxed in the state in which the business 
functions are exercised. This is typically the residence state of the service company 
as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other contracting state. The 
functions have to be measured on an arm’s length basis. This should be in line with 
equity considerations.  
 
4.) Interest income should be taxable in the source state. In this respect, the source 
state has to be seen as the state in which the income-producing activity is carried on 
and in which the income which is the basis for the interest payment is actually 
“created.” If this is the case, the income related to an equity investment and the 
income related to a loan investment are treated in a comparable manner for tax 
                                            
74 This will be discussed in more detail later on.  
75 The report was issued in the year 2000. See Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration 
of their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, page 54. 
   
 
the state of residence. There is basically no preference for one of the two methods of 
avoiding international double taxation included in the MTC (exemption method and 
credit method) and it is possible to insert both methods in a respective double tax 
convention.72  
 
The taxation of interest income requires the crediting of a withholding tax when the 
taxing rights are split between the source state (withholding tax) and the residence 
state.73 The same is true for royalty income if a withholding tax is stipulated in the 
respective double tax convention (Article 12 of the OECD-MTC does not provide for a 
limited taxation at source). Business profits are only taxable in the residence state as 
long as no permanent establishment exists in the other state. In the latter case, both 
methods are applied to avoid double taxation. The treatment of dividends depends 
upon whether the shareholder is an individual or a corporate shareholder. Typically, 
the credit method is applied to individual shareholders whereas both methods are 
applied for corporate shareholders. 
 
3.3.5. The OECD Model Tax Convention and Hybrid Investments 
 
The legal structure of an international group of companies is often influenced by tax 
aspects. It is obvious to me that the OECD-MTC and its concept of allocating taxing 
rights clearly supports the creation of hybrid structures. I would like to come back to 
the example of a parent company in state A with an “active” manufacturing and 
marketing subsidiary in state B and a finance (or leasing) subsidiary in state C. State 
C shall be considered to be a low-tax state in this example.  
 
From the perspective of the parent company A, the investment in state B is generally 
taxed in the latter state according to Article 7 of the OECD-MTC as long as there is 
no permanent establishment in state A (or any other state). Even though the 
business profits accumulated in state B will generally be taxable as soon as they are 
remitted to state A in the form of a dividend payment, it has to be considered that the 
distribution is very often exempt from taxation according to the domestic legislation of 
state A, or is subject to tax but allows the crediting of the foreign tax paid in state B 
by the foreign subsidiary. However, part of the business profits of company B can be 
easily transferred to state C. The financing of the business activities of company B as 
well as all other services rendered will be taxable in state C pursuant to Article 7, 
Article 11 and Article 12 of the OECD-MTC - with the exception of a limited 
withholding tax in state B and in case of a permanent establishment. The residence-
based taxation certainly supports the outsourcing to a separate legal entity (and 
therefore a separate taxpayer) in the low-tax country C. It provides the possibility of 
income taxation in state C at a lower tax rate and the sheltering from the higher 
domestic taxation in state A. The latter, i.e. the deferral of income taxation in state A, 
is only true in the absence of a CFC legislation in state A (or similar anti-deferral 
measures). One could argue that it does not really matter for the taxation in state A 
whether the equity investment is only made in state B or whether the same amount of 
equity is split-up over the two states B and C - with additional activities of company C 
towards company B. However, it was outlined above that there are convincing 
economic and equality arguments against this position, at least with respect to the 
basic interest component included in the income. 
 
                                            
72 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraphs 28-31.  
73 See in this respect also Article 23 A paragraph 2. 
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The arguments would be even stronger if the services of company C were not only 
directed towards company B but also towards the parent company A, i.e. in cases 
where the parent company - for example - makes an equity investment in company C 
and receives, subsequently, a loan from the subsidiary company in order to finance 
its own activities.74 Such a structure would directly influence the domestic tax base in 
country A. Also in this situation, the interest paid to company C would be taxable in 
state C and would only be subject to a limited withholding tax in state A.  
 
Overall, the provisions of the OECD-MTC, especially with respect to business profits, 
interest income and royalty income, give enough leeway for a group structure which 
can lead - from the perspective of the state of the parent company - to an additional 
capital outflow towards foreign companies in order to supply inter-company services. 
This has the consequence of a limitation of taxing rights and can even have the effect 
of a permanent erosion of the domestic tax base. If one takes into account that 
according to a report issued by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) about 80 percent of royalty payments worldwide are made 
between related parties, it seems to be rather obvious that hybrid structures will play 




1.) Equity aspects require a source-based taxation rather than a residence-based 
taxation of direct investments. The same should be true with respect to portfolio 
investments.  
 
2.) The OECD-MTC generally provides for a residence-based taxation of dividend 
income, interest income and royalty income. In case of dividend and interest income 
the OECD-MTC provides for a limited taxation at source. Business profits are taxable 
in the residence state as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other 
contracting state.  
 
3.) The allocation of taxing rights based on the OECD-MTC supports, in my view, the 
creation of hybrid structures in which service companies of any type are implemented 
in an international group structure. Those service companies are often incorporated 
in low-tax countries, i.e. the international group can take advantage of the lower level 
of taxation which is generally possible because of the residence-based taxation in the 
low-tax country and the limited source-based taxation in the high-tax country. Those 
service companies should in general be taxed in the state in which the business 
functions are exercised. This is typically the residence state of the service company 
as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other contracting state. The 
functions have to be measured on an arm’s length basis. This should be in line with 
equity considerations.  
 
4.) Interest income should be taxable in the source state. In this respect, the source 
state has to be seen as the state in which the income-producing activity is carried on 
and in which the income which is the basis for the interest payment is actually 
“created.” If this is the case, the income related to an equity investment and the 
income related to a loan investment are treated in a comparable manner for tax 
                                            
74 This will be discussed in more detail later on.  
75 The report was issued in the year 2000. See Schindel / Atchabahian, Source and residence: new configuration 
of their principles, General Report, IFA 2005, page 54. 
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72 Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B, paragraphs 28-31.  
73 See in this respect also Article 23 A paragraph 2. 
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be taxed in the country where the service company carries on the income-producing 
activity. The interest component included in the payments should be treated in the 
same way as the interest income outlined above. Theoretically, a separation of the 
interest component from the other components could be made by stipulating a certain 
percentage of the payments which should reflect the interest component and which 
should be taxed in the source state. The percentage could be stipulated by protocol 
or mutual agreement or, alternatively, a standard could be included in the double tax 
convention. However, the OECD-MTC provides for a residence-based taxation of the 
total amount of income without separating the income into the different elements. 
 
8.) In case of dividends and capital gains derived from portfolio investments in 
shares, the taxation should be limited to the source state. Contrary to the interest 
component included in interest payments, royalty payments or leasing payments, the 
profit underlying the dividends and capital gains is already taxed in the source state. 
Thus, a subsequent taxation of the dividends or capital gains is not required by equity 
aspects.  
 
9.) Thus, the concept of a current taxation of the basic interest component in the 
hands of the resident taxpayer is supported by economic and equity principles. Both, 
economic and equity aspects, require - in principle - that the foreign income should 
be taxed in the state in which the income-producing activity is carried on. However, if 
this optimal result cannot be achieved, other aspects have to be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, if a residence-based taxation leads to a shifting of taxing 
rights, with the effect that the income is not taxed in the state in which the income is 
produced but in the state in which the capital is legally concentrated, it is necessary 
to separate the basic interest component - which is neither related to the exercising 
of certain functions nor to the taking over of risks in the state of the intermediate 
company - and to allocate this interest component to the state the capital comes 
from. The taxation itself should theoretically be limited to the tax burden applicable in 
the state of source. The latter is true for both, the current taxation of the basic interest 
component in case of an indirect financing structure (via an intermediate company) 
and the taxation in case of a direct loan investment. The reason for such a limitation 
is the fact that this is, in my opinion, the only possibility to support the 
competitiveness of the group within a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation. Without such a limitation, the group might be subject to a higher taxation 
than in case of a strict source-based taxation (at least with respect to the basic 
interest income) and would therefore face a competitive disadvantage on a group 
level. In other words, if the optimal result cannot be achieved, the overall tax burden 
imposed on the basic interest component should not exceed the income tax rate 
which would be applied in case of a taxation at source. In this case, the resident 
investor would be treated in the same way (with respect to the overall tax burden 
imposed on the basic interest component but not with respect to the countries 
imposing the income taxes) no matter whether the financial means are provided 
through (i) a direct loan investment, (ii) an indirect loan investment (or a similar 
investment which contains a separable financing element) - through the interposition 
of an intermediate company - or (iii) an equity investment in the company which 
produces the income (with respect to the comparable amount of income). In my 
opinion, this is - from an equity perspective - the most preferable result within a non-
optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation. Such an approach is therefore not 
only supported by the economic principles outlined in the previous chapter, but is 
   
 
purposes. This would also lead to an equal treatment of resident and non-resident 
investors which would both be subject to tax in the state of source. Both types of 
investors would be taxed according to the benefits received and both would be in a 
comparable position to compensate for the risks inherent in the business activities 
carried on in the source state. However, since the OECD-MTC provides for a 
residence-based taxation of interest income (and a limited taxation at source), this 
can be considered - in my opinion - to be a non-optimal scenario from an equity point 
of view. In such a non-optimal scenario, the interest income has to be split-up into a 
risk component and a basic interest component (risk-free component). The income 
which is related to the risk component should be taxable in the same way as the 
exercising of business functions, i.e. in the state where the risk is taken directly, 
which is typically the state in which the service company carries on its activities (e.g. 
in case of a hybrid investment). The basic interest component, however, should be 
allocable to the state where the invested capital comes from. The reason is that in the 
absence of an optimal scenario of a source-based taxation, the comparison between 
resident investors becomes decisive. In this respect, equity aspects require a 
comparison either between resident individuals or a comparison between resident 
corporations. A direct comparison between resident individuals and resident 
corporations can only lead to an appropriate result if the differences in tax treatment 
between individuals and corporations are taken into account. 
 
5.) In a non-optimal scenario, the equal treatment of taxpayers makes it necessary to 
currently allocate the basic interest component to the resident taxpayer. In general, 
this should be the ultimate individual shareholder who  provides the capital for the 
investment. Any other approach supports the sheltering of the risk-free interest 
component of capital. This might even be true in case of an interposition of a resident 
intermediate (holding) company. In my opinion, the absence of a current taxation of 
income in case of an identifiable basic interest component - within the 
aforementioned described hybrid structures - would result in an unequal treatment of 
resident individual investors. However, it is equally clear that the current taxation of 
income should not encompass any other income components apart from the basic 
interest component. The reason is that the other income components are either 
related to functions carried out or to risks assumed by another taxpayer. This 
conclusion is not dependent upon the fact whether, for example, an intermediate 
(holding) company actively carries out business activities or whether the individual 
shareholder has a decisive influence on the activities of the holding company and 
any other subsidiary companies.  
 
6.) The taxation of the basic interest component should follow the principles outlined 
in the previous chapter. Based on these principles, the basic interest component 
should be taxed on a “rolling” basis, i.e. the increase or decrease over the period of 
investment is to be taken into account. This ensures the taxation of the risk-free 
(minimum) income in the state of the shareholder. However, the taxation of the basic 
interest component must be limited (as a maximum) to the positive income derived by 
the intermediate service company. Any other approach might lead to the taxation of 
income which is not existent.    
 
7.) Royalty and leasing income has to be separated into four different parts: a 
compensation for write-offs of the property concerned, a compensation for 
maintaining the property, a compensation for bearing the risks, and an interest 
component. Consequently, the income related to the first three components should 
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than in case of a strict source-based taxation (at least with respect to the basic 
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level. In other words, if the optimal result cannot be achieved, the overall tax burden 
imposed on the basic interest component should not exceed the income tax rate 
which would be applied in case of a taxation at source. In this case, the resident 
investor would be treated in the same way (with respect to the overall tax burden 
imposed on the basic interest component but not with respect to the countries 
imposing the income taxes) no matter whether the financial means are provided 
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conclusion is not dependent upon the fact whether, for example, an intermediate 
(holding) company actively carries out business activities or whether the individual 
shareholder has a decisive influence on the activities of the holding company and 
any other subsidiary companies.  
 
6.) The taxation of the basic interest component should follow the principles outlined 
in the previous chapter. Based on these principles, the basic interest component 
should be taxed on a “rolling” basis, i.e. the increase or decrease over the period of 
investment is to be taken into account. This ensures the taxation of the risk-free 
(minimum) income in the state of the shareholder. However, the taxation of the basic 
interest component must be limited (as a maximum) to the positive income derived by 
the intermediate service company. Any other approach might lead to the taxation of 
income which is not existent.    
 
7.) Royalty and leasing income has to be separated into four different parts: a 
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It is obvious that the EU law is of utmost importance for the application of the CFC 
regimes of the Member States. It is especially the case law of the ECJ which 
permanently reminds the Member States that, although direct taxation falls within the 
competence of the Member States, the latter must exercise that competence 
consistently with EU law. In the following, the basic freedoms which may be of 
importance for this study will be examined based on the case law of the ECJ. This 
will not only encompass the scope of the basic freedoms but also the justifications 
under the rule of reason for restrictions on the basic freedoms. With respect to the 
scope of the basic freedoms I will not go into detail regarding all cases which might 
somehow be (indirectly) relevant for CFC taxation, but I will concentrate on some 
basic decisions which are, in my opinion, particularly important in this context. In 
contrast thereto, the justifications are discussed separately - structured according to 
the type of justification and not on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, it is also the 
secondary EU law which may affect the application of such regimes. The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive will therefore be examined in this context as well. This should 
provide the general basis for a verification of the concept of CFC taxation in the light 
of the basic freedoms of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and the secondary EU law (in chapter 8), and should further provide the basis for an 
alternative concept (in chapter 9). 
 
4.2. Primary European Union Law - The Basic Freedoms 
 
Primary EU law requires to examine first of all the scope of the basic freedoms which 
may be of particular importance in the context of this study. The relevant basic 
freedoms are the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services, and the 
free movement of capital and payments. After determining the scope of the latter 
basic freedoms, it is also necessary to identify whether precedence has to be given 
to one of the basic freedoms, e.g. in case of a simultaneous application of basic 
freedoms, and to examine the application of the relevant basic freedoms in relation to 
states outside of the EU. Last but not least, the question of the abuse of the basic 
freedoms is to be verified. 
 
4.2.1. The Freedom of Establishment 
 
Article 49 of the TFEU states that “(...) restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be 
prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in 
the territory of any Member State.”1 In the second paragraph of Article 49 it is 
outlined that “(f)reedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue 
activities and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is 
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.”2 The freedom of 
establishment is conferred upon individuals (“natural persons”) who are nationals of a 
                                            
1 Article 49 paragraph 1 of the TFEU. 
2 Article 49 (2) of the TFEU. 
   
 
also supported by equity considerations. In essence, it leads to a partial and strictly 
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freedom of establishment confers no right to transfer the central management and 
control to another Member State.12 What is now of some relevance - especially for 
the purpose of this study - is the fact that the Court clearly stipulated that the freedom 
of establishment prohibits the Member State of origin from hindering the secondary 
establishment in another Member State. It is also very interesting, however, that the 
Court did not explicitly limit the right of establishment to a certain kind of activity. In 
the case itself, the Daily Mail and General Trust PLC was an “investment holding 
company.”13 The Court pointed out that the company can exercise that right of 
establishment by opening an “investment management office” in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, the following basic conclusions can be drawn which are of importance in 
the context of this study: 
 
1.) an investment holding company can exercise its right of establishment by 
itself; and 
 
2.) the right can be exercised by establishing an investment management office or 
an investment management subsidiary in another Member State; 
 
3.) the right of establishment prohibits the Member State of origin from hindering 
the establishment of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under 
its legislation in another Member State.14 
 
Of course, the case law related to the question of primary establishment has been 
developed further and was verified by the ECJ in a number of additional cases.15 
Here, I will not go into detail of this particular question since the aforementioned 
conclusions related to secondary establishment are still valid. The questions related 
to primary establishment are of no comparable importance for this study and shall 
therefore not be addressed.  
 
4.2.1.1.2. The Factortame Case and the Jaderow Case 
 
The Factortame case16 and the Jaderow case17 both deal with questions relating to 
the compatibility of national legislation laying down the conditions for the registrations 
of fishing vessels with EC law (now EU law). One of the interesting aspects of the 
Factortame case is the fact that the Commission argued that the registration of a 
vessel constituted in itself an act of establishment and that therefore the rules on the 
freedom of establishment were applicable.18 In that regard, the Court stated that “the 
concept of establishment within the meaning of Article 52 et seq. (now Article 43 et 
seq.) of the Treaty involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
                                            
12 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 25. 
13 See case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 6. 
14 See in this respect also Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax 
Review 1999, page 39 et seq. (40); Terra / Wattel, European Tax Law, 1997, page 109.   
15 See case C-212/97 (Centros), case C-208/00 (Überseering), case C-167/01 (Inspire Art), case C-210/06 
(Cartesio). See with respect to the question of primary establishment and the aforementioned case law Müller, 
Cartesio (Case C-210/06), Tax Planning International European Tax Service, March 06, 2009. See also Haase, 
Genzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaften vor und nach dem Urteil des EuGH vom 
5.11.2002 (Rs. „Überseering“), Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2003, Fach 11, Gruppe 2, page 529 et seq.  
16 Case C-221/89 (The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others), July 25, 
1991, ECR 1991, page I-03905. 
17 Case C-216/87 (The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow Ltd.), December 
14, 1989, ECR 1989, page 04509.  
18 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 19. 
   
 
Member State and companies or firms3 formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Union.4 The freedom of establishment therefore not only 
encompasses the right to set up new undertakings in another Member State (primary 
establishment) but also the right to set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries of 
existing undertakings (secondary establishment).5 Thus, it is quite obvious that Article 
49 of the TFEU could be of particular relevance for the investment in controlled 
foreign companies. However, in order to determine the scope of the freedom of 
establishment it is of utmost importance to verify and evaluate the existing case law 
of the ECJ. 
 
4.2.1.1. Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
 
4.2.1.1.1. The Daily Mail Case 
 
In the Daily Mail case 6 the ECJ had to decide on the question of a primary 
establishment in another Member State. By transferring the central management and 
control from the UK to the Netherlands, Daily Mail wanted to avoid the capital gains 
taxation of shares held by the company. In its decision, the Court pointed out that the 
freedom of establishment also prohibits “(…) the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a 
company incorporated under its legislation.”7 The latter, of course, is a very important 
conclusion in the context of this study. Before Daily Mail, a number of commentators 
took the position that the freedom of establishment solely protects host state 
discrimination.8 Pursuant to Knobbe-Keuk, the ECJ does not attach much importance 
to a historical interpretation of the EC Treaty which would justify an application of the 
freedom of establishment principles only to the host state legislation.9 In the 
following, the Court made a distinction between natural persons and companies.10 
For companies, the freedom of establishment is generally exercised by the setting-up 
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries. “Indeed, that is the form of establishment in 
which the applicant engaged in this case by opening an investment management 
office in the Netherlands. A company may also exercise its right of establishment by 
taking part in the incorporation of a company in another Member State (...).” 11 The 
Court pointed out that according to the present state of EC law (now EU law), the 
                                            
3 Article 54 (2) of the TFEU states that “companies” or “firms” means companies or firms constituted under civil 
or commercial law, including co-operative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, 
save for those which are non-profit-making.  
4 Article 54 (1) of the TFEU.  
5 Terra / Wattel, European Tax Law, 1997, page 25. 
6 Case 81/87 (The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust PLC), September 27, 1988, ECR 1988 page 5483. See with respect to this case also Thiel, Daily 
Mail Case: Tax Planning and the European Right of Establishment: A Setback, European Taxation 1988, page 
357 et seq.  
7 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 16. This was basically confirmed by the ECJ in later cases (e.g. case C-
264/96 (ICI), paragraph 21; case C-200/98 (X and Y), paragraph 26; case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 28). 
8 See in this respect Troberg in Groeben / Thiesing / Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, 5th Edition, 
1997. See with respect to “home-state restrictions” Bergström / Bruzelius, Home-State Restrictions on the 
Freedom of Establishment in a Swedish Income Tax Law Perspective, Intertax 2001, page 233 et seq.  
9 Knobbe-Keuk, Die Niederlassungsfreiheit: Diskriminierungs- oder Beschränkungsverbot?, Der Betrieb 1990, 
page 2574; Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax Review 
1999, page 39 et seq. (40). 
10 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 16. 
11 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 17. 
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freedom of establishment confers no right to transfer the central management and 
control to another Member State.12 What is now of some relevance - especially for 
the purpose of this study - is the fact that the Court clearly stipulated that the freedom 
of establishment prohibits the Member State of origin from hindering the secondary 
establishment in another Member State. It is also very interesting, however, that the 
Court did not explicitly limit the right of establishment to a certain kind of activity. In 
the case itself, the Daily Mail and General Trust PLC was an “investment holding 
company.”13 The Court pointed out that the company can exercise that right of 
establishment by opening an “investment management office” in the Netherlands. 
Therefore, the following basic conclusions can be drawn which are of importance in 
the context of this study: 
 
1.) an investment holding company can exercise its right of establishment by 
itself; and 
 
2.) the right can be exercised by establishing an investment management office or 
an investment management subsidiary in another Member State; 
 
3.) the right of establishment prohibits the Member State of origin from hindering 
the establishment of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under 
its legislation in another Member State.14 
 
Of course, the case law related to the question of primary establishment has been 
developed further and was verified by the ECJ in a number of additional cases.15 
Here, I will not go into detail of this particular question since the aforementioned 
conclusions related to secondary establishment are still valid. The questions related 
to primary establishment are of no comparable importance for this study and shall 
therefore not be addressed.  
 
4.2.1.1.2. The Factortame Case and the Jaderow Case 
 
The Factortame case16 and the Jaderow case17 both deal with questions relating to 
the compatibility of national legislation laying down the conditions for the registrations 
of fishing vessels with EC law (now EU law). One of the interesting aspects of the 
Factortame case is the fact that the Commission argued that the registration of a 
vessel constituted in itself an act of establishment and that therefore the rules on the 
freedom of establishment were applicable.18 In that regard, the Court stated that “the 
concept of establishment within the meaning of Article 52 et seq. (now Article 43 et 
seq.) of the Treaty involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
                                            
12 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 25. 
13 See case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 6. 
14 See in this respect also Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax 
Review 1999, page 39 et seq. (40); Terra / Wattel, European Tax Law, 1997, page 109.   
15 See case C-212/97 (Centros), case C-208/00 (Überseering), case C-167/01 (Inspire Art), case C-210/06 
(Cartesio). See with respect to the question of primary establishment and the aforementioned case law Müller, 
Cartesio (Case C-210/06), Tax Planning International European Tax Service, March 06, 2009. See also Haase, 
Genzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Kapitalgesellschaften vor und nach dem Urteil des EuGH vom 
5.11.2002 (Rs. „Überseering“), Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2003, Fach 11, Gruppe 2, page 529 et seq.  
16 Case C-221/89 (The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and others), July 25, 
1991, ECR 1991, page I-03905. 
17 Case C-216/87 (The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Jaderow Ltd.), December 
14, 1989, ECR 1989, page 04509.  
18 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 19. 
   
 
Member State and companies or firms3 formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Union.4 The freedom of establishment therefore not only 
encompasses the right to set up new undertakings in another Member State (primary 
establishment) but also the right to set up agencies, branches or subsidiaries of 
existing undertakings (secondary establishment).5 Thus, it is quite obvious that Article 
49 of the TFEU could be of particular relevance for the investment in controlled 
foreign companies. However, in order to determine the scope of the freedom of 
establishment it is of utmost importance to verify and evaluate the existing case law 
of the ECJ. 
 
4.2.1.1. Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
 
4.2.1.1.1. The Daily Mail Case 
 
In the Daily Mail case 6 the ECJ had to decide on the question of a primary 
establishment in another Member State. By transferring the central management and 
control from the UK to the Netherlands, Daily Mail wanted to avoid the capital gains 
taxation of shares held by the company. In its decision, the Court pointed out that the 
freedom of establishment also prohibits “(…) the Member State of origin from 
hindering the establishment in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a 
company incorporated under its legislation.”7 The latter, of course, is a very important 
conclusion in the context of this study. Before Daily Mail, a number of commentators 
took the position that the freedom of establishment solely protects host state 
discrimination.8 Pursuant to Knobbe-Keuk, the ECJ does not attach much importance 
to a historical interpretation of the EC Treaty which would justify an application of the 
freedom of establishment principles only to the host state legislation.9 In the 
following, the Court made a distinction between natural persons and companies.10 
For companies, the freedom of establishment is generally exercised by the setting-up 
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries. “Indeed, that is the form of establishment in 
which the applicant engaged in this case by opening an investment management 
office in the Netherlands. A company may also exercise its right of establishment by 
taking part in the incorporation of a company in another Member State (...).” 11 The 
Court pointed out that according to the present state of EC law (now EU law), the 
                                            
3 Article 54 (2) of the TFEU states that “companies” or “firms” means companies or firms constituted under civil 
or commercial law, including co-operative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, 
save for those which are non-profit-making.  
4 Article 54 (1) of the TFEU.  
5 Terra / Wattel, European Tax Law, 1997, page 25. 
6 Case 81/87 (The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust PLC), September 27, 1988, ECR 1988 page 5483. See with respect to this case also Thiel, Daily 
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357 et seq.  
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1999, page 39 et seq. (40). 
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the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State for an indefinite period of time. However, the Member State which 
requires evidence of an economic link may not stipulate exclusive conditions but has 
to admit any kind of evidence to proof such an economic link.  
 
4.2.1.1.3. The Gebhard Case 
 
The Gebhard case25 deals with the situation of a German lawyer who moved to Italy. 
The local Italian Bar Council prohibited Mr. Gebhard from using the title “avvocato” 
and imposed the sanction of suspension from pursuing his professional activity for a 
certain period of time. The conclusions of the Court with respect to the concept of 
establishment are very interesting in this respect. The Court held that “(t)he concept 
of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is (…) a very broad one, allowing a 
Community national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic 
life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so 
contributing to economic and social inter-penetration within the Community in the 
sphere of activities as self-employed persons.” 26 The Court already outlined in the 
Reyners case that the directives provided for by the Treaty fulfil the function to 
introduce into the law of the Member States a set of provisions intended to facilitate 
the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment for the purpose of assisting 
economic and social inter-penetration within the EC (now EU).27 Economic and social 
inter-penetration can be regarded as one of the aims of the Treaty.28 The wording 
“concept of establishment (...) is therefore a very broad one” which was used in the 
Gebhard case has to be seen, in my opinion, in contrast to the freedom to provide 
services, which only leads to a temporary link to the other Member State. Even 
though this does not necessarily mean that there is no local binding, e.g. in the form 
of an office,29 it has to be distinguished from a national who pursues an activity on a 
stable and continuous basis in another Member State.30 Applying the statement of 
the Court in the Gebhard case and the Reyners case to a service company with 
limited activities - but on a continuous basis - in the state of secondary establishment 
which provides services towards recipients in other (third) states, the outcome should 
be that such a company is nonetheless within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and is not outside of the scope just because of the fact that the 
company only supplies services to recipients in other states.31 This, of course, has to 
be distinguished from abusive structures which will be discussed separately. Even 
though the economic and social interrelation with the host Member State could be 
very limited in such cases, it cannot be overlooked that the possibility of close 
interrelation with the host Member State is basically a right (“to profit therefrom”) and 
not an obligation. It is therefore clear to me that there is no necessity to supply any 
services to recipients within the Member State of the secondary establishment. 
 
                                            
25 Case C-55/94 (Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano), November 
30, 1995, ECR 1995 page I-04165. 
26 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 25. 
27 Case 2/74 (Jean Reyners v Belgian State), June 21, 1974, ECR 1974 page 631, paragraph 21. 
28 Article 2 (ex Article 2) of the EC Treaty. 
29 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 27. 
30 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 28. 
31 The wording in the Gebhard case is misleading in this respect: “However, that situation is to be distinguished 
from that of Mr. Gebhard who, as a national of a Member State, pursues a professional activity on a stable and 
continuous basis in another Member State where he holds himself out from an established professional base to, 
amongst others, nationals of that State.” (See case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 28). 
   
 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period” 19  and 
“consequently, the registration of a vessel does not necessarily involve establishment 
within the meaning of the Treaty, in particular where the vessel is not used to pursue 
an economic activity or where the application for registration is made by or on behalf 
of a person who is not established, and has no intention of becoming established, in 
the State concerned. However, where the vessel constitutes an instrument for 
pursuing an economic activity which involves a fixed establishment in the Member 
State concerned, the registration of that vessel cannot be dissociated from the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment.” 20 This is exactly the point: the vessel may 
constitute an instrument for the exercising of an economic activity, but in order to 
exercise the right of establishment the instrument must be used in order to pursue an 
economic activity.  
 
Another interesting aspect was the requirement that the vessel must be managed 
and its operations directed and controlled from within the Member State. In this 
regard, the Court pointed out that this “essentially coincides with the actual concept 
of establishment (…), which implies a fixed establishment. It follows that those 
articles, which enshrine the very concept of freedom of establishment, cannot be 
interpreted as precluding such a requirement. Such a requirement, however, would 
not be compatible with those provisions if it had to be interpreted as precluding 
registration in the event that a secondary establishment or the centre for directing the 
operations of the vessel in the Member State in which the vessel was to be registered 
acted on instructions from a decision-taking centre located in the Member State of 
the principal establishment.” 21 Therefore, the Court concluded that it is not contrary 
to EC law (now EU law) to stipulate conditions which require that the vessel must be 
managed and its operations directed and controlled from within the Member State.22 
This conclusion is the logical consequence of the required fixed establishment. This, 
however, does not have to be understood in a way that the economic activity must be 
partially directed towards the host Member State. Nothing is included in the decision 
which indicates such a conclusion. The statement of the Court can be especially 
relevant in the context of this study. The instrument “vessel” can be easily replaced 
by other tangible and intangible assets, which can be - for example - certain rights, 
financial means and loan receivables. The assets can only be an instrument which 
has to be utilised in order to pursue an economic activity. The instrument itself is not 
sufficient. Another important fact is that the respective economic activity must be 
pursued through a fixed establishment in the other Member State for an indefinite 
period and that the instructions from a decision-taking centre (in most cases head 
office or parent company) located in the Member State of the principal establishment 
will not negatively affect the right of establishment. 
 
The Jaderow case, which was decided earlier, shows that the possibilities of a 
Member State stipulating conditions to provide evidence of an economic link with the 
respective Member State are limited.23 The related cases Factortame and Jaderow 24 
are - in combination - important for the definition of the scope of the freedom of 
establishment. It is clear from the cases that the freedom of establishment requires 
                                            
19 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20.  
20 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraphs 21 and 22. 
21 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraphs 34 and 35. 
22 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 36. 
23 Case C-216/87 (Jaderow), paragraphs 43, 44. 
24 Related in the sense that they are dealing with the same subject matter.  
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the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State for an indefinite period of time. However, the Member State which 
requires evidence of an economic link may not stipulate exclusive conditions but has 
to admit any kind of evidence to proof such an economic link.  
 
4.2.1.1.3. The Gebhard Case 
 
The Gebhard case25 deals with the situation of a German lawyer who moved to Italy. 
The local Italian Bar Council prohibited Mr. Gebhard from using the title “avvocato” 
and imposed the sanction of suspension from pursuing his professional activity for a 
certain period of time. The conclusions of the Court with respect to the concept of 
establishment are very interesting in this respect. The Court held that “(t)he concept 
of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is (…) a very broad one, allowing a 
Community national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic 
life of a Member State other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so 
contributing to economic and social inter-penetration within the Community in the 
sphere of activities as self-employed persons.” 26 The Court already outlined in the 
Reyners case that the directives provided for by the Treaty fulfil the function to 
introduce into the law of the Member States a set of provisions intended to facilitate 
the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment for the purpose of assisting 
economic and social inter-penetration within the EC (now EU).27 Economic and social 
inter-penetration can be regarded as one of the aims of the Treaty.28 The wording 
“concept of establishment (...) is therefore a very broad one” which was used in the 
Gebhard case has to be seen, in my opinion, in contrast to the freedom to provide 
services, which only leads to a temporary link to the other Member State. Even 
though this does not necessarily mean that there is no local binding, e.g. in the form 
of an office,29 it has to be distinguished from a national who pursues an activity on a 
stable and continuous basis in another Member State.30 Applying the statement of 
the Court in the Gebhard case and the Reyners case to a service company with 
limited activities - but on a continuous basis - in the state of secondary establishment 
which provides services towards recipients in other (third) states, the outcome should 
be that such a company is nonetheless within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and is not outside of the scope just because of the fact that the 
company only supplies services to recipients in other states.31 This, of course, has to 
be distinguished from abusive structures which will be discussed separately. Even 
though the economic and social interrelation with the host Member State could be 
very limited in such cases, it cannot be overlooked that the possibility of close 
interrelation with the host Member State is basically a right (“to profit therefrom”) and 
not an obligation. It is therefore clear to me that there is no necessity to supply any 
services to recipients within the Member State of the secondary establishment. 
 
                                            
25 Case C-55/94 (Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano), November 
30, 1995, ECR 1995 page I-04165. 
26 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 25. 
27 Case 2/74 (Jean Reyners v Belgian State), June 21, 1974, ECR 1974 page 631, paragraph 21. 
28 Article 2 (ex Article 2) of the EC Treaty. 
29 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 27. 
30 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 28. 
31 The wording in the Gebhard case is misleading in this respect: “However, that situation is to be distinguished 
from that of Mr. Gebhard who, as a national of a Member State, pursues a professional activity on a stable and 
continuous basis in another Member State where he holds himself out from an established professional base to, 
amongst others, nationals of that State.” (See case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 28). 
   
 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period” 19  and 
“consequently, the registration of a vessel does not necessarily involve establishment 
within the meaning of the Treaty, in particular where the vessel is not used to pursue 
an economic activity or where the application for registration is made by or on behalf 
of a person who is not established, and has no intention of becoming established, in 
the State concerned. However, where the vessel constitutes an instrument for 
pursuing an economic activity which involves a fixed establishment in the Member 
State concerned, the registration of that vessel cannot be dissociated from the 
exercise of the freedom of establishment.” 20 This is exactly the point: the vessel may 
constitute an instrument for the exercising of an economic activity, but in order to 
exercise the right of establishment the instrument must be used in order to pursue an 
economic activity.  
 
Another interesting aspect was the requirement that the vessel must be managed 
and its operations directed and controlled from within the Member State. In this 
regard, the Court pointed out that this “essentially coincides with the actual concept 
of establishment (…), which implies a fixed establishment. It follows that those 
articles, which enshrine the very concept of freedom of establishment, cannot be 
interpreted as precluding such a requirement. Such a requirement, however, would 
not be compatible with those provisions if it had to be interpreted as precluding 
registration in the event that a secondary establishment or the centre for directing the 
operations of the vessel in the Member State in which the vessel was to be registered 
acted on instructions from a decision-taking centre located in the Member State of 
the principal establishment.” 21 Therefore, the Court concluded that it is not contrary 
to EC law (now EU law) to stipulate conditions which require that the vessel must be 
managed and its operations directed and controlled from within the Member State.22 
This conclusion is the logical consequence of the required fixed establishment. This, 
however, does not have to be understood in a way that the economic activity must be 
partially directed towards the host Member State. Nothing is included in the decision 
which indicates such a conclusion. The statement of the Court can be especially 
relevant in the context of this study. The instrument “vessel” can be easily replaced 
by other tangible and intangible assets, which can be - for example - certain rights, 
financial means and loan receivables. The assets can only be an instrument which 
has to be utilised in order to pursue an economic activity. The instrument itself is not 
sufficient. Another important fact is that the respective economic activity must be 
pursued through a fixed establishment in the other Member State for an indefinite 
period and that the instructions from a decision-taking centre (in most cases head 
office or parent company) located in the Member State of the principal establishment 
will not negatively affect the right of establishment. 
 
The Jaderow case, which was decided earlier, shows that the possibilities of a 
Member State stipulating conditions to provide evidence of an economic link with the 
respective Member State are limited.23 The related cases Factortame and Jaderow 24 
are - in combination - important for the definition of the scope of the freedom of 
establishment. It is clear from the cases that the freedom of establishment requires 
                                            
19 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20.  
20 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraphs 21 and 22. 
21 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraphs 34 and 35. 
22 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 36. 
23 Case C-216/87 (Jaderow), paragraphs 43, 44. 
24 Related in the sense that they are dealing with the same subject matter.  
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the right of establishment. For the entitlement of the right of establishment it is 
required that the holding company pursues an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.38 If this is the case, 
there is, of course, no reason to treat the activity of a holding company different from 
any other kind of economic activity. This, however, will be verified below. 
 
4.2.1.1.5. The Baars Case  
 
The Baars case39 deals with a Dutch resident who owned all of the shares in an Irish 
company. He claimed a wealth tax allowance which could be applied for substantial 
shareholdings in a company or partnership established in the Netherlands.40 
Substantial shareholding in the sense of the respective legislation was a holding for 
the last five years of at least one third of the shares in a company and more than 
seven percent of paid-up nominal capital.41 The requirements were fulfilled, with the 
exception of the shareholding in a company established in the Netherlands. The 
Court pointed out that the domestic requirements did not necessarily imply “control or 
management” of the company, “which are factors connected with the exercise of the 
right of establishment.”42 With such a statement, the Court made it clear that control 
or management of the company are prerequisites for the exercise of the right of 
establishment. The conclusion that the respective provision does not necessarily 
affect the freedom of establishment is therefore consistent. In the underlying case, 
however, Mr. Baars was the sole shareholder of the Irish company. “A 100% holding 
in the capital of a company having its seat in another Member State undoubtedly 
brings such a taxpayer within the scope of application of the Treaty provisions of the 
right of establishment.”43 In the following, the Court stated that “(…) a national of a 
Member State who has a holding in the capital of a company established in another 
Member State which gives him definite influence over the company’s decisions and 
allows him to determine its activities is exercising his right of establishment” 44 and a 
“definite influence over the company’s decisions” and the possibility “to determine its 
activities” is “self-evidently always the case wherever there is a 100% holding.” 45 
 
After the Baars decision it is clear that a 100 percent shareholding brings the 
taxpayer within the scope of the right of establishment, and that a minority 
shareholding without influence, control or management of the company is outside of 
the scope of the right of establishment. But what about the situations in between? For 
example a 51 percent shareholding, a 50 percent shareholding, a minority 
shareholding with additional voting rights and management functions etc.? What 
about the ICI case? ICI had a 49 percent shareholding in a holding which, in turn, 
was the shareholder of companies in other Member States. The Court had to verify 
                                            
38 See case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20. 
39 Case C-251/98 (C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem), April 13, 
2000, ECR 2000, page I-2787; see with respect to the Baars case also Lüdicke, Baars: Weigerung der 
Anerkennung des Vermögensteuerfreibetrags als Verletzung der Niederlassungsfreiheit, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2000, page 337 et seq.; Stangl, Der Begriff der steuerlichen Kohärenz nach den Urteilen Baars und 
Verkooijen, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2000, page 463 et seq.; Lupo, Reliefs from Economic Double 
Taxation on EU Dividends: Impact of the Baars and Verkooijen Cases, European Taxation 2000, page 270 et 
seq.  
40 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 7. 
41 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 8. 
42 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 20. 
43 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 21. 
44 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 22. 
45 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 26. 
   
 
4.2.1.1.4. The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Case 
 
The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) case32 entails questions which can be 
important with respect to the definition of the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
The facts are the following: two companies resident in the UK formed a consortium 
through which they beneficially owned 49 percent (ICI) and 51 percent (Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd.), respectively, of a holding company in the UK). The sole business of 
the holding company was to hold shares in resident and non-resident trading 
companies. One of the resident trading companies incurred losses on its UK trading 
activities. ICI sought to set 49 percent of those losses against its chargeable profits 
for the corresponding periods by way of tax relief.33 The Inland Revenue refused the 
application because of the fact that the majority of subsidiaries were non-resident 
companies.34 One of the interesting points in the ICI case is that the Court explicitly 
clarified that the freedom of establishment can be exercised through a holding 
company. The Court stated that “(…) Article 52 (know Article 43) of the Treaty 
precludes legislation of a Member State which, in the case of companies established 
in that State belonging to a consortium through which they control a holding 
company, by means of which they exercise their right to freedom of establishment in 
order to set up subsidiaries in other Member States, makes a particular form of tax 
relief subject to the requirement that the holding company’s business consist wholly 
or mainly in the holding of shares in subsidiaries that are established in the Member 
States concerned.” 35 A holding company can therefore be a “vehicle” for companies 
(or individuals) to rely - indirectly - on the right of establishment. This does not mean 
that the holding company itself cannot exercise the freedom of establishment. But in 
the underlying case it was the shareholder of the holding company who claimed a 49 
percent tax relief and not the holding company itself.36 In a different situation, e.g. in 
a hypothetical case of a cross-border fiscal unity (or tax consolidation) in which - for 
example - the holding company would be the parent in the fiscal unity, the right of 
establishment would be directly exercised by the holding company. The Court is in 
my opinion very clear in that respect. The wording “by means of which they exercise 
their right of establishment” does not necessarily imply that a holding company itself 
is entitled to claim the right of establishment (in this case the right of secondary 
establishment) since it was just a “vehicle” in the underlying case. However, the 
entitlement of a holding company - under certain circumstances - was already 
confirmed in the Daily Mail case.37 From ICI we can learn that the right of secondary 
establishment can be indirectly exercised by means of a holding company, although 
this does not necessarily imply that the holding company itself is entitled to exercise 
                                            
32 Case C-264/96 (Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer), July 16, 1998, ECR 1998, 
page I-4695. See with respect to this case also Corben, Commentary on the ICI v Colmer Case, The EC Tax 
Journal 1998, page 29 et seq.; Hughes, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her 
Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1999, page 13 et seq.; Cussons, 
The Sleeping Dragons Stir, The Tax Journal 1999, page 11 et seq.; Cussons, The Wider European Implications 
of the ICI v. Colmer Judgement, Tax Planning International Review 1999, pages 10, 11; Rupal / Todd, EU Court 
Opens Group Opportunities, International Tax Review 1999, page 46 et seq.; Daniels, The Freedom of 
Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax Review 1999, page 39 et seq. 
33 So-called “consortium relief”, Section 258 – 264 ICTA 1970 (respectively 1988).  
34 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 7; Section 258 ICTA 1970 (respectively 1988). 
35 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30. 
36 See in this respect also Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax 
Review 1999, page 39 et seq. (40).  
37 See case 81/87 (Daily Mail). Of course, this is only true for companies formed in accordance with the law of 
the Member States and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within 
the EU (Article 54 of the TFEU).  
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the right of establishment. For the entitlement of the right of establishment it is 
required that the holding company pursues an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.38 If this is the case, 
there is, of course, no reason to treat the activity of a holding company different from 
any other kind of economic activity. This, however, will be verified below. 
 
4.2.1.1.5. The Baars Case  
 
The Baars case39 deals with a Dutch resident who owned all of the shares in an Irish 
company. He claimed a wealth tax allowance which could be applied for substantial 
shareholdings in a company or partnership established in the Netherlands.40 
Substantial shareholding in the sense of the respective legislation was a holding for 
the last five years of at least one third of the shares in a company and more than 
seven percent of paid-up nominal capital.41 The requirements were fulfilled, with the 
exception of the shareholding in a company established in the Netherlands. The 
Court pointed out that the domestic requirements did not necessarily imply “control or 
management” of the company, “which are factors connected with the exercise of the 
right of establishment.”42 With such a statement, the Court made it clear that control 
or management of the company are prerequisites for the exercise of the right of 
establishment. The conclusion that the respective provision does not necessarily 
affect the freedom of establishment is therefore consistent. In the underlying case, 
however, Mr. Baars was the sole shareholder of the Irish company. “A 100% holding 
in the capital of a company having its seat in another Member State undoubtedly 
brings such a taxpayer within the scope of application of the Treaty provisions of the 
right of establishment.”43 In the following, the Court stated that “(…) a national of a 
Member State who has a holding in the capital of a company established in another 
Member State which gives him definite influence over the company’s decisions and 
allows him to determine its activities is exercising his right of establishment” 44 and a 
“definite influence over the company’s decisions” and the possibility “to determine its 
activities” is “self-evidently always the case wherever there is a 100% holding.” 45 
 
After the Baars decision it is clear that a 100 percent shareholding brings the 
taxpayer within the scope of the right of establishment, and that a minority 
shareholding without influence, control or management of the company is outside of 
the scope of the right of establishment. But what about the situations in between? For 
example a 51 percent shareholding, a 50 percent shareholding, a minority 
shareholding with additional voting rights and management functions etc.? What 
about the ICI case? ICI had a 49 percent shareholding in a holding which, in turn, 
was the shareholder of companies in other Member States. The Court had to verify 
                                            
38 See case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20. 
39 Case C-251/98 (C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem), April 13, 
2000, ECR 2000, page I-2787; see with respect to the Baars case also Lüdicke, Baars: Weigerung der 
Anerkennung des Vermögensteuerfreibetrags als Verletzung der Niederlassungsfreiheit, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2000, page 337 et seq.; Stangl, Der Begriff der steuerlichen Kohärenz nach den Urteilen Baars und 
Verkooijen, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2000, page 463 et seq.; Lupo, Reliefs from Economic Double 
Taxation on EU Dividends: Impact of the Baars and Verkooijen Cases, European Taxation 2000, page 270 et 
seq.  
40 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 7. 
41 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 8. 
42 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 20. 
43 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 21. 
44 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 22. 
45 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 26. 
   
 
4.2.1.1.4. The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) Case 
 
The Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) case32 entails questions which can be 
important with respect to the definition of the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
The facts are the following: two companies resident in the UK formed a consortium 
through which they beneficially owned 49 percent (ICI) and 51 percent (Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd.), respectively, of a holding company in the UK). The sole business of 
the holding company was to hold shares in resident and non-resident trading 
companies. One of the resident trading companies incurred losses on its UK trading 
activities. ICI sought to set 49 percent of those losses against its chargeable profits 
for the corresponding periods by way of tax relief.33 The Inland Revenue refused the 
application because of the fact that the majority of subsidiaries were non-resident 
companies.34 One of the interesting points in the ICI case is that the Court explicitly 
clarified that the freedom of establishment can be exercised through a holding 
company. The Court stated that “(…) Article 52 (know Article 43) of the Treaty 
precludes legislation of a Member State which, in the case of companies established 
in that State belonging to a consortium through which they control a holding 
company, by means of which they exercise their right to freedom of establishment in 
order to set up subsidiaries in other Member States, makes a particular form of tax 
relief subject to the requirement that the holding company’s business consist wholly 
or mainly in the holding of shares in subsidiaries that are established in the Member 
States concerned.” 35 A holding company can therefore be a “vehicle” for companies 
(or individuals) to rely - indirectly - on the right of establishment. This does not mean 
that the holding company itself cannot exercise the freedom of establishment. But in 
the underlying case it was the shareholder of the holding company who claimed a 49 
percent tax relief and not the holding company itself.36 In a different situation, e.g. in 
a hypothetical case of a cross-border fiscal unity (or tax consolidation) in which - for 
example - the holding company would be the parent in the fiscal unity, the right of 
establishment would be directly exercised by the holding company. The Court is in 
my opinion very clear in that respect. The wording “by means of which they exercise 
their right of establishment” does not necessarily imply that a holding company itself 
is entitled to claim the right of establishment (in this case the right of secondary 
establishment) since it was just a “vehicle” in the underlying case. However, the 
entitlement of a holding company - under certain circumstances - was already 
confirmed in the Daily Mail case.37 From ICI we can learn that the right of secondary 
establishment can be indirectly exercised by means of a holding company, although 
this does not necessarily imply that the holding company itself is entitled to exercise 
                                            
32 Case C-264/96 (Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer), July 16, 1998, ECR 1998, 
page I-4695. See with respect to this case also Corben, Commentary on the ICI v Colmer Case, The EC Tax 
Journal 1998, page 29 et seq.; Hughes, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her 
Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1999, page 13 et seq.; Cussons, 
The Sleeping Dragons Stir, The Tax Journal 1999, page 11 et seq.; Cussons, The Wider European Implications 
of the ICI v. Colmer Judgement, Tax Planning International Review 1999, pages 10, 11; Rupal / Todd, EU Court 
Opens Group Opportunities, International Tax Review 1999, page 46 et seq.; Daniels, The Freedom of 
Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax Review 1999, page 39 et seq. 
33 So-called “consortium relief”, Section 258 – 264 ICTA 1970 (respectively 1988).  
34 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 7; Section 258 ICTA 1970 (respectively 1988). 
35 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30. 
36 See in this respect also Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax 
Review 1999, page 39 et seq. (40).  
37 See case 81/87 (Daily Mail). Of course, this is only true for companies formed in accordance with the law of 
the Member States and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within 
the EU (Article 54 of the TFEU).  
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involved himself in conducting the business. Such involvement requires the 
shareholder to go beyond simply exercising his voting rights, and to participate in a 
way which will enable him to exercise real influence over the company’s business 
decisions. In determining whether such is the case, regard should be had to the rules 
of company law in the State in which the undertaking is established.” 52 Of course, 
the reference to the company law of the Member State in question would lead to the 
outcome that the right of establishment could be applied differently, depending on the 
domestic provisions in the respective Member State. The predominant opinion in the 
literature seems to be that reference should be made to secondary EU law.53 
However, the reference to a 20 percent threshold based on Directive 83/349/EEC 
and Directive 78/660/EEC54 as well as the 25 percent threshold based on Directive 
90/435/EEC (Parent-Subsidiary Directive)55 do - in my opinion - not comply with the 
requirements stipulated by the Court in the underlying case, i.e. especially the 
requirement to have definite influence to determine its activities. In typical cases, a 
shareholding of more than 50 percent gives the respective majority shareholder the 
possibility to determine the activities of the company. In cases where the voting rights 
differ from the shareholding (i.e. majority voting rights but minority shareholding) it 
seems that the deviating voting rights are decisive. In 50:50 situations (shareholding 
and / or voting rights) there will in most cases not be a definite influence of one single 
shareholder (but in combination) since both shareholders are dependent on each 
other. The definite influence is certainly to be denied in situations with minority 
shareholdings and minority voting rights, even though there may certainly be cases 
with a definite influence on a factual or contractual basis (e.g. combined interests).56 
A right to block certain decisions is, as such, not sufficient since it does not lead to a 
definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
4.2.1.1.6. The Überseering Case 
 
The dependence on the question of a definite influence over the company’s decisions 
was later on confirmed in the Überseering case.57 Without going into detail of the 
                                            
52 Opinion of Advocate General Alber, dated October 14, 1999, paragraph 33. 
53 See the references in Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, page 721, footnote 
1231.  
54 Troberg in Groeben / Thiesing / Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, Article 52, paragraph 12 and 
Article 221, paragraphs 3, 6.  
55 Schön, Gedächtnisschrift für Knobbe-Keuk, page 743 and page 750 et seq.  
56 See in this respect case C-298/05 (Columbus Container) which is outlined in more detail below. 
57 Case C-208/00 (Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC)), November 
5, 2002, ECR 2002, page I-09919; see with respect to the Überseering case also Thömmes, Klagemöglichkeit 
ausländischer juristischer Personen vor deutschen Gerichten, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2002, page 575 et 
seq.; Thömmes, Beschränkung der Niederlassungsfreiheit: EuGH, Urt. v. 5.11.2002 - Rs. C-208/00 Überseering 
BV gegen Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, 
Fach 11A, page 623 et seq.; Pache, Die Urteile des BFH und des BGH vom 29.01.2003 als erste Reaktion auf die 
Überseering-Entscheidung des EuGH, Internationales Steuerrecht 2003, page 808 et seq.; Biebl, 
Niederlassungsfreiheit und Zuzug doppelt ansässiger Kapitalgesellschaften, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 
2003, page 168 et seq.; Weber, Exit Taxes on the Transfer of Seat and the Applicability of the Freedom of 
Establishment after Überseering, European Taxation 2003, page 350 et seq.; Aigner / Kofler, Steuerliche Folgen 
des Zuzugs von EU-Kapitalgesellschaften nach Österreich nach der Rechtsprechung des EuGH in der Rs. 
Überseering (C-208/00), Internationales Steuerrecht 2003, page 570 et seq.; Birk, Zuzug und Wegzug von 
Kapitalgesellschaften - zu den körperschaftsteuerlichen Folgen der Überseeringentscheidung des EuGH, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2003, page 469 et seq.; Haase, Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegungen von 
Kapitalgesellschaften vor und nach dem Urteil des EuGH vom 5.11.2002 (Rs. Überseering), Internationale 
Wirtschafts-Briefe 2003, Fach 11, Gruppe 2, page 529 et seq.; Deininger, Körperschaftsteuerliche Auswirkungen 
der Überseering-Entscheidung des EuGH, Internationales Steuerrecht 2003, page 214 et seq. 
   
 
the right of establishment of ICI, since ICI wanted to apply the consortium relief and 
not the holding company. The Court stated that “(...) companies established in that 
State belonging to a consortium through which they exercise their right to freedom of 
establishment (...)” 46 From the wording it seems that the “consortium” gives ICI the 
possibility to exercise the right of establishment.47 If this is the case, certain other 
legal provisions (e.g. combined organic structures) or even contractual arrangements 
in which two or more companies exercise their control together should lead to the 
outcome that each of the participants can claim the right of establishment. It could 
even be the case that the mere existence of two or more shareholders which together 
hold the majority of shares can be considered to exercise the right of establishment. 
In this case, the question arises whether a minority shareholder can rely on the 
freedom of establishment if he holds the shares together with one or more additional 
shareholders. In principle, there should be no difference between a “consortium” in 
the sense of the United Kingdom legislation and the mere parallel existence of a 
number of shareholders which have - combined - a definite influence over the 
company’s decisions. It is also possible that the Court did not see any necessity to 
doubt that the ICI could exercise the right of establishment since ICI (or the 
“consortium”) was directly or indirectly involved in the management 48 of the 
subsidiary companies. It should be taken into consideration that the Court described 
control or management (and not control and management) as relevant factors for the 
exercising of the right of establishment.49 The involvement in the management of a 
company can, of course, also exist in cases without control. However, this was not 
the issue in the Baars case. 
 
Even though it seems that the outcome of the ICI case and the Baars case do not 
perfectly fit together, it cannot be overlooked that the Court gave some “instructions” 
in the latter case, whereas nothing is included in the ICI case. Of course, there was 
no doubt about the question whether Mr. Baars could exercise the right of 
establishment since he was the 100 percent shareholder of the Irish company.50 In 
my opinion, the expression “definite influence over the company’s decisions” and 
“allows him to determine its activities” have to be seen in the light of the respective 
commercial law and company law of the respective Member State. I do not think that 
the Directive 78/660/EEC on accounts and the Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated 
accounts can be very helpful in this respect.51 In his Opinion to the case Advocate 
General Alber outlined that in his view “the border between the simple investment of 
capital in shares in an undertaking established in another Member State, and actual 
establishment in that Member State, should probably be set at the point where a 
shareholder ceases to confine himself to the mere provision of capital in support of a 
particular business activity carried on by another person, and begins to become 
                                            
46 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30. 
47 According to Daniels, some clarification as to the meaning of being engaged in a consortium would have been 
useful (see Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax Review 1999, 
page 39 et seq. (40).   
48 “Directly or indirectly involved in the management of the companies” is the wording which was used by the 
ECJ in the Polysar case (a VAT case) which is outlined below (see case C-60/90 (Polysar), paragraph 14). 
49 The reference to control or management is not unusual. Article 9 (1) of the OECD-MTC also refers to 
“management, control or capital of an enterprise.”  
50 See in this respect also the Opinion of Advocate General Alber, dated October 14, 1999, paragraph 34. 
51 According to the Directive 78/660/EEC on accounts (Fourth Company Law Directive, dated July 25, 1978) a 
minimum participation of 20 percent is required in the respective context. The Directive 83/349/EEC on 
consolidated accounts (Seventh Company Law Directive, dated June 13, 1983) applies to a majority participation 
or participation that allows control to be exercised over another corporation. 
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involved himself in conducting the business. Such involvement requires the 
shareholder to go beyond simply exercising his voting rights, and to participate in a 
way which will enable him to exercise real influence over the company’s business 
decisions. In determining whether such is the case, regard should be had to the rules 
of company law in the State in which the undertaking is established.” 52 Of course, 
the reference to the company law of the Member State in question would lead to the 
outcome that the right of establishment could be applied differently, depending on the 
domestic provisions in the respective Member State. The predominant opinion in the 
literature seems to be that reference should be made to secondary EU law.53 
However, the reference to a 20 percent threshold based on Directive 83/349/EEC 
and Directive 78/660/EEC54 as well as the 25 percent threshold based on Directive 
90/435/EEC (Parent-Subsidiary Directive)55 do - in my opinion - not comply with the 
requirements stipulated by the Court in the underlying case, i.e. especially the 
requirement to have definite influence to determine its activities. In typical cases, a 
shareholding of more than 50 percent gives the respective majority shareholder the 
possibility to determine the activities of the company. In cases where the voting rights 
differ from the shareholding (i.e. majority voting rights but minority shareholding) it 
seems that the deviating voting rights are decisive. In 50:50 situations (shareholding 
and / or voting rights) there will in most cases not be a definite influence of one single 
shareholder (but in combination) since both shareholders are dependent on each 
other. The definite influence is certainly to be denied in situations with minority 
shareholdings and minority voting rights, even though there may certainly be cases 
with a definite influence on a factual or contractual basis (e.g. combined interests).56 
A right to block certain decisions is, as such, not sufficient since it does not lead to a 
definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
4.2.1.1.6. The Überseering Case 
 
The dependence on the question of a definite influence over the company’s decisions 
was later on confirmed in the Überseering case.57 Without going into detail of the 
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54 Troberg in Groeben / Thiesing / Ehlermann, Kommentar zum EU-/EG-Vertrag, Article 52, paragraph 12 and 
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the right of establishment of ICI, since ICI wanted to apply the consortium relief and 
not the holding company. The Court stated that “(...) companies established in that 
State belonging to a consortium through which they exercise their right to freedom of 
establishment (...)” 46 From the wording it seems that the “consortium” gives ICI the 
possibility to exercise the right of establishment.47 If this is the case, certain other 
legal provisions (e.g. combined organic structures) or even contractual arrangements 
in which two or more companies exercise their control together should lead to the 
outcome that each of the participants can claim the right of establishment. It could 
even be the case that the mere existence of two or more shareholders which together 
hold the majority of shares can be considered to exercise the right of establishment. 
In this case, the question arises whether a minority shareholder can rely on the 
freedom of establishment if he holds the shares together with one or more additional 
shareholders. In principle, there should be no difference between a “consortium” in 
the sense of the United Kingdom legislation and the mere parallel existence of a 
number of shareholders which have - combined - a definite influence over the 
company’s decisions. It is also possible that the Court did not see any necessity to 
doubt that the ICI could exercise the right of establishment since ICI (or the 
“consortium”) was directly or indirectly involved in the management 48 of the 
subsidiary companies. It should be taken into consideration that the Court described 
control or management (and not control and management) as relevant factors for the 
exercising of the right of establishment.49 The involvement in the management of a 
company can, of course, also exist in cases without control. However, this was not 
the issue in the Baars case. 
 
Even though it seems that the outcome of the ICI case and the Baars case do not 
perfectly fit together, it cannot be overlooked that the Court gave some “instructions” 
in the latter case, whereas nothing is included in the ICI case. Of course, there was 
no doubt about the question whether Mr. Baars could exercise the right of 
establishment since he was the 100 percent shareholder of the Irish company.50 In 
my opinion, the expression “definite influence over the company’s decisions” and 
“allows him to determine its activities” have to be seen in the light of the respective 
commercial law and company law of the respective Member State. I do not think that 
the Directive 78/660/EEC on accounts and the Directive 83/349/EEC on consolidated 
accounts can be very helpful in this respect.51 In his Opinion to the case Advocate 
General Alber outlined that in his view “the border between the simple investment of 
capital in shares in an undertaking established in another Member State, and actual 
establishment in that Member State, should probably be set at the point where a 
shareholder ceases to confine himself to the mere provision of capital in support of a 
particular business activity carried on by another person, and begins to become 
                                            
46 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30. 
47 According to Daniels, some clarification as to the meaning of being engaged in a consortium would have been 
useful (see Daniels, The Freedom of Establishment: Some Comments on the ICI Decision, EC Tax Review 1999, 
page 39 et seq. (40).   
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consolidated accounts (Seventh Company Law Directive, dated June 13, 1983) applies to a majority participation 
or participation that allows control to be exercised over another corporation. 
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permanent basis from an economic and financial viewpoint, the undertaking of the 
acquiring company and that of another person.” 62 Parallel to this purely domestic 
exchange of shares an intra-EU share-for-share exchange, with the same 
requirements, was implemented in Dutch law, too, in order to fulfil the obligation of 
implementing the Merger Directive into domestic law.63 Pursuant to the ECJ, the term 
“undertaking” within the meaning of the Netherlands Law must in substance be 
understood as the economic activity of a legal person, the term “company” referring 
to the legal personality.” 64 There are two features which are of particular interest: (i) 
the term “undertaking” is defined as the economic activity of a legal person, and (ii)  
both companies are required to combine their “undertaking,” which consequently 
prerequisites that both companies pursue an economic activity. 
 
It is important to know that the domestic condition “with a view of combining in a 
single unit, on a permanent basis from an economic and financial viewpoint, the 
undertaking of the acquiring company and that of another person” was added by the 
Dutch legislature and is not included in Article 2 (d) of the Merger Directive. The 
condition was added in order to prevent, pursuant to Article 11 of the Merger 
Directive, the tax advantages which the Merger Directive provides from being granted 
for operations having as their principal objective tax evasion or tax avoidance.65 The 
Court made it clear that Article 2 (d) of the Merger Directive applies without distinction 
to all exchanges of shares, irrespective of the reasons, whether financial, economic 
or simply fiscal.66 The fact that the acquiring company does not itself carry on a 
business does not prevent the operation from being treated as an exchange of 
shares within the meaning of Article 2 (d) of the Merger Directive.67 In order to 
determine whether the objective of the planned operation is tax evasion or tax 
avoidance, the competent national authorities cannot confine themselves to applying 
predetermined general criteria, but must carry out a general examination in each 
particular case.68 The involvement of a newly-created holding company which “does 
not therefore have any business” does not imply that no valid commercial reasons 
exist.69 The domestic provision, which indirectly requires an economic activity of the 
holding company  - since two undertakings have to be combined in a single unit - is 
not in line with the Merger Directive. It is not clear whether the holding of shares - 
after the restructuring - would be considered to be a business activity. It can be 
understood from the case that due to the fact that the holding company was just 
incorporated a business activity does not (“therefore”) exist. In any case, it is clear 
that no business activity of the holding company is required by the Merger Directive - 
and it cannot be required by Dutch law - for the planned operation. If valid 
commercial reasons for the operation exist, a business activity of the holding 
company will not even be required after the transaction is executed.  
 
The actual pursuit of an economic activity which is a precondition to come within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment is not a precondition for the acquiring 
company under the Merger Directive. This can very well be the case since the 
requirements in order to apply the right of establishment do not need to coincide with 
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64 Case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 6.  
65 Case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 35. 
66 Case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 36. The same is true for mergers, divisions, and the transfer of assets. 
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case itself at this point, it is nevertheless worth having a look at that particular 
question. From the case it was clear that two German nationals together were the 
sole shareholders of the Überseering BV.58 What was not clear from the case and the 
Opinion of the Advocate General was whether each one of the two shareholders had 
a percentage of 50 percent or whether there was a deviating participation. However, 
it seems that this question was not relevant since the Court stated that “(...) it must be 
borne in mind that as a general rule the acquisition by one or more natural persons 
residing in a Member State of shares in a company incorporated and established in 
another Member State is covered by the Treaty provisions on the free movement of 
capital, provided that the shareholding does not confer on those natural persons 
definite influence over the company’s decisions and does not allow them to 
determine its activities. By contrast, where the acquisition involves all the shares in a 
company having its registered office in another Member State and the shareholding 
confers a definite influence over the company’s decisions and allows the 
shareholders to determine its activities, it is the Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment which apply.” 59 The Court concluded that the freedom of 
establishment could be relied on in the underlying case. The statement shows that 
the Court does not restrict the application of the freedom of establishment to the 
definite influence of one single shareholder but considers that both shareholders can 
exercise the freedom of establishment together. It seems to be sufficient that both 
shareholders together have the required definite influence. Taking into consideration 
the outcome of the ICI case, it should theoretically be possible that each one of the 
two shareholders could separately rely on the freedom of establishment. 
 
4.2.1.1.7. The Leur-Bloem Case 
 
Since it can be learned from Factortame that the “actual pursuit of an economic 
activity” is a precondition to come into the scope of the freedom of establishment, it 
could be of some interest to have a look at the Leur-Bloem decision.60 The Leur-
Bloem case deals with secondary EU Law, namely the Merger Directive, and the 
question of the interpretation of Dutch law (and not with questions related to the 
freedom of establishment). However, it could be of some relevance here that a 
newly-incorporated holding company - without any business activity - was involved in 
a proposed operation. According to the plan of Mrs. Leur-Bloem, the shares in two 
Dutch companies should be transferred to a Dutch holding company in exchange for 
a number of own shares of the holding company.61 Dutch law provided for a 
deferment of taxation in a situation in which “a company established in the 
Netherlands acquires, in return for the transfer of a number of shares together in 
some cases with an additional payment, possession of a number of shares of another 
company established in the Netherlands permitting it to exercise more than half of the 
voting rights in the latter company, with a view to combining in a single unit, on a 
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Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the Interpretation of the Anti-Abuse Clause in the Merger 
Directive, EC Tax Review 1997, page 206 et seq.; Bruin / Molenaars, European Court of Justice Hands Down 
Decision on EU Merger Directive, Tax Notes International 1997, page 424 et seq.; Liebman, Ruling on Merger 
Directive, European Taxation 1997, pages 462, 463; Stevens, Blumen aus Holland? - Auswirkungen der Leur-
Bloem-Entscheidung auf das niederländische Umwandlungssteuerrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht 1998, page 
201 et seq.  
61 See case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 3. 
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permanent basis from an economic and financial viewpoint, the undertaking of the 
acquiring company and that of another person.” 62 Parallel to this purely domestic 
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not therefore have any business” does not imply that no valid commercial reasons 
exist.69 The domestic provision, which indirectly requires an economic activity of the 
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not in line with the Merger Directive. It is not clear whether the holding of shares - 
after the restructuring - would be considered to be a business activity. It can be 
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incorporated a business activity does not (“therefore”) exist. In any case, it is clear 
that no business activity of the holding company is required by the Merger Directive - 
and it cannot be required by Dutch law - for the planned operation. If valid 
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company will not even be required after the transaction is executed.  
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4.2.1.1.9. The Columbus Container Case 
 
The Columbus Container decision74 is another decision which - at least indirectly - 
deals with CFC legislation. The national measure which was subject to verification by 
the ECJ was section 20 (2) and (3) of the German Außensteuergesetz (AStG). Based 
on this legislation, the double taxation of income derived through a foreign permanent 
establishment will - under certain circumstances - be avoided by the application of 
the credit method instead of the exemption method. The rules even apply in cases in 
which the double tax convention concluded between Germany and the state of the 
permanent establishment considers, in principle, the application of the exemption 
method for income derived through the permanent establishment. The legislation can 
therefore result in a treaty-override. In short, the requirements for the general 
application of the credit method - and therefore also for the possible switch-over from 
the exemption method to the credit method - are as follows:75 
 
- the foreign permanent establishment of a person with unlimited liability to tax 
in Germany derives passive income within the meaning of the second 
sentence of section 10 (6) AStG; and 
 
- the passive income would be liable to tax as CFC income if that establishment 
were a foreign corporation. 
 
Passive controlled-foreign-corporation income in the sense of section 10 (6) AStG 
means income which is derived from holding, administering, maintaining or 
                                            
74 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt), December 6, 
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EuGH - Meistbegünstigung “Reloaded”?, Finanz-Rundschau 2005, page 1079 et seq.; Wimpissinger, 
Gemeinschaftsrechtswidrigkeit der Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung ausländischer Betriebsstätteneinkünfte in 
Deutschland: Neue Erkenntnisse aus Cadbury Schweppes für Columbus Container?, Steuer und Wirtschaft 
International 2006, page 559 et seq.; Lüdicke, Pending Cases Filed by German Courts I: Kolumbus Container 
Services Case, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation 2006, page 163 et seq.; Schnitger, German 
CFC Legislation Pending before the European Court of Justice - Abuse of the Law and Revival of the Most-
Favoured-Nation-Clause?, EC Tax Review 2006, page 151 et seq.; Franck, § 20 Abs. 2 AStG auf dem Prüfstand 
der Grundfreiheiten - Anmerkung zu den Schlussanträgen des Generalanwalts Mengozzi in der Rechtssache C-
298/05 (Columbus), Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 489 et seq.; Cloer / Lavrelashvili / Biebl, 
Rechtssache Columbus: Unilateraler Switch-over im Fokus des Gemeinschaftsrechts, Steuer und Wirtschaft 
International 2007, page 359 et seq.; Niederlassungs- und Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit: darf ein Mitgliedstaat einseitig 
die in einem DBA vorgesehene Freistellungs- durch die Anrechnungsmethode ersetzen (Par. 20 Abs. 2, 3 
AStG)? - Schlussanträge „Columbus Container Services“, in Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 2007, 
page 221 et seq.; Rainer, Columbus Container: Belgisches Koordinierungszentrum und AStG, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2008, page 63 et seq.; Thömmes, Übergang zur Hinzurechnungsmethode bei Betriebsstätten EG-
rechtskonform, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2008, Fach 11A, page 1169 et seq.; Meussen, Columbus 
Container Services: A Victory for the Member States’ Fiscal Autonomy, European Taxation 2008, page 169 et 
seq.; Kessler / Eicke, The Egg of Columbus Container: German Buget Sunny Side Up, Not Scrambled, Tax 
Notes International 2008, page 587 et seq.; Morgan / Bridges, Columbus Container Services, The Tax Journal 
2008, pages 15, 16.  
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PE, European Tax Service, November 2008; Calderón / Baez, The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and 
Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle, Intertax 
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the requirements under the Merger Directive. Pursuant to Kemmeren, a directive can 
confer rights upon a person who would otherwise not be subject to EC law (now EU 
law).70 Nevertheless, it is in my opinion instructive that the Court linked the meaning 
of the term “undertaking” in Dutch law with the pursuit of an economic activity. The 
same was done by the Court in the Job Centre case71 where the Court pointed out 
that “it must be observed, in the context of competition law, first, that the concept of 
an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
regardless of its status and the way in which it is financed and, second, that the 
placement of employees is an economic activity.” 72 It is clear from the statements 
that “undertaking” and “economic activity” are connected, but it is also clear from the 
statements, in my opinion, that not each and every activity of a legal entity is an 
economic activity. 
 
4.2.1.1.8. The Cadbury Schweppes Case 
 
Without any doubts, the Cadbury Schweppes case73 is one of those cases which are 
of particular importance in the context of this study since it is the first decision of the 
ECJ which explicitly deals with the application of the CFC rules of one Member State 
in relation to a secondary establishment in another Member State. However, in order 
to avoid an overlapping with chapter 8 - where the important elements of the case will 
be examined - I will not describe the Cadbury Schweppes case in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, in the following I will refer to elements of the case whenever it is need 
to determine the scope of the freedom of establishment in order to have a complete 





















                                            
70 Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions - A Rethinking of Models, page 185. 
71 Case C-55/96 (Job Centre coop. arl.), December 11, 1997, ECR 1997 page I-07119. 
72 Case C-55/96 (Job Centre), paragraph 21; see also Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions - A 
Rethinking of Models, page 184 and Footnote 339.  
73 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue), September 12, 2006, ECR 2006. See with respect to the Cadbury Schweppes case the references 
included in chapter 8 and in the bibliography.  
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confers definite influence over the company’s decisions. The fact that the 
shareholders had the same representative at the general meeting, of course, 
supported this conclusion. 
 
4.2.1.1.10. The Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) Case  
 
The SGI decision82 is a further step towards a better understanding of the 
requirement of having a ‘definite influence’ over the company’s decisions. In this 
case, a company incorporated under Luxembourg law (Cobelpin) held 34 percent of 
the shares in SGI. Cobelpin was also director and managing director of SGI.83 In 
addition, an individual person (Mr. Leone) was managing director of SGI and a 
director of Cobelpin as well as a director of a subsidiary company of SGI.84 While 
examining whether the respective investment comes within the scope of the freedom 
of establishment, the ECJ concluded - with reference to the Baars case-law - that 
“such holdings” are, “in principle”, capable of giving Cobelpin definite influence over 
the decisions and activities of SGI.85 Based on the latter statement, one could 
conclude that a shareholding of 34 percent is sufficient to confer definite influence 
and, therefore, to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment. However, it 
has to be noted that the ECJ added that there were also “(…) links between those 
companies at management level.”86 The latter part brings uncertainty to the question 
whether the 34 percent shareholding as such, i.e. without considering the links on the 
management level, would have been sufficient for the conclusion that a definite 
influence exists.87 I think it is sufficient, because the statement “such holdings”  
referred to paragraph 34 of the decision where only the shareholding was outlined, 
without any reference to the management links.88 
 
4.2.1.2. Economic Activity and the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The ECJ defined the concept of establishment in the Factortame decision as the 
“actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State for an indefinite period.” 89 There are basically four important elements 
included in this statement: (i) actual pursuit of an economic activity (ii) through a fixed 
establishment (iii) in another Member State (iv) for an indefinite period. The third and 
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83 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraph 10.  
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increasing the value of payment media, receivables, securities, investments and 
similar assets. For the application of the German CFC legislation to income realised 
by a foreign legal entity, the income must be subject to low taxation, i.e. less than 30 
percent.76 By the stipulation of the link in section 20 (2) and (3) AStG to the “regular” 
CFC legislation it is clear that the rules will only apply to low-taxed income. 
 
In the underlying case, a Belgian limited partnership acted as a coordinator of 
activities within an international group (Belgian coordination centre) and was 
responsible, in particular, for the centralisation of financial transactions and of the 
accounts, the financing of the liquidity of subsidiaries or branches, the 
computerisation of data and advertising and marketing services. The shares in the 
Belgian limited partnership were held by eight members of the same family residing 
in Germany, each member having a 10 percent holding. The remaining 20 percent of 
the shares were held by a German partnership which, in turn, was held by members 
of the aforementioned family. At Columbus’ general meeting, all shareholders were 
represented by the same person.77 Columbus’ economic activities centred on the 
management of designated passive income within the meaning of section 10 (6) 
AStG. Moreover, the income derived by through the partnership was subject to low 
taxation - due to the coordination centre regime. The Belgian partnership was 
considered to be transparent from a German tax perspective. Thus, since the 
requirements of section 20 (2) AStG were fulfilled for most of the income derived by 
the partnership, the passive income was allocated to the German resident partners 
and the double taxation of passive income had to be avoided according to the credit 
method and not according to the exemption method (which otherwise would have 
been the case without section 20 (2) AStG). 78 
 
The question referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling by the German court was, in 
essence, whether section 20 (2) and (3) AStG was contrary to Article 49 of the TFEU 
and Articles 63-65 of the TFEU.79 While examining the existence of a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment, the ECJ made a statement which, in my opinion, can 
be helpful for the further differentiation between the scope of the freedom of 
establishment and the free movement of capital. The ECJ held that “(…) the 
acquisition by one or more natural persons residing in a Member State of all the 
shares in a company registered in another Member State, conferring on those 
persons definite influence over the company’s decisions and allowing them to 
determine its activities, is thus covered by the Treaty provisions on the freedom of 
establishment (…). In the present case, it is apparent (…) that all shares in Columbus 
are held, either directly or indirectly, by members of one family. The latter pursue the 
same interests, take decisions concerning Columbus by agreement through the same 
representative at the general meeting of Columbus and decide on its activities. It 
follows that the Treaty provisions on the freedom of establishment apply to a situation 
such as that in the main proceedings.”80 Thus, even a participation of 10 to 12.50 
percent81 can be within the scope of the freedom of establishment as long as the 
majority of shareholders have the same interest and, therefore, the shareholding 
                                            
76 The low-taxation threshold of 30 percent which was applicable in 1996 was later on reduced to 25 percent.  
77 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 13 to 16.  
78 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 17 to 19. 
79 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 25. 
80 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 30 to 32. 
81 The direct participation of 10 percent of each of the individual family members is clear from the case. What is 
not completely clear is the indirect participation (through the German partnership). However, mathematically the 
participation of some of the family members should be between 10 percent and 12.50 percent.  
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confers definite influence over the company’s decisions. The fact that the 
shareholders had the same representative at the general meeting, of course, 
supported this conclusion. 
 
4.2.1.1.10. The Société de Gestion Industrielle (SGI) Case  
 
The SGI decision82 is a further step towards a better understanding of the 
requirement of having a ‘definite influence’ over the company’s decisions. In this 
case, a company incorporated under Luxembourg law (Cobelpin) held 34 percent of 
the shares in SGI. Cobelpin was also director and managing director of SGI.83 In 
addition, an individual person (Mr. Leone) was managing director of SGI and a 
director of Cobelpin as well as a director of a subsidiary company of SGI.84 While 
examining whether the respective investment comes within the scope of the freedom 
of establishment, the ECJ concluded - with reference to the Baars case-law - that 
“such holdings” are, “in principle”, capable of giving Cobelpin definite influence over 
the decisions and activities of SGI.85 Based on the latter statement, one could 
conclude that a shareholding of 34 percent is sufficient to confer definite influence 
and, therefore, to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment. However, it 
has to be noted that the ECJ added that there were also “(…) links between those 
companies at management level.”86 The latter part brings uncertainty to the question 
whether the 34 percent shareholding as such, i.e. without considering the links on the 
management level, would have been sufficient for the conclusion that a definite 
influence exists.87 I think it is sufficient, because the statement “such holdings”  
referred to paragraph 34 of the decision where only the shareholding was outlined, 
without any reference to the management links.88 
 
4.2.1.2. Economic Activity and the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The ECJ defined the concept of establishment in the Factortame decision as the 
“actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State for an indefinite period.” 89 There are basically four important elements 
included in this statement: (i) actual pursuit of an economic activity (ii) through a fixed 
establishment (iii) in another Member State (iv) for an indefinite period. The third and 
                                            
82 Case C-311/08 (Société de Gestion Industrielle SA (SGI) v État belge), January 21, 2010. See with respect to 
the SGI case also Jiménez, Transfer Pricing and EU Law Following the ECJ Judgement in SGI: Some Thoughts 
on Controversial Issues, Bulletin for International Taxation 2010, page 271 et seq.; Meussen, The SGI Case: ECJ 
Approves Belgian System of Selective Profit Corrections in Relation to Foreign Group Companies, European 
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economic activity not only encompasses the activities of producers, traders and the 
supply of services, but also the exploitation of tangible or intangible property. The 
latter can be a typical activity which is often qualified as a passive activity in the 
context of CFC legislation. It is required, however, that the exploitation is carried out 
with the purpose of obtaining income on a continuing basis. The second 
subparagraph of Article 9 paragraph 1 includes just a typological description of 
economic activities. It is therefore important to verify existing VAT case law in order 
to clarify the term “economic activities.” 
 
In the Hong-Kong case,97 the Amsterdam office of the Hong-Kong Trade 
Development Council claimed to be a taxable person, even though the Trade Council 
provided only services which were free of charge.98 The Court took the opportunity to 
describe the VAT system of neutrality and made it clear that  “(t)he requirement that 
taxable transactions must be effected against payment is confirmed by the fact that 
the economic activities of taxable persons (...) are necessarily activities which are 
carried on with the object of obtaining payment of consideration (…), because if they 
are free of charge in all cases they do not fall within the system of value added tax 
(…).” 99 It is clear from subsequent case law of the ECJ that a supply of services “for 
consideration” is taxable “(...) only if there is a legal relationship between the provider 
of the service and the recipient pursuant to which there is a reciprocal performance, 
the remuneration received by the provider of the service constituting the value 
actually given in return for the service supplied to the recipient.” 100 These statements 
are also of particular interest with respect to the “holding cases” below and the 
question how “direct or indirect involvement in the management” has to be 
understood. The Enkler case101 shows that the hiring out of tangible property102 must 
be regarded as an “exploitation” of such property within the meaning of the second 
sentence of Article 4 (2) of the 6th VAT Directive and not as a supply of services 
within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 4 (2) of the 6th VAT Directive.103 
The hiring out of tangible property constitutes exploitation of such property and must 
therefore be classified as an “economic activity” if it is done for the purpose of 
obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis.104 The Court stated that pursuant 
to Article 4 (1) of the 6th VAT Directive105, the purpose and the results of the activity 
were irrelevant as such for the purposes of determining the scope of the Directive106 
                                            
97 Case 89/81 (Staatssecretaris van Financien v Hong-Kong Trade Development Council), April 1, 1982, ECR 
1982, page 01277. 
98 The Hong-Kong Trade Development Council provided - free of charge - traders with information and advice 
about Hong Kong and the opportunities for trade with Hong Kong. The income of the office was provided in the 
form of a fixed annual grant from the Hong Kong Government and from the proceeds of a charge amounting to 
0.5% of the value of the products imported into and exported from Hong Kong (Case C 89/81 (Hong-Kong), 
paragraph 2). 
99 Case 89/81 (Hong-Kong), paragraph 11. 
100 Case C-16/93 (Tolsma), ECR 1994, page I-743, paragraph 14; case C-2/95 (SDC), ECR 1997, page I-3017, 
paragraph 45; case C-305/91 (Finanzamt Groß-Gerau v MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-Factoring GmbH), June 26, 2003, 
ECR 2003, page I-06729, paragraph 47.  
101 Case C-230/94 (Renate Enkler v Finanzamt Homburg), September 26, 1996, ECR 1996, page I-04517. See 
with respect to this case also Beiser, Die “kleine Vermietung” in der Umsatz- und Einkommensteuer: eine 
gemeinschaftsrechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche Analyse, in Steuer und Wirtschaftskartei 2006, page 666 et 
seq. 
102 In this case a motor caravan.  
103 Now Article 9 (1) subparagraph 2 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC. See case C-230/94 (Enkler), 
paragraph 21. 
104 Case C-230/94 (Enkler), paragraph 22. 
105 Now Article 9 (1)subparagraph 1 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC.  
106 Case C-230/94 (Enkler), paragraph 25. 
   
 
fourth element “another Member State” and “indefinite period” seems to be relatively 
clear and allows the participation, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic 
life of a Member State other than his State of origin. 90 This should basically give an 
individual or a company the possibility to pursue its activities in the Member State of 
the secondary establishment in the same way as in the Member State of origin. 
However, such a degree of integration can only be achieved if the activity is not only 
exercised on a temporary basis. The second element “fixed establishment” will be 
discussed separately. The first element, however, needs additional investigation in 
order to find out what is actually meant by “economic activity” in the context of the 
freedom of establishment. 
 
The existing case law, especially the Factortame decision, can be very helpful in this 
respect. The Court concluded that the vessel “does not necessarily involve 
establishment within the meaning of the Treaty, in particular where the vessel is not 
used to pursue an economic activity.” 91 However, the vessel can constitute “an 
instrument for pursuing an economic activity.” 92 As already outlined above, the 
instrument vessel can easily be replaced by other assets.93 In my opinion, tangible or 
intangible assets cannot by themselves create an economic activity. The assets must 
(i) directly or indirectly be utilised to pursue an activity, and (ii) the activity itself must 
be an economic activity. In the same way as a vessel may theoretically be registered 
without pursuing any economic activity, a company can hold any kind of assets 
without utilising them at all, or without utilising them for economic but other activities. 
In contrast, it is theoretically possible to pursue an economic activity without utilising 
any assets or with a very limited utilisation of assets, but it will not be possible to 
pursue an economic activity without performing any activity, i.e. simply by holding 
assets. 
 
4.2.1.2.1. Economic Activity and Indirect Taxation 
 
In order to clarify what is actually meant by economic activity, it could be helpful to 
have a look at the VAT system in the EU. Article 9 paragraph 1 of the Council 
Directive 2006/112/EC (which replaced Article 4 (1) and (2) of the 6th VAT Directive) 
94 states that “taxable person” in the sense of the VAT system shall mean “any 
person who, independently, carries out in any place any economic activity, whatever 
the purpose or results of that activity. Any activity of producers, traders or persons 
supplying services, including mining and agricultural activities and activities of 
professions, shall be regarded as ‘economic activity’. The exploitation of tangible and 
intangible property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing 
basis shall in particular be regarded as an economic activity.” 95 According to Article 
12 paragraph 1 a Member State may also treat as a taxable person anyone who 
carries out, on an occasional basis, a transaction relating to the activities referred to 
in the second subparagraph of Article 9 paragraph 1 and - under certain 
circumstances - the supply of buildings and land.96 Pursuant to this definition 
                                            
90 Case C-55/95 (Gebhard), paragraph 25. 
91 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 21. 
92 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 22. 
93 In my opinion, there are certain assets which are relevant in this context, since they can be an instrument to 
pursue an economic activity. Liabilities are only the consequence of the activity itself or the consequence of the 
re-financing of the assets.  
94 Council Directive 2006/112/EC, dated November 28, 2006 on the common system of value added tax. 
95 Article 9 paragraph 1 first and second subparagraphs of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC. 
96 Article 12 paragraph 1 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC.  
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holdings and the dividends received from these financial holdings are not directly 
related in the sense of a consideration for an exploitation of property is obvious. The 
exploitation of property or the supply of services and goods must be directly linked to 
the consideration paid for the exploitation or the supply of services and goods.119 The 
Polysar case was considered a landmark decision with a determinant role on the 
outcome of the subsequent cases on the VAT treatment of shares, but was also 
criticised because of the minimal level of arguments put forward by the ECJ to 
support its decision.120 
 
The statement of the ECJ with respect to the “direct or indirect involvement in the 
management of the companies” is not obvious. The holding company can therefore 
become a taxable person if there is a certain degree of involvement in the 
management. It is questionable whether the “involvement” itself requires economic 
activities which are rendered for a consideration, e.g. management services or similar 
services,121 as it is stipulated in Article 2 and 4 of the 6. VAT Directive.122 This would - 
at least to that extent - lead to the result that the holding company is a taxable person 
for VAT purposes.123 The term “indirect involvement” could also be understood in a 
way that no consideration is necessary, for example an involvement in the form of 
guidelines for the subsidiary, and it should not be seen very strict and together with 
the very wide scope conferred by Article 4 of the 6. VAT Directive.124 Pursuant to 
Stadie it should therefore be sufficient that the holding company controls the 
subsidiary, i.e. a management contract etc. is not even necessary.125 If the holding 
company exercises control only with respect to certain companies but not with 
respect to all companies, the taxable activity has to be separated for VAT 
purposes.126 The ECJ had to deal with these questions in the Floridienne and 
Berginvest case127, the Welthgrove case128 and the Cibo Participations case129 which 
will be outlined below. 
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and that “one of the factors on the basis of which the tax authorities must consider 
whether a taxable person has acquired goods for the purposes of his economic 
activities is the nature of the goods concerned.” 107 And “(t)he fact that property is 
suitable only for economic exploitation will normally be sufficient to find that its owner 
is exploiting it for the purposes of his economic activities (…). If the property can be 
used for economic and private purposes, the circumstances have to be examined in 
order to determine whether it is actually used for the purpose of obtaining income on 
a regular basis.108 From the Rompelman case109 it can be learned that if someone 
plans to pursue an economic activity, even preparatory activities in an early stage will 
be attracted to the (future) economic activity.110 
 
The first case which dealt with the question of a holding company as a taxable 
person in the sense of Article 4 of the 6th VAT Directive,111 and therefore also with 
the question of economic activity, was the Polysar case.112 The Dutch holding 
company Polysar BV received dividends on a yearly basis but was not engaged in 
trading activities.113 Based on the judgement of the ECJ in the Van Tiem decision,114  
Article 4 confers a very wide scope on VAT. The “exploitation” of tangible or 
intangible property within the meaning of Article 4 (2) refers to all transactions, 
irrespective of the legal form, which are carried out for the purpose of obtaining 
income on a continuing basis.115 However, it does not follow from that decision that 
“the mere acquisition and holding of shares in a company is to be regarded as an 
economic activity, within the meaning of the Sixth Directive, conferring on the holder 
the status of a taxable person. The mere acquisition of financial holdings in other 
undertakings does not amount to the exploitation of property for the purpose of 
obtaining income therefrom on a continuing basis because any dividend yielded by 
that holding is merely the result of ownership of the property.” 116 Interestingly, the 
Court went on to state that “(i)t is otherwise where the holding is accompanied by 
direct or indirect involvement in the management of the companies in which the 
holding has been acquired, without prejudice to the rights held by the holding 
company as shareholder.” 117 The conclusion and the answer to the question is 
therefore that a holding company the (actual) activity of which is limited to the 
acquisition of holdings in undertakings, without being directly or indirectly involved in 
the management of those undertakings, does not have the status of a taxable person 
for the purpose of VAT.118 In my opinion, the fact that the acquisition of financial 
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holdings and the dividends received from these financial holdings are not directly 
related in the sense of a consideration for an exploitation of property is obvious. The 
exploitation of property or the supply of services and goods must be directly linked to 
the consideration paid for the exploitation or the supply of services and goods.119 The 
Polysar case was considered a landmark decision with a determinant role on the 
outcome of the subsequent cases on the VAT treatment of shares, but was also 
criticised because of the minimal level of arguments put forward by the ECJ to 
support its decision.120 
 
The statement of the ECJ with respect to the “direct or indirect involvement in the 
management of the companies” is not obvious. The holding company can therefore 
become a taxable person if there is a certain degree of involvement in the 
management. It is questionable whether the “involvement” itself requires economic 
activities which are rendered for a consideration, e.g. management services or similar 
services,121 as it is stipulated in Article 2 and 4 of the 6. VAT Directive.122 This would - 
at least to that extent - lead to the result that the holding company is a taxable person 
for VAT purposes.123 The term “indirect involvement” could also be understood in a 
way that no consideration is necessary, for example an involvement in the form of 
guidelines for the subsidiary, and it should not be seen very strict and together with 
the very wide scope conferred by Article 4 of the 6. VAT Directive.124 Pursuant to 
Stadie it should therefore be sufficient that the holding company controls the 
subsidiary, i.e. a management contract etc. is not even necessary.125 If the holding 
company exercises control only with respect to certain companies but not with 
respect to all companies, the taxable activity has to be separated for VAT 
purposes.126 The ECJ had to deal with these questions in the Floridienne and 
Berginvest case127, the Welthgrove case128 and the Cibo Participations case129 which 
will be outlined below. 
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technology services and with loan finance. Furthermore, both companies received 
dividends from their subsidiaries and interest on the loan.142 It is quite clear that the 
supply of administrative, accounting and information technology services for 
consideration was regarded by the Court as an economic activity within the meaning 
of Article 4 (2) and Article 2 of the 6. VAT Directive. The dividends, however, cannot 
be regarded as a consideration for the economic activity in question since there is no 
direct link between the activity carried out and the dividends received. Such a direct 
link is required in order to fall within the scope of the VAT.143 Moreover, the Court 
made it clear that there are additional features underlying the exclusion from VAT 
and the non-existence of a link to the supply of services: A dividend payment is 
dependent on unknown factors like the year-end results of the company and the 
proportions in which the dividend is distributed are normally determined by the shares 
held and the classes of shares. Dividends represent the return on investment in a 
company and are merely the result of the ownership of that property.144 The dividend 
payments can therefore not be seen as (additional) contributions for the management 
services rendered by the holding companies. The same is basically true for the 
interest payments. The two companies merely reinvested the dividends paid by their 
subsidiaries in loans to some of those subsidiaries without there being any link with 
the management services. The interest on the loan constitutes income resulting from 
the ownership of the debts owed by the subsidiaries (or, alternatively, income from 
credit transactions incidental to the main activity, namely the holding of shares).145 
 
There is a very limited possibility that the income from loan comes into the scope of 
the VAT. This could be the case if it either constituted in itself an economic activity 
within the meaning of Article 4 (2) of the 6.VAT Directive,146 or if it was a direct, 
permanent and necessary extension of a taxable activity (without being incidental to 
the main activity). The making available of capital to subsidiaries may of itself be 
considered an economic activity if it is not merely on an occasional basis and if it is 
“not confined to managing an investment portfolio in the same way as a private 
investor and provided that it is carried out with a business or commercial purpose 
characterised by, in particular, a concern to maximise returns on capital investment.” 
147 With respect to a possible extension of an economic activity, the Court made it 
clear that the making of loans to subsidiaries is not a direct, permanent and 
necessary extension of the supply of (management) services. “Such loans are neither 
necessarily nor directly linked to services thus supplied.” 148 It is therefore clear from 
this case that dividends or interest payments will not become an economic activity, or 
part of an economic activity, just because of the fact that there is an existing 
economic activity of the (holding) company in the form of a supply of management 
services. Here we have, without any doubt, a direct or indirect involvement in the 
management of the subsidiary. But this does not infect the – parallel existing – non-
economic activity of the (holding) company. The judgement of the Court in the 
Floridienne and Berginvest case was later on confirmed in the Cibo Participations 
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The aforementioned differentiation was also relevant in the Wellcome Trust case130 
where the ECJ had to decide on the question whether the term “economic activities” 
in Article 4 (2) of the 6. VAT Directive131 was capable of covering the sale of shares 
and securities by a person who was not a dealer in shares and securities and the 
question whether a large number of share sales and purchases, combined with 
sophisticated preparation over a considerable period of time, could in itself constitute 
“economic activities.”132 In the underlying case, the Wellcome Trust Ltd. acted as the 
sole trustee for the Wellcome Trust, a charitable trust. In the course of its activities 
the Trust purchased and sold shares and securities, received dividends from its 
shareholdings and earned interest income from securities, cash balances and direct 
bank loans to institutions and banks. The trust also made investments in futures and 
options in order to hedge its positions. Moreover, the Trust executed a sale of a large 
stake in a company by way of a public offering which involved a long period of 
planning and considerable fees for the services of lawyers, financial consultants and 
public-relations experts.133 However, the trustee was required to make all reasonable 
efforts to avoid engaging in trade when exercising the investment powers.134 The 
Trust’s Director of Finance monitored all portfolios in order to make sure that the 
Trust did not accidentally acquire a reportable interest in any company.135 Based on 
former case law the Court confirmed the very wide scope on VAT,136 but the mere 
exercise of the right of ownership by its holder could not, in itself, be regarded as an 
economic activity.137 If such activities do not in themselves constitute an economic 
activity within the meaning of the Directive, the same must be true for activities 
consisting of the sale of such holdings.138 The transactions in shares and securities 
may fall within the scope of the VAT in case such transactions are effected as part of 
a commercial share-dealing activity139 or in order to secure a direct or indirect 
involvement in the management of the companies in which the holding has been 
acquired.140  
 
Subsequent case law shows what is actually meant by the direct or indirect 
involvement in the management of the subsidiary and to which extent it can basically 
lead to an economic activity of the holding company. In the Floridienne and 
Berginvest case141 a holding company (and an intermediary holding company) 
claimed to be directly or indirectly involved in the management of the subsidiaries, in 
particular by supplying them with administrative, accounting and information 
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basis. The dividend and interest payment received is merely the result of the 
ownership of the property, but not a consideration for an economic activity. 
 
8.) This is different if the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in 
the management of the companies. 
 
9.) Direct or indirect involvement in the management of companies is limited to the 
supply of services for a consideration, i.e. only insofar can the activity be considered 
an economic activity. Non-economic activities will not become economic activities just 
because of the parallel existence of a supply of services of a (holding) company. 
 
10.) The transactions in shares and bonds may fall within the scope of the VAT in 
cases (i) in which such transactions are effected as part of a commercial share-
dealing or bond-dealing activity or (ii) in which they constitute the direct, permanent 
and necessary extension of an (existing) economic activity. 
 
11.) The holding of shares and the granting of loans to subsidiary companies is not a 
direct, permanent and necessary extension of an economic activity such as the 
supply of management services of a holding company. 
 
4.2.1.2.3. Economic Activity and Direct Taxation 
 
The Cadbury Schweppes case could have been a perfect case for a clear separation 
between economic and non-economic activities, because such a separation might be 
of particular interest for the activities carried on by companies which are subject to 
CFC taxation. However, neither the ECJ nor the Advocate General Léger tried to find 
a clear definition. Instead, they took a different route which, however, is important 
and conclusive, too. In his Opinion to the case Advocate General Léger held that “(...) 
‘establishment’, within the meaning of Article 43 EC et seq., involves the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity in the host State. If the subsidiary is actually carrying 
on such an activity in that State and, in that connection, it provides genuine and 
actual services to the parent company, I do not think that that situation may be 
regarded, in itself, as tax evasion or avoidance, even if payment for those services 
leads to a reduction in the taxable profits of the parent company in the State of origin. 
Having regard to the objective of freedom of establishment, as long as the subsidiary 
carries on a genuine economic activity in the host State, there is no difference 
between the provision of services to third parties and the provision of those services 
to companies belonging to the same group as the subsidiary. In addition, the 
provision of services by a subsidiary to its parent company is an economic activity 
which takes the form of transactions between distinct legal persons. (...) Transactions 
between a CFC and its parent company which result in reducing the taxable profits of 
the latter can therefore be regarded as tax avoidance only if the establishment of that 
subsidiary and those transactions constitute (...) a wholly artificial arrangement aimed 
at circumventing national law..”152 The focus is on the separation between abusive 
(artificial) structures and “genuine economic activities” and the question of the actual 
type of services does not really play a role in the examinations. This becomes 
particularly obvious when the Advocate General outlines the three criteria which 
appear to be relevant for a distinction between a genuine economic activity in the 
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case. In the Cibo Participations case the holding company supplied general, 
administrative, financial, commercial and technical management services on a flat 
rate basis of 0.5% of the turnover. Moreover, the chairman of the holding company 
became the chairman of the subsidiaries.149 Even though it seems that there was a 
higher degree of direct or indirect involvement in the management of the subsidiaries 
than in the Floridienne and Berginvest case, the outcome cannot be different. The 
Welthgrove case is similar to the aforementioned two cases. However, there is one 
decisive difference: Welthgrove - an intermediate holding company - claimed to be 
involved in the management of the subsidiaries, but without charging a remuneration 
for such activities. The members of the board of directors of Welthgrove were 
engaged in the active guidance of its subsidiaries, but no additional staff was 
employed. However, Welthgrove received dividends from its subsidiaries.150 In this 
case, the Court confirmed that the mere involvement of a holding company in the 
management of its subsidiaries without carrying out transactions subject to VAT 
cannot be regarded as an economic activity. 151 
 
4.2.1.2.2. Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Indirect Taxation 
 
Some general principles can be derived from the existing VAT case law of the ECJ 
and the Council Directive 2006/112/EC: 
 
1.) The second subparagraph of Article 9 (1) includes a typological enumeration of 
economic activities which is not concluding. 
 
2.) The exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining 
income therefrom on a continuing basis shall in particular be regarded as an 
economic activity. The net result of the activity is not decisive. 
 
3.) The exploitation of tangible or intangible property is, in principle, irrespective of 
the legal form. This underlines the very wide scope of value added tax. 
 
4.) Economic activities of taxable persons are necessarily activities which are carried 
on with the object of obtaining payment of consideration or which are likely to be 
rewarded by the payment of consideration. This is true for both, the first and the 
second sentence of Article 9 (1) subparagraph 2 of the Council Directive 
2006/112/EC, i.e. the supply of services and goods and the exploitation of tangible or 
intangible property. 
 
5.) The nature of the (tangible or intangible) property can be an indicator for the 
question whether an economic activity will be pursued with the property in question. 
 
6.) If it is planned to pursue an economic activity, even preparatory activities in an 
early stage will be attracted to the (future) economic activity. 
 
7.) The mere acquisition and holding of shares and bonds does not amount to the 
exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing 
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151 Case C-102/00 (Welthgrove), paragraph 17. See with respect to the question whether true and quasi factoring 
can be considered an economic activity: case C-305/01 (Finanzamt Groß-Gerau v MKG-Kraftfahrzeuge-
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basis. The dividend and interest payment received is merely the result of the 
ownership of the property, but not a consideration for an economic activity. 
 
8.) This is different if the holding is accompanied by direct or indirect involvement in 
the management of the companies. 
 
9.) Direct or indirect involvement in the management of companies is limited to the 
supply of services for a consideration, i.e. only insofar can the activity be considered 
an economic activity. Non-economic activities will not become economic activities just 
because of the parallel existence of a supply of services of a (holding) company. 
 
10.) The transactions in shares and bonds may fall within the scope of the VAT in 
cases (i) in which such transactions are effected as part of a commercial share-
dealing or bond-dealing activity or (ii) in which they constitute the direct, permanent 
and necessary extension of an (existing) economic activity. 
 
11.) The holding of shares and the granting of loans to subsidiary companies is not a 
direct, permanent and necessary extension of an economic activity such as the 
supply of management services of a holding company. 
 
4.2.1.2.3. Economic Activity and Direct Taxation 
 
The Cadbury Schweppes case could have been a perfect case for a clear separation 
between economic and non-economic activities, because such a separation might be 
of particular interest for the activities carried on by companies which are subject to 
CFC taxation. However, neither the ECJ nor the Advocate General Léger tried to find 
a clear definition. Instead, they took a different route which, however, is important 
and conclusive, too. In his Opinion to the case Advocate General Léger held that “(...) 
‘establishment’, within the meaning of Article 43 EC et seq., involves the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity in the host State. If the subsidiary is actually carrying 
on such an activity in that State and, in that connection, it provides genuine and 
actual services to the parent company, I do not think that that situation may be 
regarded, in itself, as tax evasion or avoidance, even if payment for those services 
leads to a reduction in the taxable profits of the parent company in the State of origin. 
Having regard to the objective of freedom of establishment, as long as the subsidiary 
carries on a genuine economic activity in the host State, there is no difference 
between the provision of services to third parties and the provision of those services 
to companies belonging to the same group as the subsidiary. In addition, the 
provision of services by a subsidiary to its parent company is an economic activity 
which takes the form of transactions between distinct legal persons. (...) Transactions 
between a CFC and its parent company which result in reducing the taxable profits of 
the latter can therefore be regarded as tax avoidance only if the establishment of that 
subsidiary and those transactions constitute (...) a wholly artificial arrangement aimed 
at circumventing national law..”152 The focus is on the separation between abusive 
(artificial) structures and “genuine economic activities” and the question of the actual 
type of services does not really play a role in the examinations. This becomes 
particularly obvious when the Advocate General outlines the three criteria which 
appear to be relevant for a distinction between a genuine economic activity in the 
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case. In the Cibo Participations case the holding company supplied general, 
administrative, financial, commercial and technical management services on a flat 
rate basis of 0.5% of the turnover. Moreover, the chairman of the holding company 
became the chairman of the subsidiaries.149 Even though it seems that there was a 
higher degree of direct or indirect involvement in the management of the subsidiaries 
than in the Floridienne and Berginvest case, the outcome cannot be different. The 
Welthgrove case is similar to the aforementioned two cases. However, there is one 
decisive difference: Welthgrove - an intermediate holding company - claimed to be 
involved in the management of the subsidiaries, but without charging a remuneration 
for such activities. The members of the board of directors of Welthgrove were 
engaged in the active guidance of its subsidiaries, but no additional staff was 
employed. However, Welthgrove received dividends from its subsidiaries.150 In this 
case, the Court confirmed that the mere involvement of a holding company in the 
management of its subsidiaries without carrying out transactions subject to VAT 
cannot be regarded as an economic activity. 151 
 
4.2.1.2.2. Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Indirect Taxation 
 
Some general principles can be derived from the existing VAT case law of the ECJ 
and the Council Directive 2006/112/EC: 
 
1.) The second subparagraph of Article 9 (1) includes a typological enumeration of 
economic activities which is not concluding. 
 
2.) The exploitation of tangible or intangible property for the purpose of obtaining 
income therefrom on a continuing basis shall in particular be regarded as an 
economic activity. The net result of the activity is not decisive. 
 
3.) The exploitation of tangible or intangible property is, in principle, irrespective of 
the legal form. This underlines the very wide scope of value added tax. 
 
4.) Economic activities of taxable persons are necessarily activities which are carried 
on with the object of obtaining payment of consideration or which are likely to be 
rewarded by the payment of consideration. This is true for both, the first and the 
second sentence of Article 9 (1) subparagraph 2 of the Council Directive 
2006/112/EC, i.e. the supply of services and goods and the exploitation of tangible or 
intangible property. 
 
5.) The nature of the (tangible or intangible) property can be an indicator for the 
question whether an economic activity will be pursued with the property in question. 
 
6.) If it is planned to pursue an economic activity, even preparatory activities in an 
early stage will be attracted to the (future) economic activity. 
 
7.) The mere acquisition and holding of shares and bonds does not amount to the 
exploitation of property for the purpose of obtaining income therefrom on a continuing 
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4.2.1.2.4. Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Direct Taxation 
 
It is quite obvious from the case law of the ECJ that not each and every activity can 
be considered an economic activity. Even though a clear separation between 
economic activities and other activities may be difficult, it can be concluded that the 
holding of assets itself is not sufficient for a qualification as economic activity, but that 
additional elements are required. It seems to me that a certain “economic output” 
must be created in the host Member State. This can be, for example, the exercising 
of management functions related to subsidiary companies or the provision of 
additional services. Article 49 of the TFEU states that “(...) restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the 
setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State 
established in the territory of any Member State.” It is clear from the Daily Mail case 
that the right of establishment may also be exercised by opening an investment 
management office. This, at least, makes it clear that an investment management 
activity can be seen, in principle, as an economic activity in the sense of the right of 
establishment. It is also clear from the ECJ case law, in particular from the 
Factortame decision, that the subsidiary company which is established in another 
Member State may be “directed and controlled” from within the Member State of 
primary establishment. This makes it clear that a dependence on the decisions of the 
parent company is not, in general, contrary to the right of establishment. Thus, if a 
subsidiary company carries on its “own” activities without being a “mere tool of 
execution” of the parent company, such an activity will be in the scope of the right of 
establishment even if the activity is strongly influenced by the shareholders and even 
if the activity is only of limited overall importance - as long as the activity is not 
without any economic substance. Such minimum requirements are therefore equally 
important for activities which are usually considered - from the perspective of 
Member States - to be business activities (e.g. all kind of services provided to related 
or non-related parties) or investment management activities. In other words, an 
economic activity also encompasses investment management activities if the latter 
are not only limited to the holding of assets, shares et cetera, but also encompass 
their own income-producing activity which is carried out in the state of secondary 
establishment. 
 
4.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment and the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The economic activity must be pursued through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State.158 Such a fixed establishment can be created by a migration from one 
Member State to another Member State (primary establishment) or by the setting-up 
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries (secondary establishment).159 Since there is no 
direct link between the TFEU and double tax conventions, the terms “agency” and 
“branch” do not have to coincide with the term “permanent establishment” used in 
double tax conventions.160 Of course, there is a certain likelihood that in many cases 
a permanent establishment in the sense of a double tax convention will also be 
considered to be an agency or branch in the context of Article 49 of the TFEU, but 
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host Member State and a wholly artificial arrangement. In fact, these criteria were 
suggested by the United Kingdom and the Commission. The three criteria are 
 
1.) the degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the host State; 
 
2.) the genuine nature of the activity provided by the subsidiary; 
 
3.) the economic value of that activity with regard to the parent company and the 
entire group.153 
 
According to Advocate General Léger, the first criterion requires that the subsidiary to 
be “genuinely established in the host State.” This should be the case if the subsidiary 
has the premises, staff and equipment required to carry out the services provided.154 
The second criterion relates to the “competence of the subsidiary’s staff in relation to 
the services provided and the level of decision-making in carrying out those 
services.” If the subsidiary can be seen as “a mere tool of execution,” the structure 
may be considered wholly artificial.155  Finally, the third criterion relates to the “value 
added by the subsidiary’s activity.” The latter should be of relevance if the services 
provided by the subsidiary have “no economic substance in the light of the parent 
company’s activity.”156 Therefore, if the subsidiary company is genuinely established 
in the host state and carries out “useful” services with its own staff, the agreement 
cannot be considered wholly artificial - based on the Opinion of the Advocate 
General. The ECJ itself, however, did not explicitly pick up the “three criteria concept” 
of the Advocate General - suggested by the United Kingdom and the Commission - 
but concentrated on the first criterion. The ECJ outlined that “(a)s suggested by the 
United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing, that finding must 
be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in 
particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff 
and equipment. If checking those factors leads to the finding that the CFC is a 
fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic activity in the territory 
of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be regarded as having the 
characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could be so in particular in the 
case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.”157 The services provided in the Cadbury 
Schweppes case were related to the financing of group companies. However, I have 
no doubt that any other inter-company services, e.g. leasing, renting, licensing or 
similar services, in the same way have to be considered a genuine economic activity 
- in case of the fulfilment of the respective three criteria. I am referring to the three 
criteria - and not only to the criterion explicitly referred to by the ECJ - since it is not 
completely clear, in my opinion, whether the second and the third criterion also play a 
role in the examinations. I will come back to that aspect later on when this question is 
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4.2.1.2.4. Conclusions Regarding Economic Activity and Direct Taxation 
 
It is quite obvious from the case law of the ECJ that not each and every activity can 
be considered an economic activity. Even though a clear separation between 
economic activities and other activities may be difficult, it can be concluded that the 
holding of assets itself is not sufficient for a qualification as economic activity, but that 
additional elements are required. It seems to me that a certain “economic output” 
must be created in the host Member State. This can be, for example, the exercising 
of management functions related to subsidiary companies or the provision of 
additional services. Article 49 of the TFEU states that “(...) restrictions on the freedom 
of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member 
State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the 
setting-up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State 
established in the territory of any Member State.” It is clear from the Daily Mail case 
that the right of establishment may also be exercised by opening an investment 
management office. This, at least, makes it clear that an investment management 
activity can be seen, in principle, as an economic activity in the sense of the right of 
establishment. It is also clear from the ECJ case law, in particular from the 
Factortame decision, that the subsidiary company which is established in another 
Member State may be “directed and controlled” from within the Member State of 
primary establishment. This makes it clear that a dependence on the decisions of the 
parent company is not, in general, contrary to the right of establishment. Thus, if a 
subsidiary company carries on its “own” activities without being a “mere tool of 
execution” of the parent company, such an activity will be in the scope of the right of 
establishment even if the activity is strongly influenced by the shareholders and even 
if the activity is only of limited overall importance - as long as the activity is not 
without any economic substance. Such minimum requirements are therefore equally 
important for activities which are usually considered - from the perspective of 
Member States - to be business activities (e.g. all kind of services provided to related 
or non-related parties) or investment management activities. In other words, an 
economic activity also encompasses investment management activities if the latter 
are not only limited to the holding of assets, shares et cetera, but also encompass 
their own income-producing activity which is carried out in the state of secondary 
establishment. 
 
4.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment and the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The economic activity must be pursued through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State.158 Such a fixed establishment can be created by a migration from one 
Member State to another Member State (primary establishment) or by the setting-up 
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries (secondary establishment).159 Since there is no 
direct link between the TFEU and double tax conventions, the terms “agency” and 
“branch” do not have to coincide with the term “permanent establishment” used in 
double tax conventions.160 Of course, there is a certain likelihood that in many cases 
a permanent establishment in the sense of a double tax convention will also be 
considered to be an agency or branch in the context of Article 49 of the TFEU, but 
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host Member State and a wholly artificial arrangement. In fact, these criteria were 
suggested by the United Kingdom and the Commission. The three criteria are 
 
1.) the degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the host State; 
 
2.) the genuine nature of the activity provided by the subsidiary; 
 
3.) the economic value of that activity with regard to the parent company and the 
entire group.153 
 
According to Advocate General Léger, the first criterion requires that the subsidiary to 
be “genuinely established in the host State.” This should be the case if the subsidiary 
has the premises, staff and equipment required to carry out the services provided.154 
The second criterion relates to the “competence of the subsidiary’s staff in relation to 
the services provided and the level of decision-making in carrying out those 
services.” If the subsidiary can be seen as “a mere tool of execution,” the structure 
may be considered wholly artificial.155  Finally, the third criterion relates to the “value 
added by the subsidiary’s activity.” The latter should be of relevance if the services 
provided by the subsidiary have “no economic substance in the light of the parent 
company’s activity.”156 Therefore, if the subsidiary company is genuinely established 
in the host state and carries out “useful” services with its own staff, the agreement 
cannot be considered wholly artificial - based on the Opinion of the Advocate 
General. The ECJ itself, however, did not explicitly pick up the “three criteria concept” 
of the Advocate General - suggested by the United Kingdom and the Commission - 
but concentrated on the first criterion. The ECJ outlined that “(a)s suggested by the 
United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing, that finding must 
be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties with regard, in 
particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in terms of premises, staff 
and equipment. If checking those factors leads to the finding that the CFC is a 
fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic activity in the territory 
of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be regarded as having the 
characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could be so in particular in the 
case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.”157 The services provided in the Cadbury 
Schweppes case were related to the financing of group companies. However, I have 
no doubt that any other inter-company services, e.g. leasing, renting, licensing or 
similar services, in the same way have to be considered a genuine economic activity 
- in case of the fulfilment of the respective three criteria. I am referring to the three 
criteria - and not only to the criterion explicitly referred to by the ECJ - since it is not 
completely clear, in my opinion, whether the second and the third criterion also play a 
role in the examinations. I will come back to that aspect later on when this question is 
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relations to third parties at all. A permanent establishment can very well be 
constituted by the fulfilment of functions which are only directed to other group 
companies without having any other - third party - relationship.169 In this respect one 
has to keep in mind that - under the TFEU - each company (e.g. within a group of 
companies) has an individual right of establishment.170 One might even argue that - 
from an EU perspective - each single group company is to be seen (and treated) as a 
‘third party’. Therefore, I do not think that regarding Somafer the Court intended to 
stipulate a condition which refers directly to third parties. Even though the Court 
described the concept of branch, agency or other establishment in general terms, it 
must be seen - in my opinion - in the context of the underlying case. In the case itself, 
a French company created legal relations and obligations with third parties in 
Germany through its German branch. The third party relationship and the claims and 
obligations which can arise from the business of the branch office were therefore an 
important issue in the Somafer case. In my opinion, the Court certainly intended to 
stipulate a concept of branch, agency or other establishment, and in the context of 
the underlying case it makes perfect sense to do this in the way it was actually done 
by the Court. But the statement of the Court does not mean that a “third party 
element” was introduced as a condition for a place of business. In my opinion, it has 
to be understood in a different way: the place of business must be materially 
equipped to negotiate business with third parties only if the negotiation with third 
parties is actually relevant. If the establishment has to fulfil certain other functions 
which are only directed to the head office (or other related parties), it should be at 
least sufficiently equipped to carry out those functions. Of course, it is very likely that 
functions which are carried out - for example - by a subsidiary company or a 
permanent establishment towards other group companies require exactly the same 
equipment as the functions which are solely carried out towards unrelated parties. 
The third party element in relation to the equipment is, in my opinion, irrelevant and 
should therefore not be considered to be a condition for the place of business.  
 
The aforementioned conclusion can also be drawn from the subsequent decisions in 
Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container, where the fact that services were 
provided towards related parties was not critical with respect to the question whether 
a ‘fixed establishment’ existed or not. In his Opinion to the Cadbury Schweppes case 
Advocate General Léger solely stated that “(...) in this case it seems important to 
state that ‘establishment’ allows a Community national to participate, on a stable and 
continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of 
origin and to profit therefrom. Freedom of establishment thus concerns the genuine 
and actual pursuit of an economic activity in the host Member State. As stated by 
Advocate General Darmon in point 3 of his Opinion in the Daily Mail and General 
Trust case, ‘establishment “means integration into a national economy”’. It is 
therefore the exercise of an economic activity in the host Member State which is the 
raison d’etre of freedom of establishment.”171 However, the Advocate General made 
it clear that - in order to fulfil the first of the three criteria which were outlined earlier - 
the subsidiary company must be genuinely established in the host Member State. 
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this will not necessarily always be the case. In the Somafer decision,161 the ECJ 
stated that “(t)he concept of branch, agency or other establishment implies a place of 
business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a 
parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business 
with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary be a 
legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have to deal 
directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of business 
constituting the extension.” 162 Based on the statement of the Court, it can be 
concluded that three conditions have to be met in order to classify a place of 
business as a branch, agency or other establishment. The place of business: 
 
1.) has the appearance of permanency; 
 
2.) has a management; and 
 
3.) is materially equipped to negotiate with third parties.163 
 
The conditions “appearance of permanency” and (a certain degree of) “management” 
seem to be obvious, taking into consideration that the concept of establishment 
requires that an economic activity is pursued in another Member State for an 
indefinite period. The third condition, however, needs further explanations. I fully 
agree with the conclusion that an agency or branch has - to a certain extent - to be 
materially equipped, depending on the function and the extent of the agency or 
branch. What is not completely clear is the fact that the establishment should be 
equipped to negotiate business with third parties. If this is a requirement for the 
establishment in another Member State in the sense of Article 49 of the TFEU, it 
deviates in an important point from the concept of permanent establishment in the 
OECD-MTC. Pursuant to Article 5 (1) of the OECD-MTC the term “permanent 
establishment” means a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.164 This includes - similar to the conditions 
described above - a place of management.165 A permanent establishment will not 
exist in cases in which only preparatory or auxiliary activities are carried on through 
the fixed place of business.166 If a person acts on behalf of the enterprise and has, 
and habitually exercises, in a contracting state an authority to conclude contracts in 
the name of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in that state in respect of any activities which that person undertakes 
for the enterprise, unless the activities of such a person are limited to preparatory and 
auxiliary activities.167 A permanent establishment does usually not exist if the activity 
is carried on through an independent agent, provided that such a person acts in the 
ordinary course of its business.168 However, there is no requirement that the 
permanent establishment is materially equipped to negotiate with third parties. 
Moreover, there is not even a requirement that the permanent establishment has any 
                                            
161 Case 33/78 (Somafer SA v Saar-Ferngas AG), November 22, 1978, ECR 1978, page 02183. 
162 Case 33/78 (Somafer), paragraph 12.  
163 See with respect to the three conditions also Kemmeren, Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions - A 
Rethinking of Models, page 174  
164 Article 5 (1) of the OECD-MTC. 
165 Article 5 (2) (a) of the OECD-MTC. However, it is clear that a “place of management” is only one of several 
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relations to third parties at all. A permanent establishment can very well be 
constituted by the fulfilment of functions which are only directed to other group 
companies without having any other - third party - relationship.169 In this respect one 
has to keep in mind that - under the TFEU - each company (e.g. within a group of 
companies) has an individual right of establishment.170 One might even argue that - 
from an EU perspective - each single group company is to be seen (and treated) as a 
‘third party’. Therefore, I do not think that regarding Somafer the Court intended to 
stipulate a condition which refers directly to third parties. Even though the Court 
described the concept of branch, agency or other establishment in general terms, it 
must be seen - in my opinion - in the context of the underlying case. In the case itself, 
a French company created legal relations and obligations with third parties in 
Germany through its German branch. The third party relationship and the claims and 
obligations which can arise from the business of the branch office were therefore an 
important issue in the Somafer case. In my opinion, the Court certainly intended to 
stipulate a concept of branch, agency or other establishment, and in the context of 
the underlying case it makes perfect sense to do this in the way it was actually done 
by the Court. But the statement of the Court does not mean that a “third party 
element” was introduced as a condition for a place of business. In my opinion, it has 
to be understood in a different way: the place of business must be materially 
equipped to negotiate business with third parties only if the negotiation with third 
parties is actually relevant. If the establishment has to fulfil certain other functions 
which are only directed to the head office (or other related parties), it should be at 
least sufficiently equipped to carry out those functions. Of course, it is very likely that 
functions which are carried out - for example - by a subsidiary company or a 
permanent establishment towards other group companies require exactly the same 
equipment as the functions which are solely carried out towards unrelated parties. 
The third party element in relation to the equipment is, in my opinion, irrelevant and 
should therefore not be considered to be a condition for the place of business.  
 
The aforementioned conclusion can also be drawn from the subsequent decisions in 
Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container, where the fact that services were 
provided towards related parties was not critical with respect to the question whether 
a ‘fixed establishment’ existed or not. In his Opinion to the Cadbury Schweppes case 
Advocate General Léger solely stated that “(...) in this case it seems important to 
state that ‘establishment’ allows a Community national to participate, on a stable and 
continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of 
origin and to profit therefrom. Freedom of establishment thus concerns the genuine 
and actual pursuit of an economic activity in the host Member State. As stated by 
Advocate General Darmon in point 3 of his Opinion in the Daily Mail and General 
Trust case, ‘establishment “means integration into a national economy”’. It is 
therefore the exercise of an economic activity in the host Member State which is the 
raison d’etre of freedom of establishment.”171 However, the Advocate General made 
it clear that - in order to fulfil the first of the three criteria which were outlined earlier - 
the subsidiary company must be genuinely established in the host Member State. 
                                            
169 According to paragraph 26 of the Commentary to the OECD-MTC, a fixed place of business which renders 
services not only to its enterprise but also directly to other enterprises, for example to other companies of a group 
to which the company owning the fixed place belongs, would not fall within the scope of Article 5 (4) (e) of the 
OECD-MTC, i.e. cannot be considered to be a preparatory or auxiliary activity.  
170 See in this respect Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU.  
171 Advocate General Léger in his Opinion to case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 42, with reference 
to the following cases: case C-2/74 (Reyners), paragraph 21, case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 25, case C-
221/89 (Factortame), paragraph 20, and case C-246/89 (Commission v United Kingdom), paragraph 21.  
   
 
this will not necessarily always be the case. In the Somafer decision,161 the ECJ 
stated that “(t)he concept of branch, agency or other establishment implies a place of 
business which has the appearance of permanency, such as the extension of a 
parent body, has a management and is materially equipped to negotiate business 
with third parties so that the latter, although knowing that there will if necessary be a 
legal link with the parent body, the head office of which is abroad, do not have to deal 
directly with such parent body but may transact business at the place of business 
constituting the extension.” 162 Based on the statement of the Court, it can be 
concluded that three conditions have to be met in order to classify a place of 
business as a branch, agency or other establishment. The place of business: 
 
1.) has the appearance of permanency; 
 
2.) has a management; and 
 
3.) is materially equipped to negotiate with third parties.163 
 
The conditions “appearance of permanency” and (a certain degree of) “management” 
seem to be obvious, taking into consideration that the concept of establishment 
requires that an economic activity is pursued in another Member State for an 
indefinite period. The third condition, however, needs further explanations. I fully 
agree with the conclusion that an agency or branch has - to a certain extent - to be 
materially equipped, depending on the function and the extent of the agency or 
branch. What is not completely clear is the fact that the establishment should be 
equipped to negotiate business with third parties. If this is a requirement for the 
establishment in another Member State in the sense of Article 49 of the TFEU, it 
deviates in an important point from the concept of permanent establishment in the 
OECD-MTC. Pursuant to Article 5 (1) of the OECD-MTC the term “permanent 
establishment” means a fixed place of business through which the business of an 
enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.164 This includes - similar to the conditions 
described above - a place of management.165 A permanent establishment will not 
exist in cases in which only preparatory or auxiliary activities are carried on through 
the fixed place of business.166 If a person acts on behalf of the enterprise and has, 
and habitually exercises, in a contracting state an authority to conclude contracts in 
the name of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in that state in respect of any activities which that person undertakes 
for the enterprise, unless the activities of such a person are limited to preparatory and 
auxiliary activities.167 A permanent establishment does usually not exist if the activity 
is carried on through an independent agent, provided that such a person acts in the 
ordinary course of its business.168 However, there is no requirement that the 
permanent establishment is materially equipped to negotiate with third parties. 
Moreover, there is not even a requirement that the permanent establishment has any 
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an economic activity. Here, it might be sufficient, in my opinion, that additional 
services are provided towards the subsidiary companies which can be, for example, 
the providing of financial means by way of cash pooling et cetera. The mere 
combination of a holding of shares and a holding of bonds or loan amounts, however, 
may not be sufficient since it is just the combination of holding different assets - 
without carrying on additional activities. Moreover, there is no necessity to 
differentiate - in a narrower sense - between “business activities” and “investment 
management activities.” Such a differentiation is, in my opinion, not required for the 
question of being in the scope of Article 49 of the TFEU or not. The approach is not 
only supported by the Cadbury Schweppes decision but also by the Daily Mail 
decision. 
 
The economic activity described above must be pursued in the host Member State 
through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. In effect, any economic activity 
which is not only temporarily carried on in the Member State of secondary 
establishment requires some sort of fixed place of business and therefore physical 
presence - even if it is just an activity of minor importance. Based on the Somafer 
decision it can be concluded that the place of business requires (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management and (iii) must be materially equipped for the carrying 
out of the respective functions. In other words, the establishment must be sufficiently 
equipped (premises, management, staff, equipment et cetera) in order to provide the 
respective services or any other function by its own and without being a “mere tool of 
execution” of - for example - the parent company. Again, this does not require that 
the subsidiary company acts totally independent and without any direction and 
controlling from the shareholder, but it requires that the (perhaps minor) functions are 
actually and physically carried on by the subsidiary company itself at a fixed place of 
business within the host Member State. 
 
Another aspect of great importance is the fact that the shareholder - in order to come 
into the scope of the freedom of establishment - must have a “(...) definite influence 
over the company’s decisions and allows him to determine its activities.” It is still not 
completely clear from case law of the ECJ whether the requirement of a “definite 
influence” can be linked to a certain percentage of shareholding (or voting rights) and 
how the collaboration of shareholders has to be seen in this context. In the ICI case, 
the company which invoked the right of establishment had a shareholding of 49 
percent in the intermediate holding company and in the Überseering case there were 
two shareholders who held together 100 percent in the respective company. In the 
SGI case a shareholding of 34 percent was sufficient to come within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment. In the Columbus Container case, the shares in a Belgian 
limited partnership were held, on the one hand, by eight members of the same family, 
each member having 10 percent holding, and, on the other hand, as regards the 
remaining 20 percent, by a German partnership. The shares in the German 
partnership were, in turn, also held by members of that family. The family members 
took decisions concerning the Belgian partnership by agreement through the same 
representative at the general meeting of the partnership. In this case, the ECJ 
concluded that the freedom of establishment was affected. That means that even a 
shareholding of 10 to 12.50 percent can be sufficient to come within the scope of 
Article 49 of the TFEU if there are further elements which show that the shareholders 
are acting together and, therefore, the shareholding confers definite influence over 
the company’s decisions. 
 
   
 
This requires that the subsidiary company to have “(...) the premises, staff and 
equipment necessary to carry out the services provided to the parent company.”172 
This was subsequently confirmed in the decision of the ECJ.173 This is therefore a 
clear statement for an approach which merely focuses on the balance between the 
equipment (including premises, management and other personnel) and the actual 
functions exercised by the subsidiary company - no matter whether the services are 
provided to related or unrelated parties. 
 
4.2.2. Conclusions Regarding the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The concept of establishment was described by the ECJ as the “actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period.” This should enable the EU national “to participate, on a stable and 
continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of 
origin and to profit therefrom.” The latter has to be seen, in my opinion, in contrast to 
the freedom to provide services, which only lead to a temporary link to the other 
Member State. The freedom of establishment is, thus, a far-reaching concept which 
provides the possibility for EU nationals to carry on an economic activity in another 
Member State and to profit from a full integration in the latter Member State. The 
previously described case law of the ECJ shows, in my opinion, that it is not too 
difficult to come into the scope of the freedom of establishment. In the context of this 
study, where the focus is on outbound investments in other Member States through 
subsidiary companies, it seems to me that the following requirements established in 
the case law of the ECJ are of particular importance and may need additional 
clarification: 
 
(i) the actual pursuing of an economic activity; 
 
(ii) through a fixed establishment in another Member State; and 
 
(iii) the definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
With respect to the requirement of pursuing an economic activity, it seems to be 
obvious that not each and every activity can be considered to be an economic 
activity. In my opinion, there must be a certain “economic output” which is created in 
the host Member State. The mere holding of assets or shares can therefore not be 
seen as the pursuing of an economic activity in the host Member State. The assets 
may be seen as an “instrument” which may be utilised for an economic activity. It is 
therefore obvious that capital intensive services - like leasing, renting, or licensing 
activities - are economic activities. In the latter case, it should, based on the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision, neither play a role whether the activities are carried on with 
related or unrelated parties nor whether the services are of minor importance in the 
overall context, e.g. within a group of companies. Even the fact that the activities are 
“directed and controlled” from within the Member State of primary establishment 
should, based on the Factortame decision, not be an element which may be contrary 
to the right of establishment. It is required, however, that the subsidiary company 
carries out its “own” activities in the host Member State and that the subsidiary 
company is not just a “mere tool of execution” of the parent company. Similar aspects 
should apply for holding companies: the mere holding of shares cannot be seen as 
                                            
172 Advocate General Léger in his Opinion to case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 112. 
173 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 67.  
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an economic activity. Here, it might be sufficient, in my opinion, that additional 
services are provided towards the subsidiary companies which can be, for example, 
the providing of financial means by way of cash pooling et cetera. The mere 
combination of a holding of shares and a holding of bonds or loan amounts, however, 
may not be sufficient since it is just the combination of holding different assets - 
without carrying on additional activities. Moreover, there is no necessity to 
differentiate - in a narrower sense - between “business activities” and “investment 
management activities.” Such a differentiation is, in my opinion, not required for the 
question of being in the scope of Article 49 of the TFEU or not. The approach is not 
only supported by the Cadbury Schweppes decision but also by the Daily Mail 
decision. 
 
The economic activity described above must be pursued in the host Member State 
through a fixed establishment for an indefinite period. In effect, any economic activity 
which is not only temporarily carried on in the Member State of secondary 
establishment requires some sort of fixed place of business and therefore physical 
presence - even if it is just an activity of minor importance. Based on the Somafer 
decision it can be concluded that the place of business requires (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management and (iii) must be materially equipped for the carrying 
out of the respective functions. In other words, the establishment must be sufficiently 
equipped (premises, management, staff, equipment et cetera) in order to provide the 
respective services or any other function by its own and without being a “mere tool of 
execution” of - for example - the parent company. Again, this does not require that 
the subsidiary company acts totally independent and without any direction and 
controlling from the shareholder, but it requires that the (perhaps minor) functions are 
actually and physically carried on by the subsidiary company itself at a fixed place of 
business within the host Member State. 
 
Another aspect of great importance is the fact that the shareholder - in order to come 
into the scope of the freedom of establishment - must have a “(...) definite influence 
over the company’s decisions and allows him to determine its activities.” It is still not 
completely clear from case law of the ECJ whether the requirement of a “definite 
influence” can be linked to a certain percentage of shareholding (or voting rights) and 
how the collaboration of shareholders has to be seen in this context. In the ICI case, 
the company which invoked the right of establishment had a shareholding of 49 
percent in the intermediate holding company and in the Überseering case there were 
two shareholders who held together 100 percent in the respective company. In the 
SGI case a shareholding of 34 percent was sufficient to come within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment. In the Columbus Container case, the shares in a Belgian 
limited partnership were held, on the one hand, by eight members of the same family, 
each member having 10 percent holding, and, on the other hand, as regards the 
remaining 20 percent, by a German partnership. The shares in the German 
partnership were, in turn, also held by members of that family. The family members 
took decisions concerning the Belgian partnership by agreement through the same 
representative at the general meeting of the partnership. In this case, the ECJ 
concluded that the freedom of establishment was affected. That means that even a 
shareholding of 10 to 12.50 percent can be sufficient to come within the scope of 
Article 49 of the TFEU if there are further elements which show that the shareholders 
are acting together and, therefore, the shareholding confers definite influence over 
the company’s decisions. 
 
   
 
This requires that the subsidiary company to have “(...) the premises, staff and 
equipment necessary to carry out the services provided to the parent company.”172 
This was subsequently confirmed in the decision of the ECJ.173 This is therefore a 
clear statement for an approach which merely focuses on the balance between the 
equipment (including premises, management and other personnel) and the actual 
functions exercised by the subsidiary company - no matter whether the services are 
provided to related or unrelated parties. 
 
4.2.2. Conclusions Regarding the Freedom of Establishment 
 
The concept of establishment was described by the ECJ as the “actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period.” This should enable the EU national “to participate, on a stable and 
continuous basis, in the economic life of a Member State other than his State of 
origin and to profit therefrom.” The latter has to be seen, in my opinion, in contrast to 
the freedom to provide services, which only lead to a temporary link to the other 
Member State. The freedom of establishment is, thus, a far-reaching concept which 
provides the possibility for EU nationals to carry on an economic activity in another 
Member State and to profit from a full integration in the latter Member State. The 
previously described case law of the ECJ shows, in my opinion, that it is not too 
difficult to come into the scope of the freedom of establishment. In the context of this 
study, where the focus is on outbound investments in other Member States through 
subsidiary companies, it seems to me that the following requirements established in 
the case law of the ECJ are of particular importance and may need additional 
clarification: 
 
(i) the actual pursuing of an economic activity; 
 
(ii) through a fixed establishment in another Member State; and 
 
(iii) the definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
With respect to the requirement of pursuing an economic activity, it seems to be 
obvious that not each and every activity can be considered to be an economic 
activity. In my opinion, there must be a certain “economic output” which is created in 
the host Member State. The mere holding of assets or shares can therefore not be 
seen as the pursuing of an economic activity in the host Member State. The assets 
may be seen as an “instrument” which may be utilised for an economic activity. It is 
therefore obvious that capital intensive services - like leasing, renting, or licensing 
activities - are economic activities. In the latter case, it should, based on the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision, neither play a role whether the activities are carried on with 
related or unrelated parties nor whether the services are of minor importance in the 
overall context, e.g. within a group of companies. Even the fact that the activities are 
“directed and controlled” from within the Member State of primary establishment 
should, based on the Factortame decision, not be an element which may be contrary 
to the right of establishment. It is required, however, that the subsidiary company 
carries out its “own” activities in the host Member State and that the subsidiary 
company is not just a “mere tool of execution” of the parent company. Similar aspects 
should apply for holding companies: the mere holding of shares cannot be seen as 
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4.2.3.1.2. The Eurowings Case 
 
Typical services which can be rendered from a provider in one Member State to a 
recipient in another Member State on a permanent basis which do not necessarily 
require any infrastructure in the Member State of the recipient are leasing services. In 
the Eurowings case,181 the ECJ had to decide on the German treatment of leasing 
payments which will be outlined in more detail below. Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG, an 
operator of scheduled and charter flights in Germany and Europe, leased an aircraft 
form Air Tara Ltd. in Ireland.182 There was no doubt for the Court that leasing 
services were services within the meaning of Article 57 of the TFEU and that they 
were therefore within the scope of the freedom to provide services.183 The leasing of 
an aircraft is typically a long-term agreement, i.e. the services are rendered over a 
certain period of time to a recipient in another Member State. Taking into account that 
such a provider of leasing services is typically the lessor of not only one aircraft, and 
that the intention is to renew the leasing agreements, it can be assumed that these 
kinds of services are rendered on a permanent and continuous basis without any 
involvement in the territory of another Member State or with a very limited - 
temporary - activity in the Member State of the recipient. The fact that leasing 
agreements are within the scope of the freedom to provide services is not surprising, 
but these kinds of services, or at least services which contain similar elements 
compared to leasing agreements, are typical services which are of particular 
importance in the context of this study. In its decision, the Court held that the leasing 
activities come within the scope of the freedom to provide services and that the 
recipient of the leasing services may rely on the latter basic freedom.184 
 
4.2.4. Conclusions Regarding the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
The basic difference between the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services is therefore that the first one requires the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period of time, i.e. on a stable and continuous basis, whereas the latter 
requires the actual pursuit of an economic activity from either within the Member 
State of primary establishment towards the recipient in another Member State or with 
a temporary link to the Member State of the recipient of the services. Apparently, the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services both require the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity. Hence, there is a certain overlapping of the 
requirements to come within the scope of the latter two freedoms. Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely - at least for investments in the context of this study - that two activities will 
be covered simultaneously by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
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4.2.3. The Freedom to Provide Services 
 
Pursuant to Article 56 of the TFEU restrictions on the freedom to provide services 
within the Union shall be prohibited regarding nationals of Member States who are 
established in a State of the Union other than that of the person for whom the 
services are intended.174 Services shall be considered to be “services” within the 
meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far 
as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for 
goods, capital and persons.175 This shall particularly include the activities of an 
industrial and commercial character, as well as activities of craftsmen and 
professions.176 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Chapter relating to the right 
of establishment, the person providing a service may, in order to do so, temporarily 
pursue its activity in the State in which the service is provided, under the same 
conditions as are imposed by that State on its own nationals.177 
 
4.2.3.1. Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
 
4.2.3.1.1. The Gebhard Case 
 
In the Gebhard case the ECJ outlined that “(t)he situation of a Community national 
who moves to another Member State of the Community in order there to pursue an 
economic activity is governed by the chapter of the Treaty on the free movement of 
workers, or the chapter on the right of establishment or the chapter on services, 
these being mutually exclusive.” 178 The pursuing of an economic activity is therefore 
equally relevant for the freedom to provide services and the freedom of 
establishment. However, the ECJ stated that “(t)he provisions of the chapter on 
services are subordinate to those of the chapter on the right of establishment in so 
far, first, as the wording of the first paragraph of Article 59 assumes that the provider 
and the recipient of the services concerned are “established” in two different Member 
States and, second, as the first paragraph of Article 60 specifies that the provisions 
relating to services apply only if those relating to the right of establishment do not 
apply.” 179 The decisive element is that the provider of services in the sense of 
chapter 3 pursues his activity in the other Member State on a temporary basis. 
Pursuant to the Court, “(…) the temporary nature of the activities in question has to 
be determined in the light, not only of the duration of the provision of the service, but 
also of its regularity, periodicity or continuity. The fact that the provision of services is 
temporary does not mean that the provider of services with the meaning of the Treaty 
may not equip himself with some form of infrastructure in the host Member State 
(including an office, chambers or consulting rooms) in so far as such infrastructure is 
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177 Article 57 (3) of the TFEU.  
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4.2.3.1.2. The Eurowings Case 
 
Typical services which can be rendered from a provider in one Member State to a 
recipient in another Member State on a permanent basis which do not necessarily 
require any infrastructure in the Member State of the recipient are leasing services. In 
the Eurowings case,181 the ECJ had to decide on the German treatment of leasing 
payments which will be outlined in more detail below. Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG, an 
operator of scheduled and charter flights in Germany and Europe, leased an aircraft 
form Air Tara Ltd. in Ireland.182 There was no doubt for the Court that leasing 
services were services within the meaning of Article 57 of the TFEU and that they 
were therefore within the scope of the freedom to provide services.183 The leasing of 
an aircraft is typically a long-term agreement, i.e. the services are rendered over a 
certain period of time to a recipient in another Member State. Taking into account that 
such a provider of leasing services is typically the lessor of not only one aircraft, and 
that the intention is to renew the leasing agreements, it can be assumed that these 
kinds of services are rendered on a permanent and continuous basis without any 
involvement in the territory of another Member State or with a very limited - 
temporary - activity in the Member State of the recipient. The fact that leasing 
agreements are within the scope of the freedom to provide services is not surprising, 
but these kinds of services, or at least services which contain similar elements 
compared to leasing agreements, are typical services which are of particular 
importance in the context of this study. In its decision, the Court held that the leasing 
activities come within the scope of the freedom to provide services and that the 
recipient of the leasing services may rely on the latter basic freedom.184 
 
4.2.4. Conclusions Regarding the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
The basic difference between the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services is therefore that the first one requires the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period of time, i.e. on a stable and continuous basis, whereas the latter 
requires the actual pursuit of an economic activity from either within the Member 
State of primary establishment towards the recipient in another Member State or with 
a temporary link to the Member State of the recipient of the services. Apparently, the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services both require the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity. Hence, there is a certain overlapping of the 
requirements to come within the scope of the latter two freedoms. Nonetheless, it is 
unlikely - at least for investments in the context of this study - that two activities will 
be covered simultaneously by the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
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4.2.3. The Freedom to Provide Services 
 
Pursuant to Article 56 of the TFEU restrictions on the freedom to provide services 
within the Union shall be prohibited regarding nationals of Member States who are 
established in a State of the Union other than that of the person for whom the 
services are intended.174 Services shall be considered to be “services” within the 
meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far 
as they are not governed by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for 
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4.2.3.1. Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
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174 Article 56 (1) of the TFEU. 
175 Article 57 (1) of the TFEU.  
176 Article 57 (2) of the TFEU. 
177 Article 57 (3) of the TFEU.  
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180 Case C-55/94 (Gebhard), paragraph 27.  
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Member State to another Member State, which may at the same time typically be 
seen as an investment.194 The transfer is not made for the purpose of discharging an 
obligation in exchange for services rendered or goods supplied.195 For the purpose of 
this study, the movement of capital is of particular relevance. I will therefore 
concentrate the following verifications on the movement of capital and I will not go 
into detail regarding the movement of payments. 
 
With respect to the scope of the free movement of capital the ECJ stated in the 
Trummer and Mayer case 196 that the meaning of the term “movement of capital” 
should be determined by reference to the nomenclature in Annex I to Council 
Directive 88/361/EEC.197 The reason is that the TFEU itself does not contain any 
definition of the term “movement of capital.”198 However, the nomenclature is not an 
exhaustive list for the notion of capital movements and it should therefore not be 
interpreted as restricting the scope of the principle of the full liberalisation of capital 
movements as referred to in Article 1 of the Directive.199 The capital movements are 
classified according to the economic nature of the assets and liabilities they concern, 
and it is structured as follows: 
 
1.) direct investments 
- establishment and extension of branches or new undertakings belonging solely to 
the person providing the capital, and the acquisition in full of existing undertakings 
- participation in new or existing undertaking with a view to establishing or 
maintaining lasting economic links 
- long term loans with a view of establishing or maintaining lasting economic links 
- reinvestment of profits with a view to maintaining lasting economic links 
2.) investments in real estate 
3.) operations in securities normally dealt in on the capital markets 
- shares and other securities of a participating nature 
- bonds 
4.) operations in units of collective investment undertakings 
5.) operations in securities and other instruments normally dealt in on the money       
market 
6.) operations in current and deposit accounts with financial institutions 
7.) credits related to commercial transactions or to the provision of services in which 
a resident is participating 
- short-, medium-, and long-term 
8.) financial loans and credits 
- short-, medium-, and long-term 
9.) sureties, other guarantees and rights of pledge 
10.) transfer in performance of insurance contracts 
                                            
194 Kiemel in Groeben, Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, Article 56, paragraph 1. 
195 See also Sedlaczek, Capital and Payments: The Prohibition of Discrimination and Restrictions, European 
Taxation 2000, page 14 et seq. (17).  
196 Case C-222/97 (Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer), March 16, 1999, ECR 1999 page I-01661.  
197 Council Directive 88/361/EEC, June 24, 1988; see also Sedlaczek, Capital and Payments: The Prohibition of 
Discrimination and Restrictions, European Taxation 2000, page 14 et seq. (16). 
198 Case C-222/97 (Trummer and Mayer), paragraphs 7 and 20; see in ths respect also the joined cases C-163/94, 
C-165/94 and C-250/94 (Criminal proceedings against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera, Raimundo Diaz Jimenez and 
Figen Kapanoglu), December 14, 1995, ECR 1995, page I-04821, paragraph 34.  
199 Case C-222/97 (Trummer and Mayer), paragraphs 13, 21; see also the joined cases C-515/99, C-519/99 to 
524/99,  and C-526/99 to C-540/99 (Reisch and Others), paragraph 30; case C-513/03 (van Hilten), paragraph 
39; Annex I of the Council Directive 88/361/EEC.  
   
 
4.2.5. The Free Movement of Capital 
 
Pursuant to Article 63 of the TFEU, all restrictions on the movement of capital and 
payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited.185 Article 64 (1) of the TFEU includes a ‘standstill clause’ and 
Article 65 of the TFEU provides, inter alia, for further clarification and concessions to 
the Member States. This shall be outlined in the context of the justifications. From the 
Daily Mail case it is clear that a Member State is prohibited to hinder the 
establishment of its own nationals or companies in another Member State.186 The 
Court ruled in this case - with respect to the freedom of establishment - that “(e)ven 
though those provisions are directed mainly to ensuring that foreign nationals and 
companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals of that 
State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering the establishment 
in another Member State of one of its nationals or of a company incorporated under 
its legislation which comes within the definition contained in Article 58. As the 
Commission rightly observed, the rights guaranteed by Articles 52 et seq. would  be 
rendered meaningless if the Member State of origin could prohibit undertakings from 
leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member State.”187 This was later 
on repeated by the Court in several other cases which dealt with the freedom of 
establishment.188 The question came up whether the statement of the Court in these 
cases could be transferred to the free movement of capital. In the context of Article 
63 of the TFEU the rights conferred by the free movement of capital would be 
rendered meaningless if a Member State could prohibit the investment of one of its 
nationals or of a company incorporated under its legislation in another Member State 
(or third countries).189 With the Verkooijen decision 190 it became clear that the 
principle determined in the context of the freedom of establishment was equally 
applicable to the free movement of capital. I will come back to the Verkooijen 
decision below. 
 
The differentiation between the free movement of capital and the free movement of 
payments is outlined in the Luisi and Carbone case,191 where the ECJ stated that 
“(...) current payments are transfers of foreign exchange which constitute the 
consideration within the context of an underlying transaction, whilst movements of 
capital are financial operations essentially concerned with the investment of the funds 
in question rather than remuneration for a service. For that reason movements of 
capital may themselves give rise to current payments (...)” 192 and “(t)he physical 
transfer of bank notes may not therefore be classified as a movement of capital 
where the transfer in question corresponds to an obligation to pay arising from a 
transaction involving the movement of goods or services.” 193 The movement of 
capital may be understood as an unilateral and one-sided transfer of capital from one 
                                            
185 Article 63 (1) of the TFEU (capital) and Article 63 (2) (ex Article 73 b (2)) of the TFEU (payments). 
186 Case 81/87 (The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and 
General Trust PLC), September 27, 1988, ECR 1988 page 5483.  
187 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 16.  
188 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 21; case C-200/98 (X and Y), paragraph 26; case C-251/98 (Baars), 
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189 See also Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, page 186. 
190 Case C-35/98 (Staatssecretaris van Financien v B.G.M. Verkooijen), June 6, 2000, ECR 2000, page I-04071.  
191 Cases 286/82 and 26/83 (Graziana Luisi and Giuseppe Carbone v Ministero del Tesoro), January 31, 1984, 
ECR 1984 page 00377. 
192 Cases C 286/82 and 26/83 (Luisi and Carbone), paragraph 21. 
193 Cases C 286/82 and 26/83 (Luisi and Carbone), paragraph 22.  
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that this includes especially loans granted by a company to its subsidiaries or to 
companies in which it has a share and loans linked with a profit-sharing 
arrangement.206 Apart from the direct investments, the investment in land, buildings, 
portfolio investments in shares and bonds, financial loans, credits, and a large 
number of other capital movements are included in the nomenclature and are 
therefore within the scope of the free movement of capital. At first glance it seems 
that the participation in a company which does not fulfil the requirements of a direct 
investment (part I) - e.g. a small percentage of shareholding without any influence - 
and which is not listed on a stock exchange or another capital market is not explicitly 
mentioned in the nomenclature. The investment in companies referred to in part III 
comprises securities which are normally dealt on a capital market. However, when 
considering the (non-exhaustive) financial transfers and transactions referred to in 
the nomenclature, it is quite obvious that the transfer of financial means207 from one 
Member State to another state in order to invest in a participation - even if it is without 
any influence on the business of the respective company - is within the scope of the 
free movement of capital. The investments are not restricted whatsoever to a certain 
minimum amount or percentage. Moreover, the investments described in the 
nomenclature and the explanatory notes are not linked to an economic activity, apart 
from the explanation of direct investments. The fact that direct investments require 
that the “capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity” 208 does 
not mean that economic activity is of any relevance for the other capital movements 
covered by the nomenclature, which are indirect investments. This was basically 
confirmed by the ECJ in a number of cases, not only with respect to the investment in 
shares209 but also with respect to the investment in immovable property.210 
 
4.2.5.1 Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
 
4.2.5.1.1. The Verkooijen Case 
 
In Verkooijen211 the Court had to decide on a different treatment of dividends 
received from companies established in another Member State compared to 
dividends received from domestic companies. Similar to the Trummer and Mayer 
case the Court referred to Directive 88/361 and made it clear that the Treaty does not 
define the term “capital movements.” The Court examined whether the receipt of 
dividends falls within the scope of the free movement of capital and concluded that 
this is the case, although the receipt of dividends is not expressly mentioned in the 
nomenclature annexed to the Directive.212  
 
                                            
206 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).  
207 The same is true for the transfer of assets.  
208 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).   
209 See, for example, case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), case C-315/02 (Lenz), case C-319/02 (Manninen), case C-
292/04 (Meilicke). 
210 Case C-364/01 (Barbier), paragraph 58.  
211 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), dated June 6, 2000. See with respect to the Verkooijen decision also Stangl, Der 
Begriff der steuerlichen Kohärenz nach den Urteilen Baars und Verkooijen, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 
2000, page 463 et seq.; Lupo, Reliefs from Economic Double Taxation on EU Dividends: Impact of the Baars 
and Verkooijen Cases, European Taxation 2000, page 270 et seq.; Wimpissinger, Der Fall Verkooijen und seine 
Auswirkungen, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2000, page 313 et seq.; Boekhorst, Dutch Dividend Relief in 
Breach of E.U. Law, Tax Planning International European Union Focus 2000, page 21 et seq. 
212 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 28.  
   
 
11.) personal capital movements 
12.) physical import and export of financial assets 
13.) other capital movements 
 
According to the explanatory notes of the nomenclature, direct investments have the 
meaning of investments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial, industrial or 
financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to maintain lasting and direct 
links between the person providing the capital and the entrepreneur or the 
undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic 
activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest sense.200 The 
undertakings mentioned under no. 1 (first insertion) include wholly owned 
subsidiaries and branches. The undertakings referred to under no. 1 (second 
insertion) which have the status “limited by shares” and there is participation in the 
nature of direct investment where the block of shares held by a natural person of 
another undertaking or any other holder enables the shareholder, either pursuant to 
the provisions of national laws relating to companies limited by shares or otherwise, 
to effectively participate in the management of the company or in its control.201 The 
direct investments described under no. 1 (first and second insertion) may coincide to 
a large extent with the investments covered by the freedom of establishment. The 
direct investment in this sense requires - in the same way as the freedom of 
establishment does - that the capital is made available in order to carry on an 
economic activity. Up to this point, there is a certain overlapping with Article 49 of the 
TFEU. This was basically confirmed in the jurisprudence of the ECJ. In the Orange 
European Smallcap Fund case, 202 the question was raised whether “direct 
investment” in Article 64 (1) of the TFEU also includes the holding of a block of 
shares in a company if the holder of the shares holds them only as an investment 
and the size of the block does not confer a decisive influence over the management 
or control of the company.203 In its decision the Court stated, in essence, that “direct 
investment” presupposes that the shareholding in the new or existing undertakings 
enables the shareholder, either pursuant to the provisions of national law relating to 
companies limited by shares or in some other way, to participate effectively in the 
management of that company or in its control.204  
 
However, the free movement of capital goes much further than the freedom of 
establishment. Long-term loans of a participating nature are also considered to be 
direct investments. Pursuant to the explanatory notes, this is the case if loans are 
granted for a period of more than five years and which are granted for the purpose of 
establishing or maintaining lasting economic links.205 The explanatory notes outline 
                                            
200 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).  
201 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments). 
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Significance of the Standstill-Clause ex-Article 57 (1) of the EC Treaty in the Field of Direct Taxation, EC Tax 
Review 2006, page 203 et seq. (206); Sedlaczek, Capital and Payments: The Prohibition of Discrimination and 
Restrictions, European Taxation 2001, page 17; Schönfeld, Die Fortbestandsgarantie des Art. 57 Abs. 1 EG im 
Steuerrecht: Anmerkung zu FG Hamburg vom 9.3.2004, VI 279/01, EFG, 2004, 1573, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2005, page 412.  
205 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).  
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However, the free movement of capital goes much further than the freedom of 
establishment. Long-term loans of a participating nature are also considered to be 
direct investments. Pursuant to the explanatory notes, this is the case if loans are 
granted for a period of more than five years and which are granted for the purpose of 
establishing or maintaining lasting economic links.205 The explanatory notes outline 
                                            
200 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).  
201 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments). 
202 Case C-194/06 (Staatssecretaris van Financien v Orange European Smallcap Fund NV), May 20, 2008. See 
with respect to the Orange European Smallcap Fund decision also Weber, ECJ concludes Netherlands Fiscal 
Investment Fund Regime incompatible with EC Law: Orange European Smallcap Fund, Tax Planning 
International European Tax Service, June 2008.  
203 Case C-194/06 (Orange European Smallcap Fund), paragraph 20.  
204 Case C-194/06 (Orange European Smallcap Fund), paragraphs 101, 102. See with respect to the previous 
attempts to quantify the concept of direct investment: Smit, Capital Movements and Third Countries: The 
Significance of the Standstill-Clause ex-Article 57 (1) of the EC Treaty in the Field of Direct Taxation, EC Tax 
Review 2006, page 203 et seq. (206); Sedlaczek, Capital and Payments: The Prohibition of Discrimination and 
Restrictions, European Taxation 2001, page 17; Schönfeld, Die Fortbestandsgarantie des Art. 57 Abs. 1 EG im 
Steuerrecht: Anmerkung zu FG Hamburg vom 9.3.2004, VI 279/01, EFG, 2004, 1573, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2005, page 412.  
205 Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex I, Explanatory Notes (Direct Investments).  
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4.2.5.1.2. The Cases Lenz, Manninen and Meilicke 
 
The Lenz case217 and the Manninen case 218 are a consistent continuation of the 
Verkooijen jurisprudence - at least with respect to the scope of the free movement of 
capital. The same is true for the Meilicke case.219 The Lenz case deals with a 
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seq.; Hintsanen /Pettersson, The Implications of the ECJ Holding the Denial of Finnish Imputation Credits in 
Cross-Border Situations to be Incompatible With the EC Treaty in the Manninen Case, European Taxation 2005, 
page 130 et seq.; Intemann, Das Körperschaftsteueranrechnungsverfahren auf dem Prüfstand des EuGH: 
Anrechnung ausländischer Körperschaftsteuer nach der Manninen-Entscheidung, Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe 2005, 
page 4955 et seq.; O’Shea, Dividend Taxation Post-Manninen: Shifting Sands or Solid Foundations?, Tax Notes 
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219 Case C-292/04 (Wienand Meilicke, Heidi Christa Weyde, Marina Stöffler v. Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt), 
March 6,2007. See with respect to the Meilicke case also Stok / Thomson,  Temporal Limitations to Tax 
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European Court of Justice: Limitation of the Legal Consequences?, European Taxation 2006, page 470 et seq.; 
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The Court stated that “(a) legislative provision such as the one at issue in the main 
proceedings has the effect of dissuading nationals of a Member State residing in the 
Netherlands from investing their capital in companies which have their seat in 
another Member State”213 and “(s)uch a provision also has a restrictive effect as 
regards companies established in other Member States: it constitutes an obstacle to 
the raising of capital in the Netherlands since the dividends which such companies 
pay to Netherlands residents receive less favourable tax treatment than dividends 
distributed by a company established in the Netherlands, so that their shares are less 
attractive to investors residing in the Netherlands than shares in companies which 
have their seat in that Member State.” 214 The restriction is twofold and coincides with 
the rulings of the Court with respect to the freedom of establishment in Daily Mail 215 
and Baars.216 It is not limited to the “capital export” of a resident of a Member State to 
another Member State, and therefore directed from the investor towards its own 
Member State, but also comprises the “capital import” into another Member State, i.e. 
if it is directed from the company which attracts the investments towards the other 
































                                            
213 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 34.  
214 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 35.  
215 Case 81/87 (Daily Mail), paragraph 16.  
216 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 29.  
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4.2.6. Conclusions Regarding the Free Movement of Capital 
 
Without any doubt, the scope of the free movement of capital is much broader than 
the scope of the freedom of establishment (and basically also the freedom to provide 
services) and also encompasses portfolio investments. This is, of course, of utmost 
importance in the context of this study. The actual pursuit of an economic activity is 
not, in principle, one of the requirements to come within the scope of Article 63 of the 
TFEU. Therefore, the free movement of capital covers a broad range of foreign 
investments which are not covered by the freedom of establishment. This is 
particularly relevant for shareholdings which do not provide a definite influence over 
the company’s decisions - due to the fact that the investor only holds a small and 
insignificant percentage in the respective company. Moreover, the scope of the free 
movement of capital is not limited to investments in other Member States but Article 
63 of the TFEU is equally relevant for investments in non-member states. However, 
the decisive question is the relationship between the freedom of establishment, the 
free movement of capital and the freedom to provide services in the light of the TFEU 
and the case law of the ECJ. This will be examined in the following. 
 
4.2.7. The Simultaneous Application of the Basic Freedoms 
 
In general, it may be possible that certain activities and investments are protected by 
more than one of the basic freedoms simultaneously. In such a situation, the question 
arises whether it is required to stipulate any form of order among the different basic 
freedoms, i.e. whether one of the basic freedoms prevails over another basic 
freedom. It is obvious, however, that the basic freedoms which are of importance in 
the context of this study may only have a certain “overlapping scope of application” 
but they are not identical in their full scope. Of course, the freedom of establishment, 
the freedom to provide services, and the free movement of capital all provide the 
protection from any form of discrimination and restriction, and in this respect any 
order would not really play a significant role. However, the question whether one of 
the basic freedoms excludes the application of another basic freedom can be 
relevant with respect to (possible) justifications for a restriction on the basic 
freedoms. Moreover, the latter question may be of significance for investments in 
states outside of the European Union. In the following, the relationship among the 
basic freedoms will be examined based on the TFEU and the case law of the ECJ. 
 
4.2.7.1. The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Free Movement of Capital 
 
The investment in a foreign company which pursues an economic activity can be 
covered by both the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. This 
is at least true if the shareholder exercises entrepreneurial control with a definite 
influence over the company’s decisions.225 If this is not the case, i.e. the investor 
effects only portfolio investment without exercising any form of entrepreneurial 
control, the freedom of establishment will not be affected. In the X and Y case the 
Court outlined that the free movement of capital is only of relevance in a situation in 
which Article 49 of the TFEU does not apply due to the insufficient level of 
participation.226 Moreover, in a number of cases, the ECJ came to the conclusion that 
the freedom of establishment was violated, but did not verify the question whether 
                                            
225 See in this respect case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 22.  
226 Case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 68.  
   
 
provision in the Austrian income tax law which provides for a different treatment of 
dividends received from domestic companies and dividends received from foreign 
companies (in this case dividends from a Germany company). The foreign dividends 
paid to an Austrian taxpayer are subject to ordinary income tax which can amount to - 
depending on the total taxable income of the Austrian taxpayer - up to 50 percent. In 
contrast thereto, dividends received from domestic companies are subject to a 
different treatment: the taxpayer may opt for a definite taxation (flat tax) of 25 percent 
or, as an alternative, may choose the taxation according to the half rate system. In 
the latter case, the tax rate is reduced to half of the average tax rate applicable to the 
aggregate taxable income.220 
 
In the Manninen case, the ECJ had to deal with the Finnish tax credit system which 
provided - similar to the Lenz case - for a different treatment of dividends received 
from domestic sources and dividends received from foreign sources.221 Pursuant to 
the Finnish system, the corporate income tax levied on the taxable profit of the 
Finnish company is creditable against the income tax levied on the dividend income 
of the shareholder. Since the corporate income tax rate and the income tax levied on 
the dividend income are both 29 percent, the system provides for an avoidance of 
double taxation. However, no tax credit is provided for dividends received from 
foreign companies. Thus, a double taxation may only be avoided in case of domestic 
investments but not in case of foreign investments. The Meilicke case is very similar 
to the Manninen case and dealt with the German imputation system. 
 
In the same way as outlined above in the Verkooijen decision the ECJ did not make 
any differentiation between direct investments and portfolio investments but in all 
three cases concluded that “(...) legislation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital”.222 The ECJ did 
not deal with the question of the underlying percentage of shareholding in the foreign 
companies nor with the activity of those companies. It seems to be quite obvious that 
this does not play any role for the question whether Article 63 of the TFEU is 
applicable or not.223 The portfolio investments in the publicly listed companies are - 
based on the existing case law - definitely within the scope of the free movement of 
capital. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in the Lenz case, the Manninen case 
and the Meilicke case the ECJ stipulated again that the respective domestic 
provisions not only have the effect of deterring fully taxable persons in Austria 
(respectively Finland and Germany) from investing their capital in companies 
established in other Member States but do also have a restrictive effect as regards 
companies established in other Member States, in that they constitute an obstacle to 
their raising capital in Austria (respectively Finland and Germany).224 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Belgium, Stahlwerk Ergste Westig and Deutsche Shell Cases, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation, 
2007, page 47 et seq.; Thömmes, Verpflichtung zur Anrechnung ausländischer Körperschaftsteuer - keine 
zeitliche Beschränkung der Urteilswirkungen, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 11A, page 1131 et 
seq. 
220 See with respect to the Austrian legal background paragraphs 3-10.  
221 Case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraph 12.  
222 Case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraph 24, case C-315/02 (Lenz), paragraph 22, case C-292/04 (Meilicke), 
paragraph 20.  
223 See in this respect also C-516/99 (Walter Schmid), May 30, 2002, ECR 2002, page I-04573. Mr. Schmid held 
a portfolio investment in the publicly listed German MAN AG.  
224 Case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraphs 22, 23; case C-315/02 (Lenz), paragraphs 20, 21; case C-292/04 
(Meilicke), paragraphs 23, 24.   
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from domestic sources and dividends received from foreign sources.221 Pursuant to 
the Finnish system, the corporate income tax levied on the taxable profit of the 
Finnish company is creditable against the income tax levied on the dividend income 
of the shareholder. Since the corporate income tax rate and the income tax levied on 
the dividend income are both 29 percent, the system provides for an avoidance of 
double taxation. However, no tax credit is provided for dividends received from 
foreign companies. Thus, a double taxation may only be avoided in case of domestic 
investments but not in case of foreign investments. The Meilicke case is very similar 
to the Manninen case and dealt with the German imputation system. 
 
In the same way as outlined above in the Verkooijen decision the ECJ did not make 
any differentiation between direct investments and portfolio investments but in all 
three cases concluded that “(...) legislation such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings constitutes a restriction on the free movement of capital”.222 The ECJ did 
not deal with the question of the underlying percentage of shareholding in the foreign 
companies nor with the activity of those companies. It seems to be quite obvious that 
this does not play any role for the question whether Article 63 of the TFEU is 
applicable or not.223 The portfolio investments in the publicly listed companies are - 
based on the existing case law - definitely within the scope of the free movement of 
capital. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in the Lenz case, the Manninen case 
and the Meilicke case the ECJ stipulated again that the respective domestic 
provisions not only have the effect of deterring fully taxable persons in Austria 
(respectively Finland and Germany) from investing their capital in companies 
established in other Member States but do also have a restrictive effect as regards 
companies established in other Member States, in that they constitute an obstacle to 
their raising capital in Austria (respectively Finland and Germany).224 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Belgium, Stahlwerk Ergste Westig and Deutsche Shell Cases, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation, 
2007, page 47 et seq.; Thömmes, Verpflichtung zur Anrechnung ausländischer Körperschaftsteuer - keine 
zeitliche Beschränkung der Urteilswirkungen, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 11A, page 1131 et 
seq. 
220 See with respect to the Austrian legal background paragraphs 3-10.  
221 Case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraph 12.  
222 Case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraph 24, case C-315/02 (Lenz), paragraph 22, case C-292/04 (Meilicke), 
paragraph 20.  
223 See in this respect also C-516/99 (Walter Schmid), May 30, 2002, ECR 2002, page I-04573. Mr. Schmid held 
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- Cadbury Schweppes case: the CFC legislation was applicable - at that time - to 
holdings of more than 50 percent;234 
 
- Lasertec: the German thin-cap legislation was applicable to “significant holdings” - 
which were (direct or indirect) holdings of more than 25 percent. However, the 
legislation was also applicable in case the shareholder was holding more than 25 
percent together with other shareholders “with whom he forms an association or 
by whom he is controlled, whom he controls, or, who, together with him, are 
controlled. A shareholder with no significant holding shall be treated in the same 
way as a shareholder with a significant holding where he exercises, either 
independently or in collaboration with other shareholders, a controlling influence 
over the company limited by shares.”235 
 
Clearly, the national measures in the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation 
case and the Cadbury Schweppes case were structured in a way that - in order to be 
applicable - the shareholder had to have a definite influence on the decisions of the 
companies concerned. That means the intention of the respective legislation is to be 
applicable to investments through which the shareholder has sufficient influence on 
the activities and this, of course, is - at the same time - what the application of the 
freedom of establishment requires. On the other hand, the national measure in the 
Lasertec case might not only be applicable to situations in which a definite influence 
exists from the perspective of Article 49 of the TFEU. This will at least be the case if 
one takes the position that the freedom of establishment, in principle, requires a 
majority shareholding and not merely a participation of more than 25 percent (or even 
less - depending on the situation). However, I think, first of all, that it is not the exact 
percentage which plays a role in this context. It seems that the ECJ rather focuses on 
the purpose of the national legislation in question than on mere quantitative aspects. 
The national legislation in the Lasertec case nonetheless focused on a controlling 
influence (see above) and was not applicable to shareholdings of up to 25 percent if 
the additional requirements were not fulfilled. Hence, it remains the intention to target 
entrepreneurial investments, and not just portfolio investments. At least, what is 
obvious is the fact that in all of the three cases - where the national measures 
                                                                                                                                         
European Taxation 2007, page 431 et seq.; Whitehead, A Definite Resemblance, International Tax Review 2007, 
page 43 et seq.; Whitehouse, The UK and Non-EU States: Fortress Europe?, The Tax Journal 2007, page 21 et 
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European Tax Service 2007, pages 25, 26. 
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Lasertec Case, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation, 2006, page 143 et seq.; Köhler / Tippelhofer, 
Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit auch in Drittstaatenfällen? Zugleich Anmerkung zu den Entscheidungen des EuGH in 
den Rechtssachen Lasertec (C-492/04) und Holböck (C-157/05) sowie zum BMF-Schreiben v. 21.3.2007 (IV B 
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there was a simultaneous violation of the free movement of capital.227 This could lead 
to the impression that the ECJ considers the free movement of capital to be 
secondary in cases in which a violation of the freedom of establishment exists.228 In 
the X and Y case the Court made it clear, though, that the free movement of capital 
needs to be considered only to the extent that “(...) the national provision at issue is 
such as to involve a separate restriction, where the Treaty provisions concerning 
freedom of establishment do not apply.” 229 However, in the case law of the ECJ with 
respect to the so-called “golden shares”230 the Court verified first whether the free 
movement of capital was affected. After concluding that the domestic provision 
violated the free movement of capital and after verifying possible justifications, the 
Court outlined that “to the extent that the legislation in issue involves restrictions on 
freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a direct consequence of the obstacles 
to the free movement of capital considered above, to which they are inextricably 
linked. Consequently, since an infringement of Article 73 b of the EC Treaty has been 
established, there is no need for a separate examination of the measures at issue in 
the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom of establishment.” 231 
 
However, it is the more recent case law of the ECJ which, in my opinion, provides a 
better understanding of the relationship and the principles for giving priority (or not) to 
one of these two basic freedoms. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Lasertec case 
and the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case, the Court stated 
clearly that “(i)f (…) it were to be accepted that the national measure at issue in the 
main proceedings has restrictive effects on the free movement of capital, such effects 
must be seen as an unavoidable consequence of the restriction on freedom of 
establishment (…) and do not justify an examination of that measure in the light of 
Articles 56 EC to 58 EC.”232 From the aforementioned case law it can be understood 
that it is the national measure which is decisive for the examination of the exclusive 
application of the freedom of establishment and not just the degree of (actual) 
influence or participation. In all of the latter cases, the national measure in question 
required a certain degree of participation: 
 
- Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case: the legislation was 
applicable in case of participations of at least 75 percent and (in the amended 
version) in case of common control;233 
                                            
227 See, inter alia, case C-200/98 (X AB and Y AB v Riksskatteverket), November 18, 1999, ECR 1999 page I-
08261; case C-264/96 (Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer), July 16, 1998, ECR 1998 
page I-4695; case C-251/98 (C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem), 
April 13, 2000, ECR 2000 page I-2787.  
228 See in this respect Saß, Zum Schutz von Kapitalbewegungen in der EU gegen steuerliche Diskriminierung, 
Finanz-Rundschau 2000, page 1270 et seq. (1271). In case C-374/04 (Rewe Zentralfinanz eG), paragraph 71, the 
ECJ outlined that “(s)ince the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of establishment thus preclude 
national legislation such as the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, it is not necessary to consider 
whether the provisions of the Treaty relating to free movement of capital also preclude that legislation.” 
229 Case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 66.  
230 Case C-483/99 (Commission of the European Communities v French Republic), June 4, 2002, ECR 2002 page 
I-04781; case C-367/98 (Commission of the European Communities v Portuguese Republic), June 4, 2002, ECR 
2002 page I-04731), Kiemel in Groeben, Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, Article 56, paragraph 20.  
231 Case C-483/99 (Commission v France), paragraph 56. See in this respect also case C-364/01 (Barbier), 
paragraph 75. 
232 Case C-492/04 (Lasertec), paragraph 25; see also case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 33 and 
case C-524/04 (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation), paragraph 34. 
233 Case C-524/04 (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation), paragraphs 29, 30. See with respect to this 
case also Aitken, The “Thin Cap” End of the Wedge?, Tax Planning International Review 2006, page 12; 
Fontana, Direct Investments and Third Countries: Things are Finally Moving… in the Wrong Direction, 
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- Cadbury Schweppes case: the CFC legislation was applicable - at that time - to 
holdings of more than 50 percent;234 
 
- Lasertec: the German thin-cap legislation was applicable to “significant holdings” - 
which were (direct or indirect) holdings of more than 25 percent. However, the 
legislation was also applicable in case the shareholder was holding more than 25 
percent together with other shareholders “with whom he forms an association or 
by whom he is controlled, whom he controls, or, who, together with him, are 
controlled. A shareholder with no significant holding shall be treated in the same 
way as a shareholder with a significant holding where he exercises, either 
independently or in collaboration with other shareholders, a controlling influence 
over the company limited by shares.”235 
 
Clearly, the national measures in the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation 
case and the Cadbury Schweppes case were structured in a way that - in order to be 
applicable - the shareholder had to have a definite influence on the decisions of the 
companies concerned. That means the intention of the respective legislation is to be 
applicable to investments through which the shareholder has sufficient influence on 
the activities and this, of course, is - at the same time - what the application of the 
freedom of establishment requires. On the other hand, the national measure in the 
Lasertec case might not only be applicable to situations in which a definite influence 
exists from the perspective of Article 49 of the TFEU. This will at least be the case if 
one takes the position that the freedom of establishment, in principle, requires a 
majority shareholding and not merely a participation of more than 25 percent (or even 
less - depending on the situation). However, I think, first of all, that it is not the exact 
percentage which plays a role in this context. It seems that the ECJ rather focuses on 
the purpose of the national legislation in question than on mere quantitative aspects. 
The national legislation in the Lasertec case nonetheless focused on a controlling 
influence (see above) and was not applicable to shareholdings of up to 25 percent if 
the additional requirements were not fulfilled. Hence, it remains the intention to target 
entrepreneurial investments, and not just portfolio investments. At least, what is 
obvious is the fact that in all of the three cases - where the national measures 
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there was a simultaneous violation of the free movement of capital.227 This could lead 
to the impression that the ECJ considers the free movement of capital to be 
secondary in cases in which a violation of the freedom of establishment exists.228 In 
the X and Y case the Court made it clear, though, that the free movement of capital 
needs to be considered only to the extent that “(...) the national provision at issue is 
such as to involve a separate restriction, where the Treaty provisions concerning 
freedom of establishment do not apply.” 229 However, in the case law of the ECJ with 
respect to the so-called “golden shares”230 the Court verified first whether the free 
movement of capital was affected. After concluding that the domestic provision 
violated the free movement of capital and after verifying possible justifications, the 
Court outlined that “to the extent that the legislation in issue involves restrictions on 
freedom of establishment, such restrictions are a direct consequence of the obstacles 
to the free movement of capital considered above, to which they are inextricably 
linked. Consequently, since an infringement of Article 73 b of the EC Treaty has been 
established, there is no need for a separate examination of the measures at issue in 
the light of the Treaty rules concerning freedom of establishment.” 231 
 
However, it is the more recent case law of the ECJ which, in my opinion, provides a 
better understanding of the relationship and the principles for giving priority (or not) to 
one of these two basic freedoms. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Lasertec case 
and the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case, the Court stated 
clearly that “(i)f (…) it were to be accepted that the national measure at issue in the 
main proceedings has restrictive effects on the free movement of capital, such effects 
must be seen as an unavoidable consequence of the restriction on freedom of 
establishment (…) and do not justify an examination of that measure in the light of 
Articles 56 EC to 58 EC.”232 From the aforementioned case law it can be understood 
that it is the national measure which is decisive for the examination of the exclusive 
application of the freedom of establishment and not just the degree of (actual) 
influence or participation. In all of the latter cases, the national measure in question 
required a certain degree of participation: 
 
- Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case: the legislation was 
applicable in case of participations of at least 75 percent and (in the amended 
version) in case of common control;233 
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establishment. This becomes clearer after the Glaxo Wellcome decision, which will 
be outlined below.244 
 
In principle, the above conclusions are supported by the fact that in the Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case, the Holböck case and the Lammers & Van 
Cleeff case the ECJ did not reject the examination of the free movement of capital in 
those situations in which no definite influence was requested by the respective 
legislation.245 In the Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case the ECJ held, 
inter alia, that “(s)ince the legislation applies to payments of dividends to shareholder 
companies irrespective of the size of the holding, it is capable of coming under both 
Article 43 EC on the freedom of establishment and Article 56 on the free movement 
of capital. However, to the extent to which the holdings in question confer on their 
owner a definite influence over the decisions of the companies concerned and allow 
it to determine their activities, it is the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of 
establishment which apply.”246 In other words, both basic freedoms can be relevant, 
but due to the fact that a definite influence exists (although it is not required by the 
national legislation) the ECJ starts its examination with the freedom of establishment. 
In the Holböck case, the approach of the ECJ becomes even clearer: “(a)s regards 
the question whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the 
freedoms of movement, it is clear from what is now well established case-law that the 
purpose of the legislation must be taken into consideration (…). Unlike the situations 
in Cadbury Schweppes and (…) Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (…), 
the Austrian legislation in the present case is not intended to apply only to those 
shareholdings which enable the holder to have a definite influence on a company’s 
decisions and to determine its activities. National legislation which makes the receipt 
of dividends liable to tax, where the rate depends on whether the source of those 
dividends is national or otherwise, irrespective of the extent of the holding which the 
shareholder has in the company making the distribution, may fall within the scope of 
both Article 43 EC (…) and Article 56 EC (…).”247 The fact that the Court accepts, in 
general, that both freedoms may be affected can be of particular relevance in cases 
in which countries outside of the EU are involved. In the Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation case as well as in the Holböck case, the ECJ examined the free 
movement of capital only after coming to the conclusion that the freedom of 
establishment could not be invoked in situations in which non-member countries were 
                                            
244 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt München II), September 17, 2009. 
245 In case C-446/04 (Test Claimant in the FII Group Litigation) the ECJ had to deal with a number of questions 
referring to different national legislation - with and without the requirement of a certain percentage of 
shareholding. 
246 Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraphs 80, 81.  
247 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 22, 23 and 24. See with respect to this case also Staringer, Pending 
Cases Filed by Austrian Courts: The Holböck Case, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation, 2006, 
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Direction, European Taxation 2007, page 431 et seq.; Köhler / Tippelhofer, Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit auch in 
Drittstaatenfällen? Zugleich Anmerkung zu den Entscheidungen des EuGH in den Rechtssachen Lasertec (C-
492/04) und Holböck (C-157/05) sowie zum BMF-Schreiben v. 21.3.2007 (IV B 7 – G 1421/0), Internationales 
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required a (certain) controlling or definite influence - the ECJ exclusively examined 
the freedom of establishment and rejected the examination of the respective 
legislation in the light of the free movement of capital.236 The approach was 
confirmed, inter alia, in the Stahlwerk Ergste Westig decision237 which, however, did 
not deal with the participation in foreign legal entities but with foreign permanent 
establishments.238 In this decision as well, the ECJ solely concentrated on the 
freedom of establishment and - after coming to the conclusion that the latter freedom 
was not affected in case of an investment in a non-member state - did not examine 
the free movement of capital.239 At first glance, it seems that the outcome of the 
Stahlwerk Ergste Westig case is in line with the aforementioned decisions only if one 
agrees with the Court that the relevant provisions are intended to be applicable to 
participations - in this case transparent partnerships - which confer a definite 
influence.240 However, the relevant treaty provisions are not connected to a certain 
minimum participation, i.e. the exemption would also be granted in case of a very 
small interest in the US partnerships.241 For this reason, one might be tempted to 
argue that it is the intention that the relevant provisions focus on entrepreneurial and 
non-entrepreneurial investments and, theoretically, an examination of the free 
movement of capital could have been made as well. After Stahlwerk Ergste Westig 
(and also the cases A and B and Lidl Belgium)242 one might have the impression that 
the Court considers Article 49 of the TFEU to be applicable exclusively in case of a 
permanent establishment, but this would be in contradiction to the Columbus 
Container decision where the general application of Article 49 and Article 63 of the 
TFEU was, in principle, accepted.243 However, I think the decisive point in Stahlwerk 
Ergste Westig is the fact that the legislation - although not connected to a certain 
minimum participation - is closely linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of 
                                            
236 See in this respect also Köhler / Tippelhofer, Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit auch in Drittstaatenfällen?, 
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establishment. This becomes clearer after the Glaxo Wellcome decision, which will 
be outlined below.244 
 
In principle, the above conclusions are supported by the fact that in the Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case, the Holböck case and the Lammers & Van 
Cleeff case the ECJ did not reject the examination of the free movement of capital in 
those situations in which no definite influence was requested by the respective 
legislation.245 In the Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case the ECJ held, 
inter alia, that “(s)ince the legislation applies to payments of dividends to shareholder 
companies irrespective of the size of the holding, it is capable of coming under both 
Article 43 EC on the freedom of establishment and Article 56 on the free movement 
of capital. However, to the extent to which the holdings in question confer on their 
owner a definite influence over the decisions of the companies concerned and allow 
it to determine their activities, it is the provisions of the Treaty relating to freedom of 
establishment which apply.”246 In other words, both basic freedoms can be relevant, 
but due to the fact that a definite influence exists (although it is not required by the 
national legislation) the ECJ starts its examination with the freedom of establishment. 
In the Holböck case, the approach of the ECJ becomes even clearer: “(a)s regards 
the question whether national legislation falls within the scope of one or other of the 
freedoms of movement, it is clear from what is now well established case-law that the 
purpose of the legislation must be taken into consideration (…). Unlike the situations 
in Cadbury Schweppes and (…) Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation (…), 
the Austrian legislation in the present case is not intended to apply only to those 
shareholdings which enable the holder to have a definite influence on a company’s 
decisions and to determine its activities. National legislation which makes the receipt 
of dividends liable to tax, where the rate depends on whether the source of those 
dividends is national or otherwise, irrespective of the extent of the holding which the 
shareholder has in the company making the distribution, may fall within the scope of 
both Article 43 EC (…) and Article 56 EC (…).”247 The fact that the Court accepts, in 
general, that both freedoms may be affected can be of particular relevance in cases 
in which countries outside of the EU are involved. In the Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation case as well as in the Holböck case, the ECJ examined the free 
movement of capital only after coming to the conclusion that the freedom of 
establishment could not be invoked in situations in which non-member countries were 
                                            
244 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt München II), September 17, 2009. 
245 In case C-446/04 (Test Claimant in the FII Group Litigation) the ECJ had to deal with a number of questions 
referring to different national legislation - with and without the requirement of a certain percentage of 
shareholding. 
246 Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraphs 80, 81.  
247 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 22, 23 and 24. See with respect to this case also Staringer, Pending 
Cases Filed by Austrian Courts: The Holböck Case, in ECJ - Recent Developments in Direct Taxation, 2006, 
page 9 et seq.; Fontana, Direct Investments and Third Countries: Things are Finally Moving… in the Wrong 
Direction, European Taxation 2007, page 431 et seq.; Köhler / Tippelhofer, Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit auch in 
Drittstaatenfällen? Zugleich Anmerkung zu den Entscheidungen des EuGH in den Rechtssachen Lasertec (C-
492/04) und Holböck (C-157/05) sowie zum BMF-Schreiben v. 21.3.2007 (IV B 7 – G 1421/0), Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2007, page 645 et seq.; Cordewener / Kofler / Schindler, Free Movement of Capital and Third 
Countries: Exploring the Outer Boundaries With Lasertec, A and B and Holböck, European Taxation 2007, page 
371 et seq.; Marschner, Die Freiheit des Kapitalverkehrs mit Drittstaaten: eine Analyse des EuGH-Urteils 
Holböck, Finanz Journal 2007, page 359 et seq.; Hohenwarter / Plansky, Die Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit mit 
Drittstaaten im Lichte der Rechtssache Holböck, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2007, page 346 et seq.; 
O’Shea, Holböck: Austrian Dividend Tax Rules Found Compatible With the EC Treaty, Tax Notes International 
2007, page 1131 et seq.  
   
 
required a (certain) controlling or definite influence - the ECJ exclusively examined 
the freedom of establishment and rejected the examination of the respective 
legislation in the light of the free movement of capital.236 The approach was 
confirmed, inter alia, in the Stahlwerk Ergste Westig decision237 which, however, did 
not deal with the participation in foreign legal entities but with foreign permanent 
establishments.238 In this decision as well, the ECJ solely concentrated on the 
freedom of establishment and - after coming to the conclusion that the latter freedom 
was not affected in case of an investment in a non-member state - did not examine 
the free movement of capital.239 At first glance, it seems that the outcome of the 
Stahlwerk Ergste Westig case is in line with the aforementioned decisions only if one 
agrees with the Court that the relevant provisions are intended to be applicable to 
participations - in this case transparent partnerships - which confer a definite 
influence.240 However, the relevant treaty provisions are not connected to a certain 
minimum participation, i.e. the exemption would also be granted in case of a very 
small interest in the US partnerships.241 For this reason, one might be tempted to 
argue that it is the intention that the relevant provisions focus on entrepreneurial and 
non-entrepreneurial investments and, theoretically, an examination of the free 
movement of capital could have been made as well. After Stahlwerk Ergste Westig 
(and also the cases A and B and Lidl Belgium)242 one might have the impression that 
the Court considers Article 49 of the TFEU to be applicable exclusively in case of a 
permanent establishment, but this would be in contradiction to the Columbus 
Container decision where the general application of Article 49 and Article 63 of the 
TFEU was, in principle, accepted.243 However, I think the decisive point in Stahlwerk 
Ergste Westig is the fact that the legislation - although not connected to a certain 
minimum participation - is closely linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of 
                                            
236 See in this respect also Köhler / Tippelhofer, Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit auch in Drittstaatenfällen?, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 645 et seq.; Wellens, Nichtabziehbare Betriebsausgaben bei 
Drittlandsdividenden - Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit contra Niederlassungsfreiheit, Deutsches Steuerrecht 2007, page 
1852 et seq.  
237 Case C-415/06 (Stahlwerk Ergste Westig GmbH v Finanzamt Düsseldorf-Mettmann), November 6, 2007. See 
with respect to this case also Tetzlaff / Schallock, Abzug von Verlusten ausländischer Betriebsstätten in 
Deutschland möglich?, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2006, Fach 3, Gruppe 2, page 1326 et seq.; Lüdicke, 
Pending Cases Filed by German Courts: The Meilicke, Burda, Gronfeldt, Jäger, Heinrich Bauer Verlag, Rewe 
Zentralfinanz, Lidl Belgium, Stahlwerk Ergste Westig and Deutsche Shell Cases, in ECJ - Recent Developments 
in Direct Taxation, 2007, page 47 et seq.; Arginelli / Gusmeroli, The 2007 Leiden Alumni Forum on Recent and 
Pending Direct Taxation Cases Before the European Court of Justice, Intertax 2008, page 312 et seq.; EuGH-
Entscheidungen, Abziehbarkeit von Betriebsstättenverlusten aus Drittstaaten, Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, 
page 107 et seq.; Rehm / Nagler, Neues von der grenzüberschreitenden Verlustverrechnung!, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2008, page 129 et seq.  
238 The company held two 100 percent participations in US-(transparent) partnerships (case C-415/06 (Stahlwerk 
Ergste Westig), paragraph 3).  
239 Case C-415/06 (Stahlwerk Ergste Westig), paragraphs 16-19.  
240 See case C-415/06 (Stahlwerk Ergste Westig), paragraph 15.  
241 Articles 7 (1) and 23 (2) letter a of the German-US double tax convention. 
242 Case C-102/05 (A and B), May 10, 2007; case C-414/06 (Lidl Belgium), May 15, 2008. See with respect to 
case C-102/05 (A and B) also Cordewener / Kofler / Schindler, Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries: 
Exploring the Outer Boundaries with Lasertec, A and B and Holböck, European Taxation 2007, page 371 et seq. 
(374).   
243 See case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 55 to 57. I will not go into further detail of this 
question with respect to permanent establishments since it is not of particular relevance for this study. See with 
regard to the contradiction in the jurisprudence of the ECJ also Tippelhofer / Lohmann, Niederlassungsfreiheit 
vs. Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit: Analyse der jüngeren Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu den direkten Steuern, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 857 et seq. (861). See also Obser, Deutsches Steuerrecht 2008, page 1088.  
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However, in order to complete the picture it is important to have a look at the Glaxo 
Wellcome case, too.259 The case itself deals with the restructuring of the German part 
of the Glaxo Wellcome group. Here, the ECJ stated that the relevant German 
legislation did not depend on the size of the holdings acquired and was not limited to 
situations in which the shareholder could exercise definite influence on the decisions 
of the company concerned and determine its activities.260 Furthermore, the ECJ 
concluded that “(…) the purpose of the legislation (…) is to prevent resident 
shareholders from obtaining an undue tax advantage directly through the sales of 
shares with the sole objective of obtaining that advantage, and not with the objective 
of exercising the freedom of establishment or as a result of exercising that freedom, it 
must be held that the free movement of capital aspect of that legislation prevails over 
that of the freedom of establishment.”261 Consistently, the ECJ proceeded with an 
exclusive examination of the free movement of capital.262 In my opinion, the case is 
important, because it confirms that the ECJ strictly focuses on the purpose of the 
legislation and - even though the freedom of establishment might theoretically be 
relevant as well - the Court did not give preference to Article 49 of the TFEU just 
because of the fact that the case deals with a group structure in which the 
requirement of a ‘definite influence’ is existent. In other words, the purpose of the 
legislation remains the decisive element for the decision whether Article 49 or Article 
63 of the TFEU will be examined.263  
 
In my opinion, the conclusions which can be drawn from the case law outlined above 
are the following: 
 
- The purpose of the national legislation must be considered for the decision which 
of the basic freedoms is affected. This is the most decisive element.  
 
- If the purpose of the legislation is the application to investments which confer a 
definite influence over a company’s decisions, it is the freedom of establishment 
which is to be exclusively examined. The purpose of the legislation can be 
identified not only by quantitative elements (e.g. the percentage of participation), 
but also by qualitative elements (e.g. the collaboration of shareholders to achieve 
a definite influence).264 
 
- If the purpose of the legislation is the general application to all types of portfolio 
and entrepreneurial investments, the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital can, in principle, both be affected.  
 
- However, if the actual investment confers definite influence over a company’s 
decisions and the purpose of the legislation is linked to the objective of exercising 
the freedom of establishment, the ECJ gives preference to the freedom of 
                                            
259 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt München II), September 17, 2009. 
260 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraph 49.  
261 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraph 50. 
262 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraphs 51, 52. 
263 However, it is apparent that the question whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement of 
capital applies remains a relatively complex question and may lead to confusion on the level of national courts. 
See with respect to the differing approaches of national courts Den Boer, Freedom of Establishment versus Free 
Movement of Capital: Ongoing Confusion at the ECJ and in the National Courts?, European Taxation 2010, 
page 250 et seq. and Hemels et al., Freedom of Establishment or Free Movement of Capital: Is There an Order of 
Priority? Conflicting Visions of National Courts and the ECJ, EC Tax Review 2010, page 19 et seq.    
264 See also Köhler / Tippelhofer, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 645 et seq. (649).  
   
 
involved.248 I will come back to the aspects which are of importance in case of 
investments in non-member states below. In the Lammers & Van Cleeff case - where 
no third countries were involved - the ECJ first examined the freedom of 
establishment.249 After the conclusion that the national measure resulted in a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment which cannot be justified, the ECJ did not 
see the necessity to examine, in addition, whether the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of capital also preclude the respective legislation.250  
 
In the Burda decision251 the ECJ concluded that the respective national legislation 
may fall within the purview both of the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital, because the legislation does not depend on the extent of the 
holding which the company receiving the dividend has in the company paying it.252 
However, in the following the ECJ determined an ‘exclusive’ application of the 
freedom of establishment and concluded that a restriction of the free movement of 
capital is just an unavoidable consequence of an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment.253 That means the fact that the company had a 50 percent 
participation resulted in an exclusive application of Article 49 of the TFEU, even 
though the purpose of the legislation is the general application to portfolio and 
entrepreneurial investments. The situation in the SGI case was very similar: the 
legislation in question was not dependent on the percentage of shareholding.254 So, 
theoretically, both Article 49 and Article 63 of the TFEU could have been relevant. 
However, also in this case the ECJ decided that - based on the fact that the 
companies involved had a ‘definite influence’ within the meaning of the Baars case-
law - it was necessary to answer the question ‘solely’ in the light of the freedom of 
establishment.255  Looking at the Burda and SGI decisions, the exclusive application 
of Article 49 TFEU in those cases where a ‘definite influence’ exists might restrict the 
relevance of Article 63 TFEU. According to Haslehner and Kofler, this would mean 
that the protection under the free movement of capital would be inversely proportional 
to the extent of participation.256 Pursuant to Hemels et al. it is the question whether 
the strict focus on one freedom is in accordance with the purpose of the Treaty.257 
Tippelhofer and Lohmann concluded that the Burda decision might be based on the 
fact that the national rules concern only relationships within a group of companies.258 
 
                                            
248 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 29 et seq.; case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), 
paragraph 165.  
249 Case C-105/07 (Lammers & Van Cleeff), paragraphs 15 to 17.  
250 Case C-105/07 (Lammers & Van Cleeff), paragraph 35.  
251 Case C-284/06 (Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH), June 26, 2008. 
252 Case C-284/06 (Burda), paragraph 71.  
253 Case C-284/06 (Burda), paragraphs 72 to 75.  
254 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraph 29. 
255 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraphs 36, 37.  
256 Haslehner, Das Konkurrenzverhältnis der Europäischen Grundfreiheiten in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu 
den direkten Steuern, Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 565 et seq. (575); see in this respect also Sedemund, 
Betriebs-Berater 2008, page 1830, 1831; Rehm / Nagler, Anmerkungen zum nachstehenden EuGH-Urteil 
“Burda” S. 515, Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 511 et seq.  
257 Hemels et al., Freedom of Establishment or Free Movement of Capital: Is There an Order of Priority? 
Conflicting Visions of National Courts and the ECJ, EC Tax Review 2010, page 19 et seq. (31).    
258 Tippelhofer / Lohmann, Niederlassungsfreiheit vs. Kapitalverkehrsfreiheit: Analyse der jüngeren 
Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu den direkten Steuern, Zugleich Anmerkungen zum EuGH-Urteil in der 
Rechtssache Burda (C-284/06), Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 857 et seq. (862).  
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However, in order to complete the picture it is important to have a look at the Glaxo 
Wellcome case, too.259 The case itself deals with the restructuring of the German part 
of the Glaxo Wellcome group. Here, the ECJ stated that the relevant German 
legislation did not depend on the size of the holdings acquired and was not limited to 
situations in which the shareholder could exercise definite influence on the decisions 
of the company concerned and determine its activities.260 Furthermore, the ECJ 
concluded that “(…) the purpose of the legislation (…) is to prevent resident 
shareholders from obtaining an undue tax advantage directly through the sales of 
shares with the sole objective of obtaining that advantage, and not with the objective 
of exercising the freedom of establishment or as a result of exercising that freedom, it 
must be held that the free movement of capital aspect of that legislation prevails over 
that of the freedom of establishment.”261 Consistently, the ECJ proceeded with an 
exclusive examination of the free movement of capital.262 In my opinion, the case is 
important, because it confirms that the ECJ strictly focuses on the purpose of the 
legislation and - even though the freedom of establishment might theoretically be 
relevant as well - the Court did not give preference to Article 49 of the TFEU just 
because of the fact that the case deals with a group structure in which the 
requirement of a ‘definite influence’ is existent. In other words, the purpose of the 
legislation remains the decisive element for the decision whether Article 49 or Article 
63 of the TFEU will be examined.263  
 
In my opinion, the conclusions which can be drawn from the case law outlined above 
are the following: 
 
- The purpose of the national legislation must be considered for the decision which 
of the basic freedoms is affected. This is the most decisive element.  
 
- If the purpose of the legislation is the application to investments which confer a 
definite influence over a company’s decisions, it is the freedom of establishment 
which is to be exclusively examined. The purpose of the legislation can be 
identified not only by quantitative elements (e.g. the percentage of participation), 
but also by qualitative elements (e.g. the collaboration of shareholders to achieve 
a definite influence).264 
 
- If the purpose of the legislation is the general application to all types of portfolio 
and entrepreneurial investments, the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital can, in principle, both be affected.  
 
- However, if the actual investment confers definite influence over a company’s 
decisions and the purpose of the legislation is linked to the objective of exercising 
the freedom of establishment, the ECJ gives preference to the freedom of 
                                            
259 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt München II), September 17, 2009. 
260 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraph 49.  
261 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraph 50. 
262 Case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraphs 51, 52. 
263 However, it is apparent that the question whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement of 
capital applies remains a relatively complex question and may lead to confusion on the level of national courts. 
See with respect to the differing approaches of national courts Den Boer, Freedom of Establishment versus Free 
Movement of Capital: Ongoing Confusion at the ECJ and in the National Courts?, European Taxation 2010, 
page 250 et seq. and Hemels et al., Freedom of Establishment or Free Movement of Capital: Is There an Order of 
Priority? Conflicting Visions of National Courts and the ECJ, EC Tax Review 2010, page 19 et seq.    
264 See also Köhler / Tippelhofer, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 645 et seq. (649).  
   
 
involved.248 I will come back to the aspects which are of importance in case of 
investments in non-member states below. In the Lammers & Van Cleeff case - where 
no third countries were involved - the ECJ first examined the freedom of 
establishment.249 After the conclusion that the national measure resulted in a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment which cannot be justified, the ECJ did not 
see the necessity to examine, in addition, whether the Treaty provisions on the free 
movement of capital also preclude the respective legislation.250  
 
In the Burda decision251 the ECJ concluded that the respective national legislation 
may fall within the purview both of the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital, because the legislation does not depend on the extent of the 
holding which the company receiving the dividend has in the company paying it.252 
However, in the following the ECJ determined an ‘exclusive’ application of the 
freedom of establishment and concluded that a restriction of the free movement of 
capital is just an unavoidable consequence of an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment.253 That means the fact that the company had a 50 percent 
participation resulted in an exclusive application of Article 49 of the TFEU, even 
though the purpose of the legislation is the general application to portfolio and 
entrepreneurial investments. The situation in the SGI case was very similar: the 
legislation in question was not dependent on the percentage of shareholding.254 So, 
theoretically, both Article 49 and Article 63 of the TFEU could have been relevant. 
However, also in this case the ECJ decided that - based on the fact that the 
companies involved had a ‘definite influence’ within the meaning of the Baars case-
law - it was necessary to answer the question ‘solely’ in the light of the freedom of 
establishment.255  Looking at the Burda and SGI decisions, the exclusive application 
of Article 49 TFEU in those cases where a ‘definite influence’ exists might restrict the 
relevance of Article 63 TFEU. According to Haslehner and Kofler, this would mean 
that the protection under the free movement of capital would be inversely proportional 
to the extent of participation.256 Pursuant to Hemels et al. it is the question whether 
the strict focus on one freedom is in accordance with the purpose of the Treaty.257 
Tippelhofer and Lohmann concluded that the Burda decision might be based on the 
fact that the national rules concern only relationships within a group of companies.258 
 
                                            
248 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 29 et seq.; case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), 
paragraph 165.  
249 Case C-105/07 (Lammers & Van Cleeff), paragraphs 15 to 17.  
250 Case C-105/07 (Lammers & Van Cleeff), paragraph 35.  
251 Case C-284/06 (Finanzamt Hamburg-Am Tierpark v Burda GmbH), June 26, 2008. 
252 Case C-284/06 (Burda), paragraph 71.  
253 Case C-284/06 (Burda), paragraphs 72 to 75.  
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255 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraphs 36, 37.  
256 Haslehner, Das Konkurrenzverhältnis der Europäischen Grundfreiheiten in der Rechtsprechung des EuGH zu 
den direkten Steuern, Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 565 et seq. (575); see in this respect also Sedemund, 
Betriebs-Berater 2008, page 1830, 1831; Rehm / Nagler, Anmerkungen zum nachstehenden EuGH-Urteil 
“Burda” S. 515, Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 511 et seq.  
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Conflicting Visions of National Courts and the ECJ, EC Tax Review 2010, page 19 et seq. (31).    
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Rechtssache Burda (C-284/06), Internationales Steuerrecht 2008, page 857 et seq. (862).  
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4.2.7.3. The Freedom to Provide Services vs. the Free Movement of Capital 
 
The difference between the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital can be minor and according to the “older” case law of the ECJ it seems as if 
both freedoms can be applied simultaneously. In Svensson269 the Court stated that 
“(i)t should also be noted that by virtue of Article 61 (2) of the Treaty “the liberalization 
of banking and insurance services connected with movements of capital shall be 
effected in step with the progressive liberalization of movement of capital.” Since 
transactions such as building loans provided by banks constitute services within the 
meaning of Article 59 of the EC Treaty, it is also necessary to ascertain whether the 
rule referred to by the national court is compatible with the Treaty provisions on 
freedom to provide services.”270 Furthermore, in Safir 271 the Court concluded that the 
freedom to provide services precludes the application of legislation in a Member 
State which provides for different tax regimes for capital life assurance policies, 
depending upon whether they are taken out with companies established in that 
Member State or with companies established elsewhere. Interestingly, the Court did 
not even see any necessity to verify whether the free movement of capital could be 
affected simultaneously after coming to the conclusion that an unjustified violation of 
the freedom to provide services existed.272 The same was true in the subsequent 
Skandia case.273 However, it seems that in situations in which the purpose of a 
transfer could not be determined the ECJ considered the free movement of capital to 
be applicable.274 
 
                                            
269 Case C-484/93 (Peter Svensson et Lena Gustavsson v Ministre du Logement et de l’Urbanisme), November 
14, 1995, ECR 1995 page I-3955.  
270 Case C-484/93 (Svensson and Gustavsson), paragraph 11.  
271 Case C-118/96 (Jessica Safir v Skattemyndigheten I Dalarnas Län, formerly Skattemyndigheten I 
Kopparbergs Län), April 28, 1998, ECR 1998 page I-01897.  
272 Case C-118/96 (Safir), paragraph 35; according to Cordewener nothing is included in the decision which 
indicates than one of the basic freedoms prevails over the other, or which gives exclusivity to one of the basic 
freedoms in question (Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, page 585); see in 
this respect also Toifl, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 1998 page 261; see the detailed verification of 
Advocate General Tesauro, Opinion of the Advocate General (case C-118/96, Safir), September 23, 1997, 
paragraphs 8-19. Advocate General Tesauro outlined that “(i)t is clear from an examination of the rules 
governing the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, their place in the Treaty and a 
careful reading of all the relevant case-law that the provisions of Article 59 et seq., on the one hand, and of 
Article 73b et seq., on the other, are not intended to apply cumulatively and still less indiscriminately, but that 
they govern, at least in principle, different cases: the first require abolition of all restrictions on the free 
provision of services - including financial services - within the Community whereas the second prohibit all 
restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments (...). As a result, the compatibility with Community 
law of the national legislation at issue should - unless it simultaneously hinders both the free provision of 
services and the free movement of capital - be examined under either Article 59 et seq. or under Article 73b et 
seq.” (see the Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro, paragraph 9).   
273 Case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraph 60: “In the light of the foregoing observations, there is no need to assess 
whether the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of persons and capital preclude national legislation 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings.”  
274 Kiemel in Groeben, Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, Article 56, paragraph 22; case C-358/93 and C-416/93 
(Criminal proceedings against Aldo Bordessa and Vicente Mari Mellado and Concepcion Barbero Maestre), 
February 23, 1995, ECR 1995, page I-0361; case C-302/97 (Konle), June 1, 1999, ECR 1999 page I-3101.  
   
 
establishment. In contrast thereto, if the aforementioned link does not exist and 
the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ prevails, the ECJ gives preference to the 
free movement of capital.265 
 
- If the examination of the legislation results in the conclusion that a restriction on 
one of the freedoms exists which cannot be justified, the ECJ refrains from 
additionally examining whether the TFEU provisions on the other freedom also 
preclude the respective legislation. 
 
4.2.7.2. The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
The freedom of establishment requires the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period of time 
whereas the freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity either from within the Member State of primary establishment towards the 
recipient in another Member State or with a temporary connection to the Member 
State of the recipient. The investment in a service company in another Member State, 
for example, should therefore - if all the aforementioned requirements are fulfilled - 
come within the scope of the freedom of establishment but not at the same time 
within the scope of the freedom to provide services. The reason is that in a typical 
situation the economic activity is pursued through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State. On the other hand, the services supplied by the company to other 
related or unrelated recipients situated in other Member States will come within the 
scope of the freedom to provide services since they will not be pursued through a 
fixed establishment in the Member State of the recipient of the services (which could 
be a “third” Member State or even the Member State of the investor). In case of a 
service company it is therefore likely that the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services are both applicable, but not necessarily to the same 
entity and not in the same “direction.” In those cases in which both freedoms are 
affected simultaneously, one might be tempted to conclude that Article 57 (1) of the 
TFEU gives preference to the right of establishment. However, the more recent case 
law does not support such a conclusion. In the Fidium Finanz decision266 the Court 
clearly stated that Article 57 (1) of the TFEU relates to the definition of the notion of 
‘services’ and does not establish any order of priority between the freedom to provide 
services and the other fundamental freedoms. Pursuant to the Court, the notion of 
‘services’ covers services which are not governed by other freedoms, in order to 
ensure that all economic activity falls within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms.267 In the Cadbury Schweppes case the ECJ concluded that if CFC 
legislation “(...) has restrictive effects on the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital, such effects are an unavoidable consequence of any restriction 
on freedom of establishment and do not justify, in any event, an independent 
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4.2.7.3. The Freedom to Provide Services vs. the Free Movement of Capital 
 
The difference between the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital can be minor and according to the “older” case law of the ECJ it seems as if 
both freedoms can be applied simultaneously. In Svensson269 the Court stated that 
“(i)t should also be noted that by virtue of Article 61 (2) of the Treaty “the liberalization 
of banking and insurance services connected with movements of capital shall be 
effected in step with the progressive liberalization of movement of capital.” Since 
transactions such as building loans provided by banks constitute services within the 
meaning of Article 59 of the EC Treaty, it is also necessary to ascertain whether the 
rule referred to by the national court is compatible with the Treaty provisions on 
freedom to provide services.”270 Furthermore, in Safir 271 the Court concluded that the 
freedom to provide services precludes the application of legislation in a Member 
State which provides for different tax regimes for capital life assurance policies, 
depending upon whether they are taken out with companies established in that 
Member State or with companies established elsewhere. Interestingly, the Court did 
not even see any necessity to verify whether the free movement of capital could be 
affected simultaneously after coming to the conclusion that an unjustified violation of 
the freedom to provide services existed.272 The same was true in the subsequent 
Skandia case.273 However, it seems that in situations in which the purpose of a 
transfer could not be determined the ECJ considered the free movement of capital to 
be applicable.274 
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14, 1995, ECR 1995 page I-3955.  
270 Case C-484/93 (Svensson and Gustavsson), paragraph 11.  
271 Case C-118/96 (Jessica Safir v Skattemyndigheten I Dalarnas Län, formerly Skattemyndigheten I 
Kopparbergs Län), April 28, 1998, ECR 1998 page I-01897.  
272 Case C-118/96 (Safir), paragraph 35; according to Cordewener nothing is included in the decision which 
indicates than one of the basic freedoms prevails over the other, or which gives exclusivity to one of the basic 
freedoms in question (Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, page 585); see in 
this respect also Toifl, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 1998 page 261; see the detailed verification of 
Advocate General Tesauro, Opinion of the Advocate General (case C-118/96, Safir), September 23, 1997, 
paragraphs 8-19. Advocate General Tesauro outlined that “(i)t is clear from an examination of the rules 
governing the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital, their place in the Treaty and a 
careful reading of all the relevant case-law that the provisions of Article 59 et seq., on the one hand, and of 
Article 73b et seq., on the other, are not intended to apply cumulatively and still less indiscriminately, but that 
they govern, at least in principle, different cases: the first require abolition of all restrictions on the free 
provision of services - including financial services - within the Community whereas the second prohibit all 
restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments (...). As a result, the compatibility with Community 
law of the national legislation at issue should - unless it simultaneously hinders both the free provision of 
services and the free movement of capital - be examined under either Article 59 et seq. or under Article 73b et 
seq.” (see the Opinion of the Advocate General Tesauro, paragraph 9).   
273 Case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraph 60: “In the light of the foregoing observations, there is no need to assess 
whether the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of persons and capital preclude national legislation 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings.”  
274 Kiemel in Groeben, Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, Article 56, paragraph 22; case C-358/93 and C-416/93 
(Criminal proceedings against Aldo Bordessa and Vicente Mari Mellado and Concepcion Barbero Maestre), 
February 23, 1995, ECR 1995, page I-0361; case C-302/97 (Konle), June 1, 1999, ECR 1999 page I-3101.  
   
 
establishment. In contrast thereto, if the aforementioned link does not exist and 
the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ prevails, the ECJ gives preference to the 
free movement of capital.265 
 
- If the examination of the legislation results in the conclusion that a restriction on 
one of the freedoms exists which cannot be justified, the ECJ refrains from 
additionally examining whether the TFEU provisions on the other freedom also 
preclude the respective legislation. 
 
4.2.7.2. The Freedom of Establishment vs. the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
The freedom of establishment requires the actual pursuit of an economic activity 
through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period of time 
whereas the freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity either from within the Member State of primary establishment towards the 
recipient in another Member State or with a temporary connection to the Member 
State of the recipient. The investment in a service company in another Member State, 
for example, should therefore - if all the aforementioned requirements are fulfilled - 
come within the scope of the freedom of establishment but not at the same time 
within the scope of the freedom to provide services. The reason is that in a typical 
situation the economic activity is pursued through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State. On the other hand, the services supplied by the company to other 
related or unrelated recipients situated in other Member States will come within the 
scope of the freedom to provide services since they will not be pursued through a 
fixed establishment in the Member State of the recipient of the services (which could 
be a “third” Member State or even the Member State of the investor). In case of a 
service company it is therefore likely that the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services are both applicable, but not necessarily to the same 
entity and not in the same “direction.” In those cases in which both freedoms are 
affected simultaneously, one might be tempted to conclude that Article 57 (1) of the 
TFEU gives preference to the right of establishment. However, the more recent case 
law does not support such a conclusion. In the Fidium Finanz decision266 the Court 
clearly stated that Article 57 (1) of the TFEU relates to the definition of the notion of 
‘services’ and does not establish any order of priority between the freedom to provide 
services and the other fundamental freedoms. Pursuant to the Court, the notion of 
‘services’ covers services which are not governed by other freedoms, in order to 
ensure that all economic activity falls within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms.267 In the Cadbury Schweppes case the ECJ concluded that if CFC 
legislation “(...) has restrictive effects on the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital, such effects are an unavoidable consequence of any restriction 
on freedom of establishment and do not justify, in any event, an independent 
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is apparent that, in the circumstances of the main case, the predominant 
consideration is freedom to provide services rather than free movement of capital. 
Since the rules in dispute impede access to the German financial market for 
companies established in non-member countries, they affect primarily the freedom to 
provide services. Given that the restrictive effects of those rules on the free 
movement of capital are merely an inevitable consequence of the restriction imposed 
on the provision of services, it is not necessary to consider whether the rules are 
compatible with Article 56 et seq.”284 However, since Fidium Finanz was established 
in Switzerland, a non-member country, the Court concluded that the latter company 
could not rely on the freedom to provide services.285 Even under these circumstances 
the Court did not see any necessity for a further - alternative - examination of the free 
movement of capital. Overall, it seems that - similar to the situation described in the 
context of the freedom of establishment vs. the free movement of capital - the 
purpose of the legislation is decisive. If the national legislation clearly focuses on 
services, e.g. the supervision of services, there is no room for any (additional) 
examination of the free movement of capital. On the other hand, one should also 
conclude from this jurisprudence that national legislation which is foremost directed 
towards the investment (as such) - and not the services provided by the investment 
(e.g. the respective legal entity) - the prevailing freedom should be the free 
movement of capital and not the freedom to provide services. 
 
4.2.8. The Basic Freedoms and the Investment in Non-Member States 
 
Whereas the scope of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services is limited to movements and transactions within the EU, Article 63 et seq. of 
the TFEU prohibits all restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries.286 In this 
respect, it is important to note that not only nationals of a Member State or 
companies established in a Member State can claim the free movement of capital 
and payments but also nationals and companies from outside the EU.287 The 
extension to capital transfers to and from non-member states gives Article 63 et seq. 
of the TFEU a somehow unique position within the basic freedoms.288 The 
importance of this position becomes even more obvious by the fact that the ECJ 
considers the free movement of capital - as outlined above - not necessarily to be 
secondary in relation to the other basic freedoms. It has to be noted, however, that 
Article 64 (1) of the TFEU provides for a “standstill clause” (“grandfather clause”) 
which allows the Member States to apply restrictive legislation in relation to third 
countries which already existed on 31st of December 1993. Thus, if a Member State 
has introduced such legislation before the respective date and has not substantially 
changed that legislation afterwards, there is still the possibility to apply such 
restrictive legislation to investments in non-member states. I will come back to this 
clause in the context of the justifications for a restriction on the basic freedoms. 
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285 Case C-452/04 (Fidium Finanz), paragraph 50. 
286 The erga-omnes effect of Article 56 et seq. (ex Article 73 b et seq.) to non-member states is applicable as of 
1st January 1994.  
287 See also Kiemel in Groeben, Kommentar zum EU/EG Vertrag, Article 56, paragraph 26; Seidel, Recht und 
Verfassung des Kapitalmarktes, page 772.  
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In the more recent Fidium Finanz decision,275 the ECJ went into more detail of the 
question of a simultaneous application of the two freedoms. Fidium Finanz AG, a 
Swiss company, granted credits mainly to German citizens resident in Germany who 
met certain criteria.276 The credits were offered via an internet site operated from 
Switzerland and credit intermediaries operating in Germany. According to the 
national court, the intermediaries neither acted as representatives nor as authorised 
agents of Fidium Finanz, but concluded contracts on behalf of that company and 
were paid commissions.277 The German Bundesanstalt für Kreditwesen prohibited 
Fidium Finanz from carrying on lending activities on a commercial basis since the 
latter did not fulfil the requirements of the German Kreditwesengesetz (KWG).278 In 
essence, the national court submitted the question to the ECJ whether the granting of 
commercial loans through a company established in a non-member country to 
residents of a Member State might come within the scope of the free movement of 
capital and / or the freedom to provide services.279 In this respect, the ECJ stated that 
“(w)here a national measure relates to the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of capital at the same time, it is necessary to consider to what extent the 
exercise of those fundamental liberties is affected and whether, in the circumstances 
of the main proceedings, one of those prevail over the other (…). The Court will in 
principle examine the measure in dispute in relation to only one of those two 
freedoms if it appears, in the circumstances of the case, that one of them is entirely 
secondary in relation to the other and may be considered together with it (…).”280 
Further, the ECJ concluded that “(…) the activity of granting credit on a commercial 
basis concerns, in principle, both the freedom to provide services within the meaning 
of Article 49 EC et seq. and the free movement of capital within the meaning of 
Article 56 EC et seq.” 281 Also in this case, the Court verified the purpose of the 
(German) rules and held that “(t)he purpose (…) is to supervise the provision of such 
services and to authorise such provision only for undertakings which guarantee to 
conduct such transactions properly.”282 And “(t)he rules in dispute prevent economic 
operators which do not have the qualities required by the KWG from having access to 
the German financial market. It is settled case law that all measures which prohibit, 
impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services must 
be regarded as restrictions on that freedom.”283 With respect to a possible restriction 
on the free movement of capital, the ECJ stated that this was “(…) merely an 
unavoidable consequence of the restriction on the freedom to provide services (…). It 
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is apparent that, in the circumstances of the main case, the predominant 
consideration is freedom to provide services rather than free movement of capital. 
Since the rules in dispute impede access to the German financial market for 
companies established in non-member countries, they affect primarily the freedom to 
provide services. Given that the restrictive effects of those rules on the free 
movement of capital are merely an inevitable consequence of the restriction imposed 
on the provision of services, it is not necessary to consider whether the rules are 
compatible with Article 56 et seq.”284 However, since Fidium Finanz was established 
in Switzerland, a non-member country, the Court concluded that the latter company 
could not rely on the freedom to provide services.285 Even under these circumstances 
the Court did not see any necessity for a further - alternative - examination of the free 
movement of capital. Overall, it seems that - similar to the situation described in the 
context of the freedom of establishment vs. the free movement of capital - the 
purpose of the legislation is decisive. If the national legislation clearly focuses on 
services, e.g. the supervision of services, there is no room for any (additional) 
examination of the free movement of capital. On the other hand, one should also 
conclude from this jurisprudence that national legislation which is foremost directed 
towards the investment (as such) - and not the services provided by the investment 
(e.g. the respective legal entity) - the prevailing freedom should be the free 
movement of capital and not the freedom to provide services. 
 
4.2.8. The Basic Freedoms and the Investment in Non-Member States 
 
Whereas the scope of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services is limited to movements and transactions within the EU, Article 63 et seq. of 
the TFEU prohibits all restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments 
between Member States and between Member States and third countries.286 In this 
respect, it is important to note that not only nationals of a Member State or 
companies established in a Member State can claim the free movement of capital 
and payments but also nationals and companies from outside the EU.287 The 
extension to capital transfers to and from non-member states gives Article 63 et seq. 
of the TFEU a somehow unique position within the basic freedoms.288 The 
importance of this position becomes even more obvious by the fact that the ECJ 
considers the free movement of capital - as outlined above - not necessarily to be 
secondary in relation to the other basic freedoms. It has to be noted, however, that 
Article 64 (1) of the TFEU provides for a “standstill clause” (“grandfather clause”) 
which allows the Member States to apply restrictive legislation in relation to third 
countries which already existed on 31st of December 1993. Thus, if a Member State 
has introduced such legislation before the respective date and has not substantially 
changed that legislation afterwards, there is still the possibility to apply such 
restrictive legislation to investments in non-member states. I will come back to this 
clause in the context of the justifications for a restriction on the basic freedoms. 
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In the more recent Fidium Finanz decision,275 the ECJ went into more detail of the 
question of a simultaneous application of the two freedoms. Fidium Finanz AG, a 
Swiss company, granted credits mainly to German citizens resident in Germany who 
met certain criteria.276 The credits were offered via an internet site operated from 
Switzerland and credit intermediaries operating in Germany. According to the 
national court, the intermediaries neither acted as representatives nor as authorised 
agents of Fidium Finanz, but concluded contracts on behalf of that company and 
were paid commissions.277 The German Bundesanstalt für Kreditwesen prohibited 
Fidium Finanz from carrying on lending activities on a commercial basis since the 
latter did not fulfil the requirements of the German Kreditwesengesetz (KWG).278 In 
essence, the national court submitted the question to the ECJ whether the granting of 
commercial loans through a company established in a non-member country to 
residents of a Member State might come within the scope of the free movement of 
capital and / or the freedom to provide services.279 In this respect, the ECJ stated that 
“(w)here a national measure relates to the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of capital at the same time, it is necessary to consider to what extent the 
exercise of those fundamental liberties is affected and whether, in the circumstances 
of the main proceedings, one of those prevail over the other (…). The Court will in 
principle examine the measure in dispute in relation to only one of those two 
freedoms if it appears, in the circumstances of the case, that one of them is entirely 
secondary in relation to the other and may be considered together with it (…).”280 
Further, the ECJ concluded that “(…) the activity of granting credit on a commercial 
basis concerns, in principle, both the freedom to provide services within the meaning 
of Article 49 EC et seq. and the free movement of capital within the meaning of 
Article 56 EC et seq.” 281 Also in this case, the Court verified the purpose of the 
(German) rules and held that “(t)he purpose (…) is to supervise the provision of such 
services and to authorise such provision only for undertakings which guarantee to 
conduct such transactions properly.”282 And “(t)he rules in dispute prevent economic 
operators which do not have the qualities required by the KWG from having access to 
the German financial market. It is settled case law that all measures which prohibit, 
impede or render less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide services must 
be regarded as restrictions on that freedom.”283 With respect to a possible restriction 
on the free movement of capital, the ECJ stated that this was “(…) merely an 
unavoidable consequence of the restriction on the freedom to provide services (…). It 
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element for the decision whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement 
of capital will be examined. Consequently, if the national legislation is not linked to 
the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment and the ‘free movement of 
capital aspect’ prevails, there will be an exclusive examination of the free movement 
of capital.295  
 
4.2.9. The Abuse of the Basic Freedoms 
 
It is quite obvious that the basic freedoms confer important rights to individuals and 
entities with respect to cross-border investments and services. It is therefore equally 
obvious that situations exist in which the basic freedoms are abusively invoked just 
for the purpose of taking advantage of these rights without being entitled to do so. 
The Member States may therefore apply rules which prevent the circumvention of 
national legislation by abusively invoking EU law. However, the case law of the ECJ 
clearly shows that, for example, the abuse of the freedom of establishment must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and cannot be generalised. In the Centros 
case296 the ECJ stated that “(i)t is true that according to the case-law of the Court a 
Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals 
from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to 
circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community Law.(...) However, 
although, in such circumstances, the national courts may, case by case, take account 
- on the basis of objective evidence - of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of 
the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law on which they seek to rely, they must nevertheless 
assess such conduct in the light of the objectives pursued by those provisions.(...) 
(T)he fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company 
chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the 
least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, 
constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.” 297 
 
In the X and Y case the ECJ pointed out that a national provision which “(...) excludes 
categorically and generally any (...) share transfer from the benefit of deferral of tax, 
does not allow national courts to make such a case-by-case analysis taking account 
of the particular features of each case.”298 Furthermore, and very important, “(...) the 
criterion on the basis of which the national provision excludes (...) share transfers 
from that tax advantage - namely the fact that the transfer is to a company 
established under the legislation of another Member State or a branch set up in 
Sweden by such a company - relates to the exercise of the freedom of establishment 
guaranteed by the Treaty and cannot, therefore, in itself, constitute an abuse of the 
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In principle, the free movement of capital can be invoked (i) if it is the only freedom 
which is affected, (ii) if it prevails of another basic freedom or (iii) if it can be applied 
simultaneously. However, if the purpose of the national legislation is the application 
to investments which confer a definite influence over a company’s decisions and the 
legislation is linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment, the 
ECJ examines the freedom of establishment and not, simultaneously, the free 
movement of capital. The same is true if the national legislation is intended to be 
applied to services, e.g. the supervision of services. Here, the ECJ gives preference 
to the freedom to provide services without any alternative examination of the free 
movement of capital. In my opinion, the more recent case law of the ECJ - as 
outlined above - shows that the free movement of capital plays a less important role 
than it could be understood from the mere wording of the TFEU. According to Smit, 
the categorical exclusion of a substantial number of third country investments from 
the scope of the free movement of capital makes it impossible to fully serve the 
underlying goal of the latter freedom, namely the achievement of an optimal 
geographical distribution of economic activity289 and therefore the improving of global 
welfare.290 A number of authors consider the fact that the ECJ creates a framework of 
protection which is inversely proportional to the size of the investment to be critical.291 
Pursuant to Wimpissinger, the scope of the freedom of establishment is broader than 
the scope of the free movement of capital. The freedom of establishment, therefore, 
generally includes the free movement of capital with the consequence that if the 
freedom of establishment cannot be applicable only because of the third country 
context, the narrower freedom should be applicable.292 Panayi went in the same 
direction and raised the (rhetorical) question whether - in case two freedoms were 
potentially breached but only one was inapplicable - it would not be logical for the 
ECJ to proceed to examine whether or not the other freedom was affected.293 Stahl 
concluded that if a national measure is consistent with one basic freedom, it is 
nevertheless necessary to proceed and examine the national measure against the 
other applicable basic freedom.294 However, this is not necessarily the case - taking 
into account the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Of course, this may have important 
consequences for the investments in non-member states and may “close the door” 
for the treaty protection under the free movement of capital. On the other hand, what 
is clear from the more recent case law - and in particular from the Glaxo Wellcome 
case - is the fact that the purpose of the national legislation remains the decisive 
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element for the decision whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement 
of capital will be examined. Consequently, if the national legislation is not linked to 
the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment and the ‘free movement of 
capital aspect’ prevails, there will be an exclusive examination of the free movement 
of capital.295  
 
4.2.9. The Abuse of the Basic Freedoms 
 
It is quite obvious that the basic freedoms confer important rights to individuals and 
entities with respect to cross-border investments and services. It is therefore equally 
obvious that situations exist in which the basic freedoms are abusively invoked just 
for the purpose of taking advantage of these rights without being entitled to do so. 
The Member States may therefore apply rules which prevent the circumvention of 
national legislation by abusively invoking EU law. However, the case law of the ECJ 
clearly shows that, for example, the abuse of the freedom of establishment must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and cannot be generalised. In the Centros 
case296 the ECJ stated that “(i)t is true that according to the case-law of the Court a 
Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals 
from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to 
circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community Law.(...) However, 
although, in such circumstances, the national courts may, case by case, take account 
- on the basis of objective evidence - of abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of 
the persons concerned in order, where appropriate, to deny them the benefit of the 
provisions of Community law on which they seek to rely, they must nevertheless 
assess such conduct in the light of the objectives pursued by those provisions.(...) 
(T)he fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company 
chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the 
least restrictive and to set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, 
constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.” 297 
 
In the X and Y case the ECJ pointed out that a national provision which “(...) excludes 
categorically and generally any (...) share transfer from the benefit of deferral of tax, 
does not allow national courts to make such a case-by-case analysis taking account 
of the particular features of each case.”298 Furthermore, and very important, “(...) the 
criterion on the basis of which the national provision excludes (...) share transfers 
from that tax advantage - namely the fact that the transfer is to a company 
established under the legislation of another Member State or a branch set up in 
Sweden by such a company - relates to the exercise of the freedom of establishment 
guaranteed by the Treaty and cannot, therefore, in itself, constitute an abuse of the 
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In principle, the free movement of capital can be invoked (i) if it is the only freedom 
which is affected, (ii) if it prevails of another basic freedom or (iii) if it can be applied 
simultaneously. However, if the purpose of the national legislation is the application 
to investments which confer a definite influence over a company’s decisions and the 
legislation is linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment, the 
ECJ examines the freedom of establishment and not, simultaneously, the free 
movement of capital. The same is true if the national legislation is intended to be 
applied to services, e.g. the supervision of services. Here, the ECJ gives preference 
to the freedom to provide services without any alternative examination of the free 
movement of capital. In my opinion, the more recent case law of the ECJ - as 
outlined above - shows that the free movement of capital plays a less important role 
than it could be understood from the mere wording of the TFEU. According to Smit, 
the categorical exclusion of a substantial number of third country investments from 
the scope of the free movement of capital makes it impossible to fully serve the 
underlying goal of the latter freedom, namely the achievement of an optimal 
geographical distribution of economic activity289 and therefore the improving of global 
welfare.290 A number of authors consider the fact that the ECJ creates a framework of 
protection which is inversely proportional to the size of the investment to be critical.291 
Pursuant to Wimpissinger, the scope of the freedom of establishment is broader than 
the scope of the free movement of capital. The freedom of establishment, therefore, 
generally includes the free movement of capital with the consequence that if the 
freedom of establishment cannot be applicable only because of the third country 
context, the narrower freedom should be applicable.292 Panayi went in the same 
direction and raised the (rhetorical) question whether - in case two freedoms were 
potentially breached but only one was inapplicable - it would not be logical for the 
ECJ to proceed to examine whether or not the other freedom was affected.293 Stahl 
concluded that if a national measure is consistent with one basic freedom, it is 
nevertheless necessary to proceed and examine the national measure against the 
other applicable basic freedom.294 However, this is not necessarily the case - taking 
into account the jurisprudence of the ECJ. Of course, this may have important 
consequences for the investments in non-member states and may “close the door” 
for the treaty protection under the free movement of capital. On the other hand, what 
is clear from the more recent case law - and in particular from the Glaxo Wellcome 
case - is the fact that the purpose of the national legislation remains the decisive 
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case.305 It is important to note that, with respect to the second criterion, the Court 
held in the Halifax case that the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the 
economic activity carried out may have some explanations other than the mere 
attainment of tax advantages.306 In order to determine the real substance and 
significance of the transactions concerned, the national court “(…) may take account 
of the purely artificial nature of those transactions and the links of a legal, economic 
and/or personal nature between the operators involved in the scheme for reduction of 
the tax burden.”307 This was basically confirmed in the Part Service decision, but the 
Court added that “(…) those aspects being such as to demonstrate that the accrual of 
a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim pursued, notwithstanding the possible 
existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, 
organisation or guarantee considerations.”308 In my opinion, the second part of the 
latter sentence may lead to some confusion regarding the question whether an 
abusive practice exists despite the fact that the transactions follow economic 
objectives. In my opinion, it is important to see the statement of the ECJ in the 
context of the case: in Part Service, a structure was established to separate leasing 
income into different components in order to achieve, at least for part of the 
components, an exemption from VAT (otherwise the total amount of leasing income 
would have been subject to VAT). The separation of the components and the 
allocation to two different entities may have economic and other (non tax-related) 
reasons - and this was put forward by the taxpayer.309 However, it seems that the 
structure has to be assessed in its totality and that the non-tax related reasons were 
of minor significance, compared to the loss of VAT for the Member State which was 
achieved by the structure. So, the Part Service case made it clear that it is not 
enough “to have some explanations other than the mere attainment of tax 
advantages”, but the explanations have to be of some relative significance.  
 
The conclusions derived from the case law of the ECJ in the field of indirect taxation 
are, in principle, of relevance for cases dealing with direct taxation as well.310 In the 
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right of establishment.”299 In the Lasteyrie du Saillant case the Court held that “(...) a 
national measure should not presume, as in the present case, that the freedom of 
establishment under Community law is being exercised fraudulently, although it could 
provide for the possibility of the tax authorities demonstrating on a case-by-case 
basis there is actual tax evasion or avoidance.”300 
 
It is also clear from the case law of the ECJ that the reasons for the establishment in 
another Member State are, in principle, irrelevant - with the exception of fraud. In the 
Inspire Art case, the Court stated - based on the earlier Centros and Segers 
decisions - that “(...) it is immaterial, having regard to the application of the rules on 
freedom of establishment, that the company was formed in one Member State only 
for the purpose of establishing itself in a second Member State, where its main, or 
indeed entire, business is to be conducted (...). The reasons for which a company 
chooses to be formed in a particular Member State are, save in the case of fraud, 
irrelevant with regard to application of the rules on freedom of establishment (...). The 
Court has also held that the fact that the company was formed in a particular Member 
State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation does 
not constitute abuse even if that company conducts its activities entirely or mainly in 
that second State (...).”301 The jurisprudence of the ECJ was once more confirmed in 
the Cadbury Schweppes case. According to the Court, the fact that an EU national 
“(...) sought to profit from tax advantages in force in a Member State other than his 
State of residence cannot in itself deprive him of the right to rely on the provisions of 
the Treaty.”302 And “(...) it follows that the fact that in this case CS decided to 
establish CSTS and CSTI in the IFSC for the avowed purpose of benefiting from the 
favourable tax regime which that establishment enjoys does not in itself constitute 
abuse.”303 
 
Additional information and guidance may be obtained from the case law of the ECJ in 
the field of indirect taxation. In the Halifax case, the Court stated that, in the context 
of the interpretation of the 6th VAT Directive, an abusive practice can be held to exist 
where: 
 
- the transactions concerned, notwithstanding the formal application of the 
conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the 6th VAT Directive and the 
national legislation transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the 
granting of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions (objective 
element); 
 
- it is apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the 
transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage (subjective element).304 
 
Therefore, both criteria have to be met in order to consider the relevant transaction to 
be an abusive practice. This was later on explicitly confirmed in the Part Service 
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case.305 It is important to note that, with respect to the second criterion, the Court 
held in the Halifax case that the prohibition of abuse is not relevant where the 
economic activity carried out may have some explanations other than the mere 
attainment of tax advantages.306 In order to determine the real substance and 
significance of the transactions concerned, the national court “(…) may take account 
of the purely artificial nature of those transactions and the links of a legal, economic 
and/or personal nature between the operators involved in the scheme for reduction of 
the tax burden.”307 This was basically confirmed in the Part Service decision, but the 
Court added that “(…) those aspects being such as to demonstrate that the accrual of 
a tax advantage constitutes the principal aim pursued, notwithstanding the possible 
existence, in addition, of economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, 
organisation or guarantee considerations.”308 In my opinion, the second part of the 
latter sentence may lead to some confusion regarding the question whether an 
abusive practice exists despite the fact that the transactions follow economic 
objectives. In my opinion, it is important to see the statement of the ECJ in the 
context of the case: in Part Service, a structure was established to separate leasing 
income into different components in order to achieve, at least for part of the 
components, an exemption from VAT (otherwise the total amount of leasing income 
would have been subject to VAT). The separation of the components and the 
allocation to two different entities may have economic and other (non tax-related) 
reasons - and this was put forward by the taxpayer.309 However, it seems that the 
structure has to be assessed in its totality and that the non-tax related reasons were 
of minor significance, compared to the loss of VAT for the Member State which was 
achieved by the structure. So, the Part Service case made it clear that it is not 
enough “to have some explanations other than the mere attainment of tax 
advantages”, but the explanations have to be of some relative significance.  
 
The conclusions derived from the case law of the ECJ in the field of indirect taxation 
are, in principle, of relevance for cases dealing with direct taxation as well.310 In the 
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right of establishment.”299 In the Lasteyrie du Saillant case the Court held that “(...) a 
national measure should not presume, as in the present case, that the freedom of 
establishment under Community law is being exercised fraudulently, although it could 
provide for the possibility of the tax authorities demonstrating on a case-by-case 
basis there is actual tax evasion or avoidance.”300 
 
It is also clear from the case law of the ECJ that the reasons for the establishment in 
another Member State are, in principle, irrelevant - with the exception of fraud. In the 
Inspire Art case, the Court stated - based on the earlier Centros and Segers 
decisions - that “(...) it is immaterial, having regard to the application of the rules on 
freedom of establishment, that the company was formed in one Member State only 
for the purpose of establishing itself in a second Member State, where its main, or 
indeed entire, business is to be conducted (...). The reasons for which a company 
chooses to be formed in a particular Member State are, save in the case of fraud, 
irrelevant with regard to application of the rules on freedom of establishment (...). The 
Court has also held that the fact that the company was formed in a particular Member 
State for the sole purpose of enjoying the benefit of more favourable legislation does 
not constitute abuse even if that company conducts its activities entirely or mainly in 
that second State (...).”301 The jurisprudence of the ECJ was once more confirmed in 
the Cadbury Schweppes case. According to the Court, the fact that an EU national 
“(...) sought to profit from tax advantages in force in a Member State other than his 
State of residence cannot in itself deprive him of the right to rely on the provisions of 
the Treaty.”302 And “(...) it follows that the fact that in this case CS decided to 
establish CSTS and CSTI in the IFSC for the avowed purpose of benefiting from the 
favourable tax regime which that establishment enjoys does not in itself constitute 
abuse.”303 
 
Additional information and guidance may be obtained from the case law of the ECJ in 
the field of indirect taxation. In the Halifax case, the Court stated that, in the context 
of the interpretation of the 6th VAT Directive, an abusive practice can be held to exist 
where: 
 
- the transactions concerned, notwithstanding the formal application of the 
conditions laid down by the relevant provisions of the 6th VAT Directive and the 
national legislation transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the 
granting of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions (objective 
element); 
 
- it is apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the 
transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage (subjective element).304 
 
Therefore, both criteria have to be met in order to consider the relevant transaction to 
be an abusive practice. This was later on explicitly confirmed in the Part Service 
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the basic freedoms may theoretically be justified by reasons which are stipulated in 
the TFEU itself. In addition to these “written” justifications there are justifications 
which are not expressly stipulated in the TFEU but which have to be taken into 
consideration as well. In fact, it seems that in the case law of the ECJ in the field of 
direct taxation the latter justifications play an even more important role than the 
written justifications. In Dassonville the ECJ concluded that a Member State may 
“take measures” but these measures “should be reasonable.”317 In the Cassis de 
Dijon decision the Court made it clear that “(o)bstacles to movement within the 
Community resulting from disparities between the national laws (...) must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as being necessary in 
order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.” 318 After the Cassis de Dijon decision 
it is clear that Member States may protect their domestic legislation under certain 
circumstances and based on “unwritten” justifications (the “Cassis doctrine” or the 
“rule of reason”).319 These justifications recognised under the rule of reason are 
called overriding reasons (or mandatory requirements) of public interest. However, 
such restrictive measures must be appropriate for the protection of the recognised 
public interest and proportionate in relation to the goal pursued.320 This is not the 
case if there are equally effective measures which would be less restrictive.  
 
4.2.10.2. Justifications Stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
 
The justifications expressly stipulated in the TFEU, such as, for example, public 
policy, public security, or public health are usually irrelevant in the field of direct 
taxation.321 However, Article 64 (1) and Article 65 (1) and (3) of the TFEU shall be 
referred to in this context.322 Article 64 (1) of the TFEU allows Member States to 
retain measures which can result in a restriction on the free movement of capital to or 
from third countries involving direct investment - including in real estate - 
establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to 
capital markets.323 This is only true, however, if the national measures already 
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Cadbury Schweppes case, for example, the ECJ explicitly referred to the two-criteria 
approach described in the Halifax case.311 However, it seems that a differentiation is 
nonetheless required between cases dealing with abusive structures in the field of 
indirect taxation and the question of abuse in the field of direct taxation. Pursuant to 
Innamorato, in order to define the subjective element, reference is made - in VAT 
cases - to the objective of the transaction instead of the intentions of the taxpayers 
and, in addition, the ECJ appears to give more weight to the objective element.312 
According to Zalasinski, the conditions are different from the factors of artificiality 
applicable in case of the basic freedoms. The system of VAT confers the entitlement 
to a direct financial transfer from the public sector upon individuals and, therefore, the 
abuse test includes the reference to the intention to obtain a tax advantage. In 
contrast thereto, the basic freedoms are not aimed at granting direct financial 
advantages to taxpayers.313 Pursuant to Vanistendael, the important difference 
between Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes is the fact that in Halifax the ECJ still 
leaves some leeway to the national courts in VAT to decide whether the tax motive is 
‘essential’ compared to some other non-tax explanations. This is not the case in 
Cadbury Schweppes. Here, the ECJ states categorically that when the cross-border 
economic reality of the transactions is established there can be no tax avoidance and 
the goal of achieving the tax advantage has no importance.314 In my opinion, Part 
Service is, in general, in line with these findings: the tax motive was considered to be 
essential whereas the other non-tax related reasons were of minor significance (but 
apparently existent). For this reason, I do not think that the conclusions derived from 
Halifax and the subsequent cases Part Service and Ampliscientifica will have an 
immediate and major impact in the field of direct taxation.315 I will come back to this 
question in chapter 8 when the concrete legislation will be examined.   
 
4.2.10. Justifications for a Restriction on the Basic Freedoms 
 
4.2.10.1. General Aspects 
 
It is clear from the case law of the ECJ that any restriction on the basic freedoms is 
prohibited, even if it is of limited scope or minor importance.316 Such a restriction on 
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the basic freedoms may theoretically be justified by reasons which are stipulated in 
the TFEU itself. In addition to these “written” justifications there are justifications 
which are not expressly stipulated in the TFEU but which have to be taken into 
consideration as well. In fact, it seems that in the case law of the ECJ in the field of 
direct taxation the latter justifications play an even more important role than the 
written justifications. In Dassonville the ECJ concluded that a Member State may 
“take measures” but these measures “should be reasonable.”317 In the Cassis de 
Dijon decision the Court made it clear that “(o)bstacles to movement within the 
Community resulting from disparities between the national laws (...) must be 
accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised as being necessary in 
order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial 
transactions and the defence of the consumer.” 318 After the Cassis de Dijon decision 
it is clear that Member States may protect their domestic legislation under certain 
circumstances and based on “unwritten” justifications (the “Cassis doctrine” or the 
“rule of reason”).319 These justifications recognised under the rule of reason are 
called overriding reasons (or mandatory requirements) of public interest. However, 
such restrictive measures must be appropriate for the protection of the recognised 
public interest and proportionate in relation to the goal pursued.320 This is not the 
case if there are equally effective measures which would be less restrictive.  
 
4.2.10.2. Justifications Stipulated in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union 
 
The justifications expressly stipulated in the TFEU, such as, for example, public 
policy, public security, or public health are usually irrelevant in the field of direct 
taxation.321 However, Article 64 (1) and Article 65 (1) and (3) of the TFEU shall be 
referred to in this context.322 Article 64 (1) of the TFEU allows Member States to 
retain measures which can result in a restriction on the free movement of capital to or 
from third countries involving direct investment - including in real estate - 
establishment, the provision of financial services or the admission of securities to 
capital markets.323 This is only true, however, if the national measures already 
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Cadbury Schweppes case, for example, the ECJ explicitly referred to the two-criteria 
approach described in the Halifax case.311 However, it seems that a differentiation is 
nonetheless required between cases dealing with abusive structures in the field of 
indirect taxation and the question of abuse in the field of direct taxation. Pursuant to 
Innamorato, in order to define the subjective element, reference is made - in VAT 
cases - to the objective of the transaction instead of the intentions of the taxpayers 
and, in addition, the ECJ appears to give more weight to the objective element.312 
According to Zalasinski, the conditions are different from the factors of artificiality 
applicable in case of the basic freedoms. The system of VAT confers the entitlement 
to a direct financial transfer from the public sector upon individuals and, therefore, the 
abuse test includes the reference to the intention to obtain a tax advantage. In 
contrast thereto, the basic freedoms are not aimed at granting direct financial 
advantages to taxpayers.313 Pursuant to Vanistendael, the important difference 
between Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes is the fact that in Halifax the ECJ still 
leaves some leeway to the national courts in VAT to decide whether the tax motive is 
‘essential’ compared to some other non-tax explanations. This is not the case in 
Cadbury Schweppes. Here, the ECJ states categorically that when the cross-border 
economic reality of the transactions is established there can be no tax avoidance and 
the goal of achieving the tax advantage has no importance.314 In my opinion, Part 
Service is, in general, in line with these findings: the tax motive was considered to be 
essential whereas the other non-tax related reasons were of minor significance (but 
apparently existent). For this reason, I do not think that the conclusions derived from 
Halifax and the subsequent cases Part Service and Ampliscientifica will have an 
immediate and major impact in the field of direct taxation.315 I will come back to this 
question in chapter 8 when the concrete legislation will be examined.   
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(the first case dealing with CFC legislation) will be excluded from the examinations 
below and will only be discussed in chapter 8. However, the relatively large number 
of cases and the limited number of possible justifications should provide a general 
basis for the later verifications. 
 
4.2.10.3.1. Justification Based on the Cohesion of the Tax System 
 
The need to safeguard the cohesion of the applicable tax system is typically invoked 
by the Member States as a justification. It was once accepted by the Court in 
Bachmann 331 and the parallel Commission v Belgium case.332 In the Bachmann case 
a link between the deductibility of insurance contributions and the liability to tax sums 
payable by the insurers existed under Belgian law. Pensions, annuities, capital sums 
or surrender values under life insurance contracts were exempt from tax if there was 
no deduction of contributions for tax purposes. On the other hand, the loss of 
revenue resulting from the possible deduction of contributions was offset by the 
subsequent taxation of the payments made by the insurers. In the underlying case, a 
German national employed in Belgium was refused to deduct contributions paid in 
Germany pursuant to sickness and invalidity insurance contracts and a life assurance 
contract concluded prior to his arrival in Belgium.333 According to Belgian law only 
voluntary sickness and invalidity insurance contributions paid to a mutual insurance 
company recognised by Belgium and pension and life insurance contributions paid in 
Belgium were deductible from occupational income.334 The cohesion of the Belgian 
system required the certainty to tax the benefits if the insurance premiums had been 
deducted, which was not the case if the benefits were paid abroad. The Court 
accepted the link between deduction and subsequent taxation as a condition which 
may be justified by the need to preserve the cohesion of the applicable tax system.335 
There are some important elements which can be derived from the existing case law 
and which can be separated:336 
 
a.) The right to tax is waived under a double taxation convention 
 
In the Wielockx decision 337 the consequences of double taxation conventions were 
added to the cohesion argument. With respect to the question of  the tax deduction of 
pension reserves and the subsequent taxation of income from pensions the Court 
pointed out that “(...) the effect of double-taxation conventions which (...) follow the 
OECD model is that the State taxes all pensions received by residents in its territory, 
whatever the State in which the contributions were paid, but, conversely, waives the 
right to tax pensions received abroad even if they derive from contributions paid in its 
territory which it treated as deductible. Fiscal cohesion has not therefore been 
established in relation to one and the same person by a strict correlation between the 
deductibility of contributions and the taxation of pensions but is shifted to another 
level, that of the reciprocity of the rules applicable in the Contracting States. Since 
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existed on 31st of December 1993.324 In other words, if the restrictive national 
measures existed on the aforementioned date, they can be applied without any 
further justification, e.g. under the rule of reason. The ECJ clarified that the national 
measures can even be adopted after 31st of December 1993. A provision which is, in 
substance, identical to the previous legislation (‘substance criterion’), or limited to 
reducing or eliminating an obstacle to the exercise of EU rights and freedoms in the 
earlier legislation (‘rollback criterion’), will be covered by the derogation. By contrast, 
legislation based on an approach which differs from that of the previous measures 
and establishes new procedures cannot be treated as legislation existing on 31st of 
December 1993.325 Pursuant to Smit, the focus should be on the restrictive elements 
of the legislation (and not the legislation as a whole). Thus, if one or more restrictive 
elements are introduced, these elements cannot be regarded as existing restrictions, 
even if the legislation remains, in substance, identical to the previous legislation.326 
From my perspective, it is a logical approach to focus on the imposition of restrictive 
elements instead of the legislation as a whole. However, this means that Article 64 
(1) of the TFEU does not lead to a “strict fossilisation” of the respective legislation.327 
Moreover, Article 65 (1) of the TFEU allows the Member States (i) to apply the 
relevant provisions of their tax laws which distinguish between taxpayers who are not 
in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the 
place where their capital is invested and (ii) to take all requisite measures to prevent 
infringements on national law and regulations.328 This, again, is an important 
stipulation in the TFEU itself which, of course, can be of particular relevance for an 
investment in a company established in a third country. However, it is determined 
that the measures and procedures referred to in Article 65 (1) of the TFEU shall not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free 
movement of capital.329  
 
4.2.10.3. Justifications under the Rule of Reason 
 
The existing case law in the field of direct taxation shows that the justifications which 
were accepted under the rule of reason are rather limited. Arguments of a purely 
budgetary or economic nature, for example, have never been accepted by the Court 
as an overriding reason of public interest.330 In addition, not all of the justifications put 
forward by the Member States are of significance for the study. I will therefore 
concentrate on the examination of those arguments which came up in cases dealing 
with direct taxation and which can theoretically be of relevance in the context of this 
study. However, in order to avoid an overlapping with chapter 8 - where CFC 
legislation and European Union law will be examined - the Cadbury Schweppes case 
                                            
324 Article 64 (1) of the TFEU. In respect of restrictions existing under national law in Estonia and Hungary, the 
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Antennevoorziening Gouda and Others v Commissariaat voor de Media), July 25, 1991, ECR 1991, page I-4007, 
paragraph 11; case C-120/95 (Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives), ECR 1998, page I-1831, 
paragraph 39; case C-158/96 (Kohll v Union des Caisses de Maladie), ECR 1998, page I-1931, paragraph 41.  
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(the first case dealing with CFC legislation) will be excluded from the examinations 
below and will only be discussed in chapter 8. However, the relatively large number 
of cases and the limited number of possible justifications should provide a general 
basis for the later verifications. 
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existed on 31st of December 1993.324 In other words, if the restrictive national 
measures existed on the aforementioned date, they can be applied without any 
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that the measures and procedures referred to in Article 65 (1) of the TFEU shall not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on the free 
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were accepted under the rule of reason are rather limited. Arguments of a purely 
budgetary or economic nature, for example, have never been accepted by the Court 
as an overriding reason of public interest.330 In addition, not all of the justifications put 
forward by the Member States are of significance for the study. I will therefore 
concentrate on the examination of those arguments which came up in cases dealing 
with direct taxation and which can theoretically be of relevance in the context of this 
study. However, in order to avoid an overlapping with chapter 8 - where CFC 
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of the non-identity of taxpayers and taxes, but proceeded with additional verifications. 
The aim of the system in question was identified as the avoidance of double 
taxation348 and there was an explicit link between the tax credit of the shareholder 
and the corporate income taxation of the company.349 Finally, the Court rejected the 
arguments based on the cohesion of the tax system because of the fact that there 
can be measures which are less restrictive in order to achieve the aim pursued.350 In 
order to understand the change in the approach followed by the Court, it is important 
to take into account the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott who obviously 
follows a broader concept of fiscal cohesion.351 The Advocate General outlined that 
“(i)t is unclear whether the criteria ‘one and the same taxpayer’ and ‘one and the 
same tax’ are binding and must both be met, or whether they are only indicators - 
albeit strong ones - of the existence of a direct link between a tax advantage and 
disadvantage.”352 The Advocate General suggested that one could also take the view 
“(…) that the undertaking ultimately pays a kind of advance dividend tax on behalf of 
the shareholder, in so far as it deducts corporation tax on corporate earnings that are 
subsequently distributed as dividends. These considerations suggest that, 
exceptionally, a link justifying the tax cohesion argument may exist if a charge on one 
taxpayer is offset by a relief for another. The preconditions for this are that: the tax is 
levied, if not on the same taxpayer then at least on the same income or the same 
economic process, and the legal configuration of the system ensures that the 
advantage accrues to the one taxpayer only if the disadvantage to the other is real 
and in the same amount. (…) Hence, the argument based on cohesion of the tax 
system does not fail by reason of the fact that the present case relates to two 
taxpayers: the company and the recipient of the dividend.353 Apparently, the Court 
followed the position of the Advocate General, but did not go into detail in this 
respect. The deviation from the previous approach was confirmed in subsequent 
decisions, inter alia with respect to a parent-subsidiary relationship in the Papillon 
case.354 The Court required that a direct link had to be established between the tax 
advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy.355 
However, the strict approach with the criteria ‘one and the same taxpayer’ and ‘one 
and the same tax’ does apparently not exist anymore.356   
 
c.) The direct link between a tax relief and a subsequent taxation (advantage and 
disadvantage) 
 
In the Danner case357 the Finnish tax authorities refused to grant a full deduction for 
pension insurance contributions paid to pension insurance schemes operated by 
German insurance institutions.358 By contrast, contributions paid to institutions in 
Finland were fully deductible. The Finnish (and Danish) Governments argued that the 
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fiscal cohesion is secured by a bilateral convention concluded with another Member 
State, that principle may not be invoked to justify the refusal of a deduction such as 
that in issue.” 338 This was subsequently confirmed in X and Y.339 It is therefore clear 
that a Member State cannot rely on the cohesion argument if it gives away the 
cohesion at the individual taxpayer level in favour of the cohesion at the interstate 
level. 340 This was obviously not considered in the Bachmann case where the tax 
treaty between Belgium and Germany should theoretically lead to a similar outcome. 
The Bachmann decision is therefore limited to situations not covered by a tax treaty, 
or at least not covered by a tax treaty in a manner implying the waiving of cohesion at 
the individual taxpayer level by the two Member States involved.341 
 
b.) The cohesion argument refers to more than one taxpayer and to separate taxes 
 
Whereas in Bachmann and Wielockx only one taxpayer was concerned, the cohesion 
argument was in later cases also upheld by Member States in parent-subsidiary 
relations, i.e. where more than one taxpayer and separate taxes were involved. 
However, up to the Manninen decision the Court consistently ruled that the direct link 
between tax deduction and subsequent taxation which had to be maintained in order 
to preserve the cohesion of the tax system refers to one and the same taxpayer and 
one and the same tax and can therefore not be invoked if a group of companies is 
concerned. In the ICI case, the Court outlined that “(...) there is no such direct link 
between the consortium relief granted for losses incurred by a resident subsidiary 
and the taxation of profits made by non-resident subsidiaries.” 342 The same was true 
in the Verkooijen case,343 the Baars case,344 the Metallgesellschaft case,345 and the 
Bosal Holding case.346 In the latter decision the Court pointed out that “(u)nlike 
operating branches or establishments, parent companies and their subsidiaries are 
distinct legal persons, each being subject to a tax liability of its own, so that a direct 
link in the context of the same liability to tax is lacking and the coherence of the tax 
system cannot be relied upon.” 347 
 
However, the approach changed with the Manninen decision. The case related to two 
different taxpayers and two different taxes, namely the income taxation of the 
shareholder and the income taxation of the company in which the shareholder holds 
an interest. The ECJ did not immediately refuse the cohesion argument just because 
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of the non-identity of taxpayers and taxes, but proceeded with additional verifications. 
The aim of the system in question was identified as the avoidance of double 
taxation348 and there was an explicit link between the tax credit of the shareholder 
and the corporate income taxation of the company.349 Finally, the Court rejected the 
arguments based on the cohesion of the tax system because of the fact that there 
can be measures which are less restrictive in order to achieve the aim pursued.350 In 
order to understand the change in the approach followed by the Court, it is important 
to take into account the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott who obviously 
follows a broader concept of fiscal cohesion.351 The Advocate General outlined that 
“(i)t is unclear whether the criteria ‘one and the same taxpayer’ and ‘one and the 
same tax’ are binding and must both be met, or whether they are only indicators - 
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taxpayer is offset by a relief for another. The preconditions for this are that: the tax is 
levied, if not on the same taxpayer then at least on the same income or the same 
economic process, and the legal configuration of the system ensures that the 
advantage accrues to the one taxpayer only if the disadvantage to the other is real 
and in the same amount. (…) Hence, the argument based on cohesion of the tax 
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case.354 The Court required that a direct link had to be established between the tax 
advantage concerned and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy.355 
However, the strict approach with the criteria ‘one and the same taxpayer’ and ‘one 
and the same tax’ does apparently not exist anymore.356   
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fiscal cohesion is secured by a bilateral convention concluded with another Member 
State, that principle may not be invoked to justify the refusal of a deduction such as 
that in issue.” 338 This was subsequently confirmed in X and Y.339 It is therefore clear 
that a Member State cannot rely on the cohesion argument if it gives away the 
cohesion at the individual taxpayer level in favour of the cohesion at the interstate 
level. 340 This was obviously not considered in the Bachmann case where the tax 
treaty between Belgium and Germany should theoretically lead to a similar outcome. 
The Bachmann decision is therefore limited to situations not covered by a tax treaty, 
or at least not covered by a tax treaty in a manner implying the waiving of cohesion at 
the individual taxpayer level by the two Member States involved.341 
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However, up to the Manninen decision the Court consistently ruled that the direct link 
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concerned. In the ICI case, the Court outlined that “(...) there is no such direct link 
between the consortium relief granted for losses incurred by a resident subsidiary 
and the taxation of profits made by non-resident subsidiaries.” 342 The same was true 
in the Verkooijen case,343 the Baars case,344 the Metallgesellschaft case,345 and the 
Bosal Holding case.346 In the latter decision the Court pointed out that “(u)nlike 
operating branches or establishments, parent companies and their subsidiaries are 
distinct legal persons, each being subject to a tax liability of its own, so that a direct 
link in the context of the same liability to tax is lacking and the coherence of the tax 
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restatement of the direct link which puts more emphasis on the real effect of the tax 
rules and widens the scope in a way that it applies to all tax systems of all Member 
States across the whole Internal Market and is not just limited to the national territory 
of a single Member State.370 In a more recent article to the Papillon decision it was 
Hahn who made a further separation with respect to the principle of cohesion.371 In a 
number of cases, including Bachmann, the focus was on a quantitative and 
systematic link which might even partially be interpreted as an exception to the 
prohibition of the compensation of advantages and disadvantages.372 However, 
pursuant to Hahn, some of the more recent decisions apparently focused more on 
the functional element.373 In the latter case, the question whether the legislation is 
appropriate and proportionate plays a more important role than in the first-mentioned 
case. According to Hahn, this development might finally lead to a change in the 
concept of cohesion which makes this justification more difficult and complicated.374 
In my opinion, there is certainly the risk that the justification based on the cohesion of 
the tax system will be put forward to justify all types of restrictive measures and will 
become, as described by Hahn, the ‘top hat of the magician out of which he can 
produce any desired or desirable animal’.375     
 
4.2.10.3.2. Justification Based on the Loss of Tax Revenue and the Erosion of 
the Tax Base 
 
A justification which is based on any kind of compensation for the loss of tax revenue 
and the erosion of the tax base is - similar to what was outlined above - an argument 
which is directed to safeguard the cohesion of the applicable tax system. However, it 
has to be pointed out in this respect that it is settled case law of the ECJ that “(...) 
aims of a purely economic nature cannot constitute an overriding reason in the 
general interest justifying a restriction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty.” 376 This general statement is also of particular relevance for the question 
whether the loss of revenue and the erosion of the tax base can theoretically be 
justified at all. In the ICI case, the UK tax authorities made the application of a 
provision which allowed the offsetting of losses of a UK subsidiary with the profits of 
the parent holding company, inter alia, dependent on the fact that the majority of the 
subsidiaries are bodies corporate resident in the UK.377 The UK Treasury argued that 
one of the objectives of this measure was to prevent a reduction in tax revenue 
                                            
370 Vanistendael, Cohesion: The Phoenix Rises from his Ashes, EC Tax Review 2005, page 208 et seq. (221, 
222); see in this respect also Arginelli, The Discriminatory Taxation of Permanent Establishments by the Host 
State in the European Union: a Too Much Separate Entity Approach, Intertax 2007, page 82 et seq. (93).  
371 Hahn, Im Westen nichts Neues, Überlegungen zur Entscheidung des EuGH in der Rechtssache Papillon, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2009, page 198 et seq. (201). 
372 Case C-204/90 (Bachmann), case C-484/93 (Svensson/Gustavsson), paragraph 18; case C-264/96 (ICI), 
paragraph 29; case C-471/04 (Keller), paragraph 40; case C-157/07 (Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee), 
paragraph 42. 
373 Case C-9/02 (Lasteyrie du Saillant), paragraphs 65 to 67; case C-319/02 (Manninen), paragraphs 42, 43. 
374 Hahn, Im Westen nichts Neues, Überlegungen zur Entscheidung des EuGH in der Rechtssache Papillon, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2009, page 198 et seq. (201). 
375 Hahn, Im Westen nichts Neues, Überlegungen zur Entscheidung des EuGH in der Rechtssache Papillon, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2009, page 198 et seq. (201). 
376 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 48; case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 50; case C-484/93 (Svensson 
and Gustavsson), paragraph 15; see also case C-288/89 (Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and 
Others v Commissariaat voor de Media), July 25, 1991, ECR 1991, page I-4007, paragraph 11; Case C-120/95 
(Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives), ECR 1998, page I-1831, paragraph 39; case C-158/96 (Kohll 
v Union des Caisses de Maladie), ECR 1998, page I-1931, paragraph 41.  
377 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 7.  
   
 
measure could be justified by the need to ensure the cohesion of the Finnish tax 
system since the system was based on the existence of a direct link between the 
deductibility of contributions and the liability to income tax of the pensions payable by 
insurers.359 In its ruling the Court made it clear that a distinction has to be made to 
the situation in the Bachmann case. In the Belgian system the loss of revenue 
resulting from the deduction was offset by the taxation of the subsequent payments 
of the institutions, but - on the other hand - if the contributions had not been 
deducted, the subsequent payments would be consequently exempt from taxation.360 
However, under the Finnish system, the pensions payable by foreign institutions to 
Finnish residents were taxable, irrespective of whether the contributions were 
actually deducted or not.361 If this is the case, the system does not provide a direct 
connection between the deductibility of contributions and the subsequent taxation of 
payments made by the institutions.362 The requirement of a direct link between a tax 
advantage and the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax levy was confirmed 
in a number of subsequent decisions - also with respect to a parent-subsidiary 
relationship.363  
 
d.) The objective pursued by the tax legislation in question 
 
In the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case364 the ECJ started to examine the argument 
based on the need to safeguard the cohesion of a tax system in the light of the 
objective pursued by the respective legislation. The French legislation in question 
deals with the circumvention of the taxation of unrealised profits included in 
shareholdings by moving to another country. The Court held that the respective 
provision “(…) is designed to prevent temporary transfers of tax residence outside 
France exclusively for tax reasons..”365 The provision in question “(…) does not 
therefore appear to be aimed at ensuring generally that increases in value are to be 
taxed, in the case where a taxpayer transfers his tax residence outside France, in so 
far as the increases in value in question are acquired during the latter’s stay on 
French territory.”366 Taking into account the aim of the provision, the justification 
based on fiscal coherence cannot be accepted.367 The reasoning based on the 
objective pursued by the tax legislation in question was confirmed in subsequent 
decisions.368 
 
With respect to the Manninen decision and the development of the cohesion doctrine 
Vanistendael stated that “the justification was almost reduced to legal dust, from 
which a new principle of cohesion would arise.”369 In summary, he concluded, based 
on the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott, that the ECJ engaged in a movement 
of “cautious relaxation” of the respective criteria. This is, according to Vanistendael, a 
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overriding general interest which may be relied upon in order to justify a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment.” 385 Overall, it is obvious from the case law of the ECJ 
that a justification which is merely based on the loss of tax revenue and the erosion 
of the tax base will not be accepted by the ECJ. 
 
4.2.10.3.3. Justification Based on the General Compensation for Advantages 
 
An additional argument put forward by the German Government in the Saint-Gobain 
case was that the refusal of certain tax concessions could be justified by the 
advantage which permanent establishments enjoy in comparison with resident 
subsidiaries regarding the transfer of profits to the parent company.386 However, the 
Court rejected this argument in a similar way as it already did in the former 
Commission v France case387 and stated that “(...) it must be observed that the 
difference in tax treatment between resident companies and branches cannot, 
however, be justified by other advantages which branches enjoy in comparison with 
resident companies and which, according to the German Government, will 
compensate for the disadvantages (…).. Even if such advantages exist, they cannot 
justify breach of the obligation laid down in Article 52 of the Treaty (…).” 388 The fact 
that the Court does not even question whether there is actually an advantage 
emphasises the non-acceptance of a general principle based on a compensation 
approach.389 
 
4.2.10.3.4. Justification Based on a Different Taxation in Another Member State 
 
The justification based on a different taxation in another Member State is not 
necessarily the same as the justification which is based on the loss of tax revenue, 
the erosion of the tax base or the compensation for advantages. A case which is of 
particular relevance in this respect is the Eurowings case.390 The case dealt with 
provisions of the German Trade Tax Law according to which certain add-backs were 
required to determine the tax base for the trade tax on capital and earnings.391 In 
essence, part of the leasing payments had to be added back to the tax base of the 
lessee (and assets had to be included in the trade capital) if the payments were not 
taken into account for the determination of the trade tax of the lessor. In other words, 
an add-back was not required if the leasing income was subject to trade income tax 
(and assets were included in the trade capital) of the lessor.392 As a result, the 
leasing payments were partly added-back in situations where the lessor was 
established outside of Germany since he was not obliged to pay trade tax on the 
leasing income. In a purely domestic situation, such an adding-back was most often 
not required since the lessor was subject to trade tax on the receipts of the activities. 
In the underlying case, Eurowings leased an aircraft from an Irish company. Based 
on the respective provisions of the German Trade Tax Law, an add-back had to be 
made for the purpose of the determination of the trade income tax and the trade tax 
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caused by the mere existence of non-resident subsidiaries, since the Inland Revenue 
could not tax profits made by subsidiaries located outside the UK in order to offset 
the revenue lost through the granting of relief on losses incurred by resident 
subsidiaries.378 Similarly - and in addition to the cohesion argument outlined above - 
the UK Treasury tried to combine the offsetting of losses between UK subsidiaries 
and a UK parent company with the fact that a foreign subsidiary is not taxable in the 
UK. The ECJ, however, stated that “(i)n answer to the argument that revenue lost 
through the granting of tax relief on losses incurred by resident subsidiaries cannot 
be offset by taxing the profits of non-resident subsidiaries, it must be pointed out that 
diminution of tax revenue occurring in this way is not one of the grounds listed in 
Article 56 of the Treaty and cannot be regarded as a matter of overriding general 
interest which may be relied upon in order to justify unequal treatment that is, in 
principle, incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty.” 379 In the following Saint-Gobain 
case380 the German Government put forward similar arguments in order to justify the 
different treatment of a permanent establishment of a non-resident company in 
Germany compared to a resident subsidiary of such a non-resident parent company. 
One of the arguments was the need to prevent a reduction in tax revenue given the 
impossibility of the German tax authorities to compensate for the reduction in 
revenue brought about by the granting of the tax concessions in question by taxing 
dividends distributed by non-resident companies limited by shares operating 
permanent establishments in Germany.381 In this case as well, the Court clearly 
rejected this argument. The need to prevent a reduction in tax revenue was - like in 
the ICI case - not accepted as one of the grounds listed in Article 63 of the TFEU or a 
matter of overriding general interest.382 The Court confirmed its view in subsequent 
decisions.383 
 
In the Bosal Holding case the Dutch Government and the Commission argued that 
the limitation of the deductibility of costs incurred in relation to the holding of 
subsidiary companies was justified by the objective of avoiding an erosion of the tax 
base going beyond a mere diminution in tax receipts.384 Interestingly, the argument of 
the Dutch Government and the Commission was directed to differentiate between the 
erosion of the tax base and the loss of tax revenue. Obviously, the erosion of the tax 
base should be considered to have a greater impact than the loss of tax receipts. 
However, the Court did not accept the argument and ruled that “(s)uch a justification 
does not differ in substance from that concerning the risk of diminution in tax 
revenue. In that respect, the case-law of the Court of Justice shows that such a 
justification does not appear amongst the grounds listed in Article 56 (1) of the EC 
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 46 (1) EC) and does not constitute a matter of 
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overriding general interest which may be relied upon in order to justify a restriction on 
the freedom of establishment.” 385 Overall, it is obvious from the case law of the ECJ 
that a justification which is merely based on the loss of tax revenue and the erosion 
of the tax base will not be accepted by the ECJ. 
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however, be justified by other advantages which branches enjoy in comparison with 
resident companies and which, according to the German Government, will 
compensate for the disadvantages (…).. Even if such advantages exist, they cannot 
justify breach of the obligation laid down in Article 52 of the Treaty (…).” 388 The fact 
that the Court does not even question whether there is actually an advantage 
emphasises the non-acceptance of a general principle based on a compensation 
approach.389 
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necessarily the same as the justification which is based on the loss of tax revenue, 
the erosion of the tax base or the compensation for advantages. A case which is of 
particular relevance in this respect is the Eurowings case.390 The case dealt with 
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required to determine the tax base for the trade tax on capital and earnings.391 In 
essence, part of the leasing payments had to be added back to the tax base of the 
lessee (and assets had to be included in the trade capital) if the payments were not 
taken into account for the determination of the trade tax of the lessor. In other words, 
an add-back was not required if the leasing income was subject to trade income tax 
(and assets were included in the trade capital) of the lessor.392 As a result, the 
leasing payments were partly added-back in situations where the lessor was 
established outside of Germany since he was not obliged to pay trade tax on the 
leasing income. In a purely domestic situation, such an adding-back was most often 
not required since the lessor was subject to trade tax on the receipts of the activities. 
In the underlying case, Eurowings leased an aircraft from an Irish company. Based 
on the respective provisions of the German Trade Tax Law, an add-back had to be 
made for the purpose of the determination of the trade income tax and the trade tax 
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caused by the mere existence of non-resident subsidiaries, since the Inland Revenue 
could not tax profits made by subsidiaries located outside the UK in order to offset 
the revenue lost through the granting of relief on losses incurred by resident 
subsidiaries.378 Similarly - and in addition to the cohesion argument outlined above - 
the UK Treasury tried to combine the offsetting of losses between UK subsidiaries 
and a UK parent company with the fact that a foreign subsidiary is not taxable in the 
UK. The ECJ, however, stated that “(i)n answer to the argument that revenue lost 
through the granting of tax relief on losses incurred by resident subsidiaries cannot 
be offset by taxing the profits of non-resident subsidiaries, it must be pointed out that 
diminution of tax revenue occurring in this way is not one of the grounds listed in 
Article 56 of the Treaty and cannot be regarded as a matter of overriding general 
interest which may be relied upon in order to justify unequal treatment that is, in 
principle, incompatible with Article 52 of the Treaty.” 379 In the following Saint-Gobain 
case380 the German Government put forward similar arguments in order to justify the 
different treatment of a permanent establishment of a non-resident company in 
Germany compared to a resident subsidiary of such a non-resident parent company. 
One of the arguments was the need to prevent a reduction in tax revenue given the 
impossibility of the German tax authorities to compensate for the reduction in 
revenue brought about by the granting of the tax concessions in question by taxing 
dividends distributed by non-resident companies limited by shares operating 
permanent establishments in Germany.381 In this case as well, the Court clearly 
rejected this argument. The need to prevent a reduction in tax revenue was - like in 
the ICI case - not accepted as one of the grounds listed in Article 63 of the TFEU or a 
matter of overriding general interest.382 The Court confirmed its view in subsequent 
decisions.383 
 
In the Bosal Holding case the Dutch Government and the Commission argued that 
the limitation of the deductibility of costs incurred in relation to the holding of 
subsidiary companies was justified by the objective of avoiding an erosion of the tax 
base going beyond a mere diminution in tax receipts.384 Interestingly, the argument of 
the Dutch Government and the Commission was directed to differentiate between the 
erosion of the tax base and the loss of tax revenue. Obviously, the erosion of the tax 
base should be considered to have a greater impact than the loss of tax receipts. 
However, the Court did not accept the argument and ruled that “(s)uch a justification 
does not differ in substance from that concerning the risk of diminution in tax 
revenue. In that respect, the case-law of the Court of Justice shows that such a 
justification does not appear amongst the grounds listed in Article 56 (1) of the EC 
Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 46 (1) EC) and does not constitute a matter of 
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i.e. the tax advantage for the service provider cannot be the relevant criterion for an 
unfavourable treatment of the recipient of the services. However, the Court went 
even further and denied any compensatory taxation, independent from the existence 
and non-existence of a trade tax and irrespective of the reason for the lower taxation 
in the other Member State. In my opinion, this has to be understood as a general 
prohibition of any compensatory taxation. The Court made the importance of such a 
prohibition very clear by outlining that this would otherwise “(…) prejudice the very 
foundations of the single market.”401 It should therefore be clear that the lower 
taxation in Ireland, even though it was a privileged taxation in the form of a 10 
percent corporation tax, cannot outweigh the existing restriction of the freedom to 
provide services. In his Opinion to the case Advocate General Mischo pointed out 
that “(i)f differences in the direct taxation of undertakings could be “neutralised” by 
compensatory levies imposed by Member States on intra-Community movements of 
goods, services and capital, little would remain of those fundamental freedoms. 
Virtually all goods and services moving between Member States would be subject to 
one compensatory levy or another. Member States and undertakings must in 
principle accept differences in fiscal charges in the same way as differences in social 
charges or labour costs.” 402  
 
In the Danner case, one of the arguments put forward by the Danish Government to 
justify the restriction applied to the right to deduct insurance contributions was the 
need to preserve the integrity of the tax base. If insurance contributions paid to 
schemes run by foreign insurers were deductible, residents in Member States with 
high income taxes would have a very strong incentive to take out insurance with 
institutions established in Member States with low income taxes. That would result, 
according to the Danish Government, in ploys by persons seeking to benefit from the 
most favourable tax system and this would not be without consequences for Member 
States which finance high quality social services through tax revenue. In addition, the 
Member States have a legitimate interest in disallowing the fiscal advantage of the 
deductibility of insurance contributions if the savings encouraged by the deduction 
are accumulated abroad.403 The Court made it clear that the need to fill the fiscal 
vacuum was not accepted as a justification for a national measure which restricted 
the freedom to provide services404 and the need to prevent the reduction of tax 
revenue was not one of the grounds listed in Article 52 of the TFEU or a matter of 
overriding general interest.405 In addition, the Court confirmed that any tax advantage 
from the low taxation in the Member State where the service provider is established 
cannot be used by another Member State to justify a less favourable treatment in tax 
matters.406 Therefore, the freedom to provide services precludes a Member State’s 
tax legislation from restricting or disallowing the deductibility for income tax purposes 
of contributions paid to pension providers in other Member States while allowing such 
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on capital.393 Eurowings lodged a complaint against the decision of the German tax 
authorities and the Lower Tax Court of Münster subsequently referred to the ECJ for 
a preliminary ruling. One of the questions was whether it was necessary to take into 
account the fact that the lessor, an Irish company, pays no tax comparable to the 
trade tax and enjoys “Shannon privileges” in the form of a 10 percent corporation 
tax.394  
 
The ECJ concluded that the legislation contained tax rules which differed depending 
on whether the provider of the services was established in Germany or in another 
Member State and which were less favourable to German undertakings leasing 
goods from lessors established in other Member States.395 In other words, the 
respective tax rules reserve a fiscal advantage for those undertakings which lease 
goods from lessors established in Germany whilst depriving those leasing from 
lessors established in another Member State of such an advantage.396 Such a 
different treatment based on the place of establishment of the lessor is prohibited by 
the freedom to provide services.397 With respect to a possible justification based on 
the need for coherency of the tax system the ECJ pointed out that “(…) a merely 
indirect link between a fiscal advantage accorded to a taxable person, such as the 
absence in the case of German undertakings leasing from lessors established in 
Germany of the obligation to make the add-backs in question, and the unfavourable 
tax treatment of another taxable person, such as the liability of such lessors to pay 
trade tax, cannot be used to justify the fact that German undertakings are treated 
differently according to whether they lease from lessors established in Germany or 
from lessors in other Member States.”398 Moreover, the ECJ went on to clarify that 
the “(…) difference of treatment can also not be justified by the fact that the lessor 
established in another Member State is there subject to lower taxation. Any tax 
advantage resulting for providers of services from the low taxation to which they are 
subject in the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another 
Member State to justify less favourable treatment in tax matters given to recipients of 
services established in the latter State. As the Commission rightly observed, such 
compensatory tax arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single 
market.”399 The different treatment is therefore prohibited and cannot be justified.400 
The judgment of the ECJ is especially important with respect to the subject of this 
study. The ECJ clearly rejected the argument which was based on the link between a 
favourable tax treatment of one taxpayer and an unfavourable tax treatment of 
another taxpayer. The existence (or non-existence) of a trade tax and the fact that 
the lessor is subject to trade tax (or not) cannot be used as a criterion for a 
differentiation. The Court rejected this argument because of the fact that the link was 
considered to be merely indirect. This is a consequent result, taking into 
consideration the case law outlined above. Of course, this is true in both directions: 
the trade tax burden of the service provider cannot be the relevant criterion for a 
favourable treatment of the recipient of the services and, in turn, the lack of trade tax, 
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i.e. the tax advantage for the service provider cannot be the relevant criterion for an 
unfavourable treatment of the recipient of the services. However, the Court went 
even further and denied any compensatory taxation, independent from the existence 
and non-existence of a trade tax and irrespective of the reason for the lower taxation 
in the other Member State. In my opinion, this has to be understood as a general 
prohibition of any compensatory taxation. The Court made the importance of such a 
prohibition very clear by outlining that this would otherwise “(…) prejudice the very 
foundations of the single market.”401 It should therefore be clear that the lower 
taxation in Ireland, even though it was a privileged taxation in the form of a 10 
percent corporation tax, cannot outweigh the existing restriction of the freedom to 
provide services. In his Opinion to the case Advocate General Mischo pointed out 
that “(i)f differences in the direct taxation of undertakings could be “neutralised” by 
compensatory levies imposed by Member States on intra-Community movements of 
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Virtually all goods and services moving between Member States would be subject to 
one compensatory levy or another. Member States and undertakings must in 
principle accept differences in fiscal charges in the same way as differences in social 
charges or labour costs.” 402  
 
In the Danner case, one of the arguments put forward by the Danish Government to 
justify the restriction applied to the right to deduct insurance contributions was the 
need to preserve the integrity of the tax base. If insurance contributions paid to 
schemes run by foreign insurers were deductible, residents in Member States with 
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States which finance high quality social services through tax revenue. In addition, the 
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vacuum was not accepted as a justification for a national measure which restricted 
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revenue was not one of the grounds listed in Article 52 of the TFEU or a matter of 
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The ECJ concluded that the legislation contained tax rules which differed depending 
on whether the provider of the services was established in Germany or in another 
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goods from lessors established in other Member States.395 In other words, the 
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goods from lessors established in Germany whilst depriving those leasing from 
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services established in the latter State. As the Commission rightly observed, such 
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another taxpayer. The existence (or non-existence) of a trade tax and the fact that 
the lessor is subject to trade tax (or not) cannot be used as a criterion for a 
differentiation. The Court rejected this argument because of the fact that the link was 
considered to be merely indirect. This is a consequent result, taking into 
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out that the argument with respect to the differentiation between subsidiaries which 
make profits in the Netherlands and subsidiaries without such profits was irrelevant 
since the difference in tax treatment concerned only the parent companies in the 
Netherlands, and as regards the tax situation of the parent companies in relation to 
the profits of their subsidiaries “(…) it must be noted that those profits are not taxable 
in the hands of those companies, whether the profits come from subsidiaries taxable 
in the Netherlands or from other subsidiaries. Moreover, in a case concerning the tax 
treatment of a subsidiary which varied in relation to the seat of the parent company, 
the Court has held that the difference in the tax treatment of parent companies 
depending on whether or not they are resident cannot justify denial of a tax 
advantage to subsidiaries, resident in the United Kingdom, of parent companies 
having their seat in another Member State where that advantage is available to 
subsidiaries, resident in the United Kingdom, of parent companies also resident in the 
United Kingdom, since all those subsidiaries are liable to mainstream corporation tax 
on their profits irrespective of the place of residence of their parent companies.” 415 
From my perspective, the outcome of the Bosal case does not mean that the Court 
has given up the territoriality principle as a valid justification. In the Futura case it was 
a single legal entity which derived income from activities in two jurisdictions and had 
to bear costs which had to be allocated to these jurisdictions. In Bosal, there were 
separate legal entities involved, and it was already clear from the existing case law 
that the Court consistently treated parent companies and subsidiary companies 
independent from each other. Thus, the principle of territoriality can theoretically be a 
valid justification for a restriction on the basic freedoms. However, the Bosal case 
shows that the principle of territoriality which came up in earlier cases cannot simply 
be transferred to the relationship between two separate legal entities, i.e. it might be 
especially relevant in cases of cross-border investments through transparent 
partnerships or permanent establishments.  
 
4.2.10.3.6. Justification Based on the Protection of a Balanced Allocation of the 
Power to Impose Taxes between Member States 
  
Another justification which can be identified in the case law of the ECJ is the 
justification based on the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose 
taxes between Member States. In the Marks & Spencer case, the ECJ stated that 
“(…) in tax matters profits and losses are two sides of the same coin and must be 
treated symmetrically in the same tax system in order to protect a balanced allocation 
of the power to impose taxes between the different Member States concerned.”416 
Therefore, it might be necessary “(…) to apply to the economic activities of 
companies established in one of those States only the tax rules of that State in 
respect to both profits and losses.”417 And “(…) to give companies the option to have 
their losses taken into account in the Member State in which they are established or 
in another Member State would significantly jeopardise a balanced allocation of the 
power to impose taxes between Member States (…).”418 The justification based on 
the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes played a significant role in the 
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contributions to be deducted if they are paid to pension providers in the first-
mentioned Member State.407 
 
The conclusions drawn by the Court in Eurowings and Danner were also confirmed in 
subsequent decisions, e.g. in Skandia408 and Lenz.409 Overall, it seems to be settled 
case law that if the justification is based on the different taxation in another Member 
State and the argument comes close (or is even identical) to the justifications based 
on the loss of tax revenues, the erosion of the tax base or the general compensation 
for advantages, there seems to be no chance that the ECJ will accept such a 
position. 
 
4.2.10.3.5. Justification Based on the Principle of Territoriality 
 
Two of the early cases which dealt with the justification based on the principle of 
territoriality were Futura and AMID.410 Both cases dealt with one single entity with a 
permanent establishment in another Member State. The Futura case concerned the 
taxation of non-residents whereas the AMID case concerned the taxation of 
residents. In both cases, the Court accepted the separation of taxable income 
derived by a legal entity and the allocation of that income to the respective Member 
States concerned according to international tax principles, namely the principle of 
territoriality. In the subsequent Bosal case, the principle of territoriality again played 
an important role. However, in contrast to Futura and AMID the principle was now put 
forward by the Dutch Government as an argument in a situation where different legal 
entities - and therefore different taxpayers - were involved.  
 
The Bosal case dealt with a provision in the Dutch Corporation Tax Act which 
governed that no account had to be taken of gains acquired from a holding or of the 
costs relating to a holding, unless it was evident that such costs were indirectly 
instrumental in making profit that is taxable in the Netherlands.411 Based on that 
legislation, the Bosal Holding B.V. - a company established in the Netherlands - was 
not allowed to deduct the interest expenses in connection with the financing of its 
holdings in companies established outside of the Netherlands in other Member 
States.412 In contrast, the interest expenses in connection with the investment in 
subsidiary companies established in the Netherlands were deductible. In his Opinion 
to the Bosal case Advocate General Alber made it very clear that it is “(...) impossible 
to deduce from the territoriality principle that the profits and losses accruing to 
different taxpayers can be offset against each other.” 413 In its decision, the Court 
simply concluded that “(...) the application of the territoriality principle in Futura 
Participations and Singer concerned the taxation of a single company which carried 
on business in the Member State where it had its principal establishment and in other 
Member States from secondary establishments.” 414 Furthermore, the Court pointed 
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respect to both profits and losses.”417 And “(…) to give companies the option to have 
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the field of direct taxation can be invoked by a Member State in order to obtain all the 
information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, 
there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer 
himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not 
the deduction requested should be allowed.427 In the Lasteyrie du Saillant case the 
Court referred, in addition to the Council Directive 77/799/EEC, to the double tax 
conventions concluded by France and the so-called “recovery assistance” clause in 
those conventions.428 Hence, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision may be ensured 
by measures which are less restrictive and therefore the different tax treatment is 
generally not accepted by the Court as a justification.429 Therefore, it seems that the 
justification based on the effectiveness of fiscal supervision is, as such, an 
acceptable justification, but does not usually pass the proportionality test. The 
situation may be different with respect to third countries. Here, the Council Directive 
77/799/EEC is not applicable and, therefore, the contractual obligations - if any - do 
not correspond to those which are established in the European Union. It was 
explicitly stated in the A case that a Member State is allowed, in principle, to make a 
differentiation in this respect between Member States and third countries.430 This was 
subsequently confirmed in the Rimbaud decision - a case dealing with the 
relationship between France and Liechtenstein.431 The Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
does not apply between the competent authorities and there is a lack of any 
obligation on the tax authorities of Liechtenstein to lend assistance. In contrast to the 
ELISA case (which involved only Member States), the ECJ did not recognise under 
the latter circumstances that a ‘case-by-case assessment’, i.e. the possibility that the 
taxpayer produces the necessary evidence, can be considered a less restrictive 
measure than the national French legislation at issue. In such a legal environment, 
there is no possibility for the Member State involved to examine the correctness of 
the information provided by the taxpayer.432 A very similar situation to the one in the 
Rimbaud case exists in the Prunus case.433 Here, the relationship between France 
and the British Virgin Islands is in the focus of the case. Similar to Lichtenstein, there 
is no obligation of the British Virgin Islands to provide assistance in tax matters. 
Consistently, the Advocate General comes to the conclusion that the French 
authorities are unable to use the cooperation mechanisms provided for in the Council 
Directive 77/799/EEC but also, if they were to accept documentary evidence from the 
taxpayer, they would find it difficult to verify its truthfulness or lawfulness. In the 
absence of cooperation instruments of the kind concluded between the Member 
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cases Rewe Zentralfinanz, Oy AA, Lidl Belgium and X Holding as well.419 In these 
cases the ECJ confirmed, in principle, the approach followed in the Marks & Spencer 
decision. Moreover, it is clear now that this can be a justification which is not 
necessarily to be connected to another justification (or other justifications) - as was 
the case in the Marks & Spencer decision. In the X Holding case, a case dealing with 
the Dutch legislation on the formation of a single tax entity and the different treatment 
in case of non-resident subsidiaries, the ECJ considered the need to safeguard the 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States clearly to be a valid 
and ‘exclusive’ justification which does not have to be accompanied by another 
justification.420 In fact, this was already Gutmann’s position after Oy AA. Pursuant to 
Gutmann, if the measure protects the balanced allocation of the power to impose 
taxes, this acknowledgment alone suffices as a justification.421 Of course, the latter 
justification and the justification based on the prevention of tax avoidance may be 
affected simultaneously, but this is not necessarily the case.422 I fully agree with the 
latter conclusion - which has now been finally confirmed by the case law of the ECJ. 
It has to be noted, however, that there are critical voices after the decision in X 
Holding which consider the justification based on the protection of the balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes to be interpreted so widely that it potentially 
covers a broad spectrum of revenue concerns - which would be contrary to the 
settled case law of the ECJ since the latter did not accept revenue concerns and the 
risk of tax base erosion to be an acceptable argument to justify a restriction on the 
basic freedoms.423   
 
4.2.10.3.7. Justification Based on the Effectiveness of Fiscal Supervision 
 
In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court pointed out that the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision constituted an overriding reason of general interest capable of justifying a 
restriction on the free movement of goods.424 This was later on confirmed for other 
basic freedoms in the Futura decision.425 Therefore, the justification based on the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision was put forward in a number of subsequent cases, 
but the Court consistently rejected that argument in respect of Member States for the 
following reasons: measures which provide a different treatment for the deduction of 
costs (or the deduction of contributions) occurred in connection with investments (or 
insurance contracts) in another Member State and which are more restrictive as 
compared to a purely domestic situation can generally not be justified based on the 
effectiveness of fiscal control. The reason is that Council Directive 77/799/EEC426 
concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in 
                                            
419 Case C-347/04 (Rewe Zentralfinanz), paragraphs 41, 42; case C-231/05 (Oy AA), paragraphs 55, 56; case C-
414/06 (Lidl Belgium), paragraphs 31 to 34; case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraphs 33, 42.  
420 Case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraphs 33, 42.  
421 Gutmann, Taxation of Groups of Companies: Lessons to be Drawn from Oy AA, Tax Planning International 
European Tax Services, February 2008.  
422 See in this respect the ‘diagram one’ shown in Gutmann, Taxation of Groups of Companies: Lessons to be 
Drawn from Oy AA, Tax Planning International European Tax Services, February 2008. 
423 See Thiel / Vascega, X Holding: Why Ulysses Should Stop Listening to the Siren, European Taxation 2010, 
page 334 et seq. (348). See in this regard also Weber, ECJ 25 February 2010, C-337/08, X Holding, Highlights & 
Insights on European Taxation, 1/2010, page 64 et seq.; Englisch, EuGH Entscheidung: Besteuerung der 
Gewinne bei der Muttergesellschaft unter Ausschluss gebietsfremder Tochtergesellschaften - Anmerkungen, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2010, page 213 et seq. According to Englisch, the decision in X Holding leaves more 
questions open than it answers.  
424 Case 120/78 (Cassis de Dijon), paragraph 8.  
425 Case C-250/95 (Futura), paragraph 31; see also case C-254/97 (Baxter and Others), paragraph 18.  
426 Council Directive 77/799/EEC, December 19, 1977, OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15.  
European Union Law
163
   
 
the field of direct taxation can be invoked by a Member State in order to obtain all the 
information enabling it to ascertain the correct amount of income tax. In addition, 
there is nothing to prevent the tax authorities concerned from requiring the taxpayer 
himself to produce the proof which they consider necessary to assess whether or not 
the deduction requested should be allowed.427 In the Lasteyrie du Saillant case the 
Court referred, in addition to the Council Directive 77/799/EEC, to the double tax 
conventions concluded by France and the so-called “recovery assistance” clause in 
those conventions.428 Hence, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision may be ensured 
by measures which are less restrictive and therefore the different tax treatment is 
generally not accepted by the Court as a justification.429 Therefore, it seems that the 
justification based on the effectiveness of fiscal supervision is, as such, an 
acceptable justification, but does not usually pass the proportionality test. The 
situation may be different with respect to third countries. Here, the Council Directive 
77/799/EEC is not applicable and, therefore, the contractual obligations - if any - do 
not correspond to those which are established in the European Union. It was 
explicitly stated in the A case that a Member State is allowed, in principle, to make a 
differentiation in this respect between Member States and third countries.430 This was 
subsequently confirmed in the Rimbaud decision - a case dealing with the 
relationship between France and Liechtenstein.431 The Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
does not apply between the competent authorities and there is a lack of any 
obligation on the tax authorities of Liechtenstein to lend assistance. In contrast to the 
ELISA case (which involved only Member States), the ECJ did not recognise under 
the latter circumstances that a ‘case-by-case assessment’, i.e. the possibility that the 
taxpayer produces the necessary evidence, can be considered a less restrictive 
measure than the national French legislation at issue. In such a legal environment, 
there is no possibility for the Member State involved to examine the correctness of 
the information provided by the taxpayer.432 A very similar situation to the one in the 
Rimbaud case exists in the Prunus case.433 Here, the relationship between France 
and the British Virgin Islands is in the focus of the case. Similar to Lichtenstein, there 
is no obligation of the British Virgin Islands to provide assistance in tax matters. 
Consistently, the Advocate General comes to the conclusion that the French 
authorities are unable to use the cooperation mechanisms provided for in the Council 
Directive 77/799/EEC but also, if they were to accept documentary evidence from the 
taxpayer, they would find it difficult to verify its truthfulness or lawfulness. In the 
absence of cooperation instruments of the kind concluded between the Member 




                                            
427 Case C-240/90 (Bachmann), paragraphs 18-20; case C-279/93 (Schumacker), paragraph 45; Case C-55/98 
(Vestergaard), paragraphs 25-28; Case C-80/94 (Wielockx), paragraph 26; case C-136/00 (Danner), paragraphs 
49 and 50; case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraphs 42 and 43; case C-451/05 (ELISA), paragraphs 95, 98.  
428 Case C-9/02 (Lasteyrie du Saillant), paragraphs 68, 69.  
429 Case C-136/00 (Danner), paragraph 51; case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraph 44. 
430 Case C-101/05 (Skatteverket v A), December 18, 2007, paragraphs 60, 63. See in this respect also case C-
540/07 (Commission v Italy), November 19, 2009, paragraph 69.   
431 Case C-72/09 (Établissements Rimbaud SA v Directeur général des impots, Directeur des services fiscaux 
d’Aix-en-Provence), October 28, 2010.  
432 Case C-72/09 (Rimbaud), paragraphs 47 to 51.  
433 Case C-384/09 (Prunus SARL v Directeur des services fiscaux) - not yet decided; Opinion of the Advocate 
General Cruz Villalón, delivered on December 9, 2010.  
434 Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón, paragraphs 89 to 91. 
   
 
cases Rewe Zentralfinanz, Oy AA, Lidl Belgium and X Holding as well.419 In these 
cases the ECJ confirmed, in principle, the approach followed in the Marks & Spencer 
decision. Moreover, it is clear now that this can be a justification which is not 
necessarily to be connected to another justification (or other justifications) - as was 
the case in the Marks & Spencer decision. In the X Holding case, a case dealing with 
the Dutch legislation on the formation of a single tax entity and the different treatment 
in case of non-resident subsidiaries, the ECJ considered the need to safeguard the 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States clearly to be a valid 
and ‘exclusive’ justification which does not have to be accompanied by another 
justification.420 In fact, this was already Gutmann’s position after Oy AA. Pursuant to 
Gutmann, if the measure protects the balanced allocation of the power to impose 
taxes, this acknowledgment alone suffices as a justification.421 Of course, the latter 
justification and the justification based on the prevention of tax avoidance may be 
affected simultaneously, but this is not necessarily the case.422 I fully agree with the 
latter conclusion - which has now been finally confirmed by the case law of the ECJ. 
It has to be noted, however, that there are critical voices after the decision in X 
Holding which consider the justification based on the protection of the balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes to be interpreted so widely that it potentially 
covers a broad spectrum of revenue concerns - which would be contrary to the 
settled case law of the ECJ since the latter did not accept revenue concerns and the 
risk of tax base erosion to be an acceptable argument to justify a restriction on the 
basic freedoms.423   
 
4.2.10.3.7. Justification Based on the Effectiveness of Fiscal Supervision 
 
In the Cassis de Dijon case the Court pointed out that the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision constituted an overriding reason of general interest capable of justifying a 
restriction on the free movement of goods.424 This was later on confirmed for other 
basic freedoms in the Futura decision.425 Therefore, the justification based on the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision was put forward in a number of subsequent cases, 
but the Court consistently rejected that argument in respect of Member States for the 
following reasons: measures which provide a different treatment for the deduction of 
costs (or the deduction of contributions) occurred in connection with investments (or 
insurance contracts) in another Member State and which are more restrictive as 
compared to a purely domestic situation can generally not be justified based on the 
effectiveness of fiscal control. The reason is that Council Directive 77/799/EEC426 
concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the Member States in 
                                            
419 Case C-347/04 (Rewe Zentralfinanz), paragraphs 41, 42; case C-231/05 (Oy AA), paragraphs 55, 56; case C-
414/06 (Lidl Belgium), paragraphs 31 to 34; case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraphs 33, 42.  
420 Case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraphs 33, 42.  
421 Gutmann, Taxation of Groups of Companies: Lessons to be Drawn from Oy AA, Tax Planning International 
European Tax Services, February 2008.  
422 See in this respect the ‘diagram one’ shown in Gutmann, Taxation of Groups of Companies: Lessons to be 
Drawn from Oy AA, Tax Planning International European Tax Services, February 2008. 
423 See Thiel / Vascega, X Holding: Why Ulysses Should Stop Listening to the Siren, European Taxation 2010, 
page 334 et seq. (348). See in this regard also Weber, ECJ 25 February 2010, C-337/08, X Holding, Highlights & 
Insights on European Taxation, 1/2010, page 64 et seq.; Englisch, EuGH Entscheidung: Besteuerung der 
Gewinne bei der Muttergesellschaft unter Ausschluss gebietsfremder Tochtergesellschaften - Anmerkungen, 
Internationales Steuerrecht 2010, page 213 et seq. According to Englisch, the decision in X Holding leaves more 
questions open than it answers.  
424 Case 120/78 (Cassis de Dijon), paragraph 8.  
425 Case C-250/95 (Futura), paragraph 31; see also case C-254/97 (Baxter and Others), paragraph 18.  
426 Council Directive 77/799/EEC, December 19, 1977, OJ 1977 L 336, p. 15.  
Chapter 4
164
   
 
of the State in which it is established.” 441 It was even confirmed by the national court 
itself that there was no abuse, since the loan was made “to prevent financial disaster” 
and to reduce the burden of loan interest from banking commitments.442 It was 
therefore obvious in this particular case that the rule applied to a situation which was 
by no means “wholly artificial” but rather triggered by an economic and financial 
necessity. Based on the aforementioned case law, an anti-avoidance provision can 
only be accepted to be proportionate if it is specifically designed to target purely 
artificial schemes. Any general rule automatically excluding certain categories of 
operations would not fulfil the principle of proportionality. This was subsequently 
confirmed in a number of cases, such as the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case and the Lammers & Van Cleeff 
case.443 
 
In the Leur-Bloem case and the Kofoed case the Court had to deal with the anti-
abuse provision of the Merger Directive.444 According to Article 11 (1) (a) of the 
Merger Directive a Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw the benefit of the 
Merger Directive if the transaction has as its principal objective or as one of its 
principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance. The Court held in Leur-Bloem that 
“(...) in order to determine whether the planned operation has such an objective, the 
competent national authorities cannot confine themselves to applying predetermined 
general criteria but must subject each particular case to a general examination.”445 
Furthermore, “(...) the laying down of a general rule automatically excluding certain 
categories of operations from the tax advantage (...) whether or not there is actually 
tax evasion or tax avoidance, would go further than is necessary for preventing such 
tax evasion or tax avoidance and would undermine the aim pursued by the 
Directive.”446 In the Kofoed case the Court made it clear that Article 11 (1) (a) of the 
Merger Directive reflects the general EU law principle that the abuse of rights is 
prohibited.447 It is clear, therefore, that the conclusions of the Court are equally 
relevant for both primary and secondary EU law.448  
 
The case law outlined above shows, inter alia, that a differentiation has to be made 
between a justification which is based on the mere risk of tax avoidance and a 
justification which is based on the prevention of tax avoidance. The mere risk of tax 
avoidance seems to be an insufficient justification whereas the Court, in principle, 
accepted that the prevention of tax avoidance can be an acceptable justification. 
Furthermore, one might take the position that the necessity that the national 
measures have to be ‘specifically designed to target wholly artificial arrangements’ 
has been somehow mitigated in the Oy AA case.449 In this case, the Court 
considered the national legislation in question to be proportionate despite the fact 
that the legislation was not specifically designed to exclude purely artificial 
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4.2.10.3.8. Justification Based on the Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance 
 
The Court already had to deal with such an argument in the Commission v France 
case. The French avoir fiscal provisions discriminated against the freedom of 
establishment because they were only available to French resident corporations, 
including wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and not to French 
branches of foreign corporations. In this case, the Court held that “(...) the risk of tax 
avoidance cannot be relied upon in this context. Article 52 of the EEC Treaty does 
not permit any derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of establishment 
on such a ground.” 435 The Court very clearly rejected the argument of the risk of tax 
avoidance and without the restriction “in this context” one could even have the 
impression that such an argument could not be upheld as a justification at all.436 
 
The argument was again put forward by the United Kingdom Government in the ICI 
case. The Government argued that the legislation at issue was designed to reduce 
the risk of tax avoidance. The risk was described as a “(...) possibility for members of 
a consortium to channel the charges of non-resident subsidiaries to a subsidiary 
resident in the United Kingdom and to have profits accrue to non-resident 
subsidiaries. The purpose of the legislation at issue is therefore to prevent the 
creation of foreign subsidiaries from being used as a means of depriving the United 
Kingdom Treasury of taxable revenues.” 437 This, of course, was a very general 
argument and it supposed that the group companies shifted charges (and therefore 
also taxable profits) from one subsidiary to another or from a subsidiary to the parent 
company and vice versa. However, this can theoretically always be the case if a 
company or a group of companies invests abroad. It is even not only restricted to a 
foreign investment by way of establishing a subsidiary but can be equally relevant - at 
least to a certain extent - if a permanent establishment is created in another Member 
State. Thus, in its response to that argument the Court clearly outlined that “(...) the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not have the specific purpose of 
preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up to circumvent United Kingdom tax 
legislation, from attracting tax benefits, but applies generally to all situations in which 
the majority of a group’s subsidiaries are established, for whatever reason, outside 
the United Kingdom. However, the establishment of a company outside the United 
Kingdom does not, of itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance, since that company will 
in any event be subject to the tax legislation of the State of establishment.” 438 This 
was confirmed in the X and Y decision.439 The formula used in the ICI case with 
respect to subsidiaries in other Member States was subsequently completed in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst with respect to parent companies in other Member States. The 
Court concluded that the German thin-capitalisation rule440 “(...) applies generally to 
any situation in which the parent company has its seat, for whatever reason, outside 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a situation does not, of itself, entail a risk of 
tax evasion, since such a company will in any event be subject to the tax legislation 
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of the State in which it is established.” 441 It was even confirmed by the national court 
itself that there was no abuse, since the loan was made “to prevent financial disaster” 
and to reduce the burden of loan interest from banking commitments.442 It was 
therefore obvious in this particular case that the rule applied to a situation which was 
by no means “wholly artificial” but rather triggered by an economic and financial 
necessity. Based on the aforementioned case law, an anti-avoidance provision can 
only be accepted to be proportionate if it is specifically designed to target purely 
artificial schemes. Any general rule automatically excluding certain categories of 
operations would not fulfil the principle of proportionality. This was subsequently 
confirmed in a number of cases, such as the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Test 
Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case and the Lammers & Van Cleeff 
case.443 
 
In the Leur-Bloem case and the Kofoed case the Court had to deal with the anti-
abuse provision of the Merger Directive.444 According to Article 11 (1) (a) of the 
Merger Directive a Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw the benefit of the 
Merger Directive if the transaction has as its principal objective or as one of its 
principal objectives tax evasion or tax avoidance. The Court held in Leur-Bloem that 
“(...) in order to determine whether the planned operation has such an objective, the 
competent national authorities cannot confine themselves to applying predetermined 
general criteria but must subject each particular case to a general examination.”445 
Furthermore, “(...) the laying down of a general rule automatically excluding certain 
categories of operations from the tax advantage (...) whether or not there is actually 
tax evasion or tax avoidance, would go further than is necessary for preventing such 
tax evasion or tax avoidance and would undermine the aim pursued by the 
Directive.”446 In the Kofoed case the Court made it clear that Article 11 (1) (a) of the 
Merger Directive reflects the general EU law principle that the abuse of rights is 
prohibited.447 It is clear, therefore, that the conclusions of the Court are equally 
relevant for both primary and secondary EU law.448  
 
The case law outlined above shows, inter alia, that a differentiation has to be made 
between a justification which is based on the mere risk of tax avoidance and a 
justification which is based on the prevention of tax avoidance. The mere risk of tax 
avoidance seems to be an insufficient justification whereas the Court, in principle, 
accepted that the prevention of tax avoidance can be an acceptable justification. 
Furthermore, one might take the position that the necessity that the national 
measures have to be ‘specifically designed to target wholly artificial arrangements’ 
has been somehow mitigated in the Oy AA case.449 In this case, the Court 
considered the national legislation in question to be proportionate despite the fact 
that the legislation was not specifically designed to exclude purely artificial 
                                            
441 Case C-324/00 (Lankhorst-Hohorst), paragraph 37; see also Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 26. 
442 Opinion of the Advocate General Mischo, September 26, 2002, paragraph 92.  
443 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 75; case C-524/04 (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group 
Litigation), paragraphs 72 to 74; case C-105/07 (Lammers & Van Cleeff), paragraphs 26 to 28, 32.  
444 Council Directive 90/434/EEC, dated July 23, 1990 (Merger Directive).  
445 Case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 41.  
446 Case C-28/95 (Leur-Bloem), paragraph 44.  
447 Case C-321/05 (Kofoed), paragraph 38.  
448 See with respect to the free movement of capital and the reference to the Leur-Bloem decision case C-478/98 
(Commission v Belgium), paragraph 45. 
449 Case C-231/05 (Oy AA), July 18, 2007.  
   
 
4.2.10.3.8. Justification Based on the Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance 
 
The Court already had to deal with such an argument in the Commission v France 
case. The French avoir fiscal provisions discriminated against the freedom of 
establishment because they were only available to French resident corporations, 
including wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign corporations, and not to French 
branches of foreign corporations. In this case, the Court held that “(...) the risk of tax 
avoidance cannot be relied upon in this context. Article 52 of the EEC Treaty does 
not permit any derogation from the fundamental principle of freedom of establishment 
on such a ground.” 435 The Court very clearly rejected the argument of the risk of tax 
avoidance and without the restriction “in this context” one could even have the 
impression that such an argument could not be upheld as a justification at all.436 
 
The argument was again put forward by the United Kingdom Government in the ICI 
case. The Government argued that the legislation at issue was designed to reduce 
the risk of tax avoidance. The risk was described as a “(...) possibility for members of 
a consortium to channel the charges of non-resident subsidiaries to a subsidiary 
resident in the United Kingdom and to have profits accrue to non-resident 
subsidiaries. The purpose of the legislation at issue is therefore to prevent the 
creation of foreign subsidiaries from being used as a means of depriving the United 
Kingdom Treasury of taxable revenues.” 437 This, of course, was a very general 
argument and it supposed that the group companies shifted charges (and therefore 
also taxable profits) from one subsidiary to another or from a subsidiary to the parent 
company and vice versa. However, this can theoretically always be the case if a 
company or a group of companies invests abroad. It is even not only restricted to a 
foreign investment by way of establishing a subsidiary but can be equally relevant - at 
least to a certain extent - if a permanent establishment is created in another Member 
State. Thus, in its response to that argument the Court clearly outlined that “(...) the 
legislation at issue in the main proceedings does not have the specific purpose of 
preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up to circumvent United Kingdom tax 
legislation, from attracting tax benefits, but applies generally to all situations in which 
the majority of a group’s subsidiaries are established, for whatever reason, outside 
the United Kingdom. However, the establishment of a company outside the United 
Kingdom does not, of itself, necessarily entail tax avoidance, since that company will 
in any event be subject to the tax legislation of the State of establishment.” 438 This 
was confirmed in the X and Y decision.439 The formula used in the ICI case with 
respect to subsidiaries in other Member States was subsequently completed in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst with respect to parent companies in other Member States. The 
Court concluded that the German thin-capitalisation rule440 “(...) applies generally to 
any situation in which the parent company has its seat, for whatever reason, outside 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Such a situation does not, of itself, entail a risk of 
tax evasion, since such a company will in any event be subject to the tax legislation 
                                            
435 Case C-270/83 (Commission v France), paragraph 25.  
436 Pursuant to Terra / Wattel “(o)ne would have expected that under a rule of reason approach the French 
argument of prevention of abuse would at least in abstracto have been accepted. The Court’s firm rejection of all 
of France’s arguments and justifications is probably explained by the fact that in the case presented there was 
no risk of abuse whatsoever” (Terra / Wattel, European Tax Law, 1997, page 41).   
437 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 25.  
438 Case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 26.  
439 Case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraphs 61 and 62.  
440 Section 8 a of the German Corporate Income Tax Act.  
Chapter 4
166
   
 
Luxembourg. In the first-mentioned situation there was no deduction of withholding 
tax at source whereas in the second-mentioned situation there was a deduction of 
withholding tax at source of 15 percent.458 In essence, the Court accepted the 
difference in treatment, despite the fact that, at that time, the Benelux Convention 
provided for mutual administrative assistance in the recovery of tax claims.459 The 
Court outlined that the resident recipient companies are directly subject to the 
supervision of the Belgian authorities, which is not the case with regard to non-
resident companies inasmuch as, in their case, recovery of the tax requires the 
assistance of the tax authorities of the other Member State.460 Thus, the Court seems 
to be more open now for arguments which are linked to administrative 
inconvenience.461 According to Lang, as far as proportionality is concerned, the Court 
does not seem to require the Member States to impose only the least restrictive 
measure.462  
 
4.2.10.4. Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States 
 
It is clear from the case law of the ECJ that a justification for a restriction on the free 
movement of capital may be seen differently depending upon whether the investment 
is made in a Member State or in a non-member state. In the Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation decision and the A decision the ECJ held that it may be the case 
that a Member State will be able to demonstrate that a restriction on the free 
movement of capital to or from third countries is justified for a particular reason in 
circumstances where that reason would not constitute a valid justification for a 
restriction on capital movements between Member States.463 The same conclusions 
can be drawn from the Rimbaud decision and the Opinion of the Advocate General in 
the Prunus case.464 Apparently, the movement of capital to or from third countries 
takes place in a different legal context from that which occurs within the EU (e.g. with 
respect to the application of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC).465 However, it should 
not be overlooked that a Member State may have concluded double tax conventions 
and / or other agreements with third countries which may result in legal obligations 
which are comparable to those which are existent in the EU. In the latter case, it may 
be difficult for a Member State to demonstrate that a justification is to be “weighted” 
differently. On the other hand, if no (comparable) legal obligations are existent, e.g. in 
relation to a tax haven investment, it is obvious that a restriction on the free 
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arrangements from the tax advantage it confers.450 In other words, the Finnish 
legislation in the Oy AA case was proportionate even though it may (also) target 
intra-group financial transfers which are not purely artificial. However, it is important 
to note that in Oy AA the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of the power to 
impose taxes and the prevention of tax avoidance were considered to be linked and 
accepted as a valid justification. I agree with Thömmes that - given the massive 
impact which the national measure might have in a cross-border situation - it would 
have been enough to rely on the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
and unnecessary to create a link to the prevention of tax avoidance.451 In contrast to 
Marks & Spencer, the case did not deal with the utilisation of losses, but with the 
possibility of transferring profits from one entity to another entity. In a cross border 
situation, such a possibility would jeopardize the basic principle of territoriality.452 For 
this reason, I doubt that the ECJ really changed its position with respect to the 
necessity of ‘specifically designed’ measures in cases where only the prevention of 
tax avoidance is of relevance and not an additional justification. In my opinion, it 
would hardly be understandable to give up the necessity of ‘specifically designed’ 
measures in case of the (mere) prevention of tax avoidance - given the fact that this 
is settled case law and that the least proportionate measure has to be applied. 
Gutmann suggested that the ECJ should re-establish the distinction and - for 
measures aimed at preventing tax evasion - the requirements should be specific and 
apply concretely.453 Essentially, the above conclusions are supported by the decision 
in X Holding where the ECJ considered the need to safeguard the allocation of the 
power to impose taxes between Member States to be a valid and ‘exclusive’ 
justification which does not have to be accompanied by another justification.454  
 
4.2.10.3.9. Justification Based on Administrative Inconvenience 
 
It is settled case law of the ECJ that administrative inconvenience is not capable of 
justifying an infringement of the basic freedoms.455 For example, in the Manninen 
case, which deals with the different treatment of dividends received from domestic 
companies and foreign companies, the ECJ made clear that possible difficulties in 
the determination of the foreign tax actually paid cannot, in any event, justify an 
obstacle to the free movement of capital.456 However, the more recent case law 
shows that the Court can be willing to accept a different treatment between residents 
and non-residents which is essentially linked to administrative inconvenience. In the 
Truck Center case457 the Court had to deal with the question of a different treatment 
of interest payments made between companies resident in Belgium and interest 
payments made from a company resident in Belgium to a company resident in 
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4.2.10.5. The Principle of Proportionality 
 
I will not go into detail of the principle of proportionality since it will be part of the later 
verifications. However, it has to be kept in mind that the restrictive measures have to 
be appropriate for the protection of the recognised public interest and proportionate 
in relation to the goal pursued.476 The proportionality principle can thus be considered 
a - generally recognised - fundamental principle of unwritten primary law which is 
inherent in the system of the TFEU.477 Moreover, it plays a permanent and important 
role in the case law of the ECJ.478 Therefore, the restrictive measures applied by the 
Member States not only have to pass the verification of the ECJ related to the 
possible justifications but also the test of proportionality. That means, even if the ECJ 
accepts one of the arguments put forward by the Member States as a justification for 
a restriction of the basic freedoms, the ECJ must be convinced that the measure 
does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of the provision and that 
there is no measure which is less burdensome.479 The principle of proportionality is 
relevant for both investments in another Member State and investments in a third 
country. In other words, also in case of an investment in a third country, which may 
be covered by the free movement of capital, it is the least restrictive measure which 
has to be applied. Thus, despite the differentiation which might be required with 
respect to the justification for a restriction on the free movement of capital (see 
above), there is still the requirement to pass the test of proportionality.  
 
4.2.11. Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for a Restriction on the Basic 
Freedoms 
 
In the context of this study, the justifications which are explicitly stipulated in the 
TFEU seem to be of less importance compared to the justifications under the rule of 
reason. However, Article 64 (1) of the TFEU (‘standstill clause’) and Article 65 (1) and 
(3) of the TFEU can be of particular relevance with respect to the free movement of 
capital. With respect to the “unwritten” justifications under the rule of reason the 
following justifications were identified and examined in more detail: 
 
- justification based on the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
- justification based on the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax 
base; 
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movement of capital can be justified, in this context, which would not be justified in 
case of an intra-EU investment. In other words, the justifications for a restriction on 
the free movement of capital have to be evaluated very carefully not only with respect 
to the question whether the investment is related to a Member State or a third 
country, but also with respect to the legal context in case of a third country 
investment. According to Cordewener, Kofler and Schindler, a differentiation between 
third countries might be considered, depending upon whether a tax treaty is 
concluded which provides for the exchange of information or not.466 The decision in 
the Commission v. Netherlands case shows that, for example, an argumentation 
which is (just) based on the fact that Council Directive 77/799/EEC is not applicable 
in case of non-member states (here Iceland and Norway) cannot be accepted as a 
kind of ‘knockout argument’.467 In the latter case, the Commission made the point that 
even if it were more difficult to obtain compliance with obligations of international law 
than on the basis of EU law and the EU framework, it does not mean that the 
international conventions are irrelevant when answering the question whether the 
specific measure is proportionate to the objective pursued.468 The ECJ did not give, 
in my opinion, a crystal clear answer, but pointed out that it could not be accepted 
that the Dutch legislation stipulated higher holding thresholds for Iceland and Norway 
in order to benefit from the exemption of dividend taxation at source in the 
Netherlands.469 The higher holding thresholds bear no relation to the conditions 
otherwise required from all companies in order to be entitled to the exemption, e.g. a 
certain legal form, subject to tax on profits and the need to be the final beneficiary of 
the dividends paid.470 It is accepted by the Court that the Dutch tax authorities must 
be in a position to verify compliance, but there is no evidence that a lower holding 
threshold has any impact on the risk that the competent authorities might be given 
erroneous information, particularly as regards the tax treatment in Iceland and 
Norway.471 In my opinion, the ECJ (indirectly) accepts the fact that there can be an 
information exchange on a bilateral basis which deviates from the one existent within 
the EU on the basis of the Council Directive 77/799/EEC but which may have the 
same effect. This was subsequently confirmed in the Commission v. Italy case.472 
Here, the ECJ explicitly stated that the framework of cooperation on the basis of 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC did not exist between a Member State and a non-
member state “(…) when the latter has not entered into any undertaking of mutual 
assistance.”473 In other words, if a cooperation is bilaterally concluded between a 
Member State and a non-member state, this may have the same effect as the 
cooperation on the basis of the latter Council Directive.474 In the Commission v. Italy 
case no such mutual assistance was concluded with Liechtenstein, Iceland and 
Norway and, therefore, the Italian legislation was justified by an overriding reason in 
the public interest concerning the fight against tax evasion.475  
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4.2.10.5. The Principle of Proportionality 
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inherent in the system of the TFEU.477 Moreover, it plays a permanent and important 
role in the case law of the ECJ.478 Therefore, the restrictive measures applied by the 
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in particular, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive which can be of interest and which 
should therefore be examined in some more detail in the following and - with respect 
to CFC legislation - in chapter 8. Regarding the Interest and Royalty Directive, I will 
concentrate my comments on the impact in CFC cases, i.e. it will only be outlined in 
chapter 8. In my opinion, the general aspects of the latter Directive are of no 
particular importance for the purpose of this study. 
 
4.3.1. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
According to the preamble of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive the purpose of the latter 
is, inter alia, “(...) to create within the Community conditions analogous to those of an 
internal market and in order thus to ensure the establishment and effective 
functioning of the common market” and parent-subsidiary operations “(...) ought not 
to be hampered by restrictions, disadvantages or distortions arising in particular form 
the tax provisions of the Member States.” It is therefore required “(...) to introduce (...) 
tax rules which are neutral from the point of view of competition, in order to allow 
enterprises (...) to improve their competitive strength at the international level.” In 
order to achieve this purpose, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive stipulates that the 
Member State of the parent company which receives profit distributions from 
subsidiary companies established in another Member State should either refrain from 
taxing such profits or should tax such profits while providing a tax credit for the taxes 
imposed in the other Member State.484 In other words, the Member State should 
follow the exemption method or the credit method for the avoidance of double 
taxation of dividend payments. The credit method itself is determined as an ordinary 
tax credit system which should be limited to the amount of domestic taxation. It is 
further stipulated that “(...) each Member State shall retain the option of providing that 
any charges relating to the holding and any losses resulting from the distribution of 
the profits of the subsidiary may not be deducted from the taxable profits or the 
parent company. Where the management costs relating to the holding in such a case 
are fixed as a flat rate, the fixed amount may not exceed 5% of the profits distributed 
by the subsidiary.”485 In addition to the clarification of the treatment of dividends in the 
state of the parent company, it is further determined that the Member State of the 
subsidiary company which distributes the profits should refrain - under certain 
circumstances - from deducting a withholding tax. In general, this should be the case 
if the parent company holds a minimum of 25 percent of the capital of the subsidiary 
company.486 It should further be noted that the Directive shall not preclude the 
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of 
fraud or abuse.487 
 
The question arises what has to be considered a “distribution of profits” in the sense 
of the Directive. Article 1 (1) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive solely states that each 
Member State shall apply this Directive “to distributions of profits received by 
companies of that State which come from their subsidiaries of other Member States” 
and “to distributions of profits by companies of that State to companies of other 
Member States of which they are subsidiaries.” The lack of a general definition of 
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- justification based on the general compensation for advantages; 
 
- justification based on a different taxation in another Member State; 
 
- justification based on the principle of territoriality; 
 
- justification based on the protection of a balanced allocation of the power 
to impose taxes between Member States;  
 
- justification based on the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
- justification based on the aim of preventing tax avoidance; 
 
- justification based on administrative inconvenience. 
 
The examination shows that there are limited possibilities for the Member States to 
justify restrictions on the aforementioned basic freedoms. Some justifications have 
never been accepted, especially those which were merely based on budgetary or 
economic reasons, including justifications based on the erosion of the tax base and 
the loss of tax revenue. The justifications based on a general compensation for 
advantages and administrative inconvenience were rejected by the ECJ in earlier 
cases. However, from the more recent case law one might have the impression that 
the ECJ is more open now for arguments which are linked to administrative 
inconvenience. A justification based on a different taxation in another Member State 
must be seen in the context of the respective national legislation. If it comes close (or 
is even identical) to the argument based on the erosion of the tax base, the loss of 
tax revenue or the general compensation for advantages, it cannot be accepted as a 
valid justification. The principle of territoriality was accepted by the ECJ and might 
play a role in future decisions as well. The same is true for a justification based on 
the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States. Other justifications, like the cohesion of the tax system, the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision or the aim of preventing tax avoidance, can be 
acceptable under certain - very limited - circumstances. The reason is that restrictive 
measures applied by the Member States have to be appropriate for the protection of 
the recognised public interest and proportionate to the aim pursued. They must not 
go beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of the provision. Thus, Member 
States are required to apply those measures which are the less restrictive to achieve 
the aim pursued.  
 
4.3. Secondary European Union Law 
 
The secondary EU law in the field of direct taxation which may be of particular 
importance for the further development of an internal market and the cross-border 
investments of multinational enterprises is certainly the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive,480 the Merger Directive,481 the (proposed) Loss Compensation Directive482 
and the Interest and Royalties Directive.483 However, in the context of this study it is, 
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483 Council Directive 2003/49/EC, dated June 3, 2003 (Interest and Royalty Directive).  
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Schönfeld, the limitation to regular distributions would lead to the result that the 
avoidance of double taxation according to Article 4 (1) of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive would not be applicable to fictive distributions - with the effect of a possible 
over-taxation.493 The Position Paper of the Fédération des Experts Comptables 
Européens (FEE) also comes to the conclusion that a deemed dividend falls within 
the scope of the Directive.494 In any event, this question will be examined in more 
detail - with respect to income attributions under a CFC regime - in chapter 8. In this 
context, the amendment to the Directive regarding fiscally transparent entities will be 
considered as well. 
 
4.3.2. Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
The examination of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the case law of the ECJ 
shows that the classification of dividends - in the sense of the latter Directive - must 
be made according to objective characteristics and irrespective of the classification of 
dividends under the national legislation of the Member States. Further, it can be 
concluded that not only regular dividend distributions are within the scope of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, but also hidden dividend distributions. The question 
arises whether other types of deemed dividends as well as current income 
attributions - which are not classified as dividends under national legislation - may fall 
within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The most important income 
attribution in the context of this study is, of course, the attribution based on CFC 
rules. However, this question will exclusively be examined in chapter 8 since it should 
not be part of the general verifications. In this respect, it is of great importance to take 





1.) The case law of the ECJ shows that the investment in another Member State may 
be protected, in principle, by the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide 
services and the free movement of capital. 
 
2.) The concept of establishment was described by the ECJ as the actual pursuit of 
an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period. The case law of the ECJ shows further that - in order to come within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment - the secondary establishment (e.g. in a 
legal entity) must confer definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
3.) It seems to be obvious that not each and every activity can be considered an 
economic activity. In order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment, 
an economic output must exist which is created in the host Member State. The mere 
holding of assets or shares cannot be seen as the pursuing of an economic activity, 
but assets and shares can be seen as an “instrument” which may be utilised to carry 
out economic activities. 
 
4.) The economic activity must be pursued through a fixed establishment. Based on 
the case law of the ECJ, such an establishment requires (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management and (iii) has to be materially equipped for the 
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“distribution of profits” in the Directive leaves some room for interpretation. With 
respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive the Court stated in the Athinaiki Zythopoiia 
case 488 that “(…) the nature of a tax, duty or charge must be determined by the 
Court, under Community law, according to the objective characteristics by which it is 
levied, irrespective of its classification under national law.”489 Therefore, it is an 
autonomous classification which has to be made by the Court and which is, in 
principle, unconnected to the national law of the Member State. The autonomous 
classification is, of course, not only relevant for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive but 
for any secondary EU law. It was subsequently also confirmed for the Merger 
Directive in the Kofoed case and the A.T. case and can therefore be considered 
settled case law of the ECJ.490  
 
Interestingly, in his Opinion to the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, Advocate General Mischo 
concluded that the jurisprudence of the Court in the aforementioned Athinaiki 
Zythopoiia case could be transferred to the situation of a hidden distribution of profit. 
He outlined that “(i)t seems to me that the considerations which led the Court of 
Justice, in the Athinaiki Zythopoiia case, (…) to classify the tax at issue in the main 
proceedings as a withholding tax are present in this case also.”491 It is important to 
note that the classification as a withholding tax under Article 5 (1) of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive and the identification of substitutes to such a tax on the level of 
the state of the subsidiary company are not the same as the classification of a profit 
distribution on the level of the state of the parent company. The Directive does not 
give any hint whether the provisions should also apply to deemed dividends. It seems 
to be quite logical, in my opinion, that hidden distributions of profit are covered by the 
Directive in the same way as any other regular (overt) dividend payment. One must 
be aware of the fact that a hidden distribution of profit typically requires some sort of 
(hidden) advantage for the shareholder or, at least, is somehow triggered by the 
shareholder relationship. That means it is either a direct reduction of the net asset 
value of the company or the company gives away the opportunity to increase the net 
asset value (e.g. by not charging services to the shareholder or related parties). The 
tax concept of a hidden distribution of profit focuses on the identification and the 
separation of profit and loss relevant transactions from mere profit distributions. It is 
therefore consistent, in my opinion, to treat the latter element in exactly the same 
manner as any regular distribution which is based on a formal decision of the 
shareholders. Pursuant to Scherer and Helminen, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
may be interpreted as also applying to such situations in which the domestic tax law 
of a Member State subjects a fictive distribution to taxation, as if an actual distribution 
had been made.492 Schönfeld takes the same position, because this would otherwise 
allow the Member States to circumvent the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. According to 
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Schönfeld, the limitation to regular distributions would lead to the result that the 
avoidance of double taxation according to Article 4 (1) of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive would not be applicable to fictive distributions - with the effect of a possible 
over-taxation.493 The Position Paper of the Fédération des Experts Comptables 
Européens (FEE) also comes to the conclusion that a deemed dividend falls within 
the scope of the Directive.494 In any event, this question will be examined in more 
detail - with respect to income attributions under a CFC regime - in chapter 8. In this 
context, the amendment to the Directive regarding fiscally transparent entities will be 
considered as well. 
 
4.3.2. Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
The examination of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the case law of the ECJ 
shows that the classification of dividends - in the sense of the latter Directive - must 
be made according to objective characteristics and irrespective of the classification of 
dividends under the national legislation of the Member States. Further, it can be 
concluded that not only regular dividend distributions are within the scope of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, but also hidden dividend distributions. The question 
arises whether other types of deemed dividends as well as current income 
attributions - which are not classified as dividends under national legislation - may fall 
within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The most important income 
attribution in the context of this study is, of course, the attribution based on CFC 
rules. However, this question will exclusively be examined in chapter 8 since it should 
not be part of the general verifications. In this respect, it is of great importance to take 





1.) The case law of the ECJ shows that the investment in another Member State may 
be protected, in principle, by the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide 
services and the free movement of capital. 
 
2.) The concept of establishment was described by the ECJ as the actual pursuit of 
an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period. The case law of the ECJ shows further that - in order to come within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment - the secondary establishment (e.g. in a 
legal entity) must confer definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
3.) It seems to be obvious that not each and every activity can be considered an 
economic activity. In order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment, 
an economic output must exist which is created in the host Member State. The mere 
holding of assets or shares cannot be seen as the pursuing of an economic activity, 
but assets and shares can be seen as an “instrument” which may be utilised to carry 
out economic activities. 
 
4.) The economic activity must be pursued through a fixed establishment. Based on 
the case law of the ECJ, such an establishment requires (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management and (iii) has to be materially equipped for the 
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“distribution of profits” in the Directive leaves some room for interpretation. With 
respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive the Court stated in the Athinaiki Zythopoiia 
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principle, unconnected to the national law of the Member State. The autonomous 
classification is, of course, not only relevant for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive but 
for any secondary EU law. It was subsequently also confirmed for the Merger 
Directive in the Kofoed case and the A.T. case and can therefore be considered 
settled case law of the ECJ.490  
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affected. If the purpose of the legislation is the application to investments which 
confer a definite influence over a company’s decisions, it is the freedom of 
establishment which is to be exclusively examined. The purpose of the legislation 
can be identified not only by quantitative elements (e.g. percentage of 
participation), but also by qualitative elements (e.g. collaboration of shareholders 
to achieve a definite influence). If the purpose of the legislation is the general 
application to all types of portfolio and entrepreneurial investments, the freedom 
of establishment and the free movement of capital can, in principle, both be 
affected. However, if the actual investment confers definite influence over a 
company’s decisions and the purpose of the legislation is linked to the objective of 
exercising the freedom of establishment, the ECJ - in its examination - gives 
preference to the freedom of establishment. In contrast thereto, if the link does not 
exist and the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ prevails, the ECJ gives preference 
to the free movement of capital. If the examination results in the conclusion that a 
restriction on one of the freedoms exists which cannot be justified, the ECJ 
refrains from additionally examining whether the TFEU provisions on the other 
freedom also preclude the respective legislation. 
 
- The freedom of establishment vs. the freedom to provide services: the case law of 
the ECJ made it clear that the freedom of establishment does not necessarily 
prevail over the freedom to provide services. In Fidium Finanz the ECJ held that 
Article 57 (1) of the TFEU relates to the definition of the notion of ‘services’ and 
does not establish any order of priority between the two basic freedoms. In the 
Cadbury Schweppes case, the ECJ concluded that - with respect to the UK CFC 
legislation - the restrictive effects on the freedom to provide services are an 
unavoidable consequence of any restriction on the freedom of establishment. 
 
- The freedom to provide services vs. the free movement of capital: In the 
relationship between Article 56 of the TFEU and Article 63 of the TFEU it is - 
again - the more recent case law of the ECJ which provides a clearer picture. 
Based on this case law, it seems that the purpose of the national legislation is 
decisive. If the national legislation clearly focuses on services, e.g. the 
supervision of services, there is apparently no room for any (additional) 
examination of the free movement of capital. On the other hand, one should also 
conclude from this jurisprudence that national legislation which is foremost 
directed towards the investment (as such) - and not the services provided by the 
investment (e.g. the respective legal entity) - the prevailing freedom should be the 
free movement of capital and not the freedom to provide services. 
 
9.) It is obvious that the fact that one basic freedom may prevail over another basic 
freedom can have important consequences. The most important consequence is, in 
my opinion and in the context of this study, related to the free movement of capital: 
the latter freedom is the only basic freedom which can also be invoked in case of 
investments in non-member states. Thus, if another freedom prevails over the free 
movement of capital - with the effect that Article 63 of the TFEU cannot be invoked 
anymore - the door for a protection of the investment in a non-member state (based 
on the TFEU) is closed. However, what is clear from the more recent case law is the 
fact that the purpose of the national legislation remains the decisive element for the 
decision whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital will be 
examined. Consequently, if the national legislation is not linked to the objective of 
   
 
carrying out of the respective functions. Essentially, the establishment must be 
sufficiently equipped (premises, management, staff, equipment) in order to provide 
the respective services or any other functions on its own and without being a mere 
tool of execution of, for example, the parent company. 
 
5.) In order to have a definite influence over the company’s decisions and to 
determine its activities it is not necessarily required that a single shareholder has a 
majority interest in the company. In the SGI case a shareholding of 34 percent was 
sufficient to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment. The ECJ case 
law shows that even a combination of relatively low minority holdings of about 10 to 
12.50 percent per shareholder, like in Columbus Container, can be sufficient if further 
elements are existent which show that a definite influence exists. This is the case, for 
example, if shareholders act together, e.g. by a common representative, and the 
(combined) shareholding confers such a definite influence. In general, no clear 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights can be derived from the case law. In my 
opinion, the national commercial and company law has to be referred to, but it seems 
to be apparent that a definite influence may also exist on a factual or contractual 
basis. 
 
6.) The freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity from either within the Member State of primary establishment towards the 
recipient in another Member State or with a temporary link to the Member State of the 
recipient of the services. Apparently, the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services both require the actual pursuit of an economic activity. Hence, 
there is a certain overlapping of the requirements to come within the scope of the 
latter two freedoms. Nonetheless, it is unlikely - at least for investments in the context 
of this study - that two activities will be covered simultaneously by the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. 
 
7.) The scope of the free movement of capital is much broader than the scope of the 
freedom of establishment (and basically also the freedom to provide services) and 
also encompasses any type of portfolio investments. A significant difference to the 
freedom of establishment is therefore the fact that - in order to come within the scope 
of Article 63 of the TFEU - the investment in a company in another Member State 
neither requires a definite influence over the company’s decisions nor the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity. Moreover, it is important to note that the scope of the 
free movement of capital is not limited to investments in other Member States but 
Article 63 of the TFEU is equally relevant for investments in non-member states. 
 
8.) The scope of the above basic freedoms is one thing, but the “ranking” of these 
freedoms among each other is another. In other words, the decisive question in a 
situation in which the basic freedoms are theoretically affected simultaneously is 
whether there is a certain form of order among these freedoms and whether there is 
a prevailing freedom which takes preference over another freedom (or other 
freedoms). The outcome of the examinations of the TFEU and the case law of the 
ECJ can be summarised as follows: 
 
- The freedom of establishment vs. the free movement of capital: the more recent 
case law of the ECJ provides a better understanding of the relationship between 
these two freedoms. Based on this case law, the purpose of the national 
legislation must be considered for the decision which of the basic freedoms is 
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affected. If the purpose of the legislation is the application to investments which 
confer a definite influence over a company’s decisions, it is the freedom of 
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does not establish any order of priority between the two basic freedoms. In the 
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- The freedom to provide services vs. the free movement of capital: In the 
relationship between Article 56 of the TFEU and Article 63 of the TFEU it is - 
again - the more recent case law of the ECJ which provides a clearer picture. 
Based on this case law, it seems that the purpose of the national legislation is 
decisive. If the national legislation clearly focuses on services, e.g. the 
supervision of services, there is apparently no room for any (additional) 
examination of the free movement of capital. On the other hand, one should also 
conclude from this jurisprudence that national legislation which is foremost 
directed towards the investment (as such) - and not the services provided by the 
investment (e.g. the respective legal entity) - the prevailing freedom should be the 
free movement of capital and not the freedom to provide services. 
 
9.) It is obvious that the fact that one basic freedom may prevail over another basic 
freedom can have important consequences. The most important consequence is, in 
my opinion and in the context of this study, related to the free movement of capital: 
the latter freedom is the only basic freedom which can also be invoked in case of 
investments in non-member states. Thus, if another freedom prevails over the free 
movement of capital - with the effect that Article 63 of the TFEU cannot be invoked 
anymore - the door for a protection of the investment in a non-member state (based 
on the TFEU) is closed. However, what is clear from the more recent case law is the 
fact that the purpose of the national legislation remains the decisive element for the 
decision whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital will be 
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law shows that even a combination of relatively low minority holdings of about 10 to 
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elements are existent which show that a definite influence exists. This is the case, for 
example, if shareholders act together, e.g. by a common representative, and the 
(combined) shareholding confers such a definite influence. In general, no clear 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights can be derived from the case law. In my 
opinion, the national commercial and company law has to be referred to, but it seems 
to be apparent that a definite influence may also exist on a factual or contractual 
basis. 
 
6.) The freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity from either within the Member State of primary establishment towards the 
recipient in another Member State or with a temporary link to the Member State of the 
recipient of the services. Apparently, the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services both require the actual pursuit of an economic activity. Hence, 
there is a certain overlapping of the requirements to come within the scope of the 
latter two freedoms. Nonetheless, it is unlikely - at least for investments in the context 
of this study - that two activities will be covered simultaneously by the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. 
 
7.) The scope of the free movement of capital is much broader than the scope of the 
freedom of establishment (and basically also the freedom to provide services) and 
also encompasses any type of portfolio investments. A significant difference to the 
freedom of establishment is therefore the fact that - in order to come within the scope 
of Article 63 of the TFEU - the investment in a company in another Member State 
neither requires a definite influence over the company’s decisions nor the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity. Moreover, it is important to note that the scope of the 
free movement of capital is not limited to investments in other Member States but 
Article 63 of the TFEU is equally relevant for investments in non-member states. 
 
8.) The scope of the above basic freedoms is one thing, but the “ranking” of these 
freedoms among each other is another. In other words, the decisive question in a 
situation in which the basic freedoms are theoretically affected simultaneously is 
whether there is a certain form of order among these freedoms and whether there is 
a prevailing freedom which takes preference over another freedom (or other 
freedoms). The outcome of the examinations of the TFEU and the case law of the 
ECJ can be summarised as follows: 
 
- The freedom of establishment vs. the free movement of capital: the more recent 
case law of the ECJ provides a better understanding of the relationship between 
these two freedoms. Based on this case law, the purpose of the national 
legislation must be considered for the decision which of the basic freedoms is 
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14.) With regard to the justifications, it is clear from the case law of the ECJ that it 
can be necessary to make a differentiation between an investment in a Member State 
and an investment in a non-member state. In other words, it may be the case that a 
restriction on the free movement of capital to or from third countries is justified for a 
particular reason in circumstances where that reason would not constitute a valid 
justification for a restriction on capital movements between Member States. The 
movement of capital to or from third countries takes place in a different legal context 
from that which occurs within the EU, e.g. with respect to the application of the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC. Nevertheless, a Member State may have concluded 
double tax conventions and / or other agreements with third countries which may 
result in legal obligations which are comparable to those which are existent in the EU. 
In this case, it may be difficult for a Member State to demonstrate that a justification 
is to be “weighted” differently. Therefore, the differentiation is not limited to the 
question whether the country of investment is a Member State or non-member state, 
but also requires a differentiation among the non-member states. However, it is clear 
that the national measure must still be proportionate in relation to the aim pursued, 
no matter whether it is related to Member States or non-member states. 
 
15.) From the perspective of secondary EU law it is the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
which might be of general importance. In my opinion, the examination of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive and the jurisprudence of the ECJ in this respect shows that the 
classification of dividends - in the sense of the latter Directive - must be made 
according to objective characteristics and irrespective of the classification of 
dividends under the national legislation of the Member States. In principle, this covers 
regular and hidden dividend distributions. The question whether other types of 
income attributions are covered by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, namely those 
which are based on the application of CFC rules, will be examined in chapter 8. The 
amendment to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive will be taken into account in this 























   
 
exercising the freedom of establishment and the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ 
prevails, there will be an exclusive examination of the free movement of capital. 
 
10.) Given the importance of the basic freedoms for individuals and entities, it is 
obvious that situations exist in which the basic freedoms are abusively invoked just 
for the purpose of taking advantage of these freedoms without being entitled to do 
so. It is equally obvious that Member States apply rules in order to prevent such 
situations. However, the case law of the ECJ shows that the abuse of the basic 
freedoms must be determined case-by-case and cannot be generalised. In my 
opinion, the case law with respect to VAT does not lead to another outcome. 
 
11.) The question whether the application of national measures leads to a restriction 
on the exercising of the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services 
and / or the free movement of capital shall be examined in the context of the concrete 
legislation. This question will therefore be examined exclusively in chapter 8. 
 
12.) There are a number of justifications for a restriction on the exercising of the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital. The justifications are either included in the TFEU itself or can be derived from 
the case law of the ECJ. The latter justifications are recognised under the rule of 
reason as overriding reasons of public interest and are of great importance, 
especially in cases dealing with direct taxation. The examination was mainly 
concentrated on justifications based on the rule of reason which have already come 
up in previous decisions and which might somehow be relevant in the context of this 
study. Thus, the examination of the justifications should provide a general basis for 
the more specific verifications in chapter 8. 
 
13.) The examination shows that there are limited possibilities for the Member States 
to justify restrictions on the aforementioned basic freedoms. Some justifications have 
never been accepted, especially those which were merely based on budgetary or 
economic reasons, including justifications based on the erosion of the tax base and 
the loss of tax revenue, as well as the general compensation for advantages. 
Administrative inconvenience was rejected by the ECJ in earlier cases, but from the 
more recent case law one might have the impression that the ECJ is more open now 
for arguments which are linked to administrative inconvenience. A justification based 
on a different taxation in another Member State must be seen in the context of the 
respective national legislation. If it comes close (or is even identical) to the argument 
based on the erosion of the tax base, the loss of tax revenue or the general 
compensation for advantages, it cannot be accepted as a valid justification. The 
principle of territoriality and the protection of a balanced allocation of power to impose 
taxes between Member States were both accepted by the ECJ and might play a role 
in future decisions as well. Other justifications, like the cohesion of the tax system, 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision or the aim of preventing tax avoidance, can be 
acceptable under certain - very limited - circumstances. The reason is that restrictive 
measures applied by the Member States have to be appropriate for the protection of 
the recognised public interest and proportionate to the aim pursued. They cannot go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of the provision. Thus, Member States 
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exercising the freedom of establishment and the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ 
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for the purpose of taking advantage of these freedoms without being entitled to do 
so. It is equally obvious that Member States apply rules in order to prevent such 
situations. However, the case law of the ECJ shows that the abuse of the basic 
freedoms must be determined case-by-case and cannot be generalised. In my 
opinion, the case law with respect to VAT does not lead to another outcome. 
 
11.) The question whether the application of national measures leads to a restriction 
on the exercising of the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services 
and / or the free movement of capital shall be examined in the context of the concrete 
legislation. This question will therefore be examined exclusively in chapter 8. 
 
12.) There are a number of justifications for a restriction on the exercising of the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital. The justifications are either included in the TFEU itself or can be derived from 
the case law of the ECJ. The latter justifications are recognised under the rule of 
reason as overriding reasons of public interest and are of great importance, 
especially in cases dealing with direct taxation. The examination was mainly 
concentrated on justifications based on the rule of reason which have already come 
up in previous decisions and which might somehow be relevant in the context of this 
study. Thus, the examination of the justifications should provide a general basis for 
the more specific verifications in chapter 8. 
 
13.) The examination shows that there are limited possibilities for the Member States 
to justify restrictions on the aforementioned basic freedoms. Some justifications have 
never been accepted, especially those which were merely based on budgetary or 
economic reasons, including justifications based on the erosion of the tax base and 
the loss of tax revenue, as well as the general compensation for advantages. 
Administrative inconvenience was rejected by the ECJ in earlier cases, but from the 
more recent case law one might have the impression that the ECJ is more open now 
for arguments which are linked to administrative inconvenience. A justification based 
on a different taxation in another Member State must be seen in the context of the 
respective national legislation. If it comes close (or is even identical) to the argument 
based on the erosion of the tax base, the loss of tax revenue or the general 
compensation for advantages, it cannot be accepted as a valid justification. The 
principle of territoriality and the protection of a balanced allocation of power to impose 
taxes between Member States were both accepted by the ECJ and might play a role 
in future decisions as well. Other justifications, like the cohesion of the tax system, 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision or the aim of preventing tax avoidance, can be 
acceptable under certain - very limited - circumstances. The reason is that restrictive 
measures applied by the Member States have to be appropriate for the protection of 
the recognised public interest and proportionate to the aim pursued. They cannot go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the aim of the provision. Thus, Member States 
are required to apply those measures which are the less restrictive to achieve the aim 
pursued. 
 
     
 
Part III - CFC and FIF Legislation in the European Union and the Alternative 
CSC Concept  
 




The controlled foreign company rules (CFC rules)1 are an important part of the 
domestic legislation in nearly half of the EU Member States2 and it is - in my opinion - 
likely that the number of countries which enact a CFC regime will increase in the 
future.3 The reasons are, inter alia, the immense differences in corporate income tax 
rates - on a global scale - and the increased possibility to shift capital from one 
country to another and therefore to earn income even in the remotest parts of the 
world.4  
 
In addition, some of the Member States enacted so-called foreign investment fund 
rules (FIF rules). However, the latter rules are not as widespread as the CFC rules 
and can, in general, be seen as a part of the domestic CFC legislation.5 Thus, in the 
following, the term “CFC” will cover both, the CFC and FIF rules, unless a 
differentiation is required or more appropriate. The main differences between CFC 
and FIF rules will be outlined below.  
 
A significant number of the Member States which have not enacted CFC rules apply 
tax rules which can have a similar economic effect, even though they cannot be 
considered CFC rules in a narrower sense.6 The various types and the specific 
elements of European CFC rules will be verified in detail in the subsequent chapter. 
In the following, the general aspects of CFC taxation will be outlined: the current 
taxation of income, the basic requirements which exist in almost all of the countries 
which apply such rules, the main differences between CFC and FIF rules, and the 
                                            
1 Sometimes also called controlled foreign corporation rules.  
2 In the year 2005, 12 of the 25 Member States (48 percent) have enacted CFC rules (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom). See in this respect 
also Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislations in the EU, April 2002, and the earlier overview of Kaufmann, Controlled Foreign Companies 
(CFC)-Gesetzgebung - Übersicht über die Rechtslage in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Steuer und Wirtschaft 
International 2001, page 16 et seq.; national reports are included in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004; International 
Fiscal Association (IFA), Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current 
Measures and Emerging Trends, 2001 San Francisco Congress; Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation - Pushing the Boundaries, The Chartered Institute of Taxation, 1998 (overview in the 
appendix). See also the earlier overview in: OECD - Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislation, 1996.  
3 See also Lang, CFC-Gesetzgebung und Gemeinschaftsrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 217 (the 
English version of the article “CFC Legislation and Community Law” was published in European Taxation 
2002, page 374 et seq.; see also the OECD recommendations included in the OECD Report on Harmful Tax 
Competition (see in more detail below). The Austrian Ministry of Finance has presented a draft of an Austrian 
Foreign Tax Act (CFC legislation), included as an annex to Gassner / Lang / Lechner, Der Entwurf eines 
österreichischen Außensteuergesetzes - Grenzen der Gestaltung (2001).  
4 This is not only true for the „normal“ passive activities but also for business activities which have come up in 
the course of the last few years, e.g. electronic commerce (see with respect to e-commerce and CFC taxation: 
Doernberg / Hinnekens / Hellerstein / Li, Electronic Commerce and Multijurisdictional Taxation - Applying 
Current Multijurisdictional Income Tax Rules to Electronic Commerce, 2001, pages 320 - 337). 
5 For example in Germany.  
6 For example, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (see in this respect also FEE Position Paper,  
page 5).  
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Part III - CFC and FIF Legislation in the European Union and the Alternative 
CSC Concept  
 




The controlled foreign company rules (CFC rules)1 are an important part of the 
domestic legislation in nearly half of the EU Member States2 and it is - in my opinion - 
likely that the number of countries which enact a CFC regime will increase in the 
future.3 The reasons are, inter alia, the immense differences in corporate income tax 
rates - on a global scale - and the increased possibility to shift capital from one 
country to another and therefore to earn income even in the remotest parts of the 
world.4  
 
In addition, some of the Member States enacted so-called foreign investment fund 
rules (FIF rules). However, the latter rules are not as widespread as the CFC rules 
and can, in general, be seen as a part of the domestic CFC legislation.5 Thus, in the 
following, the term “CFC” will cover both, the CFC and FIF rules, unless a 
differentiation is required or more appropriate. The main differences between CFC 
and FIF rules will be outlined below.  
 
A significant number of the Member States which have not enacted CFC rules apply 
tax rules which can have a similar economic effect, even though they cannot be 
considered CFC rules in a narrower sense.6 The various types and the specific 
elements of European CFC rules will be verified in detail in the subsequent chapter. 
In the following, the general aspects of CFC taxation will be outlined: the current 
taxation of income, the basic requirements which exist in almost all of the countries 
which apply such rules, the main differences between CFC and FIF rules, and the 
                                            
1 Sometimes also called controlled foreign corporation rules.  
2 In the year 2005, 12 of the 25 Member States (48 percent) have enacted CFC rules (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom). See in this respect 
also Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislations in the EU, April 2002, and the earlier overview of Kaufmann, Controlled Foreign Companies 
(CFC)-Gesetzgebung - Übersicht über die Rechtslage in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Steuer und Wirtschaft 
International 2001, page 16 et seq.; national reports are included in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004; International 
Fiscal Association (IFA), Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current 
Measures and Emerging Trends, 2001 San Francisco Congress; Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation - Pushing the Boundaries, The Chartered Institute of Taxation, 1998 (overview in the 
appendix). See also the earlier overview in: OECD - Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislation, 1996.  
3 See also Lang, CFC-Gesetzgebung und Gemeinschaftsrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 217 (the 
English version of the article “CFC Legislation and Community Law” was published in European Taxation 
2002, page 374 et seq.; see also the OECD recommendations included in the OECD Report on Harmful Tax 
Competition (see in more detail below). The Austrian Ministry of Finance has presented a draft of an Austrian 
Foreign Tax Act (CFC legislation), included as an annex to Gassner / Lang / Lechner, Der Entwurf eines 
österreichischen Außensteuergesetzes - Grenzen der Gestaltung (2001).  
4 This is not only true for the „normal“ passive activities but also for business activities which have come up in 
the course of the last few years, e.g. electronic commerce (see with respect to e-commerce and CFC taxation: 
Doernberg / Hinnekens / Hellerstein / Li, Electronic Commerce and Multijurisdictional Taxation - Applying 
Current Multijurisdictional Income Tax Rules to Electronic Commerce, 2001, pages 320 - 337). 
5 For example in Germany.  
6 For example, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (see in this respect also FEE Position Paper,  
page 5).  























































     
 
c.) The income must be low-taxed  
 
The requirement of low-taxation is of importance in all of the countries which 
apply CFC regimes. The current taxation of income only takes place if the 
effective tax rate in the foreign country deviates to a certain predetermined 
extent from the tax rate theoretically applicable on the respective income in the 
residence country of the shareholder.13 
 
The basic requirements will be outlined in more detail below. However, they can give 
a first impression on the concept and therefore “the face” of CFC regimes. It is not 
only the effect which is similar in the countries which apply such legislation but also 
the basic requirements for the application of the CFC taxation.  
 
5.4. The Main Differences between CFC and FIF Rules 
 
Very generally, the main differences between CFC and FIF rules can be described as 
follows: (i) FIF rules already apply to very small and insignificant shareholdings, 
whereas CFC rules require in most cases a participation of at least 10 percent or 
more, and (ii) FIF rules are often only applicable to certain types of passive 
investment income but not generally to the wide range of passive income which is in 
the scope of CFC taxation. The reason for the low participation threshold and the 
concentration on passive investment income is mostly due to the fear of an increased 
risk of national tax base erosion. Residents may defer domestic taxation by acquiring 
shares in - for example - mutual funds. If such funds are widely owned, they will not 
be controlled by a small group of resident shareholders; nor will any one resident 
shareholder own a significant interest in the fund.14 Thus, such investors will not be 
subject to CFC taxation since they do not reach the required participation threshold. 
The FIF provisions can basically be seen as a part of (or a supplement to) the CFC 
rules which are often embedded in the respective CFC legislation. In some cases, I 
would even consider the CFC legislation to be a “mixture” of CFC and FIF rules. For 
example, the German Foreign Tax Act15 requires, in general, that German investors 
own, directly or indirectly, at least 50 percent of the shares, the voting rights, or 
dividend rights at the end of the financial year. If the threshold of 50 percent is 
reached, the tainted income will be allocated to all resident shareholders regardless 
of the size of their shareholding in the foreign entity.16 Thus, the small investment in a 
mutual fund - to a large extent owned by German investors - will already be covered 
by the CFC regime.17 In addition, a separate threshold exists for passive income of a 
capital investment kind: if the income of the foreign entity includes passive income of 
a capital investment kind and the shareholding in the foreign entity is at least one 
percent, the income will be allocated to the resident shareholder unless the income of 
a capital investment kind comprises only a minor part of the whole income.18 If the 
foreign entity exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital 
                                            
13 Typically stipulated as a fraction or a percentage of the domestic tax rate.  
14 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 101. 
15 The German CFC legislation is embedded in the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz).  
16 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
17 Similar provisions exist in other EU countries, even though a threshold often remains, e.g. in Portugal 
(reduction to 10 percent) and France (reduction to 5 percent). See in more detail below.  
18 Thus, the rules apply even though German shareholders own – in total – less than 50 percent in the CFC.  
     
 
policy rationale for those regimes. I will go into detail of the concept of deferral, the 
alleged alternative measures, and the ability-to-pay principle in the context of CFC 
taxation. Moreover, the legislation will be compared to the taxation of permanent 
establishments and partnerships. Last of all, the OECD and EU efforts against 
harmful tax competition will be outlined.   
 
5.2. The Current Taxation of CFC Income 
 
What makes the CFC taxation somehow “unique” is the fact that income derived by a 
foreign legal entity is subject to current taxation in the hands of the resident 
shareholder. That means, despite the fact that the foreign legal entity is considered to 
be non-transparent for tax purposes,7 the income is directly allocable to the resident 
taxpayer - even though an actual profit distribution does not take place. This has the 
significant consequence - for tax purposes - that the income derived by the foreign 
legal entity cannot be sheltered through the corporate veil. The current allocation of 
income according to the CFC rules takes away any flexibility with respect to the 
question if and when the income of the foreign legal entity becomes subject to 
domestic taxation through an actual profit distribution. Moreover, and even more 
important, it can lead to the taxation of foreign source income on a domestic 
corporate level which would otherwise be outside of the scope of domestic taxation.8  
 
5.3. The Basic Requirements for the Application of CFC Rules  
 
There are three basic requirements for the application of CFC rules which exist in 
almost all of the EU Member States which have enacted a CFC regime. The basic 
requirements are: 
 
 a.) The foreign entity must derive certain passive income (tainted income)  
 
With very few exceptions, the CFC rules of the EU Member States only apply 
to certain passive income9 and to income which is derived by entities with 
mainly passive activities.10 Active income is typically outside of the scope of 
CFC regimes: Either through a direct active-passive separation (transactional 
approach) or through the provision of exemptions for active businesses (entity 
approach).11 Thus, there is - in general - no unlimited allocation of income 
based on the CFC regimes. 
 
b.) The ownership in the foreign entity  
 
All of the countries which apply a CFC and FIF taxation require a shareholding 
in the foreign entity.12 In most cases, a minimum threshold is necessary for the 
application of the CFC and FIF taxation. The percentage of shareholding, 
however, can deviate considerably.  
 
                                            
7 From the perspective of the state of residence of the shareholder.  
8 In case the exemption method is applied to the profit distributions.  
9 The so-called transactional approach.  
10 The so-called entity approach.  
11 In case of an entity approach: If the foreign company carries on mainly active businesses.  
12 Leaving aside the constructive ownership rules. The constructive ownership rules will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
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5.4. The Main Differences between CFC and FIF Rules 
 
Very generally, the main differences between CFC and FIF rules can be described as 
follows: (i) FIF rules already apply to very small and insignificant shareholdings, 
whereas CFC rules require in most cases a participation of at least 10 percent or 
more, and (ii) FIF rules are often only applicable to certain types of passive 
investment income but not generally to the wide range of passive income which is in 
the scope of CFC taxation. The reason for the low participation threshold and the 
concentration on passive investment income is mostly due to the fear of an increased 
risk of national tax base erosion. Residents may defer domestic taxation by acquiring 
shares in - for example - mutual funds. If such funds are widely owned, they will not 
be controlled by a small group of resident shareholders; nor will any one resident 
shareholder own a significant interest in the fund.14 Thus, such investors will not be 
subject to CFC taxation since they do not reach the required participation threshold. 
The FIF provisions can basically be seen as a part of (or a supplement to) the CFC 
rules which are often embedded in the respective CFC legislation. In some cases, I 
would even consider the CFC legislation to be a “mixture” of CFC and FIF rules. For 
example, the German Foreign Tax Act15 requires, in general, that German investors 
own, directly or indirectly, at least 50 percent of the shares, the voting rights, or 
dividend rights at the end of the financial year. If the threshold of 50 percent is 
reached, the tainted income will be allocated to all resident shareholders regardless 
of the size of their shareholding in the foreign entity.16 Thus, the small investment in a 
mutual fund - to a large extent owned by German investors - will already be covered 
by the CFC regime.17 In addition, a separate threshold exists for passive income of a 
capital investment kind: if the income of the foreign entity includes passive income of 
a capital investment kind and the shareholding in the foreign entity is at least one 
percent, the income will be allocated to the resident shareholder unless the income of 
a capital investment kind comprises only a minor part of the whole income.18 If the 
foreign entity exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital 
                                            
13 Typically stipulated as a fraction or a percentage of the domestic tax rate.  
14 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 101. 
15 The German CFC legislation is embedded in the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz).  
16 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
17 Similar provisions exist in other EU countries, even though a threshold often remains, e.g. in Portugal 
(reduction to 10 percent) and France (reduction to 5 percent). See in more detail below.  
18 Thus, the rules apply even though German shareholders own – in total – less than 50 percent in the CFC.  
     
 
policy rationale for those regimes. I will go into detail of the concept of deferral, the 
alleged alternative measures, and the ability-to-pay principle in the context of CFC 
taxation. Moreover, the legislation will be compared to the taxation of permanent 
establishments and partnerships. Last of all, the OECD and EU efforts against 
harmful tax competition will be outlined.   
 
5.2. The Current Taxation of CFC Income 
 
What makes the CFC taxation somehow “unique” is the fact that income derived by a 
foreign legal entity is subject to current taxation in the hands of the resident 
shareholder. That means, despite the fact that the foreign legal entity is considered to 
be non-transparent for tax purposes,7 the income is directly allocable to the resident 
taxpayer - even though an actual profit distribution does not take place. This has the 
significant consequence - for tax purposes - that the income derived by the foreign 
legal entity cannot be sheltered through the corporate veil. The current allocation of 
income according to the CFC rules takes away any flexibility with respect to the 
question if and when the income of the foreign legal entity becomes subject to 
domestic taxation through an actual profit distribution. Moreover, and even more 
important, it can lead to the taxation of foreign source income on a domestic 
corporate level which would otherwise be outside of the scope of domestic taxation.8  
 
5.3. The Basic Requirements for the Application of CFC Rules  
 
There are three basic requirements for the application of CFC rules which exist in 
almost all of the EU Member States which have enacted a CFC regime. The basic 
requirements are: 
 
 a.) The foreign entity must derive certain passive income (tainted income)  
 
With very few exceptions, the CFC rules of the EU Member States only apply 
to certain passive income9 and to income which is derived by entities with 
mainly passive activities.10 Active income is typically outside of the scope of 
CFC regimes: Either through a direct active-passive separation (transactional 
approach) or through the provision of exemptions for active businesses (entity 
approach).11 Thus, there is - in general - no unlimited allocation of income 
based on the CFC regimes. 
 
b.) The ownership in the foreign entity  
 
All of the countries which apply a CFC and FIF taxation require a shareholding 
in the foreign entity.12 In most cases, a minimum threshold is necessary for the 
application of the CFC and FIF taxation. The percentage of shareholding, 
however, can deviate considerably.  
 
                                            
7 From the perspective of the state of residence of the shareholder.  
8 In case the exemption method is applied to the profit distributions.  
9 The so-called transactional approach.  
10 The so-called entity approach.  
11 In case of an entity approach: If the foreign company carries on mainly active businesses.  
12 Leaving aside the constructive ownership rules. The constructive ownership rules will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
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The structure of the CFC regimes emphasises the general anti-deferral approach 
which - of course - not only prevents the sheltering of income derived in tax havens 
and jurisdictions with a preferential tax regime, but also prevents the deferral of 
domestic taxation on passive income derived in low-tax countries with a non-
preferential tax regime. It is therefore also important to have a closer look at the 
concept of deferral. In fact, CFC taxation can make foreign passive investments 
unattractive - especially in those cases where taxation is one of the main factors for 
the investment decision.  
 
The current attribution of low-taxed passive income ensures - from the perspective of 
the state of residence of the shareholder - the limited application of the principle of 
capital export neutrality. I will go into more detail of that aspect later on.  
 
5.6. The Concept of Deferral 
 
5.6.1. General Aspects 
 
CFC legislation can be seen as an anti-deferral regime which is directed to stop 
deferral of domestic taxation on foreign source income in certain situations and under 
certain conditions.22 It is therefore important to know what the “deferral privilege” 
actually means.23 In general, deferral can be seen as any situation in which a country 
taxes foreign source income earned by resident individuals or corporations directly or 
indirectly through a foreign corporation, trust, or other entity, not as such income is 
earned, but only when the income is actually received by the resident taxpayers.24 As 
already described earlier, deferral of the domestic taxation on foreign source income 
is in line with the economic principle of capital import neutrality. However, even those 
countries which generally follow the economic principle of capital export neutrality 
typically recognise foreign corporations as separate taxable entities, with the effect 
that the income derived by the foreign corporations is not currently taxed in the 
residence state of the shareholder. Arnold characterises the deferral of domestic tax 
on the foreign source income as an “unintentional by-product of the fundamental tax 
principles that a foreign corporation is a separate taxable entity and is usually 
considered to be non-resident for tax purposes.”25  
 
However, the effect of deferral can be illustrated best by using examples. Supposing 
a holding company situated in country A (company A) holds all of the shares in a 
subsidiary company in country B (company B). The income generated in country B is 
taxed with a rate of 10 percent whereas the income in country A is subject to an 
income tax of 30 percent. The latter country applies a credit system to avoid double 
taxation caused by a dividend distribution of the subsidiary company B to the holding 
company A. Assuming that company B derives a taxable income of 100 Euro at the 
end of the year 01, the income tax in country B would be 10 Euro26 and the remaining 
                                            
22 See for example Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 39. 
23 See with respect to the “deferral privilege” Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Stephen E. Shay, Getting 
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 
457. 
24 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 83.  
25 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 85. 
26 10 percent tax rate in country B applied to a taxable income of 100 Euro.  
     
 
investment kind, the income will be attributed to the resident shareholder - 
irrespective of the percentage of shareholding.19  
 
In most cases, the conclusions which will be drawn below with respect to the CFC 
rules are equally relevant for the FIF rules. As already outlined above, I will only 
mention the FIF rules separately where it is required in the respective context or 
where it is more appropriate. Otherwise, the term “CFC” will cover both, the FIF and 
CFC rules.  
 
5.5. The Policy Rationale for CFC Rules  
 
In theory, there can be several reasons why a country introduces a CFC regime and 
taxes certain types of income on a current basis which would otherwise be sheltered 
from domestic taxation based on the principle that a foreign legal entity is to be 
considered a separate taxpayer. Taking into account the aforementioned basic 
requirements, especially the fact that CFC taxation is only applied to certain low-
taxed passive income, the anti-avoidance approach becomes obvious. The CFC 
rules can fulfil the following requirements:20  
 
a.) As a general “anti-deferral” measure: the CFC regimes are directed to 
counteract techniques used by taxpayers to obtain tax deferrals by simply 
interposing a foreign corporate structure between themselves and the source 
of income. It can be seen as a broad anti-deferral regime which applies to 
certain low-taxed passive income - irrespective of the source of income.  
 
b.) As a defensive measure against the investment in tax havens and in 
jurisdictions with a preferential tax regime.  
 
c.) As a tax policy measure against the erosion of the domestic tax base and to 
reduce the outflow of capital towards low-tax countries.  
 
d.) As a supplementary legislation to transfer pricing rules: the shifting of profits 
from high-tax countries to low-tax countries is less attractive in case of CFC 
taxation, and the transfer pricing issues are of less importance for the tax 
authorities.21 However, since CFC rules are limited to certain passive income 
and base company income, the effect will be rather limited. The difficulties 
typically arise in case of active businesses (supply of goods and services) and 
not to a comparable extent for passive activities. In my opinion, the fact that 
transfer pricing adjustments become less important if CFC rules apply 
simultaneously can be seen as a positive “side effect.”  
 
e.) As a supplementary legislation to the residence test: especially in case of 
passive investments, the determination of fiscal residence (or the place of 
effective management) can be difficult. Also in this situation, the assessment 
in case of passive activities becomes less important if the income is taxed 
according to the CFC rules anyway.  
 
                                            
19 Section 7 (6), (6 a) of the German Foreign Tax Act; see in more detail Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a 
Changing World: A German Perspective, Tax Notes International, September 30, 2002, page 1679 et seq. 
20 See the FEE Position Paper, pages 4 and 5.  
21 Since it will be subject to domestic taxation in the country of the shareholder anyway.  
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considered to be non-resident for tax purposes.”25  
 
However, the effect of deferral can be illustrated best by using examples. Supposing 
a holding company situated in country A (company A) holds all of the shares in a 
subsidiary company in country B (company B). The income generated in country B is 
taxed with a rate of 10 percent whereas the income in country A is subject to an 
income tax of 30 percent. The latter country applies a credit system to avoid double 
taxation caused by a dividend distribution of the subsidiary company B to the holding 
company A. Assuming that company B derives a taxable income of 100 Euro at the 
end of the year 01, the income tax in country B would be 10 Euro26 and the remaining 
                                            
22 See for example Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 39. 
23 See with respect to the “deferral privilege” Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Stephen E. Shay, Getting 
Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 
457. 
24 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 83.  
25 Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 85. 
26 10 percent tax rate in country B applied to a taxable income of 100 Euro.  
     
 
investment kind, the income will be attributed to the resident shareholder - 
irrespective of the percentage of shareholding.19  
 
In most cases, the conclusions which will be drawn below with respect to the CFC 
rules are equally relevant for the FIF rules. As already outlined above, I will only 
mention the FIF rules separately where it is required in the respective context or 
where it is more appropriate. Otherwise, the term “CFC” will cover both, the FIF and 
CFC rules.  
 
5.5. The Policy Rationale for CFC Rules  
 
In theory, there can be several reasons why a country introduces a CFC regime and 
taxes certain types of income on a current basis which would otherwise be sheltered 
from domestic taxation based on the principle that a foreign legal entity is to be 
considered a separate taxpayer. Taking into account the aforementioned basic 
requirements, especially the fact that CFC taxation is only applied to certain low-
taxed passive income, the anti-avoidance approach becomes obvious. The CFC 
rules can fulfil the following requirements:20  
 
a.) As a general “anti-deferral” measure: the CFC regimes are directed to 
counteract techniques used by taxpayers to obtain tax deferrals by simply 
interposing a foreign corporate structure between themselves and the source 
of income. It can be seen as a broad anti-deferral regime which applies to 
certain low-taxed passive income - irrespective of the source of income.  
 
b.) As a defensive measure against the investment in tax havens and in 
jurisdictions with a preferential tax regime.  
 
c.) As a tax policy measure against the erosion of the domestic tax base and to 
reduce the outflow of capital towards low-tax countries.  
 
d.) As a supplementary legislation to transfer pricing rules: the shifting of profits 
from high-tax countries to low-tax countries is less attractive in case of CFC 
taxation, and the transfer pricing issues are of less importance for the tax 
authorities.21 However, since CFC rules are limited to certain passive income 
and base company income, the effect will be rather limited. The difficulties 
typically arise in case of active businesses (supply of goods and services) and 
not to a comparable extent for passive activities. In my opinion, the fact that 
transfer pricing adjustments become less important if CFC rules apply 
simultaneously can be seen as a positive “side effect.”  
 
e.) As a supplementary legislation to the residence test: especially in case of 
passive investments, the determination of fiscal residence (or the place of 
effective management) can be difficult. Also in this situation, the assessment 
in case of passive activities becomes less important if the income is taxed 
according to the CFC rules anyway.  
 
                                            
19 Section 7 (6), (6 a) of the German Foreign Tax Act; see in more detail Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a 
Changing World: A German Perspective, Tax Notes International, September 30, 2002, page 1679 et seq. 
20 See the FEE Position Paper, pages 4 and 5.  
21 Since it will be subject to domestic taxation in the country of the shareholder anyway.  
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the 20 Euro investment is transferred into 20 Euro tax. However, in the meantime the 
deferred tax can be used to produce additional income in country B. Even though the 
additional income will also be subject to the increased domestic tax in country A, the 
(after-tax) benefit of 1,40 Euro remains existent even when a complete taxation of the 
foreign income in country A takes place. 
 
Supposing the amount of 98,10 Euro is not distributed immediately after the end of 
year 02 and the companies A and B are of the opinion that it makes more sense to 
accumulate the profits within company B, the effect of deferral becomes much more 
obvious. The amount of 98,10 Euro produces additional after-tax income of 8,83 Euro 
(year 03), 9,62 Euro (year 04), and 10,49 Euro (year 05).37 The original after-tax 
income of 90 Euro will be increased to a total amount of 213,06 Euro after a 
reinvestment period of ten years.38 This can now be compared to the situation where 
the income derived by company B is subject to current taxation in country A. The 
after-tax return will only amount to 5,24 Euro (year 03), 5,61 Euro (year 04), and 6,00 
Euro (year 05). The original after-tax income of 70 Euro will be increased to a total 
amount of 137,70 Euro after a reinvestment period of ten years. In effect, the original 
difference of 20 Euro will grow to a total difference of 75,36 Euro.39 The reason for 
this difference is obvious and can be separated into the following parts: 
 
a.) The original difference of 20 Euro produces additional income with an after-tax 
rate of 9 percent. This results in a total amount of 47,35 Euro after ten years of 
reinvestment. It is the complete return of 9 percent which is “new” and which 
can only be derived because of the non-existence of a current taxation in 
country A. In effect, it is the prospective income tax of country A which can be 
invested – fully and to an unlimited extent – for the production of new 
income.40 
 
b.) The “basic amount”41 of 70 Euro produces after-tax income with a rate of 
return of 9 percent in the absence of a current taxation in country A, and 7 
percent where a current taxation takes place in country A. The accumulated 
difference amounts to 28,01 Euro over a period of ten years.42 It is therefore a 
difference of 2 percent, applied on the basic amount, which has an additional 
positive effect on the future earnings.  
 
Very generally, the progressive increase of the income difference is due to (i) the 
possibility of an investment (and further reinvestment) of the prospective income tax 
of country A and (ii) the higher effective return on investment of the basic amount 
(followed by further reinvestment of the proceeds). However, it should be clear that 
the impact on the business activities of company B is not necessarily limited to the 
respective difference. For example, the accumulated positive income difference 
increases the equity of company B. This can have a positive impact on the rating of 
                                            
37 Always under the assumption of a return on investment of 10 percent (before tax) and an income tax of 10 
percent, i.e. an after tax return on investment of 9 percent per year.  
38 Which is the period from the beginning of the year 02 until the end of year 11.  
39 213,06 Euro minus 137,70 Euro. 
40 It is the “prospective income tax” which can be invested since it is unclear whether the income tax actually has 
to be paid. For example, if the company suffers massive losses in following years which have to be offset against 
the retained earnings, there will be no future profit distribution and therefore no additional income tax in country 
A.  
41 I call it basic amount since it is available in both scenarios, i.e. with and without current taxation.  
42 165,71 Euro (70 Euro / 9 percent over ten years) minus 137,70 Euro (70 Euro / 7 percent over ten years).  
     
 
amount for reinvestment or distribution would be 90 Euro. If it is further assumed that 
the amount of 90 Euro is reinvested in year 02 and the return on investment is 10 
percent, the taxable result in country B – only related to the reinvested amount of 90 
Euro – would be 9 Euro.27 This, in turn, would lead to an after tax result of 8,10 Euro 
in year 02.28 At the beginning of year 03, and after the deduction of the income tax in 
country B, the total amount which can be subject to profit distribution or further 
reinvestment is 98,10 Euro.29 
 
In contrast, if the assumed income of 100 Euro derived in country B is subject to 
current taxation in country A, the result will be different. Assuming that country A 
taxes the 100 Euro immediately after the end of the year 01 with the domestic tax 
rate of 30 percent and allows a full tax credit for the foreign income tax applied in 
country B with 10 percent, an additional 20 Euro would have to be paid in country A 
which cannot be subject to any further reinvestment. In this example, it is assumed 
that company B has to transfer the amount of 20 Euro to company A in the form of a 
profit distribution in order to enable company A to pay the additional domestic income 
tax on the 100 Euro attributed income. Therefore, company B has - at the beginning 
of year 02 - only the possibility to reinvest the net amount of 70 Euro. A return on 
investment of 10 percent would lead to a pre-tax profit on the reinvested amount of 7 
Euro and an after-tax profit (in country B) of 6,30 Euro at the end of year 02.30 
However, if the profit related to the reinvested financial means is again subject to 
current taxation in country A, the additional tax burden right at the end of year 02 will 
amount to 1,40 Euro.31 Following the same pattern as described above, the 
additional tax burden of 1,40 Euro has to be covered by a distribution of company B 
to company A. At the beginning of year 03, and after the deduction of all income 
taxes, the total amount which can be subject to profit distribution or further 
reinvestment is 74,90 Euro.32  
 
Coming back to the first scenario, it is assumed that the total amount of 98,10 Euro is 
distributed immediately after the end of the year 02. This would lead to an additional 
taxation in country A of 21,80 Euro.33 Thus, the net amount after tax which would be 
available for company A at the beginning of year 03 is 76,30 Euro.34 That means, if 
the scenario of a one-year deferral followed by a profit distribution is compared to the 
scenario of a current taxation of income, a difference of 1,40 Euro can be identified.35 
This is exactly the amount of after-tax income which is related to the difference 
between 90 Euro reinvestment and 70 Euro reinvestment.36 That means the 
difference of 20 Euro remains available for reinvestment until the “principal amount of 
income” of 100 Euro is subject to tax in country A. This will then have the effect that 
                                            
27 Under the assumption that the income tax of 10 Euro is immediately transferred to the tax authorities at the 
beginning of year 02 or is at least not available in year 02 for any partial reinvestment.  
28 9 Euro minus income tax of 0,90 Euro (10 percent).  
29 90 Euro plus 8,10 Euro. Again, under the assumption that the income tax is levied at the end of the year 02 (or 
immediately after the end of the year 02).  
30 7 Euro minus income tax of 0,70 Euro.  
31 Income tax of 2,10 Euro (7 Euro x 30 percent) minus tax credit of 0,70 Euro.  
32 70 Euro plus the net amount of 4,90 Euro.  
33 The gross amount of 109 Euro (100 Euro plus 9 Euro) would be taxed with 30 percent. The income tax in 
country A would be 32,70 Euro and a foreign income tax of 10,90 Euro (10 Euro plus 0,90 Euro) would be 
credited. The remaining tax burden would be 21,80 Euro (32,70 Euro minus 10,90 Euro).  
34 98,10 Euro minus 21,80 Euro. Under the assumption that the additional tax burden in country A is 
immediately payable or is, at least, not available for further investments in year 03.  
35 76,30 Euro minus 74,90 Euro. 
36 2 Euro (20 Euro x 10 percent yield for one year) minus 0,60 Euro (30 percent income tax).  
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the 20 Euro investment is transferred into 20 Euro tax. However, in the meantime the 
deferred tax can be used to produce additional income in country B. Even though the 
additional income will also be subject to the increased domestic tax in country A, the 
(after-tax) benefit of 1,40 Euro remains existent even when a complete taxation of the 
foreign income in country A takes place. 
 
Supposing the amount of 98,10 Euro is not distributed immediately after the end of 
year 02 and the companies A and B are of the opinion that it makes more sense to 
accumulate the profits within company B, the effect of deferral becomes much more 
obvious. The amount of 98,10 Euro produces additional after-tax income of 8,83 Euro 
(year 03), 9,62 Euro (year 04), and 10,49 Euro (year 05).37 The original after-tax 
income of 90 Euro will be increased to a total amount of 213,06 Euro after a 
reinvestment period of ten years.38 This can now be compared to the situation where 
the income derived by company B is subject to current taxation in country A. The 
after-tax return will only amount to 5,24 Euro (year 03), 5,61 Euro (year 04), and 6,00 
Euro (year 05). The original after-tax income of 70 Euro will be increased to a total 
amount of 137,70 Euro after a reinvestment period of ten years. In effect, the original 
difference of 20 Euro will grow to a total difference of 75,36 Euro.39 The reason for 
this difference is obvious and can be separated into the following parts: 
 
a.) The original difference of 20 Euro produces additional income with an after-tax 
rate of 9 percent. This results in a total amount of 47,35 Euro after ten years of 
reinvestment. It is the complete return of 9 percent which is “new” and which 
can only be derived because of the non-existence of a current taxation in 
country A. In effect, it is the prospective income tax of country A which can be 
invested – fully and to an unlimited extent – for the production of new 
income.40 
 
b.) The “basic amount”41 of 70 Euro produces after-tax income with a rate of 
return of 9 percent in the absence of a current taxation in country A, and 7 
percent where a current taxation takes place in country A. The accumulated 
difference amounts to 28,01 Euro over a period of ten years.42 It is therefore a 
difference of 2 percent, applied on the basic amount, which has an additional 
positive effect on the future earnings.  
 
Very generally, the progressive increase of the income difference is due to (i) the 
possibility of an investment (and further reinvestment) of the prospective income tax 
of country A and (ii) the higher effective return on investment of the basic amount 
(followed by further reinvestment of the proceeds). However, it should be clear that 
the impact on the business activities of company B is not necessarily limited to the 
respective difference. For example, the accumulated positive income difference 
increases the equity of company B. This can have a positive impact on the rating of 
                                            
37 Always under the assumption of a return on investment of 10 percent (before tax) and an income tax of 10 
percent, i.e. an after tax return on investment of 9 percent per year.  
38 Which is the period from the beginning of the year 02 until the end of year 11.  
39 213,06 Euro minus 137,70 Euro. 
40 It is the “prospective income tax” which can be invested since it is unclear whether the income tax actually has 
to be paid. For example, if the company suffers massive losses in following years which have to be offset against 
the retained earnings, there will be no future profit distribution and therefore no additional income tax in country 
A.  
41 I call it basic amount since it is available in both scenarios, i.e. with and without current taxation.  
42 165,71 Euro (70 Euro / 9 percent over ten years) minus 137,70 Euro (70 Euro / 7 percent over ten years).  
     
 
amount for reinvestment or distribution would be 90 Euro. If it is further assumed that 
the amount of 90 Euro is reinvested in year 02 and the return on investment is 10 
percent, the taxable result in country B – only related to the reinvested amount of 90 
Euro – would be 9 Euro.27 This, in turn, would lead to an after tax result of 8,10 Euro 
in year 02.28 At the beginning of year 03, and after the deduction of the income tax in 
country B, the total amount which can be subject to profit distribution or further 
reinvestment is 98,10 Euro.29 
 
In contrast, if the assumed income of 100 Euro derived in country B is subject to 
current taxation in country A, the result will be different. Assuming that country A 
taxes the 100 Euro immediately after the end of the year 01 with the domestic tax 
rate of 30 percent and allows a full tax credit for the foreign income tax applied in 
country B with 10 percent, an additional 20 Euro would have to be paid in country A 
which cannot be subject to any further reinvestment. In this example, it is assumed 
that company B has to transfer the amount of 20 Euro to company A in the form of a 
profit distribution in order to enable company A to pay the additional domestic income 
tax on the 100 Euro attributed income. Therefore, company B has - at the beginning 
of year 02 - only the possibility to reinvest the net amount of 70 Euro. A return on 
investment of 10 percent would lead to a pre-tax profit on the reinvested amount of 7 
Euro and an after-tax profit (in country B) of 6,30 Euro at the end of year 02.30 
However, if the profit related to the reinvested financial means is again subject to 
current taxation in country A, the additional tax burden right at the end of year 02 will 
amount to 1,40 Euro.31 Following the same pattern as described above, the 
additional tax burden of 1,40 Euro has to be covered by a distribution of company B 
to company A. At the beginning of year 03, and after the deduction of all income 
taxes, the total amount which can be subject to profit distribution or further 
reinvestment is 74,90 Euro.32  
 
Coming back to the first scenario, it is assumed that the total amount of 98,10 Euro is 
distributed immediately after the end of the year 02. This would lead to an additional 
taxation in country A of 21,80 Euro.33 Thus, the net amount after tax which would be 
available for company A at the beginning of year 03 is 76,30 Euro.34 That means, if 
the scenario of a one-year deferral followed by a profit distribution is compared to the 
scenario of a current taxation of income, a difference of 1,40 Euro can be identified.35 
This is exactly the amount of after-tax income which is related to the difference 
between 90 Euro reinvestment and 70 Euro reinvestment.36 That means the 
difference of 20 Euro remains available for reinvestment until the “principal amount of 
income” of 100 Euro is subject to tax in country A. This will then have the effect that 
                                            
27 Under the assumption that the income tax of 10 Euro is immediately transferred to the tax authorities at the 
beginning of year 02 or is at least not available in year 02 for any partial reinvestment.  
28 9 Euro minus income tax of 0,90 Euro (10 percent).  
29 90 Euro plus 8,10 Euro. Again, under the assumption that the income tax is levied at the end of the year 02 (or 
immediately after the end of the year 02).  
30 7 Euro minus income tax of 0,70 Euro.  
31 Income tax of 2,10 Euro (7 Euro x 30 percent) minus tax credit of 0,70 Euro.  
32 70 Euro plus the net amount of 4,90 Euro.  
33 The gross amount of 109 Euro (100 Euro plus 9 Euro) would be taxed with 30 percent. The income tax in 
country A would be 32,70 Euro and a foreign income tax of 10,90 Euro (10 Euro plus 0,90 Euro) would be 
credited. The remaining tax burden would be 21,80 Euro (32,70 Euro minus 10,90 Euro).  
34 98,10 Euro minus 21,80 Euro. Under the assumption that the additional tax burden in country A is 
immediately payable or is, at least, not available for further investments in year 03.  
35 76,30 Euro minus 74,90 Euro. 
36 2 Euro (20 Euro x 10 percent yield for one year) minus 0,60 Euro (30 percent income tax).  
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is related to the (theoretically separable) risk-free interest component of capital can 
be seen, in my opinion, as a privilege and not as a necessity.  
 
5.6.2. Deferral and the OECD Methods of Avoiding Double Taxation 
 
In general, and as already described above, deferral is of particular importance in 
cases where (i) the credit method is applied for the avoidance of double taxation in 
the country of the parent company and (ii) where the income tax applied to the 
distributed income in the country of the parent company is higher than the foreign 
income tax which is credited against the domestic income tax. If the income tax in the 
country of the parent company is lower than the foreign income tax, deferral will not 
be an issue. The opposite would be the case: financial means which are not 
necessarily required in the high-tax country of the subsidiary would flow to the low-tax 
country of the parent company, i.e. typically also by way of profit distribution.  
 
It can be argued that deferral does not play any role if the country of the parent 
company applies the exemption method instead of the credit method for the 
avoidance of double taxation.47 Surely, a profit distribution does not lead to an 
additional taxation if the distribution is exempt from domestic taxation.48 However, it 
should be clear that in a situation of a major difference in income tax rates between 
the parent company (high-tax country) and the subsidiary company (low-tax country) 
there is still an incentive to keep the income in the low-tax country. In my opinion, 
there is an increased likelihood that financial means – even though not necessarily 
required for the core business activities of the subsidiary company – will not be 
distributed to the parent company but instead used for other non-core business 
activities, e.g. the financing of other group companies and portfolio investments. This 
is not a deferral of domestic taxation of foreign source income in the aforementioned 
sense – because it would not be taxed in case of a distribution – but it may keep 
financial means, and therefore the basis for the production of new income, away from 
the country of the parent company. Or from another perspective: the non-distribution 
of foreign source income reduces the possibility of the parent company to create and 
increase taxable domestic income.  
 
5.7. Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules 
 
In the following, I will briefly describe other anti-avoidance measures and clarify 
whether those measures can have an effect which is similar to CFC taxation. Some 
of the countries which do not have a CFC legislation apply one or more of the 
following measures and it should therefore be verified whether those measures can 
be a substitute for CFC taxation. However, in order to avoid the overlapping with 
other chapters, especially the part of the study which deals with the development of 





                                            
47 See in this respect Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, 
Canadian Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), pages 83 and 84.  
48 Some states calculate an amount of 5 percent of the exempt profit distribution which has to be added-back to 
the income of the parent company. The measure is directed at eliminating the expenses which are related to the 
exempt distribution.  However, this shall be of no relevance in this context.   
     
 
the company and its debts. Any improvement of the rating can have the 
consequence of a lower interest rate on the outstanding debts in general. Thus, the 
effect can go far beyond the pure mathematical difference which is calculated above.  
 
The differences caused by the deferral of domestic taxation on foreign source income 
depend on two main factors: the period of deferral and the rate of return. The longer 
the period of deferral and the higher the rate of return, the higher the difference 
caused by the deferral of income. Or from another perspective: an extremely long 
period of deferral – combined with a high interest rate – can have the theoretical 
effect of income exemption.43 For this reason, deferral is often considered to be a 
reduction of the effective tax rate in the country of the parent company or an “interest 
free loan” granted to the domestic parent company from the jurisdiction which allows 
the deferral.44 The benefits are therefore commonly illustrated in the form of a 
discounted future tax burden or in the form of accumulated and avoided future (after-
tax) interest expenses.45 However, it is more convincing to describe deferral as a kind 
of “forced equity investment” of the domestic government into the foreign company.46 
The reason is very simple: if the profit of company B in year 01 is completely offset by 
a corresponding loss in year 02, there will be no possibility for a profit distribution. 
Country A would therefore not be in a position to claim the potential taxes related to 
year 01 in the future. In case of an interest free loan this should be different since the 
“principal amount” (tax) would theoretically still be subject to repayment. Tax deferral 
has therefore rather features of an equity investment than of a debt investment. The 
total amount of tax in the country of the parent company fully depends upon the 
success of the foreign investment. And even though the total amount of aggregated 
income is taxable as soon as the retained profit is distributed to the parent company, 
or after liquidation of the foreign investment, it must be recognised that during that 
period the foreign company is in a position to create additional values which is only 
possible because of the tax deferral. Even though the effect of deferral can be 
calculated and determined if the rate of return and the total period of deferral is given, 
the question remains to what extent the benefit of deferral can be seen as a 
“privilege” and to what extent is has to be recognised as a necessity which is caused 
by economic and other aspects. If one follows the argumentation that the income 
derived by the foreign entity - and which is above the risk-free interest component of 
capital - is necessary to cover the risks related to the passive activities, deferral 
cannot be seen as a privilege. The foreign entity should have the possibility to use 
the amount of income which is above the risk-free interest component of capital in 
order to cover those risks. However, if the risk-free interest component is a 
theoretically separable part of the foreign passive activities, there is no necessity for 
a tax deferral related to this component. Thus, the deferral of domestic taxation which 
                                            
43 The present value of an amount of 1 Euro discounted with an interest rate of 25 percent over a period of 20 
years is approximately 0,012 Euro.  
44 See for example Gustafson / Peroni / Pugh, Taxation of International Transactions (1997), page 337;  
Isenbergh, International Taxation (1999), 1.22; Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 Cornell Law Rev. 18 (1993), page 34; Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious 
About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465; 
Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 88. 
45 See for example the tables in Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. 
Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465 and Arnold, The Taxation of 
Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax 
Foundation (1986), page 89.  
46 See in this respect Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on 
Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465 
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is related to the (theoretically separable) risk-free interest component of capital can 
be seen, in my opinion, as a privilege and not as a necessity.  
 
5.6.2. Deferral and the OECD Methods of Avoiding Double Taxation 
 
In general, and as already described above, deferral is of particular importance in 
cases where (i) the credit method is applied for the avoidance of double taxation in 
the country of the parent company and (ii) where the income tax applied to the 
distributed income in the country of the parent company is higher than the foreign 
income tax which is credited against the domestic income tax. If the income tax in the 
country of the parent company is lower than the foreign income tax, deferral will not 
be an issue. The opposite would be the case: financial means which are not 
necessarily required in the high-tax country of the subsidiary would flow to the low-tax 
country of the parent company, i.e. typically also by way of profit distribution.  
 
It can be argued that deferral does not play any role if the country of the parent 
company applies the exemption method instead of the credit method for the 
avoidance of double taxation.47 Surely, a profit distribution does not lead to an 
additional taxation if the distribution is exempt from domestic taxation.48 However, it 
should be clear that in a situation of a major difference in income tax rates between 
the parent company (high-tax country) and the subsidiary company (low-tax country) 
there is still an incentive to keep the income in the low-tax country. In my opinion, 
there is an increased likelihood that financial means – even though not necessarily 
required for the core business activities of the subsidiary company – will not be 
distributed to the parent company but instead used for other non-core business 
activities, e.g. the financing of other group companies and portfolio investments. This 
is not a deferral of domestic taxation of foreign source income in the aforementioned 
sense – because it would not be taxed in case of a distribution – but it may keep 
financial means, and therefore the basis for the production of new income, away from 
the country of the parent company. Or from another perspective: the non-distribution 
of foreign source income reduces the possibility of the parent company to create and 
increase taxable domestic income.  
 
5.7. Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules 
 
In the following, I will briefly describe other anti-avoidance measures and clarify 
whether those measures can have an effect which is similar to CFC taxation. Some 
of the countries which do not have a CFC legislation apply one or more of the 
following measures and it should therefore be verified whether those measures can 
be a substitute for CFC taxation. However, in order to avoid the overlapping with 
other chapters, especially the part of the study which deals with the development of 
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the company and its debts. Any improvement of the rating can have the 
consequence of a lower interest rate on the outstanding debts in general. Thus, the 
effect can go far beyond the pure mathematical difference which is calculated above.  
 
The differences caused by the deferral of domestic taxation on foreign source income 
depend on two main factors: the period of deferral and the rate of return. The longer 
the period of deferral and the higher the rate of return, the higher the difference 
caused by the deferral of income. Or from another perspective: an extremely long 
period of deferral – combined with a high interest rate – can have the theoretical 
effect of income exemption.43 For this reason, deferral is often considered to be a 
reduction of the effective tax rate in the country of the parent company or an “interest 
free loan” granted to the domestic parent company from the jurisdiction which allows 
the deferral.44 The benefits are therefore commonly illustrated in the form of a 
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43 The present value of an amount of 1 Euro discounted with an interest rate of 25 percent over a period of 20 
years is approximately 0,012 Euro.  
44 See for example Gustafson / Peroni / Pugh, Taxation of International Transactions (1997), page 337;  
Isenbergh, International Taxation (1999), 1.22; Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 Cornell Law Rev. 18 (1993), page 34; Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious 
About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465; 
Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper 
No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 88. 
45 See for example the tables in Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. 
Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465 and Arnold, The Taxation of 
Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax 
Foundation (1986), page 89.  
46 See in this respect Peroni / Fleming Jr. / Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on 
Foreign Source Income, 52 S.M.U. Law Rev. 455 (1999), page 465 
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5.7.3. Residence Test  
 
A residence test is typically focused on the place of effective management of the 
foreign company.53 Pursuant to those rules, the foreign company may be considered 
to be resident where its controlling shareholders are resident.54 The latter, however, 
should only be true if the controlling shareholders are actively involved in the 
management of the company from within their state of residence. The mere fact that 
the shareholders control the company through their percentage of shareholding or 
voting rights is, in my opinion, by no means sufficient. Consequently, deferral does 
not play a role anymore since the foreign company with the place of effective 
management in the country of the shareholder would be taxed according to the 
domestic tax rules, and the domestic income tax rate would be imposed on the 
respective income.55 In a very broad sense it can be considered an anti-deferral 
regime. It is interesting to see that the residence test is of particular relevance in 
countries without CFC legislation and in countries where the CFC legislation is limited 
to very specific activities.56 
 
However, it has to be kept in mind that a residence test may be successful in case of 
letter box companies or tax haven structures where it is sufficiently clear that the 
foreign company is effectively managed from within the country of the shareholder. In 
the important case of a foreign subsidiary which carries out certain business 
functions, e.g. leasing, financing and other services, and where the management is 
effectively exercised from within the foreign (low-tax) country, the residence test 
cannot be successful. This is even true where the foreign company is fully dependent 
upon the domestic shareholder.57 Furthermore, it is unlikely that the other contracting 
state would follow the domestic approach in situations where it is not sufficiently clear 
and obvious. It is therefore a provision which can lead to permanent conflicts if it is 
not restricted to letter box companies and tax haven structures.58 These are  
arguments against a broader definition of residence, e.g. in a way that all foreign 
corporations which are incorporated abroad but controlled by residents could be 
treated as resident for domestic purposes. Such legislation would theoretically 
encompass all foreign activities, irrespective of their nature.59 Moreover, it would 
                                            
53 The place of effective management is also the relevant criterion in the OECD-MTC. Article 4 (3) of the 
OECD-MTC states that if “(...) a person other than an individual is a resident of both Contracting States, then it 
shall be deemed to be a resident only of the State in which its place of effective management is situated.”  
54 See in this respect also Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An International 
Comparison, Canadian Tax Paper No. 78, Canadian Tax Foundation (1986), page 107. 
55 Another approach is the creation of a permanent establishment in the country of the shareholders instead of 
considering the foreign company to be a resident company. Such an approach was followed by the Dutch 
Supreme Court, e.g. in case of a Swiss letter box company which was not engaged in any ascertainable business 
in Switzerland and in case of a group captive insurance company which was incorporated and based in the 
Netherlands Antilles. The Court concluded that those companies could have a place of effective management in 
the Netherlands and therefore create a permanent establishment (see OECD - Studies in Taxation of Foreign 
Source Income, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, 1996, page 15 and Footnote 4; Dutch Supreme Court, 
BNB 1989/142 and BNB 1985/302).  
56 For example Austria, Luxembourg and Switzerland do not have any CFC legislation. The Danish CFC 
legislation is focused on financial activities (see Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-
Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 37).  
57 According to paragraph 24 of the Commentary on Article 4 of the OECD-MTC the place of effective 
management will ordinarily be the place where the most senior person or group of persons (for example a board 
of directors) makes its decisions.  
58 Especially in tax treaty cases with a tie-breaker rule which is based on Article 4 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
59 See in this respect Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, 1998, page 4; OECD - 
Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, 1996, pages 13 and 14.  
     
 
5.7.1. Thin-Capitalisation Rules 
 
Thin-capitalisation rules are widespread measures against the under-capitalisation of 
entities and therefore the increased deduction of interest expenses.49 The thin-
capitalisation rules are measures against the erosion of the domestic tax base but 
cannot be considered anti-deferral regimes. In contrast to CFC taxation, it is the tax 
base of the domestic entity which is “protected” from “excessive” deductions of 
interest payments. These provisions typically stipulate a certain debt-equity ratio 
according to which interest expenses are deductible. Excessive interest payments 
are qualified as profit distributions or non-deductible expenses. In general, the risk of 
excessive interest expenses exists in situations where the tax rate in the country of 
the debtor is higher than the tax rate in the country of the creditor - and typically not 
vice versa.50 Thus, the thin-capitalisation rules are in theory capable of saving the 
domestic tax base up to a certain degree, but have a totally different target compared 
to anti-deferral regimes like the CFC rules. The existing thin-capitalisation rules can 
therefore not be used as a substitute for CFC taxation.51  
 
5.7.2. Transfer Pricing Rules  
 
Transfer pricing rules are of great importance in international taxation for the 
determination and the allocation of income between related parties. The centre of 
international transfer pricing practice is the “arm’s length principle,” which is typically 
the basis for the determination of considerations for sales and services, and profit 
shares among related parties for tax purposes.52 It is of utmost importance that each 
corporation, partnership or permanent establishment receives the amount of taxable 
income which is – from a third party perspective – equal to the functions exercised 
and risks taken. Without such transfer pricing rules there would be an increased risk 
of profit allocations in favour of low-tax countries and to the detriment of high-tax 
countries. However, it must be very clear that even though transfer pricing rules are 
required for the determination of income of a CFC, they cannot fulfil the purpose of 
CFC taxation and can by no means be a substitute for CFC rules. For example, if a 
financing function is exercised by a CFC, the arm’s length consideration will typically 
be derived from a comparable interest rate in an uncontrolled transaction. Transfer 
pricing rules fully accept the deferral and accumulation of arm’s length interest 
income. CFC legislation equally accepts the arm’s length interest income as such but 
“attacks” the deferral of income, which is not – and cannot be – in the scope of 
transfer pricing regulations. To be precise, I think that transfer pricing regulations can 
play an important role in stipulating the “correct” income on a transactional basis, e.g. 
in case of sales, financing, leasing, and other services, but cannot be used as an 
effective tool to target the accumulation of foreign source income.  
                                            
49 In the past, it was typically the relation of a domestic subsidiary towards a foreign parent company (or another 
foreign group company) which was in the focus of the thin-capitalisation rules. However, after the Lankhorst-
Hohorst decision of the European Court of Justice the situation within the European Union is different: Some 
Member States do not apply those provisions to other Member States anymore (e.g. Spain), other Member States 
decided to expand the provision to domestic parent-subsidiary situations (e.g. Germany).  
50 Of course, situations exist where excessive interest expenses can make sense even if the tax rate in the country 
of the creditor is higher, e.g. in case of an existing tax loss carry forward in the country of the creditor.  
51 The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition outlines that “(...) some domestic rules, such as the setting of 
safe harbour debt/equity ratios, may be misused and thereby facilitate harmful tax competition” (see Harmful 
Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 168).  
52 See with respect to the arm’s length principle: OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995), chapter 1.  
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Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995), chapter 1.  
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foreign subsidiary company. This is clearly a restriction of the overall flexibility and 
therefore a disadvantage for the companies - compared to a situation where the 
profits can be repatriated free from additional taxation.65 However, taxation which is 
limited to actual dividend payments does not target the deferral of domestic taxation 
on foreign source income and therefore the time factor involved. Especially 
international groups can structure their investments in a way which allows the 
permanent accumulation of foreign source income without any profit distribution to 
the shareholder. In particular, this is the case where the retained profits can be made 
available to other group companies (including the parent company), e.g. by way of 
inter-company loans. In my opinion, a switch-over from the exemption method to the 
credit method for actual dividend payments can lead to a limitation of flexibility, but it 
cannot be seen as a measure which fulfils the purpose of CFC taxation and, thus, 
cannot be considered a substitute for CFC rules.  
 
5.7.6. Restriction on the Deduction of CFC-Related Business Expenses 
 
Without any doubt, the restriction on the deduction of business expenses for 
payments to a CFC would act as a deterrent for resident taxpayers to use such a 
foreign company. However, such a restriction can - in my opinion - only be applied in 
very limited cases but not as a general method in order to safeguard the domestic tax 
base. Some countries disallow the deduction in a situation where a transaction with a 
tax haven takes place and the resident recipient of the services is not able to prove 
that the underlying services were actually carried out.66 This, however, is something 
totally different compared to CFC taxation. It is a common principle that the taxpayer 
has to prove, or at least to make plausible, that the payments are business related 
and, therefore, have to be qualified as deductible business expenses. If this is not 
possible, the deduction of the payments as business expenses can be disallowed. 
However, a general restriction (which goes beyond the tax haven payments) would 
create serious problems under the existing tax treaties with the respective CFC 
country and would not be in line with the ability-to-pay principle.67 It would basically 
lead to the outcome that positive income of the domestic taxpayer is taken into 
account and taxed in the resident country, but the deduction of business expenses 
related to the positive income is disallowed. Therefore, such an approach can hardly 
be seen as a feasible alternative to CFC taxation.68  
 
5.7.7. Imposition of Withholding Taxes on CFC-Related Payments 
 
The imposition of withholding taxes can make the investment in a low-tax country 
less attractive, especially in cases where the withholding tax cannot be fully credited 
against the corporate income tax imposed by the CFC country, e.g. where the 
                                            
65 For example, if the parent company suffers losses it can be more advantageous - and even necessary - to 
distribute the profits of the (low-tax) subsidiary to the parent company in order to reduce the interest payments 
(on third party loans and inter-company loans) and to improve the result of the parent company. However, if the 
credit method is applied to the profit distribution, the tax losses of the parent company will be reduced - with the 
effect that they cannot be offset against positive taxable income in subsequent years - and the crediting of taxes 
is not possible (due to the fact that no domestic income tax is paid in the respective year). The crediting of the 
taxes can finally be possible, however, if the respective legislation provides for a carry forward (“roll-over”) of 
the tax credit. 
66 E.g. Germany, Spain.  
67 See Article 24 (1), (4) of the OECD-MTC.  
68 It seems to be quite obvious that such an approach would be a clear infringement of the basic freedoms (in an 
EU context) which cannot be justified. Whether this is the case for the CFC rules will be outlined separately.  
     
 
seriously affect the treaty relations where the provisions are based on the OECD-
MTC.60 Overall, a residence test is not an appropriate method to target the deferral of 
tax on foreign source income but is rather a method which can be applied to clearly 
abusive structures in certain - in my opinion very limited - cases.  
 
5.7.4. General Anti-Avoidance Rules  
 
The problem with general anti-avoidance rules is - very simply - that they are too 
broad and general for targeting the particular issue of tax deferral. Similar to what 
was described with respect to the residence test it can be of importance in the 
obvious cases of abuse, e.g. letter box companies. However, the typical CFC case is 
- in my opinion - far from being abusive. What should be clear is that in a situation of 
a foreign company which is situated in a low-tax country and which carries on its 
business functions within the foreign territory and where the management decisions 
are actually taken in the respective foreign country, the only “abusive” behaviour lies 
in the fact that the foreign income is accumulated and not distributed to the parent 
company, and therefore kept away from domestic taxation. However, what makes it 
more complicated is the fact that the accumulation of income is normally not 
considered to be “abusive.” Such a situation can hardly be targeted by broad and 
general anti-avoidance rules but requires more specific legislation.  
 
5.7.5. Restriction on the Participation Exemption  
 
In some cases, countries which generally apply the exemption method for dividend 
payments received from subsidiary companies switch - under certain circumstances - 
to the credit method61 or even to a full taxation without credit. For example, in 
Germany a great number of the existing tax treaties contain “activity clauses” 
according to which certain foreign source income is taxed pursuant to the credit 
method instead of the exemption method. However, this is of particular interest for 
permanent establishments but not for dividend payments anymore.62 In Belgium, the 
dividends-received deduction – which leads to a 95 percent exemption of dividends 
received from a qualifying subsidiary – can only be applied if the dividend paying 
company is not established in a country where the common tax regime is 
considerably more favourable than in Belgium.63 Similar rules exist in Austria if the 
subsidiary derives passive income which is subject to low-taxation.64 
In my opinion, those measures can only have limited influence on foreign passive 
investments. If the credit method on dividend payments is applied (or even taxation 
without a tax credit), the foreign passive investment in low-tax countries will be taxed 
as soon as the income is distributed to the resident shareholder. This is not the case 
where the dividend payment is exempt from taxation. That means, in order to take full 
advantage of the lower tax rates the profits have to be retained and reinvested by the 
                                            
60 See Article 4 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
61 See in this respect also the recommendations included in the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition 
(Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 104, 105).     
62 See Wassermeyer, Der Wirrwarr mit den Aktivitätsklauseln im deutschen Abkommensrecht, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2000, page 65 et seq.; the activity clauses are of no particular relevance anymore in case of dividend 
payments, because dividend payments are generally exempt from domestic taxation according to section 8 b (1) 
of the German Corporate Income Tax Act.  
63 In addition, certain types of dividends are explicitly excluded from the dividends-received deduction. See in 
this respect Tahon / Bogaerts, Belgium: Amendments to the Participation Exemption Regime, Tax Planning 
International Review, December 2002.  
64 Section 10 (3) of the Austrian Corporate Income Tax Act.  
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Germany a great number of the existing tax treaties contain “activity clauses” 
according to which certain foreign source income is taxed pursuant to the credit 
method instead of the exemption method. However, this is of particular interest for 
permanent establishments but not for dividend payments anymore.62 In Belgium, the 
dividends-received deduction – which leads to a 95 percent exemption of dividends 
received from a qualifying subsidiary – can only be applied if the dividend paying 
company is not established in a country where the common tax regime is 
considerably more favourable than in Belgium.63 Similar rules exist in Austria if the 
subsidiary derives passive income which is subject to low-taxation.64 
In my opinion, those measures can only have limited influence on foreign passive 
investments. If the credit method on dividend payments is applied (or even taxation 
without a tax credit), the foreign passive investment in low-tax countries will be taxed 
as soon as the income is distributed to the resident shareholder. This is not the case 
where the dividend payment is exempt from taxation. That means, in order to take full 
advantage of the lower tax rates the profits have to be retained and reinvested by the 
                                            
60 See Article 4 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
61 See in this respect also the recommendations included in the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition 
(Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 104, 105).     
62 See Wassermeyer, Der Wirrwarr mit den Aktivitätsklauseln im deutschen Abkommensrecht, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2000, page 65 et seq.; the activity clauses are of no particular relevance anymore in case of dividend 
payments, because dividend payments are generally exempt from domestic taxation according to section 8 b (1) 
of the German Corporate Income Tax Act.  
63 In addition, certain types of dividends are explicitly excluded from the dividends-received deduction. See in 
this respect Tahon / Bogaerts, Belgium: Amendments to the Participation Exemption Regime, Tax Planning 
International Review, December 2002.  
64 Section 10 (3) of the Austrian Corporate Income Tax Act.  
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is related to the functions exercised and the risks taken by the foreign entity cannot 
be targeted by the aforementioned methods. However, the avoidance of deferral in 
exactly those cases is the purpose of CFC legislation.  
 
5.8. CFC Rules and the Ability-To-Pay Principle 
 
The question arises whether the CFC-specific feature of a current taxation of CFC 
income - without any actual dividend payment of the foreign entity - is a particular 
problem under the ability-to-pay principle. If the state of the resident shareholder 
treats an actual dividend payment in the same way as the attribution of CFC income, 
the main difference lies in the fact that in the latter case the income - and therefore 
the increase in value of assets of the foreign entity - is not made available to the 
shareholder by way of profit distribution. Of course, from an economic perspective 
this is an important difference since the underlying income is still subject to the risks 
of the market where it is invested and is not transferred to the resident shareholder. If 
the underlying income is distributed to the shareholder, the domestic taxes imposed 
by the state of residence can be paid out of the dividends received. In contrast 
thereto, the attribution of CFC income is just the result of an income calculation 
without a real transfer of financial means. In such a case, the resident shareholder in 
the CFC is not in the position to actually use part of the attributed income for the 
payment of the taxes imposed on the CFC income. Nonetheless, it is questionable 
whether the actual transfer of income - by way of profit distribution - is the decisive 
criterion for the decision whether the taxation is in line with the ability-to-pay principle 
or not. Some aspects have to be clarified in this respect. 
 
a.) The legal form of the investment 
 
The CFC taxation is applied to the investment in a foreign legal entity if certain 
requirements are fulfilled.72 The shareholders in such a legal entity are not in a 
position to withdraw the investments in the same way as in case of a 
permanent establishment or partnership. In the latter case of a partnership, 
however, the procedure which is required for the withdrawal of financial means 
and the allocation and distribution of income depends on the respective 
legislation. It can be quite formal and similar to the procedure which is required 
in case of a corporate body, but there are also states which do not require any 
particular formality and which offer the possibility of stipulating the procedure 
in a partnership agreement. In the latter case, the partners are free to decide 
on the withdrawal of financial means. Thus, it may be the case that no formal 
decision whatsoever is necessary. This, of course, is different in case of a 
corporate body where the shareholders formally have to decide whether the 
legal entity distributes all or part of the profit to the shareholders or whether 
the profit is to be retained and carried forward. The percentage of 
shareholding or voting rights is therefore of great importance. If the investor 
has only a minority shareholding (minority voting rights) in the legal entity, he 
will not be in a position to influence a profit distribution. In contrast, if the 
investor has a majority shareholding (majority voting rights) in the legal entity, 
which is typically more than 50 percent, he will be in a position to influence a 
profit distribution also against the will of other (minority) shareholders. In the 
latter case of a majority shareholding (majority voting rights) the position of the 
                                            
72 Some countries also apply their CFC taxation to permanent establishments and partnerships (see below in 
more detail).  
     
 
withholding tax is higher than the income tax of the CFC. This can be of particular 
relevance in non-treaty cases. However, if a tax treaty exists between the source 
country and the resident country of the CFC, the withholding tax rate will be applied 
to the respective payments without any active-passive differentiation and, therefore, 
irrespective of the activity of the CFC. Furthermore, a comparable effect can most 
often only be achieved where the withholding tax rate is equal to – or at least similar 
to – the domestic income tax rate of the source country.69 This, however, is difficult to 
achieve in a tax treaty situation.70  
 
In addition, it must be taken into account that a withholding tax is only applied to 
direct payment streams from the source country to the CFC country, i.e. payments 
from subsidiary companies abroad towards the low-tax country are not affected. In 
contrast to CFC taxation, there is no link whatsoever to the actual result of the foreign 
entity calculated according to the rules of the country which applies the CFC taxation. 
That means, irrespective of whether the CFC is highly profitable or in a loss position, 
the withholding tax deducted from the payment will be the same. The system is 
therefore completely different to CFC taxation.  
 
5.7.8. Information Reporting Rules and Exchange of Information  
 
The information reporting rules stipulated in the national legislation can help 
countries to obtain information about the foreign activities of their residents. At least, 
those rules provide a legal basis for the gathering of information with respect to 
foreign activities. The same is true for bilateral or multilateral exchange of information 
provisions (e.g. in double tax conventions or multilateral conventions) which are of 
particular importance in case of tax evasion, i.e. in cases where the resident taxpayer 
does not submit any information with respect to the foreign investment activities.71 It 
is obvious that those provisions are a prerequisite for the proper application of CFC 
taxation and similar measures. However, it is equally obvious that those provisions 
cannot be more than a supporting element in the context of CFC taxation.  
 
5.7.9. Conclusions Regarding the Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules 
 
It can be concluded that none of the measures outlined above can be considered a 
substitute for CFC rules. Some of the alleged alternative measures for CFC rules can 
in fact limit the advantage of foreign passive investments in low-tax countries (e.g. 
the general transfer pricing rules, the switch-over from the exemption method to the 
credit method, and the imposition of withholding taxes) and can create an obstacle to 
abusive investments (e.g. the residence test, the general anti-avoidance rules). 
However, none of the measures really targets the deferral of domestic taxation on 
foreign source income. In case of a non-abusive foreign investment, the profit which 
                                            
69 At least, this is true where the CFC is equity financed and without a significant amount of business expenses. 
The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition states that “(…) the imposition of withholding taxes at a 
substantial rate on certain payments to countries that engage in harmful tax competition, if associated with 
measures aimed at preventing the use of conduit arrangements, would act as a deterrent for countries to engage 
in harmful tax competition and for taxpayers to use entities located in these countries” (see Harmful Tax 
Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 161).  
70 This would result in a factual non-taxation in the CFC country, because the ordinary tax credit would be equal 
to the income taxes imposed in the CFC country.  
71 See with respect to the recommendation for the adoption of domestic information reporting provisions and 
bilateral / multilateral exchange of information provisions: Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global 
Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 106-107 and paragraphs 114-117. 
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or not. Some aspects have to be clarified in this respect. 
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requirements are fulfilled.72 The shareholders in such a legal entity are not in a 
position to withdraw the investments in the same way as in case of a 
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however, the procedure which is required for the withdrawal of financial means 
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legislation. It can be quite formal and similar to the procedure which is required 
in case of a corporate body, but there are also states which do not require any 
particular formality and which offer the possibility of stipulating the procedure 
in a partnership agreement. In the latter case, the partners are free to decide 
on the withdrawal of financial means. Thus, it may be the case that no formal 
decision whatsoever is necessary. This, of course, is different in case of a 
corporate body where the shareholders formally have to decide whether the 
legal entity distributes all or part of the profit to the shareholders or whether 
the profit is to be retained and carried forward. The percentage of 
shareholding or voting rights is therefore of great importance. If the investor 
has only a minority shareholding (minority voting rights) in the legal entity, he 
will not be in a position to influence a profit distribution. In contrast, if the 
investor has a majority shareholding (majority voting rights) in the legal entity, 
which is typically more than 50 percent, he will be in a position to influence a 
profit distribution also against the will of other (minority) shareholders. In the 
latter case of a majority shareholding (majority voting rights) the position of the 
                                            
72 Some countries also apply their CFC taxation to permanent establishments and partnerships (see below in 
more detail).  
     
 
withholding tax is higher than the income tax of the CFC. This can be of particular 
relevance in non-treaty cases. However, if a tax treaty exists between the source 
country and the resident country of the CFC, the withholding tax rate will be applied 
to the respective payments without any active-passive differentiation and, therefore, 
irrespective of the activity of the CFC. Furthermore, a comparable effect can most 
often only be achieved where the withholding tax rate is equal to – or at least similar 
to – the domestic income tax rate of the source country.69 This, however, is difficult to 
achieve in a tax treaty situation.70  
 
In addition, it must be taken into account that a withholding tax is only applied to 
direct payment streams from the source country to the CFC country, i.e. payments 
from subsidiary companies abroad towards the low-tax country are not affected. In 
contrast to CFC taxation, there is no link whatsoever to the actual result of the foreign 
entity calculated according to the rules of the country which applies the CFC taxation. 
That means, irrespective of whether the CFC is highly profitable or in a loss position, 
the withholding tax deducted from the payment will be the same. The system is 
therefore completely different to CFC taxation.  
 
5.7.8. Information Reporting Rules and Exchange of Information  
 
The information reporting rules stipulated in the national legislation can help 
countries to obtain information about the foreign activities of their residents. At least, 
those rules provide a legal basis for the gathering of information with respect to 
foreign activities. The same is true for bilateral or multilateral exchange of information 
provisions (e.g. in double tax conventions or multilateral conventions) which are of 
particular importance in case of tax evasion, i.e. in cases where the resident taxpayer 
does not submit any information with respect to the foreign investment activities.71 It 
is obvious that those provisions are a prerequisite for the proper application of CFC 
taxation and similar measures. However, it is equally obvious that those provisions 
cannot be more than a supporting element in the context of CFC taxation.  
 
5.7.9. Conclusions Regarding the Alleged Alternative Measures for CFC Rules 
 
It can be concluded that none of the measures outlined above can be considered a 
substitute for CFC rules. Some of the alleged alternative measures for CFC rules can 
in fact limit the advantage of foreign passive investments in low-tax countries (e.g. 
the general transfer pricing rules, the switch-over from the exemption method to the 
credit method, and the imposition of withholding taxes) and can create an obstacle to 
abusive investments (e.g. the residence test, the general anti-avoidance rules). 
However, none of the measures really targets the deferral of domestic taxation on 
foreign source income. In case of a non-abusive foreign investment, the profit which 
                                            
69 At least, this is true where the CFC is equity financed and without a significant amount of business expenses. 
The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition states that “(…) the imposition of withholding taxes at a 
substantial rate on certain payments to countries that engage in harmful tax competition, if associated with 
measures aimed at preventing the use of conduit arrangements, would act as a deterrent for countries to engage 
in harmful tax competition and for taxpayers to use entities located in these countries” (see Harmful Tax 
Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 161).  
70 This would result in a factual non-taxation in the CFC country, because the ordinary tax credit would be equal 
to the income taxes imposed in the CFC country.  
71 See with respect to the recommendation for the adoption of domestic information reporting provisions and 
bilateral / multilateral exchange of information provisions: Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global 
Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 106-107 and paragraphs 114-117. 
Chapter 5
194
     
 
first case, the shareholder receives the interest payment directly - for example 
- on a yearly basis. In the second case, the interest proceeds are derived by 
the CFC and only indirectly by the shareholder. Nonetheless, the amount of 
interest income is now part of the property held by the shareholder. In my 
opinion, this is irrespective of the fact whether the amount of interest income is 
calculated in the same way and according to the same methods in both 
countries - the residence state of the shareholder and the state of the CFC - 
and whether the interest income finds expression in exactly the same amount 
in the legal net equity of the foreign company or the share value. Clearly, this 
can lead to a deviation between attributable income and subsequent dividend 
payments of the CFC. Leaving aside the question whether the interest income 
can actually be “used” by the shareholder or whether it is locked-in in the 
foreign entity (see above), it must be concluded that there is an increase in 
value of the property - from the perspective of the country of the shareholder - 
which can either be in the form of an increase of the financial means of the 
shareholder, through the direct interest payment, or in the form of an indirect 
increase of the property held by the foreign entity.  
 
c.) The different approaches under the CFC regimes 
 
In general, the countries which apply a CFC taxation follow two different 
approaches: the entity approach and the transactional approach.74 The entity 
approach can be described as an “all-or-nothing” approach, i.e. either the 
whole income of the CFC is attributed to the resident shareholder or it is 
completely excluded from CFC taxation. The transactional approach is 
focused on certain - tainted - income, i.e. only tainted income is attributed to 
the resident shareholder.75 Again, the income is in most cases calculated 
according to the rules of the country which applies the CFC taxation.76 It is 
very clear that the transactional approach can lead to additional deviations 
from the income based on the commercial accounts of the foreign company. 
For example, this can be the case where the CFC carries out an activity which 
is excluded from CFC taxation and which leads to negative income (active 
income) and, in addition, an activity which is subject to CFC taxation and 
which leads to positive tainted income. It is important to recognise that the 
tainted income is still positive and therefore increases the property of the 
shareholder, although the net equity based on the commercial accounts of the 
foreign company is negative and a profit distribution is - pursuant to the laws of 
the foreign country - not possible. This conclusion is based on the principle 
that the focus must be on the investments of the CFC and the respective 
income components and not on the income based on the commercial 
accounts of the foreign entity itself. In fact, the latter income can be seen as 
irrelevant for CFC legislation. 
 
If we accept hat the CFC income leads to an increase in value of the property of the 
shareholder and that the income has to be seen unconnected from the foreign legal 
entity, the question remains whether the fact that the shareholder does not have 
                                            
74 See Arnold / Dibout, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures 
and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 49, 50. 
75 I will go into more detail of the entity approach and the transactional approach below.  
76 In general, this is equally true for countries which follow an entity approach and countries which follow a 
transactional approach.  
     
 
shareholder is - in my opinion - not substantially different to a partnership 
interest. Of course, the fact that the income is derived by a corporate body 
requires the formal decision upon the profit distribution - and therefore 
additional steps compared to the investment in a partnership - but it is solely in 
the hands of the majority shareholder to decide whether the profit is to be 
distributed to the shareholders or retained on the corporate level.  
 
b.) The increase in value of the investment 
 
Irrespective of a majority or minority shareholding in the foreign entity, it is 
important to verify whether (i) it is the increase of the (legal) net equity of the 
foreign entity, (ii) the increase in value of the shares, or (iii) the increase in 
value of the assets held by the foreign entity which is decisive and sufficient to 
justify the current taxation of CFC income.  
 
The differentiation is important because the increase of the net equity of the 
foreign entity is not necessarily equal to the income attribution to the 
shareholder. The reason is that in most cases the amount of attributed income 
is calculated pursuant to the rules of the state which applies its CFC taxation.73 
This can lead to temporary and even permanent differences between the 
income allocation and the amount which can (legally) be distributed by the 
foreign entity. Similar aspects apply to the increase in value of the shares. The 
accumulation of CFC income can only lead to a corresponding increase in the 
value of the shares if the activity of the CFC does not result in the creation of 
additional (hidden) values which do not (yet) have an effect on the actual 
income. For example, if the investment of the CFC is mainly limited to the 
investment in a short-term bond, and the interest rate is in line with the market 
rates, the interest income will lead to a more or less comparable increase in 
the value of the shares in the CFC. Here, the return on investment in the bond 
and in the shares are comparable. However, this can be different where the 
activities of the CFC are more complex (e.g. base company activities) or 
where the CFC income is dependent on the (future) result of other companies 
which cannot be clearly stipulated in advance but which are solely dependent 
on the success of future activities. For example, if the CFC is the owner of 
patent rights which lead to royalty income from the licensing out of those rights 
to other companies, and the royalties are solely dependent on the sales of the 
foreign companies, the value of the activities (and therefore the value of the 
shares) is mainly dependent on expectations. Here, the increase (or decrease) 
of sales is decisive and therefore the discounted cash-flows which can be 
derived in the future. The increase in value of the shares will not be equal to 
the profit which is derived in one single year but will be influenced by changes 
in the expectations of future earnings (respectively cash-flows).  
 
Thus, the amount of income attribution is in most cases not dependent on the 
legal results of the foreign company and the increase of the (legal) net equity. 
The increase in value of the shares is not directly connected to the income 
attribution, either. In my opinion, the focus must be on the respective 
investment of the CFC itself. For example, a given amount of interest income 
can be derived directly by the shareholder or indirectly through the CFC. In the 
                                            
73 See Arnold / Dibout, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures 
and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
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shareholder, through the direct interest payment, or in the form of an indirect 
increase of the property held by the foreign entity.  
 
c.) The different approaches under the CFC regimes 
 
In general, the countries which apply a CFC taxation follow two different 
approaches: the entity approach and the transactional approach.74 The entity 
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whole income of the CFC is attributed to the resident shareholder or it is 
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the resident shareholder.75 Again, the income is in most cases calculated 
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accounts of the foreign entity itself. In fact, the latter income can be seen as 
irrelevant for CFC legislation. 
 
If we accept hat the CFC income leads to an increase in value of the property of the 
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shareholder is - in my opinion - not substantially different to a partnership 
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value of the assets held by the foreign entity which is decisive and sufficient to 
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The differentiation is important because the increase of the net equity of the 
foreign entity is not necessarily equal to the income attribution to the 
shareholder. The reason is that in most cases the amount of attributed income 
is calculated pursuant to the rules of the state which applies its CFC taxation.73 
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accumulation of CFC income can only lead to a corresponding increase in the 
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income. For example, if the investment of the CFC is mainly limited to the 
investment in a short-term bond, and the interest rate is in line with the market 
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and in the shares are comparable. However, this can be different where the 
activities of the CFC are more complex (e.g. base company activities) or 
where the CFC income is dependent on the (future) result of other companies 
which cannot be clearly stipulated in advance but which are solely dependent 
on the success of future activities. For example, if the CFC is the owner of 
patent rights which lead to royalty income from the licensing out of those rights 
to other companies, and the royalties are solely dependent on the sales of the 
foreign companies, the value of the activities (and therefore the value of the 
shares) is mainly dependent on expectations. Here, the increase (or decrease) 
of sales is decisive and therefore the discounted cash-flows which can be 
derived in the future. The increase in value of the shares will not be equal to 
the profit which is derived in one single year but will be influenced by changes 
in the expectations of future earnings (respectively cash-flows).  
 
Thus, the amount of income attribution is in most cases not dependent on the 
legal results of the foreign company and the increase of the (legal) net equity. 
The increase in value of the shares is not directly connected to the income 
attribution, either. In my opinion, the focus must be on the respective 
investment of the CFC itself. For example, a given amount of interest income 
can be derived directly by the shareholder or indirectly through the CFC. In the 
                                            
73 See Arnold / Dibout, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures 
and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
Chapter 5
196
     
 
What is more important with respect to the ability-to-pay principle is the question of a 
clear separation of the activities of the CFC. Only the net result of a separable activity 
can be allocated to the resident shareholder.80 If the activity itself cannot be 
separated, the partial allocation of positive income - even though the net result of the 
whole activity is negative - is certainly not in line with the ability-to-pay principle. 
Similar aspects are relevant in case of subsequent losses. If the positive income is 
attributed to the resident shareholder, it is equally required - in my opinion - to take 
into account the negative result of the same activity in subsequent years. A strict 
limitation to positive income would certainly not be in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. Another aspect seems to be important: the attribution of positive CFC 
income includes the profit related to the functions and risks which are connected to 
the respective activity. From an economic perspective it is – in my opinion – very 
clear that an attribution of positive income requires in the same way the attribution of 
negative income. Again, the same is true from the perspective of the ability-to-pay 
principle. It cannot be acceptable from a tax policy point of view to tax the positive 
foreign income together with the positive domestic income but to separate the 
negative foreign income and to disallow - legally or factually - the offsetting with 
positive domestic income. If a tax system wants to exclude the negative income from 
the domestic tax base, the CFC regime has to be structured in a different way. In 
such a case, the attribution has to be limited to a risk-free interest rate of capital and 
cannot encompass any risk component whatsoever. Otherwise, the positive increase 
in value of the property is taken into account but not - in the same way - the decrease 
in value caused by the risks involved in the foreign activities and the respective 
markets.  
 
5.9. CFC Rules and the Taxation of Permanent Establishments and 
Partnerships 
 
CFC taxation is typically applied to foreign legal entities if certain requirements are 
fulfilled. Of course, the fact that those legal entities are non-transparent for tax 
purposes offers – in the absence of a CFC taxation – the possibility to defer the 
domestic taxation on foreign source income. It is therefore quite clear that non-
transparent entities which are theoretically able to shelter the foreign source income 
from domestic taxation are the main target of CFC rules and similar anti-avoidance 
measures. However, if all other legal aspects and differences between partnerships 
(PS) and corporations – apart from the technical aspects of taxation – are put aside, 
it becomes quite obvious that the CFC taxation and the taxation of partnerships –
pursuant to the credit system – can be identical.81 The same is true for the taxation of 
permanent establishments (PE). Thus, if it is not otherwise explicitly stated in the 









                                            
80 The net result has to be seen as the gross income minus the expenses related to each of the separate activities.  
81 Under the assumption that the complete income is taken into account.  
82 A partnership interest is typically considered to be a permanent establishment of the partner in the other state. 
     
 
immediate access to the foreign income is of particular relevance in this context. 
However, even if the shareholder has a majority shareholding (majority voting rights) 
in the foreign entity, it is not self-evident that the dividend payment is equal to the 
attributed CFC income. In the worst case, the majority shareholder will not be in a 
position to decide a distribution of profit if the income based on the commercial 
accounts of the CFC is negative. This can be due to different business activities 
carried on by the CFC (see above). In case of a minority shareholding, the 
shareholder has no possibility to influence a profit distribution or a liquidation of the 
company. In such a case, the income derived by the CFC can be locked-in for many 
years, and the only possibility for the shareholder to receive liquid funds is the 
disposal of the shares. Nevertheless, I do not think that this is the decisive criterion. 
For example, if a taxpayer receives interest income from an investment in bonds but 
the proceeds are not transferred to the taxpayer but to the bank - because the 
taxpayer is indebted and therefore obliged to transfer all financial income to the bank 
- nobody will seriously question the fact that the interest income is nonetheless taxed 
in the hands of the taxpayer, even though the taxpayer does not have any possibility 
to pay the income taxes out of the income received.77 The situation in case of an 
investment in a CFC is similar to the example: the taxpayer can freely decide to 
structure his investments in a way that the income is not derived directly by the 
taxpayer but indirectly through the investment in a foreign entity. This can have the 
effect that the income which is directly earned by the CFC (and indirectly by the 
shareholder) is not immediately available. Again, the conclusion from an economic 
point of view can be different. However, it is quite clear that the property of the 
taxpayer is increased at the very moment where the CFC receives the actual interest 
payment from its investments. In my opinion, the ability-to-pay principle cannot be 
narrowed and limited to a principle which requires the taxpayer to have the income 
“in his hands.” I generally agree with the 1987 OECD-report on base companies 
which stated that the base company income “(...) improved the ability of the 
shareholder to pay taxes because economically the income is at his disposal, thus 
constituting a capital yield of a special nature.” 78 Even though the income is included 
in the CFC - and therefore locked-in - it is important to recognise that the property is 
increased and the income is economically at the disposal of the shareholder, which 
does not necessarily mean that the income can be distributed by the entity. This does 
not mean that it is economically required to tax income on a current basis, either. The 
question whether the shareholding is a majority or minority shareholding is therefore 
not really decisive, because in both cases the property is increased by the income 
derived by the CFC, and the fact that the majority shareholder has easier access to 
the retained earnings and can influence the decisions of the company is not - in my 
opinion - the prevailing criterion in the context of the ability-to-pay principle. Thus, I 
do not think that – from a mere ability-to-pay point of view – there is any necessity for 
a complete sheltering of foreign income from domestic taxation until a decision is 
made to distribute income by way of dividend payment, disposal of the shares or 
liquidation of the company.79  
 
                                            
77 In the example, it is assumed that the bank loan is not connected to the investment in the bonds.  
78 Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion - 
Four Related Studies, Issues of International Taxation (OECD 1987).  
79 Pursuant to Fleming / Peroni / Shay, the “(…) deferral privilege is fundamentally inconsistent with the ability-
to-pay principle and, therefore, fundamentally inconsistent with an income tax system based on the ability-to-pay 
norm.” (Fleming / Peroni / Shay, Fairness In International Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case For Taxing 
Worldwide Income, Florida Tax Review, Volume 5 (2001), page 340.  
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What is more important with respect to the ability-to-pay principle is the question of a 
clear separation of the activities of the CFC. Only the net result of a separable activity 
can be allocated to the resident shareholder.80 If the activity itself cannot be 
separated, the partial allocation of positive income - even though the net result of the 
whole activity is negative - is certainly not in line with the ability-to-pay principle. 
Similar aspects are relevant in case of subsequent losses. If the positive income is 
attributed to the resident shareholder, it is equally required - in my opinion - to take 
into account the negative result of the same activity in subsequent years. A strict 
limitation to positive income would certainly not be in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. Another aspect seems to be important: the attribution of positive CFC 
income includes the profit related to the functions and risks which are connected to 
the respective activity. From an economic perspective it is – in my opinion – very 
clear that an attribution of positive income requires in the same way the attribution of 
negative income. Again, the same is true from the perspective of the ability-to-pay 
principle. It cannot be acceptable from a tax policy point of view to tax the positive 
foreign income together with the positive domestic income but to separate the 
negative foreign income and to disallow - legally or factually - the offsetting with 
positive domestic income. If a tax system wants to exclude the negative income from 
the domestic tax base, the CFC regime has to be structured in a different way. In 
such a case, the attribution has to be limited to a risk-free interest rate of capital and 
cannot encompass any risk component whatsoever. Otherwise, the positive increase 
in value of the property is taken into account but not - in the same way - the decrease 
in value caused by the risks involved in the foreign activities and the respective 
markets.  
 
5.9. CFC Rules and the Taxation of Permanent Establishments and 
Partnerships 
 
CFC taxation is typically applied to foreign legal entities if certain requirements are 
fulfilled. Of course, the fact that those legal entities are non-transparent for tax 
purposes offers – in the absence of a CFC taxation – the possibility to defer the 
domestic taxation on foreign source income. It is therefore quite clear that non-
transparent entities which are theoretically able to shelter the foreign source income 
from domestic taxation are the main target of CFC rules and similar anti-avoidance 
measures. However, if all other legal aspects and differences between partnerships 
(PS) and corporations – apart from the technical aspects of taxation – are put aside, 
it becomes quite obvious that the CFC taxation and the taxation of partnerships –
pursuant to the credit system – can be identical.81 The same is true for the taxation of 
permanent establishments (PE). Thus, if it is not otherwise explicitly stated in the 
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attributed CFC income. In the worst case, the majority shareholder will not be in a 
position to decide a distribution of profit if the income based on the commercial 
accounts of the CFC is negative. This can be due to different business activities 
carried on by the CFC (see above). In case of a minority shareholding, the 
shareholder has no possibility to influence a profit distribution or a liquidation of the 
company. In such a case, the income derived by the CFC can be locked-in for many 
years, and the only possibility for the shareholder to receive liquid funds is the 
disposal of the shares. Nevertheless, I do not think that this is the decisive criterion. 
For example, if a taxpayer receives interest income from an investment in bonds but 
the proceeds are not transferred to the taxpayer but to the bank - because the 
taxpayer is indebted and therefore obliged to transfer all financial income to the bank 
- nobody will seriously question the fact that the interest income is nonetheless taxed 
in the hands of the taxpayer, even though the taxpayer does not have any possibility 
to pay the income taxes out of the income received.77 The situation in case of an 
investment in a CFC is similar to the example: the taxpayer can freely decide to 
structure his investments in a way that the income is not derived directly by the 
taxpayer but indirectly through the investment in a foreign entity. This can have the 
effect that the income which is directly earned by the CFC (and indirectly by the 
shareholder) is not immediately available. Again, the conclusion from an economic 
point of view can be different. However, it is quite clear that the property of the 
taxpayer is increased at the very moment where the CFC receives the actual interest 
payment from its investments. In my opinion, the ability-to-pay principle cannot be 
narrowed and limited to a principle which requires the taxpayer to have the income 
“in his hands.” I generally agree with the 1987 OECD-report on base companies 
which stated that the base company income “(...) improved the ability of the 
shareholder to pay taxes because economically the income is at his disposal, thus 
constituting a capital yield of a special nature.” 78 Even though the income is included 
in the CFC - and therefore locked-in - it is important to recognise that the property is 
increased and the income is economically at the disposal of the shareholder, which 
does not necessarily mean that the income can be distributed by the entity. This does 
not mean that it is economically required to tax income on a current basis, either. The 
question whether the shareholding is a majority or minority shareholding is therefore 
not really decisive, because in both cases the property is increased by the income 
derived by the CFC, and the fact that the majority shareholder has easier access to 
the retained earnings and can influence the decisions of the company is not - in my 
opinion - the prevailing criterion in the context of the ability-to-pay principle. Thus, I 
do not think that – from a mere ability-to-pay point of view – there is any necessity for 
a complete sheltering of foreign income from domestic taxation until a decision is 
made to distribute income by way of dividend payment, disposal of the shares or 
liquidation of the company.79  
 
                                            
77 In the example, it is assumed that the bank loan is not connected to the investment in the bonds.  
78 Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, in International Tax Avoidance and Evasion - 
Four Related Studies, Issues of International Taxation (OECD 1987).  
79 Pursuant to Fleming / Peroni / Shay, the “(…) deferral privilege is fundamentally inconsistent with the ability-
to-pay principle and, therefore, fundamentally inconsistent with an income tax system based on the ability-to-pay 
norm.” (Fleming / Peroni / Shay, Fairness In International Taxation: The Ability-To-Pay Case For Taxing 
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avoidance measures in case of non-transparent legal entities, transparent 
partnerships and permanent establishments.  
 
However, there is an additional aspect which is of importance for the differentiation: 
the question of ownership of passive property - and therefore the question of income 
allocation for tax purposes - is quite clear in case of a foreign legal entity. The rights, 
receivables, shares, movable and immovable assets etc. which are held by the 
foreign entity are allocable to the foreign entity - unless there are certain other 
reasons according to which the structure has to be considered abusive. However, if it 
is assumed that the assets are managed by the foreign entity from within the foreign 
jurisdiction there is typically no basis for a different outcome. Thus, the beneficial and 
legal owner of the underlying income is the foreign entity. In order to tax the foreign 
income on a current basis, the residence state of the shareholder has to apply a 
specific tax regime in order to pierce the veil or to calculate a deemed dividend of the 
foreign legal entity.90  
 
This is not equally true in case of a permanent establishment and a transparent 
partnership, even though a differentiation between PE and PS is now required. In 
case of a PE, the decision whether the passive property is allocable to the head 
office or to the PE cannot be made on the same basis as in case of a legal entity. 
Both, head office and PE, are part of a single legal entity and it is therefore not 
immediately obvious whether the passive property (and therefore the respective 
income) is allocable to the head office or the foreign PE. In this respect, it is important 
to clarify the following questions: 
 
a.) Is it possible for a company to create a PE in another state by carrying on 
passive activities only?  
 
The Commentary to the OECD-MTC states in this respect that “(w)here 
tangible property such as facilities, industrial, commercial or scientific (ICS) 
equipment, buildings, or intangible property such as patents, procedures and 
similar property, are let or leased to third parties through a fixed place of 
business maintained by an enterprise of a Contracting State in the other State, 
this activity will, in general, render the place of business a permanent 
establishment. The same applies if capital is made available through a fixed 
place of business.” 91 It is important to recognise that the OECD refers to 
property which is let or leased to third parties. Clearly, the typical inter-
company services do not encompass third parties but are solely limited to 
group companies. However, the functions exercised in the other state can be 
identical for third parties and related parties. Moreover, to a large extent 
activities can be subject to CFC taxation (and are therefore considered to be 
passive activities) even if the recipient of the services is a third party.92 Thus, it 
seems that, in general, a permanent establishment does not necessarily 
require the exercising of active business activities but can equally be created 
by passive business activities – in case the activity is not of a preparatory or 
                                            
90 The different approaches will be discussed below in more detail. See in this respect Menck, 
Rechtsmechanismus und Rechtscharakter der Zugriffsbesteuerung, Deutsche Steuer-Zeitung, Ausgabe A, 1978, 
page 106 et seq.  
91 Paragraph 8 of the Commentary to the OECD-MTC on Article 5. See in this respect also Görl in Vogel / 
Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 5, paragraph 25. 
92 See in more detail below. 





         CFC taxation          Taxation of the PS/PE 
 
            
        tax base 100 Euro x 30%     
        tax rate = 30 Euro ./.      
        10 Euro tax credit = 20 Euro    
            
            
            
        income company C / PS (PE)    
        100 Euro x 10% tax rate     
        = 10 Euro income tax     
            




The overall tax burden is in both cases 30 percent, i.e. the income cannot be 
sheltered by the CFC and it is immediately taken into account in case of a PS/PE, 
too.83 Obviously, there are serious legal differences: the CFC is a separate legal 
person and a separate taxpayer who is resident in country C, whereas the profit 
share of the PS/PE is legally allocable to company A. For tax purposes, the profit 
derived in country C is in both cases subject to tax in country C, but the person who 
is subject to tax is different.84 This is a quite important difference from a tax treaty 
point of view and I will go into more detail of that aspect below in the context of the 
tax treaty provisions.   
 
Obviously, the exemption of PS/PE income can have the same effect as the non-
application of CFC taxation to the income derived by a foreign entity. That means, if 
passive income is derived by a PS/PE and the exemption method is applied, the 
income taxation is limited to the country of the PS/PE (and perhaps a third country - 
in case of withholding taxes).85 This opens the possibility for a repatriation of foreign 
income without any additional income taxation.86 At first glance, it seems necessary 
that a country which applies a CFC taxation to legal entities requires a comparable 
system for transparent partnerships and permanent establishments - in case the 
income is not taxed according to the credit method anyway.87 In fact, some of the 
countries apply their CFC taxation to legal entities and PS/PE.88 Other countries 
switch from the exemption method to the credit method if certain passive income is 
derived by the PS/PE.89 Obviously, those countries see the necessity to apply anti-
                                            
83 The income is calculated and taxed according to the systems of both countries, A and C.  
84 Under the assumption that the tax treaty between country A and country C is drafted along the lines of the 
OECD-MTC (Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC, Article 4 of the OECD-MTC).  
85 This may be different in case of an individual investor where the profit of the PS/PE (which is exempt from 
taxation) is taken into account for the determination of the domestic tax rate. 
86 At least, in most countries there is no taxation on the actual repatriation of PS/PE income.  
87 Like - for example - in the United Kingdom.  
88 For example France. The Italian rules apply to PS/PE of a foreign company (see in more detail below).  
89 For example the activity clauses in the German tax treaties and section 2 a of the German Income Tax Act (see 
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foreign entity are allocable to the foreign entity - unless there are certain other 
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income on a current basis, the residence state of the shareholder has to apply a 
specific tax regime in order to pierce the veil or to calculate a deemed dividend of the 
foreign legal entity.90  
 
This is not equally true in case of a permanent establishment and a transparent 
partnership, even though a differentiation between PE and PS is now required. In 
case of a PE, the decision whether the passive property is allocable to the head 
office or to the PE cannot be made on the same basis as in case of a legal entity. 
Both, head office and PE, are part of a single legal entity and it is therefore not 
immediately obvious whether the passive property (and therefore the respective 
income) is allocable to the head office or the foreign PE. In this respect, it is important 
to clarify the following questions: 
 
a.) Is it possible for a company to create a PE in another state by carrying on 
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The Commentary to the OECD-MTC states in this respect that “(w)here 
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equipment, buildings, or intangible property such as patents, procedures and 
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business maintained by an enterprise of a Contracting State in the other State, 
this activity will, in general, render the place of business a permanent 
establishment. The same applies if capital is made available through a fixed 
place of business.” 91 It is important to recognise that the OECD refers to 
property which is let or leased to third parties. Clearly, the typical inter-
company services do not encompass third parties but are solely limited to 
group companies. However, the functions exercised in the other state can be 
identical for third parties and related parties. Moreover, to a large extent 
activities can be subject to CFC taxation (and are therefore considered to be 
passive activities) even if the recipient of the services is a third party.92 Thus, it 
seems that, in general, a permanent establishment does not necessarily 
require the exercising of active business activities but can equally be created 
by passive business activities – in case the activity is not of a preparatory or 
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passive income is derived by a PS/PE and the exemption method is applied, the 
income taxation is limited to the country of the PS/PE (and perhaps a third country - 
in case of withholding taxes).85 This opens the possibility for a repatriation of foreign 
income without any additional income taxation.86 At first glance, it seems necessary 
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83 The income is calculated and taxed according to the systems of both countries, A and C.  
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a holding, financing or licensing activity).99 In essence, this has the effect that 
there is a major difference if the holding functions, group-financing functions 
and licensing functions are carried out by a PE instead of a separate legal 
entity. Pursuant to the German approach the property which is related to the 
aforementioned functions will not be allocated to the PE and, what is very 
important in this respect, the income allocated to the PE will be limited to a 
(service) fee for the “handling” of the activities.100 In other words, the German 
approach does not accept, for example, the allocation of the total amount of 
interest income realised from intra-group financing activities (e.g. with group 
companies in other countries) to the PE state, but restricts the allocable 
income to the coordination and the handling of the financing activities. The 
latter, of course, will often have the effect that the income of the PE is 
substantially lower than in a situation in which the full amount of interest 
income is allocable to the PE. Therefore, such an approach makes it 
impossible to transfer property and income with respect to certain types of 
passive investments and intra-group activities to a PE.101 The German 
approach is clearly not in line with the OECD principles, as described above, 
which provide for an unrestricted functional allocation of property and income. 
The OECD approach is - in my opinion as well - the appropriate approach 
since I do not see any justification for such a limitation of the functional 
allocation. In the end, it will most certainly increase the number of mutual 
agreement procedures and arbitration procedures.  
 
c.) Is the outcome different if the PE carries on active and passive activities? 
 
The question arises whether the German approach described above leads to a 
different outcome in case the PE carries on as its main activity an active 
business and, in addition to that, a passive business activity. In this regard, the 
German concept of the central function of the head office will be equally 
relevant and still requires the compulsory allocation of certain property (and 
therefore also income) to the head office. The combination of active and 
passive activities in the PE, therefore, does not result in a different conclusion. 
As already described above, it is clear that such an approach is not in line with 
OECD principles and should, in my opinion, clearly be rejected.  
 
Similar aspects apply to the income derived by a PS. However, in contrast to the PE, 
the PS often has an economic personality of its own and can be – depending on the 
respective country and the type of PS – the legal owner of the property purchased. Of 
course, this should – in general – not lead to a different outcome for tax purposes 
compared to the principles applied in case of a PE. However, the PS concept is 
different from country to country and classification conflicts can come up where, for 
example, the state of the PS considers the PS to be non-transparent, whereas the 
residence state of the partners treats the PS as transparent for tax purposes – and 
vice versa. For example, the Spanish Sociedad Comanditaria is a limited PS 
                                            
99 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments; see in this respect also the 
German Supreme Tax Court (BFH), August 30, 1995, BStBl. 1996 II page 563.   
100 See 4.4.3 of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments. 
101 According to Kessler / Jehl it is “factually forbidden” under the German concept to carry out financing 
functions, holding functions and licensing functions through a PE (Kessler / Jehl, Kritische Analyse der 
Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, page 1977 et seq. (1980).  
     
 
auxiliary character.93 However, even if the carrying on of passive business 
activities can lead to a PE, the question of an appropriate profit allocation as 
well as the allocation of the underlying assets remains. 
 
b.) How much of the overall profit related to the passive activity is allocable to 
the PE? 
 
Based on Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC, the profits of an enterprise may be 
taxed in the state of the permanent establishment, but only so much of them 
as is attributable to that permanent establishment. Article 7 (2) of the OECD-
MTC states that “(...) there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that 
permanent establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it 
were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly 
independently with the enterprise of which it is a permanent establishment.” 
Thus, the income which is connected to the activity of the permanent 
establishment should be taxed in the state of the permanent establishment. In 
principle, it is not decisive in this respect whether the activity is an active 
business activity or a passive business activity. The property which is 
effectively connected to such an income-producing business activity in the PE 
state should, in general, also be allocable to the latter state. In other words, a 
functional allocation of income and property has to be made between PE and 
head office.94 
 
However, it might be interesting to have a look at the German concept of what 
is called the central function of the head office,95 because it reveals a 
restrictive approach which can be of particular relevance in case of passive 
investments and intra-group activities. Based on the German concept the 
property either has to be allocated to the PE or to the head office.96 In 
principle, the allocation is dependent on the respective functions carried out by 
the PE and the head office. A partial allocation is not possible.97 If assets are 
used in different parts of the entity (including PE), the decision of the 
management shall be decisive.98 However, for some types of property there is 
a compulsory allocation to the head office which is based on the German 
concept of the central function of the head office. According to this German 
concept shares in subsidiary companies, financial means and intangible 
property can only be allocated to the PE if they are directly connected to - and 
necessary for - an activity which is carried out by the PE itself (but which is not 
                                            
93 Article 5 (4) of the OECD-MTC.  
94 See in this respect Wassermeyer in Debatin / Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung, Article 7, paragraph 240. 
95 See with respect to the approach of the German tax authorities to the central function of the head office 
(“Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses”): Circular of the Ministry of Finance, dated December 24, 1999, BMF IV B 
4 – S 1300 – 111/99, BStBl. I 1999, page 1076 (“Betriebsstätten-Verwaltungsgrundsätze” - German 
Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments). It seems that Switzerland is following a similar 
concept (“Zentralverwaltung”). See in this respect Locher, Die Praxis der Bundessteuern, III. Teil: Das 
interkantonale Doppelbesteuerungsrecht (February 2007), § 8, II, B, 2d, no. 2; Kessler / Jehl, Kritische Analyse 
der Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, page 1977 et seq. (1984); 
Baumhoff / Leitner / Digeronimo, Betriebsstättengewinnermittlung im internationalen Vergleich - Deutschland, 
Österreich, Schweiz, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2000, page 1433. 
96 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments.  
97 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments.  
98 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments; German Supreme Tax Court 
(BFH), April 1, 1987, BStBl. 1987 II page 550.  
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a holding, financing or licensing activity).99 In essence, this has the effect that 
there is a major difference if the holding functions, group-financing functions 
and licensing functions are carried out by a PE instead of a separate legal 
entity. Pursuant to the German approach the property which is related to the 
aforementioned functions will not be allocated to the PE and, what is very 
important in this respect, the income allocated to the PE will be limited to a 
(service) fee for the “handling” of the activities.100 In other words, the German 
approach does not accept, for example, the allocation of the total amount of 
interest income realised from intra-group financing activities (e.g. with group 
companies in other countries) to the PE state, but restricts the allocable 
income to the coordination and the handling of the financing activities. The 
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c.) Is the outcome different if the PE carries on active and passive activities? 
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99 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments; see in this respect also the 
German Supreme Tax Court (BFH), August 30, 1995, BStBl. 1996 II page 563.   
100 See 4.4.3 of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments. 
101 According to Kessler / Jehl it is “factually forbidden” under the German concept to carry out financing 
functions, holding functions and licensing functions through a PE (Kessler / Jehl, Kritische Analyse der 
Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, page 1977 et seq. (1980).  
     
 
auxiliary character.93 However, even if the carrying on of passive business 
activities can lead to a PE, the question of an appropriate profit allocation as 
well as the allocation of the underlying assets remains. 
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functional allocation of income and property has to be made between PE and 
head office.94 
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93 Article 5 (4) of the OECD-MTC.  
94 See in this respect Wassermeyer in Debatin / Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung, Article 7, paragraph 240. 
95 See with respect to the approach of the German tax authorities to the central function of the head office 
(“Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses”): Circular of the Ministry of Finance, dated December 24, 1999, BMF IV B 
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der Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, page 1977 et seq. (1984); 
Baumhoff / Leitner / Digeronimo, Betriebsstättengewinnermittlung im internationalen Vergleich - Deutschland, 
Österreich, Schweiz, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2000, page 1433. 
96 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments.  
97 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments.  
98 See 2.4. of the German Administrative Principles for Permanent Establishments; German Supreme Tax Court 
(BFH), April 1, 1987, BStBl. 1987 II page 550.  
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states is - based on the view of the majority countries - not a reason to limit the right 
of the PS state to tax its residents.107 Only a minority of delegates followed the 
principle that the PS state should refrain from taxing the income and leave the 
exclusive taxing right with the residence state of the partners.108 Due to the fact that 
the latter state allocates the royalty income directly to the resident partners - since 
the royalty income is not allocable to a PE in the PS state - a double taxation would 
occur and could only be avoided if the residence state of the partners allowed the 
crediting of the foreign taxes levied in the PS state. The situation of royalty income 
derived in a third country does not lead to a substantially different outcome: the PS 
state would tax the royalty income based on the tax treaty concluded with the source 
state. The PS state clearly allocates the royalty income to the PS which is considered 
to be non-transparent for tax purposes. Although the source state and the PS state 
should take into consideration the treatment of the income in the residence state of 
the partners, this would not lead to the result that the PS state refrains from taxing 
the royalty income. With respect to the situation where the royalty income has its 
source in the residence state of the partners, the majority of the delegates took the 
position that the royalty income may be taxed in the residence state of the partners, 
but should give relief for a taxation of the income in the PS state.109  
 
5.10. Harmful Tax Competition - The OECD and EU Approach  
 
5.10.1. The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition 
 
The OECD published its Report “Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global 
Issue” in 1998 based on the initiative of OECD Ministers in 1996 to “develop 
measures to counter the distorting effects on harmful tax competition on investment 
and financing decisions and the consequences for national tax bases, and report 
back in 1998.”110 Progress Reports were issued in order to provide updated 
information on the harmful tax practices work.111 In general, it has been recognised 
that in a world of accelerating globalisation specific tax schemes which are aimed at 
attracting financial and other “geographically mobile activities” can create harmful tax 
competition between states and, consequently, can lead to the erosion of national tax 
bases.112 Therefore, the Report is focused on mobile activities, such as financial and 
other service activities, including the provision of intangibles, but leaves out tax 
incentives designed to attract investment in plant, building and equipment.113 
However, it must be clearly stated that the Report does not deal with low-tax 
countries as such, because tax competition and the reduction of tax rates are, in 
general, considered to be positive. According to the OECD, low tax rates can be 
“welfare enhancing where it is the outcome of a fair competitive process.”114 The 
                                            
107 Paragraph 131 of the OECD Partnership Report.  
108 Paragraph 132 of the OECD Partnership Report.  
109 Paragraph 127 of the OECD Partnership Report.  
110 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), page 3 (Foreword) and page 7 
(Introduction). 
111 The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report, (OECD 2004); The OECD’s 
Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, (OECD 2001); The OECD’s Project on Harmful 
Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (OECD 2006).  
112 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 2.  
113 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 6. 
114 The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices - A Briefing Note for Journalists, (OECD 2004) paragraph 2. 
     
 
according to Spanish law.102 For Spanish tax purposes, the PS is treated as non-
transparent and the income is subject to Spanish corporate income tax.103 From a 
German perspective, the Sociedad Comanditaria is considered a transparent PS, 
with the effect, that the income is allocable to the partners, i.e. the PS interest is seen 
as a permanent establishment of the German partners in Spain. If the Spanish limited 
PS purchases passive property like patent rights and movable assets for the 
licensing and renting out to other (group) companies, or uses the financial means 
received from the partners to start inter-company financing activities, this can lead to 
a conflict  between the Spanish and the German tax authorities. The Spanish tax 
authorities would most certainly treat the passive property and the income derived 
from the passive property as taxable income of the limited PS in Spain, whereas the 
German tax authorities would have to deal with the question whether the property 
(and the respective income) is allocable to the Spanish PS104 or whether it is 
allocable to the domestic property of the German partners and therefore taxable in 
Germany. Clearly, this is more complicated than in a regular PE situation and – very 
often – such a dispute has to be solved by way of a mutual agreement procedure.105  
 
The allocation of property and passive income is therefore comparable in case of a 
PS and a PE. It can be concluded that the shifting of passive income to a PS/PE is 
much more restricted and it cannot be shifted to the same extent as in case of a 
foreign legal entity. This is due to the fact that the general income allocation 
principles have to be applied first and irrespective of the subsequent question of an 
avoidance of double taxation according to the credit method or the exemption 
method. However, the classification (or qualification) conflicts cannot be solved by 
income allocation rules. The fact that - for example - the PS state considers the PS to 
be non-transparent for tax purposes makes the whole situation comparable to the 
treatment of a CFC, i.e. a foreign legal entity. Such a classification of the PS state 
shelters the active and passive income from taxation in the residence state of the 
partners if the PS income is generally exempt from taxation. In such a case, only the 
application of the credit method ensures the taxation of passive income which would 
otherwise be allocable to the residence state of the partners.  
 
The OECD Partnership Report deals in detail with the classification conflicts related 
to partnerships.106 In the relevant situation outlined above, i.e. where the PS is 
treated as a taxable entity in the state of the PS and as transparent entity in the 
residence state of the partners, the majority of the participating countries made a 
general distinction which is related to the source of income: if the income (e.g. royalty 
income) of the PS is derived from sources within the PS state,  it involves a purely 
domestic matter of the PS state and it simply taxes the domestic source royalty 
income of a resident taxpayer and nothing in the Convention can limit that right. The 
fact that double taxation results because of the differing income allocations of the two 
                                            
102 Article 122 no. 2 of the Spanish Trade Law. 
103 The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, Issues In International Taxation 
(OECD 1999), page 116; Article 7 (1) of the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act.  
104 Which is, in effect, a PE of the German partners in Spain.  
105 In this particular example, the Spanish-German tax treaty contains an activity clause which should be 
applicable to the PS income (see the German Ministry of Finance, circular dated May 28, 1998, BStBl. I 1998, 
page 557). Therefore, if the respective income is passive in the sense of the activity clause, the credit method 
will be applied. Nonetheless, Spain is a high-tax country and it is, of course, a different result from a German 
perspective if the income is directly allocable to the German partners without a taxing right for Spain.  
106 The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, Issues In International Taxation 
(OECD 1999). 
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include the introduction of CFC and FIF rules. It is explicitly stated with respect to 
CFC rules that “countries that do not have such rules consider adopting them and 
that countries that have such rules ensure that they apply in a fashion consistent with 
the desirability of curbing harmful tax practices.”124 The Report concluded that CFC 
rules are “(…) an effective tool to deal with harmful tax practices. However, their 
effectiveness is reduced by the fact that they are not applied by all countries and 
even in those countries that do apply them, they do not cover all situations of harmful 
tax practices.”125 Moreover, it is stated that “(w)hile the Recommendation only applies 
in the context of curbing harmful tax practices, CFC rules may also apply in situations 
which do not involve harmful tax practices as defined in this Report. It is recognised 
that countries retain their right to use such rules in such situations.”126 However, the 
Report does not see - due to the different domestic tax systems - a basis for the 
harmonisation of CFC rules or the development of model CFC provisions, but 
proposes that the “(...) greater co-ordination in targeting such domestic rules will be a 
useful improvement. Accordingly, Member countries are urged, with the continued 
co-ordination by the OECD, to try for congruence of results of their respective CFC or 
equivalent legislation in a manner consistent with the objectives of this Report. 
Further work may enable the Committee to elaborate on some minimum standards 
for the design of such regimes in terms of their effectiveness in counteracting harmful 
tax practices.”127 Comparable recommendations were given with respect to FIF rules, 
and “(...) countries that do not have FIF or equivalent rules are asked to consider 
adopting such rules.”128 I will not go into detail of the other recommendations since 
they are either not comparably important for the study or discussed separately in the 
context of alleged alternative measures for CFC taxation.  
 
It is very clear from the Report that low-taxation (or even zero-taxation) is the basic 
condition for a tax haven or a harmful preferential tax regime. One could hardly 
imagine a tax haven with a high tax rate. Especially for multinational companies it is - 
from my perspective - not the lack of transparency or the lack of effective exchange 
of information which is the important element but the reduction of the overall effective 
tax rate.129 The non-co-operation of a tax-haven jurisdiction may therefore be an 
important element for investors who have something to hide, but not - in general - for 
multinational enterprises which intent to relocate passive activities to other countries 
and which have to fulfil legal reporting obligations.130  
 
However, from the more recent developments and OECD publications it can be 
understood that changes are taking place in the focus of the project on harmful tax 
competition. Instead of focusing on tax haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential 
tax regimes, the principle of transparency and the effective exchange of information 
play a more and more important role to achieve a “global level playing field.”131 Of 
course, there is still a differentiation between co-operative and non-co-operative 
jurisdictions, but the criterion of “no or low taxation” is less visible. In the 2006 
                                            
124 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 97-100.  
125 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 98. 
126 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 98.   
127 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 100.    
128 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 101-103. 
129 Of course, this may be different in case of financial institutions with respect to their customers.  
130 E.g. reporting requirements towards the headquarter jurisdiction / shareholders. 
131 A Process for Achieving a Global Level Playing Field, OECD Global Forum on Taxation, Berlin, 3-4 June 
2004 (OECD 2004); Progress Towards a Level Playing Field: Outcomes of the OECD Global Forum on 
Taxation, Melbourne, 15-16 November 2005 (OECD 2005). 
     
 
focus of the Report are tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential tax regimes in 
non-tax-haven jurisdictions.115  
 
a.) Tax-haven jurisdictions 
 
Based on the Report, tax havens serve three main purposes: “they provide a 
location for holding passive investments (“money boxes”); they provide a 
location where “paper” profits can be booked; and they enable the affairs of 
taxpayers, particularly their bank accounts, to be effectively shielded from 
scrutiny by tax authorities of other countries.”116 There are certain key factors 
for identifying tax-haven jurisdictions which can be summarised as follows: (i) 
no or only nominal taxation of the relevant income,117 (ii) the lack of effective 
exchange of information, (iii) the lack of transparency, and (iv) no substantial 
activities in the respective jurisdiction, i.e. there is little real activity in the host 
country.118 In any case, the non-taxation or only nominal taxation is a 
necessary condition for the identification of a tax haven.119  
 
b.) Harmful preferential tax regimes  
 
Harmful preferential tax regimes are established to attract those economic 
activities which can most easily be shifted from one country to another, i.e. 
typically base company activities and other passive investments. The key 
factors to identify a harmful preferential tax regime are similar to those outlined 
above with respect to tax-havens: (i) a low or zero effective tax rate on the 
relevant income, (ii) the “ring fencing” of the regimes,120 (iii) the lack of 
effective exchange of information, and (iv) the lack of transparency.121 
Comparable to the tax havens, a harmful preferential tax regime will be 
characterised by a combination of a low or zero effective tax rate and one or 
more of the other key factors.122  
 
It seems to be quite obvious that both, the tax-haven jurisdictions and the harmful 
preferential tax regimes, can create a serious risk of tax base erosion, especially for 
high-tax countries. For this reason, the Report provided several recommendations of 
counteracting measures against harmful tax competition which are divided into the 
following three categories: (i) recommendations concerning domestic legislation and 
practices, (ii) recommendations concerning tax treaties, and (iii) recommendations to 
intensify international co-operation in response to harmful tax competition.123 It is not 
surprising, in my opinion, that the recommendations concerning domestic legislation 
                                            
115 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 38; see also Eimermann, 
OECD-Arbeiten zum schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb - ein Zwischenstand, Internationales Steuerrecht 2001, page 
81 et seq.  
116 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 49. 
117 This is certainly one of the main features of a tax-haven and the feature which is responsible for its 
attractiveness from the perspective of multinational enterprises. 
118 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 47-56.  
119 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 52.  
120 Some preferential tax regimes are partly or fully insulated from the domestic markets of the country providing 
the regime. 
121 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 57-67.  
122 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 59.  
123 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 92; see also the summary of 
the recommendations in the Appendix “Recommendations And Guidelines For Dealing With Harmful Tax 
Practices.”  
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124 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraphs 97-100.  
125 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 98. 
126 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 98.   
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129 Of course, this may be different in case of financial institutions with respect to their customers.  
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131 A Process for Achieving a Global Level Playing Field, OECD Global Forum on Taxation, Berlin, 3-4 June 
2004 (OECD 2004); Progress Towards a Level Playing Field: Outcomes of the OECD Global Forum on 
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focus of the Report are tax-haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential tax regimes in 
non-tax-haven jurisdictions.115  
 
a.) Tax-haven jurisdictions 
 
Based on the Report, tax havens serve three main purposes: “they provide a 
location for holding passive investments (“money boxes”); they provide a 
location where “paper” profits can be booked; and they enable the affairs of 
taxpayers, particularly their bank accounts, to be effectively shielded from 
scrutiny by tax authorities of other countries.”116 There are certain key factors 
for identifying tax-haven jurisdictions which can be summarised as follows: (i) 
no or only nominal taxation of the relevant income,117 (ii) the lack of effective 
exchange of information, (iii) the lack of transparency, and (iv) no substantial 
activities in the respective jurisdiction, i.e. there is little real activity in the host 
country.118 In any case, the non-taxation or only nominal taxation is a 
necessary condition for the identification of a tax haven.119  
 
b.) Harmful preferential tax regimes  
 
Harmful preferential tax regimes are established to attract those economic 
activities which can most easily be shifted from one country to another, i.e. 
typically base company activities and other passive investments. The key 
factors to identify a harmful preferential tax regime are similar to those outlined 
above with respect to tax-havens: (i) a low or zero effective tax rate on the 
relevant income, (ii) the “ring fencing” of the regimes,120 (iii) the lack of 
effective exchange of information, and (iv) the lack of transparency.121 
Comparable to the tax havens, a harmful preferential tax regime will be 
characterised by a combination of a low or zero effective tax rate and one or 
more of the other key factors.122  
 
It seems to be quite obvious that both, the tax-haven jurisdictions and the harmful 
preferential tax regimes, can create a serious risk of tax base erosion, especially for 
high-tax countries. For this reason, the Report provided several recommendations of 
counteracting measures against harmful tax competition which are divided into the 
following three categories: (i) recommendations concerning domestic legislation and 
practices, (ii) recommendations concerning tax treaties, and (iii) recommendations to 
intensify international co-operation in response to harmful tax competition.123 It is not 
surprising, in my opinion, that the recommendations concerning domestic legislation 
                                            
115 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 38; see also Eimermann, 
OECD-Arbeiten zum schädlichen Steuerwettbewerb - ein Zwischenstand, Internationales Steuerrecht 2001, page 
81 et seq.  
116 Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, (OECD 1998), paragraph 49. 
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States to refrain from introducing any new harmful tax measures (“standstill”) and 
amend any laws or practices that are deemed to be harmful in respect of the 
principles of the Code (“rollback”).141 Regarding tax avoidance and tax evasion, the 
Council notes that “anti-abuse provisions or countermeasures contained in tax laws 
and in double taxation conventions play a fundamental role in counteracting tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.”142  
 
In order to assess the tax measures of the Member States a Code of Conduct Group 
was established (the so-called Primarolo Group).143 On November 29, 1999, the 
Group presented its report on harmful tax regimes within the Member States and 
their dependent or associated territories.144 The Report adopted a classification of 
harmful measures into six categories: (i) financial services, group financing and 
royalty payments, (ii) insurance, reinsurance and captive insurance, (iii) intra-group 
services, (iv) holding companies, (v) exempt and offshore companies, (vi) 
miscellaneous measures. However, most of the systems listed in the Report can be 
placed into one of two categories: (i) systems applying to “intra-group” service 
companies and holdings, covering three kinds of enterprises, headquarters or co-
ordination centres, service centres and distribution centres; and (ii) systems applying 
to financial services companies and “offshore” companies. In principle, all these 
systems primarily benefit multinational companies belonging to non-residents.145 
 
5.10.3. The Main Differences between the OECD Report on Harmful Tax 
Competition and the EU Code of Conduct 
 
The OECD Report and the EU Code of Conduct are to a large extent overlapping, 
especially with respect to the criteria set out for the identification of preferential tax 
regimes. Nonetheless, there are important differences which should be noted.146  
 
a.) Both, the 1998 OECD Report and the EU Code of Conduct, are focused on 
preferential tax regimes which offer a low-taxation of income (or even zero 
taxation) and which are not generally applicable to all resident and non-
resident taxpayers (ring-fencing). However, the OECD Report made an 
additional differentiation between preferential tax regimes and tax havens, 
whereas the Code of Conduct only stipulated that “(...) tax measures which 
provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero 
taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in 
question are to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered 
by this code.”147 However, from the recent developments and OECD 
                                            
141 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraphs C and D.  
142 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraph L.  
143 Based on paragraph H of the Code of Conduct. The Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) was 
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haven jurisdictions and harmful preferential tax regimes is of a political nature. Tax haven jurisdictions are 
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Progress Report it was made clear that the latter criterion is used “merely as a 
gateway criterion to determine those situations in which an analysis of the other 
criteria is necessary. The adoption of a low or zero tax rate by itself is never sufficient 
to identify a preferential tax regime as harmful.”132 The 2006 Progress Report states 
that “by promoting the implementation of the principles of transparency and effective 
exchange of information, OECD countries seek to enable each country to retain 
sovereignty over national matters and to apply effectively its own tax laws. The 
decision on the appropriate rate of tax is a sovereign decision of each country. OECD 
member countries do not seek to dictate to any country (...) what its tax rate should 
be or how its tax system should be structured.”133  
 
5.10.2. The EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
 
In 1997 the ECOFIN Council134 adopted a resolution on a Code of Conduct for 
business taxation in the European Union.135 The Code of Conduct is part of a 
“package to tackle harmful tax competition in the European Union” which 
encompasses also the taxation of savings income and the issue of withholding taxes 
on cross-border interest and royalty payments between companies.136 When 
adopting the Code, the Council, acknowledged “the positive effects of fair competition 
and the need to consolidate the competitiveness of the European Union and the 
Member States at international level, whilst noting that tax competition may also lead 
to tax measures with harmful effects.” The Code of Conduct for business taxation is 
therefore designed “to curb harmful tax measures” which unduly affect, or may affect, 
“in a significant way the location of business activity in the Community.”137 It was 
made clear that “business activity” in this respect also includes the activities carried 
out within a group of companies.138 Moreover, the Code explicitly outlined that “(...) 
tax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, 
including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State 
in question are to be regarded as potentially harmful (...). Such a level of taxation 
may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any other relevant 
factor.”139 Similar to the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, the Code of 
Conduct describes certain key factors which are of importance and which should be 
taken into account for the identification of harmful tax measures. The criteria for 
identifying potentially harmful measures include: (i) the limitation of advantages to 
non-residents or in respect to transactions carried out with non-residents, (ii) the ring-
fencing of the respective regime, (iii) the granting of advantages without any real 
economic activity and substantial economic presence within the respective Member 
State, (iv) the basis of profit determination for companies in a multinational group 
departs from internationally accepted rules, in particular those approved by the 
OECD, and (v) the lack of transparency.140 The Code of Conduct requires Member 
                                            
132 The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (OECD 
2006), page 3, footnote 4. 
133 The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Countries (OECD 
2006), paragraph 6. 
134 The Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).  
135 Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council Meeting concerning taxation policy (98/C 2/01), December 1, 1997.  
136 See also van Mens / Porquet, European Union - Current Tax Issues, European Taxation 2001, page 335 et 
seq.  
137 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraph A.  
138 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraph A.  
139 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraph B. 
140 Code of Conduct for business taxation, paragraph B. 
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States to refrain from introducing any new harmful tax measures (“standstill”) and 
amend any laws or practices that are deemed to be harmful in respect of the 
principles of the Code (“rollback”).141 Regarding tax avoidance and tax evasion, the 
Council notes that “anti-abuse provisions or countermeasures contained in tax laws 
and in double taxation conventions play a fundamental role in counteracting tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.”142  
 
In order to assess the tax measures of the Member States a Code of Conduct Group 
was established (the so-called Primarolo Group).143 On November 29, 1999, the 
Group presented its report on harmful tax regimes within the Member States and 
their dependent or associated territories.144 The Report adopted a classification of 
harmful measures into six categories: (i) financial services, group financing and 
royalty payments, (ii) insurance, reinsurance and captive insurance, (iii) intra-group 
services, (iv) holding companies, (v) exempt and offshore companies, (vi) 
miscellaneous measures. However, most of the systems listed in the Report can be 
placed into one of two categories: (i) systems applying to “intra-group” service 
companies and holdings, covering three kinds of enterprises, headquarters or co-
ordination centres, service centres and distribution centres; and (ii) systems applying 
to financial services companies and “offshore” companies. In principle, all these 
systems primarily benefit multinational companies belonging to non-residents.145 
 
5.10.3. The Main Differences between the OECD Report on Harmful Tax 
Competition and the EU Code of Conduct 
 
The OECD Report and the EU Code of Conduct are to a large extent overlapping, 
especially with respect to the criteria set out for the identification of preferential tax 
regimes. Nonetheless, there are important differences which should be noted.146  
 
a.) Both, the 1998 OECD Report and the EU Code of Conduct, are focused on 
preferential tax regimes which offer a low-taxation of income (or even zero 
taxation) and which are not generally applicable to all resident and non-
resident taxpayers (ring-fencing). However, the OECD Report made an 
additional differentiation between preferential tax regimes and tax havens, 
whereas the Code of Conduct only stipulated that “(...) tax measures which 
provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, including zero 
taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State in 
question are to be regarded as potentially harmful and therefore covered 
by this code.”147 However, from the recent developments and OECD 
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Progress Report it was made clear that the latter criterion is used “merely as a 
gateway criterion to determine those situations in which an analysis of the other 
criteria is necessary. The adoption of a low or zero tax rate by itself is never sufficient 
to identify a preferential tax regime as harmful.”132 The 2006 Progress Report states 
that “by promoting the implementation of the principles of transparency and effective 
exchange of information, OECD countries seek to enable each country to retain 
sovereignty over national matters and to apply effectively its own tax laws. The 
decision on the appropriate rate of tax is a sovereign decision of each country. OECD 
member countries do not seek to dictate to any country (...) what its tax rate should 
be or how its tax system should be structured.”133  
 
5.10.2. The EU Code of Conduct for Business Taxation 
 
In 1997 the ECOFIN Council134 adopted a resolution on a Code of Conduct for 
business taxation in the European Union.135 The Code of Conduct is part of a 
“package to tackle harmful tax competition in the European Union” which 
encompasses also the taxation of savings income and the issue of withholding taxes 
on cross-border interest and royalty payments between companies.136 When 
adopting the Code, the Council, acknowledged “the positive effects of fair competition 
and the need to consolidate the competitiveness of the European Union and the 
Member States at international level, whilst noting that tax competition may also lead 
to tax measures with harmful effects.” The Code of Conduct for business taxation is 
therefore designed “to curb harmful tax measures” which unduly affect, or may affect, 
“in a significant way the location of business activity in the Community.”137 It was 
made clear that “business activity” in this respect also includes the activities carried 
out within a group of companies.138 Moreover, the Code explicitly outlined that “(...) 
tax measures which provide for a significantly lower effective level of taxation, 
including zero taxation, than those levels which generally apply in the Member State 
in question are to be regarded as potentially harmful (...). Such a level of taxation 
may operate by virtue of the nominal tax rate, the tax base or any other relevant 
factor.”139 Similar to the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, the Code of 
Conduct describes certain key factors which are of importance and which should be 
taken into account for the identification of harmful tax measures. The criteria for 
identifying potentially harmful measures include: (i) the limitation of advantages to 
non-residents or in respect to transactions carried out with non-residents, (ii) the ring-
fencing of the respective regime, (iii) the granting of advantages without any real 
economic activity and substantial economic presence within the respective Member 
State, (iv) the basis of profit determination for companies in a multinational group 
departs from internationally accepted rules, in particular those approved by the 
OECD, and (v) the lack of transparency.140 The Code of Conduct requires Member 
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considered by the EU and the OECD to be important measures against the national 
tax base erosion caused by harmful tax competition.  
 
At first glance, the current taxation of income derived by a foreign company seems to 
be an effective tool to target investments in low-tax jurisdictions with a harmful 
preferential tax regime and tax havens. In fact, such current taxation of income 
makes the investment totally unattractive if the decision is only based on tax reasons 
and if no other - e.g. economic - reason exists. The current taxation has the effect of 
a taxation of income according to the domestic tax level154 and it does not make any 
sense for the domestic investor to shift the financial means to another country if no 
other important reason exists apart from taxation. It can therefore be assumed that 
CFC taxation has a prophylactic effect with respect to any tax based passive foreign 
investment decision. However, this is only true as long as it is related to tax 
avoidance and not to tax evasion. The CFC rules require sufficient information on the 
situation in the foreign country and the activities of the taxpayer. If neither the foreign 
jurisdiction nor the domestic taxpayer are willing to submit the necessary information 
to the tax authorities, the CFC taxation cannot be applied in the appropriate manner. 
In other words, the application of CFC taxation requires sufficient information on the 
taxable income derived by the domestic taxpayer in tax-haven jurisdictions.  
 
However, there is another aspect which is - in my opinion - of particular importance. 
The existing CFC rules apply, very generally, to certain types of low-taxed income 
derived by a foreign company and there is not always a specific reference to tax-
haven jurisdictions or harmful preferential tax regimes. The CFC rules are very often 
equally applicable to tax regimes which are far from being harmful, just because of 
the fact that a lower effective tax rate applies155 in combination with the carrying on of 
certain types of activity in the respective jurisdiction. Therefore, the CFC rules can 
rather be seen as anti-avoidance rules in order to prevent the erosion of the domestic 
tax base in general - applied to low-taxed passive income - but not as specific anti-
avoidance provisions to stop the investment in tax havens and in jurisdictions with 
harmful preferential tax regimes. The CFC and FIF rules are promoted as anti-
avoidance provisions against harmful tax competition, e.g. in the OECD Report, even 
though it is quite obvious that the existing CFC and FIF rules are in practice applied 
to non-harmful tax regimes as well. Of course, this “problem” was also recognised by 
the OECD since it stated that “(w)hile the Recommendation only applies in the 
context of curbing harmful tax practices, CFC rules may also apply in situations which 
do not involve harmful tax practices as defined in this Report.” However, the OECD 
simply concluded that “(i)t is recognised that countries retain their right to use such 
rules in such situations.”156 At least from the OECD Report it is clear that CFC and 
FIF taxation are considered and accepted as anti-avoidance measures against 
harmful tax competition, even though they have a much broader scope of application. 
The Code of Conduct does not go into detail in this respect, and the Report of the 
Code of Conduct Group does not deal with that question, either, but is limited to the 
identification of harmful preferential tax regimes in the EU Member States and the 
dependent and associated territories. Clearly, there are additional questions involved 
in the EU context which will be discussed in more detail below.  
                                            
154 The CFC taxation can even lead to a higher level of taxation than the domestic level. This will be outlined in 
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155 Compared to the country which applies the CFC/FIF taxation.  
156 This is equally true for CFC and FIF rules. See Harmful Tax Competition - An Emerging Global Issue, 
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publications it can be understood that changes are taking place in the 
focus of the project on harmful tax competition. The principle of 
transparency and the effective exchange of information play a more and 
more important role to achieve a “global level playing field.”148 The criterion 
of “no or low taxation” is used merely as a “gateway criterion.”149 In this 
regard, the Code of Conduct focuses on substantial criteria as well as 
transparency whereas the OECD now focuses on transparency and the 
effective exchange of information. 
 
b.) The OECD Guidelines and the EU Code of Conduct deal with 
geographically mobile activities. However, the OECD Report is limited to 
financial and other service activities, whereas the Code of Conduct looks at 
business activities in general.150 
 
c.) The OECD Report contains several specific recommendations of 
counteracting measures against harmful tax competition, whereas the 
Code of Conduct just recognises - in general - that counteracting measures 
play “a fundamental role.”151  
 
d.) The ongoing monitoring and the dialogue between the OECD and the 
jurisdictions with a preferential tax regime increases the political and 
economic pressure on the latter countries to abolish the harmful tax 
regimes (outward- and inward-looking). The Code of Conduct is - even 
though not legally binding for the Member States - part of a package to 
tackle harmful tax competition in the EU. It is therefore solely directed 
towards the EU Member States (inward-looking). However, the non-binding 
principles included in the voluntary Resolution can become binding 
principles through a EU Directive. In other words, the principles included in 
the Code can become legally enforceable at a later point in time - which 
will not be the case for the OECD Guidelines.  
 
5.10.4. CFC Rules and Harmful Tax Competition  
 
The Code of Conduct does not give any clear recommendations with respect to 
specific anti-avoidance provisions or countermeasures, but makes clear that those 
measures “(...) contained in tax laws and in double taxation conventions play a 
fundamental role in counteracting tax avoidance and evasion.” 152 The OECD Report 
goes into more detail in this respect and gives clear recommendations for the 
adoption of specific anti-avoidance legislation, inter alia, the adoption of CFC and FIF 
rules.153 Thus, it seems that anti-avoidance provisions like CFC and FIF rules are 
                                                                                                                                         
Wartenburger, Die Bedeutung des Gemeinschaftsrechts für innergemeinschaftliche Steueroasen, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2001, page 397 et seq. (401). 
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considered by the EU and the OECD to be important measures against the national 
tax base erosion caused by harmful tax competition.  
 
At first glance, the current taxation of income derived by a foreign company seems to 
be an effective tool to target investments in low-tax jurisdictions with a harmful 
preferential tax regime and tax havens. In fact, such current taxation of income 
makes the investment totally unattractive if the decision is only based on tax reasons 
and if no other - e.g. economic - reason exists. The current taxation has the effect of 
a taxation of income according to the domestic tax level154 and it does not make any 
sense for the domestic investor to shift the financial means to another country if no 
other important reason exists apart from taxation. It can therefore be assumed that 
CFC taxation has a prophylactic effect with respect to any tax based passive foreign 
investment decision. However, this is only true as long as it is related to tax 
avoidance and not to tax evasion. The CFC rules require sufficient information on the 
situation in the foreign country and the activities of the taxpayer. If neither the foreign 
jurisdiction nor the domestic taxpayer are willing to submit the necessary information 
to the tax authorities, the CFC taxation cannot be applied in the appropriate manner. 
In other words, the application of CFC taxation requires sufficient information on the 
taxable income derived by the domestic taxpayer in tax-haven jurisdictions.  
 
However, there is another aspect which is - in my opinion - of particular importance. 
The existing CFC rules apply, very generally, to certain types of low-taxed income 
derived by a foreign company and there is not always a specific reference to tax-
haven jurisdictions or harmful preferential tax regimes. The CFC rules are very often 
equally applicable to tax regimes which are far from being harmful, just because of 
the fact that a lower effective tax rate applies155 in combination with the carrying on of 
certain types of activity in the respective jurisdiction. Therefore, the CFC rules can 
rather be seen as anti-avoidance rules in order to prevent the erosion of the domestic 
tax base in general - applied to low-taxed passive income - but not as specific anti-
avoidance provisions to stop the investment in tax havens and in jurisdictions with 
harmful preferential tax regimes. The CFC and FIF rules are promoted as anti-
avoidance provisions against harmful tax competition, e.g. in the OECD Report, even 
though it is quite obvious that the existing CFC and FIF rules are in practice applied 
to non-harmful tax regimes as well. Of course, this “problem” was also recognised by 
the OECD since it stated that “(w)hile the Recommendation only applies in the 
context of curbing harmful tax practices, CFC rules may also apply in situations which 
do not involve harmful tax practices as defined in this Report.” However, the OECD 
simply concluded that “(i)t is recognised that countries retain their right to use such 
rules in such situations.”156 At least from the OECD Report it is clear that CFC and 
FIF taxation are considered and accepted as anti-avoidance measures against 
harmful tax competition, even though they have a much broader scope of application. 
The Code of Conduct does not go into detail in this respect, and the Report of the 
Code of Conduct Group does not deal with that question, either, but is limited to the 
identification of harmful preferential tax regimes in the EU Member States and the 
dependent and associated territories. Clearly, there are additional questions involved 
in the EU context which will be discussed in more detail below.  
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publications it can be understood that changes are taking place in the 
focus of the project on harmful tax competition. The principle of 
transparency and the effective exchange of information play a more and 
more important role to achieve a “global level playing field.”148 The criterion 
of “no or low taxation” is used merely as a “gateway criterion.”149 In this 
regard, the Code of Conduct focuses on substantial criteria as well as 
transparency whereas the OECD now focuses on transparency and the 
effective exchange of information. 
 
b.) The OECD Guidelines and the EU Code of Conduct deal with 
geographically mobile activities. However, the OECD Report is limited to 
financial and other service activities, whereas the Code of Conduct looks at 
business activities in general.150 
 
c.) The OECD Report contains several specific recommendations of 
counteracting measures against harmful tax competition, whereas the 
Code of Conduct just recognises - in general - that counteracting measures 
play “a fundamental role.”151  
 
d.) The ongoing monitoring and the dialogue between the OECD and the 
jurisdictions with a preferential tax regime increases the political and 
economic pressure on the latter countries to abolish the harmful tax 
regimes (outward- and inward-looking). The Code of Conduct is - even 
though not legally binding for the Member States - part of a package to 
tackle harmful tax competition in the EU. It is therefore solely directed 
towards the EU Member States (inward-looking). However, the non-binding 
principles included in the voluntary Resolution can become binding 
principles through a EU Directive. In other words, the principles included in 
the Code can become legally enforceable at a later point in time - which 
will not be the case for the OECD Guidelines.  
 
5.10.4. CFC Rules and Harmful Tax Competition  
 
The Code of Conduct does not give any clear recommendations with respect to 
specific anti-avoidance provisions or countermeasures, but makes clear that those 
measures “(...) contained in tax laws and in double taxation conventions play a 
fundamental role in counteracting tax avoidance and evasion.” 152 The OECD Report 
goes into more detail in this respect and gives clear recommendations for the 
adoption of specific anti-avoidance legislation, inter alia, the adoption of CFC and FIF 
rules.153 Thus, it seems that anti-avoidance provisions like CFC and FIF rules are 
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8.) The income allocation as such is - in my opinion - in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This should even be true for minority shareholdings. The increase in value 
of the property which leads to passive income improves the ability of the shareholder 
to pay taxes. However, this is only true if the income allocation is equally relevant for 
positive and negative income. If the attribution is legally or factually limited to positive 
income, the CFC taxation cannot be in line with the ability-to-pay principle.  
 
9.) From a technical point of view, the CFC taxation is quite similar to the taxation of 
permanent establishments (PE) and partnerships (PS) according to the credit 
method. It seems to be necessary that a country which applies a CFC taxation to 
foreign legal entities requires a comparable system for the taxation of PE and PS if 
the income is otherwise exempt from taxation. However, countries may deviate from 
the OECD principles of an unrestricted functional allocation of property and income, 
which might be particularly relevant for passive investments and intra-group activities. 
For example, the German concept of what is called the central function of the head 
office clearly restricts the relocation of holding, financing and licensing activities to a 
PE. Under the German approach it is basically impossible to allocate the property of 
the latter activities to a PE. If these activities are carried out by the PE, the income 
allocation will be limited to a (service) fee for the coordination and the handling of the 
activities, but will not encompass the complete amount of income related to these 
activities. The latter is also true if the holding, financing and licensing functions are 
combined with other (active) activities which are carried out by the PE. In my opinion, 
the deviation from the OECD approach of an unrestricted functional allocation in case 
of certain activities is not justified and is to be rejected.  
 
10.) The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition recommends the introduction of 
CFC and FIF rules as counteracting measures against harmful tax competition. The 
EU Code of Conduct does not provide any specific recommendations, but recognises 
that such counteracting measures against harmful tax competition play a 
fundamental role. It seems that both, OECD and the Council, consider the CFC and 
FIF taxation to be an important tool to target harmful tax competition, even though the 





















1.) The current taxation of income which is derived by a non-transparent foreign legal 
entity in the hands of the resident shareholder is the basic feature of CFC taxation in 
all of the countries which apply such a regime. Such an approach is somehow 
“unique” and – in substance – a deviation from the principle that a foreign legal entity 
is to be considered a separate taxpayer.  
 
2.) Almost all of the countries apply three basic requirements which have to be 
fulfilled for the application of their CFC regimes: (i) the foreign entity must derive 
certain passive income, (ii) there must be an ownership in the foreign entity, and (iii) 
the foreign income must be subject to low-taxation.  
 
3.) The FIF rules can basically be seen as a part of (or a supplement to) the CFC 
rules. The main differences can be described as follows: (i) FIF rules already apply to 
very small and insignificant shareholdings, whereas the CFC rules require in most 
cases a participation of at least 10 percent or more, and (ii) FIF rules are often only 
applicable to certain types of passive investment income but not generally to the wide 
range of passive income which is in the scope of CFC taxation.  
 
4.) The CFC rules can be seen as anti-avoidance measures in order to target the 
deferral of domestic taxation on foreign source income (anti-deferral measures). The 
CFC taxation leads to a limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality. 
 
5.) The deferral of domestic taxation can only partially be seen as a “privilege.” The 
income which is related to the functions exercised and the risks taken by the foreign 
entity should be taxable in the residence state of the CFC. At least, this is required by 
economic and equity aspects. However, this can be different with respect to the risk-
free interest component of capital included in the passive income. To the extent that 
the risk-free interest component is theoretically separable from the total income, there 
is no necessity for a deferral of domestic taxation. Thus, the deferral which is related 
to the (theoretically separable) risk-free interest component of capital can be seen as 
a privilege rather than a necessity.  
 
6.) The deferral of domestic taxation is, of course, of particular relevance where the 
income distribution is subject to tax in the state of the shareholder, e.g. where the 
residence state of the shareholder applies the credit method for the avoidance of 
double taxation. However, even if the distribution is exempt from taxation, a 
significant difference in tax rates can lead to the outcome that financial means are not 
repatriated to the parent company but retained on the level of the subsidiary 
company and are used for other activities, e.g. the financing of other group 
companies (including the parent company). Therefore, the non-distribution of 
financial means reduces the possibility of the parent company to create and increase 
taxable domestic income.  
 
7.) Other existing anti-avoidance measures do not have an effect comparable to CFC 
taxation. Some of the alleged alternative measures can in fact limit the advantage of 
foreign passive investments in low-tax countries and can create an obstacle for 
abusive investments, but none of the measures really targets the deferral of domestic 
taxation and therefore they cannot be considered a substitute for CFC taxation.  
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In the following I will describe and comment the various types and the specific 
elements of European CFC and FIF legislation.1 In principle, the European CFC 
regimes follow a very similar pattern. However, it has to be noted that, based on the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision of the ECJ, several Member States made amendments 
to their CFC legislation which result in a deviation from the original pattern of CFC 
regimes. The aforementioned amendments are of particular importance from an EU 
law perspective. For this reason, these amendments will be discussed in some more 
detail in chapter 8 and not in this chapter.  
 
In general, the CFC regimes have common features, such as the fact that only 
certain activities (and therefore certain types of income) are targeted, that it is only 
applied to foreign income which is taxed at a lower rate than the domestic income, 
and that it requires some sort of participation in the foreign company. It is therefore 
obvious that an overlap exists in the scope of the different CFC regimes. On the other 
hand, CFC taxation may be seen - in principle - as a rather “egoistic” legislation 
which is solely based on domestic elements and which does not sufficiently provide 
for a simultaneous application of CFC regimes in a multiple tier structure. In such a 
situation, there is an increased risk of double taxation of income which will be 
described later on, too.  
 
The outcome of the following sections will be tested step-by-step with regard to the 
important principles derived from previous chapters. The test will not encompass EU 
law, because this will be tested exclusively in chapter 8. 
 
6.2. The Transactional Approach  
 
The transactional approach explicitly defines what is considered to be tainted (or 
passive) income or – as in case of Germany – defines what is generally considered 
to be active income with certain explicitly defined exceptions to tainted income. 
Irrespective of the way how it is determined in the respective legislation – as a 
positive or negative list of certain types of income – the important feature of this 
approach is the fact that only the defined income is currently taxed in the country 
which follows such a transactional approach. Since the tainted income is clearly 
marked and separated from other income it reveals more than in case of an entity 
approach. Therefore, the transactional approach should, in general, add important 
information to the understanding of CFC legislation and for the development of 
alternative measures. There are only a few EU Member States which follow a 
transactional approach, such as Spain,2 Denmark,3 Germany4 and Lithuania.5 In the 
                                            
1 As already outlined earlier, I will only use the term “CFC”, which covers CFC and FIF legislation. 
2 See with respect to the Spanish CFC legislation Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 559 et seq.; Jimenez, Spanien: Jüngste Gesetzesänderungen zur Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung, 
Unterkapitalisierungsregelung und grenzüberschreitende Lizenzzahlungen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2004, 
Länderbericht, page 3; Martn, Taxation of Global Operations Conducted Through a Tax Haven Subsidiary, Tax 
Planning International Forum, Host Country Spain, (December) 2004; Calderón, Spain, Tax Notes International 
2004, page 86 et seq.; Schönfeld, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2005, page 
611et seq.; Calderón, Spain’s Antiabuse Approach and ECJ Jurisprudence, Tax Notes International 2005, page 
    




















































The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF Legislation
213
    
                                                                                         
 





In the following I will describe and comment the various types and the specific 
elements of European CFC and FIF legislation.1 In principle, the European CFC 
regimes follow a very similar pattern. However, it has to be noted that, based on the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision of the ECJ, several Member States made amendments 
to their CFC legislation which result in a deviation from the original pattern of CFC 
regimes. The aforementioned amendments are of particular importance from an EU 
law perspective. For this reason, these amendments will be discussed in some more 
detail in chapter 8 and not in this chapter.  
 
In general, the CFC regimes have common features, such as the fact that only 
certain activities (and therefore certain types of income) are targeted, that it is only 
applied to foreign income which is taxed at a lower rate than the domestic income, 
and that it requires some sort of participation in the foreign company. It is therefore 
obvious that an overlap exists in the scope of the different CFC regimes. On the other 
hand, CFC taxation may be seen - in principle - as a rather “egoistic” legislation 
which is solely based on domestic elements and which does not sufficiently provide 
for a simultaneous application of CFC regimes in a multiple tier structure. In such a 
situation, there is an increased risk of double taxation of income which will be 
described later on, too.  
 
The outcome of the following sections will be tested step-by-step with regard to the 
important principles derived from previous chapters. The test will not encompass EU 
law, because this will be tested exclusively in chapter 8. 
 
6.2. The Transactional Approach  
 
The transactional approach explicitly defines what is considered to be tainted (or 
passive) income or – as in case of Germany – defines what is generally considered 
to be active income with certain explicitly defined exceptions to tainted income. 
Irrespective of the way how it is determined in the respective legislation – as a 
positive or negative list of certain types of income – the important feature of this 
approach is the fact that only the defined income is currently taxed in the country 
which follows such a transactional approach. Since the tainted income is clearly 
marked and separated from other income it reveals more than in case of an entity 
approach. Therefore, the transactional approach should, in general, add important 
information to the understanding of CFC legislation and for the development of 
alternative measures. There are only a few EU Member States which follow a 
transactional approach, such as Spain,2 Denmark,3 Germany4 and Lithuania.5 In the 
                                            
1 As already outlined earlier, I will only use the term “CFC”, which covers CFC and FIF legislation. 
2 See with respect to the Spanish CFC legislation Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 559 et seq.; Jimenez, Spanien: Jüngste Gesetzesänderungen zur Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung, 
Unterkapitalisierungsregelung und grenzüberschreitende Lizenzzahlungen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2004, 
Länderbericht, page 3; Martn, Taxation of Global Operations Conducted Through a Tax Haven Subsidiary, Tax 
Planning International Forum, Host Country Spain, (December) 2004; Calderón, Spain, Tax Notes International 
2004, page 86 et seq.; Schönfeld, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2005, page 
611et seq.; Calderón, Spain’s Antiabuse Approach and ECJ Jurisprudence, Tax Notes International 2005, page 
    






















































    
                                                                                         
 
taxation under a double tax convention if it were derived directly by the taxpayers 
subject to unlimited tax liability (which hold the shares in the CFC), the rental income 
will be treated as active income. In most cases the German double tax conventions 
exempt the income derived from the renting out of real estate situated in the other 
contracting state.6 For example, in case of a Swiss CFC with real estate in Italy the 
decisive double tax convention would not be the Swiss-Italian tax treaty but the 
German-Italian tax treaty. Based on that, the Italian real estate would be exempt from 
German taxation and therefore also the income of the Swiss CFC related to the 
relevant rental income.7 The situation would be different if the real estate of the Swiss 
CFC was situated in Switzerland. Pursuant to the tax treaty between Germany and 
Switzerland the rental income is not exempt from taxation but the double taxation is 
to be avoided by the application of the credit method.8 Therefore, the income of the 
CFC derived from the renting out of the real estate in Switzerland would be subject to 
the German CFC taxation. The latter clearly shows the anti-avoidance character of 
this provision: there should not be any possibility of sheltering the income from a 
Swiss real estate just because of the fact that a corporation was implemented 
between the German individual and the real estate. With respect to real estate 
located in a third country it seems to be obvious that income which is exempt in both 
countries, the country of the CFC and the country of the shareholder in the CFC, 
should not be subject to taxation in the residence state of the shareholder.9  
 
Real estate which is not used for the earning of rental income but which is part of a 
business activity of the foreign company, in principle shares the destiny of the 
business activity itself. If it is categorised as an activity which produces active income 
this will also encompass the income which is theoretically (and indirectly) related to 
the immovable property.10 In Spain, rental income derived by the foreign company is 
generally considered to be tainted income. However, it is explicitly outlined in 
Spanish law that the ownership of real estate or real property rights over such real 
estate is excluded from CFC taxation if the property is used for certain business 
activities or the use thereof has been transferred to non-resident entities belonging to 
the same group of companies as the owner.11 The Danish legislation concentrates 
the CFC taxation on income from financial activities and the renting out of real estate 
is not included in the catalogue of financial activities (only leasing income which is 
outlined below).12 This is comparable to the Lithuanian approach where financial 
leasing is considered to be tainted income.13 
 
The approach of the transactional countries shows that real estate rental income can 
be within the scope of CFC taxation but cannot be considered a primary target. Even 
though the investment in real estate can be accompanied by large capital outflows, 
the taxing rights based on the OECD-MTC are allocable to the state in which the 
                                            
6 Based on Articles 6 and 23 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
7 Flick / Wassermeyer / Baumhoff, Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, § 8 AStG, paragraph 79a.  
8 Article 24 (1) No. 2 of the double tax convention between Germany and Switzerland.  
9 This is not self-evident in a situation where the income is taxable in the CFC country but tax exempt in the 
country of the shareholder if the double tax convention between Germany and the third country is taken into 
account. 
10 Of course, the theoretically allocable income is not related to rental income.  
11 Section 121 (2) letter a of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
12 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service, Doc. 
2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et seq. 
13 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
    
                                                                                         
 
following, the different types of passive and base company income are discussed 
separately from each other.  
 
6.2.1. The Various Types of Tainted Income  
 
6.2.1.1. Rental Income from Immovable Property 
 
The German provisions follow an interesting approach in dealing with rental income 
from real estate. Based on these rules, the income derived from the renting out of 
real estate is generally considered to be tainted income. However, if the taxpayer is 
able to show that income from the renting out of real estate would be exempt from 
                                                                                                                                         
1031 et seq.; Sammarco / Pérez, Business Tax Planning Under Spain’s Holding Company Regime, Tax Notes 
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Carreno, Transfer Pricing Rules for Transactions Involving Low-Tax Countries: Spain, International Transfer 
Pricing Journal 2007, page 338 et seq. Further references related to the Spanish CFC rules are included in the 
bibliography.      
3 See with respect to the Danish CFC legislation Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 139 et seq.; Emmeluth, Taxation of Global Operations Conducted Through a Tax Haven Subsidiary, 
Tax Planning International Forum, Host Country Denmark (December) 2004; Bjornholm / Rubinstein, Denmark: 
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Corporate Tax Rate Cuts and Anti-Avoidance Measures, Tax Planning International Review (February) 2007; 
Bernsen / Byrgesen / Markholst, Transfer Pricing Rules for Transactions Involving Low-Tax Countries: 
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4 See with respect to the German CFC legislation also Rust, National Report Germany, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 255 et seq.; Förster, CFC Legislation in Germany, Intertax 2004, page 476 et seq.; Killius, 
Taxation of Global Operations Conducted Through a Tax Haven Subsidiary, Tax Planning International Forum, 
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und Europäischen Grundfreiheiten, Steuer und Wirtschaft 2005, page 158 et seq.; Kramer, German CFC 
Legislation’s Tax Haven Trapdoor, Tax Notes International 2005, page 619 et seq.; Kraft / Bron, Deutsche 
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Involving Low-Tax Countries: Germany, International Transfer Pricing Journal 2007, page 333 et seq.; Becker / 
Hölscher / Loose, Impact of ECJ’s Cadbury Schweppes Decision on German Tax Planning, Tax Notes 
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5 Lithuania joined the EU in 2005. The CFC legislation was implemented with effect as of January 2002. With 
respect to the Lithuanian CFC legislation see Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
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CFC taxation.17 Even though the wording is not completely identical, the 
requirements outlined below with respect to base company income can be referred 
to. In contrast to Germany, the Spanish CFC rules do not deal with the leasing and 
rental income from movable property separately. The base company provisions 
which deal with credit, financial, insurance and service provision activities can also be 
referred to.18 In Denmark, the taxable leasing income in connection with cross-border 
leasing activities is considered to be financial income and therefore tainted income.19 
The same is true in Lithuania where leasing income is explicitly defined as passive 
income.20 
 
As a result, the base company income rules and the treatment of other services 
under the CFC provisions can basically be referred to for the transactional countries 
Germany and Spain. The separation of the leasing and renting out of movable 
property from other services within the German catalogue of active income - even 
though the requirements for an exclusion from CFC taxation are quite similar to those 
for base company income - shows the importance of such services in the context of 
CFC taxation. A reason could be - in my opinion - that these are particularly capital-
intensive services. However, I will go into more detail of that aspect later on.  
 
6.2.1.3. Interest Income 
 
Interest income is certainly the “prototype” of passive income and due to the 
immense flexibility of capital it is the type of income which is always in the focus of 
CFC taxation. In addition - and as already outlined earlier in more detail - interest 
income is typically taxable in the residence state of the income recipient with only a 
limited taxation at source. This is particularly true if the double tax convention is 
drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC.21 In the absence of CFC taxation there is a 
certain likelihood that capital, and therefore the basis for the production of interest 
income, is shifted from high-tax countries to low-tax countries for mere tax reasons 
and with the intention of the deferral of such income in low-tax countries.   
 
With respect to interest income there is a different approach among the countries 
which follow the transactional method. In Germany, interest income is generally 
considered to be tainted income, and only the borrowing and lending of capital for 
which the taxpayer can show that it has been borrowed exclusively on foreign capital 
markets (and not by a closely related party) and has been granted to businesses or 
permanent establishments outside of Germany which derive their gross revenues 
exclusively or almost exclusively from active businesses, or granted to businesses or 
permanent establishments within Germany, is considered to produce active interest 
income.22 The basic requirement that only financial means which have been 
borrowed exclusively on foreign capital markets can subsequently lead to active 
interest income excludes any financial activities which are based on equity from the 
                                            
17 8.1.6.1. of the administrative circular. The “qualified business” in the sense of the German Foreign Tax Act 
will be outlined below in some detail. 
18 Section 121 (2) letter c of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
19 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
20 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
21 Article 11 of the OECD-MTC.  
22 Section 8 (1) no. 7 of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
    
                                                                                         
 
property is located.14 Such an allocation of taxing rights avoids some of the structures 
which are generally considered to be inappropriate, e.g. the ownership of property in 
the country of the shareholder which is held by a CFC, or the interposition of a CFC 
in a low-tax country with property located in a third country. The source-based 
taxation of real estate income takes away the attractiveness, at least from a tax point 
of view, which - most often - adheres to the other capital intensive investments which 
are taxed on a residence basis. Moreover, it has to be added that real estate 
investments do not have the same degree of flexibility and mobility compared to other 
passive investments since they are - by nature - concentrated in a respective country. 
In those cases in which no double tax convention exists and in which the residence 
state of the shareholder follows the principle of world-wide taxation by (unilaterally) 
applying the credit method instead of the exemption method for the avoidance of 
double taxation, it can be argued that CFC rules are also required for rental income in 
order to prevent the sheltering of income from domestic taxation through the 
interposition of a foreign company which holds the real estate. However, if the real 
estate is located in a third state, the income might already be taxed at the higher rate 
of the latter state (and not only at the lower rate of the CFC state). If the residence 
state of the shareholder follows, in general, the principle of territoriality by 
(unilaterally) applying the exemption method for the avoidance of double taxation, 
there seems to be no necessity for a CFC taxation of rental income. 
 
Thus, it should be clear, in my opinion, that foreign source rental income which is 
exempt from taxation - either based on a double tax convention between the 
residence state of the shareholder and the state in which the real estate is located or 
based on the general domestic concept of exempting foreign source income (in the 
absence of a double tax convention) - should not be subject to CFC taxation just 
because of the fact that a foreign company was interposed between the shareholder 
and the foreign real estate. In such a case, the interposition of a CFC does not lead 
to any tax avoidance since the income related to the foreign property will generally be 
outside of the scope of domestic taxation.  
 
6.2.1.2. Leasing and Rental Income from Movable Property 
 
The income from the leasing and renting out of movable property is in the focus of 
CFC taxation in all transactional countries. This is not particularly surprising since the 
taxing rights for such capital-intensive services - based on the OECD-MTC - are 
allocable to the state in which the leasing company carries on its business 
activities.15 In Germany, the leasing and renting out of moveable property is 
considered to be tainted income, unless the domestic taxpayer can show that the 
foreign company maintains a business operation of leasing or renting and 
participates in general commerce and performs all work associated with such 
commercial leasing or renting without the participation of a domestic shareholder or a 
closely related party thereto.16 In the same way as it is required for the provision of 
services in general, i.e. for base company income, it is necessary for the foreign 
company to fulfil the requirement of a “qualified business” in order to be exempt from 
                                            
14 See Article 6 of the OECD-MTC.  
15 Article 7 of the OECD-MTC; under the assumption that no permanent establishment exists in the other state.  
16 Section 8 (1) no. 6 letter c of the German Foreign Tax Act. With respect to the meaning of “participation in 
general commerce” and “without the participation of a domestic shareholder or a closely related party thereto” 
the subsequent explanations to base company income can be referred to. 
The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF Legislation
217
    
                                                                                         
 
CFC taxation.17 Even though the wording is not completely identical, the 
requirements outlined below with respect to base company income can be referred 
to. In contrast to Germany, the Spanish CFC rules do not deal with the leasing and 
rental income from movable property separately. The base company provisions 
which deal with credit, financial, insurance and service provision activities can also be 
referred to.18 In Denmark, the taxable leasing income in connection with cross-border 
leasing activities is considered to be financial income and therefore tainted income.19 
The same is true in Lithuania where leasing income is explicitly defined as passive 
income.20 
 
As a result, the base company income rules and the treatment of other services 
under the CFC provisions can basically be referred to for the transactional countries 
Germany and Spain. The separation of the leasing and renting out of movable 
property from other services within the German catalogue of active income - even 
though the requirements for an exclusion from CFC taxation are quite similar to those 
for base company income - shows the importance of such services in the context of 
CFC taxation. A reason could be - in my opinion - that these are particularly capital-
intensive services. However, I will go into more detail of that aspect later on.  
 
6.2.1.3. Interest Income 
 
Interest income is certainly the “prototype” of passive income and due to the 
immense flexibility of capital it is the type of income which is always in the focus of 
CFC taxation. In addition - and as already outlined earlier in more detail - interest 
income is typically taxable in the residence state of the income recipient with only a 
limited taxation at source. This is particularly true if the double tax convention is 
drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC.21 In the absence of CFC taxation there is a 
certain likelihood that capital, and therefore the basis for the production of interest 
income, is shifted from high-tax countries to low-tax countries for mere tax reasons 
and with the intention of the deferral of such income in low-tax countries.   
 
With respect to interest income there is a different approach among the countries 
which follow the transactional method. In Germany, interest income is generally 
considered to be tainted income, and only the borrowing and lending of capital for 
which the taxpayer can show that it has been borrowed exclusively on foreign capital 
markets (and not by a closely related party) and has been granted to businesses or 
permanent establishments outside of Germany which derive their gross revenues 
exclusively or almost exclusively from active businesses, or granted to businesses or 
permanent establishments within Germany, is considered to produce active interest 
income.22 The basic requirement that only financial means which have been 
borrowed exclusively on foreign capital markets can subsequently lead to active 
interest income excludes any financial activities which are based on equity from the 
                                            
17 8.1.6.1. of the administrative circular. The “qualified business” in the sense of the German Foreign Tax Act 
will be outlined below in some detail. 
18 Section 121 (2) letter c of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
19 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
20 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
21 Article 11 of the OECD-MTC.  
22 Section 8 (1) no. 7 of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
    
                                                                                         
 
property is located.14 Such an allocation of taxing rights avoids some of the structures 
which are generally considered to be inappropriate, e.g. the ownership of property in 
the country of the shareholder which is held by a CFC, or the interposition of a CFC 
in a low-tax country with property located in a third country. The source-based 
taxation of real estate income takes away the attractiveness, at least from a tax point 
of view, which - most often - adheres to the other capital intensive investments which 
are taxed on a residence basis. Moreover, it has to be added that real estate 
investments do not have the same degree of flexibility and mobility compared to other 
passive investments since they are - by nature - concentrated in a respective country. 
In those cases in which no double tax convention exists and in which the residence 
state of the shareholder follows the principle of world-wide taxation by (unilaterally) 
applying the credit method instead of the exemption method for the avoidance of 
double taxation, it can be argued that CFC rules are also required for rental income in 
order to prevent the sheltering of income from domestic taxation through the 
interposition of a foreign company which holds the real estate. However, if the real 
estate is located in a third state, the income might already be taxed at the higher rate 
of the latter state (and not only at the lower rate of the CFC state). If the residence 
state of the shareholder follows, in general, the principle of territoriality by 
(unilaterally) applying the exemption method for the avoidance of double taxation, 
there seems to be no necessity for a CFC taxation of rental income. 
 
Thus, it should be clear, in my opinion, that foreign source rental income which is 
exempt from taxation - either based on a double tax convention between the 
residence state of the shareholder and the state in which the real estate is located or 
based on the general domestic concept of exempting foreign source income (in the 
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and the foreign real estate. In such a case, the interposition of a CFC does not lead 
to any tax avoidance since the income related to the foreign property will generally be 
outside of the scope of domestic taxation.  
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The income from the leasing and renting out of movable property is in the focus of 
CFC taxation in all transactional countries. This is not particularly surprising since the 
taxing rights for such capital-intensive services - based on the OECD-MTC - are 
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commercial leasing or renting without the participation of a domestic shareholder or a 
closely related party thereto.16 In the same way as it is required for the provision of 
services in general, i.e. for base company income, it is necessary for the foreign 
company to fulfil the requirement of a “qualified business” in order to be exempt from 
                                            
14 See Article 6 of the OECD-MTC.  
15 Article 7 of the OECD-MTC; under the assumption that no permanent establishment exists in the other state.  
16 Section 8 (1) no. 6 letter c of the German Foreign Tax Act. With respect to the meaning of “participation in 
general commerce” and “without the participation of a domestic shareholder or a closely related party thereto” 
the subsequent explanations to base company income can be referred to. 
Chapter 6
218
    
                                                                                         
 
and interest income is therefore considered to be tainted income.28 However, an 
exemption was introduced for foreign subsidiaries which conduct license, insurance 
or banking businesses that are subject to public supervision, provided that the 
subsidiary conducts business mainly with customers in its own country of residence, 
and mainly with third parties.29 
 
The transactional countries do not follow a uniform approach with respect to the 
qualification and the treatment of interest income in the context of CFC legislation. 
However, there is to a great extent an overlap of the different approaches and 
similarities can be identified. Especially with regard to interest income from inter-
company financing activities and portfolio activities it can be concluded that 
 
- the interest income related to the financing of the domestic shareholder 
(parent company) leads to income which is subject to CFC taxation.30 In a 
typical case, the CFC is financed by equity which will then be routed to the 
domestic parent company by way of loan amounts. Such a structure has a 
direct impact on the domestic tax base. All of the aforementioned transactional 
countries consider the income derived by the CFC under these circumstances 
to be passive income which is subject to current taxation.31  
 
- the interest income related to the financing of other group companies resident 
elsewhere is generally also subject to CFC taxation in the transactional 
countries. However, Spain does not follow this approach if the borrower 
derives at least 85 percent of his income from business activities, i.e. activities 
which do not lead to passive income. Based on this approach, the Spanish 
rules differentiate between loan amounts granted by the CFC to foreign active 
companies and those granted to domestic active companies. 
 
- portfolio interest income is generally considered to be passive income. Under 
certain circumstances, the activities of credit, banking and insurance 
businesses are excluded from CFC taxation. The requirements to exclude 
those activities from CFC taxation are different, but it seems that the general 
requirement is that the activities have to be mainly directed towards third 
parties.  
 
6.2.1.4. Royalty Income  
 
Similar to interest income, the taxing rights related to the income from intangible 
assets are – pursuant to Article 12 of the OECD-MTC – allocable to the residence 
state of the beneficial owner of the intangible assets.32 The residence-based taxation 
of royalty income in combination with the – in most cases – uncomplicated 
transferability of intangible assets increases the likelihood that such property is 
transferred to low-tax countries. The attractive feature from a tax point of view is that 
with the transfer of the intangible property the taxing rights are “automatically” 
                                            
28 See Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 145.  
29 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Danish Parliament Approves Corporate Tax Incentives, Tax Analysts Tax 
Document Service 2002, Doc. 2002-12665.  
30 In Spain this is dependent upon the deductibility of the interest expenses. If the interest expenses are non-
deductible, the foreign income will not be subject to current taxation in Spain.  
31 See in this respect also the base company rules outlined below.  
32 Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
    
                                                                                         
 
benefit of deriving active income. Interestingly, in those cases where the 
requirements are fulfilled, the income which is considered to be active is equal to the 
spread between interest income and interest expenses (minus additional expenses of 
the finance company). This margin reflects the income which is related to the 
functions exercised and the additional risks taken by the finance company. The 
margin itself does not contain a risk-free interest component - since it is included in 
the interest expenses - but only the income related to the function of concentrating 
the borrowing of financial means and the supply of those financial means to other 
(group) companies and an additional risk component involved in the financing 
activity. The strict approach of treating any other income derived by equity based 
financing activities as tainted income shows that the German legislator obviously 
considers the transfer of those activities and the respective capital as particularly 
inappropriate measures with an increased risk of a domestic tax base erosion. An 
exclusion from CFC taxation applies to foreign banking and insurance companies if 
the activities are not mainly directed towards the domestic shareholder or related 
parties.23  
 
As a general rule, the Spanish CFC legislation defines interest income as tainted 
income but excludes such income from current taxation where the property is held (i) 
in order to comply with legal or regulatory obligations derived from the exercise of 
business activities, (ii) in order to incorporate credit rights derived from contractual 
relationships established as a result of business activities, (iii) as a result of mediation 
activities in official capital markets, (iv) by credit and insurance entities as a result of 
their business activities.24 The exclusions are very specific and it can be assumed 
that - with the exception of the exclusion for credit and insurance companies - it has 
only a limited overall impact. Apart from these exclusions, the treatment of interest 
income of a CFC mainly depends on the relationship between borrower and lender. 
In case the borrower is a related entity which is not resident in Spain, the interest 
income is not treated as passive income if at least 85 percent of the borrower’s 
income result from business activities. Moreover, there is an exemption from CFC 
taxation if more than 50 percent of tainted income is obtained from non-associated 
entities. In that case, the CFC is considered to carry on business activities.25 In 
addition, it is worth noting that interest income of a CFC derived from a Spanish 
resident person or entity will not be included in the attributable income if the interest 
payment is treated as a non-deductible expense in Spain. In other words, the CFC 
taxation will only be applicable inasmuch the payments are treated as deductible 
expenses.26 
 
In Lithuania, interest income is considered to be tainted income and - similar to the 
Spanish approach - income of the CFC which is treated as non-deductible expenses 
in Lithuania is excluded from CFC taxation. This rule was enacted in order to avoid 
the double taxation of income.27 In Denmark, the focus is clearly on financial income 
                                            
23 Section 8 (1) no. 3 of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
24 Section 121 (2) letter b of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law; Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on 
the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, 
page 812.  
25 Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 813. 
26 Section 121 (2) letter c of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
27 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
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income result from business activities. Moreover, there is an exemption from CFC 
taxation if more than 50 percent of tainted income is obtained from non-associated 
entities. In that case, the CFC is considered to carry on business activities.25 In 
addition, it is worth noting that interest income of a CFC derived from a Spanish 
resident person or entity will not be included in the attributable income if the interest 
payment is treated as a non-deductible expense in Spain. In other words, the CFC 
taxation will only be applicable inasmuch the payments are treated as deductible 
expenses.26 
 
In Lithuania, interest income is considered to be tainted income and - similar to the 
Spanish approach - income of the CFC which is treated as non-deductible expenses 
in Lithuania is excluded from CFC taxation. This rule was enacted in order to avoid 
the double taxation of income.27 In Denmark, the focus is clearly on financial income 
                                            
23 Section 8 (1) no. 3 of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
24 Section 121 (2) letter b of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law; Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on 
the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, 
page 812.  
25 Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 813. 
26 Section 121 (2) letter c of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
27 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
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seems that the active-passive classification requires additional features – compared 
to the active-passive classification of interest income – and can therefore not be 
implemented in the more general base company rules. It can be concluded that 
 
- most of the transactional countries consider royalty income derived by the 
CFC from the domestic shareholder (parent company) to be tainted income 
which is subject to CFC taxation. This is comparable to the treatment of 
interest income derived by the CFC which is outlined above.40  
 
- royalty income derived by the CFC from other group companies resident 
elsewhere is generally also subject to CFC taxation in Germany and Denmark, 
but not in Spain. The same is basically true for royalty income derived from 
unrelated parties. In Spain, the royalty income of the foreign company will not 
be subject to CFC taxation if the royalty payments are related to non-residents 
and are not deducted as business expenses in Spain. Thus, it might be 
concluded that in the latter case there is an additional separation, in contrast 
to other transactional countries, between a “direct” and an “indirect” tax base 
erosion. If the services of the CFC (and therefore also the exploitation of 
intangible property) result in an immediate reduction of the domestic tax base, 
this might be seen, in my opinion, as a direct tax base erosion. If this is not the 
case - because the recipient is a non-resident recipient - this might be seen as 
an indirect tax base erosion (because it is merely a relocation of services to 
the CFC but no (additional) immediate direct reduction of the domestic tax 
base). 
 
- an exemption from CFC taxation exists where the intangible assets are 
developed by the CFC itself (Germany and Denmark) and without the 
participation of the domestic shareholder (Germany). In Denmark, an 
additional exemption exists for license income if the subsidiary is subject to 
public supervision and if the license income is mainly derived in the residence 
state of the CFC and mainly from third parties. The Spanish legislation does 
not differentiate between self-developed and non-self-developed, but provides 
for the above mentioned exemption in case of non-resident recipients. 
 
6.2.1.5. Dividend Income 
 
It was outlined earlier in this study that dividend income should - from my point of 
view - be exempt from taxation in the country of the parent company. Of course, this 
should be equally true for any indirect taxation of dividends through the application of 
CFC rules. The German CFC rules follow such an approach and exclude any 
dividends from the CFC taxation, irrespective of the percentage of shareholding and 
irrespective of the nature of income which is “behind” the dividend payment, i.e. 
whether the income is earned through an activity which is passive or active.41 This 
results in a full exemption of dividend income from CFC taxation.42 As a rule, the 
Spanish CFC legislation considers the income derived from interests in the equity of 
a foreign company to be tainted income and, in general, the same exclusions apply 
                                            
40 However, countries like Lithuania which do not explicitly mention the royalty income as passive income in 
such a situation have base company rules which typically cover such CFC income (see below).  
41 Section 8 (1) no. 8 of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
42 However, an amount of 5 percent is added to the domestic tax base as non-deductible expenses (§ 8 b (5) of 
the German Corporate Income Tax Act).  
    
                                                                                         
 
transferred to the other country, too. It is therefore obvious that royalty income is 
regularly subject to CFC taxation. Within the transactional countries Germany follows 
a very strict approach according to which the granting of authorised use of rights, 
plans, designs, processes, know how and skills leads to passive income unless the 
taxpayer can show that the foreign company commercialises the results of its own 
research and development work undertaken without the participation of a taxpayer 
holding shares in the company or a closely related party to such a taxpayer.33 This is 
a far-reaching provision since it comprises all income related to intangible assets 
purchased from related or unrelated parties, i.e. even if the CFC purchases the 
property from a third party and makes the property available to another third party 
without any involvement of the domestic shareholder and any related party, the 
income will be subject to CFC taxation.34 Furthermore, the provision also comprises 
the intangible property which is the result of one’s own research and development 
work under certain circumstances, namely where a related party was involved in the 
research and development activities.35 In other words, only royalty income from the 
making available of intangible assets which are developed by the CFC itself without 
the involvement of the domestic shareholder or a related party is considered to be 
active income. Thus, it is of importance for the application of the German CFC rules 
whether (i) the intangible property which is exploited was self-developed or non-self-
developed (purchased) by the foreign company and - in the first-mentioned situation - 
whether (ii) the domestic shareholder was involved in the development of the 
intangible property. Denmark, which is focused on financial income, has a similar 
approach according to which royalties and gains on the sale of intangible assets are 
considered to be tainted income, provided that the CFC itself did not develop the 
intangible assets.36 An exemption exists for license companies which are subject to 
public supervision, provided that the subsidiary conducts business mainly with 
customers in its own country of residence, and mainly with third parties.37 The 
Spanish rules are not comparably strict and do not encompass royalties derived from 
related persons or companies which are not resident in Spain (see the explanations 
with respect to interest income).38 Thus, if the royalties do not reduce the tax base in 
Spain because the recipient of the services is not resident in Spain the royalty 
income will not be subject to Spanish CFC taxation. It seems that the Lithuanian rules 
are not explicitly focused on royalty income as passive income - but the base 
company rules have to be referred to.39 In general, the inter-company transactions of 
a CFC with resident companies will be covered below where base company income 
is outlined.  
 
In the same way as described above with respect to interest income, the CFC rules 
of the transactional countries are not identical but they have a similar approach. It 
                                            
33 Section 8 (1) no. 6 letter a of the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz - AStG).  
34 Flick / Wassermeyer / Baumhoff, Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, § 8 AStG, Rz. 224; Mössner in Brenzing et 
al. , Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, § 8 AStG, Rz. 69.  
35 The participation of a related party will be discussed in more detail later on in the context of base company 
income.  
36 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service, Doc. 
2001-28851 
37 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Danish Parliament Approves Corporate Tax Incentives, Tax Analysts Tax 
Document Service 2002, Doc. 2002-12665. 
38 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 565. 
39 Apart from the remuneration for author’s work (see Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 398).  
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seems that the active-passive classification requires additional features – compared 
to the active-passive classification of interest income – and can therefore not be 
implemented in the more general base company rules. It can be concluded that 
 
- most of the transactional countries consider royalty income derived by the 
CFC from the domestic shareholder (parent company) to be tainted income 
which is subject to CFC taxation. This is comparable to the treatment of 
interest income derived by the CFC which is outlined above.40  
 
- royalty income derived by the CFC from other group companies resident 
elsewhere is generally also subject to CFC taxation in Germany and Denmark, 
but not in Spain. The same is basically true for royalty income derived from 
unrelated parties. In Spain, the royalty income of the foreign company will not 
be subject to CFC taxation if the royalty payments are related to non-residents 
and are not deducted as business expenses in Spain. Thus, it might be 
concluded that in the latter case there is an additional separation, in contrast 
to other transactional countries, between a “direct” and an “indirect” tax base 
erosion. If the services of the CFC (and therefore also the exploitation of 
intangible property) result in an immediate reduction of the domestic tax base, 
this might be seen, in my opinion, as a direct tax base erosion. If this is not the 
case - because the recipient is a non-resident recipient - this might be seen as 
an indirect tax base erosion (because it is merely a relocation of services to 
the CFC but no (additional) immediate direct reduction of the domestic tax 
base). 
 
- an exemption from CFC taxation exists where the intangible assets are 
developed by the CFC itself (Germany and Denmark) and without the 
participation of the domestic shareholder (Germany). In Denmark, an 
additional exemption exists for license income if the subsidiary is subject to 
public supervision and if the license income is mainly derived in the residence 
state of the CFC and mainly from third parties. The Spanish legislation does 
not differentiate between self-developed and non-self-developed, but provides 
for the above mentioned exemption in case of non-resident recipients. 
 
6.2.1.5. Dividend Income 
 
It was outlined earlier in this study that dividend income should - from my point of 
view - be exempt from taxation in the country of the parent company. Of course, this 
should be equally true for any indirect taxation of dividends through the application of 
CFC rules. The German CFC rules follow such an approach and exclude any 
dividends from the CFC taxation, irrespective of the percentage of shareholding and 
irrespective of the nature of income which is “behind” the dividend payment, i.e. 
whether the income is earned through an activity which is passive or active.41 This 
results in a full exemption of dividend income from CFC taxation.42 As a rule, the 
Spanish CFC legislation considers the income derived from interests in the equity of 
a foreign company to be tainted income and, in general, the same exclusions apply 
                                            
40 However, countries like Lithuania which do not explicitly mention the royalty income as passive income in 
such a situation have base company rules which typically cover such CFC income (see below).  
41 Section 8 (1) no. 8 of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
42 However, an amount of 5 percent is added to the domestic tax base as non-deductible expenses (§ 8 b (5) of 
the German Corporate Income Tax Act).  
    
                                                                                         
 
transferred to the other country, too. It is therefore obvious that royalty income is 
regularly subject to CFC taxation. Within the transactional countries Germany follows 
a very strict approach according to which the granting of authorised use of rights, 
plans, designs, processes, know how and skills leads to passive income unless the 
taxpayer can show that the foreign company commercialises the results of its own 
research and development work undertaken without the participation of a taxpayer 
holding shares in the company or a closely related party to such a taxpayer.33 This is 
a far-reaching provision since it comprises all income related to intangible assets 
purchased from related or unrelated parties, i.e. even if the CFC purchases the 
property from a third party and makes the property available to another third party 
without any involvement of the domestic shareholder and any related party, the 
income will be subject to CFC taxation.34 Furthermore, the provision also comprises 
the intangible property which is the result of one’s own research and development 
work under certain circumstances, namely where a related party was involved in the 
research and development activities.35 In other words, only royalty income from the 
making available of intangible assets which are developed by the CFC itself without 
the involvement of the domestic shareholder or a related party is considered to be 
active income. Thus, it is of importance for the application of the German CFC rules 
whether (i) the intangible property which is exploited was self-developed or non-self-
developed (purchased) by the foreign company and - in the first-mentioned situation - 
whether (ii) the domestic shareholder was involved in the development of the 
intangible property. Denmark, which is focused on financial income, has a similar 
approach according to which royalties and gains on the sale of intangible assets are 
considered to be tainted income, provided that the CFC itself did not develop the 
intangible assets.36 An exemption exists for license companies which are subject to 
public supervision, provided that the subsidiary conducts business mainly with 
customers in its own country of residence, and mainly with third parties.37 The 
Spanish rules are not comparably strict and do not encompass royalties derived from 
related persons or companies which are not resident in Spain (see the explanations 
with respect to interest income).38 Thus, if the royalties do not reduce the tax base in 
Spain because the recipient of the services is not resident in Spain the royalty 
income will not be subject to Spanish CFC taxation. It seems that the Lithuanian rules 
are not explicitly focused on royalty income as passive income - but the base 
company rules have to be referred to.39 In general, the inter-company transactions of 
a CFC with resident companies will be covered below where base company income 
is outlined.  
 
In the same way as described above with respect to interest income, the CFC rules 
of the transactional countries are not identical but they have a similar approach. It 
                                            
33 Section 8 (1) no. 6 letter a of the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz - AStG).  
34 Flick / Wassermeyer / Baumhoff, Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, § 8 AStG, Rz. 224; Mössner in Brenzing et 
al. , Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, § 8 AStG, Rz. 69.  
35 The participation of a related party will be discussed in more detail later on in the context of base company 
income.  
36 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service, Doc. 
2001-28851 
37 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Danish Parliament Approves Corporate Tax Incentives, Tax Analysts Tax 
Document Service 2002, Doc. 2002-12665. 
38 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 565. 
39 Apart from the remuneration for author’s work (see Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 398).  
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sale of shares (made by the CFC) can encompass, in contrast to dividend income, a 
part of unrealised profit which is related to tainted activities which have not yet been 
subject to CFC taxation. It might be possible, therefore, to transfer income which 
would normally be subject to CFC taxation into (exempt) capital gains. This is not the 
case for dividends because dividends are based on income which has already been 
realised and which was either subject to CFC taxation or not subject to CFC taxation. 
However, instead of implementing a different treatment - at least partially - of 
dividends and capital gains it might be better, in my opinion, to adjust the income 
determination rules for the stipulation of the tainted income. Moreover, the partial 
non-exemption of capital gains could lead to a double taxation of income: the non-
realised tainted income might be taxed (indirectly) through the capital gains taxation 
and subsequently when it is realised (indirectly) according to the CFC regime of the 
state of the purchaser (and, of course, the CFC state). It can also lead to problems 
regarding the provision of an appropriate crediting of the taxes imposed in the CFC 
state on the subsequently realised income. I will come back to those aspects later on 
in more detail. 
 
6.2.1.7. Other Capital Gains 
 
It is obvious that a CFC taxation of certain income components requires also a capital 
gains taxation related to the underlying assets in order to avoid the circumvention of 
CFC taxation and to ensure the complete taxation of such tainted income. In 
Denmark, the financial income which is subject to CFC taxation also encompasses 
the taxable gains on claims, debts, and financial contracts, as well as the gains on 
the sale of intangible assets.50 Comparable rules exist in Spain51 and Lithuania.52 It is 
worth noting in this context that the transactional countries calculate the taxable CFC 
income according to domestic tax rules. This basically ensures that all taxable gains 
which are taxable pursuant to domestic law are also included in the current taxation if 
such gains occur within the CFC. However, this does not prevent a shifting of tainted 
income which is included - unrealised - in certain assets of the CFC where (i) the 
shares are sold to another (foreign) taxpayer and (ii) no capital gains taxation exists 
on the sale of shares. Therefore, it is obvious that - for example - the German CFC 
rules require a specific provision to deal with such a situation and to tax the disposal 
of shares under certain circumstances (see above).  
 
6.2.1.8. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The separation of income (and activities) under the transactional approach of the 
countries outlined above only partially fulfils the requirements which were identified in 
chapters 2 and 3. One of the important aspects is certainly the fact that the 
transactional approach provides for a mere horizontal separation of income by 
focusing on “tainted” income which is to a large extent related to capital intensive 
activities. The latter activities usually contain a separable financing element (e.g. 
included in interest, leasing, rental and royalty income). This, of course, is clearly 
                                            
50 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
51 Section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
52 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
    
                                                                                         
 
as described above with respect to interest income.43 However, the Spanish law 
provides for an additional important exception to the general rule where the CFC acts 
as a holding company. This requires that (i) the CFC holds an interest of more than 5 
percent in the foreign company, (ii) the CFC supervises and manages the interests, 
through the corresponding organisation of human and material resources, and (iii) at 
least 85 percent of the income of the entities from which the income is obtained result 
from business activities.44 Even though this exempts dividend income from 
substantial participation in active companies with more than 5 percent, the portfolio 
investment in shares remains tainted income and therefore subject to the Spanish 
CFC taxation. In Denmark, dividends are considered to be income from financial 
activities and therefore tainted income. In general, this is irrespective of the 
percentage of shareholding, i.e. not only portfolio dividends but also dividends 
received from substantial shareholdings are affected.45 The Lithuanian CFC 
legislation considers dividend income to be passive income, too.46 As a result, only 
the German approach excludes all dividend income from current taxation – even 
portfolio dividends – whereas the other transactional countries still focus on portfolio 
dividends.  
 
6.2.1.6. Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares 
 
The tax treatment with respect to controlled foreign companies in the transactional 
countries Denmark, Spain and Lithuania generally follows the treatment of 
dividends.47 This is a consistent approach since the capital gains on the disposal of 
shares theoretically reflect the retained profits and the prospective future 
development of the entity. In Germany, the tax treatment of capital gains realised by 
the CFC on the disposal of shares deviates from the tax treatment of dividends 
received by the CFC. As already outlined above, dividends received by the CFC are 
explicitly excluded from the German CFC taxation.48 In contrast thereto, capital gains 
are only excluded if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the capital gain is not 
connected to (tainted) income which is related to assets of a capital investment 
kind.49 The legislator wanted to avoid situations in which tainted income - which has 
not yet been realised and is therefore not subject to CFC taxation - is transferred to 
another person simply by transferring the shares in the company. The provision is 
therefore directed to avoid the circumvention of the German CFC legislation. Of 
course, dividends and capital gains on the sale of shares are, in principle, two sides 
of the same coin. It seems to be logical, therefore, to treat both transactions in an 
identical manner, i.e. to exclude both from the classification as tainted income. This 
would be a consistent approach. However, one has to admit that capital gains on the 
                                            
43 Section 121 (2) letter b of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
44 Section 121 (2) of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law; Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 
812.  
45 Sorensen, National Report Denmark, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 466, 467.  
46 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
47 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service, Doc. 
2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et seq.; 
section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law; Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / 
Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European 
Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
48 Section 8 (1) no. 8 of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
49 Section 8 (1) no. 9 and section 7 (6a) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
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sale of shares (made by the CFC) can encompass, in contrast to dividend income, a 
part of unrealised profit which is related to tainted activities which have not yet been 
subject to CFC taxation. It might be possible, therefore, to transfer income which 
would normally be subject to CFC taxation into (exempt) capital gains. This is not the 
case for dividends because dividends are based on income which has already been 
realised and which was either subject to CFC taxation or not subject to CFC taxation. 
However, instead of implementing a different treatment - at least partially - of 
dividends and capital gains it might be better, in my opinion, to adjust the income 
determination rules for the stipulation of the tainted income. Moreover, the partial 
non-exemption of capital gains could lead to a double taxation of income: the non-
realised tainted income might be taxed (indirectly) through the capital gains taxation 
and subsequently when it is realised (indirectly) according to the CFC regime of the 
state of the purchaser (and, of course, the CFC state). It can also lead to problems 
regarding the provision of an appropriate crediting of the taxes imposed in the CFC 
state on the subsequently realised income. I will come back to those aspects later on 
in more detail. 
 
6.2.1.7. Other Capital Gains 
 
It is obvious that a CFC taxation of certain income components requires also a capital 
gains taxation related to the underlying assets in order to avoid the circumvention of 
CFC taxation and to ensure the complete taxation of such tainted income. In 
Denmark, the financial income which is subject to CFC taxation also encompasses 
the taxable gains on claims, debts, and financial contracts, as well as the gains on 
the sale of intangible assets.50 Comparable rules exist in Spain51 and Lithuania.52 It is 
worth noting in this context that the transactional countries calculate the taxable CFC 
income according to domestic tax rules. This basically ensures that all taxable gains 
which are taxable pursuant to domestic law are also included in the current taxation if 
such gains occur within the CFC. However, this does not prevent a shifting of tainted 
income which is included - unrealised - in certain assets of the CFC where (i) the 
shares are sold to another (foreign) taxpayer and (ii) no capital gains taxation exists 
on the sale of shares. Therefore, it is obvious that - for example - the German CFC 
rules require a specific provision to deal with such a situation and to tax the disposal 
of shares under certain circumstances (see above).  
 
6.2.1.8. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The separation of income (and activities) under the transactional approach of the 
countries outlined above only partially fulfils the requirements which were identified in 
chapters 2 and 3. One of the important aspects is certainly the fact that the 
transactional approach provides for a mere horizontal separation of income by 
focusing on “tainted” income which is to a large extent related to capital intensive 
activities. The latter activities usually contain a separable financing element (e.g. 
included in interest, leasing, rental and royalty income). This, of course, is clearly 
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as described above with respect to interest income.43 However, the Spanish law 
provides for an additional important exception to the general rule where the CFC acts 
as a holding company. This requires that (i) the CFC holds an interest of more than 5 
percent in the foreign company, (ii) the CFC supervises and manages the interests, 
through the corresponding organisation of human and material resources, and (iii) at 
least 85 percent of the income of the entities from which the income is obtained result 
from business activities.44 Even though this exempts dividend income from 
substantial participation in active companies with more than 5 percent, the portfolio 
investment in shares remains tainted income and therefore subject to the Spanish 
CFC taxation. In Denmark, dividends are considered to be income from financial 
activities and therefore tainted income. In general, this is irrespective of the 
percentage of shareholding, i.e. not only portfolio dividends but also dividends 
received from substantial shareholdings are affected.45 The Lithuanian CFC 
legislation considers dividend income to be passive income, too.46 As a result, only 
the German approach excludes all dividend income from current taxation – even 
portfolio dividends – whereas the other transactional countries still focus on portfolio 
dividends.  
 
6.2.1.6. Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares 
 
The tax treatment with respect to controlled foreign companies in the transactional 
countries Denmark, Spain and Lithuania generally follows the treatment of 
dividends.47 This is a consistent approach since the capital gains on the disposal of 
shares theoretically reflect the retained profits and the prospective future 
development of the entity. In Germany, the tax treatment of capital gains realised by 
the CFC on the disposal of shares deviates from the tax treatment of dividends 
received by the CFC. As already outlined above, dividends received by the CFC are 
explicitly excluded from the German CFC taxation.48 In contrast thereto, capital gains 
are only excluded if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the capital gain is not 
connected to (tainted) income which is related to assets of a capital investment 
kind.49 The legislator wanted to avoid situations in which tainted income - which has 
not yet been realised and is therefore not subject to CFC taxation - is transferred to 
another person simply by transferring the shares in the company. The provision is 
therefore directed to avoid the circumvention of the German CFC legislation. Of 
course, dividends and capital gains on the sale of shares are, in principle, two sides 
of the same coin. It seems to be logical, therefore, to treat both transactions in an 
identical manner, i.e. to exclude both from the classification as tainted income. This 
would be a consistent approach. However, one has to admit that capital gains on the 
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44 Section 121 (2) of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law; Garcia Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the concept of 
basic interest taxation.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In the illustration above it was assumed, for the purpose of simplification, that the 
tainted activities under a transactional approach CFC taxation are identical to those 
required under the concept of basic interest taxation. It is apparent that financing 
activities, licensing activities as well as leasing and rental activities which are related 
to movable property are usually within the focus of transactional CFC regimes. The 
latter types of activities contain a separable financing element, as already mentioned 
above, and - in combination with the residence-based taxation of the respective 
income in the CFC state - are therefore particularly attractive in the context of hybrid 
structures. For this reason, the aforementioned activities should also be considered 
in an alternative concept which is based on the taxation of the basic interest 
component. However,  it should not be overlooked that the transactional countries do 
not have a uniform approach with respect to the horizontal separation of tainted and 
non-tainted income and that the qualification is by far not restricted to the question 
whether the income is subject to a residence-based taxation in the CFC state or not. 
In my opinion, and based on the conclusion of the previous chapters, the decisive 
question must be whether the basic interest component is “taxed at the right place” - 
namely the state where the income is produced. If the income is not taxed in the state 
where it is produced, but in the residence state of the CFC, there seems to be a 
necessity for a current taxation of the basic interest component. In principle, the 
conclusion that the income from capital intensive activities which includes a financing 
element has to be separated not only horizontally but also vertically is equally 
relevant for interest income, royalty income, leasing and rental income (related to 
movable property) and similar types of income. There might be reasons for a (further) 
exemption from current taxation, especially from a simplification and administrative 
perspective, but this shall be outlined and discussed in chapter 9. However, what is 
relevant here is the fact that there is no simple and straight-forward horizontal 
separation of income - and no vertical separation of income at all - under the existing 
transactional approach CFC rules. 
 
With regard to leasing and rental activities related to immovable property the situation 
is a bit different from the activities mentioned above. Here, the right to tax the 
respective income is usually allocated - according to Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC - 
to the state of source (i.e. the source-based taxation is the general rule and not the 
exception). In this case, there is no necessity for any current allocation of the basic 
interest income to the resident shareholder. However, in those cases in which the 
taxing rights are allocated to the CFC state there is, in principle, no reason to treat 
the leasing and rental activities related to immovable property differently from the 
other types of capital intensive activities which contain a separable financing element 
    
                                                                                         
 
what has to be identified under an efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance (anti-
deferral) legislation which is based on the current taxation of income and which is 
concentrated on the hybrid structures outlined earlier. However, it is equally clear that 
the focusing on a mere horizontal separation of income is by far not sufficient. The 
problem is that the transactional approach leads to a taxation of the total amount of 
tainted income which does not only encompass the basic interest component but also 
any other components - including those which are clearly connected to an “active” 
activity (within the tainted activity) carried out by the CFC. In other words, any 
economic output which is produced by the CFC in the context of receiving interest 
income, leasing income, rental income and royalty income is subject to current 
taxation in the state of the shareholder. This, without any doubt, is neither acceptable 
from an economic perspective nor from an equity perspective - which theoretically 
require the taxation of income to follow, in general, the principle of capital import 
neutrality and the current taxation to be strictly limited - in a non-optimal scenario - to 
the basic interest component. Thus, the income which is produced by the CFC in its 
state of residence should be taxed exclusively in the latter state and not, in addition, 
on a current basis in the state of the shareholder. It does not matter whether the 
income produced by the CFC is linked to an “active” or “passive” activity.  
 
Similar aspects are relevant for the income which is related to the risk component. 
Although the risk component is not produced by the CFC it was concluded that the 
latter component, which is part of the tainted income, should be taxed exclusively - in 
a non-optimal scenario - in the CFC state. This ensures a consistent treatment of 
positive and negative income related to the risk component. It is apparent that there 
is a correlation between the positive income included in the risk premium and the 
negative income which is realised in case an event arises which is theoretically 
covered by the risk component, i.e. if the risk becomes reality. 
 
Essentially, the fact that the transactional countries outlined above tax the activity 
component and the risk component (included in the tainted income) on a current 
basis is due to the complete lack of a vertical separation of income in all of these 
countries. The following figure illustrates the decisive difference with respect to the 
existing transactional regimes which merely focus on a horizontal separation of 
income and the concept based on chapters 2 and 3 which requires a strict horizontal 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the concept of 
basic interest taxation.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In the illustration above it was assumed, for the purpose of simplification, that the 
tainted activities under a transactional approach CFC taxation are identical to those 
required under the concept of basic interest taxation. It is apparent that financing 
activities, licensing activities as well as leasing and rental activities which are related 
to movable property are usually within the focus of transactional CFC regimes. The 
latter types of activities contain a separable financing element, as already mentioned 
above, and - in combination with the residence-based taxation of the respective 
income in the CFC state - are therefore particularly attractive in the context of hybrid 
structures. For this reason, the aforementioned activities should also be considered 
in an alternative concept which is based on the taxation of the basic interest 
component. However,  it should not be overlooked that the transactional countries do 
not have a uniform approach with respect to the horizontal separation of tainted and 
non-tainted income and that the qualification is by far not restricted to the question 
whether the income is subject to a residence-based taxation in the CFC state or not. 
In my opinion, and based on the conclusion of the previous chapters, the decisive 
question must be whether the basic interest component is “taxed at the right place” - 
namely the state where the income is produced. If the income is not taxed in the state 
where it is produced, but in the residence state of the CFC, there seems to be a 
necessity for a current taxation of the basic interest component. In principle, the 
conclusion that the income from capital intensive activities which includes a financing 
element has to be separated not only horizontally but also vertically is equally 
relevant for interest income, royalty income, leasing and rental income (related to 
movable property) and similar types of income. There might be reasons for a (further) 
exemption from current taxation, especially from a simplification and administrative 
perspective, but this shall be outlined and discussed in chapter 9. However, what is 
relevant here is the fact that there is no simple and straight-forward horizontal 
separation of income - and no vertical separation of income at all - under the existing 
transactional approach CFC rules. 
 
With regard to leasing and rental activities related to immovable property the situation 
is a bit different from the activities mentioned above. Here, the right to tax the 
respective income is usually allocated - according to Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC - 
to the state of source (i.e. the source-based taxation is the general rule and not the 
exception). In this case, there is no necessity for any current allocation of the basic 
interest income to the resident shareholder. However, in those cases in which the 
taxing rights are allocated to the CFC state there is, in principle, no reason to treat 
the leasing and rental activities related to immovable property differently from the 
other types of capital intensive activities which contain a separable financing element 
    
                                                                                         
 
what has to be identified under an efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance (anti-
deferral) legislation which is based on the current taxation of income and which is 
concentrated on the hybrid structures outlined earlier. However, it is equally clear that 
the focusing on a mere horizontal separation of income is by far not sufficient. The 
problem is that the transactional approach leads to a taxation of the total amount of 
tainted income which does not only encompass the basic interest component but also 
any other components - including those which are clearly connected to an “active” 
activity (within the tainted activity) carried out by the CFC. In other words, any 
economic output which is produced by the CFC in the context of receiving interest 
income, leasing income, rental income and royalty income is subject to current 
taxation in the state of the shareholder. This, without any doubt, is neither acceptable 
from an economic perspective nor from an equity perspective - which theoretically 
require the taxation of income to follow, in general, the principle of capital import 
neutrality and the current taxation to be strictly limited - in a non-optimal scenario - to 
the basic interest component. Thus, the income which is produced by the CFC in its 
state of residence should be taxed exclusively in the latter state and not, in addition, 
on a current basis in the state of the shareholder. It does not matter whether the 
income produced by the CFC is linked to an “active” or “passive” activity.  
 
Similar aspects are relevant for the income which is related to the risk component. 
Although the risk component is not produced by the CFC it was concluded that the 
latter component, which is part of the tainted income, should be taxed exclusively - in 
a non-optimal scenario - in the CFC state. This ensures a consistent treatment of 
positive and negative income related to the risk component. It is apparent that there 
is a correlation between the positive income included in the risk premium and the 
negative income which is realised in case an event arises which is theoretically 
covered by the risk component, i.e. if the risk becomes reality. 
 
Essentially, the fact that the transactional countries outlined above tax the activity 
component and the risk component (included in the tainted income) on a current 
basis is due to the complete lack of a vertical separation of income in all of these 
countries. The following figure illustrates the decisive difference with respect to the 
existing transactional regimes which merely focus on a horizontal separation of 
income and the concept based on chapters 2 and 3 which requires a strict horizontal 
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extremely mobile, but that the major part of the income is derived by an element 
which is extremely mobile. If such an element prevails within a certain activity, it 
makes the whole activity relatively mobile. It is certainly clear that the income from 
the leasing and renting out of movable property, interest income, royalty income, 
dividend income (and related hereto the income from capital gains) is very much 
influenced by a significant part of income which is related to extremely mobile capital 
investment.  
 
b.) The “capital factor” 
 
The element of mobility outlined above is strongly related to the extent of capital 
investment included in the overall activity and the significance of all other elements 
compared to the mere capital investment. It is clear that highly complex production or 
development activities most often contain considerable capital elements, too, but in 
contrast to the passive activities described above the intellectual element is much 
more important and not comparably replaceable. With respect to the aforementioned 
income it can be clearly stipulated that the factor of capital is a major element of the 
activities. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that - at least with respect to mere inter-
company activities - the accompanying elements are of less significance compared to 
the capital investment. An important part of the income derived from the passive 
activities is the interest component of capital. The best example is certainly the 
interest income from inter-company loans where the whole income is related to the 
capital provided. In case of intra-group cash pooling activities the income also 
includes a small element to cover the accompanying services. In case of the leasing 
and renting out of movable and immovable property a significant part of the income 
refers to an interest component of the capital invested and the amortisation of the 
property. The same is basically true for royalty income from intangible property. The 
investment in shares in order to earn dividend income or a subsequent capital gain 
from the disposal of the shares is - in general - slightly different with respect to the 
interest component. However, it is quite clear that the income can be derived from 
the capital investment without any other accompanying activity exercised by the 
shareholder.   
 
The performance of those activities makes it possible to earn a significant part of the 
income by employing capital and, at the same time, typically does not require a great 
number of highly skilled employees and extensive facilities. In my opinion, the 
mobility increases with the degree of income related to the capital investment. In 
other words, the higher the income related to the capital investment, the greater the 
overall mobility of the activity.  
 
c.) The residence-based taxation of income  
 
What is now important from a tax point of view is the fact that any transfer of these 
mobile activities, which are mainly based on capital investments, leads to a shifting of 
taxing rights. That means, if a parent company decides to incorporate a foreign 
subsidiary in a low-tax country which is responsible for certain intra-group service 
activities, this will generally lead to a shifting of taxing rights from the parent company 
to the foreign subsidiary in the low-tax country. Leaving aside a limited taxation in the 
source state by way of a withholding tax, this is generally true - based on the OECD-
MTC - for nearly all of the passive activities outlined above, namely the income from 
    
                                                                                         
 
and which are subject to residence-based taxation in the CFC state. From the 
examination of the transactional countries it seems that these countries often do not 
follow, as already mentioned above for other types of income, a simple and straight-
forward horizontal separation between tainted and non-tainted income which is 
dependent upon the question whether the CFC state has the right to tax the income 
or not. See in this respect, for example, the complex German rules regarding the 
taxation of income from immovable property which substantially deviates from the 
proposed general principles.  
 
I have already pointed out that the income from dividends received by the CFC and 
the income from capital gains realised from the disposal of shares by the CFC should 
not be subject to current taxation, neither under the existing CFC regimes nor (with 
respect to the basic interest component) under an alternative legislation. This should 
be equally true for substantial shareholdings and portfolio shareholdings. In other 
words, income from dividends and capital gains on the disposal of shares should be 
completely excluded from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation which is based 
on a concept of a current taxation of income. Apparently, there is not one single 
country among the transactional countries which strictly follows a consistent 
treatment of income from dividends and capital gains from the disposal of shares. In 
contrast thereto, it is understandable and consistent that the existing CFC regimes 
provide for the taxation of capital gains which are related to the disposal of other 
property which is utilised for the generation of tainted income. Any other approach 
would provide the possibility to circumvent the CFC taxation. However, the concept of 
basic interest taxation - with the combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation 
of income - has to follow a different route. This will be outlined in more detail in 
chapter 9 where an alternative concept will be presented.   
 
6.2.1.9. Preliminary Conclusions  
 
Different conclusions can be drawn with respect to the tainted (or passive) income 
outlined above, especially with respect to income from the leasing and renting out of 
movable property, interest income, royalty income, dividend income, and income 
from capital gains.  
 
a.) The element of mobility  
 
The income described above as tainted or passive income is often considered to be a 
“mobile form of income.”53 In my opinion, it is rather the underlying capital investment 
(for example the tangible or intangible property) which is extremely mobile and, thus, 
also the part of the income which is related thereto. For example, a major factor in 
case of leasing activities is the investment in the respective property. However, since 
the property will be purchased by the lessor but transferred and used by the lessee, 
the part of the activity which is related to the investment - in the narrower sense - can 
be seen as highly mobile. Nevertheless, any activities connected with the investment 
are as mobile or immobile as other comparable services which require personnel to 
prepare the investment, to do the bookkeeping, the calculations, the marketing (if it is 
not only related to group companies) and so on. It can be concluded that all passive 
activities outlined above have in common that it is not the income as a whole which is 
                                            
53 OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1996, page 
49.  
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extremely mobile, but that the major part of the income is derived by an element 
which is extremely mobile. If such an element prevails within a certain activity, it 
makes the whole activity relatively mobile. It is certainly clear that the income from 
the leasing and renting out of movable property, interest income, royalty income, 
dividend income (and related hereto the income from capital gains) is very much 
influenced by a significant part of income which is related to extremely mobile capital 
investment.  
 
b.) The “capital factor” 
 
The element of mobility outlined above is strongly related to the extent of capital 
investment included in the overall activity and the significance of all other elements 
compared to the mere capital investment. It is clear that highly complex production or 
development activities most often contain considerable capital elements, too, but in 
contrast to the passive activities described above the intellectual element is much 
more important and not comparably replaceable. With respect to the aforementioned 
income it can be clearly stipulated that the factor of capital is a major element of the 
activities. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that - at least with respect to mere inter-
company activities - the accompanying elements are of less significance compared to 
the capital investment. An important part of the income derived from the passive 
activities is the interest component of capital. The best example is certainly the 
interest income from inter-company loans where the whole income is related to the 
capital provided. In case of intra-group cash pooling activities the income also 
includes a small element to cover the accompanying services. In case of the leasing 
and renting out of movable and immovable property a significant part of the income 
refers to an interest component of the capital invested and the amortisation of the 
property. The same is basically true for royalty income from intangible property. The 
investment in shares in order to earn dividend income or a subsequent capital gain 
from the disposal of the shares is - in general - slightly different with respect to the 
interest component. However, it is quite clear that the income can be derived from 
the capital investment without any other accompanying activity exercised by the 
shareholder.   
 
The performance of those activities makes it possible to earn a significant part of the 
income by employing capital and, at the same time, typically does not require a great 
number of highly skilled employees and extensive facilities. In my opinion, the 
mobility increases with the degree of income related to the capital investment. In 
other words, the higher the income related to the capital investment, the greater the 
overall mobility of the activity.  
 
c.) The residence-based taxation of income  
 
What is now important from a tax point of view is the fact that any transfer of these 
mobile activities, which are mainly based on capital investments, leads to a shifting of 
taxing rights. That means, if a parent company decides to incorporate a foreign 
subsidiary in a low-tax country which is responsible for certain intra-group service 
activities, this will generally lead to a shifting of taxing rights from the parent company 
to the foreign subsidiary in the low-tax country. Leaving aside a limited taxation in the 
source state by way of a withholding tax, this is generally true - based on the OECD-
MTC - for nearly all of the passive activities outlined above, namely the income from 
    
                                                                                         
 
and which are subject to residence-based taxation in the CFC state. From the 
examination of the transactional countries it seems that these countries often do not 
follow, as already mentioned above for other types of income, a simple and straight-
forward horizontal separation between tainted and non-tainted income which is 
dependent upon the question whether the CFC state has the right to tax the income 
or not. See in this respect, for example, the complex German rules regarding the 
taxation of income from immovable property which substantially deviates from the 
proposed general principles.  
 
I have already pointed out that the income from dividends received by the CFC and 
the income from capital gains realised from the disposal of shares by the CFC should 
not be subject to current taxation, neither under the existing CFC regimes nor (with 
respect to the basic interest component) under an alternative legislation. This should 
be equally true for substantial shareholdings and portfolio shareholdings. In other 
words, income from dividends and capital gains on the disposal of shares should be 
completely excluded from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation which is based 
on a concept of a current taxation of income. Apparently, there is not one single 
country among the transactional countries which strictly follows a consistent 
treatment of income from dividends and capital gains from the disposal of shares. In 
contrast thereto, it is understandable and consistent that the existing CFC regimes 
provide for the taxation of capital gains which are related to the disposal of other 
property which is utilised for the generation of tainted income. Any other approach 
would provide the possibility to circumvent the CFC taxation. However, the concept of 
basic interest taxation - with the combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation 
of income - has to follow a different route. This will be outlined in more detail in 
chapter 9 where an alternative concept will be presented.   
 
6.2.1.9. Preliminary Conclusions  
 
Different conclusions can be drawn with respect to the tainted (or passive) income 
outlined above, especially with respect to income from the leasing and renting out of 
movable property, interest income, royalty income, dividend income, and income 
from capital gains.  
 
a.) The element of mobility  
 
The income described above as tainted or passive income is often considered to be a 
“mobile form of income.”53 In my opinion, it is rather the underlying capital investment 
(for example the tangible or intangible property) which is extremely mobile and, thus, 
also the part of the income which is related thereto. For example, a major factor in 
case of leasing activities is the investment in the respective property. However, since 
the property will be purchased by the lessor but transferred and used by the lessee, 
the part of the activity which is related to the investment - in the narrower sense - can 
be seen as highly mobile. Nevertheless, any activities connected with the investment 
are as mobile or immobile as other comparable services which require personnel to 
prepare the investment, to do the bookkeeping, the calculations, the marketing (if it is 
not only related to group companies) and so on. It can be concluded that all passive 
activities outlined above have in common that it is not the income as a whole which is 
                                            





    
                                                                                         
 
in contrast to the passive income outlined above, this can affect all kinds of trading 
and service activities.  
 
6.2.2.2. Income Subject to CFC Taxation under the Base Company Rules  
 
According to the general concept of the German base company rules, income 
derived from trading activities is considered to be active income, unless a domestic 
taxpayer60 holding shares in the foreign company has supplied the goods to the 
foreign company, or the goods have been supplied by the foreign company to such a 
domestic taxpayer. Service income is also considered active income, unless the 
foreign company makes use for the services of a domestic taxpayer holding shares in 
the foreign company or a closely related party to such a domestic taxpayer and who 
is liable to tax for its income from services rendered within Germany; or the foreign 
company performs the services to such a taxpayer. In principle, this is not true, i.e. 
the income is not considered to be tainted income, if the taxpayer can show that the 
foreign company maintains commercially equipped offices61 for such trading or 
service activities and takes part in general commerce62, and if the foreign company 
conducts work on preparing, concluding and implementing such business without the 
participation of such a domestic taxpayer (“qualified business”).63 However, it is 
                                            
60 Alternatively, a closely related party to such a domestic taxpayer. This is also true for the following references 
to the domestic taxpayer in the context of the German base company rules. 
61 The requirement of maintaining commercially equipped offices is fulfilled if the foreign company is from a 
practical and personnel point of view in a position to prepare, conclude and implement the respective supply of 
goods and services by itself and independent from the shareholder and related parties (paragraph 8.1.4.2.1. 
(trading) and paragraph 8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular).  
62 The participation in general commerce requires that the activity of the foreign company is not only limited to 
related parties but is instead - not only to a minor extent - directed towards an indefinite number of persons. An 
indirect participation in general commerce only through related parties is not sufficient. However, it is not 
harmful for the qualification if the number of customers is limited simply by the fact that the goods provided are, 
by nature, only limited to a small number of customers (see paragraph 8.1.4.2.3. (trading) and paragraph 
8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular; see also German Supreme Tax Court, dated August 29, 1984, 
I R 68/81, BStBl. 1985 II page 120 et seq.). Based on the administrative circular of the German Ministry of 
Finance, it should be sufficient only for the outward activities, e.g. the sales and services, to be directed towards 
an indefinite number of persons but for the respective inward activities, e.g. the purchase of goods, to be limited 
to only one related party. The same is true for the opposite situation, i.e. the providing of sales and services to 
only one related party but with the purchase of goods or the receipt of services from an indefinite number of 
third party suppliers (see paragraph 8.1.4.2.2. (trading) and 8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular). 
However, it is quite unclear where the borderline has to be drawn. A foreign sales company which purchases all 
goods from the domestic parent company (production company) but supplies those goods to several customers in 
the local market will certainly participate in general commerce. But what about a foreign company which 
operates a call centre only for group companies? The foreign company will most certainly receive third party 
services - but only to a limited extent. In contrast to the administrative circular, the German Supreme Tax Court 
made it very clear - in a case dealing with inter-company services - that the requirement of participating in 
general commerce is not fulfilled if the services are only provided within a group of companies and the 
limitation is due to the respective intra-group structure. Since the criterion of a participation in general commerce 
is not only relevant with respect to the German Foreign Tax Act but also for income tax and trade income tax 
purposes, the Court referred to existing case law. Thereto, the criterion requires that the provision of services is 
not restricted to certain persons. Even though the business activities can be restricted to certain types of 
customers the activity as such must be open for changes in the person who receives the services. Any general 
limitation on certain customers does therefore not fulfil the requirement of a participation in general commerce 
(see in this respect German Supreme Tax Court, dated August 29, 1984, I R 68/81, BStBl. 1985 II page 120 et 
seq. and German Supreme Tax Court, dated May 12, 1960, IV 159/59 U.BFHE 71, 221, BStBl. 1960 III page 
331).  
63 In case of trading activities, the domestic shareholder (or a closely related party thereto) is involved in the 
performance of the activity of the foreign company if functions are exercised by the shareholder (or the related 
party) which are related to the preparation, conclusion and implementation of the businesses (see section 8 (1) 
no. 4 of the German Foreign Tax Act; 8.1.4.3.1. of the administrative circular). This is irrespective of the 
    
                                                                                         
 
the leasing and renting out of movable property,54 interest income,55 royalty income,56 
dividend income,57 and capital gains related thereto.58 However, this is not true with 
respect to rental income from immovable property and the respective capital gains 
taxation.59 In substance, there is a great flexibility with respect to the place of taxation 
of income related to capital investments in the situations outlined above (with the 
exception of income from immovable property).  
 
d.) Direct tax base erosion  
 
It is important to recognise that the relocation of the activities described above and 
the corresponding transfer of taxing rights to a low-tax country does not in all cases 
lead to the application of the respective CFC taxation. However, all transactional 
countries focus on situations where (i) activities are relocated to a foreign low-tax 
country and (ii) the activities are directed towards the domestic shareholder (parent 
company), i.e. the activities lead to deductible business expenses in the residence 
state of the shareholder and therefore to a direct reduction of the domestic tax base.  
 
e.) Indirect tax base erosion  
 
An indirect tax base erosion can exist in situations where activities are relocated to a 
foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country and the services provided by the foreign 
subsidiary are not directed towards the domestic shareholder but instead towards 
other group companies. In contrast to the direct tax base erosion, the services will not 
have an immediate impact on the domestic tax base in the form of deductible 
expenses, but lead to an erosion of the domestic tax base through the fact that the 
services in question are not provided from within the residence country but from 
within the foreign country, and therefore do not produce taxable income in the 
country of the shareholder. The CFC rules of the transactional countries Germany 
and Denmark both focus on the direct and indirect tax base erosion, i.e. income from 
the leasing and renting out of movable property, interest income, and royalty income 
is considered to be tainted income irrespective of the fact whether it is provided 
towards the domestic shareholder or any other non-resident related party. The 
Spanish rules are not comparably strict and do not encompass income derived by the 
CFC from services provided to non-resident recipients - under certain circumstances 
- which do not lead to deductible expenses in Spain.  
 
6.2.2. Base Company Income  
 
6.2.2.1. General Aspects  
 
Another form of tainted income - although different from the aforementioned types of 
passive income - is the so-called “base company income.” The base company 
income comprises the supply of services - and in some cases even the supply of 
goods - under certain circumstances, especially where the domestic shareholder or 
other group companies are somehow involved in the transactions. Theoretically, and 
                                            
54 Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. 
55 Article 11 of the OECD-MTC. 
56 Article 12 of the OECD-MTC. 
57 Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
58 Article 13 of the OECD-MTC. 
59 Article 6 (1) and Article 13 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF Legislation
229
    
                                                                                         
 
in contrast to the passive income outlined above, this can affect all kinds of trading 
and service activities.  
 
6.2.2.2. Income Subject to CFC Taxation under the Base Company Rules  
 
According to the general concept of the German base company rules, income 
derived from trading activities is considered to be active income, unless a domestic 
taxpayer60 holding shares in the foreign company has supplied the goods to the 
foreign company, or the goods have been supplied by the foreign company to such a 
domestic taxpayer. Service income is also considered active income, unless the 
foreign company makes use for the services of a domestic taxpayer holding shares in 
the foreign company or a closely related party to such a domestic taxpayer and who 
is liable to tax for its income from services rendered within Germany; or the foreign 
company performs the services to such a taxpayer. In principle, this is not true, i.e. 
the income is not considered to be tainted income, if the taxpayer can show that the 
foreign company maintains commercially equipped offices61 for such trading or 
service activities and takes part in general commerce62, and if the foreign company 
conducts work on preparing, concluding and implementing such business without the 
participation of such a domestic taxpayer (“qualified business”).63 However, it is 
                                            
60 Alternatively, a closely related party to such a domestic taxpayer. This is also true for the following references 
to the domestic taxpayer in the context of the German base company rules. 
61 The requirement of maintaining commercially equipped offices is fulfilled if the foreign company is from a 
practical and personnel point of view in a position to prepare, conclude and implement the respective supply of 
goods and services by itself and independent from the shareholder and related parties (paragraph 8.1.4.2.1. 
(trading) and paragraph 8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular).  
62 The participation in general commerce requires that the activity of the foreign company is not only limited to 
related parties but is instead - not only to a minor extent - directed towards an indefinite number of persons. An 
indirect participation in general commerce only through related parties is not sufficient. However, it is not 
harmful for the qualification if the number of customers is limited simply by the fact that the goods provided are, 
by nature, only limited to a small number of customers (see paragraph 8.1.4.2.3. (trading) and paragraph 
8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular; see also German Supreme Tax Court, dated August 29, 1984, 
I R 68/81, BStBl. 1985 II page 120 et seq.). Based on the administrative circular of the German Ministry of 
Finance, it should be sufficient only for the outward activities, e.g. the sales and services, to be directed towards 
an indefinite number of persons but for the respective inward activities, e.g. the purchase of goods, to be limited 
to only one related party. The same is true for the opposite situation, i.e. the providing of sales and services to 
only one related party but with the purchase of goods or the receipt of services from an indefinite number of 
third party suppliers (see paragraph 8.1.4.2.2. (trading) and 8.1.5.1.2. (services) of the administrative circular). 
However, it is quite unclear where the borderline has to be drawn. A foreign sales company which purchases all 
goods from the domestic parent company (production company) but supplies those goods to several customers in 
the local market will certainly participate in general commerce. But what about a foreign company which 
operates a call centre only for group companies? The foreign company will most certainly receive third party 
services - but only to a limited extent. In contrast to the administrative circular, the German Supreme Tax Court 
made it very clear - in a case dealing with inter-company services - that the requirement of participating in 
general commerce is not fulfilled if the services are only provided within a group of companies and the 
limitation is due to the respective intra-group structure. Since the criterion of a participation in general commerce 
is not only relevant with respect to the German Foreign Tax Act but also for income tax and trade income tax 
purposes, the Court referred to existing case law. Thereto, the criterion requires that the provision of services is 
not restricted to certain persons. Even though the business activities can be restricted to certain types of 
customers the activity as such must be open for changes in the person who receives the services. Any general 
limitation on certain customers does therefore not fulfil the requirement of a participation in general commerce 
(see in this respect German Supreme Tax Court, dated August 29, 1984, I R 68/81, BStBl. 1985 II page 120 et 
seq. and German Supreme Tax Court, dated May 12, 1960, IV 159/59 U.BFHE 71, 221, BStBl. 1960 III page 
331).  
63 In case of trading activities, the domestic shareholder (or a closely related party thereto) is involved in the 
performance of the activity of the foreign company if functions are exercised by the shareholder (or the related 
party) which are related to the preparation, conclusion and implementation of the businesses (see section 8 (1) 
no. 4 of the German Foreign Tax Act; 8.1.4.3.1. of the administrative circular). This is irrespective of the 
    
                                                                                         
 
the leasing and renting out of movable property,54 interest income,55 royalty income,56 
dividend income,57 and capital gains related thereto.58 However, this is not true with 
respect to rental income from immovable property and the respective capital gains 
taxation.59 In substance, there is a great flexibility with respect to the place of taxation 
of income related to capital investments in the situations outlined above (with the 
exception of income from immovable property).  
 
d.) Direct tax base erosion  
 
It is important to recognise that the relocation of the activities described above and 
the corresponding transfer of taxing rights to a low-tax country does not in all cases 
lead to the application of the respective CFC taxation. However, all transactional 
countries focus on situations where (i) activities are relocated to a foreign low-tax 
country and (ii) the activities are directed towards the domestic shareholder (parent 
company), i.e. the activities lead to deductible business expenses in the residence 
state of the shareholder and therefore to a direct reduction of the domestic tax base.  
 
e.) Indirect tax base erosion  
 
An indirect tax base erosion can exist in situations where activities are relocated to a 
foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country and the services provided by the foreign 
subsidiary are not directed towards the domestic shareholder but instead towards 
other group companies. In contrast to the direct tax base erosion, the services will not 
have an immediate impact on the domestic tax base in the form of deductible 
expenses, but lead to an erosion of the domestic tax base through the fact that the 
services in question are not provided from within the residence country but from 
within the foreign country, and therefore do not produce taxable income in the 
country of the shareholder. The CFC rules of the transactional countries Germany 
and Denmark both focus on the direct and indirect tax base erosion, i.e. income from 
the leasing and renting out of movable property, interest income, and royalty income 
is considered to be tainted income irrespective of the fact whether it is provided 
towards the domestic shareholder or any other non-resident related party. The 
Spanish rules are not comparably strict and do not encompass income derived by the 
CFC from services provided to non-resident recipients - under certain circumstances 
- which do not lead to deductible expenses in Spain.  
 
6.2.2. Base Company Income  
 
6.2.2.1. General Aspects  
 
Another form of tainted income - although different from the aforementioned types of 
passive income - is the so-called “base company income.” The base company 
income comprises the supply of services - and in some cases even the supply of 
goods - under certain circumstances, especially where the domestic shareholder or 
other group companies are somehow involved in the transactions. Theoretically, and 
                                            
54 Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. 
55 Article 11 of the OECD-MTC. 
56 Article 12 of the OECD-MTC. 
57 Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
58 Article 13 of the OECD-MTC. 
59 Article 6 (1) and Article 13 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
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- the foreign entity does not have a sufficient number of employees that is 
usually required to ensure the activities in the country where the CFC is 
incorporated or otherwise organised; or 
 
- more than 10 percent of income during a fiscal year is derived from sources 
outside the country of incorporation (or organisation) of the CFC; or 
 
- 50 percent (or more) of the income of the CFC during a fiscal year is derived 
from business transactions with related parties.69 
 
If one of the three conditions is fulfilled, the respective income will be subject to CFC 
taxation in the hands of the resident shareholder. The Lithuanian CFC regime also 
provides for an exception to the attribution of CFC income in those cases in which the 
(corresponding) expenses paid by the domestic taxpayer to the CFC are treated as 
non-deductible expenses. This rule was enacted to avoid a possible double taxation 
of income.70 
 
The Lithuanian concept shows again the typical features of base company rules: 
activities which are usually seen as “active” are subject to CFC taxation just because 
of the circumstances of the transactions. Here, it is either the “insufficient” number of 
personnel, the percentage of income derived outside the state of residence of the 
CFC, or the percentage of income derived from business transactions with related 
parties. With respect to the latter element, the Lithuanian and Spanish base company 
rules follow a very similar concept: both regimes require a substantial amount of third 
party transactions in order to be excluded from CFC taxation (more than 50 percent) 
or, the other way round, both regimes target income which is derived from activities 
with related parties if a certain threshold is exceeded. In contrast thereto, the German 
base company rules do not set a comparably strict threshold. Moreover, there is an 
additional similarity between the Lithuanian and Spanish base company rules: both 
regimes do not attribute the income elements which were treated as non-deductible 
expenses in Lithuania and Spain, respectively. On the other hand, the Lithuanian 
rules are very strict, in contrast to Spain and Germany, when it comes to the question 
of deriving income outside of the state of residence of the CFC. A general threshold 
of 10 percent for income from sources outside the CFC state seems to be rather low 
and apparently an unusual threshold. Clearly, all of the aforementioned states focus 
on transactions with residents of the state which applies the CFC rules (especially 
Spain with the direct link to the tax base of Spanish residents). However, there is no 
comparably strict approach in Spain and Germany when it comes to third countries.  
 
In Denmark, the focus is clearly on financial income. There are no provisions which 
trigger the application of the Danish CFC rules - just because of the circumstances of 
the transactions - if the income is not classified, at the same time, as financial 
income. In this respect, the Danish rules differ from the rules applied in the other 
transactional countries outlined above. Nevertheless, in order to have a complete 
picture of the transactional approach countries and to identify the differences in the 
CFC concepts it is helpful, in my opinion, to include the Danish legislation in this part 
                                            
69 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 398, 399.  
70 Article 31 of the Lithuanian Law on Profit Tax; Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
    
                                                                                         
 
important to note that the provision of services by the CFC will always lead to tainted 
income if the CFC makes use of the domestic taxpayer for the services. In this case, 
the question of a “qualified business” does not matter, i.e. if the domestic taxpayer is 
involved in the supply of services, it will be tainted income - without exception.64 
Overall, the German rules strictly focus on the circumstances of the supply of goods / 
services and not on the type of income. In other words, the relationship - and the 
interrelation - between the supplier of goods / services and the recipient is the 
decisive element for the qualification of tainted income under the base company rules 
and the question whether the income is subject to current taxation or not. 
 
The Spanish base company rules follow a different pattern. Spanish tax law states 
that credit, financial, insurance and service provision activities, except for those 
directly related to export activities, which are performed directly or indirectly with 
related persons or entities65 resident in Spanish territory lead to tainted income 
inasmuch as the activities determine tax deductible expenses for the persons or 
entities resident in Spain.66 The income will not be included in the Spanish tax base if 
it corresponds to expenses which are not tax deductible for Spanish resident 
entities.67 Moreover, the income will not be included in the Spanish tax base in case 
more than 50 percent of the income derived from credit, financial, insurance or 
service provision activities, except for those directly related to export activities, 
carried on by the foreign company arises from operations performed with unrelated 
parties.68 The Spanish base company rules are therefore strongly related to the 
question whether the income of the foreign company leads at the same time to 
deductible expenses in Spain, i.e. whether the domestic tax base is directly reduced. 
An indirect reduction of the domestic tax base caused by the provision of certain 
services (which are not separately qualified as passive income, e.g. interest income, 
rental income) between a non-resident group service company and another non-
resident group companies is not covered by the base company rules. This is an 
obvious difference to the German concept: under the German base company rules 
there is no requirement of a (direct) reduction of the tax base caused by the supply of 
goods / services. Instead, the involvement of the German shareholder in services 
provided by the CFC to another party may trigger the application of the CFC rules 
even without any direct impact on the domestic tax base. In addition, the German 
rules do not - in contrast to the Spanish rules - provide for a link to the tax 
deductibility of the payments for the services, either.  
 
Pursuant to the Lithuanian CFC rules, income of a CFC which is not explicitly marked 
as passive income (e.g. interest income, leasing income) is subject to CFC taxation 
under the following circumstances: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
question whether the function is exercised free of charge or against an arm’s length consideration. A minor 
involvement does not lead to passive income if the activity as such is an active business. The wording with 
respect to services is slightly different since it only states that the services have to be performed without the 
participation of the domestic shareholder (or a closely related party thereto). However, it must be concluded for 
trading and service activities that the involvement of the domestic shareholder leads to tainted income (if it is not 
only a minor involvement). 
64 Section 8 (1) no. 5 letter a of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
65 In accordance with the definition of section 16 of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
66 Section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
67 Section 121 (4) of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
68 Section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
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- the foreign entity does not have a sufficient number of employees that is 
usually required to ensure the activities in the country where the CFC is 
incorporated or otherwise organised; or 
 
- more than 10 percent of income during a fiscal year is derived from sources 
outside the country of incorporation (or organisation) of the CFC; or 
 
- 50 percent (or more) of the income of the CFC during a fiscal year is derived 
from business transactions with related parties.69 
 
If one of the three conditions is fulfilled, the respective income will be subject to CFC 
taxation in the hands of the resident shareholder. The Lithuanian CFC regime also 
provides for an exception to the attribution of CFC income in those cases in which the 
(corresponding) expenses paid by the domestic taxpayer to the CFC are treated as 
non-deductible expenses. This rule was enacted to avoid a possible double taxation 
of income.70 
 
The Lithuanian concept shows again the typical features of base company rules: 
activities which are usually seen as “active” are subject to CFC taxation just because 
of the circumstances of the transactions. Here, it is either the “insufficient” number of 
personnel, the percentage of income derived outside the state of residence of the 
CFC, or the percentage of income derived from business transactions with related 
parties. With respect to the latter element, the Lithuanian and Spanish base company 
rules follow a very similar concept: both regimes require a substantial amount of third 
party transactions in order to be excluded from CFC taxation (more than 50 percent) 
or, the other way round, both regimes target income which is derived from activities 
with related parties if a certain threshold is exceeded. In contrast thereto, the German 
base company rules do not set a comparably strict threshold. Moreover, there is an 
additional similarity between the Lithuanian and Spanish base company rules: both 
regimes do not attribute the income elements which were treated as non-deductible 
expenses in Lithuania and Spain, respectively. On the other hand, the Lithuanian 
rules are very strict, in contrast to Spain and Germany, when it comes to the question 
of deriving income outside of the state of residence of the CFC. A general threshold 
of 10 percent for income from sources outside the CFC state seems to be rather low 
and apparently an unusual threshold. Clearly, all of the aforementioned states focus 
on transactions with residents of the state which applies the CFC rules (especially 
Spain with the direct link to the tax base of Spanish residents). However, there is no 
comparably strict approach in Spain and Germany when it comes to third countries.  
 
In Denmark, the focus is clearly on financial income. There are no provisions which 
trigger the application of the Danish CFC rules - just because of the circumstances of 
the transactions - if the income is not classified, at the same time, as financial 
income. In this respect, the Danish rules differ from the rules applied in the other 
transactional countries outlined above. Nevertheless, in order to have a complete 
picture of the transactional approach countries and to identify the differences in the 
CFC concepts it is helpful, in my opinion, to include the Danish legislation in this part 
                                            
69 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 398, 399.  
70 Article 31 of the Lithuanian Law on Profit Tax; Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 398. 
    
                                                                                         
 
important to note that the provision of services by the CFC will always lead to tainted 
income if the CFC makes use of the domestic taxpayer for the services. In this case, 
the question of a “qualified business” does not matter, i.e. if the domestic taxpayer is 
involved in the supply of services, it will be tainted income - without exception.64 
Overall, the German rules strictly focus on the circumstances of the supply of goods / 
services and not on the type of income. In other words, the relationship - and the 
interrelation - between the supplier of goods / services and the recipient is the 
decisive element for the qualification of tainted income under the base company rules 
and the question whether the income is subject to current taxation or not. 
 
The Spanish base company rules follow a different pattern. Spanish tax law states 
that credit, financial, insurance and service provision activities, except for those 
directly related to export activities, which are performed directly or indirectly with 
related persons or entities65 resident in Spanish territory lead to tainted income 
inasmuch as the activities determine tax deductible expenses for the persons or 
entities resident in Spain.66 The income will not be included in the Spanish tax base if 
it corresponds to expenses which are not tax deductible for Spanish resident 
entities.67 Moreover, the income will not be included in the Spanish tax base in case 
more than 50 percent of the income derived from credit, financial, insurance or 
service provision activities, except for those directly related to export activities, 
carried on by the foreign company arises from operations performed with unrelated 
parties.68 The Spanish base company rules are therefore strongly related to the 
question whether the income of the foreign company leads at the same time to 
deductible expenses in Spain, i.e. whether the domestic tax base is directly reduced. 
An indirect reduction of the domestic tax base caused by the provision of certain 
services (which are not separately qualified as passive income, e.g. interest income, 
rental income) between a non-resident group service company and another non-
resident group companies is not covered by the base company rules. This is an 
obvious difference to the German concept: under the German base company rules 
there is no requirement of a (direct) reduction of the tax base caused by the supply of 
goods / services. Instead, the involvement of the German shareholder in services 
provided by the CFC to another party may trigger the application of the CFC rules 
even without any direct impact on the domestic tax base. In addition, the German 
rules do not - in contrast to the Spanish rules - provide for a link to the tax 
deductibility of the payments for the services, either.  
 
Pursuant to the Lithuanian CFC rules, income of a CFC which is not explicitly marked 
as passive income (e.g. interest income, leasing income) is subject to CFC taxation 
under the following circumstances: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
question whether the function is exercised free of charge or against an arm’s length consideration. A minor 
involvement does not lead to passive income if the activity as such is an active business. The wording with 
respect to services is slightly different since it only states that the services have to be performed without the 
participation of the domestic shareholder (or a closely related party thereto). However, it must be concluded for 
trading and service activities that the involvement of the domestic shareholder leads to tainted income (if it is not 
only a minor involvement). 
64 Section 8 (1) no. 5 letter a of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
65 In accordance with the definition of section 16 of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
66 Section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
67 Section 121 (4) of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
68 Section 121 (2) letter d of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law.  
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Denmark, where only pre-defined financial income is subject to CFC taxation 
and a re-qualification of “active” income - just because of the circumstances of 
the transactions - does not take place. 
 
- The German and Lithuanian base company rules provide requirements with 
respect to the organisation of the CFC. In Germany, it is the requirement of a 
“qualified business” and in Lithuania it is (only) the requirement of a sufficient 
number of personnel to carry out the activities of the CFC. Thus, in both cases 
the activities must be sufficiently organised in order to be outside of the current 
taxation of income. Spain and Denmark do not have similar requirements.   
 
- The transactions with related parties are one of the core elements in all of the 
countries which apply base company rules. In Spain and Lithuania there is an 
explicit threshold for related party transactions: if more than 50 percent of the 
income of the CFC is derived from transactions with non-related parties, the 
base company income will not be subject to CFC taxation.73 In Germany, there 
is no such explicit threshold, but the requirement of a “qualified business” 
makes it necessary to carry out transactions with non-related parties. 
However, there is clearly no strict and explicit requirement in Germany to 
derive income from non-related party transactions. In Denmark, an exemption 
is granted for income from certain financial activities, provided that the CFC 
conducts business mainly with customers in its own country of residence and 
mainly with third parties.   
 
- The Spanish base company rules provide for an explicit requirement that the 
services are tax deductible for Spanish residents. In other words, only if the 
services provided by the CFC result in a tax deduction in Spain, the income 
will be subject to CFC taxation. This, of course, provides for (i) a clear concept 
which (ii) focuses on direct tax base reductions. Neither Germany nor 
Lithuania and Denmark have a comparably clear regime. Of course, the latter 
regimes equally focus on transactions towards resident taxpayers, but did not 
establish a comparable limitation. In essence, this results in a broader concept 
in Germany, Lithuania and Denmark which encompasses also indirect tax 
base reductions (or erosions), e.g. if the CFC provides services to recipients 
outside of the state which applies the CFC legislation. However, in case of 
Denmark the concept is limited to financial services (and financial income).   
 
- Spain and Lithuania both provide for a direct dependence between non-tax 
deductible expenses under the domestic legislation and (corresponding) CFC 
income. That means if the expenses are not tax deductible, the corresponding 
CFC income will not be attributed to the domestic shareholder. Such a direct 
link does not exist under the German and Danish rules.  
 
- Lithuania establishes a concrete maximum percentage of 10 percent for 
income derived by the CFC from sources outside of the state of residence of 
the CFC. Thus, the income will be subject to CFC taxation if the 10 percent 
threshold is exceeded. A comparable strict approach neither exists in 
Germany nor in Denmark and Spain.  
                                            
73 But only if all other existing requirements are fulfilled as well (see above for further details). Of course, the 
explicitly marked passive income will still be subject to current taxation under the transactional approach CFC 
regimes.  
    
                                                                                         
 
of the chapter as well. According to the Danish CFC legislation the income of the 
foreign company is considered to be tainted income if it is of a financial nature and if 
a certain threshold is exceeded - which is one-third of the total net income of the CFC 
calculated under Danish rules. The following types of income are considered to be 
tainted income:71 
 
- interest income; 
- taxable gains on claims, debts, and financial contracts; 
- commissions; 
- taxable dividends and gains on the sale of shares; 
- royalties and gains on the sale of intangible assets, provided that the 
subsidiary did not develop the intangible assets; 
- deductions in connection with the aforementioned items; 
- taxable leasing income in connection with cross-border leasing activities;  
- income in connection with insurance, bank, or mortgage activities. 
 
However, an exemption exists for foreign companies which conduct license, 
insurance or banking businesses that are subject to public supervision, provided that 
the foreign companies conduct business mainly with customers in their own countries 
of residence, and mainly with third parties.72 In my opinion, the Danish rules cannot 
be seen, in a stricter sense, as base company rules. The reason is that the Danish 
CFC regime focuses on pre-defined financial income and does not include a 
provision which re-qualifies non-tainted income as tainted income just because of the 
circumstances of the transactions, e.g. if the CFC provides non-financial services 
solely towards related parties outside of the CFC state. In other words, it is, in 
principle, clear in Denmark which types of income are in the focus of the CFC regime 
and which are outside of the latter regime. However, such a pre-determination of 
income has the consequence that the regime is, at least to a large extent, focused on 
capital intensive activities. This, of course, comes closer to a concept which is 
concentrated on the current taxation of the basic interest component (although a 
vertical separation of income is not provided under the Danish CFC regime, either) 
than a regime - like in Germany, Spain and Lithuania - which may result in the CFC 
taxation of income which is solely qualified as tainted income because of the 
circumstances of the transactions, and which may therefore very well include income 
from non-capital intensive activities. 
 
In comparison, the following important differences and common elements can be 
identified: 
 
- The transactional countries Germany, Spain and Lithuania apply base 
company rules which do not focus on specific types of income but which are 
linked to the circumstances of the transactions. Such an approach opens the 
possibility of extending the CFC taxation to income which is usually 
considered “active” income (or non-passive income), i.e. all types of services 
(Germany, Spain and Lithuania) and even trading activities (Germany, 
Lithuania). This is an important difference to the transactional country 
                                            
71 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
72 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Danish Parliament Approves Corporate Tax Incentives, Tax Analysts Tax 
Document Service 2002, Doc. 2002-12665.  
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Denmark, where only pre-defined financial income is subject to CFC taxation 
and a re-qualification of “active” income - just because of the circumstances of 
the transactions - does not take place. 
 
- The German and Lithuanian base company rules provide requirements with 
respect to the organisation of the CFC. In Germany, it is the requirement of a 
“qualified business” and in Lithuania it is (only) the requirement of a sufficient 
number of personnel to carry out the activities of the CFC. Thus, in both cases 
the activities must be sufficiently organised in order to be outside of the current 
taxation of income. Spain and Denmark do not have similar requirements.   
 
- The transactions with related parties are one of the core elements in all of the 
countries which apply base company rules. In Spain and Lithuania there is an 
explicit threshold for related party transactions: if more than 50 percent of the 
income of the CFC is derived from transactions with non-related parties, the 
base company income will not be subject to CFC taxation.73 In Germany, there 
is no such explicit threshold, but the requirement of a “qualified business” 
makes it necessary to carry out transactions with non-related parties. 
However, there is clearly no strict and explicit requirement in Germany to 
derive income from non-related party transactions. In Denmark, an exemption 
is granted for income from certain financial activities, provided that the CFC 
conducts business mainly with customers in its own country of residence and 
mainly with third parties.   
 
- The Spanish base company rules provide for an explicit requirement that the 
services are tax deductible for Spanish residents. In other words, only if the 
services provided by the CFC result in a tax deduction in Spain, the income 
will be subject to CFC taxation. This, of course, provides for (i) a clear concept 
which (ii) focuses on direct tax base reductions. Neither Germany nor 
Lithuania and Denmark have a comparably clear regime. Of course, the latter 
regimes equally focus on transactions towards resident taxpayers, but did not 
establish a comparable limitation. In essence, this results in a broader concept 
in Germany, Lithuania and Denmark which encompasses also indirect tax 
base reductions (or erosions), e.g. if the CFC provides services to recipients 
outside of the state which applies the CFC legislation. However, in case of 
Denmark the concept is limited to financial services (and financial income).   
 
- Spain and Lithuania both provide for a direct dependence between non-tax 
deductible expenses under the domestic legislation and (corresponding) CFC 
income. That means if the expenses are not tax deductible, the corresponding 
CFC income will not be attributed to the domestic shareholder. Such a direct 
link does not exist under the German and Danish rules.  
 
- Lithuania establishes a concrete maximum percentage of 10 percent for 
income derived by the CFC from sources outside of the state of residence of 
the CFC. Thus, the income will be subject to CFC taxation if the 10 percent 
threshold is exceeded. A comparable strict approach neither exists in 
Germany nor in Denmark and Spain.  
                                            
73 But only if all other existing requirements are fulfilled as well (see above for further details). Of course, the 
explicitly marked passive income will still be subject to current taxation under the transactional approach CFC 
regimes.  
    
                                                                                         
 
of the chapter as well. According to the Danish CFC legislation the income of the 
foreign company is considered to be tainted income if it is of a financial nature and if 
a certain threshold is exceeded - which is one-third of the total net income of the CFC 
calculated under Danish rules. The following types of income are considered to be 
tainted income:71 
 
- interest income; 
- taxable gains on claims, debts, and financial contracts; 
- commissions; 
- taxable dividends and gains on the sale of shares; 
- royalties and gains on the sale of intangible assets, provided that the 
subsidiary did not develop the intangible assets; 
- deductions in connection with the aforementioned items; 
- taxable leasing income in connection with cross-border leasing activities;  
- income in connection with insurance, bank, or mortgage activities. 
 
However, an exemption exists for foreign companies which conduct license, 
insurance or banking businesses that are subject to public supervision, provided that 
the foreign companies conduct business mainly with customers in their own countries 
of residence, and mainly with third parties.72 In my opinion, the Danish rules cannot 
be seen, in a stricter sense, as base company rules. The reason is that the Danish 
CFC regime focuses on pre-defined financial income and does not include a 
provision which re-qualifies non-tainted income as tainted income just because of the 
circumstances of the transactions, e.g. if the CFC provides non-financial services 
solely towards related parties outside of the CFC state. In other words, it is, in 
principle, clear in Denmark which types of income are in the focus of the CFC regime 
and which are outside of the latter regime. However, such a pre-determination of 
income has the consequence that the regime is, at least to a large extent, focused on 
capital intensive activities. This, of course, comes closer to a concept which is 
concentrated on the current taxation of the basic interest component (although a 
vertical separation of income is not provided under the Danish CFC regime, either) 
than a regime - like in Germany, Spain and Lithuania - which may result in the CFC 
taxation of income which is solely qualified as tainted income because of the 
circumstances of the transactions, and which may therefore very well include income 
from non-capital intensive activities. 
 
In comparison, the following important differences and common elements can be 
identified: 
 
- The transactional countries Germany, Spain and Lithuania apply base 
company rules which do not focus on specific types of income but which are 
linked to the circumstances of the transactions. Such an approach opens the 
possibility of extending the CFC taxation to income which is usually 
considered “active” income (or non-passive income), i.e. all types of services 
(Germany, Spain and Lithuania) and even trading activities (Germany, 
Lithuania). This is an important difference to the transactional country 
                                            
71 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
72 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Danish Parliament Approves Corporate Tax Incentives, Tax Analysts Tax 
Document Service 2002, Doc. 2002-12665.  
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because no element is included which should be subject to the current taxation of income in the state 
of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive income = tainted income under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation (including 
taxation under the base company rules). 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the horizontal and vertical “blocks” is just an assumption.  
 
In my opinion, the base company rules clearly show that the CFC regimes are anti-
avoidance regimes which do not follow - at least not foremost - economic and equity 
principles. In fact, it can even be argued that the base company rules of Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania bring the latter countries even further away from an acceptable 
approach - because the base company rules result in the attribution of income to the 
shareholder which should never be subject to a current taxation. In the figure shown 
above, it is not only the activity component and the risk component included in the 
passive income, but also the complete amount of base company income (unrelated 
to capital intensive services) which should not be attributed on a current basis to the 
shareholder.  
 
In contrast thereto, Denmark does not apply base company rules like Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania, but strictly focuses on pre-determined financial income (passive 
income). In this respect, the Danish approach comes closer to the requirement of 
focusing on capital intensive activities if a separable financing element is included. 
However, even though the Danish approach goes in the right direction, the regime 
(still) merely provides for a horizontal separation of income but not for a vertical 
separation of income. For this reason, one must finally come to the conclusion that 
none of the transactional regimes fulfil the basic requirement of a strict horizontal and 
vertical separation of income. 
 
6.2.2.4. Preliminary Conclusions  
 
The base company rules are different from the explicitly marked income outlined 
earlier which is based on capital intensive activities. The base company rules are 
directed towards any other kind of services - and in case of Germany and Lithuania 
even trading activities - which are mainly carried on between related companies or 
where the domestic shareholder is somehow involved in the activities. That means 
even activities which normally do not lead to passive income by themselves are 
treated as tainted income under the base company rules if certain requirements are 
fulfilled. Thus, what is important here are the circumstances for the provision of 
services and not the type of services. This is very interesting, since it basically also 
targets the relocation and the concentration of business functions which do not 
require any substantial amount of capital investment. One should be aware that this 
is an important difference. As already outlined above, the involvement of large 
amounts of capital as such can lead to substantial profit allocations towards the low-
tax jurisdiction, e.g. in case of finance activities, and the accompanying functions are 
often quite insignificant. This is totally different in situations where the capital 
investment does not play a comparably important role. In those cases, the functions 
exercised by personnel prevail. This does not mean that the activities have to be of 
great importance within the group or require highly skilled personnel, but it is clear 
that the functions are exercised from within the low-tax country and there is no 
obvious reason why the profit related to those functions (and risks) has to be 
    
                                                                                         
 
 
- Overall, it seems that the transactional approach CFC countries Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania see the necessity to somehow “build a bridge” - with their 
base company rules - to the concept which is underlying an entity approach 
CFC legislation. In other words, it seems that it is not sufficient for Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania to provide for a mere categorisation according to the type 
of income, i.e. a strict separation according to pre-defined active and passive 
income. The latter is only the case in Denmark. Hence, one can certainly 
conclude that the base company rules come very close to the entity approach 
CFC rules. However, this will become more obvious below when the entity 
approach CFC rules will be examined.  
 
6.2.2.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The base company rules, as a part of the transactional approach CFC legislation, are 
a clear deviation from the concept of a strict concentration on specific types of 
income (passive income). These rules determine the circumstances for the provision 
of services instead of the types of income as the connecting point for the application 
of the CFC regimes. This is true for the transactional countries Germany, Spain and 
Lithuania. It is obvious that such an approach extends the application of CFC 
regimes far beyond the capital intensive services which were described in this 
chapter and in previous chapters and which are usually qualified as passive activities 
(and income). However, the conclusion drawn from previous chapters is that the 
current taxation of income should be strictly limited to the basic interest component 
included in the separable financing element, i.e. after a horizontal and a vertical 
separation of income. If the services provided by the CFC do not include such a 
separable financing element, there is no reason and no basis for the current taxation 
of income. For this reason, the base company rules lead to a broadening of the 
transactional approach CFC regimes and to an application to income which should 
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(1) “Income block” divided into active income, base company income and passive income (horizontal) 
and into the three different income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities 
(vertical). The vertical separation of the active income / base company income is not required, 
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because no element is included which should be subject to the current taxation of income in the state 
of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive income = tainted income under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation (including 
taxation under the base company rules). 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the horizontal and vertical “blocks” is just an assumption.  
 
In my opinion, the base company rules clearly show that the CFC regimes are anti-
avoidance regimes which do not follow - at least not foremost - economic and equity 
principles. In fact, it can even be argued that the base company rules of Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania bring the latter countries even further away from an acceptable 
approach - because the base company rules result in the attribution of income to the 
shareholder which should never be subject to a current taxation. In the figure shown 
above, it is not only the activity component and the risk component included in the 
passive income, but also the complete amount of base company income (unrelated 
to capital intensive services) which should not be attributed on a current basis to the 
shareholder.  
 
In contrast thereto, Denmark does not apply base company rules like Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania, but strictly focuses on pre-determined financial income (passive 
income). In this respect, the Danish approach comes closer to the requirement of 
focusing on capital intensive activities if a separable financing element is included. 
However, even though the Danish approach goes in the right direction, the regime 
(still) merely provides for a horizontal separation of income but not for a vertical 
separation of income. For this reason, one must finally come to the conclusion that 
none of the transactional regimes fulfil the basic requirement of a strict horizontal and 
vertical separation of income. 
 
6.2.2.4. Preliminary Conclusions  
 
The base company rules are different from the explicitly marked income outlined 
earlier which is based on capital intensive activities. The base company rules are 
directed towards any other kind of services - and in case of Germany and Lithuania 
even trading activities - which are mainly carried on between related companies or 
where the domestic shareholder is somehow involved in the activities. That means 
even activities which normally do not lead to passive income by themselves are 
treated as tainted income under the base company rules if certain requirements are 
fulfilled. Thus, what is important here are the circumstances for the provision of 
services and not the type of services. This is very interesting, since it basically also 
targets the relocation and the concentration of business functions which do not 
require any substantial amount of capital investment. One should be aware that this 
is an important difference. As already outlined above, the involvement of large 
amounts of capital as such can lead to substantial profit allocations towards the low-
tax jurisdiction, e.g. in case of finance activities, and the accompanying functions are 
often quite insignificant. This is totally different in situations where the capital 
investment does not play a comparably important role. In those cases, the functions 
exercised by personnel prevail. This does not mean that the activities have to be of 
great importance within the group or require highly skilled personnel, but it is clear 
that the functions are exercised from within the low-tax country and there is no 
obvious reason why the profit related to those functions (and risks) has to be 
    
                                                                                         
 
 
- Overall, it seems that the transactional approach CFC countries Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania see the necessity to somehow “build a bridge” - with their 
base company rules - to the concept which is underlying an entity approach 
CFC legislation. In other words, it seems that it is not sufficient for Germany, 
Spain and Lithuania to provide for a mere categorisation according to the type 
of income, i.e. a strict separation according to pre-defined active and passive 
income. The latter is only the case in Denmark. Hence, one can certainly 
conclude that the base company rules come very close to the entity approach 
CFC rules. However, this will become more obvious below when the entity 
approach CFC rules will be examined.  
 
6.2.2.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The base company rules, as a part of the transactional approach CFC legislation, are 
a clear deviation from the concept of a strict concentration on specific types of 
income (passive income). These rules determine the circumstances for the provision 
of services instead of the types of income as the connecting point for the application 
of the CFC regimes. This is true for the transactional countries Germany, Spain and 
Lithuania. It is obvious that such an approach extends the application of CFC 
regimes far beyond the capital intensive services which were described in this 
chapter and in previous chapters and which are usually qualified as passive activities 
(and income). However, the conclusion drawn from previous chapters is that the 
current taxation of income should be strictly limited to the basic interest component 
included in the separable financing element, i.e. after a horizontal and a vertical 
separation of income. If the services provided by the CFC do not include such a 
separable financing element, there is no reason and no basis for the current taxation 
of income. For this reason, the base company rules lead to a broadening of the 
transactional approach CFC regimes and to an application to income which should 
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carried on in the foreign country. In other words, the complete income is the result of 
an economic output created in the foreign country by the employment of personnel. 
Of course, this is different with respect to the employment of capital. A massive 
investment in a foreign country which allows the foreign subsidiary to give an inter-
company loan to the parent company enables the foreign subsidiary to derive a 
substantial amount of income with a small number of employees and with a rather 
insignificant economic connection to the foreign country. The differentiation between 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive services seems to be important and 
necessary. The mere fact that services are provided towards a related party or the 
fact that a related party is somehow involved in the rendering of services should not 
be the decisive criterion.  
 
If we look at the principles derived from chapters 2 and 3, it seems that the 
transactional approach - which focuses on the amount of passive income and base 
company income derived through the foreign company - is not in line with these 
principles. Even though the transactional approach separates income and does not 
take into account certain income from active businesses, it remains a merely 
horizontal separation of income, i.e. according to the type of income. In other words, 
the separation will still lead to an income allocation - and therefore to an income 
taxation according to the principle of capital export neutrality - of components which 
are produced in the CFC country. In general, this is true for passive income (such as 
for financing, licensing, leasing and renting income) and base company income. The 
transactional approach cannot provide for a vertical separation of income, i.e. a 
separation of income into risk components and the basic interest component, as it is 
required according to the principles derived from chapters 2 and 3.  
 
6.3. The Entity Approach  
 
In contrast to the transactional approach, the entity approach takes into account the 
overall activity of the CFC and certain other elements in order to decide whether the 
CFC is exempt from current taxation or not. It can therefore be seen as an “all-or-
nothing” approach.74 The Member States which follow such an entity approach CFC 
legislation are Estonia,75 Finland,76 France,77 Hungary,78 Italy,79 Portugal,80 Sweden81 
                                            
74 OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1996, page 
48.  
75 See with respect to the Estonian CFC legislation Uustalu, Estonia: Estonia Introduces CFC Rules, Tax Notes 
International 2000, page 727 et seq.; Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, 
CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 
173 et seq.  
76 See with respect to the Finnish CFC legislation Juusela, Finland: An Amendment to the CFC Legislation, EC 
Tax Review 1999, page 88; Helminen, Finnish Tax Board Releases CFC Blacklist, Tax Notes International 
1999, page 2317; Juusela, National Report Finland, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 479 et seq.; Pahapill, Estonia: Finnish CFC 
Regime Not a Threat, Officials Say, Tax Notes International 2003, page 1015 et seq.; Helminen, National Report 
Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series 
on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 191et seq.; Schönfeld, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und 
Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2005, page 561 et seq.; Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, 
pages 271, 272. See chapter 7 with respect to the A Oyj Abp Case and the references to the respective tax 
literature. Further references related to the Finnish CFC rules are included in the bibliography.      
77 See with respect to the French CFC legislation Douvier, National Report France, in Limits on the Use of Low-
Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 495 et seq.; 
Kabbaj / de la Bletière, National Report France, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 221et seq.; D’Hont, 
France: Sweeping Tax Changes Affecting In/Outbound Investments, Tax Planning International Review 2004; 
    
                                                                                         
 
allocated to the domestic shareholder. From a transfer pricing perspective, the profit 
related to the respective functions exercised (and risks taken) has to fulfil the arm’s 
length requirements. Due to the absence of relevant capital investments, this is 
mainly related to the services provided by the personnel and it is - in my opinion - 
irrelevant whether the services are provided towards third parties or not and whether 
the domestic shareholder takes part in the providing of the services. The latter has, of 
course, to be taken into account by the determination of the arm’s length 
consideration for the services.  
 
Supposing a domestic parent company relocates certain administrative activities to a 
foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country. The personnel of the foreign company 
provides the services towards the parent company. The latter is therefore able to 
reduce its own personnel costs considerably since the domestic labour costs are 
higher than those in the foreign country. On the other hand, the outsourcing creates a 
different type of expenses due to the services provided by the subsidiary company. 
Since the services have to be provided on an arm’s length basis, the service fees 
have to include a certain profit which reflects the functions exercised by the service 
provider and the risks taken. In the example, the profit would be relatively small since 
the function exercised is not very complex and the risks are comparably low. It could 
be the case that the overall expenses related to the services are lower than the 
saving of domestic labour costs. It is difficult to see a tax base erosion in such an 
example. Why should the profit of the service provider be allocated to the domestic 
parent company? The profit (and risk) element related to the administrative services 
is shifted from the parent company to the subsidiary company. There is no additional 
capital investment made or any other (intangible) value transferred. A profit allocation 
to the domestic shareholder has the effect that the income connection to the foreign 
activity is completely ignored - as if the functions were still exercised by the parent 
company. Clearly, the subsequent allocation of income according to the CFC rules is 
different from the allocation of income based on transfer pricing aspects. Logically, 
the transfer pricing aspects have to be verified first, and the CFC rules are applied on 
a totally different level, namely the level of the shareholder. However, the economic 
effect is the same: the income is taxed according to the rules and the tax rate of the 
residence country of the shareholder.  
 
6.2.3. Conclusions Regarding the Transactional Approach  
 
It is very clear that there is a substantial difference between the specifically outlined 
tainted (or passive) income which is related to capital intensive investments and the 
so-called base company income which covers any other kinds of activities and which 
are mainly carried on between related parties or where the domestic shareholder is 
somehow involved in the activities. The explicitly marked income, such as income 
from financing activities, portfolio activities, licensing activities and leasing activities, 
enables the parent company to invest a substantial amount of capital in the foreign 
country and to shift income related to the investment of capital from one country to 
another. This is not necessarily true for base company income. Here, even non-
capital intensive investments are covered by the respective CFC rules with the effect 
that the profit related to personnel intensive functions and risks is attributed to the 
domestic shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore important to separate the income 
elements included in the CFC income. Any income related to service activities 
exercised by personnel - irrespective whether it is an accompanying element of a 
capital intensive activity or the main (base company) activity - is related to functions 
The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF Legislation
237
    
                                                                                         
 
carried on in the foreign country. In other words, the complete income is the result of 
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insignificant economic connection to the foreign country. The differentiation between 
capital intensive and non-capital intensive services seems to be important and 
necessary. The mere fact that services are provided towards a related party or the 
fact that a related party is somehow involved in the rendering of services should not 
be the decisive criterion.  
 
If we look at the principles derived from chapters 2 and 3, it seems that the 
transactional approach - which focuses on the amount of passive income and base 
company income derived through the foreign company - is not in line with these 
principles. Even though the transactional approach separates income and does not 
take into account certain income from active businesses, it remains a merely 
horizontal separation of income, i.e. according to the type of income. In other words, 
the separation will still lead to an income allocation - and therefore to an income 
taxation according to the principle of capital export neutrality - of components which 
are produced in the CFC country. In general, this is true for passive income (such as 
for financing, licensing, leasing and renting income) and base company income. The 
transactional approach cannot provide for a vertical separation of income, i.e. a 
separation of income into risk components and the basic interest component, as it is 
required according to the principles derived from chapters 2 and 3.  
 
6.3. The Entity Approach  
 
In contrast to the transactional approach, the entity approach takes into account the 
overall activity of the CFC and certain other elements in order to decide whether the 
CFC is exempt from current taxation or not. It can therefore be seen as an “all-or-
nothing” approach.74 The Member States which follow such an entity approach CFC 
legislation are Estonia,75 Finland,76 France,77 Hungary,78 Italy,79 Portugal,80 Sweden81 
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allocated to the domestic shareholder. From a transfer pricing perspective, the profit 
related to the respective functions exercised (and risks taken) has to fulfil the arm’s 
length requirements. Due to the absence of relevant capital investments, this is 
mainly related to the services provided by the personnel and it is - in my opinion - 
irrelevant whether the services are provided towards third parties or not and whether 
the domestic shareholder takes part in the providing of the services. The latter has, of 
course, to be taken into account by the determination of the arm’s length 
consideration for the services.  
 
Supposing a domestic parent company relocates certain administrative activities to a 
foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country. The personnel of the foreign company 
provides the services towards the parent company. The latter is therefore able to 
reduce its own personnel costs considerably since the domestic labour costs are 
higher than those in the foreign country. On the other hand, the outsourcing creates a 
different type of expenses due to the services provided by the subsidiary company. 
Since the services have to be provided on an arm’s length basis, the service fees 
have to include a certain profit which reflects the functions exercised by the service 
provider and the risks taken. In the example, the profit would be relatively small since 
the function exercised is not very complex and the risks are comparably low. It could 
be the case that the overall expenses related to the services are lower than the 
saving of domestic labour costs. It is difficult to see a tax base erosion in such an 
example. Why should the profit of the service provider be allocated to the domestic 
parent company? The profit (and risk) element related to the administrative services 
is shifted from the parent company to the subsidiary company. There is no additional 
capital investment made or any other (intangible) value transferred. A profit allocation 
to the domestic shareholder has the effect that the income connection to the foreign 
activity is completely ignored - as if the functions were still exercised by the parent 
company. Clearly, the subsequent allocation of income according to the CFC rules is 
different from the allocation of income based on transfer pricing aspects. Logically, 
the transfer pricing aspects have to be verified first, and the CFC rules are applied on 
a totally different level, namely the level of the shareholder. However, the economic 
effect is the same: the income is taxed according to the rules and the tax rate of the 
residence country of the shareholder.  
 
6.2.3. Conclusions Regarding the Transactional Approach  
 
It is very clear that there is a substantial difference between the specifically outlined 
tainted (or passive) income which is related to capital intensive investments and the 
so-called base company income which covers any other kinds of activities and which 
are mainly carried on between related parties or where the domestic shareholder is 
somehow involved in the activities. The explicitly marked income, such as income 
from financing activities, portfolio activities, licensing activities and leasing activities, 
enables the parent company to invest a substantial amount of capital in the foreign 
country and to shift income related to the investment of capital from one country to 
another. This is not necessarily true for base company income. Here, even non-
capital intensive investments are covered by the respective CFC rules with the effect 
that the profit related to personnel intensive functions and risks is attributed to the 
domestic shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore important to separate the income 
elements included in the CFC income. Any income related to service activities 
exercised by personnel - irrespective whether it is an accompanying element of a 
capital intensive activity or the main (base company) activity - is related to functions 
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classification of the foreign company. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
exemptions from current taxation to understand the main aspects of the entity 
approach.   
 
6.3.1. The Various Exemptions under the Entity Approach  
 
6.3.1.1. Exemption Based on the Activity of the CFC    
 
The activity of the CFC is one of the decisive criteria for the question whether the 
foreign entity should be subject to CFC taxation or not. Even though there is no direct 
active-passive separation of income under this approach, it can be seen as an overall 
assessment of the foreign company’s activities. In order to qualify for an exemption 
from current taxation, there are - in my opinion - three elements which are of 
particular importance: 
 
- the type of business activity 
 
- the source of CFC income  
 
- the extent of business activity 
 
a.) The type of business activity  
 
In general, the carrying on of mainly active business is an important criterion for most 
of the Member States which follow an entity approach. In Estonia, the CFC rules are 
not applicable if more than 50 percent of the income of the foreign entity is derived 
from active business such as the manufacturing of goods, trade, provision of 
transport, communication, accommodation and tourism services in the residence 
country of the foreign entity, chartering of freighting vessels as well as certain 
insurance services.83 In Finland, the CFC is required to derive its income mainly from 
industrial activity, any other comparable production activity or shipping activity in its 
country of residence, or - under certain circumstances - sales and marketing activities 
which directly serve a company conducting one of the aforementioned business 
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classification of the foreign company. It is therefore necessary to examine the 
exemptions from current taxation to understand the main aspects of the entity 
approach.   
 
6.3.1. The Various Exemptions under the Entity Approach  
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from current taxation, there are - in my opinion - three elements which are of 
particular importance: 
 
- the type of business activity 
 
- the source of CFC income  
 
- the extent of business activity 
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from active business such as the manufacturing of goods, trade, provision of 
transport, communication, accommodation and tourism services in the residence 
country of the foreign entity, chartering of freighting vessels as well as certain 
insurance services.83 In Finland, the CFC is required to derive its income mainly from 
industrial activity, any other comparable production activity or shipping activity in its 
country of residence, or - under certain circumstances - sales and marketing activities 
which directly serve a company conducting one of the aforementioned business 
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encompass income from active businesses if other requirements - such as low-
taxation and a certain percentage of shareholding - are fulfilled.89 However, when it 
comes to the exemption from Swedish CFC taxation, an active-passive separation 
plays a role, too.90 Thus, it seems that states which follow an entity approach also 
use elements which are typically applied in the context of a transactional system. It 
seems to me that this is considered to be necessary for a “fine-tuning” of the 
legislation, e.g. in case of France, Portugal, and Sweden.  
 
b.) The source of CFC income  
 
It is often not sufficient simply to carry out an active business in the sense of the 
definition provided by the respective legislation, but additional requirements which 
are related to the source of the CFC income must be fulfilled in order to qualify for an 
exemption from CFC taxation. In Finland, the industrial activity, any other comparable 
production activity or shipping activity must be connected to the country of residence 
of the CFC. An exemption from CFC taxation will also apply if the foreign company’s 
income is mainly derived from sales and marketing activities which directly serve a 
company conducting one of these areas of activity and which are mainly directed to 
the territory of the country of residence. The foreign company is not deemed to be a 
CFC if its income is mainly derived from payments made by a limited liability 
company within the same group which is resident in the same country as the foreign 
company in question and conducts one of the industrial activities mentioned above 
there.91 In France, the already existing safe harbour provision has been expanded so 
that a deemed transfer of profits does not take place if the activities of the foreign 
entity are carried out in the state in which it is located.92 The Hungarian CFC 
legislation requires a “real economic presence” in the country of the foreign entity in 
order to be exempt from CFC taxation.93 In Italy, the foreign company must carry out 
as its main business an effective industrial or commercial activity in the state or 
territory where it is established.94 The Portuguese legislation requires the business 
activities outlined above to be exercised without the involvement of Portuguese 
residents. However, the activity is exempt from Portuguese CFC taxation - even 
though Portuguese residents participate in such activities - as long as the commercial 
                                            
89 See with respect to the revised Swedish CFC legislation: Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in 
Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Koehlmark / Kaellqvist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for 
International Fiscal Documentation 2004, pages 225-232; Mutén, Sweden’s CFC Rules Under Change, Tax 
Notes International 2003, pages 216-217; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Swedish Capital Gains, CFC Rule Changes 
Still in the Works, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2002, Doc 2002-3867. 
90 Sweden applies a so-called “white list” which excludes legal entities in certain countries from being subject to 
the Swedish CFC rules. However, there are certain types of activities which might not be subject to said 
exemption even though the entity is covered by the white list. Such businesses are normally insurance-, bank-, 
financial-, and offshore business (Andulf Advokat AB, Sweden Tax and Legal Developments, January 2004). 
91 Section 2 (2) of the Finnish CFC Act.  
92 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) 
Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, 
Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 1417 et seq. (1420); see with respect to the former 
CFC rules: Bérengier, French Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties Override French CFC 
Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3; see also FEE of April 2002, page 9; section 209 B-II of 
the French Tax Code; Regulations 4H-3-98 of April 17, 1998, nos. 198-202.  
93 However, the meaning of a “real economic presence” has not been further clarified (Liszicza, National Report 
Hungary, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series 
on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 309).  
94 Section 127 (5)-bis of the Italian Corporate Income Tax Act; see Gazzo, Italy’s CFC Legislation Implemented 
and Participation Exemption Extended, IBFD Bulletin 2002, page 77 et seq. (83). 
    
                                                                                         
 
activities.84 In France, the controlling legal entity must demonstrate that the foreign 
entity effectively carries on a commercial or industrial activity, conducted from its 
country of establishment or registered office (under the former rules, the cave-out 
only applied if the activities were “primarily carried out on the local market”). An 
exemption from French CFC taxation will not be applicable if a significant part of the 
profits of the foreign entity is derived from passive income. This is the case (i) if more 
than 20 percent of the income of the CFC is derived from the management of 
financial assets and the exploitation of rights to intangibles, or (ii) if more than 50 
percent of the income of the CFC is derived from certain other activities, such as the 
provision of inter-company services. In those cases, the French company can only be 
exempt from CFC taxation if it can demonstrate that the allocation of profits to the 
country with a privileged tax regime is not the main purpose of the structure.85 In 
Italy, it is necessary that the foreign company exercises mainly an effective industrial 
or commercial activity.86 In Portugal, at least 75 percent must be derived from an 
agricultural, industrial or commercial activity. Interestingly, the Portuguese legislation 
excludes certain activities from the active industrial or commercial activities of the 
CFC and therefore builds a bridge to the active-passive definitions of the 
transactional countries. The foreign company’s main business must not comprise 
operations such as banking activities, insurance activities (under certain 
circumstances), holding of participating interests or other securities, intellectual or 
industrial property rights, or rights relating to know-how or technical assistance, and 
the renting out of assets, except immovable property situated in the foreign 
company’s country of residence.87 The United Kingdom - with the most extensive list 
of exemptions - applies an “exempt activities test” for foreign companies with mainly 
trading activities and holding companies deriving the substantial majority of their 
income as dividends directly or indirectly from exempt trading companies.88 Thus, it 
can be concluded that most of the countries which follow an entity approach require 
the CFC to carry on mainly industrial or commercial activities in order to be outside of 
the scope of CFC taxation. Hence, the mere focus on inter-company services - which 
would otherwise be classified as tainted activities or base company activities under 
the transactional approach CFC regimes - would therefore typically also result in an 
income attribution under the above entity approach regimes. The Swedish approach 
is clearly an exception. In Sweden, the type of income is - in general - not decisive, 
i.e. the Swedish rules not only focus on income from passive activities but also 
                                            
84 Section 2 (2) of the Finnish CFC Act; see also Grünbaum, Finland: CFC Rules to be Revised, Tax News 
Service 1998, page 376; Helminen, Finnish Government Proposes Changes to New CFC Regime, Tax Notes 
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Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Ippolito / Pontnau-Faure, France: CFC Rules Reform, Tax Planning International Transfer Pricing 2005, page 
10; with respect to the former rules see Bérengier, French Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties 
Override French CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3; Mbwa-Mboma, Treaty With 
Switzerland Overrides French CFC Legislation, French High Tax Court Confirms, Tax Analysts Tax Document 
Service 2002, Doc 2002-15647; see also the FEE Position Paper, April 2002, page 9; Regulations 4H-3-98 of 
April 17, 1998, nos. 198-202.  
86 Section 127 (5)-bis of the Italian Corporate Income Tax Act. See also Perin, Italy: Italian Ministry of Finance 
Explains Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Tax Notes International 2001, page 617 et seq.; Tognolo, New 
Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) Rule in Italy, Tax Planning International Review 2001, page 9. 
87 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act; de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, pages 779, 780; de Sousa da Camara / Núncio, Portugal’s 2002 Budget Bill Revises Capital Gains 
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88 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 881.  
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encompass income from active businesses if other requirements - such as low-
taxation and a certain percentage of shareholding - are fulfilled.89 However, when it 
comes to the exemption from Swedish CFC taxation, an active-passive separation 
plays a role, too.90 Thus, it seems that states which follow an entity approach also 
use elements which are typically applied in the context of a transactional system. It 
seems to me that this is considered to be necessary for a “fine-tuning” of the 
legislation, e.g. in case of France, Portugal, and Sweden.  
 
b.) The source of CFC income  
 
It is often not sufficient simply to carry out an active business in the sense of the 
definition provided by the respective legislation, but additional requirements which 
are related to the source of the CFC income must be fulfilled in order to qualify for an 
exemption from CFC taxation. In Finland, the industrial activity, any other comparable 
production activity or shipping activity must be connected to the country of residence 
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income is mainly derived from sales and marketing activities which directly serve a 
company conducting one of these areas of activity and which are mainly directed to 
the territory of the country of residence. The foreign company is not deemed to be a 
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order to be exempt from CFC taxation.93 In Italy, the foreign company must carry out 
as its main business an effective industrial or commercial activity in the state or 
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activities outlined above to be exercised without the involvement of Portuguese 
residents. However, the activity is exempt from Portuguese CFC taxation - even 
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CFC rules: Bérengier, French Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties Override French CFC 
Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3; see also FEE of April 2002, page 9; section 209 B-II of 
the French Tax Code; Regulations 4H-3-98 of April 17, 1998, nos. 198-202.  
93 However, the meaning of a “real economic presence” has not been further clarified (Liszicza, National Report 
Hungary, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series 
on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 309).  
94 Section 127 (5)-bis of the Italian Corporate Income Tax Act; see Gazzo, Italy’s CFC Legislation Implemented 
and Participation Exemption Extended, IBFD Bulletin 2002, page 77 et seq. (83). 
    
                                                                                         
 
activities.84 In France, the controlling legal entity must demonstrate that the foreign 
entity effectively carries on a commercial or industrial activity, conducted from its 
country of establishment or registered office (under the former rules, the cave-out 
only applied if the activities were “primarily carried out on the local market”). An 
exemption from French CFC taxation will not be applicable if a significant part of the 
profits of the foreign entity is derived from passive income. This is the case (i) if more 
than 20 percent of the income of the CFC is derived from the management of 
financial assets and the exploitation of rights to intangibles, or (ii) if more than 50 
percent of the income of the CFC is derived from certain other activities, such as the 
provision of inter-company services. In those cases, the French company can only be 
exempt from CFC taxation if it can demonstrate that the allocation of profits to the 
country with a privileged tax regime is not the main purpose of the structure.85 In 
Italy, it is necessary that the foreign company exercises mainly an effective industrial 
or commercial activity.86 In Portugal, at least 75 percent must be derived from an 
agricultural, industrial or commercial activity. Interestingly, the Portuguese legislation 
excludes certain activities from the active industrial or commercial activities of the 
CFC and therefore builds a bridge to the active-passive definitions of the 
transactional countries. The foreign company’s main business must not comprise 
operations such as banking activities, insurance activities (under certain 
circumstances), holding of participating interests or other securities, intellectual or 
industrial property rights, or rights relating to know-how or technical assistance, and 
the renting out of assets, except immovable property situated in the foreign 
company’s country of residence.87 The United Kingdom - with the most extensive list 
of exemptions - applies an “exempt activities test” for foreign companies with mainly 
trading activities and holding companies deriving the substantial majority of their 
income as dividends directly or indirectly from exempt trading companies.88 Thus, it 
can be concluded that most of the countries which follow an entity approach require 
the CFC to carry on mainly industrial or commercial activities in order to be outside of 
the scope of CFC taxation. Hence, the mere focus on inter-company services - which 
would otherwise be classified as tainted activities or base company activities under 
the transactional approach CFC regimes - would therefore typically also result in an 
income attribution under the above entity approach regimes. The Swedish approach 
is clearly an exception. In Sweden, the type of income is - in general - not decisive, 
i.e. the Swedish rules not only focus on income from passive activities but also 
                                            
84 Section 2 (2) of the Finnish CFC Act; see also Grünbaum, Finland: CFC Rules to be Revised, Tax News 
Service 1998, page 376; Helminen, Finnish Government Proposes Changes to New CFC Regime, Tax Notes 
International 1998, page 1431; see in this respect also the FEE Position Paper, April 2002, page 41.  
85 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 3; 
Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Ippolito / Pontnau-Faure, France: CFC Rules Reform, Tax Planning International Transfer Pricing 2005, page 
10; with respect to the former rules see Bérengier, French Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties 
Override French CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3; Mbwa-Mboma, Treaty With 
Switzerland Overrides French CFC Legislation, French High Tax Court Confirms, Tax Analysts Tax Document 
Service 2002, Doc 2002-15647; see also the FEE Position Paper, April 2002, page 9; Regulations 4H-3-98 of 
April 17, 1998, nos. 198-202.  
86 Section 127 (5)-bis of the Italian Corporate Income Tax Act. See also Perin, Italy: Italian Ministry of Finance 
Explains Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Tax Notes International 2001, page 617 et seq.; Tognolo, New 
Controlled Foreign Corporations (CFC) Rule in Italy, Tax Planning International Review 2001, page 9. 
87 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act; de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, pages 779, 780; de Sousa da Camara / Núncio, Portugal’s 2002 Budget Bill Revises Capital Gains 
Tax Regime, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, Doc 2001-28988.  
88 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 881.  
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business activity requires at the same time that the activity encompasses a 
substantial part of the activities of the CFC, i.e. normally more than 50 percent.101  
 
6.3.1.2. Exemption Based on a Motive Test  
 
The United Kingdom provides for an exemption from CFC taxation based on a motive 
test. In order to qualify for this exemption, the reduction of domestic tax must not be 
the main purpose for a certain transaction and it must not be one of the main reasons 
for the existence of the CFC to achieve a reduction in United Kingdom tax by a 
diversion of profits from the United Kingdom. The Inland Revenue provided examples 
of typical cases where the motive test is regarded as satisfied: 
 
- if the business could not have been carried on by a United Kingdom resident; 
- if there are “sound commercial reasons” for using a locally resident company 
rather than a branch of a United Kingdom resident company; 
- if the CFC exists to avoid foreign tax and not United Kingdom tax. This would 
be the case if a foreign group with a pre-existing CFC were taken over by a 
United Kingdom resident company.102 
 
In my opinion, a motive test makes some sense since CFC legislation must be seen 
as an anti-avoidance legislation. However, the subjectivity which is inherent in such a 
motive test can lead to a great uncertainty for the taxpayer. In contrast, detailed rules 
which can give the motive test objectivity can have the effect of an immense 
complexity of the CFC rules.103 The French CFC legislation also includes a general 
motive test according to which a French resident company may demonstrate that the 
foreign company was not established to localise profits in a tax privileged country.104  
 
6.3.1.3. Exemption Based on an Acceptable Distribution Policy 
 
An exemption based on an “acceptable distribution policy” - like in the United 
Kingdom - seems to be a logical and obvious exemption from CFC taxation.105 Since 
the CFC taxation is directed towards the avoidance of income deferral in low-tax 
countries, a subsequent distribution which occurs (i) a short time after the end of the 
fiscal year of the foreign company and (ii) which is taxable in the residence state of 
                                            
101 The same is true for Estonia where more than 50 percent is required – even though the CFC rules are limited 
to resident individuals (see Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 178). 
102 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 888; Section 748 (3) of the United 
Kingdom Corporate Income Tax Act.   
103 See in this respect OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source 
Income, 1996, page 75.  
104 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 
3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 
1417 et seq. (1420); the former French CFC rules were slightly different in this respect, see Bérengier, French 
Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties Override French CFC Rules, Tax Planning International 
Review 2002, page 3; see also FEE of April 2002, page 9. 
105 See with respect to the United Kingdom: Mongan / Bussey, Managing the Ever-Changing Controlled Foreign 
Company Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3 et seq.; Inland Revenue REV BN 21, 
Loophole Closed in Controlled Foreign Company Rules, on the internet: 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/budget2001/revbn21.htm; Leegaard, CFC Legislation - Recent Changes to the 
Acceptable Distribution Policy Exemption, European Taxation 2001, page 293 et seq.  
    
                                                                                         
 
activity is predominantly directed towards the foreign company’s local market.95 
Under the United Kingdom exempt activities test it is required that the CFC has a 
substantive presence in its country of residence and mainly carries on genuine 
trading activities in that country. Certain sales, financial or other service companies 
whose business is mainly with related parties or with the United Kingdom are 
excluded from the exemption. The exemption also applies to holding companies 
deriving the substantial majority of their income as dividends directly or indirectly from 
exempt trading companies. Furthermore, the CFC must have a business 
establishment in its territory of residence and its business must be effectively 
managed there.96 There are detailed conditions for trading companies and holding 
companies which must in addition be satisfied.97 All of the states mentioned above 
provide for an exemption from CFC taxation if the foreign company carries on its 
activities mainly (see below) in the state where the CFC is established. In other 
words, the providing of merely domestic services (in the state of the CFC) is 
considered to be a situation which - pursuant to the legislation outlined above - 
should not result in an immediate income allocation. Although such an approach is 
not self-evident because it may also lead to a sheltering of income from domestic 
taxation the risk of tax avoidance is apparently seen as lower than in a cross-border 
situation (in combination with the other factors - especially the type of business 
activity). However, from the perspective of a state which follows the principle of 
capital export neutrality, there is no difference between services provided by the CFC 
towards recipients in the CFC state or towards recipients in other (third) states. 
 
c.) The extent of business activity   
 
It is clear from the explanations above that the business activities which are subject 
to exemption from CFC taxation have to comprise a major part of the activities of the 
CFC. Most often the term “mainly” is used to describe the necessary extent of 
business activities. However, it is important to recognise that the term “mainly” is 
normally not only connected to the respective activity as such but also to the 
respective local market. In France, the income will not be attributed if the activities 
are carried out in the state in which the foreign entity is located. The former French 
CFC rules required that the activities were “primarily” carried out on the local market. 
The new rules now focus on a passive income test. Based on the test, certain income 
from passive activities must not exceed 20 percent (the management of financial 
assets and the exploitation of rights to intangibles) or 50 percent (certain other 
activities, such as inter-company services), respectively.98 In Finland, the term 
“mainly” has to be understood as more than 50 percent,99 and in Portugal it is at least 
75 percent of the income of the CFC.100 Therefore, an exemption based on a certain 
                                            
95 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act; de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, pages 779, 780.  
96 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 881. 
97 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 882-886.  
98 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 3; 
Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 
1417 et seq. (1420); see with respect to the former CFC rules: Regulations 4H-3-98 of April 17, 1998, nos. 198-
202. 
99 Section 2 (2) of the Finnish CFC Act. 
100 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act. 
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business activity requires at the same time that the activity encompasses a 
substantial part of the activities of the CFC, i.e. normally more than 50 percent.101  
 
6.3.1.2. Exemption Based on a Motive Test  
 
The United Kingdom provides for an exemption from CFC taxation based on a motive 
test. In order to qualify for this exemption, the reduction of domestic tax must not be 
the main purpose for a certain transaction and it must not be one of the main reasons 
for the existence of the CFC to achieve a reduction in United Kingdom tax by a 
diversion of profits from the United Kingdom. The Inland Revenue provided examples 
of typical cases where the motive test is regarded as satisfied: 
 
- if the business could not have been carried on by a United Kingdom resident; 
- if there are “sound commercial reasons” for using a locally resident company 
rather than a branch of a United Kingdom resident company; 
- if the CFC exists to avoid foreign tax and not United Kingdom tax. This would 
be the case if a foreign group with a pre-existing CFC were taken over by a 
United Kingdom resident company.102 
 
In my opinion, a motive test makes some sense since CFC legislation must be seen 
as an anti-avoidance legislation. However, the subjectivity which is inherent in such a 
motive test can lead to a great uncertainty for the taxpayer. In contrast, detailed rules 
which can give the motive test objectivity can have the effect of an immense 
complexity of the CFC rules.103 The French CFC legislation also includes a general 
motive test according to which a French resident company may demonstrate that the 
foreign company was not established to localise profits in a tax privileged country.104  
 
6.3.1.3. Exemption Based on an Acceptable Distribution Policy 
 
An exemption based on an “acceptable distribution policy” - like in the United 
Kingdom - seems to be a logical and obvious exemption from CFC taxation.105 Since 
the CFC taxation is directed towards the avoidance of income deferral in low-tax 
countries, a subsequent distribution which occurs (i) a short time after the end of the 
fiscal year of the foreign company and (ii) which is taxable in the residence state of 
                                            
101 The same is true for Estonia where more than 50 percent is required – even though the CFC rules are limited 
to resident individuals (see Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 178). 
102 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 888; Section 748 (3) of the United 
Kingdom Corporate Income Tax Act.   
103 See in this respect OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source 
Income, 1996, page 75.  
104 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 
3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 
1417 et seq. (1420); the former French CFC rules were slightly different in this respect, see Bérengier, French 
Administrative Supreme Court Holds that Tax Treaties Override French CFC Rules, Tax Planning International 
Review 2002, page 3; see also FEE of April 2002, page 9. 
105 See with respect to the United Kingdom: Mongan / Bussey, Managing the Ever-Changing Controlled Foreign 
Company Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2002, page 3 et seq.; Inland Revenue REV BN 21, 
Loophole Closed in Controlled Foreign Company Rules, on the internet: 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/budget2001/revbn21.htm; Leegaard, CFC Legislation - Recent Changes to the 
Acceptable Distribution Policy Exemption, European Taxation 2001, page 293 et seq.  
    
                                                                                         
 
activity is predominantly directed towards the foreign company’s local market.95 
Under the United Kingdom exempt activities test it is required that the CFC has a 
substantive presence in its country of residence and mainly carries on genuine 
trading activities in that country. Certain sales, financial or other service companies 
whose business is mainly with related parties or with the United Kingdom are 
excluded from the exemption. The exemption also applies to holding companies 
deriving the substantial majority of their income as dividends directly or indirectly from 
exempt trading companies. Furthermore, the CFC must have a business 
establishment in its territory of residence and its business must be effectively 
managed there.96 There are detailed conditions for trading companies and holding 
companies which must in addition be satisfied.97 All of the states mentioned above 
provide for an exemption from CFC taxation if the foreign company carries on its 
activities mainly (see below) in the state where the CFC is established. In other 
words, the providing of merely domestic services (in the state of the CFC) is 
considered to be a situation which - pursuant to the legislation outlined above - 
should not result in an immediate income allocation. Although such an approach is 
not self-evident because it may also lead to a sheltering of income from domestic 
taxation the risk of tax avoidance is apparently seen as lower than in a cross-border 
situation (in combination with the other factors - especially the type of business 
activity). However, from the perspective of a state which follows the principle of 
capital export neutrality, there is no difference between services provided by the CFC 
towards recipients in the CFC state or towards recipients in other (third) states. 
 
c.) The extent of business activity   
 
It is clear from the explanations above that the business activities which are subject 
to exemption from CFC taxation have to comprise a major part of the activities of the 
CFC. Most often the term “mainly” is used to describe the necessary extent of 
business activities. However, it is important to recognise that the term “mainly” is 
normally not only connected to the respective activity as such but also to the 
respective local market. In France, the income will not be attributed if the activities 
are carried out in the state in which the foreign entity is located. The former French 
CFC rules required that the activities were “primarily” carried out on the local market. 
The new rules now focus on a passive income test. Based on the test, certain income 
from passive activities must not exceed 20 percent (the management of financial 
assets and the exploitation of rights to intangibles) or 50 percent (certain other 
activities, such as inter-company services), respectively.98 In Finland, the term 
“mainly” has to be understood as more than 50 percent,99 and in Portugal it is at least 
75 percent of the income of the CFC.100 Therefore, an exemption based on a certain 
                                            
95 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act; de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, pages 779, 780.  
96 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 881. 
97 Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 882-886.  
98 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 3; 
Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 
1417 et seq. (1420); see with respect to the former CFC rules: Regulations 4H-3-98 of April 17, 1998, nos. 198-
202. 
99 Section 2 (2) of the Finnish CFC Act. 
100 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act. 
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taxation.109 Pursuant to the OECD, the rationale for the exemption is that a company 
with a significant proportion of its shares held by the general public would be under 
commercial constraints to pursue an acceptable distribution policy, and so it is much 
less likely to be used as an avoidance vehicle for a group of companies.110  
 
6.3.1.5. Exemption Based on a Certain Threshold  
 
A certain threshold is sometimes applied to avoid the attribution of minor amounts of 
passive income to the domestic shareholder (de minimis exemption). The exemption 
is mostly due to administrative convenience and simplification. In principle, this 
should be equally relevant for countries which follow an entity approach and a 
transactional approach. Denmark, which is a transactional country, applies a 
relatively high threshold for financial income. It will only be attributed to the Danish 
shareholder if it exceeds one-third of the total net income of the CFC calculated 
pursuant to Danish rules. Based on that rule, a substantial amount of passive income 
can be excluded from CFC taxation.111 In Germany, a transactional country, the 
exemption provision requires, under certain circumstances, that a certain percentage 
and an absolute amount is not exceeded.112 In case of countries which follow an 
entity approach, it is the United Kingdom which provides for an exemption from CFC 
taxation if the income of the CFC is below a certain absolute amount.113 In France, 
the revised CFC legislation provides for an additional threshold (percentage) in the 
context of the passive income test.114 
 
6.3.1.6. Exemption Based on an Excluded Country List  
 
An excluded country list - or “white list” - is sometimes used to determine the 
countries or territories which shall be outside of the scope of CFC taxation.115 The 
United Kingdom is one of those countries which apply such an excluded country list. 
However, the listing does not automatically lead to an exclusion from CFC taxation 
since several other aspects have to be fulfilled, such as a “local source income” 
condition.116 Here, the excluded country list can give an overview of those countries 
which are generally not considered to be CFC countries but further verifications are 
necessary. In Sweden, the excluded country list is of great importance since the 
                                            
109 See with respect to the United Kingdom: Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 
889. 
110 OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1996, page 
75.  
111 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
112 See, for example, the German rules with respect to income of a capital investment kind. The maximum 
amount is stipulated with 10 percent of the “gross income” and 62.000,00 Euro (section 7 (6) of the German 
Foreign Tax Act).  
113 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 61. 
114 Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign 
Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
115 See in this respect also Kaufmann, Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC)-Gesetzgebung - Übersicht über die 
Rechtslage in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2001, page 16 et seq. (17).  
116 See Mongan / Bussey, Managing the Ever-Changing Controlled Foreign Company Rules, Tax Planning 
International Review (September) 2002, page 3 et seq.; Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits 
on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 
2001, pages 872, 873.  
    
                                                                                         
 
the shareholder will eliminate the attractiveness of the income deferral. The 
subsequent distribution will always lead to an increase of the tax rate up to the level 
of the state of the shareholder within a short period of time, i.e. the positive effects of 
deferral cannot be used in such a situation. However, this is only true to the extent 
that the profit distribution is taxable in the state of the shareholder, like in the United 
Kingdom, and not exempt from taxation, e.g. through the application of a participation 
exemption. In the latter case, where the profit distribution is exempt from taxation, 
there is no subsequent increase in the income taxation to the domestic level. Hence, 
if an exemption from CFC taxation shall be granted on the basis of an acceptable 
distribution policy, it is logically required, in my opinion, that the profit distribution is 
subject to income taxation in the residence state of the shareholder (parent 
company). In principle, it does not matter whether the taxation is based on the regular 
tax credit system of the residence state of the shareholder, like in the United 
Kingdom, or on the basis of a system which switches from the exemption method to 
the credit method under certain circumstances. Theoretically, it is possible to apply a 
CFC regime and, in addition thereto, a regime which provides for a taxation of profit 
distributions of companies which carry on certain (passive) activities (but where the 
previous income attribution under the CFC regime is taken into account for 
subsequent distributions). In this case, an acceptable distribution policy can, of 
course, be a reason for an exemption from CFC taxation. However, this requires two 
complex systems which are partly dependent on each other. I think that in those 
cases it might be better to concentrate on CFC taxation - and therefore the current 
taxation of income - than to implement two complex systems which have, at the end, 
a similar focus - namely the domestic taxation of income which is derived from certain 
activities but not from all activities. Overall, it can be concluded, in my opinion, that an 
exemption from CFC taxation which is based on an acceptable distribution policy 
makes sense only if the subsequent distribution is subject to income taxation in the 
hands of the recipient of the dividend payment.   
 
6.3.1.4. Exemption for Publicly Traded Companies  
 
Another possibility to avoid the application of CFC taxation is the exemption for 
publicly traded companies. The United Kingdom offers such an exemption under 
certain - quite restrictive - circumstances.106 In France, there is also a specific 
provision which is applicable to publicly listed companies: for the question whether 
the participation threshold is exceeded, the French tax authorities have to 
demonstrate that the French controlling legal entity, together with other entities 
holding shares in the foreign legal entity, are acting in concert. If this cannot be 
demonstrated by the tax authorities, the French CFC rules cannot be applied.107 An 
exemption from CFC taxation also exists in Germany - which is a transactional 
country - for shares in a CFC which are quoted on a stock exchange and which are 
traded “regularly and considerably.”108 
 
The idea behind an exemption for listed companies could be the fact that a publicly 
traded company is normally owned by a great number of shareholders and the public 
listing causes an additional administrative, legal and financial burden, and it is 
therefore rather unlikely that such a structure is used for the avoidance of domestic 
                                            
106 Outside of Europe only Israel has a comparable exemption (see Arnold / Dibout, Limits on the Use of Low-
Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 62). 
107 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code.  
108 Section 7 (6a) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
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taxation.109 Pursuant to the OECD, the rationale for the exemption is that a company 
with a significant proportion of its shares held by the general public would be under 
commercial constraints to pursue an acceptable distribution policy, and so it is much 
less likely to be used as an avoidance vehicle for a group of companies.110  
 
6.3.1.5. Exemption Based on a Certain Threshold  
 
A certain threshold is sometimes applied to avoid the attribution of minor amounts of 
passive income to the domestic shareholder (de minimis exemption). The exemption 
is mostly due to administrative convenience and simplification. In principle, this 
should be equally relevant for countries which follow an entity approach and a 
transactional approach. Denmark, which is a transactional country, applies a 
relatively high threshold for financial income. It will only be attributed to the Danish 
shareholder if it exceeds one-third of the total net income of the CFC calculated 
pursuant to Danish rules. Based on that rule, a substantial amount of passive income 
can be excluded from CFC taxation.111 In Germany, a transactional country, the 
exemption provision requires, under certain circumstances, that a certain percentage 
and an absolute amount is not exceeded.112 In case of countries which follow an 
entity approach, it is the United Kingdom which provides for an exemption from CFC 
taxation if the income of the CFC is below a certain absolute amount.113 In France, 
the revised CFC legislation provides for an additional threshold (percentage) in the 
context of the passive income test.114 
 
6.3.1.6. Exemption Based on an Excluded Country List  
 
An excluded country list - or “white list” - is sometimes used to determine the 
countries or territories which shall be outside of the scope of CFC taxation.115 The 
United Kingdom is one of those countries which apply such an excluded country list. 
However, the listing does not automatically lead to an exclusion from CFC taxation 
since several other aspects have to be fulfilled, such as a “local source income” 
condition.116 Here, the excluded country list can give an overview of those countries 
which are generally not considered to be CFC countries but further verifications are 
necessary. In Sweden, the excluded country list is of great importance since the 
                                            
109 See with respect to the United Kingdom: Friel, National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 
889. 
110 OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Studies in Taxation of Foreign Source Income, 1996, page 
75.  
111 Frobert, Danish Official Proposes New Rules on CFC Taxation, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, 
Doc. 2001-28851; Dietz / Buxbom, New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 515 et 
seq. 
112 See, for example, the German rules with respect to income of a capital investment kind. The maximum 
amount is stipulated with 10 percent of the “gross income” and 62.000,00 Euro (section 7 (6) of the German 
Foreign Tax Act).  
113 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 61. 
114 Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign 
Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
115 See in this respect also Kaufmann, Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC)-Gesetzgebung - Übersicht über die 
Rechtslage in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2001, page 16 et seq. (17).  
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the shareholder will eliminate the attractiveness of the income deferral. The 
subsequent distribution will always lead to an increase of the tax rate up to the level 
of the state of the shareholder within a short period of time, i.e. the positive effects of 
deferral cannot be used in such a situation. However, this is only true to the extent 
that the profit distribution is taxable in the state of the shareholder, like in the United 
Kingdom, and not exempt from taxation, e.g. through the application of a participation 
exemption. In the latter case, where the profit distribution is exempt from taxation, 
there is no subsequent increase in the income taxation to the domestic level. Hence, 
if an exemption from CFC taxation shall be granted on the basis of an acceptable 
distribution policy, it is logically required, in my opinion, that the profit distribution is 
subject to income taxation in the residence state of the shareholder (parent 
company). In principle, it does not matter whether the taxation is based on the regular 
tax credit system of the residence state of the shareholder, like in the United 
Kingdom, or on the basis of a system which switches from the exemption method to 
the credit method under certain circumstances. Theoretically, it is possible to apply a 
CFC regime and, in addition thereto, a regime which provides for a taxation of profit 
distributions of companies which carry on certain (passive) activities (but where the 
previous income attribution under the CFC regime is taken into account for 
subsequent distributions). In this case, an acceptable distribution policy can, of 
course, be a reason for an exemption from CFC taxation. However, this requires two 
complex systems which are partly dependent on each other. I think that in those 
cases it might be better to concentrate on CFC taxation - and therefore the current 
taxation of income - than to implement two complex systems which have, at the end, 
a similar focus - namely the domestic taxation of income which is derived from certain 
activities but not from all activities. Overall, it can be concluded, in my opinion, that an 
exemption from CFC taxation which is based on an acceptable distribution policy 
makes sense only if the subsequent distribution is subject to income taxation in the 
hands of the recipient of the dividend payment.   
 
6.3.1.4. Exemption for Publicly Traded Companies  
 
Another possibility to avoid the application of CFC taxation is the exemption for 
publicly traded companies. The United Kingdom offers such an exemption under 
certain - quite restrictive - circumstances.106 In France, there is also a specific 
provision which is applicable to publicly listed companies: for the question whether 
the participation threshold is exceeded, the French tax authorities have to 
demonstrate that the French controlling legal entity, together with other entities 
holding shares in the foreign legal entity, are acting in concert. If this cannot be 
demonstrated by the tax authorities, the French CFC rules cannot be applied.107 An 
exemption from CFC taxation also exists in Germany - which is a transactional 
country - for shares in a CFC which are quoted on a stock exchange and which are 
traded “regularly and considerably.”108 
 
The idea behind an exemption for listed companies could be the fact that a publicly 
traded company is normally owned by a great number of shareholders and the public 
listing causes an additional administrative, legal and financial burden, and it is 
therefore rather unlikely that such a structure is used for the avoidance of domestic 
                                            
106 Outside of Europe only Israel has a comparable exemption (see Arnold / Dibout, Limits on the Use of Low-
Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 62). 
107 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code.  
108 Section 7 (6a) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
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my opinion, closer to the entity approach CFC taxation than to the transactional 
approach CFC taxation. At first glance, it seems that the Dutch legislation provides a 
very high threshold in order to be applicable. However, one has to keep in mind that 
the “90 percent rule” refers to the assets and not to the income. Thus, if the capital 
intensive services, which are usually in the focus of CFC regimes, are combined with 
other (non-tainted) activities, the 90 percent threshold can be reached and exceeded 
very soon - and this does not even mean (or require) that the income of the passive 
activities prevails within the overall income of the subsidiary. In essence, the Dutch 
approach is to a certain extent different from the CFC regimes outlined above (e.g. 
the mark-to-market approach, the focusing on the assets instead of the income), but 
due to the fact that the approach includes the important elements of CFC taxation, 
namely the concentration on certain (passive) investments, the low-taxation 
requirement, the requirement of a minimum participation and, most important, the 
current taxation of income, it shall be included in the following sections.  
 
6.3.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
There is a substantial difference between a CFC regime which follows a transactional 
approach and a CFC regime which follows an entity approach. In the first-mentioned 
case, the CFC regimes focus on a separation of tainted income and non-tainted 
income with the result that only tainted income shall be subject to current taxation. 
Such a horizontal separation of income is also required, as a first step, if one follows 
a concept which is based on the taxation of the basic interest component. Even 
though I have criticised the way of horizontal separation of the transactional 
countries, it is a method intended to limit the current taxation to certain types of 
income. As I have mentioned earlier, the latter income is usually related to capital 
intensive activities which contain a separable financing element.  
 
Of course, this conclusion cannot be transferred to the base company rules (as a part 
of the transactional system), because the base company rules can lead to the result 
that income which is usually considered “active” income becomes subject to current 
taxation. As already outlined earlier, this can easily result in the CFC taxation of 
income which has nothing to do with capital intensive activities and which does not 
include any separable financing element. For this reason, the combination of a 
current taxation of passive income and base company income may come very close 
to the outcome according to an entity approach CFC taxation. In this regard, there 
may still be a horizontal separation, but this separation does not, in essence, lead to 
an acceptable outcome. This is an important conclusion, given the fact that among 
the transactional countries outlined earlier it is only Denmark which does not follow a 
base company approach.  
 
In contrast to the transactional approach CFC regimes, the entity approach CFC 
regimes do not follow such a concept of horizontal separation of income at all. Thus, 
the latter regimes neither provide for a vertical separation of income nor for a 
horizontal separation of income with the important consequence that the decisive 
prerequisites for the application of an efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance 
(anti-deferral) legislation which is based on the current taxation of income are 
missing. In essence, this is equally true for regimes which follow an entity approach 
and those which follow a similar approach, e.g. the Dutch concept of mark-to-market 
revaluation under the participation exemption regime. 
    
                                                                                         
 
Swedish CFC taxation does not differentiate between active and passive income, i.e. 
both can be subject to CFC taxation. However, if Sweden has entered into a tax 
treaty with a state on the list, the treaty must encompass the income of the foreign 
entity.117  
 
6.3.2. Concepts Similar to Entity Approach CFC Legislation   
 
In principle, the Dutch legislation on participation exemption is usually not considered 
to be a CFC regime - at least not in the narrower sense.118 However, the fact that 
such legislation may result, under certain circumstances, in an annual mark-to-
market revaluation of the investment makes it worth to have a closer look at these 
rules, too. Under Dutch legislation, the mark-to-market revaluation only applies to 
certain investments in passive low-taxed participations with a minimum shareholding 
of 25 percent.119 However, the mark-to-market revaluation is only made if the assets 
of that entity exclusively or almost exclusively, directly or indirectly, consist of “free 
investments.”120 This seems to be the case if 90 percent or more of the assets 
consist of free investments.121 The latter investments are defined as other 
investments than those reasonably required by the business activities of the entity 
holding the investments.122 Free investments include assets which are used for 
activities which mostly consist of direct or indirect financing of the taxpayer or of 
entities related to the taxpayer, or assets of the taxpayer or entities related to the 
taxpayer, including the making available of assets for use or a right of use of assets, 
unless it is likely that the activities of the entity in which the taxpayer holds a 
participation can be treated as active financing activities under rules to be determined 
by ministerial decree.123   
 
The fact that the mark-to-market revaluation is applied to the complete participation 
of the shareholder, without any separation of the activities, brings the legislation, in 
                                            
117 See Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Koehlmark / 
Kaellqvist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, pages 225-
232; Muten, Sweden’s CFC Rules Under Change, Tax Notes International 2003, pages 216-217. However, there 
are certain types of activities which might not be subject to the exemption even though the entity is covered by 
the white list. Such businesses are normally insurance-, bank-, financial-, and offshore business (see Andulf 
Advokat AB, Sweden Tax and Legal Developments, January 2004). 
118 See with respect to the Dutch participation exemption regime Articles 13, 13a and 23c of the Dutch Corporate 
Income Tax Act; see with respect to the revised Dutch participation exemption regime also Kinnegim, 
Netherlands: Year in Review, Tax Notes International 2006, page 1082 et seq.; van Wettum / Bevers / van 
Minnen, The Netherlands: Corporate Income Tax Reform 2007, Tax Planning International Review 2006, page 
12 et seq.; Habers, New Dutch Tax Legislation Precursor to Favourable 2007 Corporate Income Tax Reforms, 
Tax Planning International Review 2006, page 19 et seq.; Bakker / van de Rijt, Netherlands Corporate Income 
Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2006, page 308 et 
seq.; van Dam, Dutch Corporation Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit” Submitted to Parliament, Tax 
Planning International European Union Focus (June) 2006; Zoetmulder, Dutch 2007 Tax Reform “Working on 
Profit” Approved by Upper House, Tax Planning International European Union Focus (December) 2006; Spierts, 
Steueränderungen in den Niederlanden, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 25 et 
seq.; Dikmans, New Netherlands Corporate Income Tax Provisions for 2007, European Taxation 2007, page 158 
et seq.; Willeme / Schutz, Dutch Reforms can deliver for Investors, International Tax Review 2007, page 28 et 
seq,; van Helvoirt, Niederlande: Anwendungschreiben Schachtelprivileg, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2008, 
Länderbericht, pages 32, 33.  
119 See Articles 13 and 13a of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
120 Article 13a (1) (a) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
121 Spierts, Steueränderungen in den Niederlanden, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, 
page 25 et seq. (28). 
122 Articles 13 (10) and 13a (1) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
123 Articles 13 (11) and 13a (1) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). 
(2) Assumption: passive activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the concept of 
basic interest taxation. The CFC derives mainly non-tainted income.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.  
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation (not relevant 
because the CFC derives mainly non-tainted income). 
(5) Striped area: subject to income allocation under the concept of basic interest taxation only.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
It is important to recognise that the complete exemption from CFC taxation under the 
entity approach CFC regimes is not the preferred solution, either. The reason is that 
such an exemption allows the shifting of the taxation of the basic interest component 
- within a hybrid structure - to the (low-tax) CFC state. It was concluded earlier that 
the basic interest component is exactly the element which should be targeted under 
an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation. If the legislation provides for an 
exemption of the basic interest component - even though it is, without any doubt, 
related to tainted income - the legislation clearly loses its efficiency. In other words, 
the preference of the principle of capital import neutrality does not support an 
approach which results in an exclusive taxation of the basic interest component in the 
CFC state, because it is not the state in which the latter component was produced. 
For this reason, the existence of a non-optimal scenario requires the current taxation 
of the basic interest component in the state of the shareholder and not exclusively in 
the state of the CFC. Overall, it must be concluded that none of the states which 
follow an entity approach CFC legislation fulfils the aforementioned requirements.  
 
Overall, the difference between the current taxation of income under an entity 
approach CFC regime and the current taxation of income under a transactional 
approach CFC regime (including base company rules) is, very general, the fact that 
the amount of active income - which is not qualified as tainted income under the 
transactional approach CFC regime - is not attributed to the domestic shareholder 




                                            
124 This, of course, is only true if the entity approach leads to a current taxation of income. The latter will usually 
not be the case if the “active” income prevails within the total amount of income.  
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the concept of 
basic interest taxation. The CFC derives mainly tainted income. 
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation (not relevant because the CFC derives mainly tainted 
income).  
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation and under 
the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
The illustration shows that the concept of an “all-or-nothing” approach results not only 
in the current taxation of the activity component and the risk component included in 
the tainted income but also in the taxation of the non-tainted income, i.e. the income 
which should be completely exempt from any current taxation. This, of course, is an 
unacceptable approach from an economic perspective and an equity perspective. It 
was concluded earlier that the taxation should follow the principle of capital import 
neutrality - with the exception of the taxation of the basic interest component. 
However, in the example above, the entity approach leads to an undifferentiated 
taxation according to the principle of capital export neutrality. If the exemption from 
current taxation is solely linked to the existence of an “active” or “passive” activity 
carried out by the CFC, in my opinion no consistent and reliable concept of current 
income taxation exists. The activity will be taxed according to the principle of capital 
export neutrality in one case (if the “active” activity is a minor activity), but according 
to the principle of capital import neutrality in another case (if the “active” activity is a 
major activity). In essence, this leads to an over-taxation in the first-mentioned case 
and to an insufficient taxation in the second-mentioned case. This, of course, cannot 
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entity approach does not provide for a vertical separation of income. However, in 
contrast to the transactional approach - which excludes certain types of income from 
current taxation - the entity approach allocates all of the income derived through the 
CFC (if the requirements are fulfilled) and this can lead to a taxation of income which, 
theoretically, should be completely exempt pursuant to the principle of capital import 
neutrality and which should not even lead to a partial taxation of the basic interest 
component, e.g. in cases in which the income is produced in the CFC state.  In other 
words, the selection in case of a transactional approach may often result in the 
taxation of capital intensive activities which - pursuant to the principles of chapters 2 
and 3 - may also require a current taxation of the basic interest component whereas 
the entity approach does not provide for a comparable selection. Overall, however, 
both approaches are not limited to the taxation of the basic interest component and 
can thus lead to an over-taxation of income in the residence state of the shareholder 
which would not be in line with the principles of chapters 2 and 3. 
 
6.4. The Low-Taxation Requirement  
 
6.4.1. General Aspects  
 
All of the European Member States which apply a CFC taxation have - in one way or 
another - a reference to a certain amount of tax or a certain tax rate.125 Therefore, the 
CFC rules typically apply to situations where the income of the foreign company is 
subject to “low-taxation.” What has to be considered “low-taxation” is, of course, quite 
different from country to country and mainly depends on the domestic income tax 
burden. For example, in Denmark, a foreign company will be low-taxed in a specific 
year if the actual tax paid abroad is less than 3/4 of the tax calculated under Danish 
law.126 In Estonia, the actual tax burden must be less than 2/3 of the income tax 
which an Estonian resident individual would have to pay on a similar amount of 
business income.127 Pursuant to the Finnish CFC rules, a company is low-taxed if the 
effective tax rate in the country of the CFC is less than 3/5 of the Finnish tax rate. A 
different treatment applies for tax treaty countries if the tax rate in the treaty country 
does not deviate substantially from the Finnish corporate tax rate and the foreign 
company does not take advantage of any special tax relief in that country.128 The 
French rules were applicable when the actual tax in the foreign country was at least 
1/3 lower than the French corporate tax that would be assessed on that income. This 
                                            
125 See in this respect also: Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), FEE Position Paper on 
Controlled Foreign Company Legislations in the EU, April 2002. 
126 Shelton, New Tax Law for Holding Companies, Tax Planning International Review (June) 2002; Dietz / 
Buxbom, Denmark: New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 520; Rix, National 
Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 143. The revised Danish CFC rules - after 
Cadbury Schweppes - will be outlined in chapter 8.   
127 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 178. The Estonian CFC rules are 
limited to resident individuals (Uustalu, page 176).  
128 The Finish National Board of Taxes provided a “black list” of countries with a tax regime for legal entities 
which substantially deviates from the corporate income tax which legal entities have to pay in Finland. However, 
it is nevertheless possible that a company resident in one of the listed countries has an effective tax rate which is 
above the threshold and therefore does not fulfil the requirement of low-taxation. See with respect to the Finnish 
low-tax requirement Helminen, Finnish Gouvernment Proposes Changes to New CFC Regime, Tax Notes 
International 1998, page 1431; Juusela, Finland: An Amendment to the CFC Legislation, EC Tax Review 1999, 
page 88; Grünbaum, Finland: Guidance on CFC Rules and Court Ruling, Tax News Service 1999, page 215; 
Helminen, Finnish Tax Board Releases CFC Blacklist, Tax Notes International 1999, page 2317.   
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(1) “Income block” divided into active income, base company income and passive income (horizontal) 
and into the three different income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities 
(vertical). The vertical separation of the active income / base company income is not required, 
because no element is included which should be subject to the current taxation of income in the state 
of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive income = tainted income under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(3) Black-striped area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation only.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation (including 
taxation under the base company rules) and an entity approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation, an 
entity approach CFC taxation and under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the horizontal and vertical “blocks” is just an assumption.  
 
6.3.4. Conclusions Regarding the Entity Approach  
 
The most important exemption from CFC taxation is certainly the exemption based 
on the activity of the foreign company. The activity-based exemption typically 
requires the CFC to carry out mainly an industrial or commercial activity (active 
business) and mainly on the local market, i.e. in the residence country of the CFC. Of 
course, this excludes most of the inter-company services which are normally directed 
towards the country of the parent company and the countries where other group 
companies are established. It goes further than most of the tainted income and base 
company income rules in the transactional countries. The CFC provisions in the 
countries which follow an entity approach typically cover the situations which lead to 
tainted income and base company income under a transactional approach. In 
addition, the entity approach also encompasses the income related to an active 
business which is exercised by the CFC as a minor activity. Similar to the base 
company rules, the entity approach is unconnected to the question of capital 
intensive or non-capital intensive services. Thus, it is a far-reaching method to cover 
any inter-company activities which can in theory lead to a domestic tax base erosion. 
This can be one of the reasons why most of the European countries which apply a 
CFC legislation follow an entity approach.  
 
If the entity approach, in general, is seen in the light of the principles derived from 
chapters 2 and 3, it is apparent that the way of separating the activities which result 
in a CFC taxation from those which provide for an exemption from CFC taxation 
cannot be in line with these principles. Similar to the transactional approach, the 
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entity approach does not provide for a vertical separation of income. However, in 
contrast to the transactional approach - which excludes certain types of income from 
current taxation - the entity approach allocates all of the income derived through the 
CFC (if the requirements are fulfilled) and this can lead to a taxation of income which, 
theoretically, should be completely exempt pursuant to the principle of capital import 
neutrality and which should not even lead to a partial taxation of the basic interest 
component, e.g. in cases in which the income is produced in the CFC state.  In other 
words, the selection in case of a transactional approach may often result in the 
taxation of capital intensive activities which - pursuant to the principles of chapters 2 
and 3 - may also require a current taxation of the basic interest component whereas 
the entity approach does not provide for a comparable selection. Overall, however, 
both approaches are not limited to the taxation of the basic interest component and 
can thus lead to an over-taxation of income in the residence state of the shareholder 
which would not be in line with the principles of chapters 2 and 3. 
 
6.4. The Low-Taxation Requirement  
 
6.4.1. General Aspects  
 
All of the European Member States which apply a CFC taxation have - in one way or 
another - a reference to a certain amount of tax or a certain tax rate.125 Therefore, the 
CFC rules typically apply to situations where the income of the foreign company is 
subject to “low-taxation.” What has to be considered “low-taxation” is, of course, quite 
different from country to country and mainly depends on the domestic income tax 
burden. For example, in Denmark, a foreign company will be low-taxed in a specific 
year if the actual tax paid abroad is less than 3/4 of the tax calculated under Danish 
law.126 In Estonia, the actual tax burden must be less than 2/3 of the income tax 
which an Estonian resident individual would have to pay on a similar amount of 
business income.127 Pursuant to the Finnish CFC rules, a company is low-taxed if the 
effective tax rate in the country of the CFC is less than 3/5 of the Finnish tax rate. A 
different treatment applies for tax treaty countries if the tax rate in the treaty country 
does not deviate substantially from the Finnish corporate tax rate and the foreign 
company does not take advantage of any special tax relief in that country.128 The 
French rules were applicable when the actual tax in the foreign country was at least 
1/3 lower than the French corporate tax that would be assessed on that income. This 
                                            
125 See in this respect also: Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE), FEE Position Paper on 
Controlled Foreign Company Legislations in the EU, April 2002. 
126 Shelton, New Tax Law for Holding Companies, Tax Planning International Review (June) 2002; Dietz / 
Buxbom, Denmark: New Less Restrictive CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2002, page 520; Rix, National 
Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 143. The revised Danish CFC rules - after 
Cadbury Schweppes - will be outlined in chapter 8.   
127 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 178. The Estonian CFC rules are 
limited to resident individuals (Uustalu, page 176).  
128 The Finish National Board of Taxes provided a “black list” of countries with a tax regime for legal entities 
which substantially deviates from the corporate income tax which legal entities have to pay in Finland. However, 
it is nevertheless possible that a company resident in one of the listed countries has an effective tax rate which is 
above the threshold and therefore does not fulfil the requirement of low-taxation. See with respect to the Finnish 
low-tax requirement Helminen, Finnish Gouvernment Proposes Changes to New CFC Regime, Tax Notes 
International 1998, page 1431; Juusela, Finland: An Amendment to the CFC Legislation, EC Tax Review 1999, 
page 88; Grünbaum, Finland: Guidance on CFC Rules and Court Ruling, Tax News Service 1999, page 215; 
Helminen, Finnish Tax Board Releases CFC Blacklist, Tax Notes International 1999, page 2317.   
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and into the three different income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities 
(vertical). The vertical separation of the active income / base company income is not required, 
because no element is included which should be subject to the current taxation of income in the state 
of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: passive income = tainted income under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(3) Black-striped area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation only.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation (including 
taxation under the base company rules) and an entity approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation, an 
entity approach CFC taxation and under the concept of basic interest taxation.  
(6) The size of the horizontal and vertical “blocks” is just an assumption.  
 
6.3.4. Conclusions Regarding the Entity Approach  
 
The most important exemption from CFC taxation is certainly the exemption based 
on the activity of the foreign company. The activity-based exemption typically 
requires the CFC to carry out mainly an industrial or commercial activity (active 
business) and mainly on the local market, i.e. in the residence country of the CFC. Of 
course, this excludes most of the inter-company services which are normally directed 
towards the country of the parent company and the countries where other group 
companies are established. It goes further than most of the tainted income and base 
company income rules in the transactional countries. The CFC provisions in the 
countries which follow an entity approach typically cover the situations which lead to 
tainted income and base company income under a transactional approach. In 
addition, the entity approach also encompasses the income related to an active 
business which is exercised by the CFC as a minor activity. Similar to the base 
company rules, the entity approach is unconnected to the question of capital 
intensive or non-capital intensive services. Thus, it is a far-reaching method to cover 
any inter-company activities which can in theory lead to a domestic tax base erosion. 
This can be one of the reasons why most of the European countries which apply a 
CFC legislation follow an entity approach.  
 
If the entity approach, in general, is seen in the light of the principles derived from 
chapters 2 and 3, it is apparent that the way of separating the activities which result 
in a CFC taxation from those which provide for an exemption from CFC taxation 
cannot be in line with these principles. Similar to the transactional approach, the 
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according to Dutch standards.138 From my perspective, the following general 
approaches can be derived from the country analysis: 
 
- The comparison of the actual foreign tax paid by the CFC and the (fictitious) 
domestic amount of tax which would be imposed on the respective income. 
Among the Member States mentioned above, Denmark, Estonia, France, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden follow such an approach.139 
 
- The comparison of the effective foreign tax rate of the CFC and the (fictitious) 
domestic tax rate applied on the respective income. Among the Member 
States mentioned above, Finland, Germany, Portugal and Spain follow such 
an approach. It might be argued that Lithuania and the Netherlands also follow 
such an approach.140  
 
- The comparison of the nominal (or statutory) foreign tax rate of the CFC and 
the (fictitious) domestic tax rate applied on the respective income. Here, it 
seems that only Hungary follows such an approach. 
 
- The comparison of tax rates is also, amongst others, an important element of 
the Italian CFC legislation. However, Italy does not apply - in contrast to the 
other Member States - a pre-determined fraction or a pre-determined 
percentage for the comparison.  
 
Overall, the criterion of low-taxation is typically seen in comparison to the (fictitious) 
domestic tax burden or the (fictitious) domestic tax rate. The threshold is most often 
defined as a percentage or a fraction of the domestic tax burden or the domestic tax 
rate which would be applied to a comparable domestic situation, i.e. if the threshold is 
reached or exceeded, the foreign tax burden or the foreign tax rate is considered to 
be an acceptable level of taxation or an acceptable tax rate. It is important to 
recognise that most of the countries determine the income based on their domestic 
tax rules.141 In theory, it is possible that the statutory tax rate in the foreign country is 
comparable to the statutory tax rate of the country of the shareholder, but due to 
favourable legislation in the CFC country the effective tax rate is “watered down” to a 
low-tax rate. From this perspective, there is no substantial difference, in my opinion, 
between an approach which focuses on the actual foreign tax paid and an approach 
which focuses on the effective foreign tax rate. Both components are finally 
compared to a (fictitious) taxation or a (fictitious) tax rate in relation to a tax base 
which is calculated according to domestic standards. However, a comparison of a 
nominal (or statutory) foreign tax rate with the domestic tax rate is, in my opinion, not 
a preferable approach. Of course, the comparison may be simpler than in case of a 
focus on actual taxation or effective tax rates. However, what really matters from an 
anti-avoidance perspective is not what is stipulated in the respective foreign 
legislation, but what is the actual result in terms of tax advantages. Here, the link to 
                                            
138 The comparable tax test is only relevant if the other requirements are fulfilled, i.e. if the participation qualifies 
as a portfolio investment company. See with respect to the comparable tax test Articles 13 (10) and 13a (1) of the 
Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
139 The (fictitious) domestic amount of tax is not (or not necessarily) identical to the amount which is based on 
the statutory rate of the respective country.  
140 The (fictitious) domestic tax rate is not (or not necessarily) identical to the statutory rate of the respective 
country.  
141 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
    
                                                                                         
 
has now been reduced to an actual foreign tax which is less than 1/2 of the French 
tax for a similar transaction.129 In Germany, a foreign company is considered to be 
subject to low-taxation if the effective tax rate is below 25 percent - which was exactly 
the German corporate tax rate until the end of the year 2007.130 Interestingly, the 
corporate income tax rate was reduced to 15 percent (as of the beginning of  the 
calendar year 2008) but the low-taxation threshold remained untouched. In other 
words, the low-taxation threshold which is now required under the German CFC 
regime is higher than the German corporate tax rate of 15 percent. This has to be 
seen in the context of the German tax system. In contrast to most of the other 
countries, the trade income tax is quite significant in Germany. The overall statutory 
tax burden is therefore, after the reduction of the corporate tax rate, about 28-30 
percent (corporate tax plus trade income tax). In Italy, the CFC taxation applies to 
foreign countries which have a significantly lower tax rate, do not exchange 
information, and other equivalent criteria.131 In Hungary, the CFC taxation applies to 
foreign income if the nominal foreign tax rate is less than 2/3 of the comparable 
taxation under Hungarian law.132 Under the Portuguese CFC legislation, a low-tax 
country is one that has a comparable effective tax rate which is equal or less than 3/5 
of the Portuguese corporate tax rate or, alternatively, a jurisdiction with a privileged 
tax regime included in a so-called “black list”.133 In Lithuania, the CFC legislation is 
applicable if the CFC is subject to a taxation which is less than 3/4 of the standard 
Lithuanian profit tax rate and if the CFC is established in a state which is not included 
in the “white list” or which has a “special profit tax or analogous leeway” under the 
laws of the relevant state.134 In Spain, a company is considered to be low-taxed 
pursuant to the Spanish CFC regime if the effective foreign tax rate is less than 3/4 of 
the domestic tax rate on that income.135 In the United Kingdom, a foreign company is 
subject to low-taxation if the actual foreign tax is less than 3/4 of the amount which 
would have been paid in accordance with the respective domestic rules on that 
income.136 The Swedish CFC rules are applicable if the actual foreign tax is less than 
55 percent of a comparable Swedish taxation of the CFC income.137 In the 
Netherlands, an effective tax rate of 10 percent is required under the “comparable tax 
test” to avoid the mark-to-market revaluation. The effective tax rate is calculated 
                                            
129 The concept of a favourable tax regime is now defined by law. See with respect to the revised French CFC 
regime Gouthière, Overview of the French CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2008, page 50 et seq. 
130 Section 8 (3) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
131 The countries and territories with a preferential tax regime are published in a „black list.” The list does not 
contain European Member States, with the exception of Luxembourg in case of the “1929-holding companies.” 
132 Liszicza, National Report Hungary, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 308. See with respect to the 
Hungarian tax reform: IWB Kurznachrichten, Ungarn: Steuerreform 2008 für Körperschaften, Internationale 
Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 1, page 1218.  
133 See de Sousa da Camara / Nuncio, Portugal’s 2002 Budget Bill Revises Capital Gains Tax Regime, Tax 
Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, Doc. 2001-28988.  
134 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 397. 
135  Section 121 (1) letter b of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law. 
136 Medori, United Kingdom to Strengthen CFC Legislation, Tax Planning International Review 2000; Friel, 
National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 871.  
137 Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Köhlmark / Källquist, 
New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, page 227 et seq.; 
Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 589.  
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according to Dutch standards.138 From my perspective, the following general 
approaches can be derived from the country analysis: 
 
- The comparison of the actual foreign tax paid by the CFC and the (fictitious) 
domestic amount of tax which would be imposed on the respective income. 
Among the Member States mentioned above, Denmark, Estonia, France, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden follow such an approach.139 
 
- The comparison of the effective foreign tax rate of the CFC and the (fictitious) 
domestic tax rate applied on the respective income. Among the Member 
States mentioned above, Finland, Germany, Portugal and Spain follow such 
an approach. It might be argued that Lithuania and the Netherlands also follow 
such an approach.140  
 
- The comparison of the nominal (or statutory) foreign tax rate of the CFC and 
the (fictitious) domestic tax rate applied on the respective income. Here, it 
seems that only Hungary follows such an approach. 
 
- The comparison of tax rates is also, amongst others, an important element of 
the Italian CFC legislation. However, Italy does not apply - in contrast to the 
other Member States - a pre-determined fraction or a pre-determined 
percentage for the comparison.  
 
Overall, the criterion of low-taxation is typically seen in comparison to the (fictitious) 
domestic tax burden or the (fictitious) domestic tax rate. The threshold is most often 
defined as a percentage or a fraction of the domestic tax burden or the domestic tax 
rate which would be applied to a comparable domestic situation, i.e. if the threshold is 
reached or exceeded, the foreign tax burden or the foreign tax rate is considered to 
be an acceptable level of taxation or an acceptable tax rate. It is important to 
recognise that most of the countries determine the income based on their domestic 
tax rules.141 In theory, it is possible that the statutory tax rate in the foreign country is 
comparable to the statutory tax rate of the country of the shareholder, but due to 
favourable legislation in the CFC country the effective tax rate is “watered down” to a 
low-tax rate. From this perspective, there is no substantial difference, in my opinion, 
between an approach which focuses on the actual foreign tax paid and an approach 
which focuses on the effective foreign tax rate. Both components are finally 
compared to a (fictitious) taxation or a (fictitious) tax rate in relation to a tax base 
which is calculated according to domestic standards. However, a comparison of a 
nominal (or statutory) foreign tax rate with the domestic tax rate is, in my opinion, not 
a preferable approach. Of course, the comparison may be simpler than in case of a 
focus on actual taxation or effective tax rates. However, what really matters from an 
anti-avoidance perspective is not what is stipulated in the respective foreign 
legislation, but what is the actual result in terms of tax advantages. Here, the link to 
                                            
138 The comparable tax test is only relevant if the other requirements are fulfilled, i.e. if the participation qualifies 
as a portfolio investment company. See with respect to the comparable tax test Articles 13 (10) and 13a (1) of the 
Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
139 The (fictitious) domestic amount of tax is not (or not necessarily) identical to the amount which is based on 
the statutory rate of the respective country.  
140 The (fictitious) domestic tax rate is not (or not necessarily) identical to the statutory rate of the respective 
country.  
141 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
    
                                                                                         
 
has now been reduced to an actual foreign tax which is less than 1/2 of the French 
tax for a similar transaction.129 In Germany, a foreign company is considered to be 
subject to low-taxation if the effective tax rate is below 25 percent - which was exactly 
the German corporate tax rate until the end of the year 2007.130 Interestingly, the 
corporate income tax rate was reduced to 15 percent (as of the beginning of  the 
calendar year 2008) but the low-taxation threshold remained untouched. In other 
words, the low-taxation threshold which is now required under the German CFC 
regime is higher than the German corporate tax rate of 15 percent. This has to be 
seen in the context of the German tax system. In contrast to most of the other 
countries, the trade income tax is quite significant in Germany. The overall statutory 
tax burden is therefore, after the reduction of the corporate tax rate, about 28-30 
percent (corporate tax plus trade income tax). In Italy, the CFC taxation applies to 
foreign countries which have a significantly lower tax rate, do not exchange 
information, and other equivalent criteria.131 In Hungary, the CFC taxation applies to 
foreign income if the nominal foreign tax rate is less than 2/3 of the comparable 
taxation under Hungarian law.132 Under the Portuguese CFC legislation, a low-tax 
country is one that has a comparable effective tax rate which is equal or less than 3/5 
of the Portuguese corporate tax rate or, alternatively, a jurisdiction with a privileged 
tax regime included in a so-called “black list”.133 In Lithuania, the CFC legislation is 
applicable if the CFC is subject to a taxation which is less than 3/4 of the standard 
Lithuanian profit tax rate and if the CFC is established in a state which is not included 
in the “white list” or which has a “special profit tax or analogous leeway” under the 
laws of the relevant state.134 In Spain, a company is considered to be low-taxed 
pursuant to the Spanish CFC regime if the effective foreign tax rate is less than 3/4 of 
the domestic tax rate on that income.135 In the United Kingdom, a foreign company is 
subject to low-taxation if the actual foreign tax is less than 3/4 of the amount which 
would have been paid in accordance with the respective domestic rules on that 
income.136 The Swedish CFC rules are applicable if the actual foreign tax is less than 
55 percent of a comparable Swedish taxation of the CFC income.137 In the 
Netherlands, an effective tax rate of 10 percent is required under the “comparable tax 
test” to avoid the mark-to-market revaluation. The effective tax rate is calculated 
                                            
129 The concept of a favourable tax regime is now defined by law. See with respect to the revised French CFC 
regime Gouthière, Overview of the French CFC Legislation, European Taxation 2008, page 50 et seq. 
130 Section 8 (3) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
131 The countries and territories with a preferential tax regime are published in a „black list.” The list does not 
contain European Member States, with the exception of Luxembourg in case of the “1929-holding companies.” 
132 Liszicza, National Report Hungary, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 308. See with respect to the 
Hungarian tax reform: IWB Kurznachrichten, Ungarn: Steuerreform 2008 für Körperschaften, Internationale 
Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, Fach 1, page 1218.  
133 See de Sousa da Camara / Nuncio, Portugal’s 2002 Budget Bill Revises Capital Gains Tax Regime, Tax 
Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, Doc. 2001-28988.  
134 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 397. 
135  Section 121 (1) letter b of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law. 
136 Medori, United Kingdom to Strengthen CFC Legislation, Tax Planning International Review 2000; Friel, 
National Report of the United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 871.  
137 Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Köhlmark / Källquist, 
New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, page 227 et seq.; 
Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 589.  
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would only result in additional administrative burdens without any additional (positive 
or negative) effects for the states which apply CFC rules. However, the question 
arises whether the low-tax requirement, as an important element of CFC regimes, is 
supported by the economic and equity principles described in previous chapters. 
Here, it must be kept in mind that the basic conclusion from an economic and equity 
perspective was that the income should be taxed in the state where it is produced 
(optimal scenario). The hybrid structures are part of a non-optimal scenario in which 
the basic interest component is not taxed in the state where it is produced but in an 
intermediate state. For this reason, there is no basis, from an economic and equity 
perspective, for an exclusive taxation of the basic interest component in the 
intermediate state. It was further argued that the non-taxation in the state of the 
shareholder can support the “clustering effect” in favour of hybrid investments in low-
tax states and this might result in serious distortions with respect to the competition 
among companies and states. For this reason, the residence state of the shareholder 
should, in general, tax the basic interest component on a current basis. This, at least, 
is true in a situation in which the income tax rate in the CFC state is lower than in the 
residence state of the shareholder and in the state where the income is produced (if 
this is a third state). In such a situation, it does not matter whether the deviation from 
the aforementioned tax rates is a substantial deviation or only a slight deviation. 
However, in other situations the following aspects have to be taken into account: 
 
- a.) The tax rate in the CFC state is at least as high as in the state where the 
income is produced (third state), but lower than in the state of residence of the 
shareholder: in this case, the taxation in the residence state of the shareholder 
should be limited to the (theoretical) tax rate which would be applied in the 
state where the income is produced (i.e. in case of an optimal scenario). The 
current taxation of the basic interest component should therefore not result in 
an additional tax burden in the state of residence of the shareholder. 
 
- b.) The tax rate in the CFC state is lower than in the state where the income is 
produced (third state), but at least as high as in the state of residence of the 
shareholder: in this case, there would be no additional tax in the state of 
residence of the shareholder, either. 
 
- c.) The tax rate in the CFC state is at least as high as in the state where the 
income is produced (third state) and at least as high as in the state of 
residence of the shareholder: in this case, there would be no additional tax in 
the state of residence of the shareholder, either.   
 
The question is whether the situations described under the letters a-c should result in 
a current taxation of income at all. This, of course, is also connected to the question 
whether the state of residence of the shareholder should provide for a full tax credit 
and therefore also a refund of excess foreign taxes (instead of a mere ordinary tax 
credit). The latter would be required, as outlined earlier, if one agrees with the “plain” 
principle of capital export neutrality. This, however, is not the case here. The leading 
concept should be the principle of capital import neutrality and the (limited) 
application of the principle of capital export neutrality is just required because of the 
existence of a non-optimal scenario. However, if the current taxation of income is 
solely made in order to correct, as much as possible, a situation which is neither 
acceptable from an economic perspective nor from an equity perspective, this should 
not result in the necessity of an excess foreign tax credit. For this reason, there 
    
                                                                                         
 
the actual taxes paid by the CFC or the effective tax rate of the CFC seems to be 
much more efficient. Thus, there are - in my opinion - the following basic features 
which can be seen as the typical elements with respect to low-taxation in the context 
of European CFC rules: 
 
a.) A low-taxation threshold in dependence on the domestic income taxation or the 
domestic tax rate 
 
Each country which applies a CFC taxation has its own low-taxation threshold. This, 
of course, is fully understandable since it can be assumed that the tax attractiveness 
of a foreign jurisdiction increases the more the foreign income tax rate deviates from 
the domestic income tax rate. From an administrative point of view it makes some 
sense to set a certain threshold in relation to the domestic amount of taxes or the 
domestic tax rate. Why shall a country bear the compliance costs of a current 
taxation of income (including a tax credit) in a situation where the foreign income 
taxation is equal to the domestic taxation or even higher? However, it is obvious that 
the different income tax rates among the European Member States lead to a variety 
of different thresholds. Therefore, what is considered to be low-taxation from a 
German perspective can be seen as acceptable taxation from a Finnish point of view. 
It is the mere income taxation which is important.142 Other aspects, for example the 
fact that the Finnish VAT rate is considerably higher than the German VAT rate, are 
not relevant for the comparison. 
 
b.) The “bringing in line” of the tax base through the application of domestic tax rules 
 
Apart from the different thresholds it must be taken into consideration that the 
comparison is based on the adjusted taxable income. Most of the countries apply 
their own domestic tax rules for the calculation of the tax base and the comparison of 
the effective taxation in order to determine the effective percentage of taxation. The 
CFC legislation ignores the actual tax base of the foreign company and the way it is 
calculated and therefore leads to an equalisation of foreign CFC income with 
domestic income.  
 
6.4.2. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It is obvious that the hybrid structures which were outlined in previous chapters are 
particularly attractive in those cases in which the CFC is taxed at a lower rate than in 
the state where the recipients of the services are located and in the state of 
residence of the shareholders, respectively. It is certainly true that states which apply 
a very low tax rate attract hybrid structures and it is therefore, in principle, 
understandable that the CFC regimes focus on states where the tax rate is below a 
certain threshold. Moreover, such an approach also leads to an administrative 
simplification since the rules are only applied to states where it is likely that an 
additional tax burden arises on the attributed income. This is not the case if the tax 
rate in the CFC state is as high as the tax rate in the state which applies the CFC 
rules or even higher than in the latter state. Since the Member States which apply 
CFC rules usually follow - in the context of the respective CFC rules - an ordinary tax 
credit system (and not a full tax credit system), the application to high-tax states 
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would only result in additional administrative burdens without any additional (positive 
or negative) effects for the states which apply CFC rules. However, the question 
arises whether the low-tax requirement, as an important element of CFC regimes, is 
supported by the economic and equity principles described in previous chapters. 
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this is a third state). In such a situation, it does not matter whether the deviation from 
the aforementioned tax rates is a substantial deviation or only a slight deviation. 
However, in other situations the following aspects have to be taken into account: 
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shareholder: in this case, the taxation in the residence state of the shareholder 
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state where the income is produced (i.e. in case of an optimal scenario). The 
current taxation of the basic interest component should therefore not result in 
an additional tax burden in the state of residence of the shareholder. 
 
- b.) The tax rate in the CFC state is lower than in the state where the income is 
produced (third state), but at least as high as in the state of residence of the 
shareholder: in this case, there would be no additional tax in the state of 
residence of the shareholder, either. 
 
- c.) The tax rate in the CFC state is at least as high as in the state where the 
income is produced (third state) and at least as high as in the state of 
residence of the shareholder: in this case, there would be no additional tax in 
the state of residence of the shareholder, either.   
 
The question is whether the situations described under the letters a-c should result in 
a current taxation of income at all. This, of course, is also connected to the question 
whether the state of residence of the shareholder should provide for a full tax credit 
and therefore also a refund of excess foreign taxes (instead of a mere ordinary tax 
credit). The latter would be required, as outlined earlier, if one agrees with the “plain” 
principle of capital export neutrality. This, however, is not the case here. The leading 
concept should be the principle of capital import neutrality and the (limited) 
application of the principle of capital export neutrality is just required because of the 
existence of a non-optimal scenario. However, if the current taxation of income is 
solely made in order to correct, as much as possible, a situation which is neither 
acceptable from an economic perspective nor from an equity perspective, this should 
not result in the necessity of an excess foreign tax credit. For this reason, there 
    
                                                                                         
 
the actual taxes paid by the CFC or the effective tax rate of the CFC seems to be 
much more efficient. Thus, there are - in my opinion - the following basic features 
which can be seen as the typical elements with respect to low-taxation in the context 
of European CFC rules: 
 
a.) A low-taxation threshold in dependence on the domestic income taxation or the 
domestic tax rate 
 
Each country which applies a CFC taxation has its own low-taxation threshold. This, 
of course, is fully understandable since it can be assumed that the tax attractiveness 
of a foreign jurisdiction increases the more the foreign income tax rate deviates from 
the domestic income tax rate. From an administrative point of view it makes some 
sense to set a certain threshold in relation to the domestic amount of taxes or the 
domestic tax rate. Why shall a country bear the compliance costs of a current 
taxation of income (including a tax credit) in a situation where the foreign income 
taxation is equal to the domestic taxation or even higher? However, it is obvious that 
the different income tax rates among the European Member States lead to a variety 
of different thresholds. Therefore, what is considered to be low-taxation from a 
German perspective can be seen as acceptable taxation from a Finnish point of view. 
It is the mere income taxation which is important.142 Other aspects, for example the 
fact that the Finnish VAT rate is considerably higher than the German VAT rate, are 
not relevant for the comparison. 
 
b.) The “bringing in line” of the tax base through the application of domestic tax rules 
 
Apart from the different thresholds it must be taken into consideration that the 
comparison is based on the adjusted taxable income. Most of the countries apply 
their own domestic tax rules for the calculation of the tax base and the comparison of 
the effective taxation in order to determine the effective percentage of taxation. The 
CFC legislation ignores the actual tax base of the foreign company and the way it is 
calculated and therefore leads to an equalisation of foreign CFC income with 
domestic income.  
 
6.4.2. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It is obvious that the hybrid structures which were outlined in previous chapters are 
particularly attractive in those cases in which the CFC is taxed at a lower rate than in 
the state where the recipients of the services are located and in the state of 
residence of the shareholders, respectively. It is certainly true that states which apply 
a very low tax rate attract hybrid structures and it is therefore, in principle, 
understandable that the CFC regimes focus on states where the tax rate is below a 
certain threshold. Moreover, such an approach also leads to an administrative 
simplification since the rules are only applied to states where it is likely that an 
additional tax burden arises on the attributed income. This is not the case if the tax 
rate in the CFC state is as high as the tax rate in the state which applies the CFC 
rules or even higher than in the latter state. Since the Member States which apply 
CFC rules usually follow - in the context of the respective CFC rules - an ordinary tax 
credit system (and not a full tax credit system), the application to high-tax states 
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administrative perspective - if the focus is merely on anti-avoidance - but it cannot be 
derived from the aforementioned principles.  
 
6.5. The Ownership Requirement  
 
6.5.1. Ownership and Similar Rights 
 
Another general requirement for the application of CFC rules is the shareholding in 
the foreign company. In addition to the ownership in the foreign company, voting 
rights, dividend rights or similar rights related to the foreign investment are often also 
referred to as an alternative. This is especially relevant where the percentage of 
shareholding is relatively low but other rights, e.g. the voting rights, differ from the 
percentage of shareholding and give the possibility to influence or control the foreign 
company. It has to be seen as a rule to prevent the circumvention of the CFC 
taxation and to cover all other significant constellations of having influence. However, 
the preconditions with respect to the percentage of shareholding, voting rights, 
dividend rights etc. are fairly different from country to country. For example, pursuant 
to the Danish rules, the domestic parent company must “control” the foreign 
company. In this respect, it is sufficient for the Danish parent company to own at least 
25 percent of the share capital or to control more than 50 percent of the voting rights 
at any time during the financial year of the foreign company.143 In deciding whether a 
Danish parent company may be deemed to control a subsidiary, shares and voting 
rights of group companies, individual shareholders and their relatives, and shares 
held by a fund or trust established by the parent company, group companies, 
individual shareholders and close relatives are to be taken into account.144 Based on 
the Estonian CFC rules, the requirement of control is fulfilled if one or several 
resident individuals or legal persons own, alone or together with related persons, at 
least 50 percent of the shares, votes or profit rights in the foreign company. If this is 
the case, the CFC income will be attributed to resident individuals with a participation 
of at least 10 percent in the CFC.145 In France, a resident company – originally – had 
to hold, directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the share capital, the voting rights, 
or the dividend rights at the end of the year.146 The percentage has now been 
increased to a threshold of at least 50 percent. However, the general threshold is to 
be reduced to 5 percent if 50 percent of the share capital of the foreign company is 
indirectly held through French companies or foreign companies controlled by the 
French controlling legal entity.147 Pursuant to the Finnish CFC rules, the requirement 
                                            
143 IBFD, Denmark: Changes Proposed to Taxation Inbound / Outbound Dividends and CFC Taxation, Tax 
News Service 1999, page 15; IBFD, Denmark: New Regime for Dividend Taxation Enacted, Tax News Service 
1999, page 67; Kriegbaum, Denmark Tightens CFC Taxation Once More!, Tax Planning International Review 
2001, page 9; IBFD Corporate Tax Summary (Denmark) 2002, page 19; IBFD Corporate Tax in Depth Study 
(Denmark) 2002, page 154. The revised Danish CFC rules - after Cadbury Schweppes - will be outlined in 
chapter 8.   
144 See Steenholdt / Josephsen, Denmark: The New Holding Company Regime, European Taxation 1999, page 
147 et seq.; Emmeluth, Tax Planning International Forum 2000.  
145 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 177, 179. The allocation of CFC 
income is limited to resident individuals (Uustalu, pages 176, 179). 
146 This was applied to shares owned after September 30, 1992. For shares owned before September 30, 1992, a 
threshold of a least 25 percent existed.  
147 New section 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Ippolito / Pontnau-Faure, France: CFC Rules Reform, Tax 
Planning International Transfer Pricing, 2005, page 10; Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, 
Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 1417 et seq. (1420); Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax 
    
                                                                                         
 
seems to be no requirement for an application of the concept of current taxation of 
the basic interest component if it does not have any impact in the state of residence 
of the shareholder. It is absolutely clear, though, that this question will be influenced 
by EU law as well. I will therefore go into further detail in subsequent chapters and 
will provide an alternative legislation in chapter 9.  
 
However, based on the aspects outlined above it must be concluded that the typical 
approach of creating a “link” to a low tax rate - which is defined as a fraction or a 
certain deviation from the domestic tax rate - is not in line with the concept of basic 
interest taxation. There is no basis from an economic or equity perspective for the 
application of a system of current taxation of income just in case of a pre-determined 
fraction or deviation. For example, if a CFC regime stipulates that the rules are only 
applicable if the tax rate of the CFC is less than 1/2 of the comparable domestic rate, 
this cannot be the decisive criterion - from an economic and equity perspective - for 
the question whether the income should be subject to current taxation or not. Why 
should, in this example, the income which is taxed in the CFC state with 1/3 of the 
comparable domestic tax rate be subject to current taxation but not the income which 
is taxed in the CFC state with 2/3 of the comparable domestic tax rate? In my 
opinion, the answer can only be based on pure anti-avoidance aspects and - perhaps 
in addition - administrative reasons. However, if the focus of the system of current 
taxation is on the safeguarding of competitiveness the aforementioned differentiation, 
based on the pre-determined low tax rate of the CFC (in the example less than 1/2), 
cannot be considered an efficient and target-oriented approach. In fact, such a 
concept can only result in further distortions since the separation process is - at least 
partially - based on a randomly chosen criterion, namely the fraction of (or the 
deviation from) the comparable domestic tax rate.  
 
6.4.3. Conclusions Regarding the Low-Taxation Requirement   
 
The requirement of low-taxation is a common feature in all European countries with a 
CFC regime. From the perspective of those countries, the current taxation of CFC 
income seems to be necessary only in cases where the actual foreign taxes or the 
effective foreign tax rate are below a certain threshold and the income is therefore 
considered to be low-taxed. If the CFC income is subject to a taxation which is 
comparable to the domestic taxation or even higher than the domestic taxation, an 
immediate attribution of income to the resident shareholder will not take place. Of 
course, this underlines the anti-avoidance approach of CFC taxation. The low-
taxation threshold differs from country to country and mainly depends on the 
respective domestic income tax rate. Furthermore, the determination of the effective 
foreign tax rate is in most cases based on the taxable income which is adjusted 
according to the domestic tax rules. It is therefore the domestic standard which is 
applied for the determination of the effective foreign tax rate.  
 
It was outlined in chapters 2 and 3 that the current taxation of income should focus 
on the basic interest component. The only limitation with respect to the tax rate 
imposed in the state of residence of the shareholder might be the theoretical income 
tax rate in the state of source. However, there should not be any dependence on the 
income tax rate in the state of the CFC. For this reason, the link to a certain (low-)tax 
rate in the existing European CFC regimes, as a requirement for the application of 
CFC rules, is not supported by the economic and equity principles of chapter 2 and 
chapter 3, respectively. Of course, such a requirement can be a simplification from an 
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administrative perspective - if the focus is merely on anti-avoidance - but it cannot be 
derived from the aforementioned principles.  
 
6.5. The Ownership Requirement  
 
6.5.1. Ownership and Similar Rights 
 
Another general requirement for the application of CFC rules is the shareholding in 
the foreign company. In addition to the ownership in the foreign company, voting 
rights, dividend rights or similar rights related to the foreign investment are often also 
referred to as an alternative. This is especially relevant where the percentage of 
shareholding is relatively low but other rights, e.g. the voting rights, differ from the 
percentage of shareholding and give the possibility to influence or control the foreign 
company. It has to be seen as a rule to prevent the circumvention of the CFC 
taxation and to cover all other significant constellations of having influence. However, 
the preconditions with respect to the percentage of shareholding, voting rights, 
dividend rights etc. are fairly different from country to country. For example, pursuant 
to the Danish rules, the domestic parent company must “control” the foreign 
company. In this respect, it is sufficient for the Danish parent company to own at least 
25 percent of the share capital or to control more than 50 percent of the voting rights 
at any time during the financial year of the foreign company.143 In deciding whether a 
Danish parent company may be deemed to control a subsidiary, shares and voting 
rights of group companies, individual shareholders and their relatives, and shares 
held by a fund or trust established by the parent company, group companies, 
individual shareholders and close relatives are to be taken into account.144 Based on 
the Estonian CFC rules, the requirement of control is fulfilled if one or several 
resident individuals or legal persons own, alone or together with related persons, at 
least 50 percent of the shares, votes or profit rights in the foreign company. If this is 
the case, the CFC income will be attributed to resident individuals with a participation 
of at least 10 percent in the CFC.145 In France, a resident company – originally – had 
to hold, directly or indirectly, at least 10 percent of the share capital, the voting rights, 
or the dividend rights at the end of the year.146 The percentage has now been 
increased to a threshold of at least 50 percent. However, the general threshold is to 
be reduced to 5 percent if 50 percent of the share capital of the foreign company is 
indirectly held through French companies or foreign companies controlled by the 
French controlling legal entity.147 Pursuant to the Finnish CFC rules, the requirement 
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seems to be no requirement for an application of the concept of current taxation of 
the basic interest component if it does not have any impact in the state of residence 
of the shareholder. It is absolutely clear, though, that this question will be influenced 
by EU law as well. I will therefore go into further detail in subsequent chapters and 
will provide an alternative legislation in chapter 9.  
 
However, based on the aspects outlined above it must be concluded that the typical 
approach of creating a “link” to a low tax rate - which is defined as a fraction or a 
certain deviation from the domestic tax rate - is not in line with the concept of basic 
interest taxation. There is no basis from an economic or equity perspective for the 
application of a system of current taxation of income just in case of a pre-determined 
fraction or deviation. For example, if a CFC regime stipulates that the rules are only 
applicable if the tax rate of the CFC is less than 1/2 of the comparable domestic rate, 
this cannot be the decisive criterion - from an economic and equity perspective - for 
the question whether the income should be subject to current taxation or not. Why 
should, in this example, the income which is taxed in the CFC state with 1/3 of the 
comparable domestic tax rate be subject to current taxation but not the income which 
is taxed in the CFC state with 2/3 of the comparable domestic tax rate? In my 
opinion, the answer can only be based on pure anti-avoidance aspects and - perhaps 
in addition - administrative reasons. However, if the focus of the system of current 
taxation is on the safeguarding of competitiveness the aforementioned differentiation, 
based on the pre-determined low tax rate of the CFC (in the example less than 1/2), 
cannot be considered an efficient and target-oriented approach. In fact, such a 
concept can only result in further distortions since the separation process is - at least 
partially - based on a randomly chosen criterion, namely the fraction of (or the 
deviation from) the comparable domestic tax rate.  
 
6.4.3. Conclusions Regarding the Low-Taxation Requirement   
 
The requirement of low-taxation is a common feature in all European countries with a 
CFC regime. From the perspective of those countries, the current taxation of CFC 
income seems to be necessary only in cases where the actual foreign taxes or the 
effective foreign tax rate are below a certain threshold and the income is therefore 
considered to be low-taxed. If the CFC income is subject to a taxation which is 
comparable to the domestic taxation or even higher than the domestic taxation, an 
immediate attribution of income to the resident shareholder will not take place. Of 
course, this underlines the anti-avoidance approach of CFC taxation. The low-
taxation threshold differs from country to country and mainly depends on the 
respective domestic income tax rate. Furthermore, the determination of the effective 
foreign tax rate is in most cases based on the taxable income which is adjusted 
according to the domestic tax rules. It is therefore the domestic standard which is 
applied for the determination of the effective foreign tax rate.  
 
It was outlined in chapters 2 and 3 that the current taxation of income should focus 
on the basic interest component. The only limitation with respect to the tax rate 
imposed in the state of residence of the shareholder might be the theoretical income 
tax rate in the state of source. However, there should not be any dependence on the 
income tax rate in the state of the CFC. For this reason, the link to a certain (low-)tax 
rate in the existing European CFC regimes, as a requirement for the application of 
CFC rules, is not supported by the economic and equity principles of chapter 2 and 
chapter 3, respectively. Of course, such a requirement can be a simplification from an 
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However, the Italian tax reform reduced the required participation substantially. Now, 
the Italian CFC rules are applicable if the participation in the foreign company is at 
least 20 percent.158 In Lithuania, a foreign company is controlled if the resident entity 
(or individual) together with related entities – directly or indirectly – holds more than 
50 percent of the shares or similar rights. The concept of related entities is broader 
and thus already fulfilled in case of a more than 25 percent participation of one entity 
in another entity. Based on these rules, there is a “real” controlling requirement (more 
than 50 percent) for the application of CFC taxation with a broader concept of related 
entities.159 The requirement of control must be fulfilled on the last day of the taxable 
period of the controlled entity.160 In Portugal, the requirement is fulfilled if a 
Portuguese resident, directly or indirectly, owns at least 25 percent of the share 
capital in the foreign company at the end of the financial year of the CFC.161 Even a 
participation of 10 percent of the share capital is sufficient if more than 50 percent of 
the share capital is held by Portuguese residents.162 In Spain, the CFC rules apply to 
situations where a Spanish resident company, alone or together with related persons, 
holds at least 50 percent in the capital, equity, results or voting rights at the end of 
the fiscal year of the CFC.163 In Sweden, the CFC rules require a direct or indirect 
shareholding (or voting rights) of at least 25 percent at the end of the fiscal year of 
the CFC.164 In the United Kingdom, control requires the persons to have the power to 
secure that the foreign company is operated in accordance with their wishes (i) by 
means of the holding of shares or the possession of voting power in or in relation to 
the company or any other company, or (ii) by virtue of any powers conferred by the 
articles of association or other document regulating the company or any other 
company.165 In addition, a “joint venture” rule was added to the existing control 
requirement. The rule applies to situations where (i) there are two persons who, 
taken together, control the non-resident company; and (ii) one of them is resident in 
the United Kingdom and has rights giving him control of at least 40 percent of the 
                                                                                                                                         
Participation Exemption Extended; Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, page 77 et seq.; 
Corabi, The New Italian CFC Regime, Tax Planning International Transfer Pricing, 2001; Conci / Kessler / 
Puricelli / Schommer, Die Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2002, page 763 et 
seq.  
158 Although the revised provisions of the Italian CFC regime had already been included in the tax reform 2004, 
they became effective as of the tax year 2006 since the publication in the “Gazetta Ufficiale” was on October 20, 
2006 (see Mayr, Änderungen im italienischen Steuerrecht 2007 (Teil I), Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, 
Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 559 et seq. (570)).  
159 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 395, 396.  
160 In general, the taxable period in Lithuania is a calendar year. If the taxable period of the controlled entity does 
not coincide with the calendar year, then for the purposes of the Lithuanian Law on Profit Tax the taxable period 
of the controlled entity shall be deemed to coincide with the taxable period of the controlling entity (see  
Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 395). 
161 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 780. 
162 Section 57-B, section 60 (1) of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act.  
163 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 563. 
164 See Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Koehlmark / 
Kaellqvist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, pages 225-
232; Muten, Sweden’s CFC Rules Under Change, Tax Notes International 2003, pages 216-217; Dahlberg, 
National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 588.  
165 Section 755D of the United Kingdom Corporate Income Tax Act; Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in 
Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on 
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of control is fulfilled if one or more Finnish residents own at least 50 percent of the 
share capital of the foreign company or if one or more Finnish residents are entitled 
to at least 50 percent of the return on capital of the company. The Finnish 
shareholders are subject to tax on their respective portion of the CFC income if they - 
and certain related parties - own at least 10 percent of the share capital or are 
entitled to at least 10 percent of the return on capital of the company.148 The control 
situation is evaluated at the end of the accounting period of the foreign company.149 
In Germany, it is required that the resident shareholder owns, directly or indirectly, 
more than 50 percent of the shares, the voting rights, or dividend rights at the end of 
the financial year of the CFC.150 If this is the case, the tainted income of the CFC is to 
be allocated to all resident shareholders regardless of the size of their shareholding 
in the CFC.151 A separate threshold exists for passive income of a capital investment 
kind: if the income of the CFC includes passive income of a capital investment kind 
and the shareholding in the CFC is at least 1 percent, the income will be allocated to 
the resident shareholder, unless the income of a capital investment kind comprises 
only a minor part of the whole CFC income.152 The rules even go one step further in 
case the CFC exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital 
investment kind. In such a situation, the relevant income will be attributed to the 
resident taxpayer even if the shareholding in the CFC is below 1 percent. An 
exemption exists where the shares in the CFC are quoted on a stock exchange and 
the shares are traded regularly and considerably.153 The Italian rules required the 
CFC to be, directly or indirectly, controlled by an Italian resident at the end of the 
financial year of the foreign entity. In order to determine the degree of control the 
Italian CFC rules relied on the definition of control included in the Italian Civil Code.154 
Based on this definition, the foreign company was controlled if the Italian resident 
had (i) the majority of voting rights that can be exercised in the ordinary general 
meeting of the foreign company, (ii) sufficient voting rights to influence the decisions 
taken by the ordinary general meeting, (iii) decisive influence by virtue of contractual 
agreements with the foreign company. Especially the latter concept of control155 was 
rather unusual and led to some uncertainty.156 Voting rights held by controlled 
companies, fiduciary companies and of intermediaries were taken into account.157 
                                                                                                                                         
Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax 
Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
148 As a consequence the 10 percent ownership requirement cannot be circumvented by splitting the ownership 
between related parties of the shareholder. The shares have to be added together and if the total shareholding is 
at least 10 percent, the CFC taxation will be applied; see also Ernst & Young, Country Survey Finland, January 
2002.  
149 Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 196, Fn. 23. 
150 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
151 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
152 The income of a capital investment kind must not exceed 10 percent of the gross revenues of the CFC and 
must not exceed 62.000,00 Euro (section 7 (6) of the German Foreign Tax Act).  
153 Section 7 (6a) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
154 Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code; see also Conci / Kessler / Puricelli / Schommer, Die 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 763 et seq. (764, 765).  
155 Controllo contrattuale  
156 See Busetto / Russo, Final Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation Enacted, European Taxation 2001, 
page 32 et seq.; Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 354.  
157 Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 354; see also Giuliani, Italy Introduces 
CFC legislation, World Tax Adviser (February) 2002; Nanetti, Italy’s Controlled Foreign Companies 
Legislation, IBFD-Bulletin 2000, page 281 et seq.; Gazzo, Italy’s CFC Legislation Implemented and 
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However, the Italian tax reform reduced the required participation substantially. Now, 
the Italian CFC rules are applicable if the participation in the foreign company is at 
least 20 percent.158 In Lithuania, a foreign company is controlled if the resident entity 
(or individual) together with related entities – directly or indirectly – holds more than 
50 percent of the shares or similar rights. The concept of related entities is broader 
and thus already fulfilled in case of a more than 25 percent participation of one entity 
in another entity. Based on these rules, there is a “real” controlling requirement (more 
than 50 percent) for the application of CFC taxation with a broader concept of related 
entities.159 The requirement of control must be fulfilled on the last day of the taxable 
period of the controlled entity.160 In Portugal, the requirement is fulfilled if a 
Portuguese resident, directly or indirectly, owns at least 25 percent of the share 
capital in the foreign company at the end of the financial year of the CFC.161 Even a 
participation of 10 percent of the share capital is sufficient if more than 50 percent of 
the share capital is held by Portuguese residents.162 In Spain, the CFC rules apply to 
situations where a Spanish resident company, alone or together with related persons, 
holds at least 50 percent in the capital, equity, results or voting rights at the end of 
the fiscal year of the CFC.163 In Sweden, the CFC rules require a direct or indirect 
shareholding (or voting rights) of at least 25 percent at the end of the fiscal year of 
the CFC.164 In the United Kingdom, control requires the persons to have the power to 
secure that the foreign company is operated in accordance with their wishes (i) by 
means of the holding of shares or the possession of voting power in or in relation to 
the company or any other company, or (ii) by virtue of any powers conferred by the 
articles of association or other document regulating the company or any other 
company.165 In addition, a “joint venture” rule was added to the existing control 
requirement. The rule applies to situations where (i) there are two persons who, 
taken together, control the non-resident company; and (ii) one of them is resident in 
the United Kingdom and has rights giving him control of at least 40 percent of the 
                                                                                                                                         
Participation Exemption Extended; Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2002, page 77 et seq.; 
Corabi, The New Italian CFC Regime, Tax Planning International Transfer Pricing, 2001; Conci / Kessler / 
Puricelli / Schommer, Die Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2002, page 763 et 
seq.  
158 Although the revised provisions of the Italian CFC regime had already been included in the tax reform 2004, 
they became effective as of the tax year 2006 since the publication in the “Gazetta Ufficiale” was on October 20, 
2006 (see Mayr, Änderungen im italienischen Steuerrecht 2007 (Teil I), Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2007, 
Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 559 et seq. (570)).  
159 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 395, 396.  
160 In general, the taxable period in Lithuania is a calendar year. If the taxable period of the controlled entity does 
not coincide with the calendar year, then for the purposes of the Lithuanian Law on Profit Tax the taxable period 
of the controlled entity shall be deemed to coincide with the taxable period of the controlling entity (see  
Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 395). 
161 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 780. 
162 Section 57-B, section 60 (1) of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act.  
163 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 563. 
164 See Delphi & Co., New CFC legislation introduced in Sweden, December 2003, page 1; Koehlmark / 
Kaellqvist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, pages 225-
232; Muten, Sweden’s CFC Rules Under Change, Tax Notes International 2003, pages 216-217; Dahlberg, 
National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 588.  
165 Section 755D of the United Kingdom Corporate Income Tax Act; Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in 
Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on 
European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 615. 
    
                                                                                         
 
of control is fulfilled if one or more Finnish residents own at least 50 percent of the 
share capital of the foreign company or if one or more Finnish residents are entitled 
to at least 50 percent of the return on capital of the company. The Finnish 
shareholders are subject to tax on their respective portion of the CFC income if they - 
and certain related parties - own at least 10 percent of the share capital or are 
entitled to at least 10 percent of the return on capital of the company.148 The control 
situation is evaluated at the end of the accounting period of the foreign company.149 
In Germany, it is required that the resident shareholder owns, directly or indirectly, 
more than 50 percent of the shares, the voting rights, or dividend rights at the end of 
the financial year of the CFC.150 If this is the case, the tainted income of the CFC is to 
be allocated to all resident shareholders regardless of the size of their shareholding 
in the CFC.151 A separate threshold exists for passive income of a capital investment 
kind: if the income of the CFC includes passive income of a capital investment kind 
and the shareholding in the CFC is at least 1 percent, the income will be allocated to 
the resident shareholder, unless the income of a capital investment kind comprises 
only a minor part of the whole CFC income.152 The rules even go one step further in 
case the CFC exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital 
investment kind. In such a situation, the relevant income will be attributed to the 
resident taxpayer even if the shareholding in the CFC is below 1 percent. An 
exemption exists where the shares in the CFC are quoted on a stock exchange and 
the shares are traded regularly and considerably.153 The Italian rules required the 
CFC to be, directly or indirectly, controlled by an Italian resident at the end of the 
financial year of the foreign entity. In order to determine the degree of control the 
Italian CFC rules relied on the definition of control included in the Italian Civil Code.154 
Based on this definition, the foreign company was controlled if the Italian resident 
had (i) the majority of voting rights that can be exercised in the ordinary general 
meeting of the foreign company, (ii) sufficient voting rights to influence the decisions 
taken by the ordinary general meeting, (iii) decisive influence by virtue of contractual 
agreements with the foreign company. Especially the latter concept of control155 was 
rather unusual and led to some uncertainty.156 Voting rights held by controlled 
companies, fiduciary companies and of intermediaries were taken into account.157 
                                                                                                                                         
Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax 
Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
148 As a consequence the 10 percent ownership requirement cannot be circumvented by splitting the ownership 
between related parties of the shareholder. The shares have to be added together and if the total shareholding is 
at least 10 percent, the CFC taxation will be applied; see also Ernst & Young, Country Survey Finland, January 
2002.  
149 Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 196, Fn. 23. 
150 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act. 
151 Section 7 (1), (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
152 The income of a capital investment kind must not exceed 10 percent of the gross revenues of the CFC and 
must not exceed 62.000,00 Euro (section 7 (6) of the German Foreign Tax Act).  
153 Section 7 (6a) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
154 Article 2359 of the Italian Civil Code; see also Conci / Kessler / Puricelli / Schommer, Die 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 763 et seq. (764, 765).  
155 Controllo contrattuale  
156 See Busetto / Russo, Final Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation Enacted, European Taxation 2001, 
page 32 et seq.; Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 354.  
157 Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 354; see also Giuliani, Italy Introduces 
CFC legislation, World Tax Adviser (February) 2002; Nanetti, Italy’s Controlled Foreign Companies 
Legislation, IBFD-Bulletin 2000, page 281 et seq.; Gazzo, Italy’s CFC Legislation Implemented and 
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Italian company did not have the control over the CFC, even though the overall 
mathematical participation in the CFC was 52 percent.172  
 
Another approach is the focus on the percentage in the CFC only. This can be 
particularly relevant for countries which require a lower percentage of participation in 
the foreign company. For example, the Portuguese CFC rules require a shareholding 
of at least 25 percent. The indirect control is calculated by multiplying the 
percentages in a chain of companies. That means the overall percentage in the CFC 
must be 25 percent or more - irrespective of the percentages in the intermediary 
companies. Of course, it is clear that from a mathematical perspective the 
percentage cannot be less than 25 percent in a direct line of intermediate companies, 
otherwise the participation in the CFC is less than 25 percent, too. However, the 
question can be of relevance where intermediate sister companies are involved. 
Here, it seems that only the final result is decisive - and not the intermediate 
percentages.173 In other words, a percentage of 24 percent in an intermediate 
company is sufficient if the final shareholding in the CFC is at least 25 percent (for 
example in combination with a direct shareholding of the Portuguese resident 
company in the CFC). This, of course, is a significant deviation from the treatment 
outlined above with respect to the majority shareholdings and the shareholdings of at 
least 50 percent.  
 
6.5.3. Constructive Ownership Rules  
 
Another topic which is of importance in the context of direct and indirect shareholding 
in the CFC is the question of constructive ownership rules. In general, the current 
taxation of foreign income derived by the CFC has negative consequences for the 
domestic taxpayer. Since an important element is the percentage of shareholding in 
the foreign company, it is likely that taxpayers try to avoid that the threshold is 
reached or exceeded. Therefore, the CFC legislation has to deal with direct and 
indirect shareholdings (see above) and the shareholdings through related parties. 
Another theoretical possibility - although certainly less effective - would be to deal 
with the circumvention of CFC rules in the context of general anti-avoidance 
provisions. In fact, most of the countries implemented constructive ownership rules 
within their CFC legislation and therefore try to prevent the circumvention of CFC 
taxation. The shares, voting rights and similar rights which are held by certain related 
parties are taken into account for the calculation of the respective threshold and for 
the answer to the question whether “control” exists or not.174  
 
However, the determination of the percentage of shareholding for the question 
whether the requirement of control is fulfilled or not is to be seen separately from the 
determination of the percentage of shareholding for the purpose of allocating the 
respective CFC income to the shareholder. It is obvious that in the first-mentioned 
                                            
172 40% + (30% x 40%) = 52%; see the example in Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 354. However, the required percentage for the application of the Italian CFC regime was reduced to 
20 percent in the foreign company (as of the tax year 2006 - see above for further details).  
173 See the example in: de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax 
Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 784, 785.  
174 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43; Amat / Monasterio, Spain: Controlled Foreign 
Corporation Legislation, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1995, page 290; Steenholdt / 
Josephsen, Denmark: The New Holding Company Regime, European Taxation 1999, page 147 et seq. 
    
                                                                                         
 
voting power; and (iii) the other person is not resident in the United Kingdom and has 
rights giving him control of at least 40 percent but not more than 55 percent of the 
voting power.166 It is sufficient that the requirement of control is fulfilled at any time 
during the year.167 In the Netherlands, the mark-to-market revaluation is only 
applicable in case of a shareholding of at least 25 percent.168  
 
6.5.2. Indirect Ownership 
 
It is not only the direct shareholding in a CFC which is covered by CFC taxation but 
also the indirect shareholding through, for example, subsidiary companies.169 
Otherwise, the CFC rules could be easily circumvented by the interposition of a 
foreign subsidiary company which is not subject to CFC taxation and which is located 
in a country without such legislation.170 The basic question is how the relevant 
percentages outlined above have to be applied to indirect shareholdings. This seems 
to a large extent to be a mathematical question. The countries which require a 
participation of 50 percent, or more than 50 percent (e.g. Germany), have to reach 
the threshold - combined or alone - on each of the several tiers between the domestic 
shareholder(s) and the CFC. For example, a Finish company which owns 50 percent 
in the shares of a foreign intermediary company which itself owns 50 percent in the 
CFC fulfils the requirement, even though the mathematical participation in the CFC is 
only 25 percent.171 It is decisive that the required percentage is reached on both tiers, 
irrespective of the mathematical result of ownership on the lowest tier, and gives 
therefore the possibility to influence the decisions - based on the required Finnish 
threshold - on all levels of shareholding. The same was basically true for Italy and 
Germany (as long as it refers to the more than 50 percent shareholding provision). A 
percentage of more than 50 percent in the CFC was not sufficient if it was not 
reached on all intermediate levels. For example, if an Italian company held 40 
percent in the CFC and indirectly - through a foreign intermediate company - another 
30 percent, this did not lead to control in the sense of the Italian CFC legislation if the 
shareholding in the intermediate company was - for example - only 40 percent. The 
                                            
166 Hughes, The U.K.’s Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation: A Very Real Threat, Tax Notes International 
2000, page 2528; Taylor, Further Changes to Double Taxation Relief (DTR) and Controlled Foreign Company 
(CFC) Measures, Tax Planning International Review 2000, page 39; Medori, United Kingdom to Strengthen 
CFC Legislation, Tax Planning International Review 2000, page 12; Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, page 878; Leegaard, United Kingdom: CFC Legislation - Recent Changes to the Acceptable 
Distribution Policy Exemption, European Taxation 2001, page 294.  
167 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 62. 
168 Article 13a (1), (3) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act; see also Bakker / van de Rijt, Netherlands 
Corporate Income Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
2006, page 308 et seq. (312). 
169 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43. 
170 Which was a problem in Sweden where the former CFC legislation was only applicable to direct 
shareholdings and not to indirect shareholdings in a CFC (see Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / 
Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European 
Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 587.  
171 50% x 50%; see the example in Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, 
CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 
196, Fn. 23.  
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Italian company did not have the control over the CFC, even though the overall 
mathematical participation in the CFC was 52 percent.172  
 
Another approach is the focus on the percentage in the CFC only. This can be 
particularly relevant for countries which require a lower percentage of participation in 
the foreign company. For example, the Portuguese CFC rules require a shareholding 
of at least 25 percent. The indirect control is calculated by multiplying the 
percentages in a chain of companies. That means the overall percentage in the CFC 
must be 25 percent or more - irrespective of the percentages in the intermediary 
companies. Of course, it is clear that from a mathematical perspective the 
percentage cannot be less than 25 percent in a direct line of intermediate companies, 
otherwise the participation in the CFC is less than 25 percent, too. However, the 
question can be of relevance where intermediate sister companies are involved. 
Here, it seems that only the final result is decisive - and not the intermediate 
percentages.173 In other words, a percentage of 24 percent in an intermediate 
company is sufficient if the final shareholding in the CFC is at least 25 percent (for 
example in combination with a direct shareholding of the Portuguese resident 
company in the CFC). This, of course, is a significant deviation from the treatment 
outlined above with respect to the majority shareholdings and the shareholdings of at 
least 50 percent.  
 
6.5.3. Constructive Ownership Rules  
 
Another topic which is of importance in the context of direct and indirect shareholding 
in the CFC is the question of constructive ownership rules. In general, the current 
taxation of foreign income derived by the CFC has negative consequences for the 
domestic taxpayer. Since an important element is the percentage of shareholding in 
the foreign company, it is likely that taxpayers try to avoid that the threshold is 
reached or exceeded. Therefore, the CFC legislation has to deal with direct and 
indirect shareholdings (see above) and the shareholdings through related parties. 
Another theoretical possibility - although certainly less effective - would be to deal 
with the circumvention of CFC rules in the context of general anti-avoidance 
provisions. In fact, most of the countries implemented constructive ownership rules 
within their CFC legislation and therefore try to prevent the circumvention of CFC 
taxation. The shares, voting rights and similar rights which are held by certain related 
parties are taken into account for the calculation of the respective threshold and for 
the answer to the question whether “control” exists or not.174  
 
However, the determination of the percentage of shareholding for the question 
whether the requirement of control is fulfilled or not is to be seen separately from the 
determination of the percentage of shareholding for the purpose of allocating the 
respective CFC income to the shareholder. It is obvious that in the first-mentioned 
                                            
172 40% + (30% x 40%) = 52%; see the example in Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 354. However, the required percentage for the application of the Italian CFC regime was reduced to 
20 percent in the foreign company (as of the tax year 2006 - see above for further details).  
173 See the example in: de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax 
Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 784, 785.  
174 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43; Amat / Monasterio, Spain: Controlled Foreign 
Corporation Legislation, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1995, page 290; Steenholdt / 
Josephsen, Denmark: The New Holding Company Regime, European Taxation 1999, page 147 et seq. 
    
                                                                                         
 
voting power; and (iii) the other person is not resident in the United Kingdom and has 
rights giving him control of at least 40 percent but not more than 55 percent of the 
voting power.166 It is sufficient that the requirement of control is fulfilled at any time 
during the year.167 In the Netherlands, the mark-to-market revaluation is only 
applicable in case of a shareholding of at least 25 percent.168  
 
6.5.2. Indirect Ownership 
 
It is not only the direct shareholding in a CFC which is covered by CFC taxation but 
also the indirect shareholding through, for example, subsidiary companies.169 
Otherwise, the CFC rules could be easily circumvented by the interposition of a 
foreign subsidiary company which is not subject to CFC taxation and which is located 
in a country without such legislation.170 The basic question is how the relevant 
percentages outlined above have to be applied to indirect shareholdings. This seems 
to a large extent to be a mathematical question. The countries which require a 
participation of 50 percent, or more than 50 percent (e.g. Germany), have to reach 
the threshold - combined or alone - on each of the several tiers between the domestic 
shareholder(s) and the CFC. For example, a Finish company which owns 50 percent 
in the shares of a foreign intermediary company which itself owns 50 percent in the 
CFC fulfils the requirement, even though the mathematical participation in the CFC is 
only 25 percent.171 It is decisive that the required percentage is reached on both tiers, 
irrespective of the mathematical result of ownership on the lowest tier, and gives 
therefore the possibility to influence the decisions - based on the required Finnish 
threshold - on all levels of shareholding. The same was basically true for Italy and 
Germany (as long as it refers to the more than 50 percent shareholding provision). A 
percentage of more than 50 percent in the CFC was not sufficient if it was not 
reached on all intermediate levels. For example, if an Italian company held 40 
percent in the CFC and indirectly - through a foreign intermediate company - another 
30 percent, this did not lead to control in the sense of the Italian CFC legislation if the 
shareholding in the intermediate company was - for example - only 40 percent. The 
                                            
166 Hughes, The U.K.’s Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation: A Very Real Threat, Tax Notes International 
2000, page 2528; Taylor, Further Changes to Double Taxation Relief (DTR) and Controlled Foreign Company 
(CFC) Measures, Tax Planning International Review 2000, page 39; Medori, United Kingdom to Strengthen 
CFC Legislation, Tax Planning International Review 2000, page 12; Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in 
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Distribution Policy Exemption, European Taxation 2001, page 294.  
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168 Article 13a (1), (3) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act; see also Bakker / van de Rijt, Netherlands 
Corporate Income Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 
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170 Which was a problem in Sweden where the former CFC legislation was only applicable to direct 
shareholdings and not to indirect shareholdings in a CFC (see Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / 
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171 50% x 50%; see the example in Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, 
CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 
196, Fn. 23.  
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6.5.5. Conclusions Regarding the Ownership Requirement   
 
The percentage of ownership, voting rights, dividend rights, and other rights related 
to the foreign company differs considerably from country to country. However, it is 
important to recognise that the requirement of “control” in the sense of a majority 
shareholding, i.e. a resident shareholder or a group of related shareholders own 
more than 50 percent of the shares in the foreign company, is in almost all of the 
European CFC countries not the required criterion. That means, there is either a 
lower threshold or other - alternative - criteria exist which can trigger the application 
of the respective CFC rules. This is a significant fact since the majority shareholding 
is - in a typical situation - the only possibility to decide on a profit distribution of the 
company against the position of other substantial shareholders (under the 
assumption that there are no other (substantial) shareholders who support the profit 
distribution).175  
 
Instead, some of the CFC countries require a participation of at least 50 percent. 
However, a shareholding of 50 percent in a company gives only significant influence 
if the 50 percent test is related to a single shareholder or to a group of shareholders 
who are somehow related. This is the case in Spain, where the requirement of control 
is fulfilled if a Spanish resident company, alone or together with related persons, 
holds at least 50 percent in the capital, equity, results or voting rights. The 50 percent 
threshold does not make any sense, in my opinion, where it is simply referred to 
“residents” of the respective country. Pursuant to such a rule, the mere coincidence 
that a great number of unrelated residents hold 50 percent (or more) in a respective 
company can trigger a CFC taxation, even though the single shareholder is far away 
from any substantial shareholding in the foreign company. For example, Germany176 
and Finland177 have such rules where it is generally referred to residents of the 
respective country. Similar rules exist in France where the threshold is reduced to 
only 5 percent if certain requirements are fulfilled.178 
 
However, a substantial number of European CFC countries apply a threshold which 
is below 50 percent and does therefore not give sufficient rights to influence a profit 
distribution or the decisions of the company.179 The “joint venture” rule in the United 
Kingdom, for example, triggers the CFC taxation if a shareholding of at least 40 
percent exists. In Denmark, Portugal and Sweden a participation of 25 percent is 
sufficient for the application of the CFC taxation. The same is true for the Netherlands 
in case of the mark-to-market revaluation.180 At least, a percentage of 25 percent or 
more can in some countries be high enough to block certain decisions. But it is 
certainly not sufficient to actively influence the decisions of the company against the 
position of other shareholders. Some of the CFC countries apply a threshold of at 
least 10 percent (e.g. Finland,181 Portugal182 and the former CFC rules in France). 
                                            
175 At least in a situation where the other shareholder(s) also has / have significant influence on the company.  
176 The requirement refers to more than 50 percent of domestic taxpayers (however, separate provisions exist for 
income of a capital investment kind).  
177 If the requirement of at least 50 percent of Finish residents is fulfilled, the allocation of income will only be 
made to residents with a shareholding of at least 10 percent (related parties are taken into account).  
178 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code.  
179 Of course, this depends on the respective circumstances.  
180 Article 13a (1), (3) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
181 As a minimum threshold for the allocation of income.  
182 The threshold in Portugal is reduced from 25 percent to 10 percent if more than 50 percent of the share capital 
is held by Portuguese residents.  
    
                                                                                         
 
situation all types of (constructive) ownership are taken into account and that voting 
rights (and similar rights) are as important as the shareholding in the company itself. 
However, if it comes to the allocation of income, the CFC income is allocated to 
shareholders only. The reason is that voting rights (or similar rights) do not transfer 
the right to participate in the income of the CFC. It is therefore obvious, in my opinion, 
that only the participation in the company should result in an income attribution 
according to CFC rules. As far as I can see there is no European CFC regime which 
allocates the CFC income to a resident individual or legal entity solely on the basis of 
voting rights (or similar rights), i.e. without the holding of any shares in the CFC. 
 
6.5.4. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
From an economic perspective, the conclusions regarding a concept which is based 
on the current taxation of the basic interest component is, in general, not linked to a 
certain minimum percentage of shareholding or voting rights. The fact that the basic 
interest component is to be taxed in the residence state of the shareholder is a 
necessity which is due to the fact that this portion of income is not taxed in the state 
where it is produced. Hence, it is a measure to safeguard competitiveness within a 
non-optimal scenario. The current taxation of income in order to come closer to an 
economically preferred scenario is required irrespective of the degree of influence in 
the respective legal entity. For this reason, it would be logical, from a mere economic 
perspective, to apply the concept of current taxation without looking at the 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights.  
 
On the other hand, a legislation which follows the concept of basic interest taxation 
should by no means lead to any penalisation of investments. For this reason, a 
resident investor must have the possibility - also in case of a foreign investment - of 
gathering the information which is required by the residence state of the shareholder 
and of fulfilling its (domestic) obligations. The fact that an alternative system should 
result in a more efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation 
requires, therefore, that the administrative burden is as low as possible and that the 
concept appropriately reflects the principle of equity. The minimum threshold for the 
application of a system of current taxation should therefore be high enough to find a 
balance between the obligations of the shareholder and the interest of the state of 
residence of the shareholder to tax part of the income on a current basis. I will deal 
with this question in some more detail - also with reference to the existing CFC rules - 
in chapter 9 where the alternative concept will be outlined.  
 
The question of a minimum threshold might also be influenced by the ability-to-pay 
principle. However, it was concluded in previous chapters that the current taxation of 
income is - also in case of minority shareholdings - in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This is mainly due to the fact that the tainted income increases the value of 
the property and therefore improves the ability of the shareholder to pay taxes. This 
is independent from the question whether the shareholder has direct and immediate 
access to the “increase in value” or not. However, this is only true under the condition 
that the negative income is not treated differently from the positive income allocation. 
A different treatment might seriously distort the concept of current income taxation 
and, of course, would influence the ability to pay taxes on such income. However, 
this will be subject to a separate examination.    
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6.5.5. Conclusions Regarding the Ownership Requirement   
 
The percentage of ownership, voting rights, dividend rights, and other rights related 
to the foreign company differs considerably from country to country. However, it is 
important to recognise that the requirement of “control” in the sense of a majority 
shareholding, i.e. a resident shareholder or a group of related shareholders own 
more than 50 percent of the shares in the foreign company, is in almost all of the 
European CFC countries not the required criterion. That means, there is either a 
lower threshold or other - alternative - criteria exist which can trigger the application 
of the respective CFC rules. This is a significant fact since the majority shareholding 
is - in a typical situation - the only possibility to decide on a profit distribution of the 
company against the position of other substantial shareholders (under the 
assumption that there are no other (substantial) shareholders who support the profit 
distribution).175  
 
Instead, some of the CFC countries require a participation of at least 50 percent. 
However, a shareholding of 50 percent in a company gives only significant influence 
if the 50 percent test is related to a single shareholder or to a group of shareholders 
who are somehow related. This is the case in Spain, where the requirement of control 
is fulfilled if a Spanish resident company, alone or together with related persons, 
holds at least 50 percent in the capital, equity, results or voting rights. The 50 percent 
threshold does not make any sense, in my opinion, where it is simply referred to 
“residents” of the respective country. Pursuant to such a rule, the mere coincidence 
that a great number of unrelated residents hold 50 percent (or more) in a respective 
company can trigger a CFC taxation, even though the single shareholder is far away 
from any substantial shareholding in the foreign company. For example, Germany176 
and Finland177 have such rules where it is generally referred to residents of the 
respective country. Similar rules exist in France where the threshold is reduced to 
only 5 percent if certain requirements are fulfilled.178 
 
However, a substantial number of European CFC countries apply a threshold which 
is below 50 percent and does therefore not give sufficient rights to influence a profit 
distribution or the decisions of the company.179 The “joint venture” rule in the United 
Kingdom, for example, triggers the CFC taxation if a shareholding of at least 40 
percent exists. In Denmark, Portugal and Sweden a participation of 25 percent is 
sufficient for the application of the CFC taxation. The same is true for the Netherlands 
in case of the mark-to-market revaluation.180 At least, a percentage of 25 percent or 
more can in some countries be high enough to block certain decisions. But it is 
certainly not sufficient to actively influence the decisions of the company against the 
position of other shareholders. Some of the CFC countries apply a threshold of at 
least 10 percent (e.g. Finland,181 Portugal182 and the former CFC rules in France). 
                                            
175 At least in a situation where the other shareholder(s) also has / have significant influence on the company.  
176 The requirement refers to more than 50 percent of domestic taxpayers (however, separate provisions exist for 
income of a capital investment kind).  
177 If the requirement of at least 50 percent of Finish residents is fulfilled, the allocation of income will only be 
made to residents with a shareholding of at least 10 percent (related parties are taken into account).  
178 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code.  
179 Of course, this depends on the respective circumstances.  
180 Article 13a (1), (3) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
181 As a minimum threshold for the allocation of income.  
182 The threshold in Portugal is reduced from 25 percent to 10 percent if more than 50 percent of the share capital 
is held by Portuguese residents.  
    
                                                                                         
 
situation all types of (constructive) ownership are taken into account and that voting 
rights (and similar rights) are as important as the shareholding in the company itself. 
However, if it comes to the allocation of income, the CFC income is allocated to 
shareholders only. The reason is that voting rights (or similar rights) do not transfer 
the right to participate in the income of the CFC. It is therefore obvious, in my opinion, 
that only the participation in the company should result in an income attribution 
according to CFC rules. As far as I can see there is no European CFC regime which 
allocates the CFC income to a resident individual or legal entity solely on the basis of 
voting rights (or similar rights), i.e. without the holding of any shares in the CFC. 
 
6.5.4. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
From an economic perspective, the conclusions regarding a concept which is based 
on the current taxation of the basic interest component is, in general, not linked to a 
certain minimum percentage of shareholding or voting rights. The fact that the basic 
interest component is to be taxed in the residence state of the shareholder is a 
necessity which is due to the fact that this portion of income is not taxed in the state 
where it is produced. Hence, it is a measure to safeguard competitiveness within a 
non-optimal scenario. The current taxation of income in order to come closer to an 
economically preferred scenario is required irrespective of the degree of influence in 
the respective legal entity. For this reason, it would be logical, from a mere economic 
perspective, to apply the concept of current taxation without looking at the 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights.  
 
On the other hand, a legislation which follows the concept of basic interest taxation 
should by no means lead to any penalisation of investments. For this reason, a 
resident investor must have the possibility - also in case of a foreign investment - of 
gathering the information which is required by the residence state of the shareholder 
and of fulfilling its (domestic) obligations. The fact that an alternative system should 
result in a more efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation 
requires, therefore, that the administrative burden is as low as possible and that the 
concept appropriately reflects the principle of equity. The minimum threshold for the 
application of a system of current taxation should therefore be high enough to find a 
balance between the obligations of the shareholder and the interest of the state of 
residence of the shareholder to tax part of the income on a current basis. I will deal 
with this question in some more detail - also with reference to the existing CFC rules - 
in chapter 9 where the alternative concept will be outlined.  
 
The question of a minimum threshold might also be influenced by the ability-to-pay 
principle. However, it was concluded in previous chapters that the current taxation of 
income is - also in case of minority shareholdings - in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This is mainly due to the fact that the tainted income increases the value of 
the property and therefore improves the ability of the shareholder to pay taxes. This 
is independent from the question whether the shareholder has direct and immediate 
access to the “increase in value” or not. However, this is only true under the condition 
that the negative income is not treated differently from the positive income allocation. 
A different treatment might seriously distort the concept of current income taxation 
and, of course, would influence the ability to pay taxes on such income. However, 




    
                                                                                         
 
general anti-avoidance legislation, a “control provision” which requires that the 
threshold is reached or exceeded at any time in the financial year, as is the case in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, might be a more efficient alternative. 
 
From a tax policy point of view - and taking into account the economic and equity 
principles outlined in chapters 2 and 3 - there is no necessity for a minimum 
threshold. Instead, if one follows a strict concept of basic interest taxation, as 
described earlier, the current taxation is equally required for substantial and small 
shareholdings. However, one has to admit that a basic interest taxation which is 
applied to minor shareholdings can result in unacceptable administrative burdens 
which perhaps cannot be handled in an international context - neither by the tax 
authorities nor by the taxpayer. From a practical perspective, it might therefore be 
advisable to stipulate a certain minimum percentage of shareholding and a certain 
minimum percentage of voting rights. As already mentioned above, I will come back 
to this point in some more detail in chapter 9.  
 
6.6. The Computation and Characterisation of CFC Income  
 
6.6.1. General Aspects 
 
The income computation rules are important in two situations. First, if the income of 
the foreign company is calculated to determine whether the income is low-taxed and, 
second, if the income has to be determined for the allocation to the domestic 
shareholder. In both cases, most of the European CFC countries follow the approach 
of calculating the foreign income according to domestic rules.185 This is also true for 
the calculation according to the “comparable tax test” in the Netherlands.186 As 
already outlined earlier, the foreign income is “equated” for the verification whether 
the requirement of low-taxation is fulfilled or not. This can be of some importance in 
situations where the foreign tax base is reduced by extraordinary allowances and 
other measures and where the statutory tax rate therefore deviates from the effective 
tax rate. However, the “equation” of foreign income to domestic income also takes 
place in order to determine the amount of income which has to be attributed to the 
domestic shareholder, i.e. in situations where the requirements of a current taxation 
based on the CFC rules are fulfilled. At first glance, this comes close to the taxation 
of a permanent establishment where the credit method is applied. Similar to CFC 
taxation, the income of the permanent establishment is calculated and taxed based 
on the rules of both countries and the residence state avoids the double taxation by 
allowing the crediting of the foreign income tax. The significant difference is, of 
course, the fact that the permanent establishment is legally part of the resident 
company and not - in contrast to the CFC - a legal entity by itself. However, the 
comparison of the income allocation with a dividend payment of the foreign company 
is similarly problematic since the dividend payment is based on the profits derived by 
the foreign company and those underlying profits are determined in accordance with 
the law of the foreign country. Furthermore, it must be compared to a complete profit 
distribution on a yearly basis, which is in practice not always the case. In addition, it 
must be taken into consideration that the countries which follow a transactional 
approach do not attribute the complete income of the CFC to the domestic 
shareholder but only a certain part which is clearly defined. Overall, the calculation of 
                                            
185 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
186 See Articles 13 (10) and 13a (1) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
    
                                                                                         
 
Under certain circumstances, e.g. if certain passive income is derived by the foreign 
company, no threshold at all exists (e.g. in Germany). In the latter case, the income is 
theoretically allocable to the resident shareholders with a quite insignificant 
participation and therefore without any influence whatsoever on the foreign company.  
 
A rule which refers to a majority (or at least 50 percent) of resident shareholders - 
without the requirement of a relationship among those shareholders - can only be 
understood, in my opinion, in the context of the fear of a national tax base erosion. 
Why shall the Portuguese (or Finnish / German) CFC legislation be applied to a 
Portuguese (or Finnish / German) company with a - for example - 10 percent 
shareholding only because of the fact that a great number of unrelated Portuguese 
(or Finnish / German) residents hold another 41 percent, whereas a Portuguese (or 
Finnish / German) shareholder with a participation of 24 percent will not be affected 
by the CFC taxation if he is the only Portuguese (or Finnish / German) shareholder? 
Why is a German shareholder with a - for example - 1 percent shareholding currently 
taxed pursuant to the German CFC taxation just because of the fact that a certain 
kind of passive income is included in the income of the CFC?183 Thus, it is apparent 
that under the existing CFC regimes the legal or factual control is most often not 
decisive for the question whether the rules are applicable or not. In some cases, the 
regimes do not even require a “substantial” or “qualified” shareholding, but only an 
insignificant percentage of participation.  
 
It is also interesting to see that the respective CFC regimes of the Member States 
most often require the direct or indirect control to exist at the end of the financial year 
of the foreign company. Exceptions are Denmark and the United Kingdom where it is 
required that control exists “at any time” in the financial year. Certainly, the focus on 
the end of the financial year of the CFC simplifies the legislation but opens, at least 
theoretically, the possibility for transactions in order to circumvent those regimes. 
However, it can be assumed that transactions which are apparently directed to avoid 
the application of the CFC regime, e.g. a disposal of shares before the decisive point 
in time in order to avoid that the threshold is reached or exceeded, followed by a 
subsequent increase in the participation percentage, will very often be targeted under 
general anti-avoidance legislation or similar domestic rules.184 In my opinion, it is 
certainly advisable to keep the legislation as simple as possible and to avoid 
complicated rules with respect to the requirement of control. However, as outlined 
above, the CFC regime itself should restrict, as much as possible, the possibilities of 
circumventing the legislation. If the CFC regime is not sufficiently supported by 
general anti-avoidance legislation, or if the respective country does not have such 
                                            
183 This can be seen as part of the German FIF provisions which are included in the German Foreign Tax Act.  
184 See - for an overview - OECD, Controlled Foregin Company Legislation, 1996, page 61; Kaufmann, 
Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC)-Gesetzgebung, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2001, page 19; 
Schönfeld, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2005, page 545 et seq.; Brähler, 
Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq.; see with respect to Denmark: Wittendorf, Danish 
Bill on International Taxation, Intertax 1995, page 213 et seq.; see with respect to Finland and the decision of the 
Central Board of Finland: Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 196, Fn. 
23; see with respect to Italy: Serbini, The New Italian Legislation on Controlled Foreign Companies, Intertax 
2001, page 89; see with respect to Portugal: De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 
780, footnote 33; see with respect to Sweden: Sundgren, Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) Legislation in 
Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1990, page 402 et seq.; see with respect to the United 
Kingdom: Inland Revenue, Controlled Foreign Companies: Guidance on the Provisions of Part XVII Chapter IV 
ICTA 1988, page 116 et seq. 
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general anti-avoidance legislation, a “control provision” which requires that the 
threshold is reached or exceeded at any time in the financial year, as is the case in 
Denmark and the United Kingdom, might be a more efficient alternative. 
 
From a tax policy point of view - and taking into account the economic and equity 
principles outlined in chapters 2 and 3 - there is no necessity for a minimum 
threshold. Instead, if one follows a strict concept of basic interest taxation, as 
described earlier, the current taxation is equally required for substantial and small 
shareholdings. However, one has to admit that a basic interest taxation which is 
applied to minor shareholdings can result in unacceptable administrative burdens 
which perhaps cannot be handled in an international context - neither by the tax 
authorities nor by the taxpayer. From a practical perspective, it might therefore be 
advisable to stipulate a certain minimum percentage of shareholding and a certain 
minimum percentage of voting rights. As already mentioned above, I will come back 
to this point in some more detail in chapter 9.  
 
6.6. The Computation and Characterisation of CFC Income  
 
6.6.1. General Aspects 
 
The income computation rules are important in two situations. First, if the income of 
the foreign company is calculated to determine whether the income is low-taxed and, 
second, if the income has to be determined for the allocation to the domestic 
shareholder. In both cases, most of the European CFC countries follow the approach 
of calculating the foreign income according to domestic rules.185 This is also true for 
the calculation according to the “comparable tax test” in the Netherlands.186 As 
already outlined earlier, the foreign income is “equated” for the verification whether 
the requirement of low-taxation is fulfilled or not. This can be of some importance in 
situations where the foreign tax base is reduced by extraordinary allowances and 
other measures and where the statutory tax rate therefore deviates from the effective 
tax rate. However, the “equation” of foreign income to domestic income also takes 
place in order to determine the amount of income which has to be attributed to the 
domestic shareholder, i.e. in situations where the requirements of a current taxation 
based on the CFC rules are fulfilled. At first glance, this comes close to the taxation 
of a permanent establishment where the credit method is applied. Similar to CFC 
taxation, the income of the permanent establishment is calculated and taxed based 
on the rules of both countries and the residence state avoids the double taxation by 
allowing the crediting of the foreign income tax. The significant difference is, of 
course, the fact that the permanent establishment is legally part of the resident 
company and not - in contrast to the CFC - a legal entity by itself. However, the 
comparison of the income allocation with a dividend payment of the foreign company 
is similarly problematic since the dividend payment is based on the profits derived by 
the foreign company and those underlying profits are determined in accordance with 
the law of the foreign country. Furthermore, it must be compared to a complete profit 
distribution on a yearly basis, which is in practice not always the case. In addition, it 
must be taken into consideration that the countries which follow a transactional 
approach do not attribute the complete income of the CFC to the domestic 
shareholder but only a certain part which is clearly defined. Overall, the calculation of 
                                            
185 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
186 See Articles 13 (10) and 13a (1) of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act.  
    
                                                                                         
 
Under certain circumstances, e.g. if certain passive income is derived by the foreign 
company, no threshold at all exists (e.g. in Germany). In the latter case, the income is 
theoretically allocable to the resident shareholders with a quite insignificant 
participation and therefore without any influence whatsoever on the foreign company.  
 
A rule which refers to a majority (or at least 50 percent) of resident shareholders - 
without the requirement of a relationship among those shareholders - can only be 
understood, in my opinion, in the context of the fear of a national tax base erosion. 
Why shall the Portuguese (or Finnish / German) CFC legislation be applied to a 
Portuguese (or Finnish / German) company with a - for example - 10 percent 
shareholding only because of the fact that a great number of unrelated Portuguese 
(or Finnish / German) residents hold another 41 percent, whereas a Portuguese (or 
Finnish / German) shareholder with a participation of 24 percent will not be affected 
by the CFC taxation if he is the only Portuguese (or Finnish / German) shareholder? 
Why is a German shareholder with a - for example - 1 percent shareholding currently 
taxed pursuant to the German CFC taxation just because of the fact that a certain 
kind of passive income is included in the income of the CFC?183 Thus, it is apparent 
that under the existing CFC regimes the legal or factual control is most often not 
decisive for the question whether the rules are applicable or not. In some cases, the 
regimes do not even require a “substantial” or “qualified” shareholding, but only an 
insignificant percentage of participation.  
 
It is also interesting to see that the respective CFC regimes of the Member States 
most often require the direct or indirect control to exist at the end of the financial year 
of the foreign company. Exceptions are Denmark and the United Kingdom where it is 
required that control exists “at any time” in the financial year. Certainly, the focus on 
the end of the financial year of the CFC simplifies the legislation but opens, at least 
theoretically, the possibility for transactions in order to circumvent those regimes. 
However, it can be assumed that transactions which are apparently directed to avoid 
the application of the CFC regime, e.g. a disposal of shares before the decisive point 
in time in order to avoid that the threshold is reached or exceeded, followed by a 
subsequent increase in the participation percentage, will very often be targeted under 
general anti-avoidance legislation or similar domestic rules.184 In my opinion, it is 
certainly advisable to keep the legislation as simple as possible and to avoid 
complicated rules with respect to the requirement of control. However, as outlined 
above, the CFC regime itself should restrict, as much as possible, the possibilities of 
circumventing the legislation. If the CFC regime is not sufficiently supported by 
general anti-avoidance legislation, or if the respective country does not have such 
                                            
183 This can be seen as part of the German FIF provisions which are included in the German Foreign Tax Act.  
184 See - for an overview - OECD, Controlled Foregin Company Legislation, 1996, page 61; Kaufmann, 
Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC)-Gesetzgebung, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2001, page 19; 
Schönfeld, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 2005, page 545 et seq.; Brähler, 
Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq.; see with respect to Denmark: Wittendorf, Danish 
Bill on International Taxation, Intertax 1995, page 213 et seq.; see with respect to Finland and the decision of the 
Central Board of Finland: Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 196, Fn. 
23; see with respect to Italy: Serbini, The New Italian Legislation on Controlled Foreign Companies, Intertax 
2001, page 89; see with respect to Portugal: De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use 
of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 
780, footnote 33; see with respect to Sweden: Sundgren, Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) Legislation in 
Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 1990, page 402 et seq.; see with respect to the United 
Kingdom: Inland Revenue, Controlled Foreign Companies: Guidance on the Provisions of Part XVII Chapter IV 
ICTA 1988, page 116 et seq. 
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to tax in the foreign country. Another issue is the treatment of losses in the context of 
CFC legislation which in most cases deviates from a “pure” look-through concept and 
which will be discussed separately. However, it is especially the transactional 
approach, i.e. the focusing on tainted income, and therefore the separation and 
“picking out” of income components which is obviously more related to a piercing the 
veil or limited look through approach than to a “deemed dividend” approach, even 
though the transactional countries are not completely clear in this respect, either. For 
example, the Danish CFC rules do not qualify the attributed CFC income - neither as 
business profits nor as deemed dividends.192 The same is true In Spain, where the 
CFC income can be seen, according to Almudi, as an “autonomous category of 
income.”193 
 
Among the Member States which follow an entity approach, the predominant concept 
is the piercing-the-veil approach. This is true, inter alia, for Estonia,194 Italy,195 
Portugal,196 the United Kingdom,197 and Sweden.198 The Finnish approach is not 
completely clear in this respect.199 However, it has to be pointed out once more that 
all of these regimes do not provide for a system of complete transparency (as 
outlined above). What remains are therefore substantial restrictions, e.g. with respect 
to the utilisation of negative CFC income. I will come to that aspect below in more 
detail.   
 
6.6.4. The Re-Valuation Approach  
 
In addition to the deemed dividend and the look-through (“piercing the veil”) approach 
it is also the “revaluation” approach which has to be mentioned in this context. As 
already described earlier, the Netherlands follows such an approach which results, if 
all of the requirements are fulfilled, in a yearly mark-to-market revaluation of the 
participation. Again, the Dutch concept is usually not considered to be a CFC regime, 
but it comes very close to such a regime. In my opinion, there is no substantial 
difference to a CFC regime because it may finally result - at least indirectly - in a 





                                            
192 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 160.  
193 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 569. 
194 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 179, 180. 
195 Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 360, 361. 
196 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 778. 
197 Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 611 to 614. 
198 Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 832, 833. 
199 Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 200. See in this respect also the 
Finnish A Oyj Abp Case (outlined in chapter 7). 
    
                                                                                         
 
the foreign income based on domestic rules and the subsequent allocation to the 
domestic shareholder is a procedure which cannot be easily compared to the 
treatment of the income of a permanent establishment (or partnership) and the 
treatment of dividends derived from a foreign legal entity.  
 
 6.6.2. The Deemed Dividend Approach 
 
The fact that CFC legislation typically accepts the legal status of the foreign company 
is one of the reasons why the attributed income is sometimes referred to as a kind of 
dividend income (or deemed dividend). The CFC income is only attributed to the 
domestic shareholder because of the interest in the foreign company. Without such 
an interest, nothing would be allocated to the domestic taxpayer (leaving aside the 
constructive ownership rules).187 In other words, the CFC taxation is dependent on 
the fact that a foreign company exists and the domestic taxpayer owns shares in the 
respective foreign company. In Germany, the attributed income is qualified as income 
from capital188 (which is the same for dividends), but without the possibility to apply 
the half-income principle, and the attributed income is therefore often considered to 
be a deemed dividend.189 This is of particular interest since Germany follows a 
transactional approach and therefore attributes only tainted income to the domestic 
shareholder. The same is true for the Lithuanian CFC regime which is, according to 
Bernatonis, to be classified as a system which follows a fictitious distribution concept 
rather than a system of piercing the corporate veil (look-through).190 In France, the 
attributed CFC income is treated under the new system as a deemed dividend paid to 
the French shareholder, too.191 
 
6.6.3. The Piercing the Veil Approach 
 
Another concept is the “piercing the veil” approach, which can also be seen – in my 
opinion – as a “limited look-through” approach. It is limited because the CFC (i) is 
nonetheless legally regarded as a separate entity and (ii) is by no means generally 
considered to be transparent for tax purposes. In case of the countries which follow a 
transactional approach, only tainted income is attributed to the domestic shareholder 
and therefore certain active income remains subject to tax only in the country of the 
CFC and only on the level of the foreign company – at least as long as it is not 
actually distributed to the domestic shareholder. The countries which follow an entity 
approach have to make a classification of the whole activities of the foreign company, 
and depending on the result of this classification, the CFC income is either 
completely attributable to the shareholder – at least in the particular year – or it is 
completely outside of the scope of CFC taxation and therefore – again – only subject 
                                            
187 I will go into further detail below in the context of double tax conventions.  
188 Article 10 (2) of the German Foreign Income Tax Act; section 20 of the German Income Tax Act.  
189 See, for example, Wöhrle in Wöhrle / Schelle / Gross, Außensteuergesetz, page 104 b et seq., Rust, National 
Report Germany, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 260; Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, page 63.  
190 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 400. 
191 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, 
Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 1417 et seq. (1420); Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax 
Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax 
Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
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to tax in the foreign country. Another issue is the treatment of losses in the context of 
CFC legislation which in most cases deviates from a “pure” look-through concept and 
which will be discussed separately. However, it is especially the transactional 
approach, i.e. the focusing on tainted income, and therefore the separation and 
“picking out” of income components which is obviously more related to a piercing the 
veil or limited look through approach than to a “deemed dividend” approach, even 
though the transactional countries are not completely clear in this respect, either. For 
example, the Danish CFC rules do not qualify the attributed CFC income - neither as 
business profits nor as deemed dividends.192 The same is true In Spain, where the 
CFC income can be seen, according to Almudi, as an “autonomous category of 
income.”193 
 
Among the Member States which follow an entity approach, the predominant concept 
is the piercing-the-veil approach. This is true, inter alia, for Estonia,194 Italy,195 
Portugal,196 the United Kingdom,197 and Sweden.198 The Finnish approach is not 
completely clear in this respect.199 However, it has to be pointed out once more that 
all of these regimes do not provide for a system of complete transparency (as 
outlined above). What remains are therefore substantial restrictions, e.g. with respect 
to the utilisation of negative CFC income. I will come to that aspect below in more 
detail.   
 
6.6.4. The Re-Valuation Approach  
 
In addition to the deemed dividend and the look-through (“piercing the veil”) approach 
it is also the “revaluation” approach which has to be mentioned in this context. As 
already described earlier, the Netherlands follows such an approach which results, if 
all of the requirements are fulfilled, in a yearly mark-to-market revaluation of the 
participation. Again, the Dutch concept is usually not considered to be a CFC regime, 
but it comes very close to such a regime. In my opinion, there is no substantial 
difference to a CFC regime because it may finally result - at least indirectly - in a 





                                            
192 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 160.  
193 Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 569. 
194 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 179, 180. 
195 Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 360, 361. 
196 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 778. 
197 Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 611 to 614. 
198 Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 832, 833. 
199 Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 200. See in this respect also the 
Finnish A Oyj Abp Case (outlined in chapter 7). 
    
                                                                                         
 
the foreign income based on domestic rules and the subsequent allocation to the 
domestic shareholder is a procedure which cannot be easily compared to the 
treatment of the income of a permanent establishment (or partnership) and the 
treatment of dividends derived from a foreign legal entity.  
 
 6.6.2. The Deemed Dividend Approach 
 
The fact that CFC legislation typically accepts the legal status of the foreign company 
is one of the reasons why the attributed income is sometimes referred to as a kind of 
dividend income (or deemed dividend). The CFC income is only attributed to the 
domestic shareholder because of the interest in the foreign company. Without such 
an interest, nothing would be allocated to the domestic taxpayer (leaving aside the 
constructive ownership rules).187 In other words, the CFC taxation is dependent on 
the fact that a foreign company exists and the domestic taxpayer owns shares in the 
respective foreign company. In Germany, the attributed income is qualified as income 
from capital188 (which is the same for dividends), but without the possibility to apply 
the half-income principle, and the attributed income is therefore often considered to 
be a deemed dividend.189 This is of particular interest since Germany follows a 
transactional approach and therefore attributes only tainted income to the domestic 
shareholder. The same is true for the Lithuanian CFC regime which is, according to 
Bernatonis, to be classified as a system which follows a fictitious distribution concept 
rather than a system of piercing the corporate veil (look-through).190 In France, the 
attributed CFC income is treated under the new system as a deemed dividend paid to 
the French shareholder, too.191 
 
6.6.3. The Piercing the Veil Approach 
 
Another concept is the “piercing the veil” approach, which can also be seen – in my 
opinion – as a “limited look-through” approach. It is limited because the CFC (i) is 
nonetheless legally regarded as a separate entity and (ii) is by no means generally 
considered to be transparent for tax purposes. In case of the countries which follow a 
transactional approach, only tainted income is attributed to the domestic shareholder 
and therefore certain active income remains subject to tax only in the country of the 
CFC and only on the level of the foreign company – at least as long as it is not 
actually distributed to the domestic shareholder. The countries which follow an entity 
approach have to make a classification of the whole activities of the foreign company, 
and depending on the result of this classification, the CFC income is either 
completely attributable to the shareholder – at least in the particular year – or it is 
completely outside of the scope of CFC taxation and therefore – again – only subject 
                                            
187 I will go into further detail below in the context of double tax conventions.  
188 Article 10 (2) of the German Foreign Income Tax Act; section 20 of the German Income Tax Act.  
189 See, for example, Wöhrle in Wöhrle / Schelle / Gross, Außensteuergesetz, page 104 b et seq., Rust, National 
Report Germany, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 260; Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, page 63.  
190 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 400. 
191 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, 
Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 1417 et seq. (1420); Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax 
Update, January 2005, page 3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax 
Briefing, January 2005, page 6. 
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the CFC state does not follow a very unusual and atypical way of income 
determination, it would be equally possible, from my perspective, to rely on the actual 
amount of income determined according to the rules of the CFC state instead of the 
rules of the residence state of the shareholder. In other words, the only reason for 
calculating the total amount of income of the CFC should be the determination of the 
maximum amount of income attribution according to the concept of basic interest 
taxation, but even this calculation can theoretically be based on the domestic income 
determination rules of the CFC state. This question will be elaborated further in the 
context of an alternative system.  
 
6.6.6. Conclusions Regarding the Computation and Characterisation of CFC 
Income 
 
There are different concepts for the attribution of CFC income to the resident 
shareholder. The attribution can be seen as a deemed dividend of the CFC (deemed 
dividend approach) or a direct profit allocation (look-through or piercing the veil 
approach). Moreover, the Netherlands follow a concept according to which the 
shares are subject to a yearly revaluation at the market value (revaluation approach). 
In principle, the aforementioned domestic concepts accept the legal status of the 
foreign entity. However, none of the concepts is - in my opinion - fully convincing. In 
fact, the income attribution according to the transactional approach can rather be 
seen as a system which is solely and directly focused on the separate income 
elements derived by the CFC from the perspective of the state of residence of the 
shareholder but - at the same time - completely ignores the income determination of 
the foreign legal entity. In contrast, the entity approach takes into account all income 
elements (active and passive) or none of the income elements, depending upon 
whether the active or passive activities prevail. However, even the complete 
attribution of income according to the entity approach does not reflect the legal result 
actually derived by the CFC but only the result from the perspective of the state of 
residence of the shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore difficult to combine the 
transactional and entity approaches with the aforementioned domestic concepts of 
income attribution. The characterisation of the CFC income is of particular relevance 
with respect to tax treaties. I will therefore go into more detail later on where the CFC 
rules are examined in the context of double tax conventions.   
 
The concept which might be derived from chapters 2 and 3 is different because it 
focuses on the basic interest component of capital. Thus, the dominating factor is the 
calculation of a certain return on the amount of capital invested and the determination 
of the actual income - from the perspective of the state of the shareholder - is just 
required to act as a limitation of the income attribution. In general, the economic and 
equity aspects do not prevent the state of the shareholder from calculating the 
amount of attributable income (and the limitation) on the basis of its own tax rules. 
Moreover, the domestic classification of the attributable income is not decisive, in my 
opinion, as long as the income taxation is limited to the basic interest component.  
 
6.7. Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares  
 
6.7.1. Subsequent Dividends 
 
It should be clear that dividends received by the domestic shareholder from the CFC 
and the income attributed earlier through the application of the CFC taxation are 
    
                                                                                         
 
6.6.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The general definition of the domestic concept of income allocation, i.e. whether it is 
considered a deemed dividend approach, a look-through approach, a yearly re-
valuation approach or any other approach is, in my opinion, without relevance from 
an economic perspective. The decisive point is, however, that these approaches 
result in an income allocation which does not comply with the principle of capital 
import neutrality. As I have stated earlier, these approaches also encompass the 
activity component and the risk component which should clearly not be allocated and 
taxed on a current basis in the residence state of the shareholder. In this respect, the 
statements made in the sections dealing with the transactional approach and the 
entity approach CFC regimes can be referred to.  
 
The current taxation of the total amount of (tainted) income is not in line with the 
principle of equity, either. Such an approach can place the resident investor who 
invests in a CFC in a less favourable position than the resident investor who invests 
in a company without a comparable current taxation of income or who just provides a 
loan amount to such a company (instead of an equity investment). It was outlined in 
chapter 3 that in the latter case the investor receives interest income which 
encompasses all interest components (i.e. including the risk component), but which 
shall, at the same time, result in the actual and direct risk allocation to the investor, 
i.e. in case of a realisation of risks it is the domestic tax base which shall be reduced. 
In case of CFC regimes, however, the total amount of positive income not only 
encompasses all (theoretical) interest components but also the activity component 
(either solely related to tainted income or - like in case of an entity approach CFC 
regime - also the activity component related to non-tainted income). A symmetrical 
approach would therefore, at least, require the allocation of negative income to be 
made exactly in the same way and to be treated exactly in the same manner as in 
case of positive income. This will be examined below. However, even in case of a 
strict symmetrical approach, the resident investor in a CFC would be confronted with 
an immediate domestic taxation of the critical elements from an entrepreneurial 
perspective, namely the activity component and the risk component. This, again, 
would bring the investor into a less favourable position, especially from the 
perspective of competitiveness, compared to an investor who is not subject to a 
current taxation of income.    
 
However, the calculation of the total amount of income of the CFC, including the 
activity component and the risk component, can be of relevance when it comes to the 
limitation of the current taxation of the basic interest component. It was outlined 
earlier that the attribution of income under the concept of basic interest taxation 
should not be higher than the actual income derived by the CFC. Even though the 
basic interest component does not contain the risk element, it would not be 
appropriate to tax a portion of income which is not existent, e.g. in case the risk 
became reality and the amount of income is lower than the basic interest component. 
Such an approach would hardly be in line with the ability-to-pay principle and would 
not be necessary from an anti-avoidance perspective, either. In such a situation, 
though, there is a requirement to calculate the (total) income of the CFC in order to 
determine the maximum amount of income attribution. This would be done in addition 
to the calculation of the basic interest component which, in principle, is also made 
from the perspective of the state which applies the respective legislation. However, if 
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the CFC state does not follow a very unusual and atypical way of income 
determination, it would be equally possible, from my perspective, to rely on the actual 
amount of income determined according to the rules of the CFC state instead of the 
rules of the residence state of the shareholder. In other words, the only reason for 
calculating the total amount of income of the CFC should be the determination of the 
maximum amount of income attribution according to the concept of basic interest 
taxation, but even this calculation can theoretically be based on the domestic income 
determination rules of the CFC state. This question will be elaborated further in the 
context of an alternative system.  
 
6.6.6. Conclusions Regarding the Computation and Characterisation of CFC 
Income 
 
There are different concepts for the attribution of CFC income to the resident 
shareholder. The attribution can be seen as a deemed dividend of the CFC (deemed 
dividend approach) or a direct profit allocation (look-through or piercing the veil 
approach). Moreover, the Netherlands follow a concept according to which the 
shares are subject to a yearly revaluation at the market value (revaluation approach). 
In principle, the aforementioned domestic concepts accept the legal status of the 
foreign entity. However, none of the concepts is - in my opinion - fully convincing. In 
fact, the income attribution according to the transactional approach can rather be 
seen as a system which is solely and directly focused on the separate income 
elements derived by the CFC from the perspective of the state of residence of the 
shareholder but - at the same time - completely ignores the income determination of 
the foreign legal entity. In contrast, the entity approach takes into account all income 
elements (active and passive) or none of the income elements, depending upon 
whether the active or passive activities prevail. However, even the complete 
attribution of income according to the entity approach does not reflect the legal result 
actually derived by the CFC but only the result from the perspective of the state of 
residence of the shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore difficult to combine the 
transactional and entity approaches with the aforementioned domestic concepts of 
income attribution. The characterisation of the CFC income is of particular relevance 
with respect to tax treaties. I will therefore go into more detail later on where the CFC 
rules are examined in the context of double tax conventions.   
 
The concept which might be derived from chapters 2 and 3 is different because it 
focuses on the basic interest component of capital. Thus, the dominating factor is the 
calculation of a certain return on the amount of capital invested and the determination 
of the actual income - from the perspective of the state of the shareholder - is just 
required to act as a limitation of the income attribution. In general, the economic and 
equity aspects do not prevent the state of the shareholder from calculating the 
amount of attributable income (and the limitation) on the basis of its own tax rules. 
Moreover, the domestic classification of the attributable income is not decisive, in my 
opinion, as long as the income taxation is limited to the basic interest component.  
 
6.7. Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares  
 
6.7.1. Subsequent Dividends 
 
It should be clear that dividends received by the domestic shareholder from the CFC 
and the income attributed earlier through the application of the CFC taxation are 
    
                                                                                         
 
6.6.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The general definition of the domestic concept of income allocation, i.e. whether it is 
considered a deemed dividend approach, a look-through approach, a yearly re-
valuation approach or any other approach is, in my opinion, without relevance from 
an economic perspective. The decisive point is, however, that these approaches 
result in an income allocation which does not comply with the principle of capital 
import neutrality. As I have stated earlier, these approaches also encompass the 
activity component and the risk component which should clearly not be allocated and 
taxed on a current basis in the residence state of the shareholder. In this respect, the 
statements made in the sections dealing with the transactional approach and the 
entity approach CFC regimes can be referred to.  
 
The current taxation of the total amount of (tainted) income is not in line with the 
principle of equity, either. Such an approach can place the resident investor who 
invests in a CFC in a less favourable position than the resident investor who invests 
in a company without a comparable current taxation of income or who just provides a 
loan amount to such a company (instead of an equity investment). It was outlined in 
chapter 3 that in the latter case the investor receives interest income which 
encompasses all interest components (i.e. including the risk component), but which 
shall, at the same time, result in the actual and direct risk allocation to the investor, 
i.e. in case of a realisation of risks it is the domestic tax base which shall be reduced. 
In case of CFC regimes, however, the total amount of positive income not only 
encompasses all (theoretical) interest components but also the activity component 
(either solely related to tainted income or - like in case of an entity approach CFC 
regime - also the activity component related to non-tainted income). A symmetrical 
approach would therefore, at least, require the allocation of negative income to be 
made exactly in the same way and to be treated exactly in the same manner as in 
case of positive income. This will be examined below. However, even in case of a 
strict symmetrical approach, the resident investor in a CFC would be confronted with 
an immediate domestic taxation of the critical elements from an entrepreneurial 
perspective, namely the activity component and the risk component. This, again, 
would bring the investor into a less favourable position, especially from the 
perspective of competitiveness, compared to an investor who is not subject to a 
current taxation of income.    
 
However, the calculation of the total amount of income of the CFC, including the 
activity component and the risk component, can be of relevance when it comes to the 
limitation of the current taxation of the basic interest component. It was outlined 
earlier that the attribution of income under the concept of basic interest taxation 
should not be higher than the actual income derived by the CFC. Even though the 
basic interest component does not contain the risk element, it would not be 
appropriate to tax a portion of income which is not existent, e.g. in case the risk 
became reality and the amount of income is lower than the basic interest component. 
Such an approach would hardly be in line with the ability-to-pay principle and would 
not be necessary from an anti-avoidance perspective, either. In such a situation, 
though, there is a requirement to calculate the (total) income of the CFC in order to 
determine the maximum amount of income attribution. This would be done in addition 
to the calculation of the basic interest component which, in principle, is also made 
from the perspective of the state which applies the respective legislation. However, if 
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years which reduces the basis for later dividend payments. Here, the CFC taxation 
exceeds the dividend distributions. However, the problematic lies especially in the 
treatment of CFC losses which will be outlined in more detail below. Instead of 
deducting an amount which is equal to the formerly attributed CFC income from the 
subsequent dividend it is also possible to determine the amount of tax paid on the 
attributed CFC income (instead of the CFC income itself) and credit the amount of tax 
against the income tax imposed on the dividend payment. All of the European 
countries which apply a CFC taxation have some kind of relief for subsequent 
dividend payments of the foreign company. Most countries focus on the taxation or 
non-taxation of the income difference between dividend payment and former income 
attribution.202 The United Kingdom applies a tax credit system for the avoidance of 
double taxation.203 A time limitation with respect to the relief from double taxation of 
subsequent dividends will be discussed below together with the treatment of negative 
income. The reason is that a time limitation is of particular relevance in case of 
losses.  
 
b.) Withholding taxes on a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
A “timing problem” (or “timing mismatch”) exists where the profit distribution of the 
CFC is subject to a withholding tax. The problem lies in the fact that the attribution of 
income based on the domestic CFC rules is not subject to withholding tax.204 If the 
subsequent distribution is exempt from taxation, no domestic corporate income tax is 
levied on the dividend income and, therefore, the withholding tax can theoretically not 
be credited.205 The problem can be solved - and is sometimes solved - by allowing 
the crediting of the subsequent withholding tax against the income tax on the former 
attribution of CFC income, i.e. by a later retroactive adjustment of the original tax 
notice.206 In this respect, it is important to consider the position of the OECD to the 
“timing mismatch” between the taxation in the state of source and the taxation in the 
state of residence: paragraph 32.8 of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 
23 B of the OECD-MTC stipulates that the state of residence must provide relief of 
double taxation regardless of when the tax is levied by the state of source, i.e. in an 
earlier or later year. This has the consequence, in my opinion, that - in case of CFC 
taxation - the withholding tax imposed on the dividend payment (usually in later 
years) should be credited against the income tax imposed on the attributed income in 
the year in which the latter attribution took place. However, it is also apparent that 
such a strict and consistent concept of relief is not always provided under domestic 
legislation.207  
 
c.) Non-deductible expenses related to a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
Some of the countries which, in principle, exempt the dividend distribution from 
taxation in the residence country of the shareholder add back a fixed percentage of 
                                            
202 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65.  
203 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890.  
204 The attribution of CFC income is typically not subject to withholding tax. In fact, the CFC country normally 
does not even have any information on the attribution of CFC income to its shareholders.  
205 The same is basically true if the amount of tax levied on the CFC income is determined instead of the CFC 
income itself.  
206 For example in Germany; section 12 (3) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
207 Paragraph 32.8 of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
    
                                                                                         
 
economically connected. One could even say that the dividend payment and the CFC 
income have - in an economic sense - an identical source. This is irrespective of the 
fact whether the attributed income is domestically seen as a deemed dividend or as 
business income of the shareholder. However, the amount attributable according to 
CFC rules and the amount which can be legally distributed by the CFC are often not 
identical. This is mainly due to the following reasons: 
 
- the CFC income is regularly calculated pursuant to the rules of the country of 
the shareholder and the dividend payment is based on the profits of the CFC 
which are determined according to the rules of the CFC country. This can lead 
to temporary differences which disappear in the course of time200 and to 
permanent differences;201  
 
- the country of the shareholder follows an entity approach and the activities of 
the CFC change from one year to another together with the classification of 
the foreign company; 
 
- the country of the shareholder follows a transactional approach and the 
activities of the CFC contain active and passive income. Here, only part of the 
CFC income will be attributed to the shareholder whereas a subsequent 
dividend payment will theoretically contain both, active and passive income 
elements;  
 
- the percentage of shareholding may change over time (increase or decrease). 
This can have the effect that the income attribution pursuant to the CFC 
regime and the income pursuant to the subsequent dividend payments are 
based on two different percentages of shareholding. It can also be the case 
that the threshold for the application of the CFC regime is reached in one year 
but not in another. 
 
Therefore, several general aspects have to be taken into consideration where the 
CFC actually distributes its profits to the resident shareholder(s).   
 
a.) Avoidance of double taxation caused by a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
It seems to be obvious that an amount of CFC income which was already attributed 
to the resident shareholder should not be taxed again when the CFC finally 
distributes its profits. That means, the dividend payments should - in case they are 
actually taxable in the residence state of the shareholder and not exempt from 
taxation - be reduced by the amount which was attributed earlier to the shareholder 
through the application of CFC rules. It can be the case that the overall dividend 
which is legally payable by the CFC is lower than the CFC income attributed. A 
typical reason for such a situation can be that the CFC is profitable in earlier years 
(with the effect of an immediate income attribution) and suffers losses in subsequent 
                                            
200 For example, if the CFC country allows extraordinary depreciation on tangible or intangible assets, or if the 
CFC country allows the assumption of losses of a subsidiary company which is later on reversed. In these cases, 
the differences will only be temporary. 
201 This can be the case if certain measures applied in the CFC country do not exist in the country of the 
shareholder and therefore an equalisation over the years cannot take place (e.g. extraordinary allowances). 
Another possibility is - for example - that the CFC country allows the assumption of losses of a subsidiary 
company and the losses cannot be reversed in the future.  
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years which reduces the basis for later dividend payments. Here, the CFC taxation 
exceeds the dividend distributions. However, the problematic lies especially in the 
treatment of CFC losses which will be outlined in more detail below. Instead of 
deducting an amount which is equal to the formerly attributed CFC income from the 
subsequent dividend it is also possible to determine the amount of tax paid on the 
attributed CFC income (instead of the CFC income itself) and credit the amount of tax 
against the income tax imposed on the dividend payment. All of the European 
countries which apply a CFC taxation have some kind of relief for subsequent 
dividend payments of the foreign company. Most countries focus on the taxation or 
non-taxation of the income difference between dividend payment and former income 
attribution.202 The United Kingdom applies a tax credit system for the avoidance of 
double taxation.203 A time limitation with respect to the relief from double taxation of 
subsequent dividends will be discussed below together with the treatment of negative 
income. The reason is that a time limitation is of particular relevance in case of 
losses.  
 
b.) Withholding taxes on a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
A “timing problem” (or “timing mismatch”) exists where the profit distribution of the 
CFC is subject to a withholding tax. The problem lies in the fact that the attribution of 
income based on the domestic CFC rules is not subject to withholding tax.204 If the 
subsequent distribution is exempt from taxation, no domestic corporate income tax is 
levied on the dividend income and, therefore, the withholding tax can theoretically not 
be credited.205 The problem can be solved - and is sometimes solved - by allowing 
the crediting of the subsequent withholding tax against the income tax on the former 
attribution of CFC income, i.e. by a later retroactive adjustment of the original tax 
notice.206 In this respect, it is important to consider the position of the OECD to the 
“timing mismatch” between the taxation in the state of source and the taxation in the 
state of residence: paragraph 32.8 of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 
23 B of the OECD-MTC stipulates that the state of residence must provide relief of 
double taxation regardless of when the tax is levied by the state of source, i.e. in an 
earlier or later year. This has the consequence, in my opinion, that - in case of CFC 
taxation - the withholding tax imposed on the dividend payment (usually in later 
years) should be credited against the income tax imposed on the attributed income in 
the year in which the latter attribution took place. However, it is also apparent that 
such a strict and consistent concept of relief is not always provided under domestic 
legislation.207  
 
c.) Non-deductible expenses related to a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
Some of the countries which, in principle, exempt the dividend distribution from 
taxation in the residence country of the shareholder add back a fixed percentage of 
                                            
202 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65.  
203 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890.  
204 The attribution of CFC income is typically not subject to withholding tax. In fact, the CFC country normally 
does not even have any information on the attribution of CFC income to its shareholders.  
205 The same is basically true if the amount of tax levied on the CFC income is determined instead of the CFC 
income itself.  
206 For example in Germany; section 12 (3) of the German Foreign Tax Act.  
207 Paragraph 32.8 of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
    
                                                                                         
 
economically connected. One could even say that the dividend payment and the CFC 
income have - in an economic sense - an identical source. This is irrespective of the 
fact whether the attributed income is domestically seen as a deemed dividend or as 
business income of the shareholder. However, the amount attributable according to 
CFC rules and the amount which can be legally distributed by the CFC are often not 
identical. This is mainly due to the following reasons: 
 
- the CFC income is regularly calculated pursuant to the rules of the country of 
the shareholder and the dividend payment is based on the profits of the CFC 
which are determined according to the rules of the CFC country. This can lead 
to temporary differences which disappear in the course of time200 and to 
permanent differences;201  
 
- the country of the shareholder follows an entity approach and the activities of 
the CFC change from one year to another together with the classification of 
the foreign company; 
 
- the country of the shareholder follows a transactional approach and the 
activities of the CFC contain active and passive income. Here, only part of the 
CFC income will be attributed to the shareholder whereas a subsequent 
dividend payment will theoretically contain both, active and passive income 
elements;  
 
- the percentage of shareholding may change over time (increase or decrease). 
This can have the effect that the income attribution pursuant to the CFC 
regime and the income pursuant to the subsequent dividend payments are 
based on two different percentages of shareholding. It can also be the case 
that the threshold for the application of the CFC regime is reached in one year 
but not in another. 
 
Therefore, several general aspects have to be taken into consideration where the 
CFC actually distributes its profits to the resident shareholder(s).   
 
a.) Avoidance of double taxation caused by a subsequent dividend distribution  
 
It seems to be obvious that an amount of CFC income which was already attributed 
to the resident shareholder should not be taxed again when the CFC finally 
distributes its profits. That means, the dividend payments should - in case they are 
actually taxable in the residence state of the shareholder and not exempt from 
taxation - be reduced by the amount which was attributed earlier to the shareholder 
through the application of CFC rules. It can be the case that the overall dividend 
which is legally payable by the CFC is lower than the CFC income attributed. A 
typical reason for such a situation can be that the CFC is profitable in earlier years 
(with the effect of an immediate income attribution) and suffers losses in subsequent 
                                            
200 For example, if the CFC country allows extraordinary depreciation on tangible or intangible assets, or if the 
CFC country allows the assumption of losses of a subsidiary company which is later on reversed. In these cases, 
the differences will only be temporary. 
201 This can be the case if certain measures applied in the CFC country do not exist in the country of the 
shareholder and therefore an equalisation over the years cannot take place (e.g. extraordinary allowances). 
Another possibility is - for example - that the CFC country allows the assumption of losses of a subsidiary 
company and the losses cannot be reversed in the future.  
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6.7.2. Subsequent Disposal of Shares 
 
In general, a capital gain realised by the disposal of shares theoretically includes the 
retained profits of the CFC. Depending on the activities of the CFC and the results of 
these activities the capital gain can also include future profit elements which have not 
yet been taxed according to the CFC taxation. In turn, if the business expectations 
are negative, the capital gain can theoretically be less than the net book value of the 
foreign company and therefore reflects only part of the retained profits. Capital gains 
realised by the disposal of shares and related to profits which were already subject to 
CFC taxation should be treated similar to dividend income, i.e. the attributed income 
(or the tax paid on the CFC income) should be taken into account for the 
determination of a possible taxable gain (or the tax related to the taxable gain). In 
general, everything outlined above with respect to subsequent dividends is equally 
relevant for subsequent capital gains. This is in particular true for any fixed 
percentage of non-deductible expenses calculated on the basis of the capital gains. 
Similar to dividend payments, the capital gains include retained earnings which have 
already been taxed in the residence state of the shareholder pursuant to the 
applicable CFC legislation.212 Any limitation of deductible business expenses is 
therefore - in my opinion - not justified. The same is basically true for any time limit, 
i.e. where the capital gain realised is only exempt from taxation if it contains profit 
elements which have already been taxed pursuant to the respective CFC legislation 
within a certain period of time.213 The fact that more countries provide for a relief from 
double taxation related to subsequent dividends than for subsequent capital gains is 
not really understandable.214 Both events, dividend distributions and capital gains, 
contain the same profit elements. Moreover, both events are subject to a double 
taxation of the same underlying income. In my opinion, there cannot be a different 
treatment in this respect.  
 
Among the countries which are covered by the National Reports to the 2001 IFA 
Congress, there are only four European Member States which were identified as 
countries which provide some type of relief for subsequent capital gains: Denmark, 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.215 In Denmark, a “taxation-account” 
ensures that taxable capital gains (and dividends) are reduced by previous CFC 
income attribution.216 In Germany, relief is granted for individuals if the time limit of 7 
years between CFC income attribution and disposal of shares is not exceeded. In this 
case, the capital gains will be reduced by the previously attributed CFC income.217 
Capital gains on the sale of shares realised by German corporations are tax exempt, 
but require the adding back of 5 percent of the capital gains to the domestic tax 
base.218 In Spain, the problem of double taxation is solved by an adjustment of the 
                                            
212 For example, Germany adds back 5 percent of the tax exempt capital gains realised by the disposal of shares 
to the domestic tax base; section 8 b (3) of the German Corporate Income Tax Act.  
213 The German 7 year limitation applies to resident individual shareholders; section 3 no. 41 letter b of the 
German Income Tax Act.  
214 See in this respect Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 65, 66.  
215 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 66. 
216 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 150, 151. 
217 Section 3 no. 41 letter b of the German Income Tax Act. 
218 Section 8 b (3) of the German Corporate Income Tax Act. 
    
                                                                                         
 
the distribution to the domestic tax base or tax a minor percentage of the distribution 
in order to cover the non-deductible expenses. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
explicitly allows a fixed amount which may not exceed 5 percent of the profits 
distributed by the subsidiary.208 Member States which follow such an approach, i.e. 
which add back 5 percent of the tax exempt dividend payment to the domestic tax 
base or, alternatively, which exempt 95 percent of the dividend payment are, for 
example, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.209 However, such a limitation is only 
of relevance if the country of the shareholder applies the exemption method for the 
avoidance of double taxation.210 If the credit method is applied, the dividend 
distribution is subject to tax in the residence state of the shareholder. As a 
consequence the expenses related to the foreign investment should be fully tax 
deductible. In case of CFC taxation, a two-step approach exists: first, the CFC 
income is attributed to the resident shareholder which leads to a domestic taxation 
and, second, a subsequent distribution takes place which is - at least partially with 
respect to the former income attribution - tax exempt. This is true for all of the 
Member States which apply such a CFC regime – with the exception of the United 
Kingdom. Under the United Kingdom rules, the tax imposed on the attributed CFC 
income is deemed to be foreign tax paid by the resident shareholder, which is 
creditable against the United Kingdom tax on the subsequent dividends received 
from the CFC.211 However, since the (original) CFC income attribution is taxable in 
the residence state of the shareholder, the expenses related to the CFC investment 
should be fully deductible. There is, in my opinion, no reason for any limitation of the 
deduction of the expenses which are related to the investment in the CFC. Any 
exemption of a subsequent dividend payment is just a method of avoiding the double 
taxation of income in the hands of the shareholder. For example, if CFC income of 
100 Euro is attributed in year 01, the subsequent exemption of a 100 Euro dividend 
payment in year 03 does not lead to a non-taxation of income, but merely ensures 
that the income is taxed once (and not twice) in the hands of the shareholder. The 
adding back of 5 Euro to the tax base of the shareholder (or the limitation of the 
dividend exemption to 95 Euro instead of 100 Euro) results in a taxation of 105 Euro 
(100 Euro in year 01 and 5 Euro in year 03). In this case, the total amount of income 
is subject to tax in the residence state of the shareholder and a consistent approach 
requires the (unlimited) deduction of the expenses which are connected to this 
income. In other words, there is no room for a standard percentage of non-deductible 
expenses which solely has the effect of an “over-taxation” of income. At least, this is 
true where the CFC taxation follows an entity approach. The situation can be different 
for the transactional-countries. Here, only the tainted income is subject to CFC 
taxation. Thus, a differentiation is to be made between profit distributions related to 
tainted income and profit distributions related to active income. In my opinion, any 
generalisation - like in Germany, France, Italy (see above) - where a fixed percentage 
of non-deductible expenses is calculated on the complete profit distribution - 
irrespective of the fact whether all or part of the underlying income was subject to 
CFC taxation - is not acceptable.  
 
                                            
208 Article 4 (2) of the Council Directive 90/435/EEC, dated July 23, 1990 (Parent-Subsidiary Directive). 
209 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Corporate Taxes 2004-2005 (2004), Worldwide Summaries, page 65 
(Belgium), page 261 (France), page 278 (Germany), page 397 (Italy). 
210 See in this respect also de Hosson, The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Intertax 1990, page 414 et seq. (432).  
211 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 65, 66; Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, page 890. 
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6.7.2. Subsequent Disposal of Shares 
 
In general, a capital gain realised by the disposal of shares theoretically includes the 
retained profits of the CFC. Depending on the activities of the CFC and the results of 
these activities the capital gain can also include future profit elements which have not 
yet been taxed according to the CFC taxation. In turn, if the business expectations 
are negative, the capital gain can theoretically be less than the net book value of the 
foreign company and therefore reflects only part of the retained profits. Capital gains 
realised by the disposal of shares and related to profits which were already subject to 
CFC taxation should be treated similar to dividend income, i.e. the attributed income 
(or the tax paid on the CFC income) should be taken into account for the 
determination of a possible taxable gain (or the tax related to the taxable gain). In 
general, everything outlined above with respect to subsequent dividends is equally 
relevant for subsequent capital gains. This is in particular true for any fixed 
percentage of non-deductible expenses calculated on the basis of the capital gains. 
Similar to dividend payments, the capital gains include retained earnings which have 
already been taxed in the residence state of the shareholder pursuant to the 
applicable CFC legislation.212 Any limitation of deductible business expenses is 
therefore - in my opinion - not justified. The same is basically true for any time limit, 
i.e. where the capital gain realised is only exempt from taxation if it contains profit 
elements which have already been taxed pursuant to the respective CFC legislation 
within a certain period of time.213 The fact that more countries provide for a relief from 
double taxation related to subsequent dividends than for subsequent capital gains is 
not really understandable.214 Both events, dividend distributions and capital gains, 
contain the same profit elements. Moreover, both events are subject to a double 
taxation of the same underlying income. In my opinion, there cannot be a different 
treatment in this respect.  
 
Among the countries which are covered by the National Reports to the 2001 IFA 
Congress, there are only four European Member States which were identified as 
countries which provide some type of relief for subsequent capital gains: Denmark, 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.215 In Denmark, a “taxation-account” 
ensures that taxable capital gains (and dividends) are reduced by previous CFC 
income attribution.216 In Germany, relief is granted for individuals if the time limit of 7 
years between CFC income attribution and disposal of shares is not exceeded. In this 
case, the capital gains will be reduced by the previously attributed CFC income.217 
Capital gains on the sale of shares realised by German corporations are tax exempt, 
but require the adding back of 5 percent of the capital gains to the domestic tax 
base.218 In Spain, the problem of double taxation is solved by an adjustment of the 
                                            
212 For example, Germany adds back 5 percent of the tax exempt capital gains realised by the disposal of shares 
to the domestic tax base; section 8 b (3) of the German Corporate Income Tax Act.  
213 The German 7 year limitation applies to resident individual shareholders; section 3 no. 41 letter b of the 
German Income Tax Act.  
214 See in this respect Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 65, 66.  
215 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 66. 
216 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 150, 151. 
217 Section 3 no. 41 letter b of the German Income Tax Act. 
218 Section 8 b (3) of the German Corporate Income Tax Act. 
    
                                                                                         
 
the distribution to the domestic tax base or tax a minor percentage of the distribution 
in order to cover the non-deductible expenses. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
explicitly allows a fixed amount which may not exceed 5 percent of the profits 
distributed by the subsidiary.208 Member States which follow such an approach, i.e. 
which add back 5 percent of the tax exempt dividend payment to the domestic tax 
base or, alternatively, which exempt 95 percent of the dividend payment are, for 
example, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy.209 However, such a limitation is only 
of relevance if the country of the shareholder applies the exemption method for the 
avoidance of double taxation.210 If the credit method is applied, the dividend 
distribution is subject to tax in the residence state of the shareholder. As a 
consequence the expenses related to the foreign investment should be fully tax 
deductible. In case of CFC taxation, a two-step approach exists: first, the CFC 
income is attributed to the resident shareholder which leads to a domestic taxation 
and, second, a subsequent distribution takes place which is - at least partially with 
respect to the former income attribution - tax exempt. This is true for all of the 
Member States which apply such a CFC regime – with the exception of the United 
Kingdom. Under the United Kingdom rules, the tax imposed on the attributed CFC 
income is deemed to be foreign tax paid by the resident shareholder, which is 
creditable against the United Kingdom tax on the subsequent dividends received 
from the CFC.211 However, since the (original) CFC income attribution is taxable in 
the residence state of the shareholder, the expenses related to the CFC investment 
should be fully deductible. There is, in my opinion, no reason for any limitation of the 
deduction of the expenses which are related to the investment in the CFC. Any 
exemption of a subsequent dividend payment is just a method of avoiding the double 
taxation of income in the hands of the shareholder. For example, if CFC income of 
100 Euro is attributed in year 01, the subsequent exemption of a 100 Euro dividend 
payment in year 03 does not lead to a non-taxation of income, but merely ensures 
that the income is taxed once (and not twice) in the hands of the shareholder. The 
adding back of 5 Euro to the tax base of the shareholder (or the limitation of the 
dividend exemption to 95 Euro instead of 100 Euro) results in a taxation of 105 Euro 
(100 Euro in year 01 and 5 Euro in year 03). In this case, the total amount of income 
is subject to tax in the residence state of the shareholder and a consistent approach 
requires the (unlimited) deduction of the expenses which are connected to this 
income. In other words, there is no room for a standard percentage of non-deductible 
expenses which solely has the effect of an “over-taxation” of income. At least, this is 
true where the CFC taxation follows an entity approach. The situation can be different 
for the transactional-countries. Here, only the tainted income is subject to CFC 
taxation. Thus, a differentiation is to be made between profit distributions related to 
tainted income and profit distributions related to active income. In my opinion, any 
generalisation - like in Germany, France, Italy (see above) - where a fixed percentage 
of non-deductible expenses is calculated on the complete profit distribution - 
irrespective of the fact whether all or part of the underlying income was subject to 
CFC taxation - is not acceptable.  
 
                                            
208 Article 4 (2) of the Council Directive 90/435/EEC, dated July 23, 1990 (Parent-Subsidiary Directive). 
209 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Corporate Taxes 2004-2005 (2004), Worldwide Summaries, page 65 
(Belgium), page 261 (France), page 278 (Germany), page 397 (Italy). 
210 See in this respect also de Hosson, The Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Intertax 1990, page 414 et seq. (432).  
211 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 65, 66; Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, page 890. 
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does not fit together, in my opinion, with the application of CFC rules where (part of) 
the profits realised through the foreign company are immediately taxed in the hands 
of the shareholder. In the latter case, there is no complete exemption of the foreign 
income anymore, and this requires, consistently, that (subsequent) losses are treated 
differently, too. 
 
According to the Dutch system - which is not a CFC regime in the narrower sense - 
the mark-to-market revaluation leads to a yearly increase or decrease in the 
participation which has a direct impact on the tax base of the resident shareholder. In 
case of a subsequent disposal of the shares the capital gain (or capital loss) realised 
will be subject to tax in the Netherlands. This is, in principle, a consistent approach. 
However, one should not overlook the fact that the change in value in a respective 
year - based on a mark-to-market revaluation - is not necessarily identical to the 
income derived by the subsidiary company in the respective year. The same will be 
true in case of a disposal of the shares in the subsidiary. Any mismatch between the 
regular yearly income of the subsidiary and the increase or decrease in value of the 
shares (as a taxable event) may finally result in an insufficient (indirect) tax credit. I 
will come back to this topic later on.  
 
6.7.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It was concluded earlier that a system of current taxation of income should not have 
any “penalty” effect for the investor, no matter whether the investor derives tainted or 
non-tainted income. It is therefore apparent that the current taxation of income should 
not, especially from the perspective of taxpayer equity, result in a disadvantageous 
treatment of specific types of income. In essence, this is true for a legislation which is 
based on the horizontal separation of income (like the transactional approach CFC 
regimes), the non-separation of income (like the entity approach CFC regimes) and 
the horizontal and vertical separation of income (like the concept of basic interest 
taxation). From an economic perspective, the current taxation of specific income 
components should have, as one of the main targets, the effect of safeguarding 
competitiveness within a non-optimal scenario. However, such a target can only be 
achieved by a clear and consistent legislation which ensures that the income is not, 
just by the application of a system of current taxation, subject to double taxation or 
subject to any other disadvantages, e.g. by the stipulation of time limits for dividends. 
The double taxation of income may occur if, as described above, the subsequent 
dividends and the subsequent disposal of shares in the CFC do not, or not 
sufficiently, take into account the fact that the income from dividends or the income 
from the disposal of shares have already been subject to income taxation.  
 
Clearly, to the extent that the existing CFC rules do not follow such a clear and 
consistent concept of avoidance of double taxation, the latter rules cannot provide for 
a “neutral” system of current income taxation, i.e. a system which has the purpose of 
correcting, as much as possible, the distortions within a non-optimal scenario but 
without any inherent “side effects.” Essentially, such rules are pure anti-avoidance 
rules which, in my opinion, accept the penalisation of certain investments and accept 
the deterrent effect of such - to some extent - incomplete legislation. The problem is 
that by taking into account the total income (including activity component and risk 
component) the negative effect becomes more important. This, of course, increases 
the risk for the investor. In my opinion, it should be rather self-evident - not only for a 
    
                                                                                         
 
cost base of the shares by the amount of previously taxed CFC income.219 The 
United Kingdom CFC regime provides the possibility of deducting the taxes 
previously imposed on the CFC income from the capital gains on the sale of shares 
in the CFC.220 This, of course, can only be seen as a partial relief from double 
taxation. Thus, among the very few Member States which provide relief for 
subsequent capital gains, there are still countries, like Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which either have additional restrictions or which do not provide full relief 
from double taxation. In other words, an appropriate and unrestricted relief from 
double taxation caused by subsequent capital gains is rather an exception. 
 
An additional question which can be raised is the question how the losses caused by 
the subsequent disposal of shares in the CFC should be treated. Here, it may be the 
case that CFC income is attributed to the shareholder on a yearly basis, but when the 
shares are sold, the value of the shares is below the acquisition costs. In contrast to 
a regular dividend payment where an actual value is transferred from the foreign 
company to the shareholder, there is no such transfer in case of a CFC income 
attribution. In other words, there is a periodic taxation of income which is not 
transferred to the shareholder and which is not available anymore at a later point in 
time - namely at the moment of the disposal of the shares. Below, I will deal with the 
question of negative income of the CFC and the unsystematic approach of the states 
which apply CFC rules. In principle, the same aspects are relevant for negative 
income caused by the disposal of shares: if the positive CFC income is attributed on 
a current basis, the same should be true for negative income. This, of course, is not 
only relevant for negative income which is (directly) realised by the CFC itself, but 
should be equally true for negative income caused by the disposal of shares in the 
CFC. For example, if the CFC derives interest income in the years 01-09 which is 
attributed - on a yearly basis - to the shareholder (pursuant to the CFC regime of the 
residence state of the shareholder), and it turns out in year 10 - just before the 
disposal of the shares - that the most important debtor will not be able to repay the 
principal amount of loan, it would be logical, in my opinion, to take into account the 
respective losses caused by the disposal of the shares (in the same way as the 
positive interest income related to this investment was taken into account in previous 
years). Of course, this should equally be true for liquidation losses. However, to my 
knowledge, none of the Member States which apply CFC rules really provides for a 
(CFC) specific treatment of such losses.221 That means, some Member States 
provide relief for capital gains - as outlined above - and some Member States take 
into account, in general, the losses of subsidiary companies (e.g. in Spain222) and the 
losses caused by the disposal of shares or the liquidation of the subsidiary 
companies (e.g. in the Netherlands). But Member States which provide for a general 
exemption from capital gains taxation often do not take into account the losses 
caused by such disposal, either. This is the case, for example, in Germany.223 Of 
course, this might be seen as a symmetrical approach for the “normal” cases, but it 
                                            
219 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 66. 
220 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890; Ullah, National Report United 
Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX 
Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 622. 
221 See the comments with respect to the Dutch mark-to-market revaluation below. However, the latter system is 
not considered a CFC regime in the narrower sense.  
222 If certain requirements are fulfilled; section 12.4 and 12.5 of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law. 
223 Section 8 b of the German Corporate Income Tax Act. 
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does not fit together, in my opinion, with the application of CFC rules where (part of) 
the profits realised through the foreign company are immediately taxed in the hands 
of the shareholder. In the latter case, there is no complete exemption of the foreign 
income anymore, and this requires, consistently, that (subsequent) losses are treated 
differently, too. 
 
According to the Dutch system - which is not a CFC regime in the narrower sense - 
the mark-to-market revaluation leads to a yearly increase or decrease in the 
participation which has a direct impact on the tax base of the resident shareholder. In 
case of a subsequent disposal of the shares the capital gain (or capital loss) realised 
will be subject to tax in the Netherlands. This is, in principle, a consistent approach. 
However, one should not overlook the fact that the change in value in a respective 
year - based on a mark-to-market revaluation - is not necessarily identical to the 
income derived by the subsidiary company in the respective year. The same will be 
true in case of a disposal of the shares in the subsidiary. Any mismatch between the 
regular yearly income of the subsidiary and the increase or decrease in value of the 
shares (as a taxable event) may finally result in an insufficient (indirect) tax credit. I 
will come back to this topic later on.  
 
6.7.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It was concluded earlier that a system of current taxation of income should not have 
any “penalty” effect for the investor, no matter whether the investor derives tainted or 
non-tainted income. It is therefore apparent that the current taxation of income should 
not, especially from the perspective of taxpayer equity, result in a disadvantageous 
treatment of specific types of income. In essence, this is true for a legislation which is 
based on the horizontal separation of income (like the transactional approach CFC 
regimes), the non-separation of income (like the entity approach CFC regimes) and 
the horizontal and vertical separation of income (like the concept of basic interest 
taxation). From an economic perspective, the current taxation of specific income 
components should have, as one of the main targets, the effect of safeguarding 
competitiveness within a non-optimal scenario. However, such a target can only be 
achieved by a clear and consistent legislation which ensures that the income is not, 
just by the application of a system of current taxation, subject to double taxation or 
subject to any other disadvantages, e.g. by the stipulation of time limits for dividends. 
The double taxation of income may occur if, as described above, the subsequent 
dividends and the subsequent disposal of shares in the CFC do not, or not 
sufficiently, take into account the fact that the income from dividends or the income 
from the disposal of shares have already been subject to income taxation.  
 
Clearly, to the extent that the existing CFC rules do not follow such a clear and 
consistent concept of avoidance of double taxation, the latter rules cannot provide for 
a “neutral” system of current income taxation, i.e. a system which has the purpose of 
correcting, as much as possible, the distortions within a non-optimal scenario but 
without any inherent “side effects.” Essentially, such rules are pure anti-avoidance 
rules which, in my opinion, accept the penalisation of certain investments and accept 
the deterrent effect of such - to some extent - incomplete legislation. The problem is 
that by taking into account the total income (including activity component and risk 
component) the negative effect becomes more important. This, of course, increases 
the risk for the investor. In my opinion, it should be rather self-evident - not only for a 
    
                                                                                         
 
cost base of the shares by the amount of previously taxed CFC income.219 The 
United Kingdom CFC regime provides the possibility of deducting the taxes 
previously imposed on the CFC income from the capital gains on the sale of shares 
in the CFC.220 This, of course, can only be seen as a partial relief from double 
taxation. Thus, among the very few Member States which provide relief for 
subsequent capital gains, there are still countries, like Germany and the United 
Kingdom, which either have additional restrictions or which do not provide full relief 
from double taxation. In other words, an appropriate and unrestricted relief from 
double taxation caused by subsequent capital gains is rather an exception. 
 
An additional question which can be raised is the question how the losses caused by 
the subsequent disposal of shares in the CFC should be treated. Here, it may be the 
case that CFC income is attributed to the shareholder on a yearly basis, but when the 
shares are sold, the value of the shares is below the acquisition costs. In contrast to 
a regular dividend payment where an actual value is transferred from the foreign 
company to the shareholder, there is no such transfer in case of a CFC income 
attribution. In other words, there is a periodic taxation of income which is not 
transferred to the shareholder and which is not available anymore at a later point in 
time - namely at the moment of the disposal of the shares. Below, I will deal with the 
question of negative income of the CFC and the unsystematic approach of the states 
which apply CFC rules. In principle, the same aspects are relevant for negative 
income caused by the disposal of shares: if the positive CFC income is attributed on 
a current basis, the same should be true for negative income. This, of course, is not 
only relevant for negative income which is (directly) realised by the CFC itself, but 
should be equally true for negative income caused by the disposal of shares in the 
CFC. For example, if the CFC derives interest income in the years 01-09 which is 
attributed - on a yearly basis - to the shareholder (pursuant to the CFC regime of the 
residence state of the shareholder), and it turns out in year 10 - just before the 
disposal of the shares - that the most important debtor will not be able to repay the 
principal amount of loan, it would be logical, in my opinion, to take into account the 
respective losses caused by the disposal of the shares (in the same way as the 
positive interest income related to this investment was taken into account in previous 
years). Of course, this should equally be true for liquidation losses. However, to my 
knowledge, none of the Member States which apply CFC rules really provides for a 
(CFC) specific treatment of such losses.221 That means, some Member States 
provide relief for capital gains - as outlined above - and some Member States take 
into account, in general, the losses of subsidiary companies (e.g. in Spain222) and the 
losses caused by the disposal of shares or the liquidation of the subsidiary 
companies (e.g. in the Netherlands). But Member States which provide for a general 
exemption from capital gains taxation often do not take into account the losses 
caused by such disposal, either. This is the case, for example, in Germany.223 Of 
course, this might be seen as a symmetrical approach for the “normal” cases, but it 
                                            
219 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 66. 
220 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890; Ullah, National Report United 
Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX 
Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 622. 
221 See the comments with respect to the Dutch mark-to-market revaluation below. However, the latter system is 
not considered a CFC regime in the narrower sense.  
222 If certain requirements are fulfilled; section 12.4 and 12.5 of the Spanish Corporate Tax Law. 
223 Section 8 b of the German Corporate Income Tax Act. 
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6.8. Negative Income and CFC Rules   
 
6.8.1. General Aspects   
 
The treatment of losses in the context of CFC taxation is a quite interesting and 
important topic since it clearly reveals the unsystematic approach underlying the 
existing CFC rules. One should generally assume that a system which attributes 
positive income to the domestic shareholder also takes into consideration - in the 
same way - the negative income derived from those activities. This is most often not 
the case.224 One should always be aware of the fact that CFC taxation is clearly an 
anti-avoidance legislation, i.e. it is only applied to certain low-tax countries which are 
suspected to attract capital from high-tax countries. It is therefore, from the high-tax 
countries’ position, an effective and comfortable method to simply include into the 
domestic tax base the positive income derived by the CFC but to leave aside the 
negative income. The attribution of losses - even though systematically necessary - 
would bear additional “risks” for the high-tax countries, namely a (permanent) 
reduction of the domestic tax base. The exclusion of negative income in the context 
of CFC legislation therefore deviates, in principle, from the treatment of a permanent 
establishment where the credit method is applied and from the treatment of an 
organic structure with a profit and loss pooling agreement or a fiscal unity.225 The 
typical way in dealing with CFC losses is therefore to determine the amount of 
negative income and to provide the possibility to offset the negative income with 
positive attributable CFC income in subsequent years, i.e. to allow a tax loss carry 
forward. An analysis made by the Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens 
(FEE) in 2002 showed that Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom do not allow the offsetting of negative income of one CFC with the positive 
income of another CFC. France was mentioned as an exception, but this exception is 
only relevant in case of the application of the French (international) consolidation 
regime.226 The analysis basically confirms what was already concluded by Arnold / 
Dibout in the General Report of the IFA 2001 congress: “(v)ery few countries - 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States - allow the losses of one CFC to reduce 
the income of another CFC in certain circumstances, and in all three countries the 
consolidation relief is limited.”227  
 
6.8.1.1. Negative Income in Countries with an Entity Approach  
 
The countries which follow an entity approach do not have to deal with separate 
income elements but only with the overall positive or negative result which is typically 
determined on the basis of the respective domestic tax rules. Entity approach 
countries like France, Finland, Italy and the United Kingdom apply the domestic tax 
rules for the computation of the attributable amount of CFC income.228 However, 
                                            
224 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65; FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, page 11.  
225 It has to be noted that PE rules sometimes also exclude certain negative income from the offsetting with 
domestic income. However, the credit method in case of a PE typically requires the attribution of positive and 
negative income. 
226 See FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, page 11. 
227 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65. 
228 Arnold / Dibout identified only Hungary, Israel, Korea and Portugal – among the countries which were 
included in the IFA 2001 report – as countries which permit the income calculation according to the foreign tax 
    
                                                                                         
 
concept of basic interest taxation but also for the existing CFC rules - that the 
legislation is to be structured in a clear and consistent way which avoids any form of 
(indirect) penalisation.  
 
6.7.4. Conclusions Regarding Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares 
 
The taxation of actual dividend distributions and the taxation of capital gains on the 
disposal of shares should always take into account an earlier CFC taxation of the 
underlying income. Otherwise, the income will be taxed twice in the hands of the 
resident shareholder. Such a relief can be provided by an adjustment of the tax base 
or a tax credit, i.e. the former attributable income (or the income tax burden) is 
deducted from (or credited against) the dividend income or the income from capital 
gains on the disposal of shares (or the respective tax burden). In principle, there 
should be no distinction between dividends and capital gains, because a double 
taxation exists in both situations. A different treatment with respect to capital gains 
cannot be justified. However, the examination on a country-by-country basis shows 
that even though the Member States provide for a relief from double taxation in case 
of dividends, there are only very few Member States which do the same in case of 
capital gains. Moreover, it has to be noted that the CFC regimes in the Member 
States obviously do not provide for an appropriate treatment of the combination of 
CFC income attributions and subsequent losses from the disposal of shares. In my 
opinion, the treatment of positive and negative income must be symmetrically, and 
this requires that losses caused by the disposal of shares must be taken into account 
(in the residence state of the shareholder) in the same way as the previous attribution 
of positive CFC income. In addition, there should be no time limit for the relief from 
double taxation caused by subsequent dividends and the subsequent disposal of 
shares. There is no necessity for such a time limit since the income has already been 
taxed in the residence state of the shareholder. The expiration of a time limit - before 
the distribution of the underlying income or the disposal of the shares takes place - 
would have the consequence of a double taxation of income. Such a limitation could 
be of particular relevance in case of a tax loss carry forward which will be outlined 
below. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that even if the subsequent dividends 
and capital gains are exempt from taxation, the underlying income was taxed in the 
residence state of the shareholder. Therefore, any business expenses of the 
shareholder related to the CFC (entity approach) or the tainted income (transactional 
approach) should be fully deductible and not be restricted.  
 
In general, the consistent relief from double taxation caused by subsequent dividends 
and capital gains is necessary according to the principles derived from chapters 2 
and 3. The taxation of the basic interest component is an income taxation which is 
required by economic principles and equity aspects, but which should not have any 
“penalty effect” for the investor. A consistent relief is, therefore, of utmost importance.  
However, the methods of providing such relief under a concept which focuses on the 
taxation of the basic interest component can be different. I will go into more detail of 
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224 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65; FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, page 11.  
225 It has to be noted that PE rules sometimes also exclude certain negative income from the offsetting with 
domestic income. However, the credit method in case of a PE typically requires the attribution of positive and 
negative income. 
226 See FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, page 11. 
227 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65. 
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concept of basic interest taxation but also for the existing CFC rules - that the 
legislation is to be structured in a clear and consistent way which avoids any form of 
(indirect) penalisation.  
 
6.7.4. Conclusions Regarding Subsequent Dividends and Disposal of Shares 
 
The taxation of actual dividend distributions and the taxation of capital gains on the 
disposal of shares should always take into account an earlier CFC taxation of the 
underlying income. Otherwise, the income will be taxed twice in the hands of the 
resident shareholder. Such a relief can be provided by an adjustment of the tax base 
or a tax credit, i.e. the former attributable income (or the income tax burden) is 
deducted from (or credited against) the dividend income or the income from capital 
gains on the disposal of shares (or the respective tax burden). In principle, there 
should be no distinction between dividends and capital gains, because a double 
taxation exists in both situations. A different treatment with respect to capital gains 
cannot be justified. However, the examination on a country-by-country basis shows 
that even though the Member States provide for a relief from double taxation in case 
of dividends, there are only very few Member States which do the same in case of 
capital gains. Moreover, it has to be noted that the CFC regimes in the Member 
States obviously do not provide for an appropriate treatment of the combination of 
CFC income attributions and subsequent losses from the disposal of shares. In my 
opinion, the treatment of positive and negative income must be symmetrically, and 
this requires that losses caused by the disposal of shares must be taken into account 
(in the residence state of the shareholder) in the same way as the previous attribution 
of positive CFC income. In addition, there should be no time limit for the relief from 
double taxation caused by subsequent dividends and the subsequent disposal of 
shares. There is no necessity for such a time limit since the income has already been 
taxed in the residence state of the shareholder. The expiration of a time limit - before 
the distribution of the underlying income or the disposal of the shares takes place - 
would have the consequence of a double taxation of income. Such a limitation could 
be of particular relevance in case of a tax loss carry forward which will be outlined 
below. Furthermore, it has to be pointed out that even if the subsequent dividends 
and capital gains are exempt from taxation, the underlying income was taxed in the 
residence state of the shareholder. Therefore, any business expenses of the 
shareholder related to the CFC (entity approach) or the tainted income (transactional 
approach) should be fully deductible and not be restricted.  
 
In general, the consistent relief from double taxation caused by subsequent dividends 
and capital gains is necessary according to the principles derived from chapters 2 
and 3. The taxation of the basic interest component is an income taxation which is 
required by economic principles and equity aspects, but which should not have any 
“penalty effect” for the investor. A consistent relief is, therefore, of utmost importance.  
However, the methods of providing such relief under a concept which focuses on the 
taxation of the basic interest component can be different. I will go into more detail of 
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6.8.1.2. Negative Income in Countries with a Transactional Approach  
 
The treatment of negative income under a transactional approach is different since 
the CFC legislation only focuses on tainted income and not on the total income 
derived by the CFC. Whereas Denmark concentrates its CFC taxation on financial 
income, the German, Spanish and Lithuanian CFC legislation also encompasses 
other types of tainted income, e.g. base company income. However, due to the fact 
that the countries which follow a transactional approach CFC regime separate the 
income derived by the CFC into active and passive income, it is necessary, from a 
systematic point of view, that these countries have to make the decision whether 
such a separation is made in the same way for positive and negative income and 
whether the negative income of one part (passive / active) will be influenced by the 
positive income of the other part and vice versa. This is not my proposal, but this is 
just a systematic necessity which has to be identified. In this respect, there is no 
uniform approach among the transactional countries. For example, the German CFC 
legislation is solely directed towards the overall result of the tainted income of the 
CFC, calculated according to the German tax principles, i.e. only the total sum of 
positive and negative tainted income is relevant. If the total income from passive 
activities is positive, it will be attributed to the resident shareholder. If it is negative, it 
can be carried forward (and a limited amount can even be carried back for one year) 
and offset with positive tainted income. It is not possible to reduce the tax base of the 
resident shareholder and to offset negative tainted income with positive domestic 
income. Furthermore, the active (positive or negative) income of the CFC is totally 
irrelevant and neither influences the amount of attributable income nor the negative 
income which is to be determined for the tax loss carry forward or the tax loss carry 
back. This, of course, underlines what was already outlined above: what actually 














    
                                                                                         
 
such an approach clearly shows - in my opinion - that the countries which apply the 
CFC rules are not really interested in the result of the CFC in a narrower sense but 
only in the result of the activities exercised by the CFC. Irrespective of this fact, I will 
still use the terminology of the positive and negative income of the CFC in order to 
avoid misunderstandings. However, one always has to keep in mind that there is a 
positive or negative result of the CFC based on the trade and tax law of the CFC 
country and a positive or negative result which is only used for the purpose of the 
countries which apply their respective CFC rules and which is based on their 
domestic tax rules. Thus, if the result of the activities of the CFC is positive, it will be 
completely attributed to the resident shareholder. In contrast, if the result of the 
activities is negative, entity-approach countries like France, Finland, Italy and the 
United Kingdom solely provide for the determination of the negative income for the 
purpose of a subsequent offsetting with positive income.229 Among the 
aforementioned countries it seems that only France provides for a (limited) carry back 
of the negative CFC income.230 None of these countries allows the domestic tax base 
to be directly reduced by the negative CFC income.231 However, if the domestic law 
provides for a tax loss carry forward which is limited in time, this also applies to the 





















                                                                                                                                         
or accounting rules (see Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58). See also Helminen, 
National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation 2004, page 199; Favi, National Report Italy, Ibid., page 361; Ullah, 
National Report UK, Ibid., page 619; the Portuguese CFC regime provides for a computation according to 
domestic law (see Borges, National Report Portugal, Ibid., page 537); see also the country overview in Brähler, 
Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
229 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
230 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. (268); Kabbaj / Raingeard de la 
Bletière, National Report France, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 233, 234.  
231 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
232 This is the case, for example, in Italy. See in this respect also Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 
2007, page 265 et seq. (278). 
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completely attributed to the resident shareholder. In contrast, if the result of the 
activities is negative, entity-approach countries like France, Finland, Italy and the 
United Kingdom solely provide for the determination of the negative income for the 
purpose of a subsequent offsetting with positive income.229 Among the 
aforementioned countries it seems that only France provides for a (limited) carry back 
of the negative CFC income.230 None of these countries allows the domestic tax base 
to be directly reduced by the negative CFC income.231 However, if the domestic law 
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or accounting rules (see Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58). See also Helminen, 
National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation 2004, page 199; Favi, National Report Italy, Ibid., page 361; Ullah, 
National Report UK, Ibid., page 619; the Portuguese CFC regime provides for a computation according to 
domestic law (see Borges, National Report Portugal, Ibid., page 537); see also the country overview in Brähler, 
Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
229 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
230 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. (268); Kabbaj / Raingeard de la 
Bletière, National Report France, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC 
Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 233, 234.  
231 See Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq. 
232 This is the case, for example, in Italy. See in this respect also Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 
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6.8.2. Specific Aspects 
 
6.8.2.1. The Exclusion and the Limitation of Negative CFC Income  
 
In theory, the limitation of a tax loss carry forward in the residence country of the 
shareholder is a more general issue which is not directly related to CFC taxation. 
However, the combination of a general limitation and CFC taxation can have a major 
negative impact on an international group of companies. Even though, in my opinion, 
the limitation itself is - in general - hardly justifiable,235 the impact in a purely domestic 
situation is different to the one where a CFC is involved. If the overall domestic tax 
base is negative, the resident company does not have to pay income tax. In case the 
domestic company derives positive income in a subsequent year, the company has 
to pay income tax out of the positive income (if the tax loss carry forward is utilised or 
expired). I think this is quite important: the income tax is levied only on positive 
income - which is in line with the ability-to-pay principle. Clearly, in case the tax loss 
carry forward is expired, the accumulated net result over the years can still be 
negative at the moment when the company has to pay income tax, but the income 
tax burden itself does not lead to a reduction of the net value of the company since it 
is levied on positive income.236 The same is basically true where the positive 
attributable CFC income is brought into play, at least where the increase in value of 
the participation is theoretically taken into consideration. In a substantial number of 
countries the attributable CFC income is added to the domestic tax base and 
                                            
235 In general, a tax loss carry forward limitation can lead to the outcome that positive income is taxed even 
though the total positive income does not exceed the total negative income (since the tax loss carry forward is 
expired). The net value of the activities which are subject to tax is still negative. In my opinion, this is not in line 
with the ability-to-pay principle.  
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In contrast to the German CFC taxation, the Spanish rules calculate the net income 
of each of the different types of tainted income. In general, it is not allowed to offset 
the negative result of one type of tainted income with the positive result of another 
type of tainted income (or active income). However, if the total net income of the 
foreign entity – from active and passive activities – is negative, even if one of the 
categories of tainted income is positive, the resident shareholder will not be 
compelled to include any income in the domestic tax base. Therefore, the net income 
of the CFC is the limitation for the attribution of the positive tainted income.233 The 
Spanish rules, even though strictly categorising the income derived by the CFC, take 
into account the active income for the final decision whether positive tainted income 
is attributable to the Spanish resident shareholder or not. The approach goes a step 
further than the German approach which completely ignores the CFC and its active 
income. The Spanish approach, at least, recognises the CFC and its additional 
income which can – under certain circumstances – act as a limitation for the 
attribution of tainted income. The negative tainted income can be carried forward and 
offset with positive tainted income in subsequent years. The carry forward is limited in 
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6.8.2. Specific Aspects 
 
6.8.2.1. The Exclusion and the Limitation of Negative CFC Income  
 
In theory, the limitation of a tax loss carry forward in the residence country of the 
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the limitation itself is - in general - hardly justifiable,235 the impact in a purely domestic 
situation is different to the one where a CFC is involved. If the overall domestic tax 
base is negative, the resident company does not have to pay income tax. In case the 
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countries the attributable CFC income is added to the domestic tax base and 
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state does not provide sufficient relief when the risk becomes reality, i.e. in case of 
the default of the debtor. This is an unsystematic and asymmetrical treatment of 
income which neither supports taxpayer equity nor the safeguarding of 
competitiveness. Moreover, such a situation is, in my opinion, clearly not in line with 
the ability-to-pay principle. I will come back to these aspects below in more detail. 
 
A system which follows a yearly mark-to-market revaluation of the shares in the 
subsidiary company and which consistently takes into account positive and negative 
developments, as in the case of the Netherlands, considers, at least to a certain 
extent, the negative income derived by the subsidiary company. However, as already 
outlined earlier, the change in market value does not necessarily correspond to the 
(positive or negative) income derived by the subsidiary in the respective year. 
Nonetheless, it must be concluded that, in this regard, the Dutch legislation follows a 
symmetrical system of income taxation.  
 
6.8.2.2. Negative Domestic Income of the Shareholder and CFC Income 
 
The situation where the resident shareholder has a domestic tax loss carry forward 
available in combination with the attribution of positive CFC income is equally 
unsatisfactory. At least, the problem is, in principle, comparable to any other situation 
where the credit method is applied to foreign income. Here, the problem lies in the 
fact that the income derived through the interposition of the foreign company is taxed 
twice: first, in the state of residence of the foreign company (in the hands of the 
foreign company) and, second, in the state of residence of the shareholder (in the 
hands of the shareholder). Thus, for the countries which apply CFC rules and which 
strictly follow the concept of an ordinary tax credit system for taxes paid in the CFC 
country, as is the case in most of the Member States with CFC rules,240 there is no 
possibility for an appropriate relief from economic double taxation. In those cases, 
partial relief from double taxation can be achieved if the country which applies the 
CFC taxation provides for a deduction of the taxes paid from the domestic tax base, 
i.e. a corresponding reduction of the attributable income. In Germany, for example, 
the shareholder can choose between an ordinary tax credit and a deduction from the 
tax base of the taxes paid in the CFC country - and can therefore react to the 
different circumstances.241 I will go into more detail of the relief provisions below. It is 
apparent, however, that the effect of a deduction of the foreign taxes is by no means 
comparable to the effect of a tax credit. Still, the positive CFC income attribution 
reduces the domestic losses (or the tax loss carry forward) of the resident 
shareholder and therefore also the possibility for the offsetting with positive 
(domestic) income in the future. Even though this is nothing special since it is the 
regular procedure where the credit method is the underlying method of avoiding 
double taxation, it has to be seen as an additional serious disadvantage in 
combination with the treatment of CFC losses as outlined above. Furthermore, it has 
to be noted that there can be a major difference to the situation where the domestic 
shareholder holds a substantial interest in a legal entity and where the CFC rules are 
not applicable. Here, the shareholder can - depending on the percentage of 
shareholding and voting rights - influence the actual dividend payment, with the effect 
                                            
240 I will go into more detail of the concept of an ordinary tax credit system in the context of CFC rules in section 
6.9. See in this respect also Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 64; FEE Position Paper on 
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therefore subject to the regular domestic income taxation.237 This is the case, for 
example, in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom.238 
 
The picture is completely different if negative CFC income is involved. It seems to me 
as if the CFC rules were originally designed for activities which are less risky and 
therefore typically lead to stable and continuous positive income. This could be a 
reason, together with the fear of the high tax countries to take into account the 
negative income of a CFC, why the treatment of CFC losses is most often regulated 
in the aforementioned unsystematic manner. However, I do not think that the 
activities carried on by the foreign companies which are subject to CFC taxation are 
less risky. Especially, if it is assumed that groups are interested in earning more 
income in low-tax countries but the possibilities of shifting business functions to low-
tax countries are limited, the CFC profits can only be maximised if (i) more capital 
investment is made in the low-tax countries and (ii) higher risks are taken. Since the 
latter is clearly based on transfer pricing principles,239 the higher risk - and therefore 
the change to earn more income - has actually to be taken in the low-tax country. The 
higher risk also has the consequence that the probability increases that - over a 
longer period of time - the foreign company will end up with losses (either with an 
overall loss or with periodic losses). Since the degree of risk and the chance to earn 
a higher income are clearly connected, the CFC taxation has a fatal effect: in each 
year in which the CFC income is positive, it will be included in the domestic tax base. 
In contrast, the negative years are excluded and can only be offset with positive CFC 
income if it is derived within a certain period of time. The effect can be illustrated by a 
simplified example: the most important asset of a CFC situated in a low-tax country is 
a 10-year corporate bond with an increased risk (“junk bond”). In order to cover the 
risk, the debtor pays a yearly interest of 10 percent to the creditor. As a 
consequence, the interest income derived from the investment in the corporate bond 
is attributed to the resident shareholder on a current basis. However, after 10 years 
of taxing the interest income in the residence country of the shareholder it turns out 
that the debtor is not able to repay the corporate bond. The loss caused by the 
investment turns out to be 100 percent. The negative income caused by the default 
of the debtor will not be taken into account directly in the residence country of the 
shareholder. A loss carry back in order to offset the negative income with the 
attributed interest income of the past will not be allowed in most cases, either. In 
addition, if the loss carry forward is limited in time, there is an increased likelihood 
that an offsetting with future positive income cannot take place at all (or only to a 
limited extent). However, this is only one part of the problem. Since the negative 
income caused by the default of the debtor will not have any impact on the income of 
the resident shareholder, the latter has to pay income tax on the domestic income as 
if nothing happened. This is a quite unsatisfactory and unjustified result, especially 
with respect to the fact that the high interest income - which was necessary to 
compensate the increased risk - was taken into account and taxed in the residence 
country of the shareholder year by year. In this case, the risk component (risk 
premium) is subject to current taxation in the state of the shareholder, but the latter 
                                            
237 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 63.  
238 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 63. In the General Report Germany was mentioned as 
one of the exceptions to this approach. However, the legislation changed afterwards (section 10 (2) of the 
German Foreign Income Tax Act); for a country overview see also Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-
Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq.   
239 Such as the arm’s length principle.  
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negative income of a CFC, why the treatment of CFC losses is most often regulated 
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attributed interest income of the past will not be allowed in most cases, either. In 
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if nothing happened. This is a quite unsatisfactory and unjustified result, especially 
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country of the shareholder year by year. In this case, the risk component (risk 
premium) is subject to current taxation in the state of the shareholder, but the latter 
                                            
237 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 63.  
238 Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 63. In the General Report Germany was mentioned as 
one of the exceptions to this approach. However, the legislation changed afterwards (section 10 (2) of the 
German Foreign Income Tax Act); for a country overview see also Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-
Rules, 2007, page 265 et seq.   
239 Such as the arm’s length principle.  
Chapter 6
284
    
                                                                                         
 
disadvantage in order to avoid more serious disadvantages caused by the 
expiration of the time limit.245 
 
6.8.2.4. Time Limit for Subsequent Capital Gains on the Sale of Shares  
 
What was outlined above with respect to the double taxation of dividends is, in 
principle, equally true for the taxation of capital gains on the disposal of shares. It will 
therefore not be described separately. In fact, any time limit for subsequent losses 
caused by the disposal of shares in the CFC would also be unacceptable. However, 
since the Member States which apply CFC rules do not provide for any specific 
treatment of such losses anyway, there is no reason to deal with this question in this 
context. Again, the exception from the unfavourable and unsystematic treatment in 
case of losses is the Dutch mark-to-market revaluation which was already outlined 
earlier and which is not to be considered a CFC regime in the narrower sense. 
 
6.8.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The combination of CFC taxation and negative income - on the level of the CFC and / 
or the level of the shareholder - can clearly be seen, in my opinion, as one of the 
most serious risks for a double taxation of income. In this respect, it might be 
interesting to have a look at the impact on the respective income components 
included in the tainted income.  
 
Figure 9: 
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(1) “Income block” divided into tainted and non-tainted income (horizontal) and the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) The activity component encompasses the income which is related to the carrying out of the 
respective functions and risks (but not the risk which is related to the capital investment).  
(3) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
The components which are of particular interest are the risk component, the activity 
component and the basic interest component. A further subdivision into the different 
risk elements - as shown in chapter 2 - is not required. As an example, it shall be 
assumed that positive CFC income is attributed to the resident shareholder, but the 
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that the distribution is made in a year which allows the full crediting of the foreign 
taxes. In other words, a majority shareholding without CFC taxation provides much 
more flexibility with respect to an efficient distribution policy than a majority 
shareholding with CFC taxation. This, again, is of particular relevance in case of tax 
credit limitations (e.g. in case of tax losses). 
 
6.8.2.3. Time Limit for Subsequent Dividends 
 
As already outlined earlier, there are several ways in dealing with subsequent 
dividend payments in order to avoid that the underlying income is taxed twice, as 
attributable CFC income and as taxable dividends. However, countries like Finland 
and Germany have a time limit for the relief from double taxation. Even though both 
countries generally exempt dividends in a parent-subsidiary relationship, the time 
limit is of relevance, for example, in case of individual shareholders and 
partnerships.242 In Finland, an actual dividend distribution is regarded as taxable 
income of the Finnish shareholder only to the extent that the amount received 
exceeds the amount included in the taxable income of the Finnish taxpayer in the 
same or the previous five tax years.243 The same is true in Germany, with the 
exception that the CFC income has to be included in the taxable income of the 
German taxpayer in the same or the previous seven years.244 It is obvious that the 
time limit can be of particular relevance in case of negative CFC income and negative 
income of the resident shareholder. In order to avoid the double taxation of CFC 
income and dividend income the CFC is forced to distribute the profits within the 
respective time limit. Apart from the question whether the resident shareholder has 
any influence on the profit distribution, there are other serious aspects which are 
relevant in case of negative income: 
 
- The CFC can be in a position which does not allow any profit distribution 
during the relevant period. For example, a - currently attributable - profit was 
derived in year 01 which was followed by a loss in a subsequent year which 
cancelled out the profit of year 01. The CFC can legally be in a position which 
disallows any profit distribution. Even though a later attributable CFC income 
can be offset with the tax loss carry forward of the negative CFC income, the 
original profit of year 01 cannot be distributed tax exempt if the time limit has 
expired. 
 
- The resident shareholder with a tax loss carry forward is subject to partial 
double taxation through the attribution of positive CFC income during that 
period (since the corporate income tax of the CFC can only be deducted from 
the domestic tax base but not be credited against domestic income tax). In 
case the subsequent “mandatory” profit distribution is subject to withholding 
tax, the shareholder will also suffer a partial double taxation related to the 
withholding tax. The shareholder can be forced to accept the withholding tax 
                                            
242 With an individual as a partner in the partnership.  
243 Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 202; IBFD Corporate Tax 
Summary Finland, 2002, page 16.  
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that the distribution is made in a year which allows the full crediting of the foreign 
taxes. In other words, a majority shareholding without CFC taxation provides much 
more flexibility with respect to an efficient distribution policy than a majority 
shareholding with CFC taxation. This, again, is of particular relevance in case of tax 
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such an non-optimal scenario, to provide for a symmetrical relief in case of positive 
and negative income. Essentially, this results in a distortion of the necessary balance 
between the risk component (risk premium) and the theoretical risk. Such an 
approach results in an unfavourable treatment of the investor in the CFC (related to 
the risk component) and therefore does not support taxpayer equity. Moreover, the 
general non-existence of the “risk balance” by no means safeguards competitiveness 
within a non-optimal scenario. In addition, it can hardly be argued that a concept 
which taxes positive income on a current basis but does not, at the same time, 
provide for sufficient relief in case of negative income is in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This, of course, is particularly obvious in case of the risk component where 
an inseparable link exists between the risk premium and the (subsequent) actual risk. 
In such a case, the existence of negative income can result in a systematic over-
taxation of the total amount of (accumulated) positive and negative income. In fact, it 
may result in a situation where the total amount of accumulated income (over a 
period of more than one year) is zero or negative, but a substantial amount of taxes 
was imposed on that income. Such an example was outlined above (the holding of a 
corporate bond followed by the default of the debtor). The argument that the taxpayer 
is in a position to pay the taxes at the point in time when the positive income is 
allocated is by no means satisfactory. In my opinion, one cannot just focus on one 
single year but must concentrate on a longer period of time. This, again, is 
particularly obvious for the risk premium. Thus, if the risk becomes reality, there must 
be an appropriate and consistent relief in order to avoid the taxation of income which 
is not existent (any more). 
 
In principle, similar aspects are relevant for the activity component included in the 
tainted income (and, of course, also in the non-tainted income). In this case, 
however, the income taxation in the CFC state can be seen as the optimal economic 
result, because this part of the income is produced in the latter state. Here, the strict 
application of the principle of capital import neutrality requires the exclusive taxation 
in the CFC state. The asymmetrical taxation of positive and negative income would 
essentially have a similar effect as in case of the risk component, i.e. the (additional 
current) taxation in the state of residence would take away positive income which is 
required to operate successfully in the local market and to compete with local and 
international companies in the respective market. In other words, the CFC taxation of 
the activity component cannot be justified, as already outlined above, from an 
economic and equity perspective.  
 
The situation with respect to the basic interest component is a bit different. Here, 
there is neither the carrying out of functions nor the taking over of risks which 
“matches” the respective income in the state of the CFC. In fact, the functions are 
carried out and the risks are taken in the state where the underlying income is 
produced (which is not the CFC state). It was concluded earlier that the basic interest 
component should be subject to current taxation in the residence state of the 
shareholder, but the taxation should, at least theoretically, be limited to the tax rate 
which would be imposed in the state where the income is produced. However, this 
does not mean that the avoidance of double taxation is of less importance. The 
principles outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 3 require the income to be currently 
taxed in the residence state of the shareholder at a rate which would be applicable 
on such income in comparable (domestic) situations (if the rate is not higher than in 
the state where the income is produced). For this reason, any asymmetrical 
treatment of positive and negative income which involves the risk of a double taxation 
    
                                                                                         
 
domestic tax base of the resident shareholder - including the attributed positive CFC 
income - is negative. In this case, no income tax is imposed in the state of residence 
which allows the shareholder to credit the income tax of the CFC in the respective 
year. It shall be assumed further that no roll-over is available which provides the 
possibility for the shareholder of crediting the amount of CFC tax in a subsequent 
year, but only allows him to offset the positive CFC income with the negative 
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The income tax imposed in the CFC state plus the income tax which will be imposed 
in the residence state of the shareholder (in a subsequent year when the tax base 
becomes positive) will lead to a reduction of the amount of income (on a group level) 
which is theoretically required to offset the risks involved in the respective 
investment. If the CFC regime provides for an alternative deduction of the income tax 
imposed in the CFC state from the income tax base in the state of the shareholder, 
the deduction only reduces the effect of double taxation but does not eliminate the 
latter effect. If there is not even a possibility for an alternative deduction, there is no 
elimination of double taxation at all.246  
 
The problem is, inter alia, that the negative income which is caused by the risk, i.e. in 
case the risk is realised, does not result in a similar reduction of the income tax base. 
In other words, the asymmetrical approach of CFC taxation takes away a portion of 
positive income which is not “given back” in case of negative income. Again, this is 
not a side effect, but an effect which is caused by the general system of treating 
positive CFC income different from negative CFC income. Despite the fact that the 
risk component is not subject to taxation in the state where the income is produced 
(at least not subject to a regular income taxation), it is necessary, in the context of 
                                            
246 See section 6.9. for further details.  
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such an non-optimal scenario, to provide for a symmetrical relief in case of positive 
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the risk component) and therefore does not support taxpayer equity. Moreover, the 
general non-existence of the “risk balance” by no means safeguards competitiveness 
within a non-optimal scenario. In addition, it can hardly be argued that a concept 
which taxes positive income on a current basis but does not, at the same time, 
provide for sufficient relief in case of negative income is in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This, of course, is particularly obvious in case of the risk component where 
an inseparable link exists between the risk premium and the (subsequent) actual risk. 
In such a case, the existence of negative income can result in a systematic over-
taxation of the total amount of (accumulated) positive and negative income. In fact, it 
may result in a situation where the total amount of accumulated income (over a 
period of more than one year) is zero or negative, but a substantial amount of taxes 
was imposed on that income. Such an example was outlined above (the holding of a 
corporate bond followed by the default of the debtor). The argument that the taxpayer 
is in a position to pay the taxes at the point in time when the positive income is 
allocated is by no means satisfactory. In my opinion, one cannot just focus on one 
single year but must concentrate on a longer period of time. This, again, is 
particularly obvious for the risk premium. Thus, if the risk becomes reality, there must 
be an appropriate and consistent relief in order to avoid the taxation of income which 
is not existent (any more). 
 
In principle, similar aspects are relevant for the activity component included in the 
tainted income (and, of course, also in the non-tainted income). In this case, 
however, the income taxation in the CFC state can be seen as the optimal economic 
result, because this part of the income is produced in the latter state. Here, the strict 
application of the principle of capital import neutrality requires the exclusive taxation 
in the CFC state. The asymmetrical taxation of positive and negative income would 
essentially have a similar effect as in case of the risk component, i.e. the (additional 
current) taxation in the state of residence would take away positive income which is 
required to operate successfully in the local market and to compete with local and 
international companies in the respective market. In other words, the CFC taxation of 
the activity component cannot be justified, as already outlined above, from an 
economic and equity perspective.  
 
The situation with respect to the basic interest component is a bit different. Here, 
there is neither the carrying out of functions nor the taking over of risks which 
“matches” the respective income in the state of the CFC. In fact, the functions are 
carried out and the risks are taken in the state where the underlying income is 
produced (which is not the CFC state). It was concluded earlier that the basic interest 
component should be subject to current taxation in the residence state of the 
shareholder, but the taxation should, at least theoretically, be limited to the tax rate 
which would be imposed in the state where the income is produced. However, this 
does not mean that the avoidance of double taxation is of less importance. The 
principles outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 3 require the income to be currently 
taxed in the residence state of the shareholder at a rate which would be applicable 
on such income in comparable (domestic) situations (if the rate is not higher than in 
the state where the income is produced). For this reason, any asymmetrical 
treatment of positive and negative income which involves the risk of a double taxation 
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year. It shall be assumed further that no roll-over is available which provides the 
possibility for the shareholder of crediting the amount of CFC tax in a subsequent 
year, but only allows him to offset the positive CFC income with the negative 
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The income tax imposed in the CFC state plus the income tax which will be imposed 
in the residence state of the shareholder (in a subsequent year when the tax base 
becomes positive) will lead to a reduction of the amount of income (on a group level) 
which is theoretically required to offset the risks involved in the respective 
investment. If the CFC regime provides for an alternative deduction of the income tax 
imposed in the CFC state from the income tax base in the state of the shareholder, 
the deduction only reduces the effect of double taxation but does not eliminate the 
latter effect. If there is not even a possibility for an alternative deduction, there is no 
elimination of double taxation at all.246  
 
The problem is, inter alia, that the negative income which is caused by the risk, i.e. in 
case the risk is realised, does not result in a similar reduction of the income tax base. 
In other words, the asymmetrical approach of CFC taxation takes away a portion of 
positive income which is not “given back” in case of negative income. Again, this is 
not a side effect, but an effect which is caused by the general system of treating 
positive CFC income different from negative CFC income. Despite the fact that the 
risk component is not subject to taxation in the state where the income is produced 
(at least not subject to a regular income taxation), it is necessary, in the context of 
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other hand the negative CFC income is completely separated and excluded. In fact, 
the negative CFC income in most cases does not have any influence on the domestic 
tax base, even if it exceeds the positive domestic income. In addition, some countries 
apply tax loss carry forward limitations on the CFC income and time limitations for 
subsequent dividend distributions and capital gains. This, of course, can negatively 
influence the whole situation, too. Overall, it must be concluded - in my opinion - that 
such an unsystematic treatment is not justifiable from a tax policy point of view, e.g. 
with respect to the ability-to-pay principle.  
 
Furthermore, what was already outlined with respect to the relief from double taxation 
in case of subsequent dividends and capital gains is equally relevant in the context of 
negative income (either of the shareholder or the CFC): the principles derived from 
chapters 2 and 3 do not allow the penalisation of the investor. The current attribution 
of income under a CFC regime or under an alternative regime which solely focuses 
on the taxation of the basic interest component must not result in a treatment which is 
worse than in a purely domestic situation and which is worse than in case of regular 
dividends and capital gains. The leading principle should be the non-discriminative 
taxation of the attributed income. Of course, the current taxation of certain income 
components will always be different from the situation in which the shareholder can 
decide on the point in time of the distribution of income (or the sale of shares), but the 
first-mentioned situation must not result in a systematic over-taxation of income in 
case of negative income.  
 
6.9. Relief for Foreign Taxes  
 
6.9.1. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Country 
 
The application of CFC rules by the residence state of the shareholder can lead to an 
economic double taxation of income. This is due to the fact that the underlying 
income is taxed in the residence state of the foreign company and the residence 
state of the shareholder. Double taxation is therefore in most countries avoided by 
allowing a tax credit of the foreign income tax paid by the CFC against the domestic 
tax burden calculated on the attributed income.247 An ordinary tax credit for the taxes 
imposed on the income in the CFC country is granted in Denmark,248 Estonia,249 
Finland,250 France,251 Germany,252 Italy,253 Lithuania,254 Portugal,255 Spain,256 
                                            
247 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 64; FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, pages 11, 12.  
248 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 149, 150. 
249 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 180. 
250 Juusela, National Report Finland, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 484. 
251 See with respect to the revised French regime: Goulard / Jolly, French Lawmakers Revisit CFC Rules, Tax 
Notes International 2005, page 219 et seq. (221). 
252 Schumacher, National Report Germany, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 535; section 12 (1) of the German Foreign 
Income Tax Act.  
253 Valente / Magenta, Italy: New CFC Legislation, Intertax 2001, page 55; Busetto / Russo, Italy: Final 
Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation Enacted, European Taxation 2001, page 36; Giuliano, National 
Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX 
Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 629, 630. 
    
                                                                                         
 
of income is unacceptable with respect to the basic interest component, too. At the 
end, any double taxation is a clear obstacle for any neutral concept of taxation and 
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The current taxation of the basic interest component which exceeds the theoretical 
taxation in the state where the income is produced restricts the possibility of the 
group of competing with other (local or international) companies in the latter state. 
However, the fact that the basic interest component is not connected to a 
corresponding risk in the CFC state (i.e. which might have a direct impact on the 
taxable income in the CFC state) is a substantial difference to the risk component. 
The same is true for the activity component: the functions and risks related to the 
activity component included in the tainted income are clearly connected to the CFC 
state. In other words, and as already outlined above, the current taxation of the basic 
interest component is required to safeguard competitiveness and to support taxpayer 
equity, but the system must not lead to a double taxation of income. 
 
The fact that the existing CFC regimes often provide for such an unsystematic and 
asymmetrical treatment of positive and negative income - which basically 
encompasses all three income components - can by no means be in line with the 
aforementioned principles. 
 
6.8.4. Conclusions Regarding Negative Income and CFC Rules  
 
For me, the treatment of losses in the context of CFC legislation is inconsistent, 
unsystematic and goes much further than is really necessary from an anti-avoidance 
point of view. It is too simple, in my opinion, to allocate positive CFC income to the 
resident shareholder on a current basis without taking into account the domestic 
situation and to accept - at least partially - a double taxation of income, while on the 
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other hand the negative CFC income is completely separated and excluded. In fact, 
the negative CFC income in most cases does not have any influence on the domestic 
tax base, even if it exceeds the positive domestic income. In addition, some countries 
apply tax loss carry forward limitations on the CFC income and time limitations for 
subsequent dividend distributions and capital gains. This, of course, can negatively 
influence the whole situation, too. Overall, it must be concluded - in my opinion - that 
such an unsystematic treatment is not justifiable from a tax policy point of view, e.g. 
with respect to the ability-to-pay principle.  
 
Furthermore, what was already outlined with respect to the relief from double taxation 
in case of subsequent dividends and capital gains is equally relevant in the context of 
negative income (either of the shareholder or the CFC): the principles derived from 
chapters 2 and 3 do not allow the penalisation of the investor. The current attribution 
of income under a CFC regime or under an alternative regime which solely focuses 
on the taxation of the basic interest component must not result in a treatment which is 
worse than in a purely domestic situation and which is worse than in case of regular 
dividends and capital gains. The leading principle should be the non-discriminative 
taxation of the attributed income. Of course, the current taxation of certain income 
components will always be different from the situation in which the shareholder can 
decide on the point in time of the distribution of income (or the sale of shares), but the 
first-mentioned situation must not result in a systematic over-taxation of income in 
case of negative income.  
 
6.9. Relief for Foreign Taxes  
 
6.9.1. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Country 
 
The application of CFC rules by the residence state of the shareholder can lead to an 
economic double taxation of income. This is due to the fact that the underlying 
income is taxed in the residence state of the foreign company and the residence 
state of the shareholder. Double taxation is therefore in most countries avoided by 
allowing a tax credit of the foreign income tax paid by the CFC against the domestic 
tax burden calculated on the attributed income.247 An ordinary tax credit for the taxes 
imposed on the income in the CFC country is granted in Denmark,248 Estonia,249 
Finland,250 France,251 Germany,252 Italy,253 Lithuania,254 Portugal,255 Spain,256 
                                            
247 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 64; FEE Position Paper on Controlled Foreign 
Company Legislation in the EU, April 2002, pages 11, 12.  
248 Rix, National Report Denmark, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 149, 150. 
249 Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 180. 
250 Juusela, National Report Finland, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 484. 
251 See with respect to the revised French regime: Goulard / Jolly, French Lawmakers Revisit CFC Rules, Tax 
Notes International 2005, page 219 et seq. (221). 
252 Schumacher, National Report Germany, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 535; section 12 (1) of the German Foreign 
Income Tax Act.  
253 Valente / Magenta, Italy: New CFC Legislation, Intertax 2001, page 55; Busetto / Russo, Italy: Final 
Controlled Foreign Companies Legislation Enacted, European Taxation 2001, page 36; Giuliano, National 
Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX 
Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 629, 630. 
    
                                                                                         
 
of income is unacceptable with respect to the basic interest component, too. At the 
end, any double taxation is a clear obstacle for any neutral concept of taxation and 
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The current taxation of the basic interest component which exceeds the theoretical 
taxation in the state where the income is produced restricts the possibility of the 
group of competing with other (local or international) companies in the latter state. 
However, the fact that the basic interest component is not connected to a 
corresponding risk in the CFC state (i.e. which might have a direct impact on the 
taxable income in the CFC state) is a substantial difference to the risk component. 
The same is true for the activity component: the functions and risks related to the 
activity component included in the tainted income are clearly connected to the CFC 
state. In other words, and as already outlined above, the current taxation of the basic 
interest component is required to safeguard competitiveness and to support taxpayer 
equity, but the system must not lead to a double taxation of income. 
 
The fact that the existing CFC regimes often provide for such an unsystematic and 
asymmetrical treatment of positive and negative income - which basically 
encompasses all three income components - can by no means be in line with the 
aforementioned principles. 
 
6.8.4. Conclusions Regarding Negative Income and CFC Rules  
 
For me, the treatment of losses in the context of CFC legislation is inconsistent, 
unsystematic and goes much further than is really necessary from an anti-avoidance 
point of view. It is too simple, in my opinion, to allocate positive CFC income to the 
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the legislation even more complex. In Spain, for example, the CFC regime clearly 
provides the possibility for the crediting of income taxes paid by the CFC in third 
countries - including withholding taxes.262 The same is true, for example, in 
Denmark,263 Finland,264 Germany,265 Italy,266 Sweden,267 and in the United 
Kingdom.268 
 
a.) Withholding taxes 
 
It should be clear that the withholding taxes deducted from the income derived by the 
CFC should be taken into account in one way or another. If the withholding taxes, 
e.g. on interest or royalty income, cannot be credited in the residence country of the 
CFC, it should - in effect - be credited against the income tax calculated on the 
attributed CFC income of the resident shareholder. There can be several reasons for 
such a non-crediting of withholding taxes. For example, the taxable income of the 
CFC is negative or too low for a full crediting. This can be due to the fact that the 
CFC has additional business expenses which are not accepted according to the 
income calculation rules of the residence country of the shareholder, or the CFC 
derives negative income from active business which cannot be taken into account 
pursuant to the domestic CFC legislation. This is especially relevant for countries 
which follow a transactional approach. Or, very simply, the tax rate in the CFC 
country is lower than the withholding taxes applicable on the respective income. In all 
these cases it is required, in my opinion, to allow a tax credit in the country which 
applies the CFC taxation and not simply provide for a deduction of the withholding 
taxes from the taxable income.269 Otherwise, there will be a partial double taxation of 
CFC income. Of course, if the income derived by the CFC is outside of the scope of 
the domestic CFC legislation, e.g. dividend income,270 there is no space and no 
necessity for a crediting in the residence country of the shareholder. From a technical 
point of view, the most logical way is certainly to credit the amount of tax actually 
payable in the countries, i.e. the corporate income tax in the CFC country (reduced 
by the withholding taxes which are actually creditable in the CFC country) plus the 
complete amount of withholding taxes imposed by third countries on the respective 
income elements. The situation can become more complex if the CFC state provides 
for a roll-over of the withholding tax (e.g. from year 01 to year 02). In my opinion, the 
CFC regime of the residence state of the shareholder should, in such a situation, 
allow the crediting of the withholding tax against the corporate income tax imposed 
on the attributed CFC income in year 01 (if there is a positive attributable income in 
                                            
262 Raventós, Spain: CFC Provisions Introduced, European Taxation 1995, page 166 et seq.; Casero, The Foreign 
Base Company in the Spanish Tax Law, Intertax 1995, page 586 et seq.; Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits 
on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 
2001, pages 815, 816; Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, 
Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 569, 570. 
263 Art. 32 of the Danish Corporation Tax Act.  
264 Art. 6 of the Finnish CFC Act. 
265 Section 12 (1) and section 10 (1) of the German Foreign Income Tax Act. 
266 Art. 167 of the Consolidated Act on Income Taxes (T.U.I.R.).  
267 Sections 18-22 AvrL.  
268 Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 621; see in this respect 
also Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890. 
269 As a kind of business expenses.  
270 As already outlined earlier, dividend income is not always and under all circumstances subject to CFC 
taxation.  
    
                                                                                         
 
Sweden257 and the United Kingdom.258 The Dutch regime of a mark-to-market 
revaluation provides for a notional indirect tax credit of 5 percent (in case the actual 
tax credit is lower).259 In contrast thereto, Hungary does not provide for any form of 
indirect tax credit for the relief from double taxation.260 In Spain, a differentiation is 
made between a CFC situated in a listed tax haven and a CFC which is situated in a 
non-listed low-tax country. In the first-mentioned case of a listed tax haven, there is 
no possibility for a tax credit in order to discourage the use of such territories or 
countries.261 Germany, for example, provides the possibility for an alternative 
deduction of the foreign taxes instead of a tax credit. However, it seems that the 
provision of a choice between tax credit and tax deduction is an exceptional 
approach. At least, I did not find any other European CFC legislation which provides 
for such an alternative deduction. 
 
A deduction (instead of a tax credit) might be particularly relevant where the resident 
shareholder suffers losses or has an existing tax loss carry forward available and is 
therefore not in a position to credit the foreign tax against the domestic income tax. In 
this case, however, a double taxation can only partially be avoided. Overall, the 
system is comparable, from a technical perspective, to a credit system in case of a 
permanent establishment, i.e. the foreign income is determined and taxed pursuant 
to the domestic tax rules, and the foreign income tax is credited against the domestic 
income tax levied on the respective income.  
 
6.9.2. Taxes Imposed by Third Countries 
 
The income derived by the foreign company can be subject to tax in a third country, 
e.g. by levying withholding taxes on interest income, royalty income or dividend 
income. Furthermore, the foreign company can create a permanent establishment in 
a third country by carrying on its activities, e.g. base company activities, with the 
effect that the income allocable to the permanent establishment is taxed in the third 
country. It is quite obvious that the tax credit for taxes paid in third countries makes 
                                                                                                                                         
254 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 400, 401. 
255 De Sousa da Camara / Ayala, Portugal: CFC Taxation, European Taxation 1996, page 24; de Sousa da 
Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783. 
256 Raventós, Spain: CFC Provisions Introduced, European Taxation 1995, page 166 et seq.; Casero, The Foreign 
Base Company in the Spanish Tax Law, Intertax 1995, page 586 et seq.; Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits 
on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 
2001, pages 815, 816. 
257 See Brokelind, Group Taxation and CFC Rules in Swedish Tax Cases, Tax Notes International 2005, page 
237 et seq. (240, 241). It must be noted that the Swedish system did not provide, originally, for a tax credit in 
CFC cases: see in this respect Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 593; 
Köhlmark / Källquist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, 
page 230.  
258 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 889, 890. 
259 Article 23c of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act; see also Bakker / van de Rijt, Netherlands Corporate 
Income Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2006, page 
308 et seq. (312).  
260 Deák, National Report Hungary, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 557. 
261 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65. 
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the legislation even more complex. In Spain, for example, the CFC regime clearly 
provides the possibility for the crediting of income taxes paid by the CFC in third 
countries - including withholding taxes.262 The same is true, for example, in 
Denmark,263 Finland,264 Germany,265 Italy,266 Sweden,267 and in the United 
Kingdom.268 
 
a.) Withholding taxes 
 
It should be clear that the withholding taxes deducted from the income derived by the 
CFC should be taken into account in one way or another. If the withholding taxes, 
e.g. on interest or royalty income, cannot be credited in the residence country of the 
CFC, it should - in effect - be credited against the income tax calculated on the 
attributed CFC income of the resident shareholder. There can be several reasons for 
such a non-crediting of withholding taxes. For example, the taxable income of the 
CFC is negative or too low for a full crediting. This can be due to the fact that the 
CFC has additional business expenses which are not accepted according to the 
income calculation rules of the residence country of the shareholder, or the CFC 
derives negative income from active business which cannot be taken into account 
pursuant to the domestic CFC legislation. This is especially relevant for countries 
which follow a transactional approach. Or, very simply, the tax rate in the CFC 
country is lower than the withholding taxes applicable on the respective income. In all 
these cases it is required, in my opinion, to allow a tax credit in the country which 
applies the CFC taxation and not simply provide for a deduction of the withholding 
taxes from the taxable income.269 Otherwise, there will be a partial double taxation of 
CFC income. Of course, if the income derived by the CFC is outside of the scope of 
the domestic CFC legislation, e.g. dividend income,270 there is no space and no 
necessity for a crediting in the residence country of the shareholder. From a technical 
point of view, the most logical way is certainly to credit the amount of tax actually 
payable in the countries, i.e. the corporate income tax in the CFC country (reduced 
by the withholding taxes which are actually creditable in the CFC country) plus the 
complete amount of withholding taxes imposed by third countries on the respective 
income elements. The situation can become more complex if the CFC state provides 
for a roll-over of the withholding tax (e.g. from year 01 to year 02). In my opinion, the 
CFC regime of the residence state of the shareholder should, in such a situation, 
allow the crediting of the withholding tax against the corporate income tax imposed 
on the attributed CFC income in year 01 (if there is a positive attributable income in 
                                            
262 Raventós, Spain: CFC Provisions Introduced, European Taxation 1995, page 166 et seq.; Casero, The Foreign 
Base Company in the Spanish Tax Law, Intertax 1995, page 586 et seq.; Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits 
on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 
2001, pages 815, 816; Almudi, National Report Spain, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, 
Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 569, 570. 
263 Art. 32 of the Danish Corporation Tax Act.  
264 Art. 6 of the Finnish CFC Act. 
265 Section 12 (1) and section 10 (1) of the German Foreign Income Tax Act. 
266 Art. 167 of the Consolidated Act on Income Taxes (T.U.I.R.).  
267 Sections 18-22 AvrL.  
268 Ullah, National Report United Kingdom, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax 
Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 621; see in this respect 
also Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890. 
269 As a kind of business expenses.  
270 As already outlined earlier, dividend income is not always and under all circumstances subject to CFC 
taxation.  
    
                                                                                         
 
Sweden257 and the United Kingdom.258 The Dutch regime of a mark-to-market 
revaluation provides for a notional indirect tax credit of 5 percent (in case the actual 
tax credit is lower).259 In contrast thereto, Hungary does not provide for any form of 
indirect tax credit for the relief from double taxation.260 In Spain, a differentiation is 
made between a CFC situated in a listed tax haven and a CFC which is situated in a 
non-listed low-tax country. In the first-mentioned case of a listed tax haven, there is 
no possibility for a tax credit in order to discourage the use of such territories or 
countries.261 Germany, for example, provides the possibility for an alternative 
deduction of the foreign taxes instead of a tax credit. However, it seems that the 
provision of a choice between tax credit and tax deduction is an exceptional 
approach. At least, I did not find any other European CFC legislation which provides 
for such an alternative deduction. 
 
A deduction (instead of a tax credit) might be particularly relevant where the resident 
shareholder suffers losses or has an existing tax loss carry forward available and is 
therefore not in a position to credit the foreign tax against the domestic income tax. In 
this case, however, a double taxation can only partially be avoided. Overall, the 
system is comparable, from a technical perspective, to a credit system in case of a 
permanent establishment, i.e. the foreign income is determined and taxed pursuant 
to the domestic tax rules, and the foreign income tax is credited against the domestic 
income tax levied on the respective income.  
 
6.9.2. Taxes Imposed by Third Countries 
 
The income derived by the foreign company can be subject to tax in a third country, 
e.g. by levying withholding taxes on interest income, royalty income or dividend 
income. Furthermore, the foreign company can create a permanent establishment in 
a third country by carrying on its activities, e.g. base company activities, with the 
effect that the income allocable to the permanent establishment is taxed in the third 
country. It is quite obvious that the tax credit for taxes paid in third countries makes 
                                                                                                                                         
254 Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties 
and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, pages 400, 401. 
255 De Sousa da Camara / Ayala, Portugal: CFC Taxation, European Taxation 1996, page 24; de Sousa da 
Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783. 
256 Raventós, Spain: CFC Provisions Introduced, European Taxation 1995, page 166 et seq.; Casero, The Foreign 
Base Company in the Spanish Tax Law, Intertax 1995, page 586 et seq.; Prats, National Report Spain, in Limits 
on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 
2001, pages 815, 816. 
257 See Brokelind, Group Taxation and CFC Rules in Swedish Tax Cases, Tax Notes International 2005, page 
237 et seq. (240, 241). It must be noted that the Swedish system did not provide, originally, for a tax credit in 
CFC cases: see in this respect Dahlberg, National Report Sweden, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 593; 
Köhlmark / Källquist, New CFC Legislation in Sweden, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2004, 
page 230.  
258 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 889, 890. 
259 Article 23c of the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act; see also Bakker / van de Rijt, Netherlands Corporate 
Income Tax Reform 2007 - Bill “Working on Profit”, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2006, page 
308 et seq. (312).  
260 Deák, National Report Hungary, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 557. 
261 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 65. 
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income). However, there is no reason, in my opinion, why the income tax imposed on 
the income of the permanent establishment should not be credited against the 
income tax imposed under the CFC regime (if the permanent establishment income 
is included in the attributable CFC income). It seems that in such a situation the 
crediting of the income tax should be possible, for example, in Finland and 
Portugal.273  
 
In any case, there is no reason - from my point of view - for a separate treatment with 
respect to the crediting of domestic taxes. The CFC is legally to be seen as the 
recipient of the - for example - interest income which is subject to a source based 
taxation in the form of a withholding tax. Nonetheless, the income is currently 
attributed to the shareholder and the overall tax burden has to be taken into account - 
in the same way as it was outlined for withholding taxes of a third country. In general, 
the crediting of taxes in the context of the CFC regime is required for the elimination 
of double taxation of income. If one agrees with the position that the current taxation 
of income should not have a penalty effect for the shareholder, but should merely 
lead to an immediate taxation of income, it is apparent that the relief from double 
taxation may not be restricted to the taxes imposed in the CFC state and third states. 
It is equally required to provide for a relief from double taxation caused by a source-
based taxation in the state of the shareholder. In my opinion, any other approach 
would be inconsistent and would finally result in an “over-taxation” in the state of the 
shareholder. 
 
6.9.4. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Rules of another Country   
 
Another interesting question is whether – and to what extent – the CFC taxation of 
another country should be taken into account. This could be relevant in structures 
with several tiers where different companies located in different countries (with CFC 
taxation) are involved. This issue will be discussed below in the context of multiple 
tier structures.  
 
6.9.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The insufficient crediting of taxes is another factor which can result in serious 
distortions and which might have an influence on the investment decision of the 
resident shareholder. This, of course, should not happen - at least not in those cases 
in which the system of current taxation is to be seen as more than just an anti-
avoidance regime which tries to “penalise” certain investments. With respect to the 
tax credit system, I think a differentiation can be made between those CFC regimes 
                                            
273 See with respect to the rules in Finland: Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 201; see with respect to the rules in Portugal: Borges, National Report Portugal, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 540. It may be the case that the PE issue plays a more important role in entity approach 
countries than in transactional approach countries. The reason is that under an “all-or-nothing” approach even 
high-taxed income from minor activities might be included in the attributable income as long as the overall low-
taxed (tainted) income prevails. Under the transactional approach, the income will be separated and only the 
low-taxed tainted income will be attributed to the shareholder. Nevertheless, the question may theoretically also 
play a role in transactional countries. In Germany, for example, it is clearly stated that also German taxes 
imposed on the CFC income can be credited (see section 12.1.2. of the Administrative Circular on the 
Application of the Foreign Income Tax Act).  
    
                                                                                         
 
year 01). However, in order to avoid that the withholding tax is taken into account 
twice, the effect of tax credit in the residence state of the CFC, e.g. in year 02, must 
be eliminated. Moreover, the situation may exist, as outlined above, that there is no 
possibility for a tax credit in the residence state of the shareholder (e.g. due to tax 
losses). In this case, it is unsatisfactory, in the same way as for the corporate income 
tax imposed in the CFC state, that the withholding tax is merely deducted from the 
tax base. This, again, will only lead to a partial elimination of double taxation of 
income. Thus, if the state which applies the CFC regime allows for a (general) roll-
over of non- or partially credited withholding taxes of the shareholder, the system 
should also encompass the treatment of creditable taxes in the context of the 
application of the CFC regime. A roll-over is provided, for example, by the 
Portuguese CFC regime.271 Apparently, an alternative anti-deferral regime which 
focuses on the basic interest component instead of the complete amount of (interest) 
income must provide for a relief-system which, of course, also takes into account the 
withholding taxation outside of the CFC country in order to achieve the aim of 
complete neutrality. I will go into more detail of that aspect later on.    
 
b.) Income taxes levied in the country of a permanent establishment   
 
Similar to the treatment of the withholding taxes outlined above, the income tax 
imposed by a third country on the allocable profit of a permanent establishment of the 
CFC has to be credited against the domestic income tax levied on the foreign 
income. Of course, this is only true inasmuch as the profit of the PE is in the focus of 
the respective CFC taxation and therefore attributed to the domestic shareholder. 
This is irrespective of the fact whether the foreign country applies the credit method 
or the exemption method for the avoidance of double taxation since it would 
otherwise lead - in both cases - to a double taxation of income. The income is taxed 
in the residence country of the shareholder pursuant to the CFC rules on the one 
hand, and in the CFC country and (or) the PE country on the other. Thus, it can 
generally be concluded that the facts which were outlined above with respect to 
withholding taxes are equally true for income taxes levied on the profit of a 
permanent establishment.  
 
6.9.3. Taxes Imposed by the Residence Country of the Shareholder  
 
The question arises whether there should be any difference in the treatment between 
taxes imposed by a third country and taxes imposed by the country of the 
shareholder. Such a situation could exist where the CFC invests in the state of the 
shareholder and receives income which is subject to withholding tax, e.g. interest 
income or royalty income. Theoretically, taxes could also be imposed on the income 
of a permanent establishment of the CFC in the shareholder’s country. The latter 
situation can, at least theoretically, exist in all of the countries which apply CFC rules 
as long as the requirements for the creation of a permanent establishment are 
fulfilled.272 Of course, a combination of permanent establishment taxation in the state 
of the shareholder and CFC taxation in the state of the shareholder is usually only 
possible if the income is subject to low taxation (which can be the case, for example, 
if the permanent establishment income is just a minor part of the overall CFC 
                                            
271 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783). 
272 If the tax treaty follows the OECD-MTC, the requirements will be based on Articles 5 and 7 of the OECD-
MTC.  
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income). However, there is no reason, in my opinion, why the income tax imposed on 
the income of the permanent establishment should not be credited against the 
income tax imposed under the CFC regime (if the permanent establishment income 
is included in the attributable CFC income). It seems that in such a situation the 
crediting of the income tax should be possible, for example, in Finland and 
Portugal.273  
 
In any case, there is no reason - from my point of view - for a separate treatment with 
respect to the crediting of domestic taxes. The CFC is legally to be seen as the 
recipient of the - for example - interest income which is subject to a source based 
taxation in the form of a withholding tax. Nonetheless, the income is currently 
attributed to the shareholder and the overall tax burden has to be taken into account - 
in the same way as it was outlined for withholding taxes of a third country. In general, 
the crediting of taxes in the context of the CFC regime is required for the elimination 
of double taxation of income. If one agrees with the position that the current taxation 
of income should not have a penalty effect for the shareholder, but should merely 
lead to an immediate taxation of income, it is apparent that the relief from double 
taxation may not be restricted to the taxes imposed in the CFC state and third states. 
It is equally required to provide for a relief from double taxation caused by a source-
based taxation in the state of the shareholder. In my opinion, any other approach 
would be inconsistent and would finally result in an “over-taxation” in the state of the 
shareholder. 
 
6.9.4. Taxes Imposed by the CFC Rules of another Country   
 
Another interesting question is whether – and to what extent – the CFC taxation of 
another country should be taken into account. This could be relevant in structures 
with several tiers where different companies located in different countries (with CFC 
taxation) are involved. This issue will be discussed below in the context of multiple 
tier structures.  
 
6.9.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The insufficient crediting of taxes is another factor which can result in serious 
distortions and which might have an influence on the investment decision of the 
resident shareholder. This, of course, should not happen - at least not in those cases 
in which the system of current taxation is to be seen as more than just an anti-
avoidance regime which tries to “penalise” certain investments. With respect to the 
tax credit system, I think a differentiation can be made between those CFC regimes 
                                            
273 See with respect to the rules in Finland: Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 201; see with respect to the rules in Portugal: Borges, National Report Portugal, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 540. It may be the case that the PE issue plays a more important role in entity approach 
countries than in transactional approach countries. The reason is that under an “all-or-nothing” approach even 
high-taxed income from minor activities might be included in the attributable income as long as the overall low-
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low-taxed tainted income will be attributed to the shareholder. Nevertheless, the question may theoretically also 
play a role in transactional countries. In Germany, for example, it is clearly stated that also German taxes 
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year 01). However, in order to avoid that the withholding tax is taken into account 
twice, the effect of tax credit in the residence state of the CFC, e.g. in year 02, must 
be eliminated. Moreover, the situation may exist, as outlined above, that there is no 
possibility for a tax credit in the residence state of the shareholder (e.g. due to tax 
losses). In this case, it is unsatisfactory, in the same way as for the corporate income 
tax imposed in the CFC state, that the withholding tax is merely deducted from the 
tax base. This, again, will only lead to a partial elimination of double taxation of 
income. Thus, if the state which applies the CFC regime allows for a (general) roll-
over of non- or partially credited withholding taxes of the shareholder, the system 
should also encompass the treatment of creditable taxes in the context of the 
application of the CFC regime. A roll-over is provided, for example, by the 
Portuguese CFC regime.271 Apparently, an alternative anti-deferral regime which 
focuses on the basic interest component instead of the complete amount of (interest) 
income must provide for a relief-system which, of course, also takes into account the 
withholding taxation outside of the CFC country in order to achieve the aim of 
complete neutrality. I will go into more detail of that aspect later on.    
 
b.) Income taxes levied in the country of a permanent establishment   
 
Similar to the treatment of the withholding taxes outlined above, the income tax 
imposed by a third country on the allocable profit of a permanent establishment of the 
CFC has to be credited against the domestic income tax levied on the foreign 
income. Of course, this is only true inasmuch as the profit of the PE is in the focus of 
the respective CFC taxation and therefore attributed to the domestic shareholder. 
This is irrespective of the fact whether the foreign country applies the credit method 
or the exemption method for the avoidance of double taxation since it would 
otherwise lead - in both cases - to a double taxation of income. The income is taxed 
in the residence country of the shareholder pursuant to the CFC rules on the one 
hand, and in the CFC country and (or) the PE country on the other. Thus, it can 
generally be concluded that the facts which were outlined above with respect to 
withholding taxes are equally true for income taxes levied on the profit of a 
permanent establishment.  
 
6.9.3. Taxes Imposed by the Residence Country of the Shareholder  
 
The question arises whether there should be any difference in the treatment between 
taxes imposed by a third country and taxes imposed by the country of the 
shareholder. Such a situation could exist where the CFC invests in the state of the 
shareholder and receives income which is subject to withholding tax, e.g. interest 
income or royalty income. Theoretically, taxes could also be imposed on the income 
of a permanent establishment of the CFC in the shareholder’s country. The latter 
situation can, at least theoretically, exist in all of the countries which apply CFC rules 
as long as the requirements for the creation of a permanent establishment are 
fulfilled.272 Of course, a combination of permanent establishment taxation in the state 
of the shareholder and CFC taxation in the state of the shareholder is usually only 
possible if the income is subject to low taxation (which can be the case, for example, 
if the permanent establishment income is just a minor part of the overall CFC 
                                            
271 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783). 




    
                                                                                         
 
6.9.6. Conclusions Regarding the Relief for Foreign Taxes  
 
The CFC taxation clearly focuses on the underlying income derived by the CFC – in 
most cases determined according to domestic tax rules – and not on the legal result 
actually derived by the foreign entity. That means the CFC rules ignore, to a certain 
extent, the foreign legal entity and just take into account the respective income. This 
is true for both approaches, the entity approach and the transactional approach, even 
though it is much more obvious in the latter case. Therefore, the credit method - 
which is the underlying method in the context of CFC taxation275 - should be applied 
consistently and should take into account all income related taxes which have not 
already been credited on the level of the CFC. Technically, the tax credit in the 
residence state of the shareholder should encompass the corporate income tax 
which has to be paid by the CFC, i.e. reduced by the taxes already creditable against 
the corporate income tax of the CFC, and the taxes imposed in third countries (e.g. 
withholding taxes, taxes levied on the income which is allocable to a permanent 
establishment). The possibility of a deduction of those foreign income taxes from the 
attributable income instead of a crediting would lead to a treatment which is 
comparable to regular business expenses. However, this would have the 
consequence of a partial double taxation of income.  
 
As already described earlier, economic principles and equity aspects require the 
taxation of the basic interest component instead of the (total) amount of CFC income. 
However, also in this case it is required that the system provides for a consistent 
relief from double taxation and, therefore, a relief for foreign taxes imposed on this 
particular part of attributed income. 
 
6.10. Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules 
 
6.10.1. The Indirect Participation in a CFC  
 
Due to the fact that CFC rules have to be seen as anti-avoidance measures in order 
to prevent a domestic tax base erosion, it is quite obvious that the focus of CFC rules 
cannot be restricted to a direct participation in a foreign company. Otherwise, it would 
be relatively easy to circumvent the current taxation of CFC income by simply 
interposing another foreign company - in a country without CFC legislation - between 
the parent company and the low-taxed foreign company which does not fulfil the 
requirements of the respective CFC rules. Even if one takes the position that CFC 
legislation is not - in the first instance - an anti-avoidance legislation but just a 
consistent method to ensure capital export neutrality related to certain activities, it 
should not be hindered by the fact that one or more legal entities are interposed 
between the domestic shareholder and the company which derives passive income. 
Therefore, it is a common feature of the European CFC rules to cover indirect 
shareholdings by the relevant CFC taxation with the effect that the activity of an 
indirect lower tier subsidiary can equally lead to an income attribution to the domestic 
shareholder.276  
 
                                            
275 In general, CFC taxation requires the application of the credit method. However, the provisions of a tax treaty 
sometimes allow the application of the exemption method to certain passive income, as in case of the former 
CFC system in Germany.   
276 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43. 
    
                                                                                         
 
which just provide for (or accept) the “usual” disadvantages of a tax credit system 
and those regimes which lead to additional CFC specific disadvantages. 
 
The most important usual disadvantage of a tax credit system is the fact that foreign 
taxes imposed on the CFC income are not (or not completely) creditable against the 
income taxes imposed on the attributed income in the state of the shareholder. This, 
for example, can be due to negative income (or a tax loss carry forward) of the 
shareholder. This is a typical problem which not only exists in case of the application 
of CFC rules but also in case of dividends or in case of permanent establishments (if 
the income is not exempt from taxation). In this respect, one might be tempted to 
neglect the effect of double taxation by referring to the general “systematic effects” of 
the application of the credit method. However, taking into account the theoretical 
basis which was described earlier, i.e. the fact that such a system should - within a 
non-optimal scenario - lead to a safeguarding of competitiveness and an equal 
treatment of resident shareholders, it is not appropriate, in my opinion, to accept such 
a disadvantage. This all the more since the current taxation of income on a regular 
(yearly) basis does not really provide many possibilities for the shareholder of 
avoiding the double taxation of income. Thus, the approach under all of the existing 
CFC regimes, as shown above, is apparently the acceptance of such a usual 
disadvantage of the tax credit system. 
 
The problem increases when the usual disadvantages are accompanied by CFC 
specific disadvantages, i.e. disadvantages which are solely caused by the application 
of CFC rules and which would otherwise not come up. For the shareholder, this has 
the effect that the likelihood of a penalisation increases. Hence, it must be concluded, 
in my opinion, that the regimes which create a serious risk of double taxation cannot, 
not even partially, fulfil the economic requirement of a neutral application of such 
regimes in order to safeguard competitiveness. Furthermore, the strict penalisation of 
investments in one situation (where the CFC regime is applicable) and the non-
penalisation of investments in another situation (where the CFC regime is not 
applicable) do not support taxpayer equity. The regimes which provide for such 
additional disadvantages are outlined above. This is, for example, Hungary with a 
general non-acceptance of an indirect tax credit and Spain with the non-acceptance 
of an indirect tax credit in case of listed tax havens (see above). However, also the 
simple and common effect of a non-creditable withholding tax which is caused by the 
time lack between the current taxation of income and the subsequent dividend 
payment can clearly be seen as a problem which is directly linked to the system of 
current taxation of income - even though this should not be an issue if one follows the 
OECD approach.274   
 
Overall, it should be clear that a regime which focuses on the current taxation of 
income, no matter whether it is a CFC regime or any other alternative regime, must 
provide for an appropriate tax credit system which ensures that the attributed income 
is not subject to double taxation or subject to any other serious disadvantage. If this 
is not the case, the system can only be considered a strict anti-avoidance legislation 
which accepts the unnecessary penalisation of investments and which neither 
safeguards competitiveness nor supports taxpayer equity. An insufficient tax credit 
system is a serious obstacle for a neutral system of taxation. However, only a neutral 
system of taxation can avoid the aforementioned penalty effects.  
                                            
274 See in more detail section 6.7.1. and paragraph 32.8. of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of 
the OECD-MTC.  
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275 In general, CFC taxation requires the application of the credit method. However, the provisions of a tax treaty 
sometimes allow the application of the exemption method to certain passive income, as in case of the former 
CFC system in Germany.   
276 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43. 
    
                                                                                         
 
which just provide for (or accept) the “usual” disadvantages of a tax credit system 
and those regimes which lead to additional CFC specific disadvantages. 
 
The most important usual disadvantage of a tax credit system is the fact that foreign 
taxes imposed on the CFC income are not (or not completely) creditable against the 
income taxes imposed on the attributed income in the state of the shareholder. This, 
for example, can be due to negative income (or a tax loss carry forward) of the 
shareholder. This is a typical problem which not only exists in case of the application 
of CFC rules but also in case of dividends or in case of permanent establishments (if 
the income is not exempt from taxation). In this respect, one might be tempted to 
neglect the effect of double taxation by referring to the general “systematic effects” of 
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CFC regimes, as shown above, is apparently the acceptance of such a usual 
disadvantage of the tax credit system. 
 
The problem increases when the usual disadvantages are accompanied by CFC 
specific disadvantages, i.e. disadvantages which are solely caused by the application 
of CFC rules and which would otherwise not come up. For the shareholder, this has 
the effect that the likelihood of a penalisation increases. Hence, it must be concluded, 
in my opinion, that the regimes which create a serious risk of double taxation cannot, 
not even partially, fulfil the economic requirement of a neutral application of such 
regimes in order to safeguard competitiveness. Furthermore, the strict penalisation of 
investments in one situation (where the CFC regime is applicable) and the non-
penalisation of investments in another situation (where the CFC regime is not 
applicable) do not support taxpayer equity. The regimes which provide for such 
additional disadvantages are outlined above. This is, for example, Hungary with a 
general non-acceptance of an indirect tax credit and Spain with the non-acceptance 
of an indirect tax credit in case of listed tax havens (see above). However, also the 
simple and common effect of a non-creditable withholding tax which is caused by the 
time lack between the current taxation of income and the subsequent dividend 
payment can clearly be seen as a problem which is directly linked to the system of 
current taxation of income - even though this should not be an issue if one follows the 
OECD approach.274   
 
Overall, it should be clear that a regime which focuses on the current taxation of 
income, no matter whether it is a CFC regime or any other alternative regime, must 
provide for an appropriate tax credit system which ensures that the attributed income 
is not subject to double taxation or subject to any other serious disadvantage. If this 
is not the case, the system can only be considered a strict anti-avoidance legislation 
which accepts the unnecessary penalisation of investments and which neither 
safeguards competitiveness nor supports taxpayer equity. An insufficient tax credit 
system is a serious obstacle for a neutral system of taxation. However, only a neutral 
system of taxation can avoid the aforementioned penalty effects.  
                                            
274 See in more detail section 6.7.1. and paragraph 32.8. of the OECD-Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of 
the OECD-MTC.  
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6.10.2.1. The General Recognition of the Lower Tier CFC Rules 
 
As mentioned above the CFC legislation is directed towards certain types of income 
derived by a direct or indirect participation situated in a low-tax country. Therefore, 
the CFC rules do not deal with the question whether there is any similar legislation in 
place on a higher level, i.e. the level of the direct and indirect shareholders. For 
example, country B (in the figure above) is - in principle - only interested in the 
safeguarding of its own domestic tax base. The CFC legislation is therefore 
applicable to the income of company C without taking into account a comparable 
legislation in country A. It is certainly difficult for country B, and in some cases even 
impossible, to know the exact shareholder structure on a higher level and to gather 
the necessary information in this respect.   
 
From the perspective of country A, it is equally important to avoid a domestic tax 
base erosion. However, the CFC rules of country A do not apply to country B - since 
it is not a low-tax country - but to the income derived in country C. That means, both 
countries (A and B) theoretically apply their respective CFC legislation on the income 
derived in country C. However, to the extent that a certain amount of CFC income is 
theoretically taxable in both countries A and B, the question arises whether the CFC 
taxation of one country should have priority over the CFC taxation of the other 
country or, at least, whether one country should take into account the CFC legislation 
of the other country and refrain from its own CFC taxation or to provide measures for 
the avoidance of a possible double taxation of income caused by the simultaneous 
application of CFC rules. In principle, if one accepts the concept of CFC taxation, it 
should be clear that one cannot give priority to either the CFC legislation of country A 
or country B. Both countries have a legitimate reason for the application of their 
respective rules which is the safeguarding of their own domestic tax base. However, 
there are - in my opinion - convincing arguments according to which the parent 
company in country A should take into account the CFC taxation on a lower level, i.e.  
in country B (country A should also take into account the taxes imposed in country C 
- to the extent that the taxes are not already taken into account in the intermediate 
country B).  
 
Firstly, and based on the reasoning above, it is certainly easier for company A to 
receive information from the company in which it has invested, at least if it is a 
substantial shareholding, than the other way around. Company A has to make a 
number of decisions in relation to its participation, e.g. the determination of the result 
of company B based on the commercial accounts, the decision whether the profit 
should be distributed or carried forward to the subsequent year, and the approval of 
the management of the company. In addition, the shareholder (company A) usually 
has the right to receive information from company B - and the latter company has the 
corresponding legal obligation to provide this information - at the shareholders’ 
meeting. In contrast thereto, there is typically no comparable legal obligation for the 
shareholder (company A) to inform company B about its (legal) situation. Of course, if 
the shareholder has a substantial participation in company B, it is likely that there is 
an appropriate information exchange between company A and company B, but this is 
not self-evident. Hence, if there is no legal obligation for the shareholder to provide 
information, it may be difficult for country B to gather the information required. In any 
event, if the latter country has no proper instruments available to gather such 
information, it excludes the possibility that this can be a stable basis for a decision of 
country B on the application or non-application of the domestic CFC rules.  
    
                                                                                         
 
6.10.2. The Multiple Application of CFC Rules and Similar Measures 
 
The general application of CFC rules to indirect shareholdings makes it theoretically 
possible that a certain activity is in the focus of the CFC rules of two or more 
countries. In principle, this can be true for all of the countries examined in this 
chapter. One should not forget that especially multinational groups combine certain 
inter-company activities which are often considered to produce base company 
income or other passive income which is subject to CFC taxation. Those 
multinational groups often have complicated structures with several tiers and a CFC 
can therefore have several direct and indirect shareholders situated in different 
countries but still being part of the same international group.277 However, due to the 
purpose of safeguarding the domestic tax base, the concept of CFC taxation is 
typically quite “egoistic”, i.e. each country which follows such an approach tries to 
avoid the shifting of its own domestic income to low-tax countries. All of these 
countries concentrate on the source of income but they are, in principle, not really 
interested in the question where the capital ultimately comes from. There is, to my 
knowledge, no European CFC regime which considers, e.g. for the question whether 
the CFC rules should be applicable or not, the (current or future) tax burden imposed 
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follow a transactional approach are Denmark, Germany, Spain and Lithuania. All of 
the other CFC regimes within the European Union follow an entity approach. The 
entity approach takes into account the overall activity of the CFC and certain other 
elements in order to decide whether the CFC income is exempt from current taxation 
or not. It is often required that the foreign company carries out mainly an industrial or 
commercial activity and mainly in the state or territory where the foreign company is 
established (e.g. in France, Italy, Portugal). If this requirement is fulfilled, the CFC 
income is completely excluded from current taxation. Otherwise, the whole income 
will be allocated to the resident shareholder and this also includes income 
components which are theoretically related to active business activities. This “all-or-
nothing” approach has the effect that a small increase in the passive activities within 
a foreign company can lead to the total income being subject to CFC taxation, and a 
small decrease in such activities can lead to a complete exclusion. In contrast 
thereto, the transactional approach - at least in its purest form - is only directed 
towards passive income elements and does not encompass any income from active 
business activities. This leads to a clear separation of income elements. However, 
the existing base company rules can have the effect that activities which are normally 
seen as active activities are considered to be tainted income under certain 
circumstances (e.g. in Germany). Nonetheless, the tainted income is clearly 
separated and there is no such “all-or-nothing” approach. It is therefore possible that 
the application of a CFC legislation which follows an entity approach and a CFC 
legislation which follows a transactional approach leads to a deviation in the allocable 
income. At least, this is true if the business of the foreign company (the CFC) 
encompasses different activities and is not only limited to one single passive activity. 
The problem is further increased with the number of additional tiers and, of course, 
with the involvement of additional CFC regimes. One could conclude that the more 
tiers involved, the more problems may come up.  
 
b.) The application of entity approaches   
 
This does not mean, however, that two (or more) countries which follow the same 
approach fit together. There is a substantial number of possible deviations in case of 
the entity approach. This can be, inter alia, the business activity itself, the 
requirement that the business activity must be carried out on the local market, the 
respective threshold in this context, and the variety of exemptions from the current 
taxation of income. For example, the fact that certain activities have to be carried out 
“mainly” on the respective local market is not always to be understood in the same 
way. For example, the Portuguese rules require that at least 75 percent of the income 
of the CFC is derived from activities in the local market in order to be exempt from 
CFC taxation.278 In contrast thereto, the Finnish rules require a share of local income 
of at least 50 percent279 and the (revised) French rules include an additional “passive 
income test” which, inter alia, leads to an income allocation if more than 20 percent of 
the income of the CFC is derived from the management of financial assets and the 
exploitation of intangible assets.280 Hence, even though all of the three states follow, 
                                            
278 Section 57-B of the Portuguese Corporate Income Tax Act; de Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in 
Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 
IFA 2001, pages 779, 780; de Sousa da Camara / Núncio, Portugal’s 2002 Budget Bill Revises Capital Gains 
Tax Regime, Tax Analysts Tax Document Service 2001, Doc 2001-28988. 
279 Section 2 (2) of the Finish CFC Act. 
280 New Article 209 B of the French Tax Code; see Simmons & Simmons, EU Tax Update, January 2005, page 
3; Herbert Smith, New Controlled Foreign Company (“CFC”) Rules, French Tax Briefing, January 2005, page 6; 
Tillmanns, Steueränderungen Frankreich 2004/2005, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe, Fach 5, Gruppe 2, page 
    
                                                                                         
 
Secondly, if country A does not refrain from taxing the CFC income, it is from a 
technical perspective easier to avoid a double taxation by crediting the income tax 
levied in country B against the income tax levied in country A on the same amount of 
CFC income. 
 
Thirdly, the most important aspect seems to be the fact that the application of CFC 
rules reflects the concept of taxing income pursuant to the principle of capital export 
neutrality. Hence, it is the nature of CFC legislation to include foreign income in the 
domestic tax base. This ensures that foreign income and domestic income are 
(currently) taxed at the same rate. The non-taxation of foreign source income in 
country B - because of a current taxation in country A - would be in conflict with the 
principle of capital export neutrality, because resident companies with domestic 
income would be taxed at a higher domestic rate than resident companies with 
foreign income derived by a CFC in country C. However, this does not necessarily 
mean that the income is taxed at a lower rate: if the income is subject to CFC 
taxation in country A and the tax rate in the latter country is at least as high as in 
country B, the foreign income is (ultimately) not subject to lower taxation. 
Nonetheless, only the inclusion of foreign income and the taking into account of the 
taxation on the lower group level (including a possible CFC taxation) would clearly 
reflect the concept of world-wide taxation and therefore the principle of capital export 
neutrality.  
 
However, from a mere anti-avoidance perspective it is questionable whether there is 
any necessity to tax the amount of CFC income in country A which is already taxed in 
country B if the tax rate of the latter country is above the critical tax rate stipulated by 
country A. If the purpose of CFC legislation is to prevent a tax base erosion which 
can be triggered by the attractiveness of a certain low-tax country, this will already be 
prevented by the existence and the application of the CFC rules of country B. At 
least, this is true with respect to the overlapping CFC income which is in theory 
subject to tax in both countries A and B. As a first step, it must be concluded - in my 
opinion - that the higher tier CFC legislation should recognise and consider, in one 
way or another, the CFC taxation of the direct and indirect subsidiaries on a lower 
group level. Although this is a general - and in my opinion important - conclusion, it 
must be clear that this, by itself, does not solve all of the problems related to multiple 
tier structures and the multiple application of CFC rules and similar measures. 
 
6.10.2.2. Problems Caused by the Multiple Application of CFC Rules and 
Similar Measures  
 
It is quite obvious that the CFC rules of the countries which apply such regimes do 
not really fit together. This is mainly due to the fact that the decisive elements of CFC 
regimes are influenced by domestic legislation, especially tax legislation. This is not 
only true for the income determination rules but also for the criteria of low-taxation 
and the relevant CFC income (passive income and base company income). 
Furthermore, the general approaches (entity approach and transactional approach) 
can lead to a completely different outcome under the respective CFC regimes.  
  
a.) The application of entity and transactional approaches  
 
One important reason for deviations lies in the different approaches, i.e. the entity 
approach and the transactional approach. As outlined earlier, Member States which 
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regime is considerably more favourable than in Belgium.281 Comparable rules exist in 
Austria.282 The “time lack” between the CFC taxation in one country and the 
subsequent dividend taxation in the other country can lead to a double taxation of 
income (I will go into more detail regarding such a situation in the example below).  
 
e.) The application of CFC taxation and the credit method on subsequent dividends 
 
Of course, the problem can also exist if a “regular” credit-country is interposed 
between the country which applies its CFC taxation and the CFC itself. In the same 
way as described above, the current taxation pursuant to the CFC rules and the 
subsequent taxation of dividends according to the credit method on the intermediate 
level can create a double taxation of income. For example, let us assume that a 
German parent company has a subsidiary company in the United Kingdom and the 
latter company has, in turn, a subsidiary company in a low-tax country (CFC). It may 
be the case that the CFC is exempt from current taxation in the United Kingdom 
(entity approach), but part of the (passive) income of the CFC is subject to current 
taxation according to the German CFC regime (transactional approach). If it is further 
assumed that the CFC does not (or perhaps cannot) distribute any income to the 
shareholder, the income will be subject to tax - year by year - in the hands of the 
German (grand)parent company, but not in the United Kingdom. The income tax 
levied in the CFC country will be credited, but no United Kingdom income tax 
(because at that point in time there is no income tax imposed on the CFC income in 
the United Kingdom). If, several years later, the CFC distributes income to the 
intermediate company in the United Kingdom, the distribution will be subject to 
income taxation in the United Kingdom - with the effect that the overall tax burden on 
the distributed income increases. The tax credit system in the United Kingdom will 
not take into account the previous CFC taxation on a higher level in Germany. The 
subsequent distribution of the intermediate company in the United Kingdom to the 
German company will be exempt from taxation in Germany.283 Hence, if the country 
which applies the CFC regime - in this example Germany - does not provide for a 
relief by way of (retroactive) adjustment, the double taxation of income might lead to 
a substantial increase of the overall tax burden. I will come to that aspect - and the 
approach of some of the countries which apply CFC regimes - in more detail below. 
 
f.) The application of CFC taxation to permanent establishments and partnerships   
 
In general, CFC rules are applicable to legal entities. However, it can be the case that 
- for example - a partnership is treated as a separate taxable entity in one country but 
as a transparent entity in the other (classification conflict). Thus, one country applies 
its CFC taxation on the foreign income and the other country taxes the income of the 
partnership on the basis of its domestic rules for permanent establishments (credit 
method) or exempts the income from domestic taxation (exemption method). 
Furthermore, some of the countries, such as France and Lithuania, do not limit the 
application to separate taxable legal entities but generally apply the CFC taxation to 
                                            
281 See Tahon / Bogaerts, Belgium: Amendments to the Participation Exemption Regime, Tax Planning 
International Review (December) 2002; in addition, certain dividends are explicitly excluded from the 
dividends-received deduction (see Article 203, paragraph 1, 1 and 2-5 Belgium Income Tax Code).  
282 Section 10 (3) of the Austrian Income Tax Act; see also Tax News Service, 43/2002, October 11, 2002.  
283 Leaving aside the add-back of 5 percent of the distribution to the German tax base. 
    
                                                                                         
 
in principle, an entity approach, it is apparent that the classification of CFC income 
and the decision whether the income of the CFC is exempt from current taxation or 
not can be totally different. In addition, some countries provide for exemptions from 
CFC taxation which are non-existent in other countries. For example, the United 
Kingdom CFC regime provides for a substantial number of exemptions. However, the 
exemption based on the motive test is, at least in this particular form, not available in 
other countries which follow the entity approach. The same is true for the exemption 
based on the acceptable distribution policy and the exemption for publicly traded 
companies. Thus, the differences in the entity approach CFC regimes can very well 
lead to a current taxation of income according to the CFC regime of one country, but 
to a complete exemption from current taxation according to the CFC regime of 
another country.  
 
c.) The application of transactional approaches   
 
The transactional approach focuses on the respective income, i.e. the qualification as 
passive income (tainted income) or active income. It is obvious that even in case of 
the typical passive income, e.g. interest income, deviations are possible. For 
example, under the Danish CFC rules the financial income derived by the foreign 
company will only be attributed to the Danish shareholder if it exceeds one-third of 
the total net taxable income calculated pursuant to the Danish rules. This approach 
allows for a substantial amount of passive income to be derived abroad without any 
immediate CFC taxation. This will not be the case in Germany, Spain and Lithuania 
where the threshold is either much lower or is related to another basis. In addition, 
and with respect to other types of passive income, the aforementioned transactional 
countries have a different separation between active-passive activities. For example, 
pursuant to the German CFC rules, the exploitation of intangible assets is classified 
as tainted income if the tangible assets are not self-developed by the CFC. In fact, it 
does not matter whether the recipient of the services is a German resident or not. 
The Spanish approach is totally different in this respect and focuses on the question 
whether, in general, the payments for services provided by the CFC lead to a 
deduction from the Spanish tax base. The latter question, however, does not play 
any role under the German CFC regime. Hence, the concepts are different and it is 
absolutely possible that the transactional countries will end up with a different amount 
of allocable CFC income in case of a multiple CFC taxation - just because of the fact 
that they target different types of transactions.  
 
d.) The application of CFC taxation and similar anti-avoidance measures 
 
A multiple tier structure in which a country is involved which applies a CFC taxation 
and another country which applies a similar anti-avoidance measure is an additional 
source of deviations and possible double taxation. Similar anti-avoidance measures 
are - for example - those which switch from a participation exemption to a credit 
system if certain requirements are fulfilled. Such measures do not tax the income of 
the foreign company on a current basis but they provide for a subsequent taxation in 
the residence country of the shareholder. For example, Belgium applies a “dividend-
received deduction” which leads to a 95 percent exemption of dividends received 
from a qualifying subsidiary. However, the reduction can only be applied if the 
company paying the dividend is not established in a country where the common tax 
                                                                                                                                         
1417 et seq. (1420); see with respect to the former CFC rules: Regulations 4H-3-98 of April 17, 1998, nos. 198-
202. 
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regime is considerably more favourable than in Belgium.281 Comparable rules exist in 
Austria.282 The “time lack” between the CFC taxation in one country and the 
subsequent dividend taxation in the other country can lead to a double taxation of 
income (I will go into more detail regarding such a situation in the example below).  
 
e.) The application of CFC taxation and the credit method on subsequent dividends 
 
Of course, the problem can also exist if a “regular” credit-country is interposed 
between the country which applies its CFC taxation and the CFC itself. In the same 
way as described above, the current taxation pursuant to the CFC rules and the 
subsequent taxation of dividends according to the credit method on the intermediate 
level can create a double taxation of income. For example, let us assume that a 
German parent company has a subsidiary company in the United Kingdom and the 
latter company has, in turn, a subsidiary company in a low-tax country (CFC). It may 
be the case that the CFC is exempt from current taxation in the United Kingdom 
(entity approach), but part of the (passive) income of the CFC is subject to current 
taxation according to the German CFC regime (transactional approach). If it is further 
assumed that the CFC does not (or perhaps cannot) distribute any income to the 
shareholder, the income will be subject to tax - year by year - in the hands of the 
German (grand)parent company, but not in the United Kingdom. The income tax 
levied in the CFC country will be credited, but no United Kingdom income tax 
(because at that point in time there is no income tax imposed on the CFC income in 
the United Kingdom). If, several years later, the CFC distributes income to the 
intermediate company in the United Kingdom, the distribution will be subject to 
income taxation in the United Kingdom - with the effect that the overall tax burden on 
the distributed income increases. The tax credit system in the United Kingdom will 
not take into account the previous CFC taxation on a higher level in Germany. The 
subsequent distribution of the intermediate company in the United Kingdom to the 
German company will be exempt from taxation in Germany.283 Hence, if the country 
which applies the CFC regime - in this example Germany - does not provide for a 
relief by way of (retroactive) adjustment, the double taxation of income might lead to 
a substantial increase of the overall tax burden. I will come to that aspect - and the 
approach of some of the countries which apply CFC regimes - in more detail below. 
 
f.) The application of CFC taxation to permanent establishments and partnerships   
 
In general, CFC rules are applicable to legal entities. However, it can be the case that 
- for example - a partnership is treated as a separate taxable entity in one country but 
as a transparent entity in the other (classification conflict). Thus, one country applies 
its CFC taxation on the foreign income and the other country taxes the income of the 
partnership on the basis of its domestic rules for permanent establishments (credit 
method) or exempts the income from domestic taxation (exemption method). 
Furthermore, some of the countries, such as France and Lithuania, do not limit the 
application to separate taxable legal entities but generally apply the CFC taxation to 
                                            
281 See Tahon / Bogaerts, Belgium: Amendments to the Participation Exemption Regime, Tax Planning 
International Review (December) 2002; in addition, certain dividends are explicitly excluded from the 
dividends-received deduction (see Article 203, paragraph 1, 1 and 2-5 Belgium Income Tax Code).  
282 Section 10 (3) of the Austrian Income Tax Act; see also Tax News Service, 43/2002, October 11, 2002.  
283 Leaving aside the add-back of 5 percent of the distribution to the German tax base. 
    
                                                                                         
 
in principle, an entity approach, it is apparent that the classification of CFC income 
and the decision whether the income of the CFC is exempt from current taxation or 
not can be totally different. In addition, some countries provide for exemptions from 
CFC taxation which are non-existent in other countries. For example, the United 
Kingdom CFC regime provides for a substantial number of exemptions. However, the 
exemption based on the motive test is, at least in this particular form, not available in 
other countries which follow the entity approach. The same is true for the exemption 
based on the acceptable distribution policy and the exemption for publicly traded 
companies. Thus, the differences in the entity approach CFC regimes can very well 
lead to a current taxation of income according to the CFC regime of one country, but 
to a complete exemption from current taxation according to the CFC regime of 
another country.  
 
c.) The application of transactional approaches   
 
The transactional approach focuses on the respective income, i.e. the qualification as 
passive income (tainted income) or active income. It is obvious that even in case of 
the typical passive income, e.g. interest income, deviations are possible. For 
example, under the Danish CFC rules the financial income derived by the foreign 
company will only be attributed to the Danish shareholder if it exceeds one-third of 
the total net taxable income calculated pursuant to the Danish rules. This approach 
allows for a substantial amount of passive income to be derived abroad without any 
immediate CFC taxation. This will not be the case in Germany, Spain and Lithuania 
where the threshold is either much lower or is related to another basis. In addition, 
and with respect to other types of passive income, the aforementioned transactional 
countries have a different separation between active-passive activities. For example, 
pursuant to the German CFC rules, the exploitation of intangible assets is classified 
as tainted income if the tangible assets are not self-developed by the CFC. In fact, it 
does not matter whether the recipient of the services is a German resident or not. 
The Spanish approach is totally different in this respect and focuses on the question 
whether, in general, the payments for services provided by the CFC lead to a 
deduction from the Spanish tax base. The latter question, however, does not play 
any role under the German CFC regime. Hence, the concepts are different and it is 
absolutely possible that the transactional countries will end up with a different amount 
of allocable CFC income in case of a multiple CFC taxation - just because of the fact 
that they target different types of transactions.  
 
d.) The application of CFC taxation and similar anti-avoidance measures 
 
A multiple tier structure in which a country is involved which applies a CFC taxation 
and another country which applies a similar anti-avoidance measure is an additional 
source of deviations and possible double taxation. Similar anti-avoidance measures 
are - for example - those which switch from a participation exemption to a credit 
system if certain requirements are fulfilled. Such measures do not tax the income of 
the foreign company on a current basis but they provide for a subsequent taxation in 
the residence country of the shareholder. For example, Belgium applies a “dividend-
received deduction” which leads to a 95 percent exemption of dividends received 
from a qualifying subsidiary. However, the reduction can only be applied if the 
company paying the dividend is not established in a country where the common tax 
                                                                                                                                         




    
                                                                                         
 
have the effect that two (or more) CFC rules are not consistently applicable over a 
certain period of time. That means the CFC rules step in and step out depending on 
the changes in the tax rate or the percentage of shareholding. It was outlined earlier 
that a variety of different thresholds exists and it would be a mere coincidence if the 
required level of taxation and the minimum shareholding for the application of the 
CFC rules of two or more countries were be the same.  
 
6.10.2.3. Cases of Possible Double Taxation Caused by the Multiple Application 
of CFC Rules and Similar Measures  
 
It should be clear that not all of the aforementioned aspects lead to a double taxation 
of CFC income. However, in the following I will present some examples where the 
simultaneous application of CFC regimes and similar situations in a multiple tier 
structure can lead to double taxation of income. Of course, this is by no means 
concluding, but it gives an impression of the problems which can arise in such 
situations.  
 
a.) Tax credit for taxes imposed by the CFC taxation of another country  
 
Similar to what was outlined earlier with respect to the crediting of taxes imposed on 
the underlying income in third countries and in the CFC country, it is equally 
important to take into account the taxes imposed according to the CFC rules of 
another country on a lower group level.  
 
 Figure 13: 
 
 
            
     CFC income 100 Euro x 30%   
     = 30 Euro ./. 30 Euro max. tax credit = 0 Euro  
            
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 Euro x 35%   
     = 35 Euro ./. 10 Euro tax credit = 25 Euro 
            
            
            
            
     income 100 Euro x 10%     
     = 10 Euro income tax     
            
            
            
The example shows that only in case of the consistent application of an ordinary tax 
credit system by both countries which apply a CFC taxation (countries A and B) a 
double taxation can be avoided. This is certainly the simplest case of a multiple tier 
structure since there is neither a tax loss involved nor does the tax base deviate on 
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partnerships and permanent establishments.284 It seems that this is the case where 
the income of partnerships and permanent establishments is otherwise exempt from 
domestic taxation (exemption method). These countries apparently see the necessity 
to deal with this issue in the context of CFC taxation. Other countries, such as 
Germany, have separate legislation which switches from the exemption method to 
the credit method in certain cases in order to avoid passive foreign source income of 
partnerships and permanent establishments being exempt from domestic taxation.285 
At least in one European country, namely in Italy, the CFC taxation is only applied to 
permanent establishments (or partnerships) of subsidiary companies but not to 
permanent establishments (or partnerships) of the domestic company.286 It is obvious 
that such a “mixture” of different approaches may lead to conflicts in a multiple tier 
structure.  
 
g.) The determination of income 
 
Another aspect which is quite important is the fact that CFC rules typically require the 
foreign income to be calculated according to the domestic tax rules.287 This is not 
only true for the verification of the effective foreign tax rate but also for the 
determination of the attributable income. Even though it may be the case that the 
general accounting rules of two or more states are similar, it is unlikely that the rules 
of determining the income for tax purposes is identical - given the fact that a system 
of income taxation is very much influenced by national interests. Therefore, it may be 
assumed that even in case of limited activities of a CFC there will be differences in 
the determination of the attributable income - compared to the CFC itself and 
compared to the CFC taxation of another state. As already outlined earlier, the 
approach among the Member States is to ignore the tax base calculated according to 
the residence state of the CFC and to make a separate calculation - based on 
domestic legislation - only for the application of the CFC regime. In fact, it seems that 
there is - apart from Hungary - no Member State which allows the income attribution 
based on the income determination of the residence state of the CFC. Furthermore, 
there is no Member State which accepts the income determination according to the 
CFC regime of another Member State. Hence, it is absolutely clear that the isolated 
approaches of calculating the amount of income attribution is an additional source of 
double taxation. 
 
h.) The relevant tax rate and the percentage of shareholding 
 
The fact that the countries which apply such CFC taxation have different thresholds 
with respect to the low-taxation requirement and the percentage of shareholding can 
                                            
284 See, for example, the CFC taxation in Lithuania (Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 394) and the French CFC taxation (see Thill / Mihac, French CFC Regime Examined, Tax 
Notes International 1999, page 779).  
285 For example Germany, section 2 a of the German Income Tax Act. See also the great number of activity 
clauses in the German tax treaties (see Wassermeyer, Das Wirrwarr mit den Aktivitätsklauseln im deutschen 
Abkommensrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2000, page 65 et seq.).  
286 The Italian CFC legislation is not applicable to permanent establishments of an Italian company. However, if 
a foreign subsidiary of an Italian company, e.g. in the Netherlands, has a permanent establishment in certain low-
tax countries or territories, e.g. on the Isle of Man, the Italian CFC rules will apply to the income of the 
permanent establishment but not to the Dutch subsidiary itself (see Conci / Kessler / Puricelli / Schommer, Die 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2002, page 763 et seq. (764).  
287 See in this respect Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
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have the effect that two (or more) CFC rules are not consistently applicable over a 
certain period of time. That means the CFC rules step in and step out depending on 
the changes in the tax rate or the percentage of shareholding. It was outlined earlier 
that a variety of different thresholds exists and it would be a mere coincidence if the 
required level of taxation and the minimum shareholding for the application of the 
CFC rules of two or more countries were be the same.  
 
6.10.2.3. Cases of Possible Double Taxation Caused by the Multiple Application 
of CFC Rules and Similar Measures  
 
It should be clear that not all of the aforementioned aspects lead to a double taxation 
of CFC income. However, in the following I will present some examples where the 
simultaneous application of CFC regimes and similar situations in a multiple tier 
structure can lead to double taxation of income. Of course, this is by no means 
concluding, but it gives an impression of the problems which can arise in such 
situations.  
 
a.) Tax credit for taxes imposed by the CFC taxation of another country  
 
Similar to what was outlined earlier with respect to the crediting of taxes imposed on 
the underlying income in third countries and in the CFC country, it is equally 
important to take into account the taxes imposed according to the CFC rules of 
another country on a lower group level.  
 
 Figure 13: 
 
 
            
     CFC income 100 Euro x 30%   
     = 30 Euro ./. 30 Euro max. tax credit = 0 Euro  
            
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 Euro x 35%   
     = 35 Euro ./. 10 Euro tax credit = 25 Euro 
            
            
            
            
     income 100 Euro x 10%     
     = 10 Euro income tax     
            
            
            
The example shows that only in case of the consistent application of an ordinary tax 
credit system by both countries which apply a CFC taxation (countries A and B) a 
double taxation can be avoided. This is certainly the simplest case of a multiple tier 
structure since there is neither a tax loss involved nor does the tax base deviate on 
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partnerships and permanent establishments.284 It seems that this is the case where 
the income of partnerships and permanent establishments is otherwise exempt from 
domestic taxation (exemption method). These countries apparently see the necessity 
to deal with this issue in the context of CFC taxation. Other countries, such as 
Germany, have separate legislation which switches from the exemption method to 
the credit method in certain cases in order to avoid passive foreign source income of 
partnerships and permanent establishments being exempt from domestic taxation.285 
At least in one European country, namely in Italy, the CFC taxation is only applied to 
permanent establishments (or partnerships) of subsidiary companies but not to 
permanent establishments (or partnerships) of the domestic company.286 It is obvious 
that such a “mixture” of different approaches may lead to conflicts in a multiple tier 
structure.  
 
g.) The determination of income 
 
Another aspect which is quite important is the fact that CFC rules typically require the 
foreign income to be calculated according to the domestic tax rules.287 This is not 
only true for the verification of the effective foreign tax rate but also for the 
determination of the attributable income. Even though it may be the case that the 
general accounting rules of two or more states are similar, it is unlikely that the rules 
of determining the income for tax purposes is identical - given the fact that a system 
of income taxation is very much influenced by national interests. Therefore, it may be 
assumed that even in case of limited activities of a CFC there will be differences in 
the determination of the attributable income - compared to the CFC itself and 
compared to the CFC taxation of another state. As already outlined earlier, the 
approach among the Member States is to ignore the tax base calculated according to 
the residence state of the CFC and to make a separate calculation - based on 
domestic legislation - only for the application of the CFC regime. In fact, it seems that 
there is - apart from Hungary - no Member State which allows the income attribution 
based on the income determination of the residence state of the CFC. Furthermore, 
there is no Member State which accepts the income determination according to the 
CFC regime of another Member State. Hence, it is absolutely clear that the isolated 
approaches of calculating the amount of income attribution is an additional source of 
double taxation. 
 
h.) The relevant tax rate and the percentage of shareholding 
 
The fact that the countries which apply such CFC taxation have different thresholds 
with respect to the low-taxation requirement and the percentage of shareholding can 
                                            
284 See, for example, the CFC taxation in Lithuania (Bernatonis, National Report Lithuania, in Lang / Aigner / 
Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, 
Volume 8, 2004, page 394) and the French CFC taxation (see Thill / Mihac, French CFC Regime Examined, Tax 
Notes International 1999, page 779).  
285 For example Germany, section 2 a of the German Income Tax Act. See also the great number of activity 
clauses in the German tax treaties (see Wassermeyer, Das Wirrwarr mit den Aktivitätsklauseln im deutschen 
Abkommensrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2000, page 65 et seq.).  
286 The Italian CFC legislation is not applicable to permanent establishments of an Italian company. However, if 
a foreign subsidiary of an Italian company, e.g. in the Netherlands, has a permanent establishment in certain low-
tax countries or territories, e.g. on the Isle of Man, the Italian CFC rules will apply to the income of the 
permanent establishment but not to the Dutch subsidiary itself (see Conci / Kessler / Puricelli / Schommer, Die 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung in Italien, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2002, page 763 et seq. (764).  
287 See in this respect Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by 
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 58.  
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     entity approach 
     CFC income 100 Euro x 30% = 30 Euro 
     ./. 25 Euro (A and B) = 5 Euro (in case of cross- 
     crediting) 
 
 
     transactional approach 
     CFC income 60 Euro x 35% = 21 Euro 




     income 100 Euro x 10% 





In the alternative scenario country A follows an entity approach and country B follows 
a transactional approach and attributes only part of the income of company C (the 
tainted income) to the resident shareholder. However, the income calculation in all of 
the countries is - for the reason of simplification - identical. Country A could be, for 
example, Finland and the transactional country B could be Germany.294 The latter 
country would typically allow only a partial tax credit of 6 Euro - the part which relates 
to the income attributed to company B.295 In order to avoid any double taxation of 
income, it would be necessary for country A to provide for a tax credit of the amount 
of taxes imposed in the intermediate country and the (non-credited) amount of taxes 
imposed in the CFC country. Thus, if the intermediate country imposed 15 Euro (after 
crediting 6 Euro income tax of country C) and country C imposed an amount of 
income tax of 10 Euro, it would be necessary - for a complete elimination of double 
taxation in country A (Finland) - to credit 25 Euro. If this is the case, the taxes 
imposed in country A of 30 Euro would be reduced by 25 Euro to a total of 5 Euro. 
This, however, requires the cross-crediting of an amount of 3 Euro (because the tax 
rate in country A is lower than the tax rate in country B on the same amount of 
income). Hence, the cross-crediting would result in a total tax burden of 30 percent 
whereas the situation without cross-crediting would result in a total tax burden of 33 
percent.296 Thus, country A has to take into account taxes paid in both countries B 
and C in order provide for an appropriate tax relief in this scenario. Again, this is a 
                                            
294 The tax rates used in the example do not reflect the actual income tax rates of Finland and Germany. 
However, in order to have consistent examples, it is useful to stick to the 30 percent tax rate for country A and 
35 percent for country B. 
295 10 Euro income tax (country C) x 60% = 6 Euro.  
296 An amount of 6 Euro was credited in country B (100 Euro x 60% x 10% income tax) against the income tax 
imposed on the attributable amount of 60 Euro. However, country A attributes all of the income of company C to 
the resident shareholder. The whole amount of 100 Euro has theoretically to be split up into an amount of 60 
Euro and an amount of 40 Euro. The 60 Euro attributable income is subject to an income tax of 18 Euro and a 
maximum of 18 Euro can be credited against the income tax (without the possibility of cross-crediting). The 40 
Euro attributable income is subject to an income tax of 12 Euro. However, there is no income tax levied on this 
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be equal to the tax burden of the country which has the highest tax rate.288 However, 
if country A did not take into consideration the CFC taxation in country B (but only the 
taxation in country C), the overall tax burden would drastically increase from 35 
percent to 55 percent.289 Therefore, the higher tier CFC taxation should in general 
provide for an ordinary tax credit in a situation where the CFC income is already 
taxed pursuant to another country’s CFC regime on a lower group level. 
 
In fact, only very few countries provide for such a relief from a lower tier CFC 
taxation. Finland and Germany treat the taxes imposed pursuant to the CFC rules of 
another country as a foreign tax paid by the CFC itself, and allow an ordinary tax 
credit against the domestic income tax in Finland and Germany.290 There are, at least 
to my knowledge, no other countries which provide for such an immediate relief from 
double taxation caused by lower tier CFC taxation. There may be cases of indirect 
relief which are related to subsequent dividends, like in case of Italy where the Italian 
taxpayer can claim the tax credit for the taxes paid abroad by the non-resident 
intermediate on the exempted distributed profits, but this is not comparable to the tax 
credit system in Finland and Germany.291 The same is true for cases in which a relief 
may only be granted by way of motive exemption pursuant to the applicable CFC 
legislation or by way of mutual agreement procedure based on a double tax 
convention. For example, pursuant to the United Kingdom Inland Revenue Guidance 
Notes on CFCs, a motive exemption may be granted when the CFC taxation on the 
intermediate level is broadly comparable to the United Kingdom taxes which would 
be imposed on the attributed income.292 In France, relief may be granted through 
mutual agreement procedure.293 However, the relief through motive exemption and in 
particular through mutual agreement procedure is something which includes a high 
degree of uncertainty about the possible outcome. The mutual agreement procedure 
cannot be seen as a clear concept of relief from double taxation but rather as a 
procedure for exceptional cases. In my opinion, what is really required is a legal 
concept which is stipulated in the respective CFC legislation and which gives 
certainty to the taxpayers. I consider the ignoring of the CFC taxation of another 
country to be as critical as the ignoring of the taxation in the CFC country itself. 
Hence, if a system provides for relief from double taxation of taxes imposed in the 
CFC country - as is the case (in one way or another) under all of the European CFC 
regimes - it should self-evidently also be the case for the taxes imposed according to 
the CFC regime of another (intermediate) country. 
 
 
                                            
288 In this case, the intermediate company B has the highest tax rate (35%). However, the result would be the 
same if the tax rates between the countries A and B were reversed. This is basically due to the mechanism of an 
ordinary tax credit system. 
289 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 20 Euro (country A) = 55 Euro.  
290 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. Outside of Europe it is New Zealand which 
provides for a similar relief. See also Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 201. 
291 See with respect to Italy: Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 361. 
292 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890; paragraph 3.6.38 of the United 
Kingdom Inland Revenue Guidance Notes on CFCs. 
293 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 67. 
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In the alternative scenario country A follows an entity approach and country B follows 
a transactional approach and attributes only part of the income of company C (the 
tainted income) to the resident shareholder. However, the income calculation in all of 
the countries is - for the reason of simplification - identical. Country A could be, for 
example, Finland and the transactional country B could be Germany.294 The latter 
country would typically allow only a partial tax credit of 6 Euro - the part which relates 
to the income attributed to company B.295 In order to avoid any double taxation of 
income, it would be necessary for country A to provide for a tax credit of the amount 
of taxes imposed in the intermediate country and the (non-credited) amount of taxes 
imposed in the CFC country. Thus, if the intermediate country imposed 15 Euro (after 
crediting 6 Euro income tax of country C) and country C imposed an amount of 
income tax of 10 Euro, it would be necessary - for a complete elimination of double 
taxation in country A (Finland) - to credit 25 Euro. If this is the case, the taxes 
imposed in country A of 30 Euro would be reduced by 25 Euro to a total of 5 Euro. 
This, however, requires the cross-crediting of an amount of 3 Euro (because the tax 
rate in country A is lower than the tax rate in country B on the same amount of 
income). Hence, the cross-crediting would result in a total tax burden of 30 percent 
whereas the situation without cross-crediting would result in a total tax burden of 33 
percent.296 Thus, country A has to take into account taxes paid in both countries B 
and C in order provide for an appropriate tax relief in this scenario. Again, this is a 
                                            
294 The tax rates used in the example do not reflect the actual income tax rates of Finland and Germany. 
However, in order to have consistent examples, it is useful to stick to the 30 percent tax rate for country A and 
35 percent for country B. 
295 10 Euro income tax (country C) x 60% = 6 Euro.  
296 An amount of 6 Euro was credited in country B (100 Euro x 60% x 10% income tax) against the income tax 
imposed on the attributable amount of 60 Euro. However, country A attributes all of the income of company C to 
the resident shareholder. The whole amount of 100 Euro has theoretically to be split up into an amount of 60 
Euro and an amount of 40 Euro. The 60 Euro attributable income is subject to an income tax of 18 Euro and a 
maximum of 18 Euro can be credited against the income tax (without the possibility of cross-crediting). The 40 
Euro attributable income is subject to an income tax of 12 Euro. However, there is no income tax levied on this 
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be equal to the tax burden of the country which has the highest tax rate.288 However, 
if country A did not take into consideration the CFC taxation in country B (but only the 
taxation in country C), the overall tax burden would drastically increase from 35 
percent to 55 percent.289 Therefore, the higher tier CFC taxation should in general 
provide for an ordinary tax credit in a situation where the CFC income is already 
taxed pursuant to another country’s CFC regime on a lower group level. 
 
In fact, only very few countries provide for such a relief from a lower tier CFC 
taxation. Finland and Germany treat the taxes imposed pursuant to the CFC rules of 
another country as a foreign tax paid by the CFC itself, and allow an ordinary tax 
credit against the domestic income tax in Finland and Germany.290 There are, at least 
to my knowledge, no other countries which provide for such an immediate relief from 
double taxation caused by lower tier CFC taxation. There may be cases of indirect 
relief which are related to subsequent dividends, like in case of Italy where the Italian 
taxpayer can claim the tax credit for the taxes paid abroad by the non-resident 
intermediate on the exempted distributed profits, but this is not comparable to the tax 
credit system in Finland and Germany.291 The same is true for cases in which a relief 
may only be granted by way of motive exemption pursuant to the applicable CFC 
legislation or by way of mutual agreement procedure based on a double tax 
convention. For example, pursuant to the United Kingdom Inland Revenue Guidance 
Notes on CFCs, a motive exemption may be granted when the CFC taxation on the 
intermediate level is broadly comparable to the United Kingdom taxes which would 
be imposed on the attributed income.292 In France, relief may be granted through 
mutual agreement procedure.293 However, the relief through motive exemption and in 
particular through mutual agreement procedure is something which includes a high 
degree of uncertainty about the possible outcome. The mutual agreement procedure 
cannot be seen as a clear concept of relief from double taxation but rather as a 
procedure for exceptional cases. In my opinion, what is really required is a legal 
concept which is stipulated in the respective CFC legislation and which gives 
certainty to the taxpayers. I consider the ignoring of the CFC taxation of another 
country to be as critical as the ignoring of the taxation in the CFC country itself. 
Hence, if a system provides for relief from double taxation of taxes imposed in the 
CFC country - as is the case (in one way or another) under all of the European CFC 
regimes - it should self-evidently also be the case for the taxes imposed according to 
the CFC regime of another (intermediate) country. 
 
 
                                            
288 In this case, the intermediate company B has the highest tax rate (35%). However, the result would be the 
same if the tax rates between the countries A and B were reversed. This is basically due to the mechanism of an 
ordinary tax credit system. 
289 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 20 Euro (country A) = 55 Euro.  
290 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. Outside of Europe it is New Zealand which 
provides for a similar relief. See also Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 
2004, page 201. 
291 See with respect to Italy: Favi, National Report Italy, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation, Volume 8, 2004, page 361. 
292 Friel, National Report United Kingdom, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 890; paragraph 3.6.38 of the United 
Kingdom Inland Revenue Guidance Notes on CFCs. 
293 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 67. 
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utilisation - and therefore the degree of double taxation - depends on the CFC regime 
of country A. If the latter country provides not only for a deduction of the taxes 
imposed in country C but also for the taxes imposed in country B, it may be the case, 
like in Germany, that the attributed amount can be reduced from 100 Euro to 65 
Euro, i.e. by allowing the deduction (but not the credit) of 35 Euro income taxes from 
the attributable CFC income in country A. However, if the CFC taxation on the 
intermediate level is not taken into account at all, as is the case in a substantial 
number of countries (see above), the attribution may only be reduced to 90 Euro by 
deducting the income taxation in country C. The “worst case,” of course, is to ignore 
the taxation in country B and country C. This would result in an income attribution of 
100 Euro. In the latter case, the overall tax burden including the disadvantage of the 
tax loss reduction in country A (non-discounted) amounts to 65 Euro.297 However, 
even in the “best case” of an attribution of 65 Euro, the combination of CFC taxation 
in country A and country B results in an overall tax burden of 54.50 Euro.298 Given 
the fact that the highest tax rate in the structure is 35 percent, the outcome, in my 
opinion, cannot be satisfactory.  
 
In the second scenario, there are at least as many theoretical possibilities as in the 
first scenario. Of course, the approach in the “loss country” is, again, of great 
importance for the determination of the amount of double taxation. Here, it is 
advantageous if the “intermediate” country provides a roll-over of the income taxes 
imposed in country C. This is the case, for example, in Portugal.299 However, the 
additional question is how country A deals with the loss-making intermediate 
company in combination with the (additional) CFC taxation. As already outlined 
earlier, almost all of the countries provide a tax credit for income taxes imposed in the 
CFC country (see above). The crediting of the 10 Euro income tax in country A is 
therefore, in principle, not problematic. What is problematic, however, is the fact that 
the CFC taxation in country B usually results in an offsetting of tax losses and does 
not create any (immediate) income tax which might be offset in country A. Thus, the 
CFC taxation in country B will lead to a tax payment in a subsequent period, but not 
in the period of income attribution. The problem is that Finland and Germany - the 
countries which follow the exceptional approach of providing a credit for the taxes 
imposed on the CFC income (on the intermediate level) - do not, at the same time, 
provide for subsequent adjustments for taxes payable in country B at a later point in 
time. In other words, even those countries which provide, in principle, for a relief from 
double taxation caused by the CFC taxation on the intermediate level fail to solve the 
problem if tax losses are involved. Hence, it is apparent that the involvement of tax 
losses in country A results in an over-taxation of income - similar to the first scenario. 
 
Of course, several additional scenarios are thinkable and it seems that the European 
Member States which follow a concept of CFC taxation do not really provide for an 
appropriate system of relief from double taxation. Moreover, it shows the dilemma of 
a multiple tier structure: in a situation where only one country applies its CFC rules to 
a low-tax country, the effect with respect to the losses will be the same, but the 
additional tax burden of the foreign company will be comparably low (if it is only 
applied to low-tax countries). In a multiple tier structure where two or more CFC rules 
are applied, the tax burden will be increased to a “regular level” and - in addition - the 
                                            
297 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 30 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 65 Euro.  
298 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 19.50 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 54.50 Euro.  
299 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783. 
    
                                                                                         
 
relatively simple case since it is assumed that the income determination rules in all of 
the three countries are identical. The case can become highly complex and 
problematic if - in addition to the different approaches - the income calculation rules 
differ in countries A, B and C.  
 
The opposite example, i.e. where country A follows a transactional approach (e.g. 
Germany) and country B follows an entity approach (e.g. Finland), includes similar 
aspects. However, in this case the income tax of country C should normally be fully 
credited against the income tax of country B (due to the identical tax base under the 
entity approach - and under the assumption of identical income determination rules).  
 
b.) CFC tax credit and negative income in the countries with CFC taxation    
 
The problems of a CFC tax credit in combination with tax losses (or a tax loss carry 
forward) is basically similar to the problems outlined earlier in the context of a 
“normal” tax credit. However, it is obvious that the likelihood of double taxation 
increases with the number of companies involved and the number of CFC rules 
applied to the respective CFC income. If only one company in the chain suffers a tax 





     Scenario 1    Scenario 2 
            
     CFC income 100    CFC income 100 
     but overall tax base   x 30%  
     negative = no tax credit  = 30 Euro 
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 x 35%  CFC income 100
     = 35 ./. 10 tax credit  but overall tax 
     = 25 Euro    base negative
          = no tax credit
            
            
     income 100     income 100 
     x 10% tax =     x 10% tax =  
     10 Euro    10 Euro  
    
             
In the first scenario, the income tax paid in country C can be credited against the 
income tax paid in country B, i.e. the next higher level. Since the parent company A 
suffers a tax loss (or has a tax loss carry forward available) it will not pay any 
domestic income tax with the result that there is no possibility for a tax credit. 
However, the outcome of the first scenario is dependent upon several factors. Under 
most CFC regimes, the income attribution will reduce the domestic tax losses (or the 
respective tax loss carry forward) with the effect of a partial double taxation, because 
the tax losses which will be offset against the attributed CFC income cannot be used 






Company C (CFC) 
The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF Legislation
307
    
                                                                                         
 
utilisation - and therefore the degree of double taxation - depends on the CFC regime 
of country A. If the latter country provides not only for a deduction of the taxes 
imposed in country C but also for the taxes imposed in country B, it may be the case, 
like in Germany, that the attributed amount can be reduced from 100 Euro to 65 
Euro, i.e. by allowing the deduction (but not the credit) of 35 Euro income taxes from 
the attributable CFC income in country A. However, if the CFC taxation on the 
intermediate level is not taken into account at all, as is the case in a substantial 
number of countries (see above), the attribution may only be reduced to 90 Euro by 
deducting the income taxation in country C. The “worst case,” of course, is to ignore 
the taxation in country B and country C. This would result in an income attribution of 
100 Euro. In the latter case, the overall tax burden including the disadvantage of the 
tax loss reduction in country A (non-discounted) amounts to 65 Euro.297 However, 
even in the “best case” of an attribution of 65 Euro, the combination of CFC taxation 
in country A and country B results in an overall tax burden of 54.50 Euro.298 Given 
the fact that the highest tax rate in the structure is 35 percent, the outcome, in my 
opinion, cannot be satisfactory.  
 
In the second scenario, there are at least as many theoretical possibilities as in the 
first scenario. Of course, the approach in the “loss country” is, again, of great 
importance for the determination of the amount of double taxation. Here, it is 
advantageous if the “intermediate” country provides a roll-over of the income taxes 
imposed in country C. This is the case, for example, in Portugal.299 However, the 
additional question is how country A deals with the loss-making intermediate 
company in combination with the (additional) CFC taxation. As already outlined 
earlier, almost all of the countries provide a tax credit for income taxes imposed in the 
CFC country (see above). The crediting of the 10 Euro income tax in country A is 
therefore, in principle, not problematic. What is problematic, however, is the fact that 
the CFC taxation in country B usually results in an offsetting of tax losses and does 
not create any (immediate) income tax which might be offset in country A. Thus, the 
CFC taxation in country B will lead to a tax payment in a subsequent period, but not 
in the period of income attribution. The problem is that Finland and Germany - the 
countries which follow the exceptional approach of providing a credit for the taxes 
imposed on the CFC income (on the intermediate level) - do not, at the same time, 
provide for subsequent adjustments for taxes payable in country B at a later point in 
time. In other words, even those countries which provide, in principle, for a relief from 
double taxation caused by the CFC taxation on the intermediate level fail to solve the 
problem if tax losses are involved. Hence, it is apparent that the involvement of tax 
losses in country A results in an over-taxation of income - similar to the first scenario. 
 
Of course, several additional scenarios are thinkable and it seems that the European 
Member States which follow a concept of CFC taxation do not really provide for an 
appropriate system of relief from double taxation. Moreover, it shows the dilemma of 
a multiple tier structure: in a situation where only one country applies its CFC rules to 
a low-tax country, the effect with respect to the losses will be the same, but the 
additional tax burden of the foreign company will be comparably low (if it is only 
applied to low-tax countries). In a multiple tier structure where two or more CFC rules 
are applied, the tax burden will be increased to a “regular level” and - in addition - the 
                                            
297 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 30 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 65 Euro.  
298 10 Euro (country C) + 25 Euro (country B) + 19.50 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 54.50 Euro.  
299 De Sousa da Camara, National Report Portugal, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational 
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 783. 
    
                                                                                         
 
relatively simple case since it is assumed that the income determination rules in all of 
the three countries are identical. The case can become highly complex and 
problematic if - in addition to the different approaches - the income calculation rules 
differ in countries A, B and C.  
 
The opposite example, i.e. where country A follows a transactional approach (e.g. 
Germany) and country B follows an entity approach (e.g. Finland), includes similar 
aspects. However, in this case the income tax of country C should normally be fully 
credited against the income tax of country B (due to the identical tax base under the 
entity approach - and under the assumption of identical income determination rules).  
 
b.) CFC tax credit and negative income in the countries with CFC taxation    
 
The problems of a CFC tax credit in combination with tax losses (or a tax loss carry 
forward) is basically similar to the problems outlined earlier in the context of a 
“normal” tax credit. However, it is obvious that the likelihood of double taxation 
increases with the number of companies involved and the number of CFC rules 
applied to the respective CFC income. If only one company in the chain suffers a tax 





     Scenario 1    Scenario 2 
            
     CFC income 100    CFC income 100 
     but overall tax base   x 30%  
     negative = no tax credit  = 30 Euro 
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 x 35%  CFC income 100
     = 35 ./. 10 tax credit  but overall tax 
     = 25 Euro    base negative
          = no tax credit
            
            
     income 100     income 100 
     x 10% tax =     x 10% tax =  
     10 Euro    10 Euro  
    
             
In the first scenario, the income tax paid in country C can be credited against the 
income tax paid in country B, i.e. the next higher level. Since the parent company A 
suffers a tax loss (or has a tax loss carry forward available) it will not pay any 
domestic income tax with the result that there is no possibility for a tax credit. 
However, the outcome of the first scenario is dependent upon several factors. Under 
most CFC regimes, the income attribution will reduce the domestic tax losses (or the 
respective tax loss carry forward) with the effect of a partial double taxation, because 
the tax losses which will be offset against the attributed CFC income cannot be used 
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The result is also interesting from another perspective: the respective CFC regime 
leads in most cases to a kind of “positive fiscal consolidation.” That means the 
positive CFC income is attributed to the resident shareholder with the effect of a 
reduction of the negative domestic tax base. In turn, there is typically no “negative 
fiscal consolidation,” i.e. the negative CFC income will not be taken into account 
directly for the determination of the domestic tax base. In such a multiple tier 
structure each consolidation will be made separately - always between the individual 
CFC regime and the (directly or indirectly held) CFC. The “positive fiscal 
consolidation” can be added together with the number of “CFC pairs” (CFC regime 
and CFC income) and can therefore lead to a considerable disadvantage within one 
single group of companies.  
 
It was mentioned earlier that only very few countries provide for an appropriate relief 
from double taxation caused by an additional application of CFC rules in another 
country.302 It seems that only Finland and Germany credit the income taxes imposed 
on the intermediate level. However, since these countries provide for a relief through 
a “regular” ordinary tax credit system, it is obvious that relief from double taxation of 
CFC income cannot be achieved in cases where a domestic tax loss is involved, 
either in the country of the parent company (country A) or the lower tier subsidiary 
company (country B), or in both countries at the same time (countries A and B). At 
least, this is true if one follows the approach that the reduction of a domestic tax loss 
carry forward can lead to a double taxation of income. In my opinion, one has always 
to take into account that the domestic tax losses can be carried forward and can in 
theory lead to a reduction of positive taxable income in subsequent years.303 Any 
attribution of CFC income limits the possibility of a future offsetting of income or 
makes it even completely impossible. In my opinion, the concept of CFC taxation 
should take such “loss scenarios” into account and should provide for a more flexible 
relief from double taxation of income. Otherwise, the concept of CFC taxation goes 
much too far and can lead to a massive “over-taxation.” However, the question of 
possible alternatives will be discussed later on in more detail.  
 
c.) CFC tax credit and negative income in the country of the CFC 
 
The situation where the CFC itself suffers tax losses is not free from the risk of 
double taxation. The main problem here is - in my opinion - the tax loss carry forward 
limitation in the countries which apply the CFC taxation and in the CFC country itself. 
For example, if the countries A and B apply their domestic tax loss carry forward 
limitations on the negative CFC income of company C, this can result in a maximum 
of three different time limits on the same amount of negative income. The negative 
CFC income might be offset against positive CFC income in subsequent years 
according to the legislation of one country but not according to the legislation of the 
other(s) - due to the existing time limit. This is not a specific multiple tier problem, but 
the multiple application of CFC rules increases again the likelihood of a double 
taxation of CFC income. Similar to the aforementioned situations, the offsetting of 
                                            
302 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. 
303 Of course, sometimes the possibility of a tax loss carry forward is limited in time and a tax loss utilisation can 
be impossible. However, this does not change the reasoning. The question whether the tax loss can actually be 
used can only be answered at a later point in time - this can be many years after the CFC income attribution. 
Furthermore, it has to be added that some of the counties which apply a CFC taxation provide for a limited tax 
loss carry back. 
    
                                                                                         
 
domestic tax loss(es) will be reduced. The maximum disadvantage in a situation 
where two different CFC rules are applied is certainly a scenario where both 
countries (A and B) suffer tax losses (or have tax loss carry forwards available) and 
are therefore unable to credit any income tax. In such a scenario, the amount of tax 
losses which could be utilised in subsequent years would be decreased by the 
attributed CFC income in both countries.  
 
Figure 16:  
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 Euro    
     but overall tax base     
     negative = no tax credit     
            
            
            
     CFC income 100 Euro 
     but overall tax base     
     negative = no tax credit     
            
            
            
     income 100 Euro x 10%    
     = 10 Euro       
            
            
  
Without the possibility of a tax credit in countries A and B the amount of double 
taxation - and therefore the overall tax burden - would rise dramatically. In a “worst-
case scenario,” the tax losses in both countries A and B are reduced by 100 Euro. 
This might be the case when the income tax imposed in state C is not deducted from 
the income attributed to company A and company B. This would have a negative 
effect of 30 Euro and 35 Euro, respectively, of non-discounted future income tax. The 
overall disadvantage would amount to 75 Euro300 Taking into account an additional 
tier, i.e. an additional CFC legislation involved, the overall disadvantage could easily 
exceed the attributed CFC income. It is quite obvious - in my opinion - that such an 
immense double taxation of income cannot be acceptable. However, even if the 
amount of income attribution is limited to 90 Euro in country A and country B (100 
Euro minus 10 Euro income tax in country C), it will not significantly reduce the 
amount of double taxation. Effectively, it would result in an overall tax burden of 
68.50 Euro.301 As already described earlier, the problem of tax losses and CFC 
legislation could - at least partly - be solved by a system which provides for a carry 
forward of the creditable income tax. However, there is no CFC regime, according to 
my knowledge, which provides for a relief from double taxation in country A which is 
caused by the reduction of the tax losses in the intermediate country (country B).  
 
                                            
300 10 Euro (country C) + 35 Euro (country B – non-discounted) + 30 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 75 
Euro.  
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The result is also interesting from another perspective: the respective CFC regime 
leads in most cases to a kind of “positive fiscal consolidation.” That means the 
positive CFC income is attributed to the resident shareholder with the effect of a 
reduction of the negative domestic tax base. In turn, there is typically no “negative 
fiscal consolidation,” i.e. the negative CFC income will not be taken into account 
directly for the determination of the domestic tax base. In such a multiple tier 
structure each consolidation will be made separately - always between the individual 
CFC regime and the (directly or indirectly held) CFC. The “positive fiscal 
consolidation” can be added together with the number of “CFC pairs” (CFC regime 
and CFC income) and can therefore lead to a considerable disadvantage within one 
single group of companies.  
 
It was mentioned earlier that only very few countries provide for an appropriate relief 
from double taxation caused by an additional application of CFC rules in another 
country.302 It seems that only Finland and Germany credit the income taxes imposed 
on the intermediate level. However, since these countries provide for a relief through 
a “regular” ordinary tax credit system, it is obvious that relief from double taxation of 
CFC income cannot be achieved in cases where a domestic tax loss is involved, 
either in the country of the parent company (country A) or the lower tier subsidiary 
company (country B), or in both countries at the same time (countries A and B). At 
least, this is true if one follows the approach that the reduction of a domestic tax loss 
carry forward can lead to a double taxation of income. In my opinion, one has always 
to take into account that the domestic tax losses can be carried forward and can in 
theory lead to a reduction of positive taxable income in subsequent years.303 Any 
attribution of CFC income limits the possibility of a future offsetting of income or 
makes it even completely impossible. In my opinion, the concept of CFC taxation 
should take such “loss scenarios” into account and should provide for a more flexible 
relief from double taxation of income. Otherwise, the concept of CFC taxation goes 
much too far and can lead to a massive “over-taxation.” However, the question of 
possible alternatives will be discussed later on in more detail.  
 
c.) CFC tax credit and negative income in the country of the CFC 
 
The situation where the CFC itself suffers tax losses is not free from the risk of 
double taxation. The main problem here is - in my opinion - the tax loss carry forward 
limitation in the countries which apply the CFC taxation and in the CFC country itself. 
For example, if the countries A and B apply their domestic tax loss carry forward 
limitations on the negative CFC income of company C, this can result in a maximum 
of three different time limits on the same amount of negative income. The negative 
CFC income might be offset against positive CFC income in subsequent years 
according to the legislation of one country but not according to the legislation of the 
other(s) - due to the existing time limit. This is not a specific multiple tier problem, but 
the multiple application of CFC rules increases again the likelihood of a double 
taxation of CFC income. Similar to the aforementioned situations, the offsetting of 
                                            
302 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. 
303 Of course, sometimes the possibility of a tax loss carry forward is limited in time and a tax loss utilisation can 
be impossible. However, this does not change the reasoning. The question whether the tax loss can actually be 
used can only be answered at a later point in time - this can be many years after the CFC income attribution. 
Furthermore, it has to be added that some of the counties which apply a CFC taxation provide for a limited tax 
loss carry back. 
    
                                                                                         
 
domestic tax loss(es) will be reduced. The maximum disadvantage in a situation 
where two different CFC rules are applied is certainly a scenario where both 
countries (A and B) suffer tax losses (or have tax loss carry forwards available) and 
are therefore unable to credit any income tax. In such a scenario, the amount of tax 
losses which could be utilised in subsequent years would be decreased by the 
attributed CFC income in both countries.  
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Without the possibility of a tax credit in countries A and B the amount of double 
taxation - and therefore the overall tax burden - would rise dramatically. In a “worst-
case scenario,” the tax losses in both countries A and B are reduced by 100 Euro. 
This might be the case when the income tax imposed in state C is not deducted from 
the income attributed to company A and company B. This would have a negative 
effect of 30 Euro and 35 Euro, respectively, of non-discounted future income tax. The 
overall disadvantage would amount to 75 Euro300 Taking into account an additional 
tier, i.e. an additional CFC legislation involved, the overall disadvantage could easily 
exceed the attributed CFC income. It is quite obvious - in my opinion - that such an 
immense double taxation of income cannot be acceptable. However, even if the 
amount of income attribution is limited to 90 Euro in country A and country B (100 
Euro minus 10 Euro income tax in country C), it will not significantly reduce the 
amount of double taxation. Effectively, it would result in an overall tax burden of 
68.50 Euro.301 As already described earlier, the problem of tax losses and CFC 
legislation could - at least partly - be solved by a system which provides for a carry 
forward of the creditable income tax. However, there is no CFC regime, according to 
my knowledge, which provides for a relief from double taxation in country A which is 
caused by the reduction of the tax losses in the intermediate country (country B).  
 
                                            
300 10 Euro (country C) + 35 Euro (country B – non-discounted) + 30 Euro (country A – non-discounted) = 75 
Euro.  
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     other anti-avoidance measures / 
     credit method instead of exemption method 
     for dividends paid by the CFC 
     income tax rate: 35% 
 
 
     taxable (passive) income in year 01: 100 Euro 
     income tax 10% = 10 Euro 
     the profit of the year 01 is distributed in the year 05 
     dividend payment in the year 05: 90 Euro 
 
 
Depending on the CFC rules of country A, the CFC income will be taxed on a current 
basis, i.e. most often immediately after the end of the financial year of the CFC. 
Under the assumption that the income determination rules are identical, the 
attributable income would be 100 Euro. The  income tax levied in country A would be 
20 Euro - after the crediting of the income tax imposed on the income of company 
C.308 The overall tax burden in countries A and C is therefore 30 Euro. 
 
If country B applies the credit method instead of the exemption method for the 
avoidance of double taxation caused by the dividend payment of company C in year 
05, an additional income tax is levied in country B. In case the underlying income tax 
of country C can be credited, the tax base would be grossed up and another 25 Euro 
would have to be paid on the original income of 100 Euro.309 Up to that point, the 
total income of 100 Euro in country C has caused a taxation of 55 Euro.310 The 
problem lies in the fact that the additional 25 Euro income tax was not taken into 
account in country A. Both countries A and B usually only provide for a relief from 
double taxation with respect to the taxation in country C. Essentially, this is true for all 
of the Member States which apply a CFC regime and for those which follow a credit 
system (no matter whether it is based on a general credit system or a special 
regime). Even Finland and Germany - which consider, in principle, the tax burden 
imposed on the intermediate level in the context of an additional CFC regime - do not 
provide for a relief in this particular case. 
 
The subsequent profit distribution from company B to company A will not cause any 
additional income tax burden if the relief provisions for subsequent dividends are 
equally applicable to the indirect dividend distribution (and not only to the direct 
dividend payment of the CFC to the resident shareholder). However, the final 
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positive income with negative income does not trigger any income taxation in the 
respective year but reduces the tax loss carry forward - for example - in countries A 
and C. However, if the tax loss carry forward has already expired in country B, the 
attributed income will be taxed in country B with 35 percent - without any possibility of 
a tax credit (because there is no income tax imposed (yet) in country C which could 
be credited). This can result in a situation where the tax loss carry forwards existing 
in countries A and C are actually irrelevant, since the overall tax burden is 35 percent 
- with or without a tax loss carry forward in countries A and C.304 The more countries 
are involved, the higher the probability that there are countries involved with a tax 
loss carry forward limitation. The country with the shortest tax loss carry forward 
period therefore influences the overall taxation of the international group. Thus, there 
is an increased likelihood that the positive CFC income is taxed before the existent 
tax loss carry forwards are actually utilised. Among the European Member States 
with CFC regimes there are still countries which have a (general) tax loss carry 
forward limitation, e.g. like in Spain (15 years), Italy (5 years) and Portugal (5 years). 
Sometimes, however, the possibility to carry forward negative CFC income for a 
future offsetting with positive CFC income is even more restricted than the regular 
(domestic) tax loss carry forward. In Finland, for example, the general tax loss carry 
forward period is 10 years. The possibility to carry forward negative CFC income, 
however, is limited to five years.305 In Estonia, the carry forward is limited to seven 
years.306 In Portugal, for example, a carry forward of negative CFC income is not 
allowed.307 Hence, there are a number of possibilities in a multiple tier structure which 
might finally result in a double taxation of income.  
             
d.) Double taxation caused by the application of CFC rules and the credit method on 
dividend payments  
 
It was outlined above that the parallel application of CFC rules and other anti-
avoidance measures, as well as the general application of the credit method instead 
of the exemption method on dividend payments can also lead to a double taxation of 
income. This is due to the fact that the CFC rules tax the income on a current basis 
whereas the credit system on dividends is only applied as soon as the CFC income is 
actually distributed. The fact that both measures are applicable to the same 
underlying income but not at the same time (as in case of a multiple application of 
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approach can be seen as a kind of “exemption based on an acceptable distribution 
policy on a lower tier.” 
 
e.) The application of CFC taxation to permanent establishments and partnerships  
 
Depending on the situation, the different classification of a foreign entity - as a 
separate taxable entity in one country and as a transparent entity in the other country 
- can cause a double taxation of income. The same is true if the CFC taxation of one 
country is not limited to separate legal entities but also encompasses tax transparent 
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In this example, country A applies its CFC taxation on the income of the partnership / 
permanent establishment (PS/PE) of company B in country C - either because of the 
fact that the PS is considered to be non-transparent or because of the fact that the 
CFC legislation of country A is also applicable to transparent partnerships and 
permanent establishments. 
 
In principle, classification conflicts are a common problem of international taxation 
and may also arise in the interrelation of Member States in a multiple tier structure. 
For example, under the German or Finnish approach, general and limited 
partnerships are considered to be transparent entities and the taxes which are 
imposed on the income arise as a liability of the partners.314 In contrast thereto, the 
Spanish approach classifies general and limited partnerships to be non-transparent 
for tax purposes and the taxes which are imposed on the income arise as a liability of 
the company itself.315 Hence, if - from a Spanish perspective (country A) - the PS in 
                                            
314 OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships,  Annex III: List of Entities in 
Selected Countries (Germany, Finland), 1999. 
315 OECD, The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships,  Annex III: List of Entities in 





PS / PE 
Country C 
    
                                                                                         
 
distribution to individual shareholders in country A will normally trigger additional 
income taxes. As a result, it can be concluded that the successive application of CFC 
taxation (country A) and the credit method on dividend payments (country B) can 
create a double taxation of income. Here, the main problem lies in the fact that the 
measures are applied on different levels by different countries and the relief 
provisions focus on a respective tax year. Country A should in theory provide for a - 
retroactive - tax credit of the additional income tax imposed in country B (in the 
context of the CFC taxation of country A) in order to avoid the over-taxation of the 
underlying income.311 An ordinary tax credit system which solely focuses on the 
respective tax year cannot fulfil this requirement.  
 
Theoretically, country A could be any European Member State with a CFC legislation 
since all of the jurisdictions apply their regimes to indirect shareholdings.312 Country 
B could be, for example, the United Kingdom - as a regime which, in general, applies 
a credit system - if the requirements for application of the United Kingdom CFC 
regime are not fulfilled (e.g. because of one of the various exemptions). However, the 
intermediate country B could also be, for example, Austria or Belgium, because the 
latter two countries follow a concept which switches from the exemption method to 
the credit method for dividend income under certain circumstances. Hence, there is a 
variety of possible constellations which might result in a double taxation - mainly 
because of the parallel application of the credit method and the fact that the countries 
which apply the CFC rules do not (appropriately) take into account the timing 
difference and the additional taxation on the intermediate level. 
 
In this regard, it is interesting to have a look at the position taken by the Italian tax 
authorities in 2007: an Italian company controlled a CFC in Cyprus through a 100% 
(intermediate) US company. Theoretically, the activities carried out by the CFC in 
Cyprus fulfilled the requirements for the application of the Italian CFC regime. The 
income of the CFC in Cyprus was subject to an income taxation of 10 percent. 
However, it was clear that any distribution made by the CFC to the intermediate US 
company would be subject to taxation in the US at a rate of 35 percent. In this 
situation, the Italian tax authorities granted the exemption from Italian CFC legislation 
on the income arising in Cyprus on the condition that, every year, the CFC company 
would distribute the profit realised to the US intermediate company, so that the 
effective tax burden applied in Cyprus and the US would be at least equal to the 
Italian tax rate. Finally, the Italian tax authorities asked the Italian parent company to 
provide, on a yearly basis, adequate documentation which proves the dividend 
payment and the increased taxation in the US.313  
 
Clearly, the position of the Italian tax authorities avoids the double taxation of income 
which would be caused by the application of the Italian CFC regime and it is 
therefore, without any doubt, a positive approach. Nonetheless, one has to keep in 
mind that it is a case-by-case decision of the tax authorities and not a clear and 
predetermined procedure which is stipulated in the legislation. In essence, the 
                                            
311 As already outlined earlier, I think it is more realistic that the higher tier company (parent company) takes 
into account the taxation on a lower tier (subsidiary company). In theory, country B could also refrain from 
taxing the profit distribution according to the - for example - domestic anti-avoidance measures which switch 
from the exemption method to the credit method if the CFC income has already been taxed in country A (based 
on the CFC legislation of country A).  
312 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, page 43. 
313 See in this respect Ernst & Young, EU Tax News May / June 2007, pages 8 and 9.  
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A variety of problems can come up where a CFC (or a company which is considered 
to be a CFC in one country but not in the other) has a PS/PE in a third country.317 
The overall result depends upon whether only the CFC is taken into account, only the 
PS/PE, or both. The different approaches and thresholds among the countries 
combined with the fact that there is no common way in dealing with transparent 
entities and permanent establishments can lead to a totally different outcome. The 
main problem is certainly the difference in income attribution and the treatment of the 
subsequent dividend payments. Again, this can lead to an insufficient crediting of 
taxes and therefore a double taxation of income.  
        
f.) Double taxation caused by the determination of income pursuant to domestic rules  
 
The different income determination rules can have the effect that the attributable CFC 
income is not identical in the countries which apply a CFC regime. Often, it is just a 
timing difference which can be due to different depreciation periods or due to the fact 
that one CFC regime requires the determination of income on a strict periodic 
approach and others allow - or require - the taxation based on the inflow and outflow 
of income and expenses. Many countries deviate from national accounting principles 
for the determination of the tax base, e.g. by allowing only pre-determined 
adjustments of receivables (e.g. in Portugal) or by non-accepting certain provisions 
for tax purposes (e.g. in Italy, in Scandinavian countries). Others are rather close to 
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country C is classified to be a non-transparent entity (established in country C) which 
is subject to Spanish CFC taxation, there might be a conflict with - for example - the 
German perspective (country B). The reason is that Germany would tax the income 
derived through the transparent entity pursuant to the credit method instead of the 
exemption method if it is related to certain passive activities (but not according to its 
CFC legislation)316 or if an activity clause is stipulated in the respective tax treaty with 
country C. In order to achieve an appropriate relief from double taxation, Spain 
(country A) would be required to provide for a tax credit of the taxes imposed in 
Germany (country B) on the attributed income. However, based on the earlier 
verifications, it seems that there is no general mechanism for such a relief in Spain.  
 
In addition, it might be the case that the CFC regime of country A also encompasses 
transparent entities. This is the case, for example, in Italy. Thus, if Italy (country A) 
applies its CFC taxation to the income derived through the transparent partnership or 
the permanent establishment in country C, it might - again - result in a conflict with 
the German approach on the intermediate level. In other words, if the Italian system 
does not appropriately consider the German tax imposed on that income - and I do 
not see that this is the case (see above) - it will lead to a double taxation of income.  
 
Overall, it can be summarised that the problem here lies in the fact that country A 
only credits the amount of taxes paid in country C and does not take into account the 
additional tax burden in country B. The same is true for country B: the tax credit is 
limited to the taxes paid in country C and the CFC taxation on a higher group level 
does not play any role for the tax determination. A double taxation can only be 
avoided - in my opinion - if country A takes into consideration the taxation in countries 
B and C. This should be done in the same way as described for the simultaneous 
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38.50 Euro but company B has a lower tax base and therefore pays less taxes than 
company A – even though the tax rate as such is higher. That means, even a simple 
shifting of income from one year to another which is based on different income 
calculation rules has the effect of a higher overall tax burden.  
 
g.) Double taxation caused by the disposal of shares  
 
The disposal of shares in a CFC can theoretically be taxable based on the general 
rules related to capital gains on the sale of shares or pursuant to the respective CFC 
legislation itself. The disposal of shares on a corporate level is typically taxable in 
“credit countries” like, for example, the United Kingdom. In other countries, the 
exemption may be linked, in principle, to a minimum holding period or a minimum 
percentage of shareholding (e.g. in Denmark). Hence, if the requirements for an 
exemption are not fulfilled, the disposal of shares will be taxable. Individual 
shareholders are often taxed on their income realised from the disposal of shares in a 
great number of Member States.322 However, the income taxation may be dependent 
on the degree of shareholding, i.e. whether a substantial shareholding exists or not 
(and therefore whether a certain threshold is exceeded or not) and / or may be 
dependent on the holding period, i.e. whether the shares are sold within a certain 
period of time after acquisition.323 A transfer of shares can basically lead to a double 
taxation of income if the taxable gain contains income elements which are at a later 
point in time subject to CFC taxation in the hands of the purchaser. Even though the 
risk of double taxation exists in both cases, the direct and the indirect disposal of 
shares in a CFC, the complexity in a multiple tier structure increases the likelihood of 
a double taxation.  
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The problem can be illustrated by a simplified example: it is assumed that the only 
asset held by company C (CFC) is a zero coupon bond.324 The bond was issued in 
year 01 and acquired by company C at a price of 100 Euro. The bond will be repaid 
in year 10 for 200 Euro. The shares in company C will be sold to company D in year 
05. The accumulated interest amounts to 40 Euro. However, due to a decrease in the 
overall financial market interest rates, the fair market value of the bond is 150 Euro. 
                                            
322 See for a country overview: PricewaterhouseCoopers, Individual Taxes 2002-2003, Worldwide Summaries. 
323 This was the case, for example, in Germany (up to December 31, 2008). 
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the national accounting standards and provisions are, at least in principle, also 
accepted for tax purposes (e.g. in Germany). It may be the case that there is even a 
possibility to determine the income completely on the basis of inflow and outflow of 
income and expenses. In Germany, for example, it is accepted to apply the latter 
method for the determination of CFC income.318 In other cases, the domestic 
legislation might include measures which are completely unknown or which are 
completely different in other countries and which can therefore theoretically lead to a 
permanent deviation. For example, the regular depreciation of certain intangible 
assets may be allowed in one country, but may be disallowed in another. Apparently, 
the permanent differences may create a substantial risk of double taxation. However, 
even the timing differences can have an overall negative impact under a strict 




     Year 01   Year 02   
 
     CFC income 110 x 30% CFC income 150 x 30%
     = 33 ./. 33 tax credit = 45 ./. 38.50 tax credit
     = 0 Euro   = 6,5 Euro   
            
            
            
     CFC income 150 x 35% CFC income 110 x 35%
     = 52.50 ./. 10 tax credit = 38.50 ./. 10 tax credit
     = 42.50 Euro   = 28.50 Euro  
            
            
            
     income 100    income 100  
     x 10% tax   x 10% tax  
     = 10 Euro   = 10 Euro   
            
    
          
The tax base of both countries A and B is 260 Euro319 over a period of two years. 
However, the allocation deviates from a timing perspective due to the different 
income determination rules. This has the effect that the income is not identical in year 
01 and year 02 – but only the total amount of income over the period of two years. If 
the credit system only focuses on the respective year of income allocation instead of 
the period of two years, company A will not be in a position to credit the appropriate 
amount of income tax against its own tax burden. In theory, and taking into account 
an equal and simultaneous income allocation in both countries, company A could 
credit an overall amount of 78 Euro320 and an exceeding amount of 13 Euro321 cannot 
be utilised. In the example, company A is only in a position to credit an amount of 33 
Euro in year 01 and an amount of 38.50 Euro in year 02, i.e. a total amount of 71.50 
Euro. In year 02, company A would be in a position to credit much more than the 
                                            
318 Paragraph 10.3.4. of the administrative circular.  
319 150 Euro + 110 Euro = 260 Euro.  
320 260 Euro x 30 percent = 78 Euro.  
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38.50 Euro but company B has a lower tax base and therefore pays less taxes than 
company A – even though the tax rate as such is higher. That means, even a simple 
shifting of income from one year to another which is based on different income 
calculation rules has the effect of a higher overall tax burden.  
 
g.) Double taxation caused by the disposal of shares  
 
The disposal of shares in a CFC can theoretically be taxable based on the general 
rules related to capital gains on the sale of shares or pursuant to the respective CFC 
legislation itself. The disposal of shares on a corporate level is typically taxable in 
“credit countries” like, for example, the United Kingdom. In other countries, the 
exemption may be linked, in principle, to a minimum holding period or a minimum 
percentage of shareholding (e.g. in Denmark). Hence, if the requirements for an 
exemption are not fulfilled, the disposal of shares will be taxable. Individual 
shareholders are often taxed on their income realised from the disposal of shares in a 
great number of Member States.322 However, the income taxation may be dependent 
on the degree of shareholding, i.e. whether a substantial shareholding exists or not 
(and therefore whether a certain threshold is exceeded or not) and / or may be 
dependent on the holding period, i.e. whether the shares are sold within a certain 
period of time after acquisition.323 A transfer of shares can basically lead to a double 
taxation of income if the taxable gain contains income elements which are at a later 
point in time subject to CFC taxation in the hands of the purchaser. Even though the 
risk of double taxation exists in both cases, the direct and the indirect disposal of 
shares in a CFC, the complexity in a multiple tier structure increases the likelihood of 
a double taxation.  
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the national accounting standards and provisions are, at least in principle, also 
accepted for tax purposes (e.g. in Germany). It may be the case that there is even a 
possibility to determine the income completely on the basis of inflow and outflow of 
income and expenses. In Germany, for example, it is accepted to apply the latter 
method for the determination of CFC income.318 In other cases, the domestic 
legislation might include measures which are completely unknown or which are 
completely different in other countries and which can therefore theoretically lead to a 
permanent deviation. For example, the regular depreciation of certain intangible 
assets may be allowed in one country, but may be disallowed in another. Apparently, 
the permanent differences may create a substantial risk of double taxation. However, 
even the timing differences can have an overall negative impact under a strict 
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The tax base of both countries A and B is 260 Euro319 over a period of two years. 
However, the allocation deviates from a timing perspective due to the different 
income determination rules. This has the effect that the income is not identical in year 
01 and year 02 – but only the total amount of income over the period of two years. If 
the credit system only focuses on the respective year of income allocation instead of 
the period of two years, company A will not be in a position to credit the appropriate 
amount of income tax against its own tax burden. In theory, and taking into account 
an equal and simultaneous income allocation in both countries, company A could 
credit an overall amount of 78 Euro320 and an exceeding amount of 13 Euro321 cannot 
be utilised. In the example, company A is only in a position to credit an amount of 33 
Euro in year 01 and an amount of 38.50 Euro in year 02, i.e. a total amount of 71.50 
Euro. In year 02, company A would be in a position to credit much more than the 
                                            
318 Paragraph 10.3.4. of the administrative circular.  
319 150 Euro + 110 Euro = 260 Euro.  
320 260 Euro x 30 percent = 78 Euro.  
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If the CFC income is to be calculated in country D based on the inflow of income and 
the outflow of expenses, the total amount of interest income will be derived in year 10 
(100 Euro). It may be the case that company D is not completely free in its decision 
for the system of CFC income determination. This can be the case, for example, in 
Germany: if the German company D is not the only (German) shareholder in 
company C (as an alternative to the 100 percent shareholding), the German 
shareholders which are subject to CFC taxation are required to apply the same 
system of income determination, i.e. either a determination on an “as earned” basis 
or a determination on a periodic basis.329 Furthermore, if company C derives - in 
addition to the interest income - other types of tainted income, the income 
determination in country D (Germany) must be made according to one system for all 
types of tainted income.330 In any event, country D should provide for an income 
adjustment in order to avoid the double taxation of income which has already been 
taxed in country A. Moreover, an additional risk of double taxation exists if country C 
requires the income to be calculated pursuant to a strict periodic approach and the 
income taxes paid by country C cannot be credited against the CFC income derived 
by company D in year 10. However, I do not see that the Member States which apply 
CFC rules are prepared to appropriately consider the specific situation in the other 
country - at least not in a systematic manner. As already outlined earlier, mutual 
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In an alternative multiple tier scenario where the shares in the CFC are sold indirectly 
through the transfer of the shares in company B the general conclusion should be the 
same: A partial double taxation can only be avoided if the taxation of hidden reserves 
                                                                                                                                         
not due to income calculation rules, the crediting of income tax related to the difference of 10 Euro is not self-
evident.  
329 See paragraph 10.3.1.1. of the administrative circular. If there is no agreement, the periodic income 
determination will be applied. 
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Therefore, the sales price for the shares in company C is 150 Euro since it is totally 
dependent on the market price of the bond.325  
    
If the CFC taxation of country A is based on a strict periodic income determination 
approach, the interest income will be calculated on a yearly basis, i.e. the interest 
income of 40 Euro is included in the tax base of shareholder A in the years 01-05. 
This is often not true with respect to the increase in value of the bond itself, i.e. the 
value which is related to the change of the market interest rates. The hidden reserves 
included in the bond will either be taxable as soon as the bond is sold by the CFC or 
will disappear over time if the bond is held until maturity. Therefore, if the shares in 
the CFC are sold (instead of the bond), an additional value is disclosed which was 
not subject to CFC taxation in country A up to that point in time. The value itself is 
clearly allocable to the bond and thus related to a passive activity of the CFC. The 
taxation of the hidden reserves of 10 Euro under the general capital gains taxation or 
the CFC regime of country A therefore seems to be consistent.  
 
In contrast, if the CFC taxation of country A follows an approach which calculates the 
attributable CFC income on the basis of the inflow of income and the outflow of 
expenses, interest income would not be included in the CFC taxation of the years 01-
05. In this case, the complete difference of 50 Euro should be subject to CFC 
taxation in year 05 and not only the hidden reserves of 10 Euro. Otherwise, the CFC 
taxation in country A would be circumvented completely.  
 
However, the question arises whether the legislation of country D is compatible with 
the legislation in country A. This would only be the case if country D started to 
calculate the interest income for the years 05-10 on the basis of the increased value 
of the bond. That means, the overall CFC income attributable to the shareholder in 
country D for the years 05-10 should be 50 Euro and not 60 Euro. To make it very 
clear: this would only be based on the sales price of the shares. The balance sheet of 
the CFC by no means reflects that aspect.326 The treatment of the interest income on 
the level of the CFC is totally unconnected to the disposal of the shares and is of no 
influence on this particular question of double taxation in countries A and D. Thus, a 
partial double taxation will only be avoided if country D provides for a reduced income 
allocation. However, in this case a yearly difference in the interest income remains 
which is not due to the different income calculation rules but which is only related to 
the disposal of the shares and the shifting of hidden reserves.327 This, of course, 
creates a separate risk of double taxation: the overall interest income for the 
remaining years until maturity will be 60 Euro in country C and 50 Euro in country D. 
The higher tax base in country C could lead to the outcome that the effective taxation 
is higher than in country D and not all of the income tax can be credited against the 
income tax levied in country D. However, the result depends on the tax rate 
difference between both countries. Given the fact that country C is a low-tax country, 
it can be assumed that - at least in the example - the tax base difference can be 
compensated by the difference in the tax rate.328 The outcome can be different in a 
multiple tier structure (see the example below). 
                                            
325 For reasons of simplification, leaving aside other possible aspects which can influence the value of the shares 
(e.g. the tax burden in state C). 
326 This would only be included in a balance sheet prepared for CFC tax purposes.  
327 The income calculated by country C is - in total - 10 Euro higher (year 05-10).  
328 However, this is only true if country D allows an ordinary credit for the income tax paid in country C on the 
complete income of 60 Euro - even though only 50 Euro are subject to tax in country D. Since the difference is 
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If the CFC income is to be calculated in country D based on the inflow of income and 
the outflow of expenses, the total amount of interest income will be derived in year 10 
(100 Euro). It may be the case that company D is not completely free in its decision 
for the system of CFC income determination. This can be the case, for example, in 
Germany: if the German company D is not the only (German) shareholder in 
company C (as an alternative to the 100 percent shareholding), the German 
shareholders which are subject to CFC taxation are required to apply the same 
system of income determination, i.e. either a determination on an “as earned” basis 
or a determination on a periodic basis.329 Furthermore, if company C derives - in 
addition to the interest income - other types of tainted income, the income 
determination in country D (Germany) must be made according to one system for all 
types of tainted income.330 In any event, country D should provide for an income 
adjustment in order to avoid the double taxation of income which has already been 
taxed in country A. Moreover, an additional risk of double taxation exists if country C 
requires the income to be calculated pursuant to a strict periodic approach and the 
income taxes paid by country C cannot be credited against the CFC income derived 
by company D in year 10. However, I do not see that the Member States which apply 
CFC rules are prepared to appropriately consider the specific situation in the other 
country - at least not in a systematic manner. As already outlined earlier, mutual 
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In an alternative multiple tier scenario where the shares in the CFC are sold indirectly 
through the transfer of the shares in company B the general conclusion should be the 
same: A partial double taxation can only be avoided if the taxation of hidden reserves 
                                                                                                                                         
not due to income calculation rules, the crediting of income tax related to the difference of 10 Euro is not self-
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329 See paragraph 10.3.1.1. of the administrative circular. If there is no agreement, the periodic income 
determination will be applied. 
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Therefore, the sales price for the shares in company C is 150 Euro since it is totally 
dependent on the market price of the bond.325  
    
If the CFC taxation of country A is based on a strict periodic income determination 
approach, the interest income will be calculated on a yearly basis, i.e. the interest 
income of 40 Euro is included in the tax base of shareholder A in the years 01-05. 
This is often not true with respect to the increase in value of the bond itself, i.e. the 
value which is related to the change of the market interest rates. The hidden reserves 
included in the bond will either be taxable as soon as the bond is sold by the CFC or 
will disappear over time if the bond is held until maturity. Therefore, if the shares in 
the CFC are sold (instead of the bond), an additional value is disclosed which was 
not subject to CFC taxation in country A up to that point in time. The value itself is 
clearly allocable to the bond and thus related to a passive activity of the CFC. The 
taxation of the hidden reserves of 10 Euro under the general capital gains taxation or 
the CFC regime of country A therefore seems to be consistent.  
 
In contrast, if the CFC taxation of country A follows an approach which calculates the 
attributable CFC income on the basis of the inflow of income and the outflow of 
expenses, interest income would not be included in the CFC taxation of the years 01-
05. In this case, the complete difference of 50 Euro should be subject to CFC 
taxation in year 05 and not only the hidden reserves of 10 Euro. Otherwise, the CFC 
taxation in country A would be circumvented completely.  
 
However, the question arises whether the legislation of country D is compatible with 
the legislation in country A. This would only be the case if country D started to 
calculate the interest income for the years 05-10 on the basis of the increased value 
of the bond. That means, the overall CFC income attributable to the shareholder in 
country D for the years 05-10 should be 50 Euro and not 60 Euro. To make it very 
clear: this would only be based on the sales price of the shares. The balance sheet of 
the CFC by no means reflects that aspect.326 The treatment of the interest income on 
the level of the CFC is totally unconnected to the disposal of the shares and is of no 
influence on this particular question of double taxation in countries A and D. Thus, a 
partial double taxation will only be avoided if country D provides for a reduced income 
allocation. However, in this case a yearly difference in the interest income remains 
which is not due to the different income calculation rules but which is only related to 
the disposal of the shares and the shifting of hidden reserves.327 This, of course, 
creates a separate risk of double taxation: the overall interest income for the 
remaining years until maturity will be 60 Euro in country C and 50 Euro in country D. 
The higher tax base in country C could lead to the outcome that the effective taxation 
is higher than in country D and not all of the income tax can be credited against the 
income tax levied in country D. However, the result depends on the tax rate 
difference between both countries. Given the fact that country C is a low-tax country, 
it can be assumed that - at least in the example - the tax base difference can be 
compensated by the difference in the tax rate.328 The outcome can be different in a 
multiple tier structure (see the example below). 
                                            
325 For reasons of simplification, leaving aside other possible aspects which can influence the value of the shares 
(e.g. the tax burden in state C). 
326 This would only be included in a balance sheet prepared for CFC tax purposes.  
327 The income calculated by country C is - in total - 10 Euro higher (year 05-10).  
328 However, this is only true if country D allows an ordinary credit for the income tax paid in country C on the 
complete income of 60 Euro - even though only 50 Euro are subject to tax in country D. Since the difference is 
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tier structure or a multiple tier structure). This, of course, depends very much on the 
concrete concept - which will be outlined in chapter 9.  
 
6.10.4. Conclusions Regarding Multiple Tier Structures and CFC Rules  
 
The examples show that one of the most crucial aspects in case of CFC taxation in a 
multiple tier structure is the availability of an appropriate - CFC specific - tax credit. I 
consider an appropriate tax credit system to be a system which takes into account 
the peculiarities of CFC taxation - such as the current attribution of income - and 
therefore the creation of a “time lack” with respect to the determination of the 
complete and final tax burden imposed on the income. Without such a CFC specific 
tax credit there is an increased likelihood of a double taxation of income. Another 
important aspect is the fact that the CFC rules typically apply their domestic income 
calculation rules. This can lead to problems in case of a multiple application of CFC 
rules on the same CFC income, and in similar situations where the domestic tax rules 
play a role, e.g. where the shares in the CFC are directly or indirectly transferred to 
another shareholder. The CFC specific aspects can be summarised as follows: 
 
- As a minimum requirement, the tax credit system of a country which applies a 
CFC taxation should give systematic relief from double taxation caused by the 
(additional) application of lower tier CFC rules. Thus, the higher tier CFC 
taxation should in general provide for an ordinary tax credit in a situation 
where the CFC income has already been taxed pursuant to another country’s 
CFC regime on a lower group level.332 Obviously, this is not self-evident since 
only very few countries provide for such a relief from double taxation of CFC 
income. In fact, only Finland and Germany treat the intermediate tax burden in 
the same way as the tax burden of the CFC itself, i.e. the additional income 
tax imposed by the lower tier CFC taxation is considered an imposition of 
taxes on the income of the CFC and can therefore be credited against the 
Finnish and German taxes imposed on the same amount of income.333   
 
- The different CFC approaches can lead to income allocations which are 
partially overlapping but which are not identical. In such a case, a double 
taxation can only be avoided if the higher tier CFC taxation takes into account 
the lower tier CFC taxation334 which relates to the overlapping income and the 
taxes paid by the CFC itself on the income. In theory, this requires detailed 
information on the lower tier CFC taxation and the applicable system - 
especially where a transactional approach is involved. As already outlined 
above, only Finland and Germany provide for such a relief if the domestic 
taxpayer is in a position to provide sufficient information on the respective 
income taxation and the taxes imposed in the other countries. 
 
- The multiple application of CFC rules has a particularly negative effect if one 
of the countries (or two or more countries) which applies a CFC taxation 
                                            
332 It should be clear that the CFC regime on the lowest tier should give relief from double taxation caused by the 
taxation of CFC income in the low-tax country (based on what has already been outlined earlier). The 
simultaneous CFC taxation on a higher tier should then provide for a relief from double taxation caused by the 
lower tier CFC taxation (and not from the taxation in the CFC country itself).  
333 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. 
334 The taxes imposed by the lower tier CFC taxation can, of course, already be reduced by the taxes imposed on 
the income in the country of the CFC. 
    
                                                                                         
 
is taken into account for the calculation of the subsequent attributable income in 
country D. However, a possible CFC legislation in country B would most certainly not 
take into account any shareholder changes on a higher level. That means the 
attributable income would not be affected by the taxation of hidden reserves in 
country A and a possible adjustment for CFC purposes in country D. In this case, the 
low-taxation in country C would be transformed into a “regular” taxation in country B. 
The income related to the 10 Euro hidden reserves will be taxed twice: in country A 
and in country B. The fact that country B allows a tax credit for the income tax paid in 
country C only partially reduces the negative effect.331 I do not see that there is a 
single Member State - among those with CFC regimes - which provides for a 
systematic relief in such a scenario. The inter-relation of CFC regimes in combination 
with the transfer of the CFC itself seems to be too complex for existing CFC regimes 
to provide standard solutions.  
 
6.10.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The examination of the application of CFC rules in a multiple tier structure makes one 
thing very obvious: the application of a system which is based on the current taxation 
of income cannot be structured as an “egoistic” anti-avoidance regime which ignores 
comparable systems applied in other countries without, at the same time, increasing 
the risk of double taxation of income. It was shown in previous sections that a 
substantial number of CFC regimes follow an unsystematic and asymmetrical (and 
therefore incomplete) legislative concept. If these regimes are applied simultaneously 
- on different tiers - without “accepting” each other (or at least without the 
“acceptance” on a higher tier), the likelihood of serious double taxation increases. 
The fact that the existing CFC regimes follow very different concepts (e.g. 
transactional approach vs. entity approach, different qualification of passive and base 
company income within the transactional / entity approach, different income 
determination rules,  different low-taxation thresholds) and the fact that the current 
taxation of income is always concentrated on the total amount of (tainted) income - 
without any vertical separation - makes it nearly impossible to follow a neutral 
concept. This is self-evidently not in line with an economic principle which foremost 
focuses on the safeguarding of competitiveness. I think one can even conclude that 
the CFC regimes create a clear obstacle - just due to the fact that the legislative 
concept is incomplete and does not sufficiently take into account comparable 
concepts in other countries - to a competitive environment and an equal international 
level playing field. Moreover, it cannot be acceptable from the perspective of taxpayer 
equity that an investment through a CFC results in substantial disadvantages (or the 
increased risk of substantial disadvantages) which does not exist in case of 
comparable domestic investments or in case the foreign investment is structured 
differently.  
 
It is equally clear, though, that a concept which is based on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component - although it merely focuses on one important income 
element and not all income elements - does not automatically fulfil the necessary 
requirement of a strict avoidance of double taxation (no matter whether it is a single 
                                            
331 For example, if the tax rate is 30% in country A, 35% in country B, and 10% in country C, the result will be 
as follows: the hidden reserves of 10 Euro will be taxed in country A with 3 Euro (without a tax credit - since no 
taxes are levied on that income at that time) and subsequently in country B with 2,5 Euro (3,5 Euro minus a tax 
credit of 1 Euro). The overall tax burden related to that income is therefore 6,5 Euro (65%).  
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tier structure or a multiple tier structure). This, of course, depends very much on the 
concrete concept - which will be outlined in chapter 9.  
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The examples show that one of the most crucial aspects in case of CFC taxation in a 
multiple tier structure is the availability of an appropriate - CFC specific - tax credit. I 
consider an appropriate tax credit system to be a system which takes into account 
the peculiarities of CFC taxation - such as the current attribution of income - and 
therefore the creation of a “time lack” with respect to the determination of the 
complete and final tax burden imposed on the income. Without such a CFC specific 
tax credit there is an increased likelihood of a double taxation of income. Another 
important aspect is the fact that the CFC rules typically apply their domestic income 
calculation rules. This can lead to problems in case of a multiple application of CFC 
rules on the same CFC income, and in similar situations where the domestic tax rules 
play a role, e.g. where the shares in the CFC are directly or indirectly transferred to 
another shareholder. The CFC specific aspects can be summarised as follows: 
 
- As a minimum requirement, the tax credit system of a country which applies a 
CFC taxation should give systematic relief from double taxation caused by the 
(additional) application of lower tier CFC rules. Thus, the higher tier CFC 
taxation should in general provide for an ordinary tax credit in a situation 
where the CFC income has already been taxed pursuant to another country’s 
CFC regime on a lower group level.332 Obviously, this is not self-evident since 
only very few countries provide for such a relief from double taxation of CFC 
income. In fact, only Finland and Germany treat the intermediate tax burden in 
the same way as the tax burden of the CFC itself, i.e. the additional income 
tax imposed by the lower tier CFC taxation is considered an imposition of 
taxes on the income of the CFC and can therefore be credited against the 
Finnish and German taxes imposed on the same amount of income.333   
 
- The different CFC approaches can lead to income allocations which are 
partially overlapping but which are not identical. In such a case, a double 
taxation can only be avoided if the higher tier CFC taxation takes into account 
the lower tier CFC taxation334 which relates to the overlapping income and the 
taxes paid by the CFC itself on the income. In theory, this requires detailed 
information on the lower tier CFC taxation and the applicable system - 
especially where a transactional approach is involved. As already outlined 
above, only Finland and Germany provide for such a relief if the domestic 
taxpayer is in a position to provide sufficient information on the respective 
income taxation and the taxes imposed in the other countries. 
 
- The multiple application of CFC rules has a particularly negative effect if one 
of the countries (or two or more countries) which applies a CFC taxation 
                                            
332 It should be clear that the CFC regime on the lowest tier should give relief from double taxation caused by the 
taxation of CFC income in the low-tax country (based on what has already been outlined earlier). The 
simultaneous CFC taxation on a higher tier should then provide for a relief from double taxation caused by the 
lower tier CFC taxation (and not from the taxation in the CFC country itself).  
333 See Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: 
Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, pages 66, 67. 
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is taken into account for the calculation of the subsequent attributable income in 
country D. However, a possible CFC legislation in country B would most certainly not 
take into account any shareholder changes on a higher level. That means the 
attributable income would not be affected by the taxation of hidden reserves in 
country A and a possible adjustment for CFC purposes in country D. In this case, the 
low-taxation in country C would be transformed into a “regular” taxation in country B. 
The income related to the 10 Euro hidden reserves will be taxed twice: in country A 
and in country B. The fact that country B allows a tax credit for the income tax paid in 
country C only partially reduces the negative effect.331 I do not see that there is a 
single Member State - among those with CFC regimes - which provides for a 
systematic relief in such a scenario. The inter-relation of CFC regimes in combination 
with the transfer of the CFC itself seems to be too complex for existing CFC regimes 
to provide standard solutions.  
 
6.10.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The examination of the application of CFC rules in a multiple tier structure makes one 
thing very obvious: the application of a system which is based on the current taxation 
of income cannot be structured as an “egoistic” anti-avoidance regime which ignores 
comparable systems applied in other countries without, at the same time, increasing 
the risk of double taxation of income. It was shown in previous sections that a 
substantial number of CFC regimes follow an unsystematic and asymmetrical (and 
therefore incomplete) legislative concept. If these regimes are applied simultaneously 
- on different tiers - without “accepting” each other (or at least without the 
“acceptance” on a higher tier), the likelihood of serious double taxation increases. 
The fact that the existing CFC regimes follow very different concepts (e.g. 
transactional approach vs. entity approach, different qualification of passive and base 
company income within the transactional / entity approach, different income 
determination rules,  different low-taxation thresholds) and the fact that the current 
taxation of income is always concentrated on the total amount of (tainted) income - 
without any vertical separation - makes it nearly impossible to follow a neutral 
concept. This is self-evidently not in line with an economic principle which foremost 
focuses on the safeguarding of competitiveness. I think one can even conclude that 
the CFC regimes create a clear obstacle - just due to the fact that the legislative 
concept is incomplete and does not sufficiently take into account comparable 
concepts in other countries - to a competitive environment and an equal international 
level playing field. Moreover, it cannot be acceptable from the perspective of taxpayer 
equity that an investment through a CFC results in substantial disadvantages (or the 
increased risk of substantial disadvantages) which does not exist in case of 
comparable domestic investments or in case the foreign investment is structured 
differently.  
 
It is equally clear, though, that a concept which is based on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component - although it merely focuses on one important income 
element and not all income elements - does not automatically fulfil the necessary 
requirement of a strict avoidance of double taxation (no matter whether it is a single 
                                            
331 For example, if the tax rate is 30% in country A, 35% in country B, and 10% in country C, the result will be 
as follows: the hidden reserves of 10 Euro will be taxed in country A with 3 Euro (without a tax credit - since no 
taxes are levied on that income at that time) and subsequently in country B with 2,5 Euro (3,5 Euro minus a tax 
credit of 1 Euro). The overall tax burden related to that income is therefore 6,5 Euro (65%).  
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- The application of CFC rules and other anti-avoidance measures within the 
same group structure as well as the general application of the credit method 
instead of the exemption method on dividend payments can also lead to a 
double taxation of income. Again, the problem lies in the fact that the methods 
are not applied in the same tax period. The CFC rules tax the income on a 
current basis whereas the credit method is applied on dividends (on a lower 
level - not on the level of the country which applies the CFC rules) as soon as 
the dividends are actually distributed. This leads to the result that an additional 
tax is imposed at a later point in time on a lower group level which was not 
taken into account at the moment where the CFC income was attributed and 
taxed. An ordinary tax credit system which focuses on the respective tax 
period cannot provide for relief from double taxation in such a situation. I do 
not see that any of the existing European CFC regimes properly deals with 
such situations. 
 
- The fact that classification conflicts can exist in multiple tier structures and that 
some CFC rules are limited to separate legal entities but others also 
encompass transparent partnerships and permanent establishments (PS/PE) - 
like in Italy - can, of course, create additional problems. In my opinion, this can 
only be avoided by a tax credit system which takes into account the PS/PE 
taxation on a lower level pursuant to the same principles as described for the 
multiple CFC taxation in two or more countries. 
 
- The focus on domestic income determination rules is another important factor. 
It is obvious that the lack of co-ordination and harmonisation among the CFC 
countries can lead to deviations with respect to the CFC income calculation 
and with respect to the direct or indirect transfer of shares in the CFC from one 
country to another. In these cases, it seems to be nearly impossible to provide 
for a systematic relief from double taxation. Apparently, these problems exist 
in all of the Member States which apply CFC rules. 
 
Thus, the application of CFC rules in multiple tier structures can create problems 
which may only partially be solved by - for example - an extended ordinary tax credit 
system which does not solely focus on a single tax period. Other double taxation 
issues, especially those related to the strict domestic approach, may only be solved 
by mutual agreement procedures among the countries involved.  
 
The principles derived from chapters 2 and 3 support a limited taxation according to 
the principle of capital export neutrality under certain circumstances. Such taxation, 
however, should be restricted to the basic interest component included in the CFC 
income and should by no means encompass the total amount of CFC income. In any 
event, the current taxation of income - no matter whether it is the taxation under a 
CFC regime or the taxation under an alternative regime - must not result in any over-
taxation and penalisation. The same is true, of course, for the application of such 
regimes in a multiple tier structure: any regime which taxes income on a current basis 
should provide for a consistent relief from double taxation which is caused by the 





    
                                                                                         
 
suffers tax losses or if a tax loss carry forward is available. The current 
taxation of CFC income in combination with the inability of a tax credit in the 
respective year - due to the non-existence of a domestic income tax - 
increases the overall tax burden considerably. The reduction of the domestic 
tax loss carry forward through the current attribution of CFC income does not 
allow the use of the tax losses in subsequent years. In contrast to a situation 
where only one CFC regime is involved, the multiple application of two (or 
more) regimes has the effect that the tax rate is increased to a “regular level” 
and - in addition - the domestic tax losses are offset against the attributed CFC 
income. The situation can therefore not really be compared to a regular 
dividend payment where a shareholder with a controlling interest can influence 
the decision whether and in which period a distribution takes place. In such a 
situation, the distribution could be postponed to a point in time where the 
shareholder pays domestic income tax and is therefore in a position to credit 
the foreign income tax. This is not possible in case of CFC taxation where the 
income is currently attributed to the shareholder. However, it cannot be directly 
compared to the treatment of a permanent establishment, either. Even if the 
double taxation is avoided by the application of the credit method instead of 
the exemption method, it must be taken into account that only one legal entity 
is involved and not two (or more) completely separate legal entities as in case 
of CFC taxation. It is quite clear that a “regular” ordinary tax credit cannot 
provide for a relief from double taxation in such a tax loss scenario. Finland 
and Germany, the only Member States which provide for a systematic relief in 
case of multiple CFC taxation, do not provide - at the same time - for a 
possibility of a roll-over (or a similar system) to solve the problem of double 
taxation caused by tax losses. On the other hand, countries which provide for 
a roll-over in their domestic tax system - like Portugal - do not solve the 
problem of multiple CFC taxation. Hence, it must be concluded that none of 
the Member States with CFC taxation really systematically solves the problem 
of double taxation in the aforementioned situation.  
 
- The tax losses suffered in the CFC country itself can lead to a double taxation 
of income, too. In my opinion, the main problem in this case is the tax loss 
carry forward limitation in the countries which apply the CFC taxation and in 
the CFC country. The more countries are involved, the higher the possibility 
that there are countries involved with a tax loss carry forward limitation. The 
country with the shortest tax loss carry forward period influences the overall 
taxation of the group. This can have the effect that the (unlimited) tax loss 
carry forward in the other countries does not play any role at all, e.g. in a 
situation where the tax loss carry forward expires in the country with the 
highest tax rate. There is an increased probability that the positive CFC 
income is taxed before the tax loss carry forward is actually utilised. There are 
a number of Member States which have a (general) tax loss carry forward 
limitation, like Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In some Member 
States, the possibility of a carry forward of negative CFC income is more 
restricted than the regular domestic tax loss carry forward. For example, the 
Finnish CFC rules provide for a five year carry forward of negative CFC 
income whereas the regular domestic tax loss carry forward is 10 years. In 
Portugal, the negative CFC income cannot be carried forward at all.  
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- The application of CFC rules and other anti-avoidance measures within the 
same group structure as well as the general application of the credit method 
instead of the exemption method on dividend payments can also lead to a 
double taxation of income. Again, the problem lies in the fact that the methods 
are not applied in the same tax period. The CFC rules tax the income on a 
current basis whereas the credit method is applied on dividends (on a lower 
level - not on the level of the country which applies the CFC rules) as soon as 
the dividends are actually distributed. This leads to the result that an additional 
tax is imposed at a later point in time on a lower group level which was not 
taken into account at the moment where the CFC income was attributed and 
taxed. An ordinary tax credit system which focuses on the respective tax 
period cannot provide for relief from double taxation in such a situation. I do 
not see that any of the existing European CFC regimes properly deals with 
such situations. 
 
- The fact that classification conflicts can exist in multiple tier structures and that 
some CFC rules are limited to separate legal entities but others also 
encompass transparent partnerships and permanent establishments (PS/PE) - 
like in Italy - can, of course, create additional problems. In my opinion, this can 
only be avoided by a tax credit system which takes into account the PS/PE 
taxation on a lower level pursuant to the same principles as described for the 
multiple CFC taxation in two or more countries. 
 
- The focus on domestic income determination rules is another important factor. 
It is obvious that the lack of co-ordination and harmonisation among the CFC 
countries can lead to deviations with respect to the CFC income calculation 
and with respect to the direct or indirect transfer of shares in the CFC from one 
country to another. In these cases, it seems to be nearly impossible to provide 
for a systematic relief from double taxation. Apparently, these problems exist 
in all of the Member States which apply CFC rules. 
 
Thus, the application of CFC rules in multiple tier structures can create problems 
which may only partially be solved by - for example - an extended ordinary tax credit 
system which does not solely focus on a single tax period. Other double taxation 
issues, especially those related to the strict domestic approach, may only be solved 
by mutual agreement procedures among the countries involved.  
 
The principles derived from chapters 2 and 3 support a limited taxation according to 
the principle of capital export neutrality under certain circumstances. Such taxation, 
however, should be restricted to the basic interest component included in the CFC 
income and should by no means encompass the total amount of CFC income. In any 
event, the current taxation of income - no matter whether it is the taxation under a 
CFC regime or the taxation under an alternative regime - must not result in any over-
taxation and penalisation. The same is true, of course, for the application of such 
regimes in a multiple tier structure: any regime which taxes income on a current basis 
should provide for a consistent relief from double taxation which is caused by the 





    
                                                                                         
 
suffers tax losses or if a tax loss carry forward is available. The current 
taxation of CFC income in combination with the inability of a tax credit in the 
respective year - due to the non-existence of a domestic income tax - 
increases the overall tax burden considerably. The reduction of the domestic 
tax loss carry forward through the current attribution of CFC income does not 
allow the use of the tax losses in subsequent years. In contrast to a situation 
where only one CFC regime is involved, the multiple application of two (or 
more) regimes has the effect that the tax rate is increased to a “regular level” 
and - in addition - the domestic tax losses are offset against the attributed CFC 
income. The situation can therefore not really be compared to a regular 
dividend payment where a shareholder with a controlling interest can influence 
the decision whether and in which period a distribution takes place. In such a 
situation, the distribution could be postponed to a point in time where the 
shareholder pays domestic income tax and is therefore in a position to credit 
the foreign income tax. This is not possible in case of CFC taxation where the 
income is currently attributed to the shareholder. However, it cannot be directly 
compared to the treatment of a permanent establishment, either. Even if the 
double taxation is avoided by the application of the credit method instead of 
the exemption method, it must be taken into account that only one legal entity 
is involved and not two (or more) completely separate legal entities as in case 
of CFC taxation. It is quite clear that a “regular” ordinary tax credit cannot 
provide for a relief from double taxation in such a tax loss scenario. Finland 
and Germany, the only Member States which provide for a systematic relief in 
case of multiple CFC taxation, do not provide - at the same time - for a 
possibility of a roll-over (or a similar system) to solve the problem of double 
taxation caused by tax losses. On the other hand, countries which provide for 
a roll-over in their domestic tax system - like Portugal - do not solve the 
problem of multiple CFC taxation. Hence, it must be concluded that none of 
the Member States with CFC taxation really systematically solves the problem 
of double taxation in the aforementioned situation.  
 
- The tax losses suffered in the CFC country itself can lead to a double taxation 
of income, too. In my opinion, the main problem in this case is the tax loss 
carry forward limitation in the countries which apply the CFC taxation and in 
the CFC country. The more countries are involved, the higher the possibility 
that there are countries involved with a tax loss carry forward limitation. The 
country with the shortest tax loss carry forward period influences the overall 
taxation of the group. This can have the effect that the (unlimited) tax loss 
carry forward in the other countries does not play any role at all, e.g. in a 
situation where the tax loss carry forward expires in the country with the 
highest tax rate. There is an increased probability that the positive CFC 
income is taxed before the tax loss carry forward is actually utilised. There are 
a number of Member States which have a (general) tax loss carry forward 
limitation, like Estonia, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In some Member 
States, the possibility of a carry forward of negative CFC income is more 
restricted than the regular domestic tax loss carry forward. For example, the 
Finnish CFC rules provide for a five year carry forward of negative CFC 
income whereas the regular domestic tax loss carry forward is 10 years. In 




    
                                                                                         
 
resident shareholder will not take place. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
determination of the effective foreign tax rate is usually based on a taxable income 
which is adjusted according to the domestic tax rules. Overall, the low-tax 
requirement ranges from less than 1/1 of the domestic corporate income tax rate (like 
in Germany) to less than 1/2 of the domestic corporate income tax which would 
theoretically be applied on that income (like in France). The remaining countries are 
in-between these two fractions. 
 
5.) Another basic requirement for the application of CFC rules is the ownership in the 
CFC: in order to attribute the CFC income to a resident taxpayer, a certain - direct or 
indirect - shareholding is required. It is important to recognise that “control” in the 
sense that a resident shareholder or a group of related shareholders own more than 
50 percent in the CFC is in most cases not required. A strict “more than 50 percent” 
requirement exists in Lithuania, where the resident entity (or individual) together with 
related parties has to hold - directly or indirectly - more than 50 percent. That means, 
in nearly all of the countries there is either a lower threshold or other - alternative - 
criteria exist which can trigger the application of the CFC rules. The examination of 
the ownership requirements in the countries shows that often not even a “substantial” 
or “qualified” shareholding is required, either. The requirement of control often refers 
to a certain (minimum) percentage of related or unrelated resident shareholders. 
Hence, if a substantial percentage is held by totally unrelated resident shareholders, 
the minimum threshold for the individual shareholder is extremely low, e.g. 5 percent 
in France if 50 percent of the share capital of the foreign company is directly or 
indirectly held by French residents, or 10 percent in Finland if at least 50 percent are 
held by Finnish residents. A drastic example in this respect is Germany: if the CFC 
exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital investment kind, 
the tainted income will be allocated to the resident shareholder without applying any 
minimum threshold. This gives the impression that the influence of the shareholder is 
in fact secondary, and the main focus is on the current taxation of CFC income as an 
anti-deferral measure in order to avoid any tax base erosion instead of a clear 
limitation of the CFC regimes to majority shareholdings.  
 
6.) The domestic concepts of income attribution range from a deemed dividend 
approach (e.g. in Germany) and a look-through (or “piercing the veil”) approach (e.g. 
in Estonia, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden) to a re-valuation of the 
shares in the CFC (the latter system exists in the Netherlands which, however, does 
not have a CFC regime in the narrower sense). Some Member States have a regime 
which might be seen as a look-through approach, but which is not completely clear in 
this respect (e.g. in Denmark and Spain). However, none of these concepts is fully 
convincing since the attributed income by no means reflects the result based on the 
commercial accounts of the CFC. This is due to the different CFC approaches 
(transactional approach and entity approach) and the fact that the attributable income 
is in most cases calculated pursuant to the domestic rules of the country which 
applies its CFC taxation. In fact, the income attribution according to the transactional 
approach can rather be seen as a system which solely and directly focuses on the 
separate income elements derived by the CFC from the perspective of the state of 
residence of the shareholder but - at the same time - completely ignores the income 
determination of the foreign legal entity. In contrast, the entity approach takes into 
account all income elements (active and passive) or none of the income elements, 
depending upon whether the active or the passive activity prevails. However, even 
the entity approach does not reflect the actual income based on the commercial 
    
                                                                                         
 
6.11. Conclusions  
 
1.) The countries which apply a transactional approach have a similar understanding 
of what is to be considered “passive” income in the context of CFC taxation, e.g. 
rental and leasing income, interest income, and royalty income. The common 
features of these passive activities are, amongst others, the fact that the income 
which is related to these activities is, at least to a large extent, not taxed in the state 
in which it is produced - as it would be required by the economic principle of capital 
import neutrality - but in the state of residence of the CFC. This is due to the 
allocation of taxing rights stipulated in the double tax conventions which follow the 
pattern of the OECD-MTC. Moreover, the activities are usually capital intensive 
activities. The portion of income which is related to the interest element is therefore 
increased. The concept of the transactional countries is the targeting of a direct tax 
base erosion (e.g. in Spain) and sometimes even the indirect tax base erosion (e.g. 
in Denmark, Germany).  
 
2.) The rules related to base company activities are partly different. Here, the 
circumstances for the provision of the services are decisive and not the type of 
services. That means, even non-capital intensive activities are subject to CFC 
taxation if - for example - the services are provided towards the resident shareholder 
or with the involvement of the resident shareholder. However, the economic result of 
the supply of non-capital intensive services may consist to a large extent of income 
which is related to the economic output created by personnel and not, as is the case 
for capital intensive services of the aforementioned types, of income which is largely 
related to the investment of capital, i.e. interest components, amortisation of the 
investment and the risk related to the investment. In principle, this is equally true for 
Germany, Spain and Lithuania. The Danish approach is a bit different from the other 
transactional countries since it is strongly connected to financial income without 
having separate base company rules. 
 
3.) The entity approach goes even further and covers not only the situations which 
lead to tainted income and base company income under a transactional approach, 
but also covers the income related to an active business which is exercised by the 
CFC as a minor activity (“all-or-nothing” approach). An activity-based exemption from 
CFC taxation typically requires that the foreign company carries on mainly an 
industrial or commercial activity and mainly on the local market. Of course, this 
excludes most of the inter-company services which are normally directed towards the 
country of the shareholder and the countries in which other group companies are 
established. The entity approach is therefore - similar to the base company activities - 
completely unconnected to the question of capital intensive or non-capital intensive 
services. The entity approach is the predominant system of CFC taxation and all of 
the countries which follow an entity approach have - in one way or another - such a 
link to the activity of the foreign entity. 
 
4.) The requirement of low-taxation is a common feature in all of the European 
countries with a CFC regime - no matter whether they follow a transactional or an 
entity approach. From the perspective of these countries, the current taxation of CFC 
income seems to be necessary only in cases where the effective foreign tax rate is 
below a certain threshold and the income is therefore considered to be low-taxed. If 
the income is subject to a taxation which is comparable to the domestic taxation or 
even higher than the domestic taxation, an immediate income allocation to the 
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resident shareholder will not take place. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
determination of the effective foreign tax rate is usually based on a taxable income 
which is adjusted according to the domestic tax rules. Overall, the low-tax 
requirement ranges from less than 1/1 of the domestic corporate income tax rate (like 
in Germany) to less than 1/2 of the domestic corporate income tax which would 
theoretically be applied on that income (like in France). The remaining countries are 
in-between these two fractions. 
 
5.) Another basic requirement for the application of CFC rules is the ownership in the 
CFC: in order to attribute the CFC income to a resident taxpayer, a certain - direct or 
indirect - shareholding is required. It is important to recognise that “control” in the 
sense that a resident shareholder or a group of related shareholders own more than 
50 percent in the CFC is in most cases not required. A strict “more than 50 percent” 
requirement exists in Lithuania, where the resident entity (or individual) together with 
related parties has to hold - directly or indirectly - more than 50 percent. That means, 
in nearly all of the countries there is either a lower threshold or other - alternative - 
criteria exist which can trigger the application of the CFC rules. The examination of 
the ownership requirements in the countries shows that often not even a “substantial” 
or “qualified” shareholding is required, either. The requirement of control often refers 
to a certain (minimum) percentage of related or unrelated resident shareholders. 
Hence, if a substantial percentage is held by totally unrelated resident shareholders, 
the minimum threshold for the individual shareholder is extremely low, e.g. 5 percent 
in France if 50 percent of the share capital of the foreign company is directly or 
indirectly held by French residents, or 10 percent in Finland if at least 50 percent are 
held by Finnish residents. A drastic example in this respect is Germany: if the CFC 
exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital investment kind, 
the tainted income will be allocated to the resident shareholder without applying any 
minimum threshold. This gives the impression that the influence of the shareholder is 
in fact secondary, and the main focus is on the current taxation of CFC income as an 
anti-deferral measure in order to avoid any tax base erosion instead of a clear 
limitation of the CFC regimes to majority shareholdings.  
 
6.) The domestic concepts of income attribution range from a deemed dividend 
approach (e.g. in Germany) and a look-through (or “piercing the veil”) approach (e.g. 
in Estonia, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden) to a re-valuation of the 
shares in the CFC (the latter system exists in the Netherlands which, however, does 
not have a CFC regime in the narrower sense). Some Member States have a regime 
which might be seen as a look-through approach, but which is not completely clear in 
this respect (e.g. in Denmark and Spain). However, none of these concepts is fully 
convincing since the attributed income by no means reflects the result based on the 
commercial accounts of the CFC. This is due to the different CFC approaches 
(transactional approach and entity approach) and the fact that the attributable income 
is in most cases calculated pursuant to the domestic rules of the country which 
applies its CFC taxation. In fact, the income attribution according to the transactional 
approach can rather be seen as a system which solely and directly focuses on the 
separate income elements derived by the CFC from the perspective of the state of 
residence of the shareholder but - at the same time - completely ignores the income 
determination of the foreign legal entity. In contrast, the entity approach takes into 
account all income elements (active and passive) or none of the income elements, 
depending upon whether the active or the passive activity prevails. However, even 
the entity approach does not reflect the actual income based on the commercial 
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of what is to be considered “passive” income in the context of CFC taxation, e.g. 
rental and leasing income, interest income, and royalty income. The common 
features of these passive activities are, amongst others, the fact that the income 
which is related to these activities is, at least to a large extent, not taxed in the state 
in which it is produced - as it would be required by the economic principle of capital 
import neutrality - but in the state of residence of the CFC. This is due to the 
allocation of taxing rights stipulated in the double tax conventions which follow the 
pattern of the OECD-MTC. Moreover, the activities are usually capital intensive 
activities. The portion of income which is related to the interest element is therefore 
increased. The concept of the transactional countries is the targeting of a direct tax 
base erosion (e.g. in Spain) and sometimes even the indirect tax base erosion (e.g. 
in Denmark, Germany).  
 
2.) The rules related to base company activities are partly different. Here, the 
circumstances for the provision of the services are decisive and not the type of 
services. That means, even non-capital intensive activities are subject to CFC 
taxation if - for example - the services are provided towards the resident shareholder 
or with the involvement of the resident shareholder. However, the economic result of 
the supply of non-capital intensive services may consist to a large extent of income 
which is related to the economic output created by personnel and not, as is the case 
for capital intensive services of the aforementioned types, of income which is largely 
related to the investment of capital, i.e. interest components, amortisation of the 
investment and the risk related to the investment. In principle, this is equally true for 
Germany, Spain and Lithuania. The Danish approach is a bit different from the other 
transactional countries since it is strongly connected to financial income without 
having separate base company rules. 
 
3.) The entity approach goes even further and covers not only the situations which 
lead to tainted income and base company income under a transactional approach, 
but also covers the income related to an active business which is exercised by the 
CFC as a minor activity (“all-or-nothing” approach). An activity-based exemption from 
CFC taxation typically requires that the foreign company carries on mainly an 
industrial or commercial activity and mainly on the local market. Of course, this 
excludes most of the inter-company services which are normally directed towards the 
country of the shareholder and the countries in which other group companies are 
established. The entity approach is therefore - similar to the base company activities - 
completely unconnected to the question of capital intensive or non-capital intensive 
services. The entity approach is the predominant system of CFC taxation and all of 
the countries which follow an entity approach have - in one way or another - such a 
link to the activity of the foreign entity. 
 
4.) The requirement of low-taxation is a common feature in all of the European 
countries with a CFC regime - no matter whether they follow a transactional or an 
entity approach. From the perspective of these countries, the current taxation of CFC 
income seems to be necessary only in cases where the effective foreign tax rate is 
below a certain threshold and the income is therefore considered to be low-taxed. If 
the income is subject to a taxation which is comparable to the domestic taxation or 
even higher than the domestic taxation, an immediate income allocation to the 
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away a symmetric concept of  (international) taxation of income in favour of a strict 
domestic anti-deferral policy. The price for such an approach is the violation of basic 
freedoms - which will be outlined later on in more detail. An alternative concept which 
does not provide for an unequal treatment of domestic and international income is 
therefore absolutely necessary. In chapter 9 I will outline an alternative - symmetric - 
concept which is, in my opinion, in line with the basic freedoms of the TFEU, which is 
supported by the economic principle of capital import neutrality, but which - at the 
same time - accepts the necessity of an anti-deferral regime for part of the income.   
 
9.) The examination shows that the CFC regimes have to provide for the crediting of 
taxes imposed on the underlying CFC income. However, an appropriate relief from 
double taxation requires that the crediting does not only encompass the corporate 
income tax in the CFC country but also any other income tax levied in third countries 
(e.g. in case of a permanent establishment) and the withholding taxes deducted from 
the respective income elements, e.g. royalty income, interest income. The deduction 
of taxes as a kind of business expenses is not sufficient and leads to a partial double 
taxation of income. The possibility for a crediting of the income taxes imposed in the 
CFC country exists in almost all of the Member States which apply such regimes. An 
exception, for example, is Hungary where no such indirect tax credit exists. The 
crediting of taxes imposed in third countries is provided for by a number of countries, 
e.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
10.) Another very important aspect is the fact that CFC regimes most often do not 
sufficiently provide for the multiple application of CFC taxation and similar anti-
avoidance rules, i.e. in situations where comparable legislation is applicable on a 
lower group level. The examination shows various problems which can arise in such 
a situation. One of the main aspects is certainly the question of an appropriate tax 
credit system. In order to solve the double taxation conflicts caused by the current 
taxation of income the regime must provide for a tax credit system which takes into 
account the taxation on a lower group level and which does not strictly focus on a 
particular taxation period. That means, taxes imposed on the underlying income at a 
later point in time on a lower group level cannot be outside of the scope of the tax 
credit system. Otherwise, and this is very often the case, the CFC regime leads to an 
immense over-taxation of income. Moreover, substantial conflicts can arise, inter alia, 
in cases where tax losses are involved, where limitations exist with respect to tax 
losses and time limits for subsequent profit distributions and capital gains, where the 
income is determined pursuant to the domestic tax rules of the country which applies 
the CFC taxation, where the income is taxed on a intermediate level according to the 
credit method, and in case of classification conflicts. Thus, the application of CFC 
rules in a multiple tier structure can create problems which may only partially be 
solved by - for example - an extended ordinary credit system. Other double taxation 
conflicts may only be solved by mutual agreement procedures among the countries 
involved. In other words, the multiple tier structures can considerably increase the 
already existing double taxation conflicts caused by the application of CFC rules. 
Currently, only Finland and Germany provide for a systematic (ordinary) crediting of 
the taxes imposed according to a lower tier CFC taxation. Other regimes either 
ignore these types of double taxation, rely on mutual agreement procedures (like in 
France), or take the additional (higher) taxation into account for the question of a 
motive exemption (like in the United Kingdom). However, the problem is that even the 
two countries which have a system in place for dealing with such a multiple CFC 
taxation do not provide for more than the simple ordinary tax crediting. That means 
    
                                                                                         
 
accounts of the CFC but only the income which is based on the income determination 
rules of the state of residence of the shareholder.  
 
7.) The taxation based on the income attribution according to CFC rules and the 
taxation of subsequent dividends and subsequent disposal of shares can lead - at 
least partly - to a double taxation of income. It is therefore necessary for the CFC 
regimes to provide for some sort of relief from double taxation in these cases. This 
can be done by way of an adjustment of the tax base or a tax credit of the income tax 
levied on the former CFC income attribution against the taxes imposed on the 
dividend payments and the capital gains. Interestingly, the relief from double taxation 
caused by a subsequent dividend payment is provided by all of the regimes in one 
way or another (usually by adjustment of the tax base - with the exception of the 
United Kingdom which provides for a tax credit). In contrast thereto, the relief from 
double taxation caused by the disposal of the shares in the CFC is only granted in 
very few countries, namely in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. It 
is quite apparent that there is no justification for a different treatment of dividends and 
capital gains since both transactions contain, in principle, the same profit elements 
and both transactions can lead to a double taxation of income. In addition, the test to 
the principles derived from previous chapters shows that - in order to avoid any 
penalty effects for the investor - the relief from double taxation cannot be restricted by 
CFC specific time limits - like in Finland and Germany - which can make the 
elimination of double taxation considerably more difficult or even impossible (e.g. in 
case of tax losses). Moreover, a double taxation of income can be caused by 
withholding taxes levied on the subsequent dividends. In this case, the withholding 
taxes should - retroactively - be credited against the income taxes imposed on the 
attributed CFC income if the actual dividend payment is exempt from taxation. Similar 
problems can arise if a double taxation of income is avoided by a tax credit of the 
former CFC income tax burden against the subsequent dividend income tax burden. 
Here, the problem lies in the fact that an ordinary tax credit system will often not 
provide for sufficient relief from double taxation (this can be true for income taxes and 
withholding taxes).  
 
8.) The treatment of losses in the context of CFC taxation is - in my opinion - 
inconsistent and asymmetric and goes much further than is really necessary from an 
anti-avoidance point of view. One of the main aspects is the fact that positive CFC 
income is treated differently from negative CFC income. Often, the positive CFC 
income is taxed by the residence state of the shareholder in the same manner as 
domestic income derived by the shareholder. In contrast, negative CFC income can 
usually not be offset with positive domestic income of the shareholder but can only be 
carried forward and offset with positive CFC income of the same foreign legal entity 
in subsequent periods. It seems the latter is true for all of the European CFC regimes 
outlined in this chapter. In other words, the utilisation of negative CFC income is 
extremely restricted. However, the reverse situation is equally problematic, i.e. if 
positive CFC income is attributed to the resident shareholder who suffers domestic 
tax losses or has a domestic tax loss carry forward available. The examination 
revealed several problematic aspects, especially where the CFC regimes apply 
specific time limits for subsequent dividend payments and the disposal of shares, and 
time limits for the carry forward of negative domestic income and (or) negative CFC 
income. From my perspective, there is not a single European CFC regime which 
provides for an acceptable treatment of negative CFC income. It shows clearly, in my 
opinion, that the Member States which apply CFC rules are obviously willing to give 
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away a symmetric concept of  (international) taxation of income in favour of a strict 
domestic anti-deferral policy. The price for such an approach is the violation of basic 
freedoms - which will be outlined later on in more detail. An alternative concept which 
does not provide for an unequal treatment of domestic and international income is 
therefore absolutely necessary. In chapter 9 I will outline an alternative - symmetric - 
concept which is, in my opinion, in line with the basic freedoms of the TFEU, which is 
supported by the economic principle of capital import neutrality, but which - at the 
same time - accepts the necessity of an anti-deferral regime for part of the income.   
 
9.) The examination shows that the CFC regimes have to provide for the crediting of 
taxes imposed on the underlying CFC income. However, an appropriate relief from 
double taxation requires that the crediting does not only encompass the corporate 
income tax in the CFC country but also any other income tax levied in third countries 
(e.g. in case of a permanent establishment) and the withholding taxes deducted from 
the respective income elements, e.g. royalty income, interest income. The deduction 
of taxes as a kind of business expenses is not sufficient and leads to a partial double 
taxation of income. The possibility for a crediting of the income taxes imposed in the 
CFC country exists in almost all of the Member States which apply such regimes. An 
exception, for example, is Hungary where no such indirect tax credit exists. The 
crediting of taxes imposed in third countries is provided for by a number of countries, 
e.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
10.) Another very important aspect is the fact that CFC regimes most often do not 
sufficiently provide for the multiple application of CFC taxation and similar anti-
avoidance rules, i.e. in situations where comparable legislation is applicable on a 
lower group level. The examination shows various problems which can arise in such 
a situation. One of the main aspects is certainly the question of an appropriate tax 
credit system. In order to solve the double taxation conflicts caused by the current 
taxation of income the regime must provide for a tax credit system which takes into 
account the taxation on a lower group level and which does not strictly focus on a 
particular taxation period. That means, taxes imposed on the underlying income at a 
later point in time on a lower group level cannot be outside of the scope of the tax 
credit system. Otherwise, and this is very often the case, the CFC regime leads to an 
immense over-taxation of income. Moreover, substantial conflicts can arise, inter alia, 
in cases where tax losses are involved, where limitations exist with respect to tax 
losses and time limits for subsequent profit distributions and capital gains, where the 
income is determined pursuant to the domestic tax rules of the country which applies 
the CFC taxation, where the income is taxed on a intermediate level according to the 
credit method, and in case of classification conflicts. Thus, the application of CFC 
rules in a multiple tier structure can create problems which may only partially be 
solved by - for example - an extended ordinary credit system. Other double taxation 
conflicts may only be solved by mutual agreement procedures among the countries 
involved. In other words, the multiple tier structures can considerably increase the 
already existing double taxation conflicts caused by the application of CFC rules. 
Currently, only Finland and Germany provide for a systematic (ordinary) crediting of 
the taxes imposed according to a lower tier CFC taxation. Other regimes either 
ignore these types of double taxation, rely on mutual agreement procedures (like in 
France), or take the additional (higher) taxation into account for the question of a 
motive exemption (like in the United Kingdom). However, the problem is that even the 
two countries which have a system in place for dealing with such a multiple CFC 
taxation do not provide for more than the simple ordinary tax crediting. That means 
    
                                                                                         
 
accounts of the CFC but only the income which is based on the income determination 
rules of the state of residence of the shareholder.  
 
7.) The taxation based on the income attribution according to CFC rules and the 
taxation of subsequent dividends and subsequent disposal of shares can lead - at 
least partly - to a double taxation of income. It is therefore necessary for the CFC 
regimes to provide for some sort of relief from double taxation in these cases. This 
can be done by way of an adjustment of the tax base or a tax credit of the income tax 
levied on the former CFC income attribution against the taxes imposed on the 
dividend payments and the capital gains. Interestingly, the relief from double taxation 
caused by a subsequent dividend payment is provided by all of the regimes in one 
way or another (usually by adjustment of the tax base - with the exception of the 
United Kingdom which provides for a tax credit). In contrast thereto, the relief from 
double taxation caused by the disposal of the shares in the CFC is only granted in 
very few countries, namely in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. It 
is quite apparent that there is no justification for a different treatment of dividends and 
capital gains since both transactions contain, in principle, the same profit elements 
and both transactions can lead to a double taxation of income. In addition, the test to 
the principles derived from previous chapters shows that - in order to avoid any 
penalty effects for the investor - the relief from double taxation cannot be restricted by 
CFC specific time limits - like in Finland and Germany - which can make the 
elimination of double taxation considerably more difficult or even impossible (e.g. in 
case of tax losses). Moreover, a double taxation of income can be caused by 
withholding taxes levied on the subsequent dividends. In this case, the withholding 
taxes should - retroactively - be credited against the income taxes imposed on the 
attributed CFC income if the actual dividend payment is exempt from taxation. Similar 
problems can arise if a double taxation of income is avoided by a tax credit of the 
former CFC income tax burden against the subsequent dividend income tax burden. 
Here, the problem lies in the fact that an ordinary tax credit system will often not 
provide for sufficient relief from double taxation (this can be true for income taxes and 
withholding taxes).  
 
8.) The treatment of losses in the context of CFC taxation is - in my opinion - 
inconsistent and asymmetric and goes much further than is really necessary from an 
anti-avoidance point of view. One of the main aspects is the fact that positive CFC 
income is treated differently from negative CFC income. Often, the positive CFC 
income is taxed by the residence state of the shareholder in the same manner as 
domestic income derived by the shareholder. In contrast, negative CFC income can 
usually not be offset with positive domestic income of the shareholder but can only be 
carried forward and offset with positive CFC income of the same foreign legal entity 
in subsequent periods. It seems the latter is true for all of the European CFC regimes 
outlined in this chapter. In other words, the utilisation of negative CFC income is 
extremely restricted. However, the reverse situation is equally problematic, i.e. if 
positive CFC income is attributed to the resident shareholder who suffers domestic 
tax losses or has a domestic tax loss carry forward available. The examination 
revealed several problematic aspects, especially where the CFC regimes apply 
specific time limits for subsequent dividend payments and the disposal of shares, and 
time limits for the carry forward of negative domestic income and (or) negative CFC 
income. From my perspective, there is not a single European CFC regime which 
provides for an acceptable treatment of negative CFC income. It shows clearly, in my 
opinion, that the Member States which apply CFC rules are obviously willing to give 
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7. CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
The significance of CFC legislation as an anti-deferral measure applied by an 
increasing number of high-tax countries raises the question of its compatibility with an 
existing tax treaty and the type of income in the context of such a tax treaty. Thus, it 
is important to clarify whether CFC rules have to be specifically preserved in double 
tax conventions in order to be applicable and, in addition, to clarify the type of income 
in the light of double tax conventions. The questions are of particular importance 
since - as already outlined in the foregoing chapters - CFC rules are by no means 
restricted to tax havens but are in most cases equally applicable to tax treaty 
countries which simply have a lower tax rate than the country which applies its CFC 
legislation. In the European Member States only little case law exists which is related 
to these questions, and the outcome of the cases is quite different. In the following, I 
will outline the A Oyj Abp Case (Finland), the Schneider Case (France), the Bricom 
Holdings Case (the United Kingdom), and the Captive Insurance Cases (Sweden). 
Moreover, I will make a brief excursion to non-European decisions by describing a 
Brazilian case and a Japanese case. All of these cases are interesting and important 
in this context. However, in order to understand the outcome of the cases and to find 
an answer to the question of compatibility with tax treaties, the position of the OECD - 
which is stipulated in the OECD Commentary - will be verified. Furthermore, in order 
to clarify the type of income in the light of the OECD-MTC it is of particular relevance 
to have a closer look at Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 21 of the OECD-MTC.1 The 
verifications themselves will be concentrated on the aforementioned case law and the 
OECD-MTC but will not be extended to other (model) tax conventions. The outcome 
of the following sections will be tested step-by-step with regard to the important 
principles derived from chapters 2 and 3. The test will not encompass EU law, 
because this will be tested exclusively in chapter 8.2   
 
7.2. Case Law Related to CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions 
7.2.1. The A Oyj Abp Case (Finland) 
 
A Oyj Abp (A) is the parent company of a Finnish-based group of companies with a 
wholly owned subsidiary – A Finance NV – incorporated in Belgium.3 The operations 
of A Finance NV comprise, amongst others, activities in the fields of research and 
                                            
1 The Articles will not be discussed in the respective order (Article 6 of the OECD-MTC will be discussed after 
Articles 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC).  
2 There are also references which are covered by chapter 5, e.g. the ability-to-pay principle (see in this respect 
section 7.7). 
3 A Oyj Abp Case, Supreme Administrative Court, KHO 2002/596 (26), dated March 20, 2002, International Tax 
Law Reports (ITLR), Volume 4, 2002, page 1043 et seq.; See with respect to the A Oyj Abp Case also Lang, 
CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et seq.; Lang, 
CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 
et seq.; Rytöhonka, Belgian coordination centre deemed by Finnish Court to be a CFC, Tax News Service, July 
11, 2002; Pahapill, Finnish CFC Regime Not a Threat, Officials Say, Tax Notes International 2003, page 1015 et 
seq.; Helminen in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, page 
204 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 126; Brähler, Controlled Foreign 
Companies-Rules, 2007, page 62; Malherbe et al., Controlled Foreign Corporations in the EU After Cadbury 
Schweppes, Tax Management International Journal 2007, page 607 et seq. See with respect to the question of the 
consistency of CFC legislation and (Finnish) tax treaties, in general, also the FEE Position Paper on Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislations in the EU, European Federation of Accountants, April 2002, pages 12, 13.    
    
                                                                                         
 
Finland and Germany do not really solve the other problems which may come in a 
multiple tier structure and which were revealed in this chapter. 
 
11.) Mutual agreement procedures as well as any other solutions which are not 
based on a clear legislative and systematic concept are not, in my opinion, the 
appropriate way of solving the problem of double taxation of income in the context of 
CFC taxation. As already outlined above, what is required is an alternative concept to 
CFC rules which provides for a consistent taxation of domestic and foreign income. In 
my opinion, this can be achieved by a system which accepts the taxation of income in 
the state in which it is produced - and which therefore, in general, follows the 
principle of capital import neutrality - but without ignoring the necessity of an anti-
deferral taxation for part of the income under certain circumstances.  
 
12.) An alternative concept should follow the principles outlined in previous chapters 
by providing a systematic and symmetrical system of current taxation, i.e. a system 
which is safeguarding competitiveness without creating any penalty effects for an 
investor. In essence, this would result in a deviation from the typical CFC regime 
towards a regime which limits the current taxation of income to the basic interest 
component and which therefore provides for a horizontal and vertical separation of 
income (instead of a merely horizontal separation of income). In any event, the 
economic principles and equity aspects derived from chapters 2 and 3 clearly 
support, in my opinion, such a limited taxation according to the principle of capital 
export neutrality. However, neither a CFC regime nor an alternative approach should 
lead to an over-taxation of income and, therefore, have to provide for a consistent 
relief from any sort of double taxation caused by the current taxation of income. An 
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7. CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions  
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
The significance of CFC legislation as an anti-deferral measure applied by an 
increasing number of high-tax countries raises the question of its compatibility with an 
existing tax treaty and the type of income in the context of such a tax treaty. Thus, it 
is important to clarify whether CFC rules have to be specifically preserved in double 
tax conventions in order to be applicable and, in addition, to clarify the type of income 
in the light of double tax conventions. The questions are of particular importance 
since - as already outlined in the foregoing chapters - CFC rules are by no means 
restricted to tax havens but are in most cases equally applicable to tax treaty 
countries which simply have a lower tax rate than the country which applies its CFC 
legislation. In the European Member States only little case law exists which is related 
to these questions, and the outcome of the cases is quite different. In the following, I 
will outline the A Oyj Abp Case (Finland), the Schneider Case (France), the Bricom 
Holdings Case (the United Kingdom), and the Captive Insurance Cases (Sweden). 
Moreover, I will make a brief excursion to non-European decisions by describing a 
Brazilian case and a Japanese case. All of these cases are interesting and important 
in this context. However, in order to understand the outcome of the cases and to find 
an answer to the question of compatibility with tax treaties, the position of the OECD - 
which is stipulated in the OECD Commentary - will be verified. Furthermore, in order 
to clarify the type of income in the light of the OECD-MTC it is of particular relevance 
to have a closer look at Articles 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 21 of the OECD-MTC.1 The 
verifications themselves will be concentrated on the aforementioned case law and the 
OECD-MTC but will not be extended to other (model) tax conventions. The outcome 
of the following sections will be tested step-by-step with regard to the important 
principles derived from chapters 2 and 3. The test will not encompass EU law, 
because this will be tested exclusively in chapter 8.2   
 
7.2. Case Law Related to CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions 
7.2.1. The A Oyj Abp Case (Finland) 
 
A Oyj Abp (A) is the parent company of a Finnish-based group of companies with a 
wholly owned subsidiary – A Finance NV – incorporated in Belgium.3 The operations 
of A Finance NV comprise, amongst others, activities in the fields of research and 
                                            
1 The Articles will not be discussed in the respective order (Article 6 of the OECD-MTC will be discussed after 
Articles 7, 10, 11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC).  
2 There are also references which are covered by chapter 5, e.g. the ability-to-pay principle (see in this respect 
section 7.7). 
3 A Oyj Abp Case, Supreme Administrative Court, KHO 2002/596 (26), dated March 20, 2002, International Tax 
Law Reports (ITLR), Volume 4, 2002, page 1043 et seq.; See with respect to the A Oyj Abp Case also Lang, 
CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et seq.; Lang, 
CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 
et seq.; Rytöhonka, Belgian coordination centre deemed by Finnish Court to be a CFC, Tax News Service, July 
11, 2002; Pahapill, Finnish CFC Regime Not a Threat, Officials Say, Tax Notes International 2003, page 1015 et 
seq.; Helminen in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, page 
204 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 126; Brähler, Controlled Foreign 
Companies-Rules, 2007, page 62; Malherbe et al., Controlled Foreign Corporations in the EU After Cadbury 
Schweppes, Tax Management International Journal 2007, page 607 et seq. See with respect to the question of the 
consistency of CFC legislation and (Finnish) tax treaties, in general, also the FEE Position Paper on Controlled 
Foreign Company Legislations in the EU, European Federation of Accountants, April 2002, pages 12, 13.    
    
                                                                                         
 
Finland and Germany do not really solve the other problems which may come in a 
multiple tier structure and which were revealed in this chapter. 
 
11.) Mutual agreement procedures as well as any other solutions which are not 
based on a clear legislative and systematic concept are not, in my opinion, the 
appropriate way of solving the problem of double taxation of income in the context of 
CFC taxation. As already outlined above, what is required is an alternative concept to 
CFC rules which provides for a consistent taxation of domestic and foreign income. In 
my opinion, this can be achieved by a system which accepts the taxation of income in 
the state in which it is produced - and which therefore, in general, follows the 
principle of capital import neutrality - but without ignoring the necessity of an anti-
deferral taxation for part of the income under certain circumstances.  
 
12.) An alternative concept should follow the principles outlined in previous chapters 
by providing a systematic and symmetrical system of current taxation, i.e. a system 
which is safeguarding competitiveness without creating any penalty effects for an 
investor. In essence, this would result in a deviation from the typical CFC regime 
towards a regime which limits the current taxation of income to the basic interest 
component and which therefore provides for a horizontal and vertical separation of 
income (instead of a merely horizontal separation of income). In any event, the 
economic principles and equity aspects derived from chapters 2 and 3 clearly 
support, in my opinion, such a limited taxation according to the principle of capital 
export neutrality. However, neither a CFC regime nor an alternative approach should 
lead to an over-taxation of income and, therefore, have to provide for a consistent 
relief from any sort of double taxation caused by the current taxation of income. An 







   
 
(5) of the OECD-MTC should prevent Finland from taxing the undistributed profits of 
the subsidiary in Belgium. Finland treats the co-ordination centre factually as a 
permanent establishment of A, which is prohibited by Article 5 (7) of the OECD-MTC. 
The Belgian Ministry of Finance stated further that the application of a CFC 
legislation must be explicitly permitted in the tax treaty between both countries and 
this is not the case in the underlying tax treaty. Apart from that, the CFC legislation is 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment.11  
 
The Supreme Administrative Court verified first the preparatory legal drafts of the 
Government Bills on controlled foreign company legislation.12 According to the 
Government Bills, the objective of the CFC Act is to prevent the avoidance of Finnish 
taxation by the use of controlled foreign companies. The Court stated that the income 
derived from a CFC can be characterised in two different ways. The income may be 
characterised according to the legislation of the country in which the CFC is situated 
and included in the income of its shareholder in the shareholder’s country of 
residence, but not treated as an actual distribution of profit, or it may be characterised 
as income of the shareholder company which was received on the basis of its 
shareholder status as a profit distribution from the CFC. The Finnish CFC Act does 
not explicitly provide any definition of the character of income. It could be business 
income, dividend income or other income. Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the 
attributed CFC income is not defined as profit distribution. It is therefore not obvious 
that CFC income should be characterised as dividend income and its type must be 
determined on a case by case basis according to the circumstances and the activities 
of the CFC and its parent company. In the underlying case, the type of activity carried 
out by A Finance NV, its significance to A and Article 1 of the Business Income Tax 
Act are taken into consideration. Pursuant to the Court, the income received by A 
from the Belgian subsidiary is not dividend income but other business income. 
Business income of that kind is to be classified as passive income and base 
company income.13 
 
In the following, the Court made general explanations on tax treaties. As a rule, tax 
treaty provisions, as lex specialis, overrule any conflicting rule of national law. 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a contracting state may 
not, in its national legislation, unilaterally alter an international convention that it 
concluded. Accordingly, not even national CFC legislation may be used to alter the 
content of a tax treaty which has already been concluded. Tax treaties are concerned 
with juridical double taxation and are not generally concerned with economic double 
taxation, unless it is otherwise provided in a tax treaty. The Finland-Belgium tax 
treaty does not contain provisions on the removal of economic double taxation.14 The 
tax treaty was concluded15 before the Finnish CFC legislation entered into force16 
and is drafted along the general lines of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The 
Finland-Belgium tax treaty does not make any specific reference to CFC legislation.17 
The Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention was supplemented with a 
                                            
11 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1048, 1049. 
12 Government Bill number 155/1994 and number 149/1998 which formed the amendment to the CFC Act 
adopted on December 23, 1998. 
13 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1062, 1063. 
14 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1064. 
15 Concluded on June 18, 1976 and supplemented on March 13, 1991. 
16 Adopted on December 16, 1994 and entered into force on January 1, 1995. 
17 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1066. The same is true for the other tax treaties concluded by Finland (see 
Belgian co-ordination centre deemed by Finnish Court to be a CFC, Tax News Service, July 11, 2002). 
   
 
development, information technology, accounting and providing the European 
subsidiaries of A with financial services. A Finance NV is what is known as a co-
ordination centre and since the beginning of 1999 it probably falls within the definition 
of the Finnish CFC legislation due to the preferential tax treatment provided for by the 
Belgian legislation.4 The corporate tax calculated according to Finnish tax rules is 
less than 16.8 percent.5 A applied for an advance ruling on whether, as a Finnish 
resident shareholder of A Finance NV, it may be taxed in Finland on the basis of the 
CFC Act, when the tax treaty between Finland and Belgium and the provisions of the 
EC Treaty are also taken into account.6 The Central Board of Taxation issued an 
advance ruling for the years 1999 and 2000 according to which A may be taxed in 
Finland on the basis of the CFC Act.7 The Board did not see any conflict with the tax 
treaty since the CFC rules are considered to be part of the basic domestic rules set 
by national law for the purpose of determining which facts give rise to a tax liability 
and these rules are not addressed in tax treaties. The Belgian subsidiary is not taxed 
in Finland but the Finnish resident company A and this does not conflict with the 
purpose or wording of the tax treaty. The tax treaties concluded by Finland do not 
contain any unconditional obligation for the removal of economic double taxation. 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Board, the provisions of the EC Treaty are of no 
relevance to this case.8 
 
The dissenting members of the Board took the position that the lex specialis nature of 
the tax treaty must be taken into consideration. Any incompatibility between the tax 
treaty and the CFC Act must be remedied by giving primacy to the tax treaty 
provisions. The tax would be levied on the basis of income accruing from a Belgian 
source, even though that income is not connected with Finland.9 The tax liability 
would effectively be based on the income of A Finance NV and this is contrary to the 
Finnish system of tax law since in Finland a shareholder is not liable to tax on the 
income of its subsidiary, except in the case of a dividend distribution. Furthermore, 
the taxation would also be contrary to the provisions on the taxation of business 
income in Article 7 of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty because the income of the 
subsidiary is made subject to tax in Finland, even though the company has no 
permanent establishment in Finland.10 
 
A appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court and requested that the advance 
ruling of the Central Board of Taxation be overturned. In a letter from the Belgian 
Ministry of Finance, attached to the appeal, the application of the CFC Act is 
described as a breach of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty and that it is contrary to EC 
law. By applying the CFC legislation Finland is the recipient beneficiary of the tax 
revenue based on the profits of the foreign company. It is further noted that Article 10 
                                            
4 A multinational enterprise may incorporate a co-ordination centre in Belgium if it meets the conditions 
provided for by the relevant legislation. Pursuant to the legislation in 1999, a co-ordination centre must employ 
at least 10 people within two years of the commencement of its operations. Certain kinds of services may only be 
provided to other group companies. The statutory general corporate tax rate applies to a notional tax base 
determined according to a mark-up percentage of their operating costs other than personnel and financial costs. 
In case of A Finance NV the mark-up was 8 percent. In addition, co-ordination centres are liable to an annual tax 
which is calculated per employee with a certain maximum amount. 
5 3/5 of the 1999 Finnish corporate tax rate of 28 percent. 
6 International Tax Law Reports (ITLR), Volume 4, 2002, page 1044. 
7 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1045. 
8 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1046. 
9 The financing of the activities of subsidiaries in Finland is provided from Finland and not from Belgium. 
10 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1046, 1047. 
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(5) of the OECD-MTC should prevent Finland from taxing the undistributed profits of 
the subsidiary in Belgium. Finland treats the co-ordination centre factually as a 
permanent establishment of A, which is prohibited by Article 5 (7) of the OECD-MTC. 
The Belgian Ministry of Finance stated further that the application of a CFC 
legislation must be explicitly permitted in the tax treaty between both countries and 
this is not the case in the underlying tax treaty. Apart from that, the CFC legislation is 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment.11  
 
The Supreme Administrative Court verified first the preparatory legal drafts of the 
Government Bills on controlled foreign company legislation.12 According to the 
Government Bills, the objective of the CFC Act is to prevent the avoidance of Finnish 
taxation by the use of controlled foreign companies. The Court stated that the income 
derived from a CFC can be characterised in two different ways. The income may be 
characterised according to the legislation of the country in which the CFC is situated 
and included in the income of its shareholder in the shareholder’s country of 
residence, but not treated as an actual distribution of profit, or it may be characterised 
as income of the shareholder company which was received on the basis of its 
shareholder status as a profit distribution from the CFC. The Finnish CFC Act does 
not explicitly provide any definition of the character of income. It could be business 
income, dividend income or other income. Pursuant to Finnish legislation, the 
attributed CFC income is not defined as profit distribution. It is therefore not obvious 
that CFC income should be characterised as dividend income and its type must be 
determined on a case by case basis according to the circumstances and the activities 
of the CFC and its parent company. In the underlying case, the type of activity carried 
out by A Finance NV, its significance to A and Article 1 of the Business Income Tax 
Act are taken into consideration. Pursuant to the Court, the income received by A 
from the Belgian subsidiary is not dividend income but other business income. 
Business income of that kind is to be classified as passive income and base 
company income.13 
 
In the following, the Court made general explanations on tax treaties. As a rule, tax 
treaty provisions, as lex specialis, overrule any conflicting rule of national law. 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a contracting state may 
not, in its national legislation, unilaterally alter an international convention that it 
concluded. Accordingly, not even national CFC legislation may be used to alter the 
content of a tax treaty which has already been concluded. Tax treaties are concerned 
with juridical double taxation and are not generally concerned with economic double 
taxation, unless it is otherwise provided in a tax treaty. The Finland-Belgium tax 
treaty does not contain provisions on the removal of economic double taxation.14 The 
tax treaty was concluded15 before the Finnish CFC legislation entered into force16 
and is drafted along the general lines of the OECD Model Tax Convention. The 
Finland-Belgium tax treaty does not make any specific reference to CFC legislation.17 
The Commentary to the OECD Model Tax Convention was supplemented with a 
                                            
11 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1048, 1049. 
12 Government Bill number 155/1994 and number 149/1998 which formed the amendment to the CFC Act 
adopted on December 23, 1998. 
13 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1062, 1063. 
14 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1064. 
15 Concluded on June 18, 1976 and supplemented on March 13, 1991. 
16 Adopted on December 16, 1994 and entered into force on January 1, 1995. 
17 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1066. The same is true for the other tax treaties concluded by Finland (see 
Belgian co-ordination centre deemed by Finnish Court to be a CFC, Tax News Service, July 11, 2002). 
   
 
development, information technology, accounting and providing the European 
subsidiaries of A with financial services. A Finance NV is what is known as a co-
ordination centre and since the beginning of 1999 it probably falls within the definition 
of the Finnish CFC legislation due to the preferential tax treatment provided for by the 
Belgian legislation.4 The corporate tax calculated according to Finnish tax rules is 
less than 16.8 percent.5 A applied for an advance ruling on whether, as a Finnish 
resident shareholder of A Finance NV, it may be taxed in Finland on the basis of the 
CFC Act, when the tax treaty between Finland and Belgium and the provisions of the 
EC Treaty are also taken into account.6 The Central Board of Taxation issued an 
advance ruling for the years 1999 and 2000 according to which A may be taxed in 
Finland on the basis of the CFC Act.7 The Board did not see any conflict with the tax 
treaty since the CFC rules are considered to be part of the basic domestic rules set 
by national law for the purpose of determining which facts give rise to a tax liability 
and these rules are not addressed in tax treaties. The Belgian subsidiary is not taxed 
in Finland but the Finnish resident company A and this does not conflict with the 
purpose or wording of the tax treaty. The tax treaties concluded by Finland do not 
contain any unconditional obligation for the removal of economic double taxation. 
Furthermore, pursuant to the Board, the provisions of the EC Treaty are of no 
relevance to this case.8 
 
The dissenting members of the Board took the position that the lex specialis nature of 
the tax treaty must be taken into consideration. Any incompatibility between the tax 
treaty and the CFC Act must be remedied by giving primacy to the tax treaty 
provisions. The tax would be levied on the basis of income accruing from a Belgian 
source, even though that income is not connected with Finland.9 The tax liability 
would effectively be based on the income of A Finance NV and this is contrary to the 
Finnish system of tax law since in Finland a shareholder is not liable to tax on the 
income of its subsidiary, except in the case of a dividend distribution. Furthermore, 
the taxation would also be contrary to the provisions on the taxation of business 
income in Article 7 of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty because the income of the 
subsidiary is made subject to tax in Finland, even though the company has no 
permanent establishment in Finland.10 
 
A appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court and requested that the advance 
ruling of the Central Board of Taxation be overturned. In a letter from the Belgian 
Ministry of Finance, attached to the appeal, the application of the CFC Act is 
described as a breach of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty and that it is contrary to EC 
law. By applying the CFC legislation Finland is the recipient beneficiary of the tax 
revenue based on the profits of the foreign company. It is further noted that Article 10 
                                            
4 A multinational enterprise may incorporate a co-ordination centre in Belgium if it meets the conditions 
provided for by the relevant legislation. Pursuant to the legislation in 1999, a co-ordination centre must employ 
at least 10 people within two years of the commencement of its operations. Certain kinds of services may only be 
provided to other group companies. The statutory general corporate tax rate applies to a notional tax base 
determined according to a mark-up percentage of their operating costs other than personnel and financial costs. 
In case of A Finance NV the mark-up was 8 percent. In addition, co-ordination centres are liable to an annual tax 
which is calculated per employee with a certain maximum amount. 
5 3/5 of the 1999 Finnish corporate tax rate of 28 percent. 
6 International Tax Law Reports (ITLR), Volume 4, 2002, page 1044. 
7 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1045. 
8 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1046. 
9 The financing of the activities of subsidiaries in Finland is provided from Finland and not from Belgium. 
10 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1046, 1047. 
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provisions to the contrary. Article 7 (1) of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty does 
therefore not prevent the taxation of A under the Finnish CFC Act.24 Finland taxes the 
shareholder situated in Finland on income derived from a CFC, not the company 
situated in a tax treaty country. Finland is entitled to do so on the basis of its own 
national law and the provisions of the tax treaty between Finland and Belgium do not 
prevent such taxation. This does not amount to juridical double taxation. From the 
standpoint of Finnish taxation, double taxation does not arise because the tax on the 
CFC income does not exceed the amount which would have been collected if the 
CFC had not been established and its activities had been carried out in Finland or 
through a branch situated abroad. This ensures capital export neutrality from the 
perspective of domestic taxation.25  
 
From my perspective, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court deals, in general, 
with all of the aspects which are of importance for the question whether the CFC 
regime is in line with the Finland-Belgium tax treaty or not.26 The most significant 
conclusion is, in my opinion, the fact that the Court confirmed that the income 
calculated pursuant to the CFC regime in Finland is not identical to the income 
derived by the subsidiary company in Belgium and, therefore, the income attribution 
does not lead to a juridical double taxation, but merely to an economic double 
taxation of income. The latter, however, is not within the scope of the tax treaty - I will 
come back to that aspect again later on. Moreover, it is also interesting to see that - 
for tax treaty purposes - the Court classified the attributable income, with reference to 
Finnish domestic legislation, as business income and not as dividend income. In 
principle, I fully agree with the classification as business income,27 but the method of 
classifying the income is, in my opinion, not completely made clear by the decision. It 
remains open whether the attributable income is to be classified as business income 
in general or only under certain circumstances. Pursuant to Helminen, the wording of 
the Supreme Administrative Court was selected very carefully and it may leave room 
for situations where it may have to be concluded that the application of the Finnish 
CFC regime is contrary to a tax treaty.28 Moreover, it is, in my opinion, highly 
questionable whether the decision can be based on amendments to the OECD-
Commentary which were made after the conclusion of the Finland-Belgium tax 
treaty.29 I will go into more detail of the latter aspects - and my position in this respect 
- later on.  
                                            
24 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1071, 1072. 
25 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1073. 
26 See with respect to the A Oyj Abp Case (and the criticism) also Helminen in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / 
Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, page 204 et seq. 
27 In contrast to Helminen (see above) who took the position that the classification of the attributable income as 
dividend income or other income instead of business profits would have been more appropriate (Helminen, page 
212). However, see in this respect the different positions of Aigner and Lang. Both take the position that the 
income is to be classified as dividend income instead of business income. “Die Anwendung des Art 7 OECD-MA 
auf die dem Gesellschafter hinzugerechneten Einkünfte vermag aber (…) im Anwendungsbereich des Art 10 
OECD-MA für Dividenden nicht zu überzeugen“ (Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, 
page 126; see also Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International, 2002, page 
407 et seq. (413, 414)). “Meines Erachtens zeigt die Analyse der in Betracht kommenden 
Abkommensvorschriften, dass die besten Argumente für die Anwendung der Art. 10 OECD-MA sprechen, 
wonach die Staaten, die das CFC-Regime anwenden, als Ansässigkeitsstaaten auch das Besteuerungsrecht 
haben” (Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 
717 et seq. (721)).  
28 Helminen in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, page 
207. 
29 See in this respect also Lang who considers the outcome of the case to be more convincing than the reasoning. 
The reference to the OECD-Commentary is, according to Lang, “doubtful” (see Lang, CFC-Regelungen und 
   
 
paragraph concerning CFC legislation in 1992. However, the amendments to the 
Commentary were based on a study of the OECD published in 1987 which dealt with 
CFC legislation within the OECD.18 The Court held that the applicability of CFC 
legislation is not restricted in situations where the relevant tax treaty does not contain 
a provision explicitly permitting the application of such legislation. This applies 
particularly to tax treaties which were concluded before national CFC legislation was 
adopted in the tax system of the relevant contracting state.19 
 
For the purpose of applying the Finland-Belgium tax treaty the income is to be 
considered business income and not dividend income according to the 
aforementioned characterisation. This is due to the fact that the tax treaty itself does 
not contain any definition of business income and therefore a definition is derived 
from national law.20 According to Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty between Finland and 
Belgium, the profits of an enterprise of a contracting state shall be taxable only in that 
state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state through 
a permanent establishment situated therein. If this is the case, the profits of the 
enterprise may be taxed in the other contracting state but only so much of them as 
are attributable to that permanent establishment. Article 5 (1) of the tax treaty 
between Finland and Belgium defines a permanent establishment as a fixed place of 
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. 
However, there is agreement that there is no permanent establishment of the Belgian 
subsidiary in Finland.21 
 
The question remains whether Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty between Finland and 
Belgium prevents the taxation of A under the Finnish CFC Act. In this respect, the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court strongly focused on paragraphs 22 to 26 of the 
Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC. I will go into detail of these paragraphs 
below. The application of CFC legislation falls within the category of counteracting 
measures referred to in paragraph 25 and paragraph 7 of the Commentary. However, 
the extension of counteracting measures to active business would be – according to 
paragraph 26 – contrary to the spirit and the principles underlying the OECD-MTC.22 
Pursuant to the Court, the fact that the quoted paragraphs – especially paragraph 26 
– was only later introduced23 into the Commentary does not prevent the use of the 
Commentary as an auxiliary source of interpretation. The taxation in the hands of two 
different taxable persons is not in general contrary to the tax treaty since tax treaties 
are basically concerned with juridical double taxation and not with economic double 
taxation. Paragraph 23 of the Commentary to Article 1 may, in itself, be concerned 
with economic double taxation. As it is noted in the Commentary that the large 
majority of the member countries is of the opinion that the application of CFC does 
not conflict with the articles of a tax treaty, one may reach the conclusion that the 
Finnish CFC Act is similar to the CFC legislation of other OECD countries. The Court 
concluded that according to the Commentary to the Model Tax Convention, and 
taking paragraph 7 of the Commentary to Article 1 into consideration, a tax treaty that 
is based on the OECD-MTC (as it is the case for the Finland-Belgium tax treaty) must 
admit the possibility of using CFC legislation, save where that tax treaty contains 
                                            
18 OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies (1987). 
19 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1067. 
20 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1068. 
21 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1068, 1069.  
22 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1070. 
23 In 1992. 
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provisions to the contrary. Article 7 (1) of the Finland-Belgium tax treaty does 
therefore not prevent the taxation of A under the Finnish CFC Act.24 Finland taxes the 
shareholder situated in Finland on income derived from a CFC, not the company 
situated in a tax treaty country. Finland is entitled to do so on the basis of its own 
national law and the provisions of the tax treaty between Finland and Belgium do not 
prevent such taxation. This does not amount to juridical double taxation. From the 
standpoint of Finnish taxation, double taxation does not arise because the tax on the 
CFC income does not exceed the amount which would have been collected if the 
CFC had not been established and its activities had been carried out in Finland or 
through a branch situated abroad. This ensures capital export neutrality from the 
perspective of domestic taxation.25  
 
From my perspective, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court deals, in general, 
with all of the aspects which are of importance for the question whether the CFC 
regime is in line with the Finland-Belgium tax treaty or not.26 The most significant 
conclusion is, in my opinion, the fact that the Court confirmed that the income 
calculated pursuant to the CFC regime in Finland is not identical to the income 
derived by the subsidiary company in Belgium and, therefore, the income attribution 
does not lead to a juridical double taxation, but merely to an economic double 
taxation of income. The latter, however, is not within the scope of the tax treaty - I will 
come back to that aspect again later on. Moreover, it is also interesting to see that - 
for tax treaty purposes - the Court classified the attributable income, with reference to 
Finnish domestic legislation, as business income and not as dividend income. In 
principle, I fully agree with the classification as business income,27 but the method of 
classifying the income is, in my opinion, not completely made clear by the decision. It 
remains open whether the attributable income is to be classified as business income 
in general or only under certain circumstances. Pursuant to Helminen, the wording of 
the Supreme Administrative Court was selected very carefully and it may leave room 
for situations where it may have to be concluded that the application of the Finnish 
CFC regime is contrary to a tax treaty.28 Moreover, it is, in my opinion, highly 
questionable whether the decision can be based on amendments to the OECD-
Commentary which were made after the conclusion of the Finland-Belgium tax 
treaty.29 I will go into more detail of the latter aspects - and my position in this respect 
- later on.  
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paragraph concerning CFC legislation in 1992. However, the amendments to the 
Commentary were based on a study of the OECD published in 1987 which dealt with 
CFC legislation within the OECD.18 The Court held that the applicability of CFC 
legislation is not restricted in situations where the relevant tax treaty does not contain 
a provision explicitly permitting the application of such legislation. This applies 
particularly to tax treaties which were concluded before national CFC legislation was 
adopted in the tax system of the relevant contracting state.19 
 
For the purpose of applying the Finland-Belgium tax treaty the income is to be 
considered business income and not dividend income according to the 
aforementioned characterisation. This is due to the fact that the tax treaty itself does 
not contain any definition of business income and therefore a definition is derived 
from national law.20 According to Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty between Finland and 
Belgium, the profits of an enterprise of a contracting state shall be taxable only in that 
state unless the enterprise carries on business in the other contracting state through 
a permanent establishment situated therein. If this is the case, the profits of the 
enterprise may be taxed in the other contracting state but only so much of them as 
are attributable to that permanent establishment. Article 5 (1) of the tax treaty 
between Finland and Belgium defines a permanent establishment as a fixed place of 
business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on. 
However, there is agreement that there is no permanent establishment of the Belgian 
subsidiary in Finland.21 
 
The question remains whether Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty between Finland and 
Belgium prevents the taxation of A under the Finnish CFC Act. In this respect, the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court strongly focused on paragraphs 22 to 26 of the 
Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC. I will go into detail of these paragraphs 
below. The application of CFC legislation falls within the category of counteracting 
measures referred to in paragraph 25 and paragraph 7 of the Commentary. However, 
the extension of counteracting measures to active business would be – according to 
paragraph 26 – contrary to the spirit and the principles underlying the OECD-MTC.22 
Pursuant to the Court, the fact that the quoted paragraphs – especially paragraph 26 
– was only later introduced23 into the Commentary does not prevent the use of the 
Commentary as an auxiliary source of interpretation. The taxation in the hands of two 
different taxable persons is not in general contrary to the tax treaty since tax treaties 
are basically concerned with juridical double taxation and not with economic double 
taxation. Paragraph 23 of the Commentary to Article 1 may, in itself, be concerned 
with economic double taxation. As it is noted in the Commentary that the large 
majority of the member countries is of the opinion that the application of CFC does 
not conflict with the articles of a tax treaty, one may reach the conclusion that the 
Finnish CFC Act is similar to the CFC legislation of other OECD countries. The Court 
concluded that according to the Commentary to the Model Tax Convention, and 
taking paragraph 7 of the Commentary to Article 1 into consideration, a tax treaty that 
is based on the OECD-MTC (as it is the case for the Finland-Belgium tax treaty) must 
admit the possibility of using CFC legislation, save where that tax treaty contains 
                                            
18 OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies (1987). 
19 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1067. 
20 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1068. 
21 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1068, 1069.  
22 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1070. 
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was a pure holding company and its sole activity consisted of the holding and 
management of bonds and securities. Schneider tax returns were audited by the 
French tax authorities. As a result of the inspection, Schneider was required by the 
French tax authorities to pay additional corporate income tax on the profits made by 
the Swiss subsidiary in 1986 under Section 209 B of the French Tax Code.31  
 
After unsuccessfully opposing the reassessment, Schneider brought the case to trial. 
The Lower Tax Court of Paris confirmed the view of the tax authorities in its 
decision32 and ruled – in line with a previous decision33 – that Section 209 B did not 
violate the France-Switzerland tax treaty. The judges considered that Section 209 B 
does neither lead to a juridical nor to an economic double taxation. The argument 
against a juridical double taxation, i.e. a double taxation of the same taxpayer on the 
same income by at least two different countries, is basically that the tax is imposed 
on the French corporation and not on the CFC. Economic double taxation is 
eliminated by offsetting taxes of the same nature paid by the CFC outside France 
against the French corporate tax.34 In addition, one of the purposes of the tax treaty, 
to combat tax avoidance, can also be achieved through the domestic CFC legislation. 
 
Schneider appealed to the Paris Court of Appeals with two arguments: (i) the Swiss 
corporation should benefit from the “safe haven clause” of Section 209 B-II, and (ii) 
Section 209 B-I was incompatible with the France-Switzerland tax treaty. The safe 
haven clause of Section 209 B-II would enable the Schneider corporation to avoid the 
application of Section 209 B-I. However, Schneider was not able to demonstrate that 
the Swiss subsidiary had substantial commercial or industrial activities in the Swiss 
market with unrelated parties. As already mentioned above, Paramer was a pure 
holding company and its sole activity consisted of the management of portfolio 
securities. The Court confirmed the tax authorities’ view that a pure holding company 
is not within the scope of Section 209 B-II.35  
 
The second argument was more important: The France-Switzerland tax treaty of 
September 1966 stipulates in Article 7 (1) that “the profits of (a Swiss) enterprise (...) 
shall be taxable only in (Switzerland) unless the enterprise carries out a business in 
(France) through a permanent establishment situated therein.” The Court concluded 
that pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the France-Switzerland tax treaty France was not in a 
position to tax the profits of the Swiss subsidiary, because Paramer did not carry out 
business in France through a permanent establishment. The treaty must therefore 
prevail over the domestic CFC legislation and even the need by one contracting state 
to fight international tax avoidance could not authorise a violation of the tax treaty. 
There is nothing included in the tax treaty that permits any derogation of the treaty’s 
profit allocation rules. The decision of the Paris Court of Appeals36 is consistent with 
previous decisions rendered by two French lower tax courts.37 
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31 ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, page 1077. 
32 Lower Tax Court of Paris, dated February 13, 1996. 
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L’article 209 B est-il soluble dans le droit fiscal international?, Revue de droit fiscal 2001, page 333 ; Amonn, 
   
 
7.2.2. The Schneider Case (France) 
 
Schneider Electric, a French corporation, was a 100 percent shareholder of Paramer, 
a Swiss corporation established in the canton of Geneva.30 The Swiss corporation 
                                                                                                                                         
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et seq. (723) and Lang, CFC 
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was a pure holding company and its sole activity consisted of the holding and 
management of bonds and securities. Schneider tax returns were audited by the 
French tax authorities. As a result of the inspection, Schneider was required by the 
French tax authorities to pay additional corporate income tax on the profits made by 
the Swiss subsidiary in 1986 under Section 209 B of the French Tax Code.31  
 
After unsuccessfully opposing the reassessment, Schneider brought the case to trial. 
The Lower Tax Court of Paris confirmed the view of the tax authorities in its 
decision32 and ruled – in line with a previous decision33 – that Section 209 B did not 
violate the France-Switzerland tax treaty. The judges considered that Section 209 B 
does neither lead to a juridical nor to an economic double taxation. The argument 
against a juridical double taxation, i.e. a double taxation of the same taxpayer on the 
same income by at least two different countries, is basically that the tax is imposed 
on the French corporation and not on the CFC. Economic double taxation is 
eliminated by offsetting taxes of the same nature paid by the CFC outside France 
against the French corporate tax.34 In addition, one of the purposes of the tax treaty, 
to combat tax avoidance, can also be achieved through the domestic CFC legislation. 
 
Schneider appealed to the Paris Court of Appeals with two arguments: (i) the Swiss 
corporation should benefit from the “safe haven clause” of Section 209 B-II, and (ii) 
Section 209 B-I was incompatible with the France-Switzerland tax treaty. The safe 
haven clause of Section 209 B-II would enable the Schneider corporation to avoid the 
application of Section 209 B-I. However, Schneider was not able to demonstrate that 
the Swiss subsidiary had substantial commercial or industrial activities in the Swiss 
market with unrelated parties. As already mentioned above, Paramer was a pure 
holding company and its sole activity consisted of the management of portfolio 
securities. The Court confirmed the tax authorities’ view that a pure holding company 
is not within the scope of Section 209 B-II.35  
 
The second argument was more important: The France-Switzerland tax treaty of 
September 1966 stipulates in Article 7 (1) that “the profits of (a Swiss) enterprise (...) 
shall be taxable only in (Switzerland) unless the enterprise carries out a business in 
(France) through a permanent establishment situated therein.” The Court concluded 
that pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the France-Switzerland tax treaty France was not in a 
position to tax the profits of the Swiss subsidiary, because Paramer did not carry out 
business in France through a permanent establishment. The treaty must therefore 
prevail over the domestic CFC legislation and even the need by one contracting state 
to fight international tax avoidance could not authorise a violation of the tax treaty. 
There is nothing included in the tax treaty that permits any derogation of the treaty’s 
profit allocation rules. The decision of the Paris Court of Appeals36 is consistent with 
previous decisions rendered by two French lower tax courts.37 
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7.2.2. The Schneider Case (France) 
 
Schneider Electric, a French corporation, was a 100 percent shareholder of Paramer, 
a Swiss corporation established in the canton of Geneva.30 The Swiss corporation 
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The Court did not follow the deemed dividend approach of the government and 
stated that “it results from the exact terms of these provisions (Section 209 B) that 
their purpose is to allow the taxation in France of business profits generated by a 
corporation carrying out its activities abroad and not, contrary to the argument of the 
minister, the taxation of a deemed dividend distribution by the foreign corporation to 
its shareholder that is a resident in France.” For this characterisation, the Court 
referred to Article 3 (2) of the France-Switzerland tax treaty42 and consequently to 
French law. The Court followed the clear wording of the provision which refers to the 
taxation of “profitable results of the foreign company”43 determined according to 
French tax rules. The Court held that nothing under Section 209 B supported the 
characterisation of that income as a deemed dividend.  
 
The government counsel explained that - in case the income is characterised as 
business profits - Article 7 (1) is nevertheless not applicable. Article 7 (1) must be 
seen in conjunction with Article 5 of the France-Switzerland tax treaty regarding 
permanent establishments. In that context a double taxation, by France and 
Switzerland, of the same profits of a resident of one contracting state with no 
permanent establishment in the other contracting state shall be prevented. However, 
France does not tax a Swiss resident with no permanent establishment in France, but 
a French resident pursuant to Section 209 B. In addition, the profits realised by 
Schneider through its wholly owned subsidiary do not fall within the scope of Article 7 
(1), which applies only to profits made directly by a resident of one contracting state. 
Essentially, the income attributed to the French shareholder must be distinguished 
from the profit of the CFC. There is no taxation of a permanent establishment and 
there is no taxation of a Swiss subsidiary in France. These arguments have to be 
seen together with the purpose of the OECD Model Tax Convention to eliminate 
juridical double taxation, i.e. the taxation by two contracting states of the same 
income in the hand of the same taxpayer for the same taxable year.44  
 
The Court rejected these arguments and held that there were no legal grounds for 
distinguishing between the business profits of the CFC and the income attributable to 
the French corporate shareholder. There is an “identity of nature” between the profits 
of the Swiss subsidiary and the income under Section 209 B.45 The Court stated that 
“(t)he objective of eliminating double taxation which is attributed to this (France-
Switzerland) tax treaty does not justify a misapplication of the provisions quoted 
above on the sole ground that the taxation in France of the profits of the (Swiss) 
Paramer company is not carried out in the name of the Swiss company but in that of 
its parent company which is a separate legal entity and to whom these profits have 
                                            
42 Article 3 (2) of the France-Switzerland tax treaty is similar to Article 3 (2) of the OECD-MTC. 
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creditable in the proportion mentioned in the first paragraph against the tax imposed in France provided it is 
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The government appealed to the French Supreme Tax Court and raised three 
arguments: Firstly, Schneider was not entitled to invoke the provisions of the France-
Switzerland tax treaty since it is intended to eliminate “legal” (juridical) double 
taxation, i.e. the taxation by France and Switzerland of the same item of income in 
the hands of the same taxpayer for the same taxable year. The government argued 
that the French company which had to pay the French corporate tax under the CFC 
rules did not pay Swiss corporate tax on the same income. Therefore, no juridical 
double taxation occurred and the tax authorities did not violate the purpose of the tax 
treaty. Secondly, the decision of the Paris Court of Appeals relying on the profit 
allocation rules of Article 7 (1) of the treaty was an error in law. The attribution of 
income pursuant to Section 209 B is a deemed dividend rather than a business profit. 
What the CFC legislation seeks to attack is not profits resulting from the carrying on 
of business which should have been taxed in France, but the deliberate non-
distribution of their profits by subsidiaries of resident shareholders. There are no 
provisions included in the tax treaty which prevent the application of the French CFC 
rules. However, the government counsel explained that the deemed distribution does 
not constitute a dividend in the sense of Article 11 of the France-Switzerland tax 
treaty. This is due to a former judgement on the application of identical provisions of 
the France-Netherlands tax treaty where the Court held that dividends in the sense of 
this provision must be defined according to the definition given in internal law of the 
notion of dividends as “earnings distributed by a company to its participants by virtue 
of a decision taken by the general assembly of its shareholders.” 38 That is not what 
is understood in the case of deemed distributions taxed by virtue of Article 209 B. 
Therefore, the government counsel concluded that Article 23 of the France-
Switzerland tax treaty39 is applicable with the effect that, nevertheless, the taxing 
right is attributed to France.40 Thus, the CFC taxation is in line with the conclusion of 
the OECD base companies report which states in paragraph 45 that “if the 
counteracting measures have the effect of taxing a deemed dividend of a base 
company, this is well within the taxing rights conferred on the taxpayers country of 
residence under the rules of tax treaties regarding taxation of dividends.” 41 Article 7 
(1) of the France-Switzerland tax treaty is therefore not applicable in the underlying 
case. Thirdly, the Paris Court of Appeals ignored the aim of the treaty to combat 
international tax avoidance. 
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company, this is well within the taxing rights conferred on the taxpayers country of 
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the income (because the Swiss subsidiary company did not have a permanent 
establishment in France which would otherwise have allowed the latter state to tax 
such profits). I cannot follow the approach of the French Supreme Tax Court with 
respect to the non-acceptance of the separation between juridical and economic 
double taxation. International juridical double taxation is defined as “the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the 
same subject matter and for identical periods.”52 However, it is apparent, in my 
opinion, that the French parent company and the Swiss subsidiary company have to 
be seen, in the context of the respective double tax convention, as two different 
persons (and taxpayers). Thus, the requirement of “the same taxpayer” is not fulfilled. 
What remains is an economic double taxation, i.e. “the imposition of taxes in two (or 
more) States on the same economic transaction, item of income or capital during the 
same period, but in the hands of different taxpayers.”53 The fact that one state 
(France) establishes a link within its domestic legislation to income derived through a 
foreign entity is not sufficient, in my opinion, to consider the differentiation to be 
“artificial.” Pursuant to Lang, it makes no difference from a tax treaty perspective 
whether the legislator stipulates a connection to the attributable income with an 
explicit reference to the income of the foreign entity or in an abstract way without 
such an explicit reference. This is not more than a “legislative technique” which is 
irrelevant for the qualification under the tax treaty. Moreover, there is no rule on the 
attribution of income in tax treaties which makes the decision of one of the two 
contracting states binding for the other contracting state. Both states are free to 
describe the circumstances which result in taxable income in their national 
legislation.54 Thus, it is in the discretion of each state to establish such a link as long 
as it does not lead to a circumvention of the allocation of taxing rights stipulated in 
the respective double tax convention - which, in my opinion, is not true in case of 
CFC taxation. There might be an “identity of nature” - in the sense that the profit of 
the foreign company and the income of the shareholder (based on the CFC rules) are 
related to one and the same income-producing process - but the income is 
nonetheless allocated to two different taxpayers by two different states. Overall, from 
my perspective, the application of the French CFC regime neither leads to a juridical 
double taxation nor does the concept of CFC taxation (and the link to the income 
derived through the foreign company) allow the conclusion that the differentiation 
between the two types of international double taxation is to be considered an artificial 
differentiation. Hence, what remains is the question whether international economic 
double taxation is within the scope of the respective double tax convention. If the tax 
treaty follows the lines of the OECD-MTC, it is necessary to take into account, in this 
regard, the Commentary to the OECD-MTC. The Commentary on Article 1 of the 
OECD-MTC clearly refers to “(...) problems that arise in the field of international 
juridical double taxation”55 and the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the 
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not in fact been distributed. It follows that the court below did not commit an error in 
law in deciding that the provisions of art 7 of the Franco-Swiss tax treaty prevent the 
application of the provisions of art 209 B of the CGI.”46 Pursuant to the Court, the 
scope of the tax treaty is broader than just preventing the taxation by two countries of 
the same taxpayer for the same item of income and the same taxable period. With 
that view, the Court found the distinction between “juridical” and “economic” double 
taxation to be artificial.47 Due to the fact that the Swiss subsidiary had its effective 
place of management in Switzerland and did not carry out business activities in 
France through a permanent establishment, Article 7 (1) of the France-Switzerland 
tax treaty attributes the taxing rights to Switzerland and prevents the tax authorities in 
France from taxing that income under their CFC legislation. 
 
With regard to the argument of tax avoidance, the Court held that France cannot 
apply its domestic anti-avoidance legislation “(…) in the absence of express 
provisions” in the tax treaty.48 The aim of fighting tax avoidance cannot override the 
allocation rules unless it is clearly stipulated in the tax treaty. According to Aigner, the 
reference to the aim of fighting tax avoidance in the preamble of the tax treaty is not 
sufficient to deny tax treaty protection. In this respect, Aigner agrees with the position 
of the Court that express provisions in the tax treaty are required.49 A similar 
comment was made by Richter who stated that the preamble of a tax treaty is not a 
legal norm and therefore cannot transfer rights and obligations similar to the express 
provisions stipulated in the tax treaty.50 I fully agree with the latter positions. It would 
not be acceptable to deny tax treaty protection only on the basis of a general 
reference in the preamble. However, whether this conclusion will finally be of 
importance for the application of CFC rules is a different question which will be 
answered in this chapter. 
 
In any event, the decision of the French Supreme Tax Court in the Schneider Case is 
an important decision with significant consequences for the French CFC legislation. 
Commentators even considered the decision to be one of the “great sentences” of 
the French jurisprudence in the field of international taxation.51 However, in my 
opinion, the decision can also be regarded as an exceptional decision. The main 
reason for considering the decision as an exceptional one is the fact that the Court, in 
essence, rejected the differentiation between “juridical” and “economic” double 
taxation. Consistently, the “identity of nature” between the profits of the subsidiary in 
Switzerland and the income pursuant to the CFC regime prevents France from taxing 
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the income (because the Swiss subsidiary company did not have a permanent 
establishment in France which would otherwise have allowed the latter state to tax 
such profits). I cannot follow the approach of the French Supreme Tax Court with 
respect to the non-acceptance of the separation between juridical and economic 
double taxation. International juridical double taxation is defined as “the imposition of 
comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the same taxpayer in respect of the 
same subject matter and for identical periods.”52 However, it is apparent, in my 
opinion, that the French parent company and the Swiss subsidiary company have to 
be seen, in the context of the respective double tax convention, as two different 
persons (and taxpayers). Thus, the requirement of “the same taxpayer” is not fulfilled. 
What remains is an economic double taxation, i.e. “the imposition of taxes in two (or 
more) States on the same economic transaction, item of income or capital during the 
same period, but in the hands of different taxpayers.”53 The fact that one state 
(France) establishes a link within its domestic legislation to income derived through a 
foreign entity is not sufficient, in my opinion, to consider the differentiation to be 
“artificial.” Pursuant to Lang, it makes no difference from a tax treaty perspective 
whether the legislator stipulates a connection to the attributable income with an 
explicit reference to the income of the foreign entity or in an abstract way without 
such an explicit reference. This is not more than a “legislative technique” which is 
irrelevant for the qualification under the tax treaty. Moreover, there is no rule on the 
attribution of income in tax treaties which makes the decision of one of the two 
contracting states binding for the other contracting state. Both states are free to 
describe the circumstances which result in taxable income in their national 
legislation.54 Thus, it is in the discretion of each state to establish such a link as long 
as it does not lead to a circumvention of the allocation of taxing rights stipulated in 
the respective double tax convention - which, in my opinion, is not true in case of 
CFC taxation. There might be an “identity of nature” - in the sense that the profit of 
the foreign company and the income of the shareholder (based on the CFC rules) are 
related to one and the same income-producing process - but the income is 
nonetheless allocated to two different taxpayers by two different states. Overall, from 
my perspective, the application of the French CFC regime neither leads to a juridical 
double taxation nor does the concept of CFC taxation (and the link to the income 
derived through the foreign company) allow the conclusion that the differentiation 
between the two types of international double taxation is to be considered an artificial 
differentiation. Hence, what remains is the question whether international economic 
double taxation is within the scope of the respective double tax convention. If the tax 
treaty follows the lines of the OECD-MTC, it is necessary to take into account, in this 
regard, the Commentary to the OECD-MTC. The Commentary on Article 1 of the 
OECD-MTC clearly refers to “(...) problems that arise in the field of international 
juridical double taxation”55 and the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the 
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not in fact been distributed. It follows that the court below did not commit an error in 
law in deciding that the provisions of art 7 of the Franco-Swiss tax treaty prevent the 
application of the provisions of art 209 B of the CGI.”46 Pursuant to the Court, the 
scope of the tax treaty is broader than just preventing the taxation by two countries of 
the same taxpayer for the same item of income and the same taxable period. With 
that view, the Court found the distinction between “juridical” and “economic” double 
taxation to be artificial.47 Due to the fact that the Swiss subsidiary had its effective 
place of management in Switzerland and did not carry out business activities in 
France through a permanent establishment, Article 7 (1) of the France-Switzerland 
tax treaty attributes the taxing rights to Switzerland and prevents the tax authorities in 
France from taxing that income under their CFC legislation. 
 
With regard to the argument of tax avoidance, the Court held that France cannot 
apply its domestic anti-avoidance legislation “(…) in the absence of express 
provisions” in the tax treaty.48 The aim of fighting tax avoidance cannot override the 
allocation rules unless it is clearly stipulated in the tax treaty. According to Aigner, the 
reference to the aim of fighting tax avoidance in the preamble of the tax treaty is not 
sufficient to deny tax treaty protection. In this respect, Aigner agrees with the position 
of the Court that express provisions in the tax treaty are required.49 A similar 
comment was made by Richter who stated that the preamble of a tax treaty is not a 
legal norm and therefore cannot transfer rights and obligations similar to the express 
provisions stipulated in the tax treaty.50 I fully agree with the latter positions. It would 
not be acceptable to deny tax treaty protection only on the basis of a general 
reference in the preamble. However, whether this conclusion will finally be of 
importance for the application of CFC rules is a different question which will be 
answered in this chapter. 
 
In any event, the decision of the French Supreme Tax Court in the Schneider Case is 
an important decision with significant consequences for the French CFC legislation. 
Commentators even considered the decision to be one of the “great sentences” of 
the French jurisprudence in the field of international taxation.51 However, in my 
opinion, the decision can also be regarded as an exceptional decision. The main 
reason for considering the decision as an exceptional one is the fact that the Court, in 
essence, rejected the differentiation between “juridical” and “economic” double 
taxation. Consistently, the “identity of nature” between the profits of the subsidiary in 
Switzerland and the income pursuant to the CFC regime prevents France from taxing 
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the French CFC regime does not create a double taxation. The latter regime 
authorises the French corporation to deduct the equivalent taxes imposed abroad 
from its benefits. Looking at the position of Lessambo and Gutmann, it seems to me 
that “a balance” can be found between the two positions. Juridical double taxation 
was defined as “the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the 
same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.”64 I 
have already made it clear that, in my opinion, a juridical double taxation does not 
exist in this case and, for this reason, I cannot follow the position of Lessambo in this 
respect. However, CFC taxation results in an economic double taxation and it is not 
unlikely, as I have outlined in chapter 6, that complete relief from double taxation 
cannot be achieved. For this reason, the criticism which is directed towards an 
unsymmetrical CFC regime is clearly to be supported.   
 
However, it was Vogel who congratulated the Supreme Tax Court on its decision. In 
his view, the decision calls in mind that it is indeed the income of the foreign entity 
which is taxed in France and that such taxation is contrary to the basic principles of 
tax treaty law.65 This, of course, can be seen as a more general criticism of the 
concept of CFC taxation. According to the analysis of Gutmann, Danon and Salome, 
the French CFC regime refers, at the point in time relevant for the decision, to the 
profits of the foreign entity.66 For this reason they concluded that it is consistent, in 
the absence of a permanent establishment, that France does not have the right to tax 
the income of the foreign entity.67 However, the French CFC legislation was 
subsequently amended and based on the revised wording of article 209B the 
attributed income is deemed to constitute a profit of the parent company in France (in 
contrast to the wording which was relevant for the decision in the Schneider Case 
and which, in essence, qualified the attributed income to be the beneficiary result of 
the foreign entity). Here, Gutmann, Danon and Salome raised the question whether 
the revised wording has any consequence or whether the difference is only formal - 
as it was basically suggested by Dibout who considered the difference in the wording 
to be of no significance at all. Finally, Gutmann, Danon and Salome concluded that it 
is possible to be seen as just a formal difference, but “it is not obvious.”68 Here, I will 
not go into further detail of the domestic qualification of CFC income under French 
law and the question whether the domestic qualification should have any influence on 
the income allocation rules under the tax treaties. This question will be verified in 
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OECD-MTC stipulates that “these Articles deal with the so-called juridical double 
taxation (...). This case has to be distinguished especially from the so-called 
economic double taxation (...). If two States wish to solve the problems of economic 
double taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations.”56 Therefore, a double tax 
convention which is based on the OECD-MTC does not, in general, encompass the 
avoidance of international economic double taxation. Hence, I cannot agree with the 
outcome of the Schneider Case since the France-Switzerland double tax convention 
neither explicitly referred to a non-application of the French CFC regime in the 
relationship of the two states nor to an extension of the tax treaty to the avoidance of 
international economic double taxation.57   
 
In tax literature, there are a great number of articles which focus on the description of 
the decision in the Schneider Case and the possible consequences, especially with 
respect to the (specific) French tax treaty situation.58 Here, I will not go into further 
detail of these articles and the tax treaty situation of France. Instead, I will refer to 
some commentators which made more general comments and remarks which might 
be of relevance in the context of this chapter as well. For example, according to 
Mbwa-Mboma, the decision of the Conseil d’Etat is welcome because it confirms the 
precedence of tax treaties over domestic rules and protects the useful effect of the 
profit allocation rules under the tax treaties. Mbwa-Mboma further concluded that in 
order to overcome the strict business profits characterisation of CFC income the 
government might change the tax law and treat the income as a deemed dividend.59 
Donsimoni made the same proposal by suggesting that the definition of foreign 
source income should refer to deemed distributed income.60 Pouletty confirmed that 
the decision is of importance as it clearly defines the relationship between domestic 
laws and tax treaties.61 The article of Lessambo refers to the question of juridical vs. 
economic double taxation.62 Lessambo concluded that there is an issue of juridical 
double taxation (or legal double taxation) by “grasping” the same benefits from the 
taxpayer twice. First, from the French corporation and, second, from the foreign 
corporation via the French corporation, according to the proportion held in the foreign 
company. Lessambo did not go into more detail of his conclusion to the juridical 
double taxation. Instead, he proceeded to criticise, in my opinion correctly, the biased 
nature of the CFC regime, e.g. by not reflecting appropriately the losses of the foreign 
entity under the French CFC regime. In his opinion, the biased nature of CFC 
legislation was not considered appropriately in the decision. In fact, the statement of 
Lessambo was a direct response to the comments of Gutmann - made in the context 
of the decision of the Paris Court of Appeals.63 Gutmann concluded that “in strict law” 
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the French CFC regime does not create a double taxation. The latter regime 
authorises the French corporation to deduct the equivalent taxes imposed abroad 
from its benefits. Looking at the position of Lessambo and Gutmann, it seems to me 
that “a balance” can be found between the two positions. Juridical double taxation 
was defined as “the imposition of comparable taxes in two (or more) States on the 
same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods.”64 I 
have already made it clear that, in my opinion, a juridical double taxation does not 
exist in this case and, for this reason, I cannot follow the position of Lessambo in this 
respect. However, CFC taxation results in an economic double taxation and it is not 
unlikely, as I have outlined in chapter 6, that complete relief from double taxation 
cannot be achieved. For this reason, the criticism which is directed towards an 
unsymmetrical CFC regime is clearly to be supported.   
 
However, it was Vogel who congratulated the Supreme Tax Court on its decision. In 
his view, the decision calls in mind that it is indeed the income of the foreign entity 
which is taxed in France and that such taxation is contrary to the basic principles of 
tax treaty law.65 This, of course, can be seen as a more general criticism of the 
concept of CFC taxation. According to the analysis of Gutmann, Danon and Salome, 
the French CFC regime refers, at the point in time relevant for the decision, to the 
profits of the foreign entity.66 For this reason they concluded that it is consistent, in 
the absence of a permanent establishment, that France does not have the right to tax 
the income of the foreign entity.67 However, the French CFC legislation was 
subsequently amended and based on the revised wording of article 209B the 
attributed income is deemed to constitute a profit of the parent company in France (in 
contrast to the wording which was relevant for the decision in the Schneider Case 
and which, in essence, qualified the attributed income to be the beneficiary result of 
the foreign entity). Here, Gutmann, Danon and Salome raised the question whether 
the revised wording has any consequence or whether the difference is only formal - 
as it was basically suggested by Dibout who considered the difference in the wording 
to be of no significance at all. Finally, Gutmann, Danon and Salome concluded that it 
is possible to be seen as just a formal difference, but “it is not obvious.”68 Here, I will 
not go into further detail of the domestic qualification of CFC income under French 
law and the question whether the domestic qualification should have any influence on 
the income allocation rules under the tax treaties. This question will be verified in 
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OECD-MTC stipulates that “these Articles deal with the so-called juridical double 
taxation (...). This case has to be distinguished especially from the so-called 
economic double taxation (...). If two States wish to solve the problems of economic 
double taxation, they must do so in bilateral negotiations.”56 Therefore, a double tax 
convention which is based on the OECD-MTC does not, in general, encompass the 
avoidance of international economic double taxation. Hence, I cannot agree with the 
outcome of the Schneider Case since the France-Switzerland double tax convention 
neither explicitly referred to a non-application of the French CFC regime in the 
relationship of the two states nor to an extension of the tax treaty to the avoidance of 
international economic double taxation.57   
 
In tax literature, there are a great number of articles which focus on the description of 
the decision in the Schneider Case and the possible consequences, especially with 
respect to the (specific) French tax treaty situation.58 Here, I will not go into further 
detail of these articles and the tax treaty situation of France. Instead, I will refer to 
some commentators which made more general comments and remarks which might 
be of relevance in the context of this chapter as well. For example, according to 
Mbwa-Mboma, the decision of the Conseil d’Etat is welcome because it confirms the 
precedence of tax treaties over domestic rules and protects the useful effect of the 
profit allocation rules under the tax treaties. Mbwa-Mboma further concluded that in 
order to overcome the strict business profits characterisation of CFC income the 
government might change the tax law and treat the income as a deemed dividend.59 
Donsimoni made the same proposal by suggesting that the definition of foreign 
source income should refer to deemed distributed income.60 Pouletty confirmed that 
the decision is of importance as it clearly defines the relationship between domestic 
laws and tax treaties.61 The article of Lessambo refers to the question of juridical vs. 
economic double taxation.62 Lessambo concluded that there is an issue of juridical 
double taxation (or legal double taxation) by “grasping” the same benefits from the 
taxpayer twice. First, from the French corporation and, second, from the foreign 
corporation via the French corporation, according to the proportion held in the foreign 
company. Lessambo did not go into more detail of his conclusion to the juridical 
double taxation. Instead, he proceeded to criticise, in my opinion correctly, the biased 
nature of the CFC regime, e.g. by not reflecting appropriately the losses of the foreign 
entity under the French CFC regime. In his opinion, the biased nature of CFC 
legislation was not considered appropriately in the decision. In fact, the statement of 
Lessambo was a direct response to the comments of Gutmann - made in the context 
of the decision of the Paris Court of Appeals.63 Gutmann concluded that “in strict law” 
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CFC and its “creditable tax.”72 Pursuant to the CFC regime, “a sum equal to 
corporation tax at the appropriate rate on that apportioned amount of profits, less the 
portion of the (CFC’s) creditable tax for that period (if any) which is apportioned to the 
resident company, shall be assessed on and recovered from the resident company 
as if it were an amount of corporation tax chargeable on that company.” 73 The 
“appropriate rate” is defined as the rate of corporation tax applicable to the resident 
company for its accounting period in which the accounting period of the CFC ends.74 
The “chargeable profits” are defined as the “total profits” of the CFC, excluding capital 
gains, calculated in accordance with the assumptions in Schedule 24.75 The Special 
Commissioners considered the CFC regime a three-stage process: First, chargeable 
profits are computed in accordance with the various assumptions in Schedule 24; 
secondly, the profits are apportioned to the persons having an interest in the CFC; 
and thirdly, certain United Kingdom corporations are assessed based on the 
chargeable profits less the creditable tax apportioned to them. Pursuant to the 
Special Commissioner, the interest lost its original character at the first stage of the 
process and became one ingredient in the determination of the chargeable profits of 
the CFC.76 
 
The main argument of the taxpayer before the Court of Appeal was that the amount 
apportioned in stage two of the process was the chargeable profits of Spinneys and 
that these chargeable profits included exempt United Kingdom-source income. 
However, the Court of Appeal compared the CFC provisions with a deeming 
provision in two earlier cases77 and came to the conclusion that “the interest received 
by Spinneys is not included in the sum apportioned to the taxpayer on which tax is 
chargeable. It merely provides a measure by which an element in a conventional or 
notional sum is calculated, and it is that conventional or notional sum which is 
apportioned to the taxpayer and on which tax is charged.” 78    
 
Sandler raised the question whether it would have been better to base the arguments 
on Article 7 (1) or Article 10 (7) of the United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty instead 
of Article 11.79 The same question was raised by Clayson with regard to Article 7 (1) 
of the United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty.80 Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty states 
that “the profits of an enterprise of one of the States shall be taxable only in that 
State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as 
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so 
much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment.” Since Spinneys did 
not have a permanent establishment in the United Kingdom, the profits should be 
excluded from United Kingdom taxation. Article 10 (7) states in part “where a 
company which is a resident in one of the States derives profits or income from the 
other State, that other State may not (...) subject the company’s undistributed profits 
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7.2.3. The Bricom Holdings Case (The United Kingdom) 
 
The Bricom Holdings Case69 is dated before the French Schneider Case and the 
Finnish A Oyj Abp Case. Bricom Holdings Ltd. (Bricom) was the 100 percent 
shareholder of a company incorporated and resident in the Netherlands, called 
Spinneys International BV (Spinneys). Spinneys was an investment holding 
company. Bricom was part of a United Kingdom based group of companies which 
were, directly or indirectly, 100 percent shareholders of Spinneys. The companies in 
the United Kingdom borrowed substantial sums of money from Spinneys and paid 
interest thereon which represented a substantial portion of Spinneys profits. Bricom – 
as the direct 100 percent shareholder of the subsidiary in the Netherlands – was 
assessed under the United Kingdom CFC regime.70 
 
Bricom filed an appeal against the assessment on the grounds that the assessment 
included amounts that were excluded from tax in the United Kingdom under the 1980 
United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty. Article 11 (1) of the tax treaty provides that 
“interest arising in one of the States which is derived and beneficially owned by a 
resident of the other State shall be taxable only in that other State.” According to 
Bricom, the effect of the assessment under the CFC regime was to tax interest 
arising in the United Kingdom that was beneficially owned by a resident of the 
Netherlands and that this amount was exempt from tax in the United Kingdom under 
Article 11 of the United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty.71 The assessment was 
defended by arguing that the tax according to the CFC regime was based on a 
“wholly notional amount” and not on the interest income of the subsidiary in the 
Netherlands. Therefore, Article 11 of the tax treaty was not applicable. In addition, the 
CFC regime was not a corporation tax or a substantially similar tax which would be 
necessary to qualify for relief under the treaty. These arguments were based on the 
technical language of the CFC provisions which mentioned “chargeable profits” of the 
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its understanding of the effect of the provisions is so obviously correct that no one had considered it worthwhile 
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should result in the obligation of the United Kingdom to exempt income arising in the 
United Kingdom which is beneficially owned by a resident of the Netherlands. If such 
income is not exempt from United Kingdom income tax and corporation tax, this will 
lead, according to Schwarz, to a breach of the tax treaty obligations.86        
 
In my opinion, what makes the Bricom Holdings Case to a certain extent different 
from the cases described above is the fact that the Court had to deal with the 
question whether certain types of income which are originally derived by the CFC 
itself might also be included in the attributable CFC income, i.e. whether, in this 
particular case, the interest income derived by the CFC can also be identified in the 
attributable income and whether this might have the consequence that the article in 
the double tax convention dealing with interest income may restrict the right to tax the 
attributed income.87 In my opinion, however, it is obvious that the income derived by 
the CFC itself - no matter what type of income it is - is different from the income 
which is attributable to the shareholder (parent company).88 This, again, is first of all 
due to the fact that two different taxpayers are involved and that these two taxpayers 
do not derive identical income. The attributable income may be linked to the activity 
and / or the income of the subsidiary company, but it remains income of a different 
person. In this respect, I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the attributable 
profit does not represent interest income or any other income derived by the 
subsidiary company. However, this does not answer the question whether the type of 
income is the same. Thus, even though the attributable income of the parent 
company is not identical to the income of the subsidiary company, it might still be the 
same type of income, e.g. business profits or interest income. The Court in the 
Bricom Holdings Case apparently neither considered the income (or part of the 
income) to be interest income nor dividend income, but concluded that the 
“chargeable profits” under national legislation are “a purely notional sum.” It is not, in 
my opinion, sufficiently clear what this classification means in the context of the 
respective tax treaty. It might be the case that the Court did not see the necessity to 
deal with this question in detail because of the fact that the “chargeable profits” are, 
pursuant to the Court, part of the business profits of the parent company - and 
therefore there might be no restriction on taxing the respective income. However, 
from my perspective, the necessity for a classification of the attributable income in 
the context of the respective tax treaty remains in order to determine whether the 
right to tax the latter income might be restricted or not. I will go into more detail of this 
aspect later on. 
 
7.2.4. The Captive Insurance Cases (Sweden) 
 
In Sweden, a number of cases are pending which deal with foreign captive insurance 
companies. On April 4, 2005 the Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings89 had to 
decide on two cases dealing with a Swedish parent company holding shares in a 
captive insurance company in Luxembourg and in Switzerland.90 The interesting 
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1997, page 553 et seq. (556, 557). 
87 According to Cristie / Sheiham the relationship between double tax conventions and CFC rules “is very limited 
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to a tax on the company’s undistributed profits, even if (...) the undistributed profits 
consist wholly or partly of profits or income arising in such other State.” Also in this 
case it could be argued that the United Kingdom cannot charge a tax on the 
undistributed profits of the subsidiary in the Netherlands. 
 
However, it seems that the Court of Appeal would also have rejected arguments 
based on Article 7 (1) and Article 10 (7) of the United Kingdom-Netherlands tax 
treaty. The Court held that “chargeable profits as defined by s. 747 (6) (a) are a 
purely notional sum. They do not represent any profits of Spinneys on which United 
Kingdom corporation tax is chargeable, for there are no such profits. Nor do they 
represent any actual payments or receipts of Spinneys, whether of interest or 
anything else. They are merely a product of a mathematical calculation made on a 
hypothetical basis and making counterfactual assumptions. The “chargeable profits” 
which are defined by s. 747 (6) (a) exist only as a measure of imputation. What is 
apportioned to the taxpayer company and subjected to tax is not Spinney’s actual 
profits but a notional sum which is the product of an artificial calculation.” 81  Clayson 
identified a “clear correlation” between the profits of the CFC and the attributed 
income under the CFC regime, but finally also concluded that it is probable that the 
Court of Appeal would have followed a similar reasoning, i.e. that the tax treaty would 
not restrict the taxation of the purely notional sum computed with reference to the 
profits of the CFC.82 Cristie and Sheiham highlighted in their conclusion the 
comments made by the Court of Appeal in relation to the statutory interpretation in 
this case. The Court must attempt to ascertain the intention of the Parliament from 
the words used in the light of the legislative purpose. The Court found that the 
assumptions which the CFC rules require are not additional assumptions to be made 
in combination with the actual facts, but rather the CFC rules require a substitution for 
the actual facts. In this respect, Spinneys should be assumed not to be resident in 
the Netherlands for the purposes of assessing its chargeable profits, so that relief 
under the tax treaty was not available.83 Venables concluded that if the CFC is 
deemed to be resident in the United Kingdom (just) by virtue of control, the 
chargeable profits should be nil. This is because even if the CFC were deemed to be 
resident in the United Kingdom, the CFC would still have its effective place of 
management abroad so that the dual residence article and other provisions of the tax 
treaty should exclude the profits from the hypothetical calculation.84 In response, 
Avery Jones, one of the two Special Commissioners in the Bricom Holdings Case, 
stated that the CFC is assumed to be resident by virtue of control by United Kingdom 
residents and not by reason of domicile, residence, place of management or any 
other criteria of a similar nature. Accordingly, there will be no dual residence in the 
context of CFC taxation.85  
 
Further criticism of the Bricom Holdings Case came from Schwarz. In his opinion, the 
terms of Article 11 (1) of the United Kingdom-Netherlands tax treaty are plain and 
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7.2.5. Excursion: Non-European Case Law 
 
The case law dealing with the compatibility of CFC legislation and tax treaties is, of 
course, not limited to European Member States. For this reason, I will also make a 
brief excursion to two decisions which dealt with the application of the Brazilian CFC 
legislation and the Japanese CFC legislation, respectively. 
 
The Brazilian decision was delivered on March 23, 2005 by the Eighth Chamber of 
the First Taxpayers’ Council.95 In the case at hand, Refratec Produtos Eletrofundidos 
(Refratec), a Brazilian company, held shares in two subsidiary holding companies 
established in Portugal and in Spain.96 Instead of distributing the profits to Refratec, 
the two subsidiary holding companies retained their profits. Based on the original 
Brazilian legislation dealing with controlled foreign companies, the profits made by 
the foreign subsidiary companies would only have to be included in the Brazilian tax 
base if they were actually distributed to the parent company. However, there were 
also cases of deemed distributions which had to be included in the tax base of the 
Brazilian company (since, in this case, foreign profits are deemed to be “made 
available” to the parent company). In the underlying case, the Portuguese subsidiary 
was involved in a transaction which gave rise to such a deemed distribution of profits 
pursuant to the Brazilian legislation. In this respect, the Council found that Article 7 of 
the tax treaty concluded between Brazil and Portugal does not prevent Brazil from 
taxing the deemed distribution of profits.97  
 
What makes the case interesting, however, is the fact that the Brazilian legislation 
was subsequently amended. The amended provision establishes an absolute 
presumption that foreign profits are distributed to the Brazilian company: “(...) profits 
generated by foreign controlled or affiliate companies will be considered available to 
the Brazilian controlling company on the date of the balance sheet in which such 
profits have been accrued in the form (to be) established in the regulations.”98 In 
effect, the profits accrued until December 31, 2001 are considered to be distributed 
on December 31, 2002, and the profits derived in subsequent years are deemed to 
be made available (fictitiously) at the end of the respective fiscal year.99 Such an 
absolute presumption, of course, is a typical element of CFC regimes. In the Refratec 
decision, the undistributed profits of the Spanish subsidiary were attributed, based on 
the amended legislation, to the Brazilian parent company. The taxpayer argued that 
the CFC rules cannot be applied since Article 7 of the tax treaty concluded between 
Brazil and Spain stipulates that “the profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State 
shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the 
other Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein” and the 
Brazilian Federal Constitution provides that international treaties prevail over 
                                            
95 The Taxpayers’ Council is the administrative court of first instance (see Branco / Berry / Lugthart / Veloci, 
CFC Rules Prevail over Treaty Application, Transfer Pricing International (August) 2006). 
96 Appeal No. 140,320. 
97 See Soares da Silva, Court Ruling Threatens Application of Two Tax Treaties, Tax Notes International 2006, 
page 205; Branco / Berry / Lugthart / Veloci, CFC Rules Prevail over Treaty Application, Transfer Pricing 
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Foreign Corporations in the EU After Cadbury Schweppes, Tax Management International Journal 2007, page 
607 et seq. (see especially the references to Brazilian tax literature in Portuguese language).  
98 Article 74 of Provisional Measure 2,158; see Soares da Silva, Court Ruling Threatens Application of Two Tax 
Treaties, Tax Notes International 2006, page 205. 
99 For the first year, the fictitious attribution was considered to take place with one year of postponement.  
   
 
question in this context, of course, is the question whether the application of the 
Swedish CFC regime (which follows a “look-through” approach) is in line with the 
Sweden-Luxembourg tax treaty and the Sweden-Switzerland tax treaty, respectively. 
Similar to the cases outlined above, the respective tax treaties do not deal with the 
question of applicability of CFC rules in the relationship between the respective 
states. In both cases, the Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings came to the 
conclusion that the application of the CFC regime is not in conflict with the respective 
tax treaties. The reason is that the profit derived by the captive insurance companies 
in Luxembourg and Switzerland is not the same as the income which is attributable to 
the Swedish parent company pursuant to the CFC regime.91 The Swedish Council for 
Advance Tax Rulings referred in its decision to a previous case dealing with foreign 
tax credits for partners in transparent entities.92 
 
Moreover, the Council found that the articles dealing with dividend income are of no 
relevance for the income attributable under the Swedish CFC regime. If the latter 
income is to be qualified as business profit, it is the business profit of the Swedish 
parent company and not the business profit of the captive insurance companies in 
Luxembourg and Switzerland.93 For this reason, there is no restriction - based on the 
respective tax treaties - of taxing the business profit (of the Swedish parent company) 
in Sweden. Alternatively, if the income is to be qualified, under the respective tax 
treaties, as other income, this would lead to the same outcome, namely to the 
taxation of the income in the residence state of the Swedish parent company.94 
Essentially, the decision of the Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings comes 
close to the outcome of the Finnish A Oyj Abp Case and is, once more, a deviation 
from the French Schneider Case. It is a clear statement in favour of a position which 
separates the income of the CFC from the income which is attributed to the 
shareholder (based on the applicable CFC regime) and is, therefore, a confirmation 
of the view that the attribution of income to the shareholder does not result in a 
juridical double taxation. It is also remarkable that the Council explicitly rejected the 
classification as dividend income in favour of business profits or, alternatively, other 
income. It seems that, based on the limited information available to the respective 
case, the Council did not see the necessity to ultimately determine the relevant 
article, i.e. the article related to business profits or the article related to other income, 
since neither of the latter two articles prevents the residence state of the shareholder 
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209. 
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of a Swedish corporation in US limited partnerships and single-member limited liability companies: Mutén, 
Finance Minister Proposes Revision Of Foreign Tax Credit Rules, Tax Notes International  2005, page 888. 
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The High Court also rejected the position that the CFC rules cannot be applied if the 
tax treaty does not explicitly allow the application of such rules. In this respect, the 
High Court referred to the OECD-Commentary102 and concluded that the 
Commentary has been widely recognised as being of great assistance in the 
application and interpretation of the articles of the OECD-MTC. Although not legally 
binding - according to the High Court - it is persuasive as to the conclusion that tax 
treaties could generally be considered not to preclude CFC-type rules in domestic 
legislation, including the Japanese rules. The decision of the Tokyo High Court 
seems to be in line, in my opinion, with the previous decisions outlined above (with 
the exception of the Schneider Case) and the view that the application of CFC 
legislation does not result in a violation of Article 7 of the OECD-MTC and that it is 
not required to explicitly stipulate the application of CFC legislation in the respective 
tax treaty. Moreover, it seems that the High Court, in general, considers the OECD-
Commentary as an important tool for the interpretation of tax treaties irrespective of 
whether the OECD-Commentary is legally binding or not. In this respect, the 
understanding of the High Court seems to be close to the understanding of the 
Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in the A Oyj Abp Case.      
 
7.2.6. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
Pursuant to the case law outlined above, the CFC rules can be applied without 
having been specifically preserved in the respective tax treaty. In fact, only the 
French Supreme Tax Court took a deviating position in the Schneider Case. Hence, 
based on the outcome of almost all of the cases discussed in this chapter the 
contracting states can apply the CFC rules to the income derived through another 
legal entity without violating the provisions and the principles of the underlying double 
tax convention. This means, at the same time, that these courts accepted the current 
taxation of income - and therefore the application of the principle of capital export 
neutrality - without the necessity of a vertical separation of the respective income. It 
can be understood, e.g. from the A Oyj Abp Case, that the current taxation should 
not be extended to “active businesses”, but it seems that this is just the quotation of 
the position outlined in the OECD-Commentary which suggests a separation based 
on the type of income - and therefore a horizontal separation. Hence, the case law 
does not restrict the states which follow the principle of capital export neutrality to the 
taxation of (only) specific parts of the underlying income. However, this is not in line 
with the position outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 3 which requires that the income 
taxation in the residence state of the shareholder should be limited to the basic 
interest component and should, therefore, not encompass income which is produced 
by the CFC103 and income which is related to the risk which is directly covered by the 
CFC. Thus, despite the fact that I agree with the conclusion that there is no necessity 
to deal with the applicability of CFC legislation in the double tax conventions, the 
verifications show that the income should not solely be separated according to the 
type of income (horizontal separation), but it is required to follow a concept which 
also separates the income components within a certain type of income (vertical 
separation). From my perspective, it is therefore apparent that the case law - by 
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domestic legislation. This argumentation was not accepted by the Council which 
determined that the tax treaty does not prevent Brazil from applying the Brazilian 
CFC legislation. It is important to note, in this respect, that the regular profit 
distribution of the Spanish company, in contrast to the CFC income attribution, would 
have been exempt from taxation based on Article 23 (4) of the tax treaty concluded 
between Brazil and Spain.100 In principle, the final outcome of the decision is in line 
with the outcome of the case law outlined above - with the exception of the Schneider 
Case - and confirms, once more, the position that a double tax convention does not 
prevent the application of domestic CFC rules. However, in contrast to the A Oyj Abp 
Case, for example, the line of reasoning which was the basis for the decision remains 
to a large extent unclear. 
 
The Japanese case was decided on November 1, 2007, by the Tokyo High Court and 
dealt with the question whether the application of the Japanese CFC legislation 
violates Article 7 (1) of the Japanese-Singaporean tax treaty.101 Pursuant to the 
Tokyo High Court, it is obvious from the provisions of the Japanese CFC legislation 
that it does not directly impose Japanese taxes on the profits of the subsidiary 
company in Singapore, but adopts a form of “deeming taxation” in which the 
undistributed income of certain foreign subsidiaries meeting detailed criteria is 
attributed to the parent company in Japan. However, the conclusion might be 
different, from the perspective of the High Court, if the taxation were allowed without 
any limitation. In the latter case, the taxation would, in substance, result in an 
imposition of Japanese tax on the profits of the subsidiary company and thus 
undermine the purpose of Article 7 (1) of the Japanese-Singaporean tax treaty. But in 
the High Court’s view, that is clearly not the case with respect to the Japanese CFC 
legislation. As the High Court pointed out, the CFC rules define (i) the scope of the 
foreign subsidiary subject to the CFC rules as a foreign subsidiary which is wholly or 
partially owned by Japanese residents, (ii) the scope of the undistributed income of 
the subsidiary subject to attribution as the undistributed income in proportion to the 
stock ownership, and (iii) the scope of the exception to the rules as a foreign 
subsidiary with an economic substance as an independent entity and a business 
reason to operate such business in that jurisdiction. The High Court concluded that 
the Japanese CFC rules seek to tax, in substance, the amount that would have been 
repatriated to the parent company by dividends.  
 
As to the taxpayer’s reliance on the French Schneider Case, the High Court found 
that the decision was not relevant. Pursuant to the High Court, this is due to the 
specific scheme under which France directly imposed the separate taxation on the 
undistributed profits of the subsidiary. This approach was necessary because of the 
French system of territorial taxation which excludes most of the foreign dividends 
received. Thus, according to the High Court, the French system is different from the 
Japanese system in a fundamental way. Moreover, the High Court took into account 
the conclusion of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in the A Oyj Abp Case 
which indicated that Schneider might not be a well-established international view on 
this issue.  
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Member countries consider that such measures are part of the basic domestic rules 
set by national tax law for determining which facts give rise to a tax liability. These 
rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by them. One 
could invoke the spirit of the Convention, which would be violated only if a company, 
which is a person within the meaning of the Convention, ended up with no or almost 
no activity or income being attributed to it, and the Contracting States took divergent 
views on the subject, with economic double taxation resulting therefrom, the same 
income being taxed twice in the hands of two different taxpayers (...). A dissenting 
view, on the other hand, holds that such rules are subject to the general provisions of 
tax treaties against double taxation, especially where the treaty itself contains 
provisions aimed at counteracting its improper use.108 It is not easy to reconcile these 
divergent opinions, either in theory or in mutual agreement procedures on specific 
cases. The main problem seems to be whether or not general principles such as 
“substance-over-form” are inherent in treaty provisions, i.e. whether they can be 
applied in any case, or only to the extent they are expressly mentioned in bilateral 
conventions. The dissenting view argues that to give domestic rules precedence over 
treaty rules as to who, for tax purposes, is regarded as the recipient of the income 
shifted to a base company, would erode the protection of taxpayers against double 
taxation (e.g. where by applying these rules, base company income is taxed in the 
country of the shareholders even though there is no permanent establishment of the 
base company there). However, it is the view of the wide majority that such rules, and 
the underlying principles, do not have to be confirmed in the text of the convention to 
be applicable.109 While these and the other counteracting measures described in the 
reports mentioned in paragraph 11 above are not inconsistent with the spirit of the 
tax treaties, there is agreement that Member countries should carefully observe the 
specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties, as long as there is no clear evidence 
that the treaties are being improperly used. Furthermore, it seems desirable that 
counteracting measures comply with the spirit of tax treaties with a view to avoiding 
double taxation. Where the taxpayer complies with such counteracting measures, it 
might furthermore be appropriate to grant him the protection of the treaty network.”110 
 
The Commentary outlines further in paragraph 26 (1992) that “(t)he majority of 
Member countries accept counteracting measures as a necessary means of 
maintaining equity and neutrality of national tax laws in an international environment 
characterised by very different tax burdens, but believe that such measures should 
be used only for this purpose. It would be contrary to the general principles 
underlying the Model Convention and to the spirit of tax treaties in general if 
counteracting measures were to be extended to activities such as production, normal 
rendering of services or trading of companies engaged in real industrial or 
commercial activity, when they are clearly related to the economic environment of the 
country where they are resident in a situation where these activities are carried out in 
such a way that no tax avoidance could be suspected. Counteracting measures 
should not be applied to countries in which taxation is comparable to that of the 
country of residence of the taxpayer.”111  
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accepting the application of the CFC rules in the tax treaty context - did not provide 
clear support for a less restrictive system which fosters competitiveness and which, 
at the same time, limits the application of the concept of capital export neutrality. The 
same is true for the Schneider Decision: the fact that the French Supreme Tax Court 
requires the stipulation of the application of CFC rules in the French tax treaties is not 
really a step forward. The decision is based on a position which is, in my opinion, not 
correct (and not in line with the outcome of the other cases) and which might even 
create an unnecessary obstacle for alternative concepts. A clear support would have 
been a decision which identifies the necessity of a vertical separation. However, this 
was not the case and, apparently, did not play any role regarding the question 
whether CFC rules are in line with tax treaties or not. At least, one of the conclusions 
from the case law (with the exception of Schneider) should be - for the moment - that 
there is, in principle, no obstacle from a tax treaty perspective for the application of a 
different concept which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. This, however, is quite an important conclusion. I will proceed with the 
test after the examination of the OECD perspective.   
 
7.3. The Requirement of a Specific Preservation of CFC Rules in Double Tax 
Conventions 
 
7.3.1. The OECD Perspective 
 
Obviously, one of the decisive questions is whether the application of CFC rules must 
be specifically preserved in tax treaties or not. The amendments to the OECD 
Commentary in 1992 added specific reference to CFC legislation and a conflict 
seems to exist between paragraph 7 (added in 1977) and paragraphs 22-26 (added 
in 1992) of the Commentary on Article 1.104 Paragraph 7 states that “(t)he purpose of 
double taxation conventions is to promote, by eliminating international double 
taxation, exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital and 
persons; they should not, however, help tax avoidance or evasion. True, taxpayers 
have the possibility, irrespective of double taxation conventions, to exploit differences 
in tax levels between States and the tax advantages provided by various countries’ 
taxation laws, but it is for the States concerned to adopt provisions in their domestic 
laws to counter such manoeuvres. Such States will then wish, in their bilateral double 
taxation conventions, to preserve the application of provisions of this kind contained 
in their domestic laws.”105 This statement suggests that domestic anti-avoidance 
measures must be specifically preserved in tax treaties in order to remain effective.  
In contrast thereto, the paragraphs added to the Commentary in 1992 give a different 
picture and suggest that certain anti-avoidance legislation is not within the ambit of a 
tax treaty and does not need to be confirmed in the treaty.106 Paragraphs 22 to 25 of 
the Commentary state that “(o)ther forms of abuse of treaties (e.g. the use of a base 
company) and of possible ways to deal with them such as “substance-over-form” and 
“sub-part F type” provisions have also been analysed.107 The large majority of OECD 
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Member countries consider that such measures are part of the basic domestic rules 
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legislation. Another aspect which is of importance is the fact that the detailed 
amendments to the Commentary in 1992 only reflect the majority (and minority) 
opinion of the OECD Member countries and therefore the opinion of the respective 
tax administrations.117 The position of the OECD itself is not stipulated in the 
Commentary (1992). The majority opinion cannot be the proper basis for the answer 
to the question whether the domestic CFC rules are in conflict with tax treaties - 
based on the OECD-MTC - or not.118 The majority opinion of the Member countries 
can be wrong - comparable to the situation within the EU where the case law of the 
ECJ permanently shows that important domestic tax rules applied in the Member 
States violate the basic freedoms.119  
 
The position of the OECD is now made clear in the amendments to the Commentary 
with effect as of January 2003.120 The paragraphs related to CFC legislation do not 
refer to the majority (and minority) opinion anymore. Paragraphs 22.1 and 22.2 of the 
Commentary on Article 1 outline that the anti-abuse rules “(...) are part of the basic 
domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to tax 
liability; these rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by 
them. Thus, as a general rule (...) there will be no conflict. For example, to the extent 
that the application of the rules referred to in paragraph 22 results in a 
recharacterisation of income or in a redetermination of the taxpayer who is 
considered to derive such income, the provisions of the Convention will be applied 
taking into account these changes.121 Whilst these rules do not conflict with tax 
conventions, there is agreement that Member countries should carefully observe the 
specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double taxation as long as 
there is no clear evidence that the treaties are being abused.”122 The Commentary 
becomes very clear with respect to CFC rules in paragraphs 23 and 24 where it 
outlines that “(t)he use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled 
foreign companies provisions. A significant number of Member and non-member 
countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of 
legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, 
which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the 
domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on 
income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes 
been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such 
as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of 
controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the 
reasons explained in paragraphs 10.1 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the 
Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the 
provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. 
                                            
117 Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et 
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The 1992 amendments to Article 1 of the Commentary are to a certain extent based 
on two OECD reports which were published in 1987.112 It is therefore necessary to 
consider these reports in order to understand the substantial additions to the OECD 
Commentary. With respect to CFC legislation paragraph 43 of the base company 
report states that “(u)nder existing counteracting measures, the country imposes a 
tax on residents who are shareholders in the foreign base company. The foreign 
company as such is not taxed; generally the income which gives rise to the taxation 
does not originate in the country of the base company but in the taxing country itself 
or in a third country. A tax treaty between the country using the counteracting 
legislation and the country of the base company usually protects, however, income 
flows only between these two countries. The first-mentioned country may therefore 
claim that the tax imposed under the counteracting legislation does not come under 
the scope of the said tax treaty.” Paragraphs 45 and 46 of the base company report 
state in part that “(o)n the technical level, counteracting measures can attribute 
activities – and thus income – to a shareholder, which is not contrary to the tax 
treaties. If the counteracting measures have the effect of taxing a deemed dividend of 
the base company, this is well within the taxing rights conferred on the taxpayer’s 
country of residence under the rules of tax treaties regarding taxation of dividends 
(...). On the tax policy level, counteracting measures pierce only the “umbrella effect” 
of the taxpayers’ arrangements. This effect and the consequent possibilities for an 
independent deferral are not guaranteed by tax treaties which were never intended to 
prohibit national safeguards for the equity and neutrality of a country’s tax law;” and 
“(o)n the international level, as long as some countries regard it as a sovereign right 
to shape their fiscal system in a way which might negatively affect other countries, 
tax authorities in these other countries must safeguard their sovereign right to 
preserve the equity and neutrality of their tax systems. It has never been intended 
that tax treaties would replace national sovereign rights with international co-
operation to safeguard the integrity of tax systems.113 It is evident that these are the 
views of States adopting counteracting measures and a very large majority of OECD 
Member countries have supported them (...).” 114 
 
However, what remains is a possible conflict between paragraph 7 (1977) and 
paragraphs 22-26 (1992) of the Commentary on Article 1. Pursuant to Sandler, the 
reference in paragraph 7 of the Commentary may be restricted to domestic laws 
concerning the use of conduit companies and is therefore not equally true for the 
application of CFC rules.115 This can be an explanation for the presumed conflict but 
it is not sufficiently clear from paragraph 7 itself. It is not unlikely that it has to be seen 
in the context of the following paragraphs which deal, inter alia, with the use of 
conduit companies. Paragraphs 11 to 21 contain a number of suggested treaty 
provisions related to conduit companies.116 Thus, it makes sense to see the last 
sentence of paragraph 7 of the Commentary which states that “(s)uch States will then 
wish, in their bilateral double taxation conventions, to preserve the application of 
provisions of this kind contained in their domestic laws” in the context of the 
suggested treaty provisions contained in paragraphs 11 to 21 and not related to CFC 
                                            
112 OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, 1987, and OECD, Double Taxation 
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, 1987. 
113 Paragraph 45 of the OECD base company report.  
114 Paragraph 46 of the OECD base company report.  
115 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 89. 
116 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 89. 
CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions
353
   
 
legislation. Another aspect which is of importance is the fact that the detailed 
amendments to the Commentary in 1992 only reflect the majority (and minority) 
opinion of the OECD Member countries and therefore the opinion of the respective 
tax administrations.117 The position of the OECD itself is not stipulated in the 
Commentary (1992). The majority opinion cannot be the proper basis for the answer 
to the question whether the domestic CFC rules are in conflict with tax treaties - 
based on the OECD-MTC - or not.118 The majority opinion of the Member countries 
can be wrong - comparable to the situation within the EU where the case law of the 
ECJ permanently shows that important domestic tax rules applied in the Member 
States violate the basic freedoms.119  
 
The position of the OECD is now made clear in the amendments to the Commentary 
with effect as of January 2003.120 The paragraphs related to CFC legislation do not 
refer to the majority (and minority) opinion anymore. Paragraphs 22.1 and 22.2 of the 
Commentary on Article 1 outline that the anti-abuse rules “(...) are part of the basic 
domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which facts give rise to tax 
liability; these rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are therefore not affected by 
them. Thus, as a general rule (...) there will be no conflict. For example, to the extent 
that the application of the rules referred to in paragraph 22 results in a 
recharacterisation of income or in a redetermination of the taxpayer who is 
considered to derive such income, the provisions of the Convention will be applied 
taking into account these changes.121 Whilst these rules do not conflict with tax 
conventions, there is agreement that Member countries should carefully observe the 
specific obligations enshrined in tax treaties to relieve double taxation as long as 
there is no clear evidence that the treaties are being abused.”122 The Commentary 
becomes very clear with respect to CFC rules in paragraphs 23 and 24 where it 
outlines that “(t)he use of base companies may also be addressed through controlled 
foreign companies provisions. A significant number of Member and non-member 
countries have now adopted such legislation. Whilst the design of this type of 
legislation varies considerably among countries, a common feature of these rules, 
which are now internationally recognised as a legitimate instrument to protect the 
domestic tax base, is that they result in a Contracting State taxing its residents on 
income attributable to their participation in certain foreign entities. It has sometimes 
been argued, based on a certain interpretation of provisions of the Convention such 
as paragraph 1 of Article 7 and paragraph 5 of Article 10, that this common feature of 
controlled foreign companies legislation conflicted with these provisions. For the 
reasons explained in paragraphs 10.1 of the Commentary on Article 7 and 37 of the 
Commentary on Article 10, that interpretation does not accord with the text of the 
provisions. It also does not hold when these provisions are read in their context. 
                                            
117 Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et 
seq. (718); Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq. 
118 See in this regard also Helminen in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, 2004, page 204 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 95. 
119 See in this respect Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 
2002, page 717 et seq. (718); Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 
95.  
120 See in this respect also Helminen, Is There a Future for CFC-regimes in the EU?, Intertax 2005, page 117 et 
seq. (118).  
121 Paragraph 22.1 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC. 
122 Paragraph 22.2 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
The 1992 amendments to Article 1 of the Commentary are to a certain extent based 
on two OECD reports which were published in 1987.112 It is therefore necessary to 
consider these reports in order to understand the substantial additions to the OECD 
Commentary. With respect to CFC legislation paragraph 43 of the base company 
report states that “(u)nder existing counteracting measures, the country imposes a 
tax on residents who are shareholders in the foreign base company. The foreign 
company as such is not taxed; generally the income which gives rise to the taxation 
does not originate in the country of the base company but in the taxing country itself 
or in a third country. A tax treaty between the country using the counteracting 
legislation and the country of the base company usually protects, however, income 
flows only between these two countries. The first-mentioned country may therefore 
claim that the tax imposed under the counteracting legislation does not come under 
the scope of the said tax treaty.” Paragraphs 45 and 46 of the base company report 
state in part that “(o)n the technical level, counteracting measures can attribute 
activities – and thus income – to a shareholder, which is not contrary to the tax 
treaties. If the counteracting measures have the effect of taxing a deemed dividend of 
the base company, this is well within the taxing rights conferred on the taxpayer’s 
country of residence under the rules of tax treaties regarding taxation of dividends 
(...). On the tax policy level, counteracting measures pierce only the “umbrella effect” 
of the taxpayers’ arrangements. This effect and the consequent possibilities for an 
independent deferral are not guaranteed by tax treaties which were never intended to 
prohibit national safeguards for the equity and neutrality of a country’s tax law;” and 
“(o)n the international level, as long as some countries regard it as a sovereign right 
to shape their fiscal system in a way which might negatively affect other countries, 
tax authorities in these other countries must safeguard their sovereign right to 
preserve the equity and neutrality of their tax systems. It has never been intended 
that tax treaties would replace national sovereign rights with international co-
operation to safeguard the integrity of tax systems.113 It is evident that these are the 
views of States adopting counteracting measures and a very large majority of OECD 
Member countries have supported them (...).” 114 
 
However, what remains is a possible conflict between paragraph 7 (1977) and 
paragraphs 22-26 (1992) of the Commentary on Article 1. Pursuant to Sandler, the 
reference in paragraph 7 of the Commentary may be restricted to domestic laws 
concerning the use of conduit companies and is therefore not equally true for the 
application of CFC rules.115 This can be an explanation for the presumed conflict but 
it is not sufficiently clear from paragraph 7 itself. It is not unlikely that it has to be seen 
in the context of the following paragraphs which deal, inter alia, with the use of 
conduit companies. Paragraphs 11 to 21 contain a number of suggested treaty 
provisions related to conduit companies.116 Thus, it makes sense to see the last 
sentence of paragraph 7 of the Commentary which states that “(s)uch States will then 
wish, in their bilateral double taxation conventions, to preserve the application of 
provisions of this kind contained in their domestic laws” in the context of the 
suggested treaty provisions contained in paragraphs 11 to 21 and not related to CFC 
                                            
112 OECD, Double Taxation Conventions and the Use of Base Companies, 1987, and OECD, Double Taxation 
Conventions and the Use of Conduit Companies, 1987. 
113 Paragraph 45 of the OECD base company report.  
114 Paragraph 46 of the OECD base company report.  
115 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 89. 
116 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 89. 
Chapter 7
354
   
 
applied nationally without this being prevented by the commitments entered into by 
Finland when concluding its tax treaty with Belgium nor by the way in which that 
treaty must be applied in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”128 Moreover, the Court makes clear that “(…) the fact that tax treaties 
concluded by certain countries may contain specific provisions on the acceptability of 
the application of CFC legislation does not mean that the conclusion to the contrary 
must be correct, namely that the applicability of CFC legislation is restricted in 
situations where the relevant tax treaty does not contain a provision explicitly 
permitting the application of such legislation.”129 In the French Schneider Case, the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement Austry outlines that “(…) the commentaries of the 
OECD on art 1 of the Model Tax Convention state that the application of conventions 
should not facilitate tax avoidance or evasion. But these commentaries were 
formulated after the signing of the Franco-Swiss treaty, which prevents them from 
being used to clarify the meaning of this convention.”130 The French Supreme Tax 
Court concludes that “(e)ven assuming that it had been established that the objective 
of combating tax avoidance and evasion had been assigned to the Franco-Swiss 
treaty, this objective may not, in the absence of express provisions to that effect, 
derogate from the rules stated in the treaty.”131 Thus, the legal position of the Finnish 
Supreme Tax Court and the French Supreme Tax Court is totally different with 
respect to the question whether the tax treaties have explicitly to provide for the 
application of the CFC rules, even though the circumstances of the cases are quite 
similar.  
 
It is therefore far from clear that amendments to the Commentary can be used for the 
interpretation of tax treaties concluded earlier.132 At least, the Supreme Tax Courts of 
some countries consider such an approach to be rather problematic.133 In addition, 
the compatibility of CFC rules and tax treaties is still not clarified by the Supreme Tax 
Court in a substantial number of OECD and EU countries134 and it is therefore solely 
the tax authorities’ perspective which finds expression in the paragraphs added to 
Article 1 of the Commentary (1992).135 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties stipulates in Article 31 (1) and (2) of the Convention that “(a) treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”136 And 
“(t)he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating 
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2002, page 717 et seq. (718); Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 
95; see also Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a Changing World: A German Perspective, Tax Notes 
International 2002, page 1679 et seq; Helminen, Is There a Future for CFC-regimes in the EU?, Intertax 2005, 
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Thus, whilst some countries have felt it useful to expressly clarify, in their 
conventions, that controlled foreign companies legislation did not conflict with the 
Convention, such clarification is not necessary. It is recognised that controlled foreign 
companies legislation structured in this way is not contrary to the provisions of the 
Convention.123 States that adopt controlled foreign companies provisions or the anti-
abuse rules referred to above in their domestic laws seek to maintain the equity and 
neutrality of these laws in an international environment characterised by very different 
tax burdens, but such measures should be used only for this purpose. As a general 
rule, these measures should not be applied where the relevant income has been 
subjected to taxation that is comparable to that in the country of residence of the 
taxpayer.”124 Without any doubt, the OECD takes the position that the domestic CFC 
rules can be applied without any clarification in the respective tax treaties since the 
CFC rules are not affected by the tax treaties and are not contrary to the treaty 
provisions. However, several countries made observations on the paragraphs 22 to 
26 of the Commentary, such as Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. I will come to the consequences of such observations below.125 
 
7.3.2. Additional Aspects  
 
The question remains whether the amendments to the Commentary in 1992 (which 
reflects only the majority and minority opinion of the OECD Member countries) and 
2003 are of any significance for tax treaties concluded earlier. The outcomes of the A 
Oyj Abp Case and the Schneider Case are interesting in this respect: the CFC 
legislation of both countries follows an entity approach and neither the Finland-
Belgium tax treaty nor the France-Switzerland tax treaty makes any specific 
reference to the domestic CFC legislation. Both treaties were concluded before the 
respective CFC legislation entered into force and both treaties were drafted along the 
general lines of the OECD-MTC and before the paragraphs with respect to CFC 
legislation were added to the Commentary in 1992.126 The Finnish Supreme 
Administrative Court nevertheless considers the 1992 Commentary an auxiliary 
source of interpretation and states that “(t)he wording of the Commentary which was 
in force when negotiations on the tax treaty in question were conducted lends 
particular weight to the interpretation but in the spirit of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the amendments later made to the Commentary also have 
significance as an aid to interpretation. Similarly, as the Commentary describes the 
practices of the OECD member countries, the subsequent changes and amendments 
to it are relevant particularly to matters which concern new situations and 
phenomena. The positions gathered together in the Commentary indicate the 
generally accepted view of the OECD member countries as to the type of legislation 
which may be applied. According to the Commentary, national legislation must be 
applied in the spirit of the tax treaties”127 and “(…) the Finnish CFC Act may be 
                                            
123 Paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC. The reference to paragraph 10.1 of the 
Commentary on Article 7 was replaced in the 2010 update by the reference to paragraph 14 of the Commentary 
on Article 7.  
124 Paragraph 26 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC. The Paragraphs 24 and 25 have been 
deleted.  
125 See paragraphs 27.4 - 27.9 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC.  
126 The Finland-Belgium tax treaty was concluded on June 18, 1976 and was supplemented on March 13, 1991. 
The amendments in 1991 did not concern the provisions which are relevant for the CFC legislation. The France-
Switzerland tax treaty was concluded on September 9, 1966, and Article 7 (1) of the tax treaty was amended by 
the protocol signed on December 3, 1969. 
127 International Tax Law Reports (ITLR), Volume 4, 2002, page 1065. 
CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions
355
   
 
applied nationally without this being prevented by the commitments entered into by 
Finland when concluding its tax treaty with Belgium nor by the way in which that 
treaty must be applied in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.”128 Moreover, the Court makes clear that “(…) the fact that tax treaties 
concluded by certain countries may contain specific provisions on the acceptability of 
the application of CFC legislation does not mean that the conclusion to the contrary 
must be correct, namely that the applicability of CFC legislation is restricted in 
situations where the relevant tax treaty does not contain a provision explicitly 
permitting the application of such legislation.”129 In the French Schneider Case, the 
Commissaire du Gouvernement Austry outlines that “(…) the commentaries of the 
OECD on art 1 of the Model Tax Convention state that the application of conventions 
should not facilitate tax avoidance or evasion. But these commentaries were 
formulated after the signing of the Franco-Swiss treaty, which prevents them from 
being used to clarify the meaning of this convention.”130 The French Supreme Tax 
Court concludes that “(e)ven assuming that it had been established that the objective 
of combating tax avoidance and evasion had been assigned to the Franco-Swiss 
treaty, this objective may not, in the absence of express provisions to that effect, 
derogate from the rules stated in the treaty.”131 Thus, the legal position of the Finnish 
Supreme Tax Court and the French Supreme Tax Court is totally different with 
respect to the question whether the tax treaties have explicitly to provide for the 
application of the CFC rules, even though the circumstances of the cases are quite 
similar.  
 
It is therefore far from clear that amendments to the Commentary can be used for the 
interpretation of tax treaties concluded earlier.132 At least, the Supreme Tax Courts of 
some countries consider such an approach to be rather problematic.133 In addition, 
the compatibility of CFC rules and tax treaties is still not clarified by the Supreme Tax 
Court in a substantial number of OECD and EU countries134 and it is therefore solely 
the tax authorities’ perspective which finds expression in the paragraphs added to 
Article 1 of the Commentary (1992).135 The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties stipulates in Article 31 (1) and (2) of the Convention that “(a) treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”136 And 
“(t)he context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: (a) any agreement relating 
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neutrality of these laws in an international environment characterised by very different 
tax burdens, but such measures should be used only for this purpose. As a general 
rule, these measures should not be applied where the relevant income has been 
subjected to taxation that is comparable to that in the country of residence of the 
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Article 31 (3) of the Convention states that “(t)here shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties.”142 Here, it must be concluded that a 
subsequent amendment to the OECD-MTC or to the Commentary cannot be seen as 
a subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice in the application of the respective 
tax treaty.143 In other words, such a subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice 
must be directly related to the respective tax treaty (and not to the OECD-MTC or the 
Commentary). Thus, the general rules of interpretation stipulated in Article 31 of the 
Convention do not support, in my opinion, the position that amendments to the 
OECD-MTC or to the Commentary have an influence on tax treaties concluded 
earlier. Article 32 of the Convention refers to supplementary means of interpretation. 
If the Commentary can be considered part of the preparatory work of the respective 
tax treaty, then it should be the version which was applicable at the time of 
conclusion of the respective tax treaty.144 In addition, the supplementary means of 
interpretation according to Article 32 of the Convention are relevant only if the 
interpretation according to Article 31 of the Convention “(a) leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”145  
 
In my opinion, a subsequent amendment to the OECD-MTC or to the OECD-
Commentary cannot be used for the interpretation of a tax treaty which was 
concluded earlier - even if the tax treaty strictly follows the lines of the OECD-MTC.146 
Based on the position outlined above, the subsequent amendments are not part of 
the “context” which is referred to in Article 31 (2) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.147 With respect to CFC legislation, the 1992 amendments are not, in 
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also relevant for the interpretation of Article 3 (2) of the OECD-MTC and that Article 3 (2) of the OECD-MTC 
is to be seen as a lex specialis in relation to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT for the interpretation of the 
provisions of the respective tax treaty (see Vogel / Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 3, paragraph 
120; Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 2004, pages 477-479). However, the 
definition of  the “context” in Article 31 (2) of the VCLT is, in my opinion, not relevant for the interpretation of 
the provisions of the respective tax treaty according to Article 3 (2) of the OECD-MTC (see also Vogel / Lehner, 
Ibid., paragraph 121).  Thus, the conclusion that the subsequent amendments to the OECD-MTC and / or the 
   
 
to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty.”137 There are different opinions in tax literature 
with respect to the question whether the OECD-Commentary forms part of the 
“context” for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty.138 A substantial number of 
commentators took the position that the Commentary could be part of the 
aforementioned “context” in those cases in which the contracting states follow the 
OECD-MTC, but this position seems to be restricted to the version of the 
Commentary which was existent at the time of conclusion of the tax treaty and cannot 
be transferred to changes or additions to the Commentary adopted after the 
conclusion of the tax treaty.139 According to Vogel, Lang and Wassermeyer, the 
changes to the Commentary can, in general, only be relevant for the interpretation of 
tax treaties which were concluded after the respective changes were made.140 In 
principle, Sandler takes the same position and points out that it would be 
inappropriate for a court to consider the Commentary introduced after the particular 
treaty was concluded.141 This seems to be a logical approach, from my perspective, 
because it can be assumed that contracting states - when following the pattern of the 
OECD-MTC - also accept, at least in general, the interpretation of the OECD-MTC 
which is provided by the Commentary at the point in time of the conclusion of the 
treaty. I think it is even likely that the contracting states - by transferring the 
provisions of the OECD-MTC into a concrete tax treaty - wish to adopt a proper basis 
for the interpretation of the respective tax treaty (through the Commentary). However, 
it is apparent that this cannot be generally assumed for (perhaps very important) 
future changes or additions to the Commentary which are not known at the time of 
the conclusion of the respective tax treaty and which cannot (or can only partially) be 
influenced by the contracting states. 
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Convention do not support, in my opinion, the position that amendments to the 
OECD-MTC or to the Commentary have an influence on tax treaties concluded 
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If the Commentary can be considered part of the preparatory work of the respective 
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interpretation according to Article 31 of the Convention “(a) leaves the meaning 
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be transferred to changes or additions to the Commentary adopted after the 
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tax treaties which were concluded after the respective changes were made.140 In 
principle, Sandler takes the same position and points out that it would be 
inappropriate for a court to consider the Commentary introduced after the particular 
treaty was concluded.141 This seems to be a logical approach, from my perspective, 
because it can be assumed that contracting states - when following the pattern of the 
OECD-MTC - also accept, at least in general, the interpretation of the OECD-MTC 
which is provided by the Commentary at the point in time of the conclusion of the 
treaty. I think it is even likely that the contracting states - by transferring the 
provisions of the OECD-MTC into a concrete tax treaty - wish to adopt a proper basis 
for the interpretation of the respective tax treaty (through the Commentary). However, 
it is apparent that this cannot be generally assumed for (perhaps very important) 
future changes or additions to the Commentary which are not known at the time of 
the conclusion of the respective tax treaty and which cannot (or can only partially) be 
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60). See with respect to similar positions also Michelsen in Lang, Tax Treaty Interpretation, 2001, page 63 et 
seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 98. 
141 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
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necessary to explicitly refer to CFC rules in a tax treaty in order to be applicable. The 
CFC rules are part of the domestic legislation of the contracting state(s) and there is, 
in principle, no reason why those rules should be treated differently (from other 
domestic rules) in order to be applicable in a tax treaty context. In other words, if CFC 
rules shall not be applied in the relationship between the contracting states, this fact 
must be explicitly stipulated in the tax treaty and cannot just be derived from the 
observations to the Commentary. 
 
Another aspect which is of importance is the fact that the Commentary refers to 
measures against abuse (or counteracting measures). Clearly, CFC legislation is to 
be seen as an anti-avoidance legislation which counteracts the deferral of income in 
low-tax countries. However, it is quite obvious to me that CFC rules not only affect 
structures which are abusive but can in the same way affect regular business 
activities. The system of CFC taxation does not make any clear separation between 
abusive and non-abusive activities since the focus is much too broad for such a 
separation. The outcome is a general application of those rules to certain income 
components which are taxed at a lower rate than the comparable income in the state 
of the shareholder. Thus, the CFC rules can be seen as an important tool against 
domestic tax base erosion caused by abusive and non-abusive relocations of 
activities. Therefore, even if the general aim of a double tax convention 
encompasses, inter alia, the combating of international tax avoidance and tax 
evasion, this cannot result in an unrestricted application of CFC rules outside the 
limitations provided by a double tax convention. That means, if the residence state of 
the shareholder stipulates, in the context of the domestic CFC legislation, a link to the 
income which is derived by the shareholder through a CFC interposed in the other 
contracting state, it is required to examine the latter income and to determine the type 
of income in the light of the respective tax treaty - from the perspective of the 
residence state of the shareholder. Hence, the income derived through the CFC is to 
be examined not only from the perspective of the residence state of the CFC (related 
to the CFC itself), but it is also to be examined from the perspective of the residence 
state of the shareholder (related to the shareholder) which has established such a 
link in the domestic CFC legislation. If the income classification leads to the outcome 
that the state of residence of the shareholder has the right to tax the income of the 
shareholder under the respective tax treaty, there is, in principle, no restriction for the 
application of the domestic CFC legislation. In contrast thereto, if the income 
classification leads to the outcome that the state of residence of the shareholder 
does not have the right to tax the income of the shareholder under the respective tax 
treaty, the application of the domestic CFC legislation would result in a tax treaty 
override. 
 
7.3.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The examination shows that the OECD perspective is in line with the outcome of the 
case law outlined earlier (with the exception of the Schneider Case). Although this is 
not really a big surprise - given the fact that the OECD perspective was in some of 
the cases the basis for the decision - it confirms, in my opinion, that an approach 
which focuses on the taxation of the basic interest component in the residence state 
of the shareholder is not in conflict with the respective double tax convention. At 
least, this is true as long as the double tax convention does not explicitly exclude the 
application of such a system. It has always to be kept in mind that the concept of the 
   
 
my opinion, sufficiently clear to be used for the interpretation of tax treaties.148 
However, the 2003 amendments provide a clear picture of the position of the OECD 
and are therefore of particular relevance for tax treaties which are based on the 
OECD-MTC and which were concluded in 2003 and subsequent years. Based on this 
position, there is no necessity whatsoever to preserve the CFC taxation in tax 
treaties. In this respect, the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court should not have 
referred to the 1992 Commentary as an auxiliary source of interpretation since the 
Finland-Belgium tax treaty was concluded earlier. This does not mean, though, that 
the outcome of the case is “wrong” (from my perspective), but the argumentation 
should not have been based on the amended version of the Commentary.  
 
Thus, if one agrees with the aforementioned position, it seems to be consistent that 
any observations of one of the treaty partners on subsequent amendments to the 
Commentary do not affect the existing tax treaty (and the interpretation of the tax 
treaty). That means the observations of Belgium on Article 1 - with respect to CFC 
legislation (2003 amendments)149 - do not have any impact on the existing tax treaty 
between Belgium and Finland (which was concluded earlier). Hence, if the Finnish 
Administrative Court would have had to decide (theoretically) the A Oyj Abp Case in 
2003, there should still be no reference to the amended version of the Commentary 
and the observations of the treaty partner. However, the question arises whether the 
observations of Belgium would have any impact on a tax treaty concluded in 2003 (or 
later), i.e. after the amendment and the observations. In this case, it is important to 
note that the Commentary explicitly deals with the question of CFC legislation in the 
light of the OECD-MTC and, in addition, one of the contracting states does not agree 
with this position (by making observations on the respective paragraphs). In such a 
situation, it seems to be essential that the contracting states, Finland and Belgium, 
explicitly deal with the question of the application of CFC rules in their relationship, 
either in the tax treaty itself or in the agreements or instruments which are referred to 
in Article 31 (2) (a) and (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If the tax 
treaty is based on the OECD-MTC, it has to be made sufficiently clear if the parties 
intend to deviate from the position of the OECD.150 However, if the parties do not deal 
with this question at all, this will not have the effect that the observations of Belgium 
are part of the tax treaty (and the context). At least, this is true if one follows the 
position that the Commentary (and the observations) do not form part of the context 
which has to be taken into account pursuant to the aforementioned Article 31 (2) of 
the Convention. On the other hand, if one agrees that the Commentary forms part of 
the context within the meaning of Article 31 (2) of the Convention, this will also 
encompass the observations of Belgium and should therefore theoretically be 
considered by the contracting states. Thus, the 2003 amendments to the 
Commentary, and the position of the OECD with respect to CFC legislation, cannot 
simply be used for the interpretation of a new (or revised) tax treaty because of the 
observations made by one of the contracting states.151 Nonetheless, this does not 
change the conclusion with respect to the question whether the application of the 
CFC rules must be specifically preserved in a tax treaty or not. In my opinion, it is not 
                                                                                                                                         
OECD-Commentary are not part of the “context” which is referred to in Article 31 (2) of the VCLT will not be 
changed by the existence of Article 3 (2) of the OECD-MTC. 
148 See in this respect also Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 99. 
149 See paragraph 27.4 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD-MTC (2003). This is unchanged in the 
2010 update.  
150 See in this respect Wassermeyer in Debatin / Wassermeyer, Doppelbesteuerung, vor Art. 1, paragraph 41. 
151 See in this respect also Vogel in Vogel / Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Einleitung, paragraph 130. 
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In this example, company A (resident in country A) carries on activities through a PE 
in country C. The activities of the PE can be seen as “base company activities” (in 
order to use the terminology applied in the context of CFC legislation),154 i.e. the 
providing of services towards other group companies, e.g. in country B.155 The 
services do not encompass financing, rental and licensing activities. Article 7 (1) of 
the OECD-MTC states that “(t)he profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall 
be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the 
enterprise carries on business as aforesaid, the profits that are attributable to the 
permanent establishment in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 may be 
taxed in that other State.” Thus, the income allocable to the PE in country C may be 
taxed in the latter country. However, the wording “may be taxed in that other State” 
still provides for the possibility of a taxation of the income in country A.156 This, 
however, would lead to a taxation of the same income (the “base company income”) 
in the hands of the same person (company A) by more than one state - and therefore 
to a juridical double taxation of income.157 In such a case, the state of residence 
(country A) must give relief so as to avoid the juridical double taxation.158 The double 
taxation can be avoided by the exemption method159 or the credit method.160 In 
general - and with respect to the underlying example - there is no preference 
whatsoever for one of the two methods.161 The question whether the residence 
                                            
154 “Base company activities” are, of course, typically related to a foreign legal entity and not to a PE. However, 
a PE can perform activities which are comparable to such base company activities.  
155 As already outlined earlier, the provision of services towards other group companies can be one of the reasons 
why the income derived from these activities can be subject to CFC taxation. However, legally it is quite clear 
that the services are provided by company A - since the PE is from a legal perspective a non-separable part of 
company A. Nonetheless, the functions exercised in the PE country require - from a tax point of view - the 
allocation of income to the PE. 
156 In contrast to the wording “shall be taxable only” (see in this respect paragraph 6 of the Commentary on 
Article 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC). 
157 See paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
158 See paragraph 7 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
159 Article 23 A of the OECD-MTC. 
160 Article 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  






   
 
taxation of the basic interest component is less restrictive - compared to the typical 
CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 - and neither taxes the income 
produced by the CFC nor the income which is related to the compensation of risks.152 
In other words, what was concluded with respect to the application of CFC rules 
should also be true for the application of an alternative legislation which is based on 
the concept of the taxation of the basic interest component.  
 
7.4. CFC Income in the Context of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
The number of cases which deal with the classification of attributable income 
pursuant to CFC rules is still too limited in order to identify a strong tendency towards 
a particular type of income. However, it is remarkable, in my opinion, that in none of 
the decisions outlined above the income was classified as dividend income from a tax 
treaty perspective. On the other hand, the classification as business income is 
sometimes not clear enough or not “convincing” enough. For example, the Court of 
Appeal in the Bricom Holdings Case did not deal with this question explicitly and it 
remains unclear whether the “chargeable profits” might be seen as business profits of 
the shareholder. In the Captive Insurance Cases the Swedish Council for Advance 
Rulings classified the income as business profits, but the alternative reference to a 
classification as other income reveals some uncertainty. Moreover, the OECD-
Commentary does not determine a particular type of income, either. It remains open 
whether the income of the shareholder is to be classified as business income, 
dividend income, or other income. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the 
classification of the income which is attributable to the shareholder in some more 
detail.153  
 
7.4.1. Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
In the following, the verification of the type of income in the context of the OECD-
MTC will focus on situations which are of great importance within a multinational 
group of companies: a CFC situated in a low-tax country which provides services to 
other group companies. However, it may be helpful to start with the situation of a PE 
and, subsequently, to compare the outcome with the taxation of CFC income related 







                                            
152 As long as the income produced by the CFC is not connected to a permanent establishment in the residence 
state of the shareholder, there will be no income taxation in the latter state. Of course, even in case of a 
permanent establishment the income produced by the CFC would not be taxed under the basic interest taxation 
regime but according to the regular income tax regime. 
153 See with respect to the classification of CFC income under double tax conventions also Aigner, CFC-
Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq.; Aigner, Die 
Abkommensberechtigung bei Anwendung einer CFC-Gesetzgebung, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2002, 
page 1637 et seq.; Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 
2002, page 717 et seq.; Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq.; Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a Changing World: A German 
Perspective, Tax Notes International 2002, page 1679 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-
Recht, 2004, page 103 et seq. 
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establishment situated therein.”166 Company A has no direct business activities in 
country C but only indirect business activities through the participation in company C 
which carries on base company activities. The question arises whether the 
participation is to be considered a PE. Pursuant to Article 5 (1) of the OECD-MTC 
“(...) the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.” Article 5 (7) of the 
OECD-MTC is clearer in this respect and stipulates that “(t)he fact that a company 
which is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company 
which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which carries on business in that 
other State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), shall not itself 
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.” It is outlined in 
the Commentary that “(...) the existence of a subsidiary company does not, of itself, 
constitute that subsidiary company a permanent establishment of its parent company. 
This follows from the principle that, for the purpose of taxation, such a subsidiary 
company constitutes an independent legal entity. Even the fact that the trade or 
business carried on by the subsidiary company is managed by the parent company 
does not constitute the subsidiary company a permanent establishment of the parent 
company.”167 Therefore, a subsidiary company may constitute a PE of the parent 
company under the conditions stipulated in Article 5 (5) of the OECD-MTC - as any 
other unrelated party - but not because of the mere existence of control.168 In the 
example, the fact that the subsidiary company C carries on base company activities 
towards company B - or even towards the parent company A - does not lead to the 
result that the subsidiary company C constitutes a PE of the parent company A. On 
the other hand, the subsidiary company C - as a resident taxpayer of country C - 
derives base company income which shall be taxable only in state C unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other state through a permanent establishment 
situated therein.169 The latter is - according to the example and based on the 
aforementioned arguments - not the case. The business activities of company C are 
carried on in country C and even though the services are directed towards other 
countries, there is no sufficient nexus to those countries in order to constitute a PE.  
Thus, the business income derived from the base company activities is taxable only 
in country C.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion it can be stipulated that the business profits derived by 
company A shall be taxable in country A, and the business profits derived by 
company C shall be taxable in country C - based on Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. 
Neither company A nor company C constitute a PE in the other country. However, 
additional questions come up with the application of the CFC rules of country A, i.e. 
where the income related to the base company activities is not only subject to tax in 
country C but is also in the focus of the CFC rules of country A. In principle, the CFC 
income which is defined by the domestic legislation of country A is taxable in the 
latter country - based on Article 7 (1) - if the income is not allocable to a PE. It was 
outlined above that the subsidiary company C does not constitute a PE of company 
A. However, the CFC rules typically refer to the income derived by the foreign legal 
entity. It may even be the case that the amount of CFC income determined pursuant 
to the CFC rules of country A is completely identical to the taxable income of the 
                                            
166 Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
167 Paragraph 40 of the Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD-MTC; see in this respect also Vogel, 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 5 (7), paragraph 165 et seq. 
168 See also paragraph 41 of the Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD-MTC. 
169 Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
country applies the exemption method or the credit method is strongly connected to 
the question whether the country follows the principle of capital import neutrality or 
capital export neutrality. However, even in cases where the resident country applies 
the exemption method as the general principle for the avoidance of double taxation of 
business income derived in the PE country, it is often considered necessary to 
switch-over from the exemption method to the credit method under certain 
circumstances. Here, we come close to the concept of CFC taxation. For example, 
the majority of tax treaties concluded by Germany contain activity clauses which lead 
to a switch-over from the exemption method (the main principle) to the credit method 
in case of certain passive income derived by the PE.162 In addition, the German 
Income Tax Act and the German Foreign Tax Act contain provisions which lead to an 
application of the credit method even though the exemption method is included in the 
respective tax treaty163 and which limit the offsetting of negative PE income.164 The 
application of the credit method results in the PE income being calculated (i) 
according to the rules of the residence country A and (ii) according to the rules of the 
PE country. The residence country A subsequently provides for an ordinary tax credit 
of the income taxes imposed in country C on the underlying income. The PE example 
is quite clear, at least where the income is derived from business activities in the PE 
country. In general, the same principles apply to business income which is derived by 
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The example is now amended in a way that the PE in country C is replaced by a 
separate legal entity (company C). This, of course, changes the situation - at least 
from a tax treaty perspective - considerably. Now, there are two resident companies 
involved: company A as a resident of country A, and company C as a resident of 
country C. Both companies are liable to tax in their respective countries of residence. 
The profits of company A “(...) shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise 
carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
                                            
162 See in this respect Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 23, paragraph 74 et seq.  
163 See section 20 (2) of the German Foreign Tax Act - which has the effect of a treaty override.  
164 See section 2 a of the German Income Tax Act.  
165 Paragraph 9 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC. In the example, this can be 
related to other companies resident in country A but not to company A itself (since the PE is legally a part of the 
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establishment situated therein.”166 Company A has no direct business activities in 
country C but only indirect business activities through the participation in company C 
which carries on base company activities. The question arises whether the 
participation is to be considered a PE. Pursuant to Article 5 (1) of the OECD-MTC 
“(...) the term “permanent establishment” means a fixed place of business through 
which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.” Article 5 (7) of the 
OECD-MTC is clearer in this respect and stipulates that “(t)he fact that a company 
which is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is controlled by a company 
which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which carries on business in that 
other State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), shall not itself 
constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other.” It is outlined in 
the Commentary that “(...) the existence of a subsidiary company does not, of itself, 
constitute that subsidiary company a permanent establishment of its parent company. 
This follows from the principle that, for the purpose of taxation, such a subsidiary 
company constitutes an independent legal entity. Even the fact that the trade or 
business carried on by the subsidiary company is managed by the parent company 
does not constitute the subsidiary company a permanent establishment of the parent 
company.”167 Therefore, a subsidiary company may constitute a PE of the parent 
company under the conditions stipulated in Article 5 (5) of the OECD-MTC - as any 
other unrelated party - but not because of the mere existence of control.168 In the 
example, the fact that the subsidiary company C carries on base company activities 
towards company B - or even towards the parent company A - does not lead to the 
result that the subsidiary company C constitutes a PE of the parent company A. On 
the other hand, the subsidiary company C - as a resident taxpayer of country C - 
derives base company income which shall be taxable only in state C unless the 
enterprise carries on business in the other state through a permanent establishment 
situated therein.169 The latter is - according to the example and based on the 
aforementioned arguments - not the case. The business activities of company C are 
carried on in country C and even though the services are directed towards other 
countries, there is no sufficient nexus to those countries in order to constitute a PE.  
Thus, the business income derived from the base company activities is taxable only 
in country C.  
 
As a preliminary conclusion it can be stipulated that the business profits derived by 
company A shall be taxable in country A, and the business profits derived by 
company C shall be taxable in country C - based on Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. 
Neither company A nor company C constitute a PE in the other country. However, 
additional questions come up with the application of the CFC rules of country A, i.e. 
where the income related to the base company activities is not only subject to tax in 
country C but is also in the focus of the CFC rules of country A. In principle, the CFC 
income which is defined by the domestic legislation of country A is taxable in the 
latter country - based on Article 7 (1) - if the income is not allocable to a PE. It was 
outlined above that the subsidiary company C does not constitute a PE of company 
A. However, the CFC rules typically refer to the income derived by the foreign legal 
entity. It may even be the case that the amount of CFC income determined pursuant 
to the CFC rules of country A is completely identical to the taxable income of the 
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168 See also paragraph 41 of the Commentary on Article 5 of the OECD-MTC. 
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the question whether the country follows the principle of capital import neutrality or 
capital export neutrality. However, even in cases where the resident country applies 
the exemption method as the general principle for the avoidance of double taxation of 
business income derived in the PE country, it is often considered necessary to 
switch-over from the exemption method to the credit method under certain 
circumstances. Here, we come close to the concept of CFC taxation. For example, 
the majority of tax treaties concluded by Germany contain activity clauses which lead 
to a switch-over from the exemption method (the main principle) to the credit method 
in case of certain passive income derived by the PE.162 In addition, the German 
Income Tax Act and the German Foreign Tax Act contain provisions which lead to an 
application of the credit method even though the exemption method is included in the 
respective tax treaty163 and which limit the offsetting of negative PE income.164 The 
application of the credit method results in the PE income being calculated (i) 
according to the rules of the residence country A and (ii) according to the rules of the 
PE country. The residence country A subsequently provides for an ordinary tax credit 
of the income taxes imposed in country C on the underlying income. The PE example 
is quite clear, at least where the income is derived from business activities in the PE 
country. In general, the same principles apply to business income which is derived by 
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The example is now amended in a way that the PE in country C is replaced by a 
separate legal entity (company C). This, of course, changes the situation - at least 
from a tax treaty perspective - considerably. Now, there are two resident companies 
involved: company A as a resident of country A, and company C as a resident of 
country C. Both companies are liable to tax in their respective countries of residence. 
The profits of company A “(...) shall be taxable only in that State unless the enterprise 
carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
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income allocable to the resident company A.176 Country A has to apply the tax treaty 
from its own perspective and the general definitions in Article 3 of the OECD-MTC do 
not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term “business profits” which – from the 
perspective of country A – leads to the result that the definition included in its 
domestic law has to be referred to.177 However, the verification must be concentrated 
on the actual activities, i.e. the service activities, and not on the mere domestic 
categorisation of CFC income itself.178 The latter is not decisive in the tax treaty 
context.179 Therefore, the activities carried on in country C have to be verified from 
the perspective of country A with reference to its domestic law.180 If it turns out that 
the income derived from these activities is to be qualified as “business profits,” the 
income which is allocable to the resident company A according to the domestic CFC 
rules may be taxed in country A pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC – due to 
the fact that no permanent establishment exists in country C. The Commentary on 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC states in this respect that “(t)he purpose of paragraph 
1 is to limit the right of one Contracting State to tax the business profits of enterprises 
of the other Contracting State. The paragraph does not limit the right of a Contracting 
State to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in 
its domestic law even though such tax imposed on these residents may be computed 
by reference to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is resident of the other 
Contracting State that is attributable to these residents’ participation in that 
enterprise. Tax so levied by a State on its own residents does not reduce the profits 
of the enterprise of the other State and may not, therefore, be said to have been 
levied on such profits (…).”181 In my opinion, the above examination shows that there 
are clear arguments in favour of a qualification of the attributed CFC income as 
business profits of the shareholder according to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. In 
                                            
176 See also Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 
717 et seq. (720); however, according to Portner, Article 7 does not draw a distinction whether it is the business 
of the foreign enterprise or the business of the foreign company’s domestic shareholder, and therefore Article 7 
should be respected if the CFC rules apply (Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a Changing World: A German 
Perspective, Tax Notes International 2002, page 1679 et seq. (1690)).    
177 Hemmelrath in Vogel / Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, 2003, Article 7, paragraph 21; Piltz in 
Debatin / Wassermeyer, Musterakommen, Article 7, paragraph 73; Schaumburg, Internationales Steuerrecht, 
1998, paragraph 16.228; Kroppen in Becker / Höppner / Grotherr / Kroppen, DBA, Article 7, paragraph 42. 
178 For example, the CFC income attribution may generally be qualified under the domestic legislation of the 
country which applies the CFC rules as – for example – dividend income or income from capital. However, this 
does not lead to the outcome that the income is necessarily considered to be dividend income in the tax treaty 
context, too. What is important here is the general definition of “business profits” under domestic law and not 
the categorisation of CFC income. If the income derived from the foreign activities fulfils the domestic 
requirements of business profits, it is also to be qualified as business profits in the tax treaty context.  
179 See in this respect also Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 223. 
180 See in this respect also the Finnish Supreme Tax Court in the A Oyj Abp Case: “When (…) the type of activity 
carried out by A Finance NV and its significance to A are taken into consideration and when account is taken to 
art 1 of the Business Income Tax Act, A’s income undoubtedly, on the basis of the CFC Act, falls within the 
category of business income according to the Finish domestic legislation” (see ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 
1062, 1063). When verifying the income in the light of the tax convention, the Finnish Supreme Tax Court states 
that “(a)ccording to the Commentary to art 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the concept of business 
income referred to in the Commentary is to be broadly understood and comprises all income derived from 
trading activities. Article 7 of the tax treaty between Finland and Belgium conforms to the OECD Model. It has 
already been noted above that the character of the income of the controlled foreign company is that of business 
income and base company income for the purposes of national law. When determining the character of the same 
income for the purposes of the tax treaty, the starting point must be that this income constitutes business income 
under art 1 of the Business Income Tax Act and the tax treaty does not contain any definition of business income, 
such a definition being derived from national law. Hence, for the purpose of applying the tax treaty, the income 
has the character of business income” (see ITLR, Volume 4, 2002, pages 1067, 1068).  
181 Paragraph 14 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
subsidiary company determined in country C.170 Nonetheless, both countries 
separately determine the facts which give rise to a tax liability. The fact that country A 
stipulates a nexus to income elements derived by another legal entity in country C is, 
by itself, not particularly problematic. Country A is basically free to do so and is - in 
general - not restricted by the tax treaty between the countries A and C.171 Tax 
treaties allocate taxing rights to the contracting states but do not directly affect the 
structuring of domestic legislation. In effect, the base company income is - from an 
economic perspective - subject to tax in country C and, in addition, in country A. This 
leads to an economic double taxation of income in the hands of two different 
taxpayers, namely company C (which is a resident of country C) and company A 
(which is a resident of country A). Clearly, this is one of the significant differences to 
the example outlined above with respect to the PE, where a juridical double taxation 
was involved. It was already outlined earlier that the avoidance of economic double 
taxation - in contrast to juridical double taxation - is not within the scope of a tax 
treaty. This is what the French Supreme Tax Court did not accept in the Schneider 
Case. However, it cannot be ignored - in my opinion - that there are two separate 
taxpayers involved which are resident in two different states. And even though it can 
be argued that there is - from an economic perspective - an “identity of nature”172 
between the base company income derived by company C and the CFC income 
allocable to company A, the outcome under the respective tax treaty has to be 
verified separately and from the perspective of both states. Lang compares the 
situation with the taxation of a partnership where a qualification conflict exists: one of 
the contracting states taxes the partnership (as a non-transparent entity) and the 
other state taxes the partners (because the partnership is considered to be 
transparent). It is the perspective of the respective state which leads to the double 
taxation - and it cannot be said that one of the two positions is wrong.173 
 
However, the question remains whether the CFC income is to be seen as “business 
profits of an enterprise” in the sense of Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. It should be clear 
that company A is an “enterprise of a Contracting State.”174 Pursuant to Article 3 (1) 
letter h the term “business” includes the performance of professional services and of 
other activities of an independent character.175 However, the base company activities 
themselves are directly carried on by company C and not by company A. 
Nonetheless, the allocation decision of country C is – in my opinion – not binding for 
the other contracting state, i.e. country A may still determine the income as business 
                                            
170 In cases where the whole income is subject to CFC taxation and where the income determination rules in both 
countries are to a large extent identical.  
171 See in this respect Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 
2002, page 717 et seq. (723); Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq.; Lang in IFA, Abusive Application of International Tax Agreements, 
2001, page 24. However, see the position of Vogel, Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 1990, 
paragraph 125 and Schwarz, Controlled Foreign Companies and Tax Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 1997, page 553 et seq.     
172 See in this respect the French Supreme Tax Court in the Schneider Case which was outlined earlier.  
173 Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et 
seq. (720).  
174 Article 3 (1) letter c and d of the OECD-MTC.  
175 Article 3 (1) letter h of the OECD-MTC; moreover, paragraph 71 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the 
OECD-MTC outlines that “(a)lthough it has not been found necessary in the Convention to define the term 
“profits,” it should nevertheless be understood that the term when used in this Article and elsewhere in the 
Convention has a broad meaning including all income derived in carrying on an enterprise. Such a broad 
meaning corresponds to the use of the term made in the tax laws of most OECD Member countries.” 
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income allocable to the resident company A.176 Country A has to apply the tax treaty 
from its own perspective and the general definitions in Article 3 of the OECD-MTC do 
not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term “business profits” which – from the 
perspective of country A – leads to the result that the definition included in its 
domestic law has to be referred to.177 However, the verification must be concentrated 
on the actual activities, i.e. the service activities, and not on the mere domestic 
categorisation of CFC income itself.178 The latter is not decisive in the tax treaty 
context.179 Therefore, the activities carried on in country C have to be verified from 
the perspective of country A with reference to its domestic law.180 If it turns out that 
the income derived from these activities is to be qualified as “business profits,” the 
income which is allocable to the resident company A according to the domestic CFC 
rules may be taxed in country A pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC – due to 
the fact that no permanent establishment exists in country C. The Commentary on 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC states in this respect that “(t)he purpose of paragraph 
1 is to limit the right of one Contracting State to tax the business profits of enterprises 
of the other Contracting State. The paragraph does not limit the right of a Contracting 
State to tax its own residents under controlled foreign companies provisions found in 
its domestic law even though such tax imposed on these residents may be computed 
by reference to the part of the profits of an enterprise that is resident of the other 
Contracting State that is attributable to these residents’ participation in that 
enterprise. Tax so levied by a State on its own residents does not reduce the profits 
of the enterprise of the other State and may not, therefore, be said to have been 
levied on such profits (…).”181 In my opinion, the above examination shows that there 
are clear arguments in favour of a qualification of the attributed CFC income as 
business profits of the shareholder according to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. In 
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subsidiary company determined in country C.170 Nonetheless, both countries 
separately determine the facts which give rise to a tax liability. The fact that country A 
stipulates a nexus to income elements derived by another legal entity in country C is, 
by itself, not particularly problematic. Country A is basically free to do so and is - in 
general - not restricted by the tax treaty between the countries A and C.171 Tax 
treaties allocate taxing rights to the contracting states but do not directly affect the 
structuring of domestic legislation. In effect, the base company income is - from an 
economic perspective - subject to tax in country C and, in addition, in country A. This 
leads to an economic double taxation of income in the hands of two different 
taxpayers, namely company C (which is a resident of country C) and company A 
(which is a resident of country A). Clearly, this is one of the significant differences to 
the example outlined above with respect to the PE, where a juridical double taxation 
was involved. It was already outlined earlier that the avoidance of economic double 
taxation - in contrast to juridical double taxation - is not within the scope of a tax 
treaty. This is what the French Supreme Tax Court did not accept in the Schneider 
Case. However, it cannot be ignored - in my opinion - that there are two separate 
taxpayers involved which are resident in two different states. And even though it can 
be argued that there is - from an economic perspective - an “identity of nature”172 
between the base company income derived by company C and the CFC income 
allocable to company A, the outcome under the respective tax treaty has to be 
verified separately and from the perspective of both states. Lang compares the 
situation with the taxation of a partnership where a qualification conflict exists: one of 
the contracting states taxes the partnership (as a non-transparent entity) and the 
other state taxes the partners (because the partnership is considered to be 
transparent). It is the perspective of the respective state which leads to the double 
taxation - and it cannot be said that one of the two positions is wrong.173 
 
However, the question remains whether the CFC income is to be seen as “business 
profits of an enterprise” in the sense of Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. It should be clear 
that company A is an “enterprise of a Contracting State.”174 Pursuant to Article 3 (1) 
letter h the term “business” includes the performance of professional services and of 
other activities of an independent character.175 However, the base company activities 
themselves are directly carried on by company C and not by company A. 
Nonetheless, the allocation decision of country C is – in my opinion – not binding for 
the other contracting state, i.e. country A may still determine the income as business 
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from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making the distribution is 
a resident.”186 Of course, the enumeration is by no means concluding.187 In addition, 
payments regarded as dividends may also include other benefits in money or 
money’s worth, as well as disguised distributions of profits.188 Paragraph 38 of the 
Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC refers to CFC legislation and outlines 
that “(…) such legislation or rules may, however, complicate the application of Article 
23. If the income were attributed to the taxpayer then each item of the income would 
have to be treated under the relevant provisions of the Convention (business profits, 
interest, royalties). If the amount is treated as a deemed dividend then it is clearly 
derived from the base company thus constituting income from that company’s 
country. Even then, it is by no means clear whether the taxable amount is to be 
regarded as a dividend within the meaning of Article 10 or as “other income” within 
the meaning of Article 21. Under some of these legislation or rules the taxable 
amount is treated as a dividend with the result that an exemption provided for by a 
tax convention, e.g. an affiliation exemption, is also extended to it. It is doubtful 
whether the Convention requires this to be done. If the country of residence 
considers that this is not the case it may face the allegation that it is obstructing the 
normal operation of the affiliation exemption by taxing the dividend (in the form of a 
“deemed dividend”) in advance.”189 The Commentary also goes into detail regarding 
possible problems related to the combination of current attribution of CFC income 
and subsequent dividend payment of the foreign company: “(w)here dividends are 
actually distributed by the base company, the provisions of a bilateral convention 
regarding dividends have to be applied in the normal way because there is dividend 
income within the meaning of the convention. Thus, the country of the base company 
may subject the dividend to a withholding tax. The country of residence of the 
shareholder will apply the normal methods for the elimination of double taxation (i.e. 
tax credit or tax exemption is granted). This implies that the withholding tax on the 
dividend should be credited in the shareholder’s country of residence, even if the 
distributed profit (the dividend) has been taxed years before under controlled foreign 
companies legislation or other rules with similar effect. However, the obligation to 
give credit in that case remains doubtful. Generally the dividend as such is exempted 
from tax (as it was already taxed under the relevant legislation or rules) and one 
might argue that there is no basis for a tax credit. On the other hand, the purpose of 
the treaty would be frustrated if the crediting of taxes could be avoided by simply 
anticipating the dividend taxation under counteracting legislation. The general 
principle set out above would suggest that the credit should be granted, though the 
details may depend on the technicalities of the relevant legislation or rules and the 
system for crediting foreign taxes against domestic tax, as well as on the 
particularities of the case (e.g. time lapsed since the taxation of the “deemed 
dividend”). However, taxpayers who have recourse to artificial arrangements are 
taking risks against which they cannot fully be safeguarded by tax authorities.”190  
 
The definition of the term “dividends” in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC requires the 
focus on the classification of the state of the company which makes the distribution 
(source state). However, this should be true where the source state positively 
classifies certain types of income as (regular) dividend income, but this should not 
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this case, one can follow the statement of Sandler - made as final remarks after an 
examination of the jurisprudence in CFC cases - that the only issue of consequence 
for the court in a CFC case should be the determination whether the respective 
double tax convention is limited to juridical double taxation or whether it 
encompasses also economic double taxation.182 This, in essence, would be the 
decisive point for the answer to the question whether the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right - under the double tax convention - to tax the attributed 
income or not.  
 
However, it should be noted that Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC gives first preference 
to the special articles - for example - on dividends, interest and royalties. Thus, 
Article 7 of the OEC-MTC will be applicable to business profits which do not belong to 
categories of income covered by the special articles.183 The result of the 
aforementioned examination might be different where dividend income, interest 
income or royalty income is included in the attributable CFC income. This will be 
verified below. Moreover, it has to be examined whether the CFC income attribution 
has to be seen - in general - as a dividend distribution of the CFC itself rather than an 
attribution of business income. If this is the case, Article 10 of the OECD-MTC would 
have preference over Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.184  
 
7.4.2. Article 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
It is quite obvious that the CFC income allocation has to be verified in the context of 
Article 10 of the OECD-MTC. There are a number of commentators who consider the 
CFC income to be “dividend income” in the light of the OECD-MTC.185 Pursuant to 
Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC the term “dividends” means “(…) income from 
shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or 
other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from 
other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income 
                                            
182 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 215. However, it has to be added that the remarks were made prior to the decision of the Conseil 
d’Etat in the Schneider Case and prior to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in the A Oyj Abp 
Case.  
183 Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC; see also paragraph 74 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.  
184 See in this respect also Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 
2002, page 407 et seq. (412). See with respect to the position that the CFC income can be considered business 
income from a tax treaty perspective: Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, 
CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 182, 183; Kabbaj / Raingeard de la Bletière, National 
Report France, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 
241-244. Noguera / Streichen, National Report Luxembourg, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 423, 424. However, see also the dissenting position of 
Brähler in Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 171.    
185 See the references in Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 224; see also Lang, CFC-
Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et seq. (721); Lang, 
CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 
et seq.; Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq.; 
Aigner, Die Abkommensberechtigung bei Anwendung von CFC-Gesetzgebungen, Internationale Wirtschafts-
Briefe 2002, page 1637 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 103 et seq.; 
Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, 2004, page 212 (dividend income or other income); Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 
2007, page 171 et seq. Brähler examines the “Zurechnungstheorie”, “Ausschüttungstheorie” and 
“Repräsentationstheorie” and comes to the conclusion that one should follow the “Ausschüttungstheorie” (and 
therefore Article 10 of the OECD-MTC) in the tax treaty context; see also the various arguments outlined in 
Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 96 et seq.  
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from shares by the laws of the State of which the company making the distribution is 
a resident.”186 Of course, the enumeration is by no means concluding.187 In addition, 
payments regarded as dividends may also include other benefits in money or 
money’s worth, as well as disguised distributions of profits.188 Paragraph 38 of the 
Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC refers to CFC legislation and outlines 
that “(…) such legislation or rules may, however, complicate the application of Article 
23. If the income were attributed to the taxpayer then each item of the income would 
have to be treated under the relevant provisions of the Convention (business profits, 
interest, royalties). If the amount is treated as a deemed dividend then it is clearly 
derived from the base company thus constituting income from that company’s 
country. Even then, it is by no means clear whether the taxable amount is to be 
regarded as a dividend within the meaning of Article 10 or as “other income” within 
the meaning of Article 21. Under some of these legislation or rules the taxable 
amount is treated as a dividend with the result that an exemption provided for by a 
tax convention, e.g. an affiliation exemption, is also extended to it. It is doubtful 
whether the Convention requires this to be done. If the country of residence 
considers that this is not the case it may face the allegation that it is obstructing the 
normal operation of the affiliation exemption by taxing the dividend (in the form of a 
“deemed dividend”) in advance.”189 The Commentary also goes into detail regarding 
possible problems related to the combination of current attribution of CFC income 
and subsequent dividend payment of the foreign company: “(w)here dividends are 
actually distributed by the base company, the provisions of a bilateral convention 
regarding dividends have to be applied in the normal way because there is dividend 
income within the meaning of the convention. Thus, the country of the base company 
may subject the dividend to a withholding tax. The country of residence of the 
shareholder will apply the normal methods for the elimination of double taxation (i.e. 
tax credit or tax exemption is granted). This implies that the withholding tax on the 
dividend should be credited in the shareholder’s country of residence, even if the 
distributed profit (the dividend) has been taxed years before under controlled foreign 
companies legislation or other rules with similar effect. However, the obligation to 
give credit in that case remains doubtful. Generally the dividend as such is exempted 
from tax (as it was already taxed under the relevant legislation or rules) and one 
might argue that there is no basis for a tax credit. On the other hand, the purpose of 
the treaty would be frustrated if the crediting of taxes could be avoided by simply 
anticipating the dividend taxation under counteracting legislation. The general 
principle set out above would suggest that the credit should be granted, though the 
details may depend on the technicalities of the relevant legislation or rules and the 
system for crediting foreign taxes against domestic tax, as well as on the 
particularities of the case (e.g. time lapsed since the taxation of the “deemed 
dividend”). However, taxpayers who have recourse to artificial arrangements are 
taking risks against which they cannot fully be safeguarded by tax authorities.”190  
 
The definition of the term “dividends” in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC requires the 
focus on the classification of the state of the company which makes the distribution 
(source state). However, this should be true where the source state positively 
classifies certain types of income as (regular) dividend income, but this should not 
                                            
186 Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
187 See paragraph 23 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
188 See paragraph 28 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
189 Paragraph 38 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
190 Paragraph 39 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
this case, one can follow the statement of Sandler - made as final remarks after an 
examination of the jurisprudence in CFC cases - that the only issue of consequence 
for the court in a CFC case should be the determination whether the respective 
double tax convention is limited to juridical double taxation or whether it 
encompasses also economic double taxation.182 This, in essence, would be the 
decisive point for the answer to the question whether the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right - under the double tax convention - to tax the attributed 
income or not.  
 
However, it should be noted that Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC gives first preference 
to the special articles - for example - on dividends, interest and royalties. Thus, 
Article 7 of the OEC-MTC will be applicable to business profits which do not belong to 
categories of income covered by the special articles.183 The result of the 
aforementioned examination might be different where dividend income, interest 
income or royalty income is included in the attributable CFC income. This will be 
verified below. Moreover, it has to be examined whether the CFC income attribution 
has to be seen - in general - as a dividend distribution of the CFC itself rather than an 
attribution of business income. If this is the case, Article 10 of the OECD-MTC would 
have preference over Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.184  
 
7.4.2. Article 10 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
It is quite obvious that the CFC income allocation has to be verified in the context of 
Article 10 of the OECD-MTC. There are a number of commentators who consider the 
CFC income to be “dividend income” in the light of the OECD-MTC.185 Pursuant to 
Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC the term “dividends” means “(…) income from 
shares, “jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or 
other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in profits, as well as income from 
other corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income 
                                            
182 Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 215. However, it has to be added that the remarks were made prior to the decision of the Conseil 
d’Etat in the Schneider Case and prior to the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court in the A Oyj Abp 
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183 Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC; see also paragraph 74 of the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD-MTC.  
184 See in this respect also Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 
2002, page 407 et seq. (412). See with respect to the position that the CFC income can be considered business 
income from a tax treaty perspective: Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, 
CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 182, 183; Kabbaj / Raingeard de la Bletière, National 
Report France, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 
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Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, pages 423, 424. However, see also the dissenting position of 
Brähler in Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 171.    
185 See the references in Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 224; see also Lang, CFC-
Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et seq. (721); Lang, 
CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 
et seq.; Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq.; 
Aigner, Die Abkommensberechtigung bei Anwendung von CFC-Gesetzgebungen, Internationale Wirtschafts-
Briefe 2002, page 1637 et seq.; Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 103 et seq.; 
Helminen, National Report Finland, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, 2004, page 212 (dividend income or other income); Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 
2007, page 171 et seq. Brähler examines the “Zurechnungstheorie”, “Ausschüttungstheorie” and 
“Repräsentationstheorie” and comes to the conclusion that one should follow the “Ausschüttungstheorie” (and 
therefore Article 10 of the OECD-MTC) in the tax treaty context; see also the various arguments outlined in 
Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 96 et seq.  
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situation where the company provides some advantages to the shareholder and 
which negatively influences the net asset value of the company (or which prevents 
the company from increasing the net asset value). It is therefore rather obvious, in my 
opinion, to treat such a situation in a comparable manner to an “official” profit 
distribution and to ignore the fact that the distribution is not made pursuant to a 
formal procedure with an actual outflow of financial means to the shareholder. This, 
however, has nothing to do with the situation in case of a CFC income attribution. 
Here, the focus is on the income derived by the CFC and not on the legal entity itself. 
This is basically true for both approaches, the entity approach and the transactional 
approach, even though it is much more obvious in the latter case. Anyway, no open 
or hidden transfer of values from the legal entity to the shareholder exists which has 
a - direct or indirect - effect on the net asset value of the company.198 
 
One of the main arguments for dividend income is the inseparable link between the 
holding of shares in the foreign legal entity and the income attribution based on the 
CFC rules. The existence of a shareholding in the foreign legal entity seems to be 
causal.199 In fact, one of the basic requirements for the application of CFC rules is the 
holding of shares in the foreign company.200 According to Vogel, it is decisive that the 
income which is attributed to the taxpayer under the CFC rules “stems” from the 
shares in the legal entity and is therefore for tax treaty purposes to be qualified as a 
dividend.201 Lang and Aigner concluded that the CFC income which is allocated to 
the shareholder by the state of residence is caused by the shareholding in the legal 
entity. For this reason, Article 10 of the OECD-MTC is relevant from a tax treaty 
perspective.202  
 
In my opinion, the reason for the dependency is easy to explain: the non-
transparency of the legal entity provides for the deferral of domestic taxation of low-
taxed income which would otherwise not be possible.203 Thus, the CFC rules are 
applied because of the possibility of sheltering the low-taxed income from domestic 
taxation (and not because of the shareholding). This, by itself, is not decisive. 
However, there are a number of aspects which have to be taken into account and 
which - in my opinion - do not support the dividend approach: 
 
- In almost all countries, the CFC income is determined according to domestic 
rules. The income of the foreign legal entity which may be distributed to the 
                                            
198 See in this respect also Uustalu, National Report Estonia, in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC 
Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 2004, page 184. 
199 Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 et 
seq. (721). 
200 Leaving aside constructive ownership rules.   
201 Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 224. 
202 Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq. (412, 
413)); Lang, CFC-Regelungen und Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht 2002, page 717 
et seq. (721); see also Lang, CFC Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal 
Documentation 2003, page 51 et seq.; Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and 
EC Law, General Report, 2004, pages 34, 35; see with respect to Article 10 of the OECD-MTC also Haslinger, 
National Report Austria, pages 88-90. 
203 It has to be added that the CFC rules are not always restricted to non-transparent legal entities but sometimes 
also encompass permanent establishments and partnerships. Moreover, even in countries where the CFC rules 
solely focus on non-transparent legal entities, provisions exist which switch over from the exemption method to 
the credit method in case of permanent establishments and partnerships. It is therefore the exemption of low-
taxed passive income which is in the focus of the high-tax countries, and this is most often - but not always - 
caused by the interposition of non-transparent legal entities. 
   
 
mean that a negative classification is equally binding for the residence state of the 
shareholder.191 Thus, if certain types of income cannot be classified as dividend 
income in the state of source, the state of residence of the shareholder has to make 
an autonomous examination in the light of the tax treaty.192 In any event, the 
domestic legislation of the residence state of the shareholder is not decisive for the 
classification of income as dividend income.193 In this respect, it seems that the 
definition in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC not only encompasses the distributions 
decided by the shareholders’ meeting but also, for example, hidden distributions of 
profit which do not necessarily require an actual outflow of financial means from the 
company to the shareholder.194 At least, the foreign companies which are typically in 
the focus of CFC rules are companies pursuant to Article 3 (1) letter b, namely “any 
body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” and 
it is the qualification of the residence state of the company which is decisive in this 
respect.195 However, the fact that the profit distributions of the foreign entities are 
“dividends” in the sense of Article 10 (3) does not - in my opinion - necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the CFC income attribution leads to “income from shares” 
(dividend income).196 Of course, the reference to hidden distributions of profit shows 
that dividend income does not necessarily require an actual transfer of financial 
means from the company to the shareholder. However, the situation of a hidden 
distribution of profit is - in my opinion - by no means comparable to the income 
attribution according to CFC rules. In case of a hidden distribution of profit, the 
company typically gives away a certain value in favour of the shareholder. This can 
either lead to an immediate reduction of the net asset value or to a situation where 
the company cannot increase the net asset value since it gives away the possibility to 
increase the net asset value in favour of the shareholder.197 In any case, it is a 
                                            
191 Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, Rz. 223. 
192 Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, Rz. 223. 
193 This, of course, is also true if one takes the position that the positive and negative classification of the state of 
source is decisive (and not only the positive classification). 
194 Paragraph 28 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC; see also Lang, CFC-Regelungen und 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Internationales Steuerrecht, 2002, page 717 et seq. (721); Lang, CFC 
Regulations and Double Taxation Treaties, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation 2003, page 51 et 
seq.; Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq. 
(413); see also Aigner, Die Abkommensberechtigung bei Anwendung einer CFC-Gesetzgebung, Internationale 
Wirtschafts-Briefe 2002, page 1637 et seq.; Tischbirek in Vogel / Lehner, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, 
Article 10, paragraph 203; Wassermeyer in Debatin / Wassermeyer, Musterabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 39; 
Brähler, Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 171 et seq. However, this was not the position of the 
government counsel in the Schneider Case who referred to a former decision of the Conseil d’Etat stating that 
the term “dividends” must be defined according to the definition given in internal law of the notion of dividends 
“as earnings distributed by a company to its participants by virtue of a decision taken by the general assembly of 
its shareholders” (Banque francaise de l’ Orient, October 13, 1999, appeal no. 190 083, RJF 12/99, n 1587, DF 
6/00, c 71, CE). This definition of the French Supreme Tax Court based on internal law therefore definitely does 
not comprise a deemed distribution pursuant to the French CFC rules since such an attribution is not based on the 
decision of the shareholders. It is questionable whether this definition covers a hidden distribution of profit. In 
my opinion this could be the case since a hidden distribution of profit is always caused by the shareholder 
relationship and therefore a “decision” of the shareholders may be assumed. This is, of course, not true for the 
income attribution according to Section 209 B. If the – perhaps factual – decision of the shareholder is decisive 
for the qualification of dividends in internal law, Article 10 (3) OECD-MTC cannot be applied to the CFC rules. 
Therefore, the government counsel came to the conclusion that if the dividend article is not applicable it must be 
other income. 
195 See Aigner, CFC-Gesetzgebung und DBA-Recht, Steuer und Wirtschaft International 2002, page 407 et seq. 
(412); Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 186 et seq.  
196 However, see with respect to Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC: Tischbirek in Vogel / Lehner, 
Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 223.  
197 This can also be relevant in case of persons which are related to the shareholder.  
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situation where the company provides some advantages to the shareholder and 
which negatively influences the net asset value of the company (or which prevents 
the company from increasing the net asset value). It is therefore rather obvious, in my 
opinion, to treat such a situation in a comparable manner to an “official” profit 
distribution and to ignore the fact that the distribution is not made pursuant to a 
formal procedure with an actual outflow of financial means to the shareholder. This, 
however, has nothing to do with the situation in case of a CFC income attribution. 
Here, the focus is on the income derived by the CFC and not on the legal entity itself. 
This is basically true for both approaches, the entity approach and the transactional 
approach, even though it is much more obvious in the latter case. Anyway, no open 
or hidden transfer of values from the legal entity to the shareholder exists which has 
a - direct or indirect - effect on the net asset value of the company.198 
 
One of the main arguments for dividend income is the inseparable link between the 
holding of shares in the foreign legal entity and the income attribution based on the 
CFC rules. The existence of a shareholding in the foreign legal entity seems to be 
causal.199 In fact, one of the basic requirements for the application of CFC rules is the 
holding of shares in the foreign company.200 According to Vogel, it is decisive that the 
income which is attributed to the taxpayer under the CFC rules “stems” from the 
shares in the legal entity and is therefore for tax treaty purposes to be qualified as a 
dividend.201 Lang and Aigner concluded that the CFC income which is allocated to 
the shareholder by the state of residence is caused by the shareholding in the legal 
entity. For this reason, Article 10 of the OECD-MTC is relevant from a tax treaty 
perspective.202  
 
In my opinion, the reason for the dependency is easy to explain: the non-
transparency of the legal entity provides for the deferral of domestic taxation of low-
taxed income which would otherwise not be possible.203 Thus, the CFC rules are 
applied because of the possibility of sheltering the low-taxed income from domestic 
taxation (and not because of the shareholding). This, by itself, is not decisive. 
However, there are a number of aspects which have to be taken into account and 
which - in my opinion - do not support the dividend approach: 
 
- In almost all countries, the CFC income is determined according to domestic 
rules. The income of the foreign legal entity which may be distributed to the 
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mean that a negative classification is equally binding for the residence state of the 
shareholder.191 Thus, if certain types of income cannot be classified as dividend 
income in the state of source, the state of residence of the shareholder has to make 
an autonomous examination in the light of the tax treaty.192 In any event, the 
domestic legislation of the residence state of the shareholder is not decisive for the 
classification of income as dividend income.193 In this respect, it seems that the 
definition in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC not only encompasses the distributions 
decided by the shareholders’ meeting but also, for example, hidden distributions of 
profit which do not necessarily require an actual outflow of financial means from the 
company to the shareholder.194 At least, the foreign companies which are typically in 
the focus of CFC rules are companies pursuant to Article 3 (1) letter b, namely “any 
body corporate or any entity that is treated as a body corporate for tax purposes” and 
it is the qualification of the residence state of the company which is decisive in this 
respect.195 However, the fact that the profit distributions of the foreign entities are 
“dividends” in the sense of Article 10 (3) does not - in my opinion - necessarily lead to 
the conclusion that the CFC income attribution leads to “income from shares” 
(dividend income).196 Of course, the reference to hidden distributions of profit shows 
that dividend income does not necessarily require an actual transfer of financial 
means from the company to the shareholder. However, the situation of a hidden 
distribution of profit is - in my opinion - by no means comparable to the income 
attribution according to CFC rules. In case of a hidden distribution of profit, the 
company typically gives away a certain value in favour of the shareholder. This can 
either lead to an immediate reduction of the net asset value or to a situation where 
the company cannot increase the net asset value since it gives away the possibility to 
increase the net asset value in favour of the shareholder.197 In any case, it is a 
                                            
191 Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, Rz. 223. 
192 Vogel, Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, Rz. 223. 
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Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen, Article 10, paragraph 223.  
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on the commercial accounts of the company and the (open or hidden) 
distributions to the shareholder. It is the (net) profit of the company which is 
made available to the shareholder by way of profit distribution. In contrast, the 
CFC rules are very specific and only attribute the income in certain limited and 
clearly defined situations. This can have the effect that the CFC taxation is not 
applicable during the entire period of foreign investment but only in years 
where certain requirements are fulfilled. The application typically requires that 
(i) a certain participation threshold is exceeded, (ii) a certain low-taxation 
threshold is not exceeded, and (iii) certain income elements are derived by the 
foreign entity (transactional approach) or a certain mixture of income and / or 
certain circumstances are existent (entity approach).  
 
Overall, I cannot follow the position that the CFC income is to be qualified as a 
deemed dividend (Article 10 of the OECD-MTC) - which is mainly based on the 
argument of a shareholding in the foreign legal entity which derives the income.  
 
Another obstacle for the application of CFC rules under the concept of dividends 
might be Article 10 (5) of the OECD-MTC which states that “(w)here a company 
which is a resident of a Contracting State derives profits or income from the other 
Contracting State, that other State may not impose any tax on the dividends paid by 
the company (...) nor subject the company’s undistributed profits to a tax on the 
company’s undistributed profits, even if the dividends paid or the undistributed profits 
consist wholly or partly of profits or income arising in such other State.”  At first 
glance, this seems to be a conflict with CFC taxation if it is assumed that the latter is 
directed to tax undistributed profits. However, it is made clear in paragraph 37 of the 
Commentary that “(i)t might be argued that where the taxpayer’s country of 
residence, pursuant to its controlled foreign companies legislation or other rules with 
similar effect seeks to tax profits which have not been distributed, it is acting contrary 
to the provisions of paragraph 5. However, it should be noted that paragraph 5 is 
confined to the taxation at source and, thus, has no bearing on the taxation at 
residence under such legislation or rules. In addition, the paragraph concerns only 
the taxation of the company and not that of the shareholder.”205  
 
Moreover, even if it is assumed that the attributable CFC income is to be qualified as 
dividend income - in contrast to what was outlined above and in contrast to my 
opinion - and the income is taxed in the residence state of the shareholder, it can 
create a conflict under the respective double tax convention. This is the case where 
the “regular” dividend income is exempt from taxation whereas the (deemed) 
dividend income pursuant to the applicable CFC regime is taxable, and the double 
taxation is avoided by a tax credit system.  
 
7.4.3. Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
Interest income and royalty income are of particular interest: those types of income 
are in the focus of the CFC rules in all of the countries which apply such legislation. It 
                                                                                                                                         
the laws of the OECD Member countries, such joint stock companies are legal entities with a separate juridical 
personality distinct from all their shareholders. On this point, they differ from partnerships insofar as the latter 
do not have juridical personality in most countries.”  
205 Paragraph 37 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC; see with respect to Article 10 (5) of the 
OECD-MTC also Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a Changing World: A German Perspective, Tax Notes 
International 2002, page 1679 et seq. (1692).  
   
 
shareholder is therefore typically different from (and unconnected to) the 
attributed CFC income. In other words, it would be rather a coincidence if the 
taxable income of the foreign legal entity and the taxable CFC income was 
identical. 
 
- The CFC rules focus on certain types of income and - in my opinion - ignore 
the actual result of the foreign legal entity. This is particularly true for the 
transactional approach. The application of CFC rules can lead to a positive 
income attribution even though the result of the foreign entity is negative and 
the latter is therefore not in a position to distribute any profits. In such a case, 
the consequence of the activity which is carried out by the CFC may be a 
decrease in value of the shares - and at the same time the positive income is 
attributed and taxed in the country of the shareholder based on the domestic 
CFC legislation. 
 
- Although the likelihood that the CFC rules cover the same types of income as 
the foreign legal entity is higher in case of an entity approach, it is by no 
means clear that this is the case for a period of more than one year. The 
change of activities can lead to the result that the foreign income is subject to 
CFC taxation in one year but not in the other. Thus, the basic feature of CFC 
rules that only certain types of income are of importance - combined with the 
fact that the income determination rules are different - increases the probability 
of a deviation between the income of the legal entity which may be distributed 
to the shareholder and the attributable CFC income.  
 
- The attribution of CFC income has no influence on the income based on the 
commercial accounts of the foreign company and it has no influence on the 
net asset value (in contrast to an open or hidden distribution of profit). The 
company is therefore in a position to distribute all of the profits derived from its 
activities to the shareholder and this is - and must be - totally unconnected to a 
CFC income attribution. 
 
- The actual profit distribution of the company leads to income from shares 
(dividend income) and reflects the added value of the investment. It is by no 
means comparable to the CFC income attribution. Of course, the income 
attribution and the actual dividend are economically - at least to a certain part - 
related to the same income. It is therefore necessary to avoid an economic 
double taxation on the level of the shareholder by the exemption of the 
dividend income or, alternatively, the crediting of the income taxes imposed on 
the CFC income attribution. Nonetheless, this is just a measure to avoid 
economic double taxation and does not say anything about the character of 
the CFC income attribution.  
 
- It follows from the aforementioned features and the mechanism of CFC rules 
outlined earlier that the concept of CFC income attribution is different to the 
concept of dividend income. The focus on the residence state of the foreign 
entity and the fact that the term dividend means “a distribution of profits to the 
shareholders”204 requires - in my opinion - a nexus between the income based 
                                            
204 See the preliminary remarks outlined in paragraph 1 of the Commentary on Article 10 of the OECD-MTC: 
“(b)y “dividends” is generally meant the distribution of profits to the shareholders by companies limited by 
shares, limited partnerships with share capital, limited liability companies or other joint stock companies. Under 
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Even the situation where the resident company A derives interest and royalty income 
in a third country (country B), and the income is effectively connected with a PE in 
country C, is not substantially different to the aforementioned example. Article 21 (2) 
of the OECD-MTC stipulates that “(t)he provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to 
income, other than income from immovable property as defined in paragraph 2 of 
Article 6, if the recipient of such income, being a resident of a Contracting State, 
carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent 
establishment situated therein and the right of property in respect of which the 
income is paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment. In such 
case the provisions of Article 7 shall apply.” Apart from the fact that the interest and 
royalty payments can be subject to withholding tax in country B, the question whether 
a separation of the income components is required may depend, again, on the tax 
treaty between country A and C (e.g. activity clauses) and the domestic law of 
residence country A.210 Thus, it can be concluded that interest and royalty income 
derived in a third country (country B) which is effectively connected with the PE is 









                                            
210 See paragraph 10 of the Commentary on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD-MTC.  
211 However, this is only true under the important assumption that the interest and royalty income is allocable to 










   
 
is therefore necessary to clarify whether Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC play a 
role where such types of income are included in the attributable CFC income.206 
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In the example, the PE derives - in addition to other service income - interest and 
royalty income which is attributable to the PE and the source of income is in country 
C. Here, the outcome under the tax treaty is quite similar to the first example. The 
articles dealing with interest and royalty income give preference to the PE country. 
The same is true for dividend income. Article 11 (4) of the OECD-MTC stipulates that 
“(t)he provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the 
interest, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State in which the interest arises through a permanent establishment 
situated therein and the debt-claim in respect of which the interest is paid is 
effectively connected with such permanent establishment. In such case the 
provisions of Article 7 shall apply.”207 Similar rules exist for dividends and royalties.208 
In contrast to the situation outlined above, the variety of different income elements 
may require a separation from the perspective of country A. At least, this is true 
where activity clauses or domestic provisions exist which provide for a different 
treatment of the income elements, e.g. a partial switch-over from the exemption 
method to the credit method or the limitation of the offsetting of certain negative 
income elements. Overall, it can be concluded that interest and royalty income which 





                                            
206 See with respect to CFC income and Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC also Aigner, 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 83 et seq.  
207 Article 11 (4) of the OECD-MTC.   
208 With respect to dividends and royalties see Article 10 (4) and  Article 12 (3) of the OECD-MTC, respectively.  
209 As already outlined earlier in this study, it may be difficult to allocate the passive property and passive 
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   country C 
            service income 
                                 + interest and royalty income 
 
 
                 provision of services 
                          (including financial / licensing services) 
 
 





Here, the situation is not substantially different from the example outlined earlier of a 
CFC which solely derives income from service activities. The total income is part of 
the business profits derived by company C and can be taxed in country C pursuant to 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. At least, there is no other country involved which 
might have a preferred right to tax the interest and royalty income pursuant to Articles 
11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC.212 If it is assumed that the “income mix” derived in 
country C is subject to CFC taxation in country A,213 the question arises whether it 
has to be qualified – from the perspective of country A – as business income, or 
whether it has to be divided into the different income elements (business income, 
interest income, royalty income). A third alternative would be to consider the whole 
amount of income as other income in the sense of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC.  
 
In principle, the priority of the special articles provides the possibility for a limited 
taxation at source in the other treaty country (the source country). From the 
perspective of country C, this is not an issue since the income is derived from 
domestic sources. The whole amount of income is to be taken into account for the 
determination of the business profits of company C. From the perspective of the 
country of the shareholder, the CFC income derived in country C is not allocable to a 
PE and can therefore be taxed – based on the argumentation in the example of the 
service activities – in country A pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. The 
interest and royalty income form part of the allocable business profits under the CFC 
regime of the country of the shareholder. The tax treaty between the two countries C 
                                            
212 See Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC.  
213 At least in the example it shall be assumed that the income is subject to CFC taxation. However, this is not 
necessarily the case - depending on the respective CFC rules - if the income is derived from activities carried out 




















  country C 
          service income 




The situation is, of course, different where the “income mix” is derived by a legal 
entity in country C. In order to clarify the applicable treaty provisions the following 
differentiation can be made: interest income and royalty income derived (i) from a 
source of income in the residence country of the CFC (country C), (ii) from a source 
of income in a third country (country B), and (iii) from a source of income in the 
country of the shareholder (country A). Furthermore, the situation of a strict limitation 
to passive income without any substantial service element is to be verified 
separately.  
 
a.) Interest and royalty income derived from a source of income in country C 
 
This can be the case, for example, where – in addition to other service activities – 
interest income is derived from the provision of loans to companies resident in 
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the total net income (entity approach) or a certain part of the net income 
(transactional approach) which is attributed to the shareholder. The income as such 
is derived from a business activity and is therefore - in my opinion - to be qualified as 
business income, even if it is the result of a “mixture” of different income components. 
In any case, the proposed solution does not leave any room - from my perspective - 
for the application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC.217  
 
b.) Interest and royalty income derived from a source of income in a third country 
 
In the following alternative, it is assumed that company C derives interest and royalty 
income from the provision of financial services and the licensing out of intangible 
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The interest and royalty income is part of the business income derived by company 
C. However, Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC gives preference to Articles 11 and 12 of 
the OECD-MTC which may lead to a source based taxation – at least with respect to 
the interest income – in country B. In effect, a withholding tax may be deducted from 
the gross amount of interest paid from company B to company C which would not be 
the case if Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC were applicable only for the allocation of 
                                            
217 However, the application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC would not lead to a different outcome, either. If 
the income is considered to be other income form the perspective of country A, the taxing rights will be allocable 
to country A. Article 21 (1) outlines that “(i)tems of income of a resident of a Contracting State, wherever 
arising, not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State.” As 
already outlined above, the Council for Advance Tax Rulings in the Swedish Captive Insurance Cases qualified 
the CFC income as business income for tax treaty purposes, but also referred to other income (as an alternative 







   
 
and A does not prevent the latter country from taxing the income. In my opinion, the 
fact that additional income elements are included in the attributable CFC income 
does not lead to a different outcome. The latter is, in my opinion, supported by the 
outcome of the European case law outlined under section 7.2.214 The net income 
derived from the activities carried out in country C is still to be considered business 
income, and this also includes services related to financing and licensing. As already 
outlined above, the activity, and therefore also the net income derived from this 
activity, has to be qualified, in my opinion, as a whole. If it turns out that the activity is 
to be considered a business activity, there is no necessity for a further separation of 
the net income and the different elements which make up the business income. Here, 
it does not play any role, in my opinion, whether the country which applies the CFC 
rules follows an entity approach or transactional approach. In contrast thereto, 
Sandler takes the position that the attributed income retains its character. According 
to Sandler, this would mean that under an entity approach CFC taxation the entire 
attributed income should be qualified as “profits” of the CFC. In case of a 
transactional approach CFC taxation the attributed income should be subdivided into 
the different types of income, i.e. business profits, dividends, interest, royalties or 
capital gains.215 This might be supported by paragraph 38 of the OECD-Commentary 
on Article 10 where such an approach is basically seen as a possibility. However, I 
do not see that the domestic approach of creating a link to the income of the CFC 
and the question how much of the income should be attributed, i.e. by way of 
following an entity approach or a transactional approach CFC legislation, should 
result, as outlined above, in a different conclusion with respect to the attributable net 
income. 
 
However, one could argue that the definitions included in Articles 11 (3) and 12 (2) of 
the OECD-MTC also affect the income qualification under the tax treaty for purposes 
of income allocation according to the CFC regime of country A. I do not think that this 
is the case. The abstract definition of interest and royalties is of significance for the 
identification and separation of the gross income for the purpose of allocating taxing 
rights to the source country in order to provide for a limited taxation at source 
(withholding taxation) but not for the allocation of the net income pursuant to the CFC 
regime.216 It is therefore - from a domestic perspective - important to know the 
underlying type of income in order to determine the amount of CFC income, but it is 
                                            
214 The Belgian subsidiary in the A Oyj Abp Case, inter alia, provided financial services. The same was true in 
the Bricom Holdings Case where the Dutch subsidiary of Bricom derived interest income from loan amounts 
granted to the UK companies. In both cases, the fact that interest income was included in the attributed CFC 
income did not play any role for the qualification of the income attributed to the shareholders. In the A Oyj Abp 
Case, the income was qualified as business income. In the Bricom Holdings Case, the attributed income under 
the UK CFC regime was considered “a purely notional sum” which finally did not represent any interest income. 
Also in the Schneider Case, where the activity of the Swiss subsidiary of Schneider encompassed, inter alia, the 
holding and management of bonds and securities, the type of income received by the Swiss subsidiary finally did 
not play any role for the qualification of the CFC income. In the Swedish Captive Insurance Cases the Council 
for Advance Tax Rulings concluded that the profit derived by the captive insurance companies in Luxembourg 
and Switzerland was not the same as the income which is attributable to the Swedish parent company under the 
Swedish CFC regime. Essentially, the Council for Advance Tax Rulings qualified the CFC income as business 
income - alternatively other income - but did not refer to the income components derived by the captive 
insurance companies, either.   
215Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 
1998, page 95. 
216 There seems to be no basis to derive such a limitation from Articles 11 and 12 of the OECD-MTC. To this 
extent, I fully agree with the outcome of the Bricom Holdings Case. The interest or royalty income received by 
the subsidiary company is not included (as the same type of interest and royalty income) in the income attributed 
according to the CFC regime.  
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the total net income (entity approach) or a certain part of the net income 
(transactional approach) which is attributed to the shareholder. The income as such 
is derived from a business activity and is therefore - in my opinion - to be qualified as 
business income, even if it is the result of a “mixture” of different income components. 
In any case, the proposed solution does not leave any room - from my perspective - 
for the application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC.217  
 
b.) Interest and royalty income derived from a source of income in a third country 
 
In the following alternative, it is assumed that company C derives interest and royalty 
income from the provision of financial services and the licensing out of intangible 
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The interest and royalty income is part of the business income derived by company 
C. However, Article 7 (4) of the OECD-MTC gives preference to Articles 11 and 12 of 
the OECD-MTC which may lead to a source based taxation – at least with respect to 
the interest income – in country B. In effect, a withholding tax may be deducted from 
the gross amount of interest paid from company B to company C which would not be 
the case if Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC were applicable only for the allocation of 
                                            
217 However, the application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC would not lead to a different outcome, either. If 
the income is considered to be other income form the perspective of country A, the taxing rights will be allocable 
to country A. Article 21 (1) outlines that “(i)tems of income of a resident of a Contracting State, wherever 
arising, not dealt with in the foregoing Articles of this Convention shall be taxable only in that State.” As 
already outlined above, the Council for Advance Tax Rulings in the Swedish Captive Insurance Cases qualified 
the CFC income as business income for tax treaty purposes, but also referred to other income (as an alternative 







   
 
and A does not prevent the latter country from taxing the income. In my opinion, the 
fact that additional income elements are included in the attributable CFC income 
does not lead to a different outcome. The latter is, in my opinion, supported by the 
outcome of the European case law outlined under section 7.2.214 The net income 
derived from the activities carried out in country C is still to be considered business 
income, and this also includes services related to financing and licensing. As already 
outlined above, the activity, and therefore also the net income derived from this 
activity, has to be qualified, in my opinion, as a whole. If it turns out that the activity is 
to be considered a business activity, there is no necessity for a further separation of 
the net income and the different elements which make up the business income. Here, 
it does not play any role, in my opinion, whether the country which applies the CFC 
rules follows an entity approach or transactional approach. In contrast thereto, 
Sandler takes the position that the attributed income retains its character. According 
to Sandler, this would mean that under an entity approach CFC taxation the entire 
attributed income should be qualified as “profits” of the CFC. In case of a 
transactional approach CFC taxation the attributed income should be subdivided into 
the different types of income, i.e. business profits, dividends, interest, royalties or 
capital gains.215 This might be supported by paragraph 38 of the OECD-Commentary 
on Article 10 where such an approach is basically seen as a possibility. However, I 
do not see that the domestic approach of creating a link to the income of the CFC 
and the question how much of the income should be attributed, i.e. by way of 
following an entity approach or a transactional approach CFC legislation, should 
result, as outlined above, in a different conclusion with respect to the attributable net 
income. 
 
However, one could argue that the definitions included in Articles 11 (3) and 12 (2) of 
the OECD-MTC also affect the income qualification under the tax treaty for purposes 
of income allocation according to the CFC regime of country A. I do not think that this 
is the case. The abstract definition of interest and royalties is of significance for the 
identification and separation of the gross income for the purpose of allocating taxing 
rights to the source country in order to provide for a limited taxation at source 
(withholding taxation) but not for the allocation of the net income pursuant to the CFC 
regime.216 It is therefore - from a domestic perspective - important to know the 
underlying type of income in order to determine the amount of CFC income, but it is 
                                            
214 The Belgian subsidiary in the A Oyj Abp Case, inter alia, provided financial services. The same was true in 
the Bricom Holdings Case where the Dutch subsidiary of Bricom derived interest income from loan amounts 
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the UK CFC regime was considered “a purely notional sum” which finally did not represent any interest income. 
Also in the Schneider Case, where the activity of the Swiss subsidiary of Schneider encompassed, inter alia, the 
holding and management of bonds and securities, the type of income received by the Swiss subsidiary finally did 
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for Advance Tax Rulings concluded that the profit derived by the captive insurance companies in Luxembourg 
and Switzerland was not the same as the income which is attributable to the Swedish parent company under the 
Swedish CFC regime. Essentially, the Council for Advance Tax Rulings qualified the CFC income as business 
income - alternatively other income - but did not refer to the income components derived by the captive 
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the subsidiary company is not included (as the same type of interest and royalty income) in the income attributed 
according to the CFC regime.  
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Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC stipulates that “(i)nterest arising in a Contracting 
State paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other 
State.” Thus, the OECD-MTC allocates the taxing rights for the interest income to 
country C. However, in Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC a limited right to tax is 
granted to the source country (country A) which “(…) shall not exceed 10 per cent of 
the gross amount of the interest.” In contrast thereto, Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC 
does not provide for a limited taxation at source but allocates the taxing rights solely 
to country C: “(r)oyalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a 
resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State.” 
Therefore, the taxing rights related to the interest and royalty payments are clearly 
stipulated and – apart form the limited possibility of a withholding taxation of interest 
payments – allocated to country C. Based on the clear limitations one could take the 
position that there is no room for a CFC taxation of the interest and royalty income, 
either.220 In fact, this was one of the questions raised in the Bricom Holdings Case 
outlined earlier where the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom concluded that “the 
interest received by Spinneys (here: company C) is not included in the sum 
apportioned to the taxpayer (here: company A) on which tax is chargeable. It merely 
provides a measure by which an element in a conventional or notional sum is 
calculated, and it is that conventional or notional sum which is apportioned to the 
taxpayer and on which tax is charged.”221 Even though the peculiarities of the United 
Kingdom CFC rules have to be taken into account, the statement is partly true, at 
least insofar as it makes clear that the interest income is of no relevance in the 
second step of a two-step approach: first, the actual interest payment (or royalty 
payment) has to be seen in the light of the special articles. Here, the possibility of a 
withholding taxation may be granted to the source country. Second, the interest 
payments (or royalty payments) “amalgamate” with all the other income derived by 
company C and the “income mix” is determined on a net basis, i.e. the related 
expenses are taken into account. In fact, the net income in the second step is 
determined twice: (i) for the purpose of taxation of company C in country C and (ii) for 
the purpose of CFC income taxation of the resident parent company A in country A. 
However, the statement might give the impression that the “notional sum” is not to be 
qualified for the purpose of the underlying treaty. This, of course, should not be true.  
 
If the taxation of the PE according to the credit method is compared to the taxation of 
the shareholder according to the CFC rules, it is quite obvious that - apart from the 
substantial difference related to the separate taxable person in country C and the fact 
that the CFC taxation leads to an economic instead of a juridical double taxation of 
income - the overall tax burden can be identical.222 Furthermore, and this is more 
interesting in this context, the qualification of income is the same. In case the service 
income, interest income and royalty income is derived by the PE - and is effectively 
connected with the PE - it will lead to a qualification as business income pursuant to 
Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. In this case, no separation will be made into the different 
types of income elements for tax treaty purposes. The same should be true - in my 
                                            
220 See in this respect Portner, Validity of CFC Rules in a Changing World: A German Perspective, Tax Notes 
International 2002, page 1679 et seq. (1691); Sandler, Tax Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company 
Legislation, Pushing the Boundaries, Second Edition, 1998, pages 105-107.  
221 (1997) STC 1179, on page 1195.  
222 The Finnish Supreme Tax Court also referred to this point in the A Oyj Abp Case: “From the standpoint of 
Finnish domestic taxation, double taxation does not arise because the tax on the controlled foreign company 
does not exceed the amount which would have been collected if the controlled foreign company had not been 
established and its activities had been carried out in Finland or through a branch situated abroad “ (ITLR, 
Volume 4, 2002, page 1073).  
   
 
taxing rights (due to the fact that there is no permanent establishment involved). The 
preference of the special articles over Article 7 of the OECD-MTC is important in the 
first step. However, in the second step the net amount of income is calculated on the 
level of company C. Here, all income elements derived from the activities carried out 
by company form part of the business profits and are taxable in country C pursuant to 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC.218 The special articles do not have any effect on the 
net income determination and the scope of the business profits derived by company 
C. That means, the effect of the special articles is restricted to the admission of a 
limited taxation of the gross amount of interest (or royalty) payments in the source 
country but by no means restricts or influences the net income determination of the 
business income in country C.219 
 
In contrast thereto, the tax treaty between country A and country B is of no relevance 
for the outcome since company C is typically recognised as a non-transparent legal 
entity and a resident company of country C. It is therefore – also from the perspective 
of country A – the tax treaty between country B and country C which is decisive for 
the allocation of taxing rights related to the interest and royalty income. What remains 
is the relationship between countries A and C. Here, the result is exactly the same as 
in the examples mentioned above: the CFC income is to be qualified as business 
income which can be taxed in the hands of the resident company A pursuant to 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. The fact that part of the attributable CFC income is 
due to interest and royalty payments does not play any role for the qualification of the 
net income as business income.   
 
c.) Interest and royalty income derived from a source of income in country A 
 
The provision of services of a subsidiary company situated in a low-tax country 
towards the parent company is, of course, one of the typical situations within a 
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218 As already described earlier, this conclusion is supported by the outcome of the European case law outlined 
under section 7.2. 
219 An additional effect is, of course, the necessity to provide for a tax credit of the withholding taxes (see Article 





CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions
379
   
 
Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC stipulates that “(i)nterest arising in a Contracting 
State paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other 
State.” Thus, the OECD-MTC allocates the taxing rights for the interest income to 
country C. However, in Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC a limited right to tax is 
granted to the source country (country A) which “(…) shall not exceed 10 per cent of 
the gross amount of the interest.” In contrast thereto, Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC 
does not provide for a limited taxation at source but allocates the taxing rights solely 
to country C: “(r)oyalties arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a 
resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State.” 
Therefore, the taxing rights related to the interest and royalty payments are clearly 
stipulated and – apart form the limited possibility of a withholding taxation of interest 
payments – allocated to country C. Based on the clear limitations one could take the 
position that there is no room for a CFC taxation of the interest and royalty income, 
either.220 In fact, this was one of the questions raised in the Bricom Holdings Case 
outlined earlier where the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom concluded that “the 
interest received by Spinneys (here: company C) is not included in the sum 
apportioned to the taxpayer (here: company A) on which tax is chargeable. It merely 
provides a measure by which an element in a conventional or notional sum is 
calculated, and it is that conventional or notional sum which is apportioned to the 
taxpayer and on which tax is charged.”221 Even though the peculiarities of the United 
Kingdom CFC rules have to be taken into account, the statement is partly true, at 
least insofar as it makes clear that the interest income is of no relevance in the 
second step of a two-step approach: first, the actual interest payment (or royalty 
payment) has to be seen in the light of the special articles. Here, the possibility of a 
withholding taxation may be granted to the source country. Second, the interest 
payments (or royalty payments) “amalgamate” with all the other income derived by 
company C and the “income mix” is determined on a net basis, i.e. the related 
expenses are taken into account. In fact, the net income in the second step is 
determined twice: (i) for the purpose of taxation of company C in country C and (ii) for 
the purpose of CFC income taxation of the resident parent company A in country A. 
However, the statement might give the impression that the “notional sum” is not to be 
qualified for the purpose of the underlying treaty. This, of course, should not be true.  
 
If the taxation of the PE according to the credit method is compared to the taxation of 
the shareholder according to the CFC rules, it is quite obvious that - apart from the 
substantial difference related to the separate taxable person in country C and the fact 
that the CFC taxation leads to an economic instead of a juridical double taxation of 
income - the overall tax burden can be identical.222 Furthermore, and this is more 
interesting in this context, the qualification of income is the same. In case the service 
income, interest income and royalty income is derived by the PE - and is effectively 
connected with the PE - it will lead to a qualification as business income pursuant to 
Article 7 of the OECD-MTC. In this case, no separation will be made into the different 
types of income elements for tax treaty purposes. The same should be true - in my 
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taxing rights (due to the fact that there is no permanent establishment involved). The 
preference of the special articles over Article 7 of the OECD-MTC is important in the 
first step. However, in the second step the net amount of income is calculated on the 
level of company C. Here, all income elements derived from the activities carried out 
by company form part of the business profits and are taxable in country C pursuant to 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC.218 The special articles do not have any effect on the 
net income determination and the scope of the business profits derived by company 
C. That means, the effect of the special articles is restricted to the admission of a 
limited taxation of the gross amount of interest (or royalty) payments in the source 
country but by no means restricts or influences the net income determination of the 
business income in country C.219 
 
In contrast thereto, the tax treaty between country A and country B is of no relevance 
for the outcome since company C is typically recognised as a non-transparent legal 
entity and a resident company of country C. It is therefore – also from the perspective 
of country A – the tax treaty between country B and country C which is decisive for 
the allocation of taxing rights related to the interest and royalty income. What remains 
is the relationship between countries A and C. Here, the result is exactly the same as 
in the examples mentioned above: the CFC income is to be qualified as business 
income which can be taxed in the hands of the resident company A pursuant to 
Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. The fact that part of the attributable CFC income is 
due to interest and royalty payments does not play any role for the qualification of the 
net income as business income.   
 
c.) Interest and royalty income derived from a source of income in country A 
 
The provision of services of a subsidiary company situated in a low-tax country 
towards the parent company is, of course, one of the typical situations within a 
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attributable CFC income in the relationship between countries A and C. At least, it 
should be clear that Article 11 does not restrict the taxing rights related to the 
attributable CFC income. 
 
Thus, the CFC income has to be qualified with reference to the domestic legislation 
of the country which applies the tax treaty. In the example, it is not unlikely that the 
domestic legislation treats the activity as an asset management activity which does 
not fulfil the domestic requirements of a business activity. In such a case it can be 
necessary to separate the income into the different types. In the underlying example 
of the limited investment in bonds, the income may be determined as interest income. 
The income which is allocable to the resident shareholder pursuant to the domestic 
CFC rules will therefore be included in the domestic tax base as part of the business 
profits of company A (even though it is to be qualified as interest income for tax treaty 
purposes) and taxed pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. Thus, the taxation 
of the CFC income would not be restricted by the relevant tax treaty. 
 
It should be clear that the result is not limited to interest income. Theoretically, other 
asset management activities are thinkable which do not fulfil the requirements of 
business income. This may be especially true for dividend income, i.e. portfolio 
income derived by the CFC,226 and royalty income. However, the situations where the 
latter type of income is not to be qualified as business income are certainly limited. In 
any case, Articles 10 (1) and 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC may generally not restrict - in 
the same way as Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC - the taxation of CFC income in the 
residence state of the shareholder.227 It has to be clarified in this context that the 
wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC may not prevent 
country A from taxing the CFC income which is qualified as royalty income. Company 
C (which is the actual recipient of the royalty payments) and company A are two 
different entities which are resident in two different countries. Article 12 (1) of the 
OECD-MTC is therefore not capable of creating a limitation for the CFC taxation of 
country A.228  
 
e.) Excursion: income from portfolio dividends 
 
The conclusions drawn under letter a.) to d.) are equally relevant for portfolio 
dividends included in the respective income, i.e. in addition to (or instead of) interest 
and royalty income. As already outlined earlier, the portfolio dividends are not to the 
                                            
226 To the extent that the dividends are actually in the focus of CFC rules.  
227 The problem related to participation exemption and dividend income is addressed separately.  
228 However, the commentators which follow the “Zurechnungstheorie” (“transparency approach” or “look-
through approach”) take the position that the attributed income is to be divided into the respective components 
(interest income, royalty income et cetera). See in this respect Köhler, Die steuergesetzliche Tatbestandsbildung 
der Zugriffsbesteuerung nach dem Außensteuergesetz, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 1988, page 979 et 
seq.; see in this respect also Rix who outlined that “(i)t is questionable if the total CFC income, which is 
allocated to a Danish resident shareholder, can be classified as dividends (confer Art. 10 (3)), as the allocated 
CFC income should be taxed and classified in accordance with its character, i.e. interest, royalty etc.” (Rix, 
National Report Denmark,  in Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
2004, pages 156, 157). In my opinion, the explanations in the OECD-Commentary are rather confusing: “(i)f the 
income were attributed to the taxpayer then each item of the income would have to be treated under the relevant 
provisions of the Convention (business profits, interest, royalties). If the amount is treated as a deemed dividend 
then it is clearly derived from the base company thus constituting income from that company’s country. Even 
then, it is by no means clear whether the taxable amount is to be regarded as a dividend within the meaning of 
Article 10 or as “other income” within the meaning of Article 21” (see paragraph 38 of the Commentary on 
Article 10 of the OECD-MTC).   
   
 
opinion - for the income qualified as CFC income according to the residence state of 
the shareholder. The income derived by the foreign legal entity (instead of the PE) is 
to be qualified as business income - irrespective of the fact that income elements are 
included which are related to interest and royalty payments. This is true for both, the 
residence state of company C and the residence state of company A which applies 
its CFC rules.  
 
d.) The strict limitation to passive income without any substantial service element 
 
The question arises whether the outcome of the examples would be different in cases 
where the activity does not comprise any substantial service elements but is solely 
limited – for example – to the deriving of interest income. Supposing, the only activity 
carried out by company C is to invest the capital received from the parent company in 
interest bearing bonds. The activity shall not be carried out as a professional asset 
management activity but is just limited to the investment in very few financial assets 
and without substantial trading activities.223 It shall further be assumed that the 
activity as such – even though the functions are quite limited – will be accepted by 
the state of the shareholder as an activity actually carried out by company C.224 In 
such a case, the income derived by company C only encompasses interest income 
from the investment in a limited number of bonds. Since it is assumed that the tax 
treaty between countries A and C follows the OECD-MTC, Article 11 (3) stipulates 
that “(t)he term “interest” as used in this Article means income from debt-claims of 
every kind, (…) and in particular, income from government securities and income 
from bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such 
securities, bonds or debentures.”  Thus, the income derived by company C – in 
general – matches with the definition included in Article 11 (3). There is no necessity 
to refer to domestic law in order to clarify the definition of interest. In Article 11 (1) it is 
determined that “(i)nterest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the 
other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.” However, the interest 
arises in country C (alternatively: in country A or B) but is not transferred to the 
resident company A. Instead, the interest remains in country C (alternatively: is 
transferred from country A or B to country C). Thus, the right to tax the interest 
income derived by company C is allocable to country C and becomes part of the net 
income of the latter company which is taxed as business profits pursuant to Article 7 
(1) of the OECD-MTC.225  
 
In addition, the type of CFC income must be determined from the perspective of 
country A in the light of the respective tax treaty. Here, it might be argued that the 
complete attributable CFC income is based on an activity which leads to interest 
income, i.e. the net income attributable to the resident shareholder is solely the result 
of capital investment. However, I do not think that the definition of “interest” included 
in Article 11 (3) of the OECD-MTC is of importance in this respect. The latter is to be 
seen in the context of Article 11 of the OECD-MTC, i.e. for the allocation of taxing 
rights related to the gross amount of interest income between the source country and 
the country which receives the actual interest payment (country C). The residence 
country of the shareholder does not receive any actual interest payment. The 
allocation rules of Article 11 (1) and (2) are - in my opinion - of no relevance to the 
                                            
223 “Trading” in the sense of the purchase and selling of bonds.  
224 That means it shall be assumed that no abuse of law exists.  
225 What remains is a limited taxation at source if the interest income is derived from sources in country A or B 
(Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC).  
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attributable CFC income in the relationship between countries A and C. At least, it 
should be clear that Article 11 does not restrict the taxing rights related to the 
attributable CFC income. 
 
Thus, the CFC income has to be qualified with reference to the domestic legislation 
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domestic legislation treats the activity as an asset management activity which does 
not fulfil the domestic requirements of a business activity. In such a case it can be 
necessary to separate the income into the different types. In the underlying example 
of the limited investment in bonds, the income may be determined as interest income. 
The income which is allocable to the resident shareholder pursuant to the domestic 
CFC rules will therefore be included in the domestic tax base as part of the business 
profits of company A (even though it is to be qualified as interest income for tax treaty 
purposes) and taxed pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. Thus, the taxation 
of the CFC income would not be restricted by the relevant tax treaty. 
 
It should be clear that the result is not limited to interest income. Theoretically, other 
asset management activities are thinkable which do not fulfil the requirements of 
business income. This may be especially true for dividend income, i.e. portfolio 
income derived by the CFC,226 and royalty income. However, the situations where the 
latter type of income is not to be qualified as business income are certainly limited. In 
any case, Articles 10 (1) and 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC may generally not restrict - in 
the same way as Article 11 (1) of the OECD-MTC - the taxation of CFC income in the 
residence state of the shareholder.227 It has to be clarified in this context that the 
wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 12 (1) of the OECD-MTC may not prevent 
country A from taxing the CFC income which is qualified as royalty income. Company 
C (which is the actual recipient of the royalty payments) and company A are two 
different entities which are resident in two different countries. Article 12 (1) of the 
OECD-MTC is therefore not capable of creating a limitation for the CFC taxation of 
country A.228  
 
e.) Excursion: income from portfolio dividends 
 
The conclusions drawn under letter a.) to d.) are equally relevant for portfolio 
dividends included in the respective income, i.e. in addition to (or instead of) interest 
and royalty income. As already outlined earlier, the portfolio dividends are not to the 
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opinion - for the income qualified as CFC income according to the residence state of 
the shareholder. The income derived by the foreign legal entity (instead of the PE) is 
to be qualified as business income - irrespective of the fact that income elements are 
included which are related to interest and royalty payments. This is true for both, the 
residence state of company C and the residence state of company A which applies 
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of capital investment. However, I do not think that the definition of “interest” included 
in Article 11 (3) of the OECD-MTC is of importance in this respect. The latter is to be 
seen in the context of Article 11 of the OECD-MTC, i.e. for the allocation of taxing 
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country of the shareholder does not receive any actual interest payment. The 
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223 “Trading” in the sense of the purchase and selling of bonds.  
224 That means it shall be assumed that no abuse of law exists.  
225 What remains is a limited taxation at source if the interest income is derived from sources in country A or B 
(Article 11 (2) of the OECD-MTC).  
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situated (...)”231 and “(t)he provisions of paragraph 1 shall apply to income derived 
from the direct use, letting, or use in any other form of immovable property.”232 
Furthermore, Article 6 (4) of the OECD-MTC stipulates that the relevant provisions 
also apply to income from immovable property of an enterprise. Paragraph 4 of the 
Commentary on Article 6 of the OECD-MTC states that “(...) the right to tax of the 
State of source has priority over the right to tax of the other State and applies also 
where, in the case of an enterprise, income is only indirectly derived from immovable 
property. This does not prevent income from immovable property, when derived 
through a permanent establishment, from being treated as income of an enterprise, 
but secures that income from immovable property will be taxed in the State in which 
the property is situated also in the case where such property is not part of a 
permanent establishment situated in that State. It should further be noted that the 
provisions of the Article do not prejudge the application of domestic law as regards 
the manner.”  
 
In the example, and from the perspective of country C, the income from immovable 
property will be taxed in country C. In fact, this is not a relevant issue under a double 
tax convention since the income is derived from domestic property. Theoretically, the 
low-taxation of the rental income might trigger the CFC taxation of country A. 
However, there is a major difference between interest income, royalty income, 
dividend income (which may be included in the allocable business income) and rental 
income: the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC requires a source based taxation 
of the rental income and is by no means limited to a withholding taxation of the gross 
amount of income. The taxation of rental income is therefore based on a net concept. 
In principle, if one follows the reasoning outlined above with respect to the other 
types of income, this will not lead to another outcome with respect to the CFC 
taxation of rental income. The classification of rental income from the perspective of 
state A - for example if the activity of company C cannot be considered a business 
activity, but solely a non-professional asset management activity which is related to 
income from immovable property - would not lead to the result that the income cannot 
be taxed in the hands of company A. In general, there are two different persons 
involved: company C (as the direct owner of the immovable property) and company A 
(as the shareholder in company C). The classification of income is therefore to be 
made separately for two different persons by two different states. Hence, Article 6 of 
the OECD-MTC does not directly restrict the taxing rights of state A related to 
company A in this respect. It is not the intention of state A to tax company C in state 
A on income derived from rental activities. For this reason, a limitation of taxing rights 
which follows the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC could only be made by 
analogy. However, it is questionable whether such an analogous application of Article 
6 of the OECD-MTC - which might result in a restriction of the application of CFC 
rules for this particular type of income - can be justified. In my opinion, the only 
theoretical justification for an analogous application of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC 
might be derived from the concept of a strict source-based taxation of the net income 
from immovable property. However, this would require that (i) both contracting states 
follow such an approach not only in relation to each other but also in relation to third 
states (because otherwise there might be a shifting of rental income from third states 
to the state of the CFC) and (ii) the concept clearly limits the income taxation to the 
state of source and does not allow the elimination of double taxation by the 
application of the credit method. In such a situation, it is not only questionable 
                                            
231 Article 6 (2) of the OECD-MTC.  
232 Article 6 (3) of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
same extent subject to CFC taxation as interest income and royalty income. 
However, in those countries where the portfolio dividends are included in the 
attributable CFC income the explanations above may in general be referred to.  
 
7.4.4. Article 6 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
Article 6 of the OECD-MTC deals with income from immovable property. In contrast 
to Articles 11 and 12, the state of source has the right to tax the income from 
immovable property which, of course, reduces the possibility to shift income from a 
high-tax country to a low-tax country.229 The income from immovable property, such 
as rental income, is therefore not the main target of CFC regimes. However, the 
income from immovable property should not be excluded from the verifications in 
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      rental income 
 
 
        
       provision of rental services / immovable property located  
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  country C 




Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC outlines that “(i)ncome derived by a resident of a 
Contracting State from immovable property (...) situated in the other Contracting 
State may be taxed in that other State.” Articles 6 (2) and (3) of the OECD-MTC 
make it clear that “(t)he term “immovable property” shall have the meaning which it 
has under the law of the Contracting State in which the property in question is 
                                            
229 At least in those cases where the immovable property is located in a high-tax country but owned by a group-
company situated in a low-tax country. Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC stipulates that “(i)ncome derived by a 
resident of a Contracting State from immovable property (…) situated in the other Contracting State may be 
taxed in that other State.”  
230 See with respect to CFC income and Article 6 of the OECD-MTC also Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung 
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calculation”235 one could come to the conclusion that the shareholder in the foreign 
legal entity derives other income instead of business income (or other types of 
income). The Commentary to the OECD-MTC is unclear in this respect. Paragraph 
38 of the Commentary on Article 10 outlines that “(i)f the amount is treated as a 
deemed dividend then it is clearly derived from the base company thus constituting 
income from that company’s country. Even then, it is by no means clear whether the 
taxable amount is to be regarded as a dividend within the meaning of Article 10 or as 
“other income” within the meaning of Article 21.” However, even if one follows a 
position according to which the CFC income is to be qualified as other income (which 
is not my position) this would not lead to a different outcome: the taxing rights related 
to other income are allocable to the residence state of the shareholder which applies 
its CFC taxation.236 
 
7.4.7. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters  
 
The type of income in the context of the basic interest taxation has to be determined - 
just like in case of the application of the typical CFC regimes - in the light of the 
respective double tax convention. If the income qualification leads to the outcome 
that the residence state of the shareholder has the right to tax the basic interest 
income, there is, in principle, no restriction for the application of such a concept. The 
question is, however, whether the method for the qualification of the basic interest 
income is different from the method for the qualification of income attributed under 
the typical CFC regimes. In essence, what makes the basic interest taxation different 
from CFC taxation is the (additional) vertical separation of income instead of the 
mere horizontal separation of income (under the transactional approach) or the non-
separation of income (under the entity approach if the income is not completely 
exempt from CFC taxation). In both cases, the basic interest taxation and the CFC 
taxation, the decisive element is the current taxation of income which is “connected” 
to an activity of another entity. The method of separating such income for the 
purpose of current taxation (vertical and / or horizontal) is quite important from an 
economic and equity perspective, as I have stated in chapter 2 and chapter 3, but it 
should not make any difference when it comes to the qualification of income. The 
basic interest income - which is, in essence, the result of a horizontal and vertical 
separation of income - should still be linked to the activity of the CFC in order to 
determine the type of income for tax treaty purposes. That means it is the activity 
carried on by the CFC which has to be assessed and which should be the basis for 
the income qualification of the residence state of the shareholder (the state which 
applies the system of current taxation of income). Overall, the method of income 
qualification should be identical for the current taxation according to the typical CFC 
regimes and the current taxation according to the concept of basic interest taxation. 




                                            
235 See in this respect the Bricom Holdings Case outlined earlier. See with respect to CFC legislation and Article 
21 of the OECD-MTC: Lang / Aigner / Scheuerle / Stefaner, CFC Legislation, Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
General Report, 2004, pages 36, 37 (including the references to the National Reports (footnote 129 of the 
General Report); Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung und DBA-Recht, 2004, page 83 et seq.; Brähler, 
Controlled Foreign Companies-Rules, 2007, page 177 et seq. 
236 See Article 21 (1) of the OECD-MTC.  
   
 
whether a CFC taxation of such income in state A is actually required from an anti-
avoidance perspective, but one might also argue that the application of those rules to 
income from immovable property is in contradiction to the purpose and the idea of the 
respective tax treaty. One could even raise the question whether the attribution of 
rental income in the aforementioned situation results in the circumvention of the 
respective tax treaty. The question of the application of CFC rules and the 
circumvention of tax treaties will be discussed below in more detail. However, I do not 
think that this problem can be solved by the analogous application of Article 6 of the 
OECD-MTC - because I do not see any legal basis for such an analogous application 
- but rather by the structuring of the domestic CFC rules. This, of course, will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 9. 
 
7.4.5. Article 13 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the OECD-MTC, the taxing rights related to the gains 
realised from the alienation of property - especially the property which is of relevance 
in the context of CFC taxation - shall be taxable only in the state of which the 
alienator is a resident. This is different, amongst other, for gains realised from the 
alienation of immovable property and for gains realised from the alienation of 
movable property which forms part of the business property of a permanent 
establishment in the other state.233 The principles outlined above are equally relevant 
for capital gains: if the activity is to be qualified as business activity, the capital gains 
are part of the allocable business income. In all other cases, the qualification is to be 
made with reference to the domestic legislation of the country which invokes the 
respective double tax convention. The wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 13 (5) 
of the OECD-MTC is no obstacle for the taxation of CFC income. There are two 
different resident companies involved. The restriction of the taxation in country C is of 
no relevance for the taxation of the resident company A in country A.234  
 
7.4.6. Article 21 of the OECD Model Tax Convention  
 
Article 21 of the OECD-MTC (other income) can only be applicable to items of 
income which are not dealt with in the foregoing Articles, i.e. especially Articles 6, 7, 
10, 11, 12 and 13 of the OECD-MTC. As I have already outlined above the CFC 
income attribution to the resident shareholder is - depending on the situation - very 
often to be qualified as business income under the relevant double tax convention. In 
other cases, interest income, royalty income and dividend income might play a role. 
Thus, there is consequently not much room for the application of Article 21 of the 
OECD-MTC. However, if one takes the position that the CFC income cannot be 
qualified as business income, dividend income, interest income, royalty income, or 
even rental income, due to the fact that the CFC rules solely refer to the income 
derived by the foreign legal entity but the shareholder does not derive the same type 
of income directly, the outcome might be different. If the amount of CFC income is 
just seen as a “notional amount” which is “merely a product of a mathematical 
                                            
233 Capital gains related to immovable property are most often not included in the income of the foreign entity 
(see Article 13 (1) of the OECD-MTC). However, the tangible and intangible property which is of relevance in 
the context of CFC taxation is typically subject to tax in the low-tax country (see Article 13 (5) of the OECD-
MTC).  
234 See with respect to CFC income and Article 13 of the OECD-MTC also Aigner, Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung 
und DBA-Recht, 2004, pages 137-139. 
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7.5.2. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The conclusions with respect to the different CFC approaches (transactional 
approach, entity approach) can be transferred, as already stated above, to an 
approach which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest component. Not 
the structure of the national legislation - just by referring to specific parts of the 
income of the CFC - should be decisive for the qualification of income for tax treaty 
purposes, but the activity of the CFC has to be assessed from the perspective of the 
state which applies the system of current taxation of income. This, again, is an 
important conclusion since it provides the basis for an alternative system which 
strictly focuses on the combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation of income 
and which should be in line with the OECD-MTC. The horizontal separation of 
income ensures that activities which do not include a separable financing element are 
excluded from the current taxation of income. The vertical separation of “tainted” 
income ensures, in addition, that the income element which is produced by the CFC 
and the income element which is related to the risk coverage - which are theoretically 
both part of the “tainted” income - are excluded from the current taxation of income. 
The combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation of income results in the 
safeguarding of competitiveness and limits the current taxation of income to the most 
critical element from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) perspective. In other words, 
there is no restriction with respect to the OECD-MTC, neither based on the case law 
described earlier240 nor based on the OECD position, which does not allow to follow a 
concept which is - as much as possible - based on the principle of capital import 
neutrality combined with a current taxation of income which is limited to the basic 
interest component. 
 
7.6. The Circumvention of Double Tax Conventions through CFC Legislation? 
 
7.6.1. General Aspects 
 
Obviously, if one follows the position that there is no necessity to preserve the CFC 
rules in the respective double tax conventions and the countries which apply such 
regimes have the possibility of taxing the CFC income pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the 
OECD-MTC, one could argue that there is a certain risk that the application of CFC 
rules might lead to a circumvention of double tax conventions.241 For example, the 
residence country of the shareholder could stipulate in its domestic legislation a link 
which not only encompasses certain base company activities and passive activities 
but also business activities carried on by the foreign legal entity with third party 
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7.5. The Different Approaches of CFC Income Taxation and Double Tax 
Conventions  
 
7.5.1. Entity Approach vs. Transactional Approach 
 
The question arises whether the outcome could be different depending upon whether 
the country which applies a CFC taxation follows an entity approach or a 
transactional approach.237 The countries which follow the latter approach focus much 
more on the separate types of income derived by the CFC. However, both 
approaches follow a system which creates a link to the activities of the foreign legal 
entity and the income derived by this entity. The transactional approach only 
attributes net income which is derived from certain base company and passive 
activities. Other activities are excluded from current taxation. In contrast, the entity 
approach verifies the extent of certain activities and - depending on the result of this 
verification - attributes all of the income or none of the income to the shareholder 
(“all-or-nothing” approach). However, in both cases the income attributed according 
to the transactional approach and the entity approach is often not equal to the result 
of the foreign legal entity. I do not think that the domestic methodology of creating a 
nexus to the income of the CFC can be of any influence for the qualification of 
income under the respective tax treaty.238 If it is only a certain portion of the net 
income which is attributed to the shareholder - instead of the complete net income 
derived by the foreign legal entity - this should not change the qualification of the 
activity. If the net income is to be qualified as business profits but the current taxation 
under the CFC regime is restricted to a specific part of the business profits which is 
originally derived from - for example - interest and royalty income, this should not 
lead to the result that the portion of the attributable net income is now to be qualified 
as interest and royalty income instead of business income.239 Otherwise, it would be 
the domestic structure of CFC legislation which is decisive for the qualification of the 
attributed CFC income by the mere fact that it refers to certain income components 
and through a restriction of the income attribution to the net result which is indirectly 
related to such income elements. In contrast, a CFC regime which follows an entity 
approach would not have such a decisive influence. In other words, the activity and 
the net income of the CFC are to be qualified independent of the limitations provided 
by domestic law and irrespective of whether the CFC regime follows a transactional 
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7.5.2. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
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but also business activities carried on by the foreign legal entity with third party 
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consequence in case of a credit country is the immediate taxation of income in the 
residence state of the shareholder and the avoidance of tax deferral. However, the 
general application to the complete profit from active businesses derived by the 
foreign entity would clearly be, in my opinion, an obstacle from an economic point of 
view.245 Overall, it must be concluded that the position of the OECD is contradictory 
regarding the application of CFC rules: on the one hand, the CFC rules shall not be 
addressed in tax treaties and shall therefore not be affected by them, i.e. there is, in 
principle, no restriction on the application of domestic CFC rules through tax treaties. 
On the other hand, the CFC rules shall only focus on certain activities and shall only 
be applied if the taxation is not comparable to that of the state of residence of the 
shareholder. The limitations, of course, should not be acceptable for a state which 
strictly follows the principle of capital export neutrality, because the latter approach 
requires the immediate taxation of all types of income and irrespective of whether the 
tax rate is comparable or not. Any deferral of domestic income taxation is not in line 
with such an approach. For this reason, the strict and consistent application of the 
principle of capital export neutrality can hardly be considered a circumvention of the 
underlying tax treaty if the legislation which leads to the current taxation of income is 
not affected by the respective tax treaty.  
 
7.6.2. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
The circumvention of double tax conventions might be an issue, as already outlined 
above, if the domestic legislation establishes a link to the income derived through 
another entity which carries on its activity in the other contracting state. However, 
there is a difference between the typical CFC regimes and the concept which is 
based on the taxation of the basic interest component. In case of CFC regimes it is 
possible that an amount is attributed and taxed in the residence state of the 
shareholder which is identical or almost identical to the income realised through the 
CFC. This is possible under a transactional approach (e.g. where the activity of the 
CFC solely focuses on tainted activities) and under an entity approach (e.g. where 
base company activities prevail). However, the typical CFC regimes do not focus on 
a complete and unrestricted taxation of the CFC income, but focus on income from 
certain (passive and base company) activities. The concept which is based on the 
taxation of the basic interest component goes even further and already excludes, in 
general, the income which is produced by the CFC and the income which is related to 
the compensation of risks by the CFC. Moreover, only activities which contain a 
financing element are subject to current taxation. Thus, the combination of excluding 
certain income (horizontal separation of income) together with the separation of the 
remaining “tainted” income into the respective elements (vertical separation of 
income) makes it less likely (compared to the typical CFC rules) that an amount is 
attributed and taxed in the residence state of the shareholder which is identical to the 
total amount of income realised through the CFC. For this reason, the application of a 
system which focuses on the taxation of the basic interest component clearly does 
not result, in my opinion, in a circumvention of double tax conventions. Moreover, the 
basic interest taxation might lead to greater acceptance of the current taxation of 
income within the OECD countries (and beyond).246 The latter system is not only 
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customers. This could have the effect that all (or nearly all) activities of the foreign 
legal entity are subject to CFC taxation in the residence country of the shareholder. 
This would go much further than the existing transactional and entity approaches. 
Even in the latter case of an entity approach there is only an income attribution in 
those tax years where certain activities prevail. Such a broad concept of CFC 
taxation would reflect the principle of capital export neutrality applied to all types of 
income. The 1992 version of the Commentary states that “(t)he majority of Member 
countries accept counteracting measures as a necessary means of maintaining 
equity and neutrality of national tax laws in an international environment 
characterised by very different tax burdens, but believe that such measures should 
be used only for this purpose. It would be contrary to the general principles 
underlying the Model Convention and to the spirit of tax treaties in general if 
counteracting measures were to be extended to activities such as production, normal 
rendering of services or trading of companies engaged in real industrial or 
commercial activity, when they are clearly related to the economic environment of the 
country where they are resident in a situation where these activities are carried out in 
such a way that no tax avoidance could be suspected. Counteracting measures 
should not be applied to countries in which taxation is comparable to that of the 
country of residence of the taxpayer.”242 This seems to be a clear position of the 
majority of the OECD Member countries against the general application of CFC rules 
to all types of income and for a strict limitation to base company activities and 
passive activities. The wording in the 2003 update of the Commentary is different and 
does not explicitly refer to such a strict limitation. Paragraph 26 outlines that “(s)tates 
that adopt controlled foreign companies provisions or the anti-abuse rules referred to 
above in their domestic tax laws seek to maintain the equity and neutrality of these 
laws in an international environment characterised by very different tax burdens, but 
such measures should be used only for this purpose. As a general rule, these 
measures should not be applied where the relevant income has been subjected to 
taxation that is comparable to that in the country of residence of the taxpayer.”243 
However, even without the clear reference to the active-passive differentiation the 
CFC rules are still considered to be anti-abuse measures.244 Those measures should 
therefore – from the perspective of the OECD – still be limited to the aforementioned 
base company activities and passive activities. It would certainly be problematic to 
stipulate a participation exemption in a tax treaty which exempts dividend income and 
capital gains derived from certain shareholdings but to tax all of the income derived 
by the foreign legal entity through the application of CFC rules. Such an approach 
would not only be inconsistent, it might lead to a circumvention of the tax treaty 
where it has the effect of a complete and unrestricted taxation of the whole CFC 
income. On the other hand, if a country follows the approach of taxing the world-wide 
income of its residents (based on the principle of capital export neutrality) by a strict 
application of the credit method (PE income, dividend income, capital gains), one can 
certainly not argue that the application of CFC rules are contrary to the general 
principles underlying the tax treaties and to the spirit of the tax treaties. It was 
outlined earlier that those rules are accepted by the OECD as domestic measures 
which can be applied without any explicit preservation in a tax treaty. The business 
profits derived by the foreign legal entity would still be taxable in the source country 
and as long as the country which applies the CFC rules provides for a crediting of the 
foreign income tax an economic double taxation would be avoided. The main 
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look at the classification in the respective cases: in the A Oyj Abp Case, the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court concluded that “(w)hen determining the character of 
the (...) income for the purposes of the tax treaty, the starting point must be that this 
income constitutes business income under art. 1 of the Business Income Tax Act and 
the tax treaty does not contain any definition of business income, such a definition 
being derived from national law. Hence, for the purpose of applying the tax treaty, the 
income has the character of business income.”249 In the Captive Insurance Cases, 
the Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings considered the attributable income 
under the CFC regime as business profits of the parent company in Sweden 
(alternatively: other income).250 Thus, in both cases the income was classified as 
business income of the shareholder (the parent company) and - explicitly - not as 
dividend income. In contrast thereto, the explanations of the Court of Appeal in the 
Bricom Holdings Case remains, in my opinion, too vague: the fact that the interest 
income received (directly) by the CFC is not included anymore as interest income in 
the attributable income is fully understandable. However, for tax treaty purposes, it is 
not sufficient to classify the attributable CFC income as a “purely notional sum.” Even 
such a purely notional sum must somehow be classified in order to determine which 
state has the right to tax the income. However, it seems that the Court of Appeal did 
not see the necessity to deal with this question. It might be too apparent that the 
“chargeable profits” are part of the business profits of the parent company. At least, 
the income was obviously not considered to be dividend income for tax treaty 
purposes. The OECD, on the other hand, is not fixed on a certain type of income: it 
might be business income, dividend income, or other income. In any event, a 
common element of the Bricom Holdings Case, the A Oyj Abp Case, the Captive 
Insurance Cases, and the position of the OECD, is the fact that the attributable 
income according to the CFC regime is not considered to represent any profits of the 
subsidiary company. Of course, this is - at the same time - the important difference to 
the conclusion of the French Supreme Tax Court in the Schneider Case. 
 
However, the approach of income classification for tax treaty purposes is neither 
sufficiently clear from the existing case law nor from the position of the OECD. I have 
outlined in this chapter that there are several arguments against a classification of the 
attributable income as dividend income - and it seems that the existing case law 
supports this position. Thus, if one agrees that the attributable income is income of 
the shareholder which is (i) not identical to the income of the foreign company, and 
which is (ii) not to be classified as income from shares (dividend income), it seems to 
me that a logical approach is the focus on the activity of the foreign company - from 
the perspective of the state of the shareholder - in order to classify the income which 
is attributable according to the CFC regime. In other words, the activity of the CFC 
(which is the link for the application of the domestic CFC regime) must be assessed 
in the light of the tax treaty and, if the type of income cannot be derived from the tax 
treaty itself, with reference to the domestic legislation of the state which applies the 
CFC regime. Based on such an approach, the income will most likely be classified as 
business income of the shareholder, even though it is theoretically also possible, 
depending on the domestic legislation of the shareholder, for the income to be 
classified as another type of income, e.g. interest income. However, I have made it 
clear that even in those cases where the income is not classified as business income, 
the income taxation in the residence state of the shareholder will usually not be 
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economically justified and supported by equity principles, but also shows that the 
intention of the state which applies such legislation is really the focus on the critical 
element from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) perspective. In other words, the state 
which applies such an alternative regime makes it clear, in my opinion, that there is 
no intention to tax (on a current basis) “more than necessary.”247 It is required, of 
course, that the basic interest taxation is structured in a way which does not create a 
“penalty effect” for the investor. Such an alternative system will be outlined in chapter 
9. 
 
7.7. Review of Important Aspects and Examination of the Principles Derived 
from Previous Chapters 
 
From all of the cases examined in this chapter, it is only the Schneider Case in which 
a tax court - in this case the French Supreme Tax Court - concluded that the CFC 
regime cannot be applied if the double tax convention does not explicitly preserve the 
application of such a regime. This conclusion, however, was mainly based on the fact 
that the Supreme Tax Court did not accept, in essence, the distinction between 
“juridical” and “economic” double taxation (the distinction was considered to be 
“artificial”). In other words, the purpose of the double tax convention cannot be 
limited, pursuant to the French Supreme Tax Court, to the avoidance of juridical 
double taxation, but also encompasses the avoidance of economic double taxation. I 
have already made it clear that I cannot follow the position of the French Supreme 
Tax Court. From my perspective, the double tax convention only encompasses 
international juridical double taxation if the scope is not explicitly extended to 
international economic double taxation. 
 
The other decisions which were examined in this chapter did not find a conflict 
between CFC legislation and double tax conventions, i.e. there is no necessity for an 
express provision in the double tax conventions - concluded between the respective 
states - which allows the application of CFC regimes. The outcome of these cases is, 
in principle, in line with the position of the OECD.248 This, of course, is not particularly 
surprising since it was used, at least by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in 
the A Oyj Abp Case, as an important element in the line of reasoning. In any event, I 
agree with the (final) outcome of these cases and the position of the OECD that there 
is no necessity to confirm the application of the CFC rules in a double tax convention. 
As already outlined earlier, there is no convincing reason, in my opinion, why 
domestic CFC legislation should be treated differently from any other domestic 
legislation, just because of the fact that such legislation establishes a link to income 
which is derived through the interposition of a foreign company. However, the fact 
that CFC legislation does not have to be preserved in the convention does not 
necessarily answer the question whether it can finally be taxed in the state which 
applies the CFC legislation. In other words, there is still the requirement to determine 
the type of income under the tax treaty in order to clarify whether the state of the 
shareholder - which applies the CFC taxation - has the right to tax the attributed 
income. It might be the case, at least theoretically, that the income which is 
attributable to the shareholder is to be classified - in the context of the tax treaty - as 
a type of income which can only be taxed in the other contracting state. This might 
prevent the state of the shareholder from taxing the income (even if the CFC 
legislation can, in principle, be applied). For this reason, it is interesting to have a 
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look at the classification in the respective cases: in the A Oyj Abp Case, the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court concluded that “(w)hen determining the character of 
the (...) income for the purposes of the tax treaty, the starting point must be that this 
income constitutes business income under art. 1 of the Business Income Tax Act and 
the tax treaty does not contain any definition of business income, such a definition 
being derived from national law. Hence, for the purpose of applying the tax treaty, the 
income has the character of business income.”249 In the Captive Insurance Cases, 
the Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings considered the attributable income 
under the CFC regime as business profits of the parent company in Sweden 
(alternatively: other income).250 Thus, in both cases the income was classified as 
business income of the shareholder (the parent company) and - explicitly - not as 
dividend income. In contrast thereto, the explanations of the Court of Appeal in the 
Bricom Holdings Case remains, in my opinion, too vague: the fact that the interest 
income received (directly) by the CFC is not included anymore as interest income in 
the attributable income is fully understandable. However, for tax treaty purposes, it is 
not sufficient to classify the attributable CFC income as a “purely notional sum.” Even 
such a purely notional sum must somehow be classified in order to determine which 
state has the right to tax the income. However, it seems that the Court of Appeal did 
not see the necessity to deal with this question. It might be too apparent that the 
“chargeable profits” are part of the business profits of the parent company. At least, 
the income was obviously not considered to be dividend income for tax treaty 
purposes. The OECD, on the other hand, is not fixed on a certain type of income: it 
might be business income, dividend income, or other income. In any event, a 
common element of the Bricom Holdings Case, the A Oyj Abp Case, the Captive 
Insurance Cases, and the position of the OECD, is the fact that the attributable 
income according to the CFC regime is not considered to represent any profits of the 
subsidiary company. Of course, this is - at the same time - the important difference to 
the conclusion of the French Supreme Tax Court in the Schneider Case. 
 
However, the approach of income classification for tax treaty purposes is neither 
sufficiently clear from the existing case law nor from the position of the OECD. I have 
outlined in this chapter that there are several arguments against a classification of the 
attributable income as dividend income - and it seems that the existing case law 
supports this position. Thus, if one agrees that the attributable income is income of 
the shareholder which is (i) not identical to the income of the foreign company, and 
which is (ii) not to be classified as income from shares (dividend income), it seems to 
me that a logical approach is the focus on the activity of the foreign company - from 
the perspective of the state of the shareholder - in order to classify the income which 
is attributable according to the CFC regime. In other words, the activity of the CFC 
(which is the link for the application of the domestic CFC regime) must be assessed 
in the light of the tax treaty and, if the type of income cannot be derived from the tax 
treaty itself, with reference to the domestic legislation of the state which applies the 
CFC regime. Based on such an approach, the income will most likely be classified as 
business income of the shareholder, even though it is theoretically also possible, 
depending on the domestic legislation of the shareholder, for the income to be 
classified as another type of income, e.g. interest income. However, I have made it 
clear that even in those cases where the income is not classified as business income, 
the income taxation in the residence state of the shareholder will usually not be 
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economically justified and supported by equity principles, but also shows that the 
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no intention to tax (on a current basis) “more than necessary.”247 It is required, of 
course, that the basic interest taxation is structured in a way which does not create a 
“penalty effect” for the investor. Such an alternative system will be outlined in chapter 
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7.7. Review of Important Aspects and Examination of the Principles Derived 
from Previous Chapters 
 
From all of the cases examined in this chapter, it is only the Schneider Case in which 
a tax court - in this case the French Supreme Tax Court - concluded that the CFC 
regime cannot be applied if the double tax convention does not explicitly preserve the 
application of such a regime. This conclusion, however, was mainly based on the fact 
that the Supreme Tax Court did not accept, in essence, the distinction between 
“juridical” and “economic” double taxation (the distinction was considered to be 
“artificial”). In other words, the purpose of the double tax convention cannot be 
limited, pursuant to the French Supreme Tax Court, to the avoidance of juridical 
double taxation, but also encompasses the avoidance of economic double taxation. I 
have already made it clear that I cannot follow the position of the French Supreme 
Tax Court. From my perspective, the double tax convention only encompasses 
international juridical double taxation if the scope is not explicitly extended to 
international economic double taxation. 
 
The other decisions which were examined in this chapter did not find a conflict 
between CFC legislation and double tax conventions, i.e. there is no necessity for an 
express provision in the double tax conventions - concluded between the respective 
states - which allows the application of CFC regimes. The outcome of these cases is, 
in principle, in line with the position of the OECD.248 This, of course, is not particularly 
surprising since it was used, at least by the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court in 
the A Oyj Abp Case, as an important element in the line of reasoning. In any event, I 
agree with the (final) outcome of these cases and the position of the OECD that there 
is no necessity to confirm the application of the CFC rules in a double tax convention. 
As already outlined earlier, there is no convincing reason, in my opinion, why 
domestic CFC legislation should be treated differently from any other domestic 
legislation, just because of the fact that such legislation establishes a link to income 
which is derived through the interposition of a foreign company. However, the fact 
that CFC legislation does not have to be preserved in the convention does not 
necessarily answer the question whether it can finally be taxed in the state which 
applies the CFC legislation. In other words, there is still the requirement to determine 
the type of income under the tax treaty in order to clarify whether the state of the 
shareholder - which applies the CFC taxation - has the right to tax the attributed 
income. It might be the case, at least theoretically, that the income which is 
attributable to the shareholder is to be classified - in the context of the tax treaty - as 
a type of income which can only be taxed in the other contracting state. This might 
prevent the state of the shareholder from taxing the income (even if the CFC 
legislation can, in principle, be applied). For this reason, it is interesting to have a 
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- The current taxation of income is strictly limited to the most critical element 
from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) perspective, namely the basic interest 
component.  
 
- The basic interest taxation does not encompass income which is produced by 
the CFC itself. This is a clear signal towards the other contracting state to 
show that the residence state of the shareholder has no intention to tax 
income (on a current basis) which is produced by the CFC.252  
 
- The basic interest taxation does not encompass income which is related to the 
risk directly covered by the CFC. There is a direct relationship between the 
positive income related to the risk component (risk premium) and the 
(subsequent) negative income in case an event arises which is theoretically 
covered by the risk component, i.e. the risk becomes reality. This, in addition, 
shows that the residence state of the shareholder accepts the interrelation 
between the positive and negative income and refrains from taxing the risk 
component. 
 
- The limitation to the separable financing element results in a clear focus on 
hybrid structures. The aforementioned core elements of the concept should 
therefore lead to a greater (general) acceptance among states of the current 
taxation of income. In my opinion, it is extremely difficult (and clearly more 
difficult than in case of CFC rules) to argue that the basic interest taxation 
results in a circumvention of tax treaties.   
 
- The OECD and the EU Council consider CFC / FIF rules to be an important 
tool to target harmful tax competition. The less restrictive and more target-
oriented concept of a basic interest taxation should, from my perspective, be 
clearly in line with the recommendations included in the OECD Report on 
Harmful Tax Competition and the EU Code of Conduct. 
 
- The fact that the basic interest taxation should not be restricted by a tax 
treaty253 provides the possibility to structure the concept in a way that the 
income is allocated to the ultimate resident shareholder. In my opinion, this 
would not only improve the efficiency of the concept but would also be 
supported by equity considerations.  
 
- The basic interest taxation should be in line with the ability-to-pay principle. 
This is mainly due to the fact that there is, in principle, no discrepancy 
between the treatment of positive and negative income, but the taxation is 
solely limited to the basic interest component (and leaves aside the activity 
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restricted (at least in those cases where the double tax convention follows the lines of 
the OECD-MTC). The reason is that the classification will be derived from the activity 
of another taxpayer and this will not cause any international juridical double taxation, 
but merely an international economic double taxation. The latter, however, is not - as 
outlined above - within the scope of the OECD-MTC. Further, such an approach of 
income qualification should not result in a different outcome dependent upon whether 
the resident shareholder is an individual or a legal entity. The reason is that the 
qualification should be made, in my opinion, on the basis of the activity of the CFC 
and is therefore unrelated to the (legal) status of the resident shareholder. Thus, if 
the income from the provision of loan amounts by the CFC is considered (from the 
perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules) to be business income, this 
should be decisive for the qualification described above - no matter whether the 
resident shareholder is an individual or an entity. In other words, the domestic 
differentiation in the state of residence of the shareholder between income derived by 
individuals and income derived by legal entities has no influence on the qualification, 
because it is the activity of the CFC itself which should be relevant in this respect.     
 
Thus, most of the existing double tax conventions do not prevent the application of 
CFC rules. The question arises whether this would be different if the legislation were 
based on the principles derived from previous chapters, i.e. if an alternative 
legislation were solely focused on the basic interest component. In my opinion, it 
does not really play a role - in this particular context of double tax conventions - 
whether the CFC income is completely allocated according to an entity approach, 
partly allocated according to a transactional approach (horizontal separation), or 
partly allocated according to a basic interest approach (horizontal and vertical 
separation). In all of these cases a juridical double taxation does not exist - based on 
the above reasoning - since it still refers to two different taxpayers. In other words, 
the fact that the taxation in the residence state of the shareholder should be limited to 
the basic interest component does not necessarily require any changes of a tax 
treaty which is based on the OECD-MTC (and which is limited to juridical double 
taxation). Thus, if a state is willing to follow such a concept of the taxation of the 
basic interest component, this can be done under the current framework of the tax 
treaties which are based on the OECD-MTC. On the other hand, if a state prefers to 
have clarity that the other contracting state does not apply any CFC rules or does not 
limit the current taxation to the basic interest component, it is required to specifically 
determine the non-application of CFC rules or the limitation to the current taxation of 
the basic interest component in the tax treaty.251 Thus, a “pro-active approach” may 
result in an amendment to the tax treaty. I will come back to this question in chapter 9 
where I am going to present an alternative legislation which is in line with the 
principles and the requirements identified in this chapter and the previous chapters. 
 
Hence, the basic interest taxation should be in line with tax treaties which are based 
on the OECD-MTC and which do not explicitly prevent the application of such a 
concept. The most important aspects in this context are the following: 
 
- The combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation of income results in 
the safeguarding of competitiveness and comes closer to the principle of 
capital import neutrality. 
 
                                            
251 Of course, this requires the other contracting state to stick to the principles and the provisions of the tax treaty 
and avoids any tax treaty override. 
CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions
393
   
 
- The current taxation of income is strictly limited to the most critical element 
from an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) perspective, namely the basic interest 
component.  
 
- The basic interest taxation does not encompass income which is produced by 
the CFC itself. This is a clear signal towards the other contracting state to 
show that the residence state of the shareholder has no intention to tax 
income (on a current basis) which is produced by the CFC.252  
 
- The basic interest taxation does not encompass income which is related to the 
risk directly covered by the CFC. There is a direct relationship between the 
positive income related to the risk component (risk premium) and the 
(subsequent) negative income in case an event arises which is theoretically 
covered by the risk component, i.e. the risk becomes reality. This, in addition, 
shows that the residence state of the shareholder accepts the interrelation 
between the positive and negative income and refrains from taxing the risk 
component. 
 
- The limitation to the separable financing element results in a clear focus on 
hybrid structures. The aforementioned core elements of the concept should 
therefore lead to a greater (general) acceptance among states of the current 
taxation of income. In my opinion, it is extremely difficult (and clearly more 
difficult than in case of CFC rules) to argue that the basic interest taxation 
results in a circumvention of tax treaties.   
 
- The OECD and the EU Council consider CFC / FIF rules to be an important 
tool to target harmful tax competition. The less restrictive and more target-
oriented concept of a basic interest taxation should, from my perspective, be 
clearly in line with the recommendations included in the OECD Report on 
Harmful Tax Competition and the EU Code of Conduct. 
 
- The fact that the basic interest taxation should not be restricted by a tax 
treaty253 provides the possibility to structure the concept in a way that the 
income is allocated to the ultimate resident shareholder. In my opinion, this 
would not only improve the efficiency of the concept but would also be 
supported by equity considerations.  
 
- The basic interest taxation should be in line with the ability-to-pay principle. 
This is mainly due to the fact that there is, in principle, no discrepancy 
between the treatment of positive and negative income, but the taxation is 
solely limited to the basic interest component (and leaves aside the activity 
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restricted (at least in those cases where the double tax convention follows the lines of 
the OECD-MTC). The reason is that the classification will be derived from the activity 
of another taxpayer and this will not cause any international juridical double taxation, 
but merely an international economic double taxation. The latter, however, is not - as 
outlined above - within the scope of the OECD-MTC. Further, such an approach of 
income qualification should not result in a different outcome dependent upon whether 
the resident shareholder is an individual or a legal entity. The reason is that the 
qualification should be made, in my opinion, on the basis of the activity of the CFC 
and is therefore unrelated to the (legal) status of the resident shareholder. Thus, if 
the income from the provision of loan amounts by the CFC is considered (from the 
perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules) to be business income, this 
should be decisive for the qualification described above - no matter whether the 
resident shareholder is an individual or an entity. In other words, the domestic 
differentiation in the state of residence of the shareholder between income derived by 
individuals and income derived by legal entities has no influence on the qualification, 
because it is the activity of the CFC itself which should be relevant in this respect.     
 
Thus, most of the existing double tax conventions do not prevent the application of 
CFC rules. The question arises whether this would be different if the legislation were 
based on the principles derived from previous chapters, i.e. if an alternative 
legislation were solely focused on the basic interest component. In my opinion, it 
does not really play a role - in this particular context of double tax conventions - 
whether the CFC income is completely allocated according to an entity approach, 
partly allocated according to a transactional approach (horizontal separation), or 
partly allocated according to a basic interest approach (horizontal and vertical 
separation). In all of these cases a juridical double taxation does not exist - based on 
the above reasoning - since it still refers to two different taxpayers. In other words, 
the fact that the taxation in the residence state of the shareholder should be limited to 
the basic interest component does not necessarily require any changes of a tax 
treaty which is based on the OECD-MTC (and which is limited to juridical double 
taxation). Thus, if a state is willing to follow such a concept of the taxation of the 
basic interest component, this can be done under the current framework of the tax 
treaties which are based on the OECD-MTC. On the other hand, if a state prefers to 
have clarity that the other contracting state does not apply any CFC rules or does not 
limit the current taxation to the basic interest component, it is required to specifically 
determine the non-application of CFC rules or the limitation to the current taxation of 
the basic interest component in the tax treaty.251 Thus, a “pro-active approach” may 
result in an amendment to the tax treaty. I will come back to this question in chapter 9 
where I am going to present an alternative legislation which is in line with the 
principles and the requirements identified in this chapter and the previous chapters. 
 
Hence, the basic interest taxation should be in line with tax treaties which are based 
on the OECD-MTC and which do not explicitly prevent the application of such a 
concept. The most important aspects in this context are the following: 
 
- The combination of a horizontal and a vertical separation of income results in 
the safeguarding of competitiveness and comes closer to the principle of 
capital import neutrality. 
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application of CFC rules outside the limitations provided by a double tax convention. 
That means, if the residence state of the shareholder stipulates, in the context of the 
domestic CFC legislation, a link to the income which is derived by the shareholder 
through a CFC interposed in the other contracting state, it is required to examine the 
latter income and to determine the type of income in the light of the respective tax 
treaty - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder. Hence, if the 
income classification leads to the outcome that the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right to tax the income of the shareholder under the respective 
tax treaty, there is, in principle, no restriction for the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation. In contrast thereto, if the income classification leads to the outcome that 
the state of residence of the shareholder does not have the right to tax the income of 
the shareholder under the respective tax treaty, the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation will result in a tax treaty override.   
 
5.) As already outlined above, the CFC income has to be categorised in the context 
of the tax treaty. In my opinion, it is the actual activity carried on by the CFC which 
has to be examined and which should be the basis for the income qualification of the 
residence state of the shareholder (the state which applies the CFC legislation). 
Since the OECD-MTC does not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term 
“business profits”, the domestic definition of the state which applies its CFC rules has 
to be referred to. If it turns out that the income derived from these activities (e.g. 
service activities) is to be qualified - from the perspective of the state which applies 
its CFC rules - as “business profits,” the income which is allocable to the residence 
country of the shareholder may be taxed in the latter country pursuant to Article 7 (1) 
of the OECD-MTC. Thus, it is important to note that even though the activity carried 
on by the CFC is to be examined, the qualification is to be made, in my opinion, from 
the perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules. 
 
6.) The residence state of the CFC, of course, has to make its own qualification of the 
income derived by the CFC (in contrast to the aforementioned qualification of the 
income derived by the shareholder through the interposition of the CFC). The 
approach of the residence state of the CFC, however, is of no relevance, in my 
opinion, for the qualification of income under the CFC regime in the state of the 
shareholder. Thus, there are two different states involved which examine the income 
of two different taxpayers. The qualification of the respective income as “business 
profits” does therefore not result in a conflict under the respective tax treaty. 
 
7.) It is often suggested that the CFC income is to be qualified - as a whole and in 
general - as dividend income in the context of the OECD-MTC. One of the main 
arguments for the qualification as dividend income is the inseparable link between 
the holding of shares in the foreign legal entity and the CFC income attribution. 
Furthermore, the definition of the term “dividends” in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC 
requires an autonomous examination in the context of the tax treaty. Dividends 
means “income from shares” and it seems that the definition also encompasses 
hidden distributions of profit without any actual outflow of financial means to the 
shareholder. In my opinion, those arguments do not necessarily require a 
qualification as dividends (or a deemed dividend) and there are a number of aspects 
which do not support such a qualification: 
 
- In nearly all countries which apply such legislation, the CFC income is 
determined according to domestic rules. The income of the foreign legal entity 
   
 
7.8. Conclusions  
 
1.) Up to now only a few tax courts in Europe have dealt with the question of 
compatibility of double tax conventions and CFC legislation. However, with the 
exception of the French Schneider Case, the case law which has been examined did 
not see a conflict between double tax conventions and the application of CFC rules, 
even if the latter rules are not explicitly preserved in the respective conventions. In 
the Schneider Case, the French Supreme Tax Court concluded that the CFC rules 
cannot be applied if the application is not expressly confirmed in the French tax 
treaties. In contrast, the Finnish Supreme Tax Court did not see any conflict in the A 
Oyj Abp Case between the application of the Finnish CFC regime and the Finland-
Belgium tax treaty which does not contain any specific provision in this respect. The 
same is basically true for the decision in the British Bricom Holdings Case where the 
Court of Appeal did not see any restriction for the application of the United Kingdom 
CFC regime to income derived by a legal entity resident in the Netherlands. The 
Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings decided in two cases - which dealt with 
captive insurance companies in Luxembourg and Switzerland - that the application of 
the Swedish CFC regime is not in conflict with the respective tax treaties. Also in the 
Swedish cases, the double tax convention did not explicitly deal with the applicability 
of CFC rules.  
 
2.) The position of the OECD is now made clear since the 2003 update of the 
Commentary. Before the 2003 update, the Commentary solely provided the majority 
and minority opinions of the Member countries. Pursuant to the OECD, the CFC rules 
are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which 
facts give rise to tax liabilities. These rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are 
therefore not affected by them. Thus, the OECD does not see, in principle, a conflict 
between tax treaties and domestic CFC legislation. I agree with the position that CFC 
rules do not have to be specifically preserved in a double tax convention. Those rules 
do not have to be treated differently from any other domestic legislation which can be 
of relevance in the relationship between the respective tax treaty countries. It is not 
the CFC, i.e. the foreign company, which is taxed in the residence state of the 
shareholder, but the shareholder is taxed on income derived through the interposition 
of the CFC. Thus, there are two different taxpayers involved and the tax treaty does 
not prevent the taxation of the shareholder in the state of residence on income 
derived through the CFC. In contrast thereto, the CFC itself may only be taxed in the 
residence state of the shareholder in case of a permanent establishment of the CFC 
in the latter state.  
 
3.) Furthermore, the OECD takes the position that CFC rules should only be applied 
to certain passive activities but not to active businesses. As already outlined earlier a 
separation between “active” and “passive” can be quite difficult. In any case, the 
OECD considers “base company activities” to be passive activities. In my opinion, 
this may have the effect that income from business activities is subject to CFC 
taxation.  
 
4.) Thus, the existing CFC rules are in most cases too broad for a separation of 
abusive and non-abusive activities, i.e. CFC rules target both, the abusive and the 
non-abusive relocation of activities to low-tax countries. Therefore, even if the 
general aim of a double tax convention encompasses, inter alia, the combating of 
international tax avoidance and tax evasion, this must not result in an unrestricted 
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application of CFC rules outside the limitations provided by a double tax convention. 
That means, if the residence state of the shareholder stipulates, in the context of the 
domestic CFC legislation, a link to the income which is derived by the shareholder 
through a CFC interposed in the other contracting state, it is required to examine the 
latter income and to determine the type of income in the light of the respective tax 
treaty - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder. Hence, if the 
income classification leads to the outcome that the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right to tax the income of the shareholder under the respective 
tax treaty, there is, in principle, no restriction for the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation. In contrast thereto, if the income classification leads to the outcome that 
the state of residence of the shareholder does not have the right to tax the income of 
the shareholder under the respective tax treaty, the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation will result in a tax treaty override.   
 
5.) As already outlined above, the CFC income has to be categorised in the context 
of the tax treaty. In my opinion, it is the actual activity carried on by the CFC which 
has to be examined and which should be the basis for the income qualification of the 
residence state of the shareholder (the state which applies the CFC legislation). 
Since the OECD-MTC does not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term 
“business profits”, the domestic definition of the state which applies its CFC rules has 
to be referred to. If it turns out that the income derived from these activities (e.g. 
service activities) is to be qualified - from the perspective of the state which applies 
its CFC rules - as “business profits,” the income which is allocable to the residence 
country of the shareholder may be taxed in the latter country pursuant to Article 7 (1) 
of the OECD-MTC. Thus, it is important to note that even though the activity carried 
on by the CFC is to be examined, the qualification is to be made, in my opinion, from 
the perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules. 
 
6.) The residence state of the CFC, of course, has to make its own qualification of the 
income derived by the CFC (in contrast to the aforementioned qualification of the 
income derived by the shareholder through the interposition of the CFC). The 
approach of the residence state of the CFC, however, is of no relevance, in my 
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7.8. Conclusions  
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general aim of a double tax convention encompasses, inter alia, the combating of 
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necessity for any subdivision of the business profits. In other words, it is 
decisive whether the elements included in the income can result in a different 
qualification of the respective activity and the respective income. If this is not 
the case, the whole income is to be qualified as business income. Here, the 
different elements become an integral part of the business activity and the 
business income. It can also be described, in my opinion, as an amalgamation 
of elements which might be, on a “stand-alone basis”, separate types of 
income. The outcome of the qualification should not be dependent upon 
whether the resident shareholder in the CFC is an individual or a legal entity. 
The qualification should solely be made on the basis of the activity of the CFC 
and is therefore unrelated to the (legal) status of the resident shareholder. The 
domestic differentiation in the state of residence of the shareholder between 
income derived by individuals and income derived by legal entities has no 
influence on the qualification, because it is the activity of the CFC itself which 
should be relevant in this respect.   
 
- As already outlined above, the residence state of the CFC has to make its own 
qualification of the income derived by the CFC. Here, the residence state of 
the CFC has to take into account the different types of income for the 
allocation of taxing rights under the double tax conventions concluded by the 
latter state (e.g. with respect to withholding taxes) - even though the different 
income elements may finally also become an integral part of the business 
income of the CFC from the perspective of the residence state of the CFC 
(similar to the approach which was outlined above with respect to the 
residence state of the shareholder). 
 
- If the activity carried on by the CFC is solely limited to a passive activity, such 
as the deriving of interest income (or dividend / royalty income), and the 
activity itself does not contain any substantial service element (or any other 
substantial element of a business activity), the reference to the domestic law 
of the residence state of the shareholder (the state which applies the CFC 
rules) might lead to the outcome that the income is to be determined as 
interest income (or dividend / royalty income) and not as business income. 
The definition of “interest” included in Article 11 (3) of the OECD-MTC is of no 
importance in this respect. The latter is only relevant in the context of Article 
11 of the OECD-MTC for the allocation of taxing rights related to the gross 
amount of interest payment (withholding taxation) between the country of 
source and the country of residence of the CFC (and not the shareholder). 
Based on the domestic definition of the residence state of the shareholder, the 
CFC income may be qualified as interest income (dividend / royalty income) 
for tax treaty purposes. This would also lead to a taxation of the CFC income 
in the residence state of the shareholder. The different qualification does not 
restrict the right to tax the income in the country of the shareholder which 
applies its CFC taxation. This is not only true for interest income but also for 
dividend income and royalty income. 
 
- The income from immovable property is not equally flexible and subject to 
disposal of the shareholder, and therefore less often subject to CFC taxation 
compared to the aforementioned types of passive income, but this does not 
mean that this type of income is completely outside of the scope of CFC 
taxation. However, there is a major difference between interest income, royalty 
   
 
which may be distributed to the shareholder is therefore typically different from 
(and unconnected to) the attributed CFC income. 
 
- The CFC rules focus on certain types of income and ignore the actual income 
based on the commercial accounts of the foreign entity. This is particularly true 
for the transactional approach.  
 
- Although the likelihood that the CFC rules cover the same types of income as 
the foreign legal entity is higher in case of an entity approach, it is by no 
means clear that this is the case for a period of more than one year. The 
(partial) change of activities can lead to the result that the income is subject to 
CFC taxation in one year but not in another. 
 
- The attribution of CFC income has no influence on the income based on the 
commercial accounts of the foreign company and it has no influence on the 
net asset value (in contrast to open or hidden distributions of profit). The 
company is therefore in a position to distribute all of the profits derived from its 
activities to the shareholder and this is - and must be - totally unconnected to a 
CFC income attribution.  
 
- The actual profit distribution of the company leads to income from shares 
(dividend income) and reflects the added value of the investment. It is by no 
means comparable to the CFC income attribution - even though they are 
economically related to the same income.  
 
- It follows from the features and the mechanism of CFC rules outlined earlier 
that the concept of CFC income attribution is different to the concept of 
dividend income. The focus on the residence state of the foreign entity and the 
fact that the term dividend means “a distribution of profits to the shareholders” 
requires - in my opinion - a nexus between the income based on the 
commercial accounts of the company and the (open or hidden) distributions to 
the shareholder. It is the (net) profit of the company which is made available to 
the shareholder by way of profit distribution. In contrast, the CFC rules are 
very specific and only attribute the income in certain limited and clearly defined 
situations. This can have the effect that the CFC taxation is not applicable 
during the entire period of foreign investment but only in years where certain 
requirements are fulfilled. The application typically requires that (i) a certain 
participation threshold is exceeded, (ii) a certain low-taxation threshold is not 
exceeded, and (iii) certain income elements are derived by the foreign entity 
(transactional approach) or a certain mixture of income and / or certain 
circumstances are existent (entity approach).  
 
8.) The question arises whether the CFC income can still be qualified as “business 
profits” in case the attributable income also encompasses elements of interest 
income, royalty income or dividend income. In my opinion, the following separation 
has to be made:  
 
- If, from the perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules, the income 
derived by the shareholder through the CFC is to be qualified, in total, as 
“business profits” - despite the fact that also other elements like interest 
income, royalty income, and dividend income are included - there is no 
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structure of the CFC legislation which is solely decisive for the qualification of the 
attributed CFC income by the mere fact that it refers to certain income components 
which are indirectly included in the net income.  
 
12.) In principle, the general application of CFC rules to all types of income instead of 
a limitation to certain types of income and / or certain circumstances might lead to a 
circumvention of tax treaties. At least, this might be true in cases where the 
respective tax treaty otherwise provides for the exemption of dividend income and the 
income from capital gains on the disposal of shares, and where the application of the 
CFC regime results in a complete and unrestricted taxation of the whole CFC 
income. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that in case of a credit 
country the main consequence is the immediate taxation of CFC income and the 
avoidance of tax deferral. The business profits derived by the foreign legal entity are 
still taxable in the source country and as long as the country which applies the CFC 
rules provides for a crediting of the foreign income tax an international economic 
double taxation would be avoided. 
 
13.) The conclusions drawn in this chapter are equally relevant for an alternative 
regime which is based on the principles derived from chapters 2 and 3, i.e. a regime 
which focuses on the taxation of the basic interest component. The latter approach 
does not result in a juridical double taxation - just like the regular CFC regimes. In 
other words, the basic interest approach would be in line with double tax conventions 





























   
 
income and dividend income on the one hand and income from immovable 
property on the other: the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC requires a 
source based taxation of the rental income and is by no means limited to a 
withholding taxation of the gross amount of income. The taxation is therefore 
based on a net concept. However, this should not lead to the outcome that the 
income from immovable property is treated differently from the other types of 
income outlined above. The CFC rules do not tax the direct owner of the 
immovable property but the (direct or indirect) shareholder in the company 
which carries on the rental activities. The classification of income is therefore 
to be made separately for two different persons by two different states. Hence, 
Article 6 of the OECD-MTC does not directly restrict the taxing rights of the 
state of the shareholder. For this reason, a limitation of taxing rights which 
follows the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC could only be made by 
analogy. In my opinion, the only justification for such an analogous application 
might be derived from the concept of a strict source-based taxation of the net 
income from immovable property, i.e. if both contracting states follow a strict 
source-based taxation of rental income - not only in relation to each other but 
also in relation to third states - and the double taxation is avoided solely by the 
application of the exemption method. In such a situation, it is not only 
questionable whether a CFC taxation of rental income is actually required from 
an anti-avoidance perspective, but one might also argue that the application of 
those rules is in contradiction to the purpose and the idea of the respective tax 
treaty. However, the OECD-MTC does not provide for an analogous 
application of Article 6 and I do not see, therefore, any legal basis for such an 
approach. That means, even the classification of the attributed income as 
rental income - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder - 
would not restrict the right to tax the attributed income. 
 
9.) The principles are equally relevant for the taxation of capital gains under a CFC 
regime: if the activity is to be qualified as business activity, the capital gains are part 
of the allocable business income. In all other cases, the qualification is to be made 
with reference to the domestic legislation of the country which invokes the respective 
double tax convention. The wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 13 (5) of the 
OECD-MTC is no obstacle for the taxation of CFC income, because there are two 
different taxpayers involved.  
 
10.) Based on the argumentation above, there is not much room for the application of 
Article 21 of the OECD-MTC. However, even if one takes the position that the CFC 
income attribution falls within the scope of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC, the outcome 
would not be different. The taxing rights related to other income are allocable to the 
residence state of the shareholder which applies its CFC taxation.  
 
11.) In my opinion, the qualification of income should not be dependent upon the 
respective CFC system (entity approach or transactional approach). The domestic 
methodology of creating a nexus to the income of the CFC and the limitation to 
certain types of income cannot be of any influence for the qualification of income 
under the respective tax treaty. If the income has to be qualified pursuant to the 
actual activity carried out in the CFC country (e.g. business activity), any limitation of 
the income attribution to a certain part of the net income, e.g. interest income under a 
transactional system, should not lead to a qualification of the attributable income as 
interest income instead of business income. Otherwise, it would be the domestic 
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8. CFC Legislation and European Union Law 
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the concept of CFC legislation will be examined in the light of the 
basic freedoms which were outlined in chapter 4 and which may be of particular 
relevance in the context of the application of CFC rules, i.e. the freedom of 
establishment, the freedom to provide services, and the free movement of capital. It 
will be clarified whether the CFC taxation may result in a restriction on the exercising 
of the aforementioned basic freedoms and whether the appropriate pair of 
comparison for the identification of such a restriction is limited to a hypothetical 
domestic investment or whether the comparison may by extended to hypothetical 
foreign investments in other Member State which do not trigger the application of 
CFC rules (vertical comparison) and to hypothetical permanent establishments 
(horizontal comparison). Moreover, it will be verified whether - in case of a restriction 
on the basic freedoms - there will be any justifications under the rule of reason. In 
addition to the examinations related to primary EU law, I will also clarify the concept 
of CFC legislation in relation to secondary EU law. Here, the focus will be on the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive. The examinations 
will be based on the conclusions drawn in previous chapters where the basic 
principles have been outlined. Finally, I will briefly outline the dilemma of the Member 
States with respect to the application of CFC rules, the reaction of some Member 
States to the outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes decision - the first decision of the 
ECJ which dealt with the application of CFC rules - and the necessity of a “limited” 
capital export neutrality approach.  
 
8.2. CFC Legislation and Primary European Union Law 
 
8.2.1. CFC Legislation and the Freedom of Establishment 
 
As already outlined earlier, the ECJ defined the concept of establishment in the 
Factortame decision as “the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.”1 In the following, it 
has to be examined whether - and under which circumstances - the investment in a 
CFC in another Member State falls within the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
The investment in a CFC is to be understood as an investment in a foreign company 
which fulfils the requirements of the residence state of the shareholder for the 
application of domestic CFC rules. It is clear from the earlier chapters that the 
application of these rules usually requires the exercising of certain passive or base 
company activities2 or activities which are mainly directed towards related parties 
outside of the residence state of the CFC.3 It is therefore important to clarify whether 
these activities are, in principle, covered by the freedom of establishment or whether 
they are - in whole or in part - outside of the scope of the latter freedom. Furthermore, 
the conclusions derived from the earlier examinations, e.g. the necessity of a definite 




                                            
1 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20.  
2 See the “transactional approach“ outlined in chapter 6.  
3 See the “entity approach“ outlined in chapter 6.  
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CFC in another Member State falls within the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
The investment in a CFC is to be understood as an investment in a foreign company 
which fulfils the requirements of the residence state of the shareholder for the 
application of domestic CFC rules. It is clear from the earlier chapters that the 
application of these rules usually requires the exercising of certain passive or base 
company activities2 or activities which are mainly directed towards related parties 
outside of the residence state of the CFC.3 It is therefore important to clarify whether 
these activities are, in principle, covered by the freedom of establishment or whether 
they are - in whole or in part - outside of the scope of the latter freedom. Furthermore, 
the conclusions derived from the earlier examinations, e.g. the necessity of a definite 




                                            
1 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraph 20.  
2 See the “transactional approach“ outlined in chapter 6.  
3 See the “entity approach“ outlined in chapter 6.  























































   
 
through the establishment of a holding company in another Member State. Thus, if 
the holding company provides services to, for example, subsidiary companies, this 
may very well be considered to be an economic activity of the holding company. This 
is especially true if the holding company is involved in the management of the 
subsidiary companies and provides financial services to the subsidiary companies. In 
case of portfolio investments, the active and professional management of the 
investments - and therefore the exercising of an income-producing activity in the 
state of the CFC - can lead to an economic activity.  
 
8.2.1.1.2. Investment Management Activity vs. Economic Activity? 
 
Especially in case of CFC legislation it is important to clarify whether investment 
management activities can, in general, be seen as economic activities or whether 
these activities have to be seen as (other) activities which are outside of the scope of 
the freedom of establishment. This question might come up if the foreign legal entity 
does not exercise all of the functions which are necessary for the activity to be 
considered clearly and in its totality as a “professional” investment management 
activity, i.e. in those cases where the functions carried out by the CFC are rather 
limited. As already stated earlier, it is often the case that the capital investment is the 
prevailing purpose - and therefore the prevailing activity - of the CFC, and the 
accompanying services are of minor importance. This may lead to a strong 
dependency of the CFC from the domestic shareholder (parent company). However, 
this does not mean that the CFC itself is not able to carry on its (limited) activities or 
that the business as such cannot be seen as a self-contained activity, but it might 
lead to the result that additional services have to be received from the parent 
company and significant decisions are influenced by the parent company. However, 
this should be in line with the concept of establishment. In my opinion, this can be 
understood from the Factortame decision. In the latter case, the ECJ considered a 
“decision taking centre” located in the Member State of the principal establishment 
not to be contrary to the right of establishment.7 The dependency from a 
management point of view - either by management decisions or by the receiving of 
services - should therefore not be particularly problematic for the classification as an 
economic activity. That means the limitation of functions exercised in the CFC 
country is, as such, in line with the right of establishment. Of course, this does not 
answer the question whether the (limited) investment management activities may be 
seen as economic activities. In this respect, it should be clear that any domestic 
separation of the Member States between investment management activities and 
business activities - which can also be based on the concept of an economic activity - 
does not play any role in the context of the freedom of establishment. Here, it seems 
to be important that a certain “economic output” is produced in the state of the CFC 
and it does not really matter whether this output is related to an investment 
management activity or a business activity. This becomes more obvious below.  
 
8.2.1.1.3. Inter-Company Activities  
 
Inter-company service activities are not only one of the main targets of CFC rules, but 
are also of great significance for multinational enterprises.8 In my opinion, it is worth 
dealing with the inter-company activities separately from the holding and portfolio 
                                            
7 Case C-221/89 (Factortame II), paragraphs 34 and 35.  
8 Sometimes it is not restricted to inter-company services but also encompasses inter-company trading activities 
(e.g. in Germany).  
   
 
8.2.1.1. Economic Activity  
 
The fact that only economic activities are covered by the freedom of establishment 
makes it necessary to have a closer look at the activities typically carried on by 
CFCs. Based on the earlier examinations it seems to be apparent that the mere 
holding of assets cannot be considered an economic activity. It was outlined in 
chapter 4 that such a holding of assets must be accompanied by an income-
producing activity in the respective state - even if the income-producing activity is 
only of minor overall importance, e.g. within a group of companies. On the other 
hand, the mere artificial “creation” of a foreign activity without any substance would 
often not be in the focus of CFC taxation. In the latter case, the artificial foreign 
activity would be considered to take place in the state where the activities are actually 
carried out.  
 
8.2.1.1.1. Holding and Portfolio Activities 
 
If the sole purpose and actual activity of the foreign legal entity is literally the holding 
of assets, and nothing else, this should not be within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment since it cannot be considered an economic activity. This is, in my 
opinion, not self-evident but requires further clarification. The point is that the holding 
of assets itself is not free from risks; or from another perspective: the risks related to 
the assets held by the foreign legal entity are - in the absence of any other 
accompanying activities - the only economically decisive factor. In those cases, the 
investment risks related to the assets are shifted to the state of the CFC and 
encompass, in particular, the change in value of the investments. This, by itself, 
might be an important element within, for example, a group of companies. However, 
it should be clear from the earlier examinations of the case law of the ECJ that the 
assets must be utilised to pursue an economic activity, and can only be seen as an 
instrument for pursuing an economic activity.4 The risks which are inherent in the 
holding of assets cannot, therefore, be seen as a decisive factor for the qualification 
as an economic activity in the sense of the freedom of establishment - if it is not 
accompanied by an income-producing activity in the respective state. But what does 
that actually mean? The implementation of a holding company in another Member 
State which can only be seen as a conduit company for the holding of shares in other 
companies and which does not carry out any additional functions cannot be covered 
by the freedom of establishment.5 This should be true for majority shareholdings, 
minority shareholdings and the investment in bonds and similar portfolio investments.   
 
The outcome may be different if the foreign holding company (the CFC) fulfils 
additional functions, i.e. in addition to the mere holding of assets. Only in such a 
situation can the activity be seen as an economic activity. There is no doubt, from my 
perspective, that a holding company itself can, in general, rely on the right of 
establishment or that a holding company can be used as a “vehicle” to claim - directly 
or indirectly - the right of establishment.6 However, in the direct relationship between 
the Member State of the shareholder and the Member State of the holding company, 
it is decisive that the activity of the holding company is to be classified as an 
economic activity. Here, it is the shareholder who exercises his right of establishment 
                                            
4 See the examination in chapter 4, especially related to the Factortame and Jaderow case.  
5 Alternatively, the investment can be in the scope of the free movement of capital, but this will be examined 
separately later on.  
6 See the examination in chapter 4, especially related to the ICI case.  
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concept which does not consider activities isolated from each other. In my opinion, 
the same should be true in the context of the right of establishment, even if it refers to 
functions of minor importance. The concentration on substantial services may be 
helpful in a domestic situation, e.g. for simplification reasons, but it would not be an 
appropriate element for a differentiation under the right of establishment. 
 
The first case in which the ECJ had to deal with CFC legislation and the provision of 
inter-company services was the Cadbury Schweppes case.9 In this case, the 
question whether the financing services provided by the CFC could be seen, in 
general, as an economic activity was obviously not considered particularly 
problematic. In this respect, Advocate General Léger outlined in his Opinion to the 
case that “(...) ‘establishment’, within the meaning of Article 43 EC et seq, involves 
the actual pursuit of an economic activity in the host State. If the subsidiary is actually 
carrying on such an activity in that State and, in that connection, it provides genuine 
and actual services to the parent company, I do not think that that situation may be 
regarded, in itself, as tax evasion or avoidance, even if payment for those services 
leads to a reduction in the taxable profits of the parent company in the State of origin. 
Having regard to the objective of the freedom of establishment, as long as the 
subsidiary carries on genuine economic activity in the host State, there is no 
difference between the provision of services to third parties and the provision of those 
services to companies belonging to the same group as the subsidiary. In addition, the 
provision of services by a subsidiary to its parent company is an economic activity 
which takes the form of transactions between distinct legal persons. The fact that 
those companies are linked does not prevent the pricing of those transactions from 
being determined under normal competitive conditions. (...) Transactions between a 
CFC and its parent company which result in reducing the taxable profits of the latter 
can therefore be regarded as tax avoidance only if the establishment of that 
subsidiary and those transactions constitute (...) a wholly artificial arrangement aimed 
at circumventing national law. Likewise (...) the fact that a company centralises in 
another Member State with a low tax rate the carrying on of certain activities of use to 
the entire group and seeks by that means to reduce the group’s overall tax burden 
does not in itself constitute abuse. In such a case, as long as the subsidiary 
responsible for those intragroup services is carrying on genuine economic activity in 
the host State, under the tax sovereignty of which it falls, the territorial allocation of 
the Member States’ power to impose taxes is not, a priori, affected. The loss of 
taxable profits affecting the State of origin is the result of the economic activity which 
is carried out in the host State and taxed by that State.”10 Interestingly, the ECJ itself 
did not really go into detail of the question of economic activity, but rather 
concentrated on other questions, such as the abuse of the freedom of establishment 
and the separation from wholly artificial arrangements. For this reason, the decision 
does not provide any further information on the differentiation between economic 
activities and other (non-economic) activities. At least, it seems that the ECJ did not 
see any problem in classifying the inter-company finance activity as an economic 
activity and, thus, apparently followed the position of the Advocate General.  
 
Hence, it seems that there is no doubt about the fact that a CFC may carry on an 
economic activity by providing services to the parent company or any other related 
party. Even though the case itself only encompasses financing services, there is no 
reason, in my opinion, to assume that the outcome would be different in case of 
                                            
9 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes).  
10 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 106 to 109. 
   
 
activities outlined above. What is meant here are the capital intensive activities which 
are relocated from the Member State of the principal establishment to other Member 
States, namely financing activities (e.g. cash pooling), leasing and rental activities, 
licensing activities, and any other similar intra-group service activities. Leaving aside 
the tax aspects for a moment, it is from an economic point of view the separation and 
allocation of functions among different legal entities in different states. For example, if 
a leasing company is incorporated in Member State C which is now responsible for 
the investment in machinery and the renting out to the production companies in other 
Member States, nobody would seriously question the economic activity in its totality, 
i.e. the production and sales activity of the group. This raises the question whether it 
is justified to separate a single fraction of the whole activity - the secondary 
establishment of a leasing company in Member State C - and to qualify this activity 
differently. Or is it not rather necessary to see the leasing activity in the context of the 
complete business activity of the group? Without any doubt, the right of 
establishment plays are role in the relationship between the Member State of the 
principal establishment and the Member State of the secondary establishment, but 
this does not necessarily answer the question whether the overall context is decisive 
or not. In my opinion, it would not be helpful to start qualifying each and every activity 
without taking into consideration the overall picture. Only the overall picture provides 
the possibility for an appropriate categorisation of any activity. It is therefore unlikely, 
in my opinion, to end up in the aforementioned example of a leasing company with 
anything other than an economic activity. Again, this should be true even for minor 
functions, as long as it is not solely limited to the holding of assets. The performance 
of additional functions is part of the complete business activity and fulfils a certain 
purpose within the overall activity. It must be repeated at this point that there is 
basically a small borderline between the acceptance of the performance of very 
limited functions in the CFC country (in addition to the holding of assets) and the 
qualification by one of the Member States - normally the Member State of the 
principal establishment - as an abusive structure. However, if the decision is made 
that the very limited activity is performed in the CFC country and that there is no 
situation which must be considered abusive and no situation where the effective 
place of management has to be considered to be in the country of the shareholder 
(parent company), the activity as such is to be accepted. In this case, the functions 
exercised in the CFC country are part of the overall economic process of the group. 
Otherwise, the different categorisation would be solely dependent upon the decision 
whether the activity remains connected to other activities within a certain country 
which are indisputably considered an economic activity, or whether the activity is 
separated and relocated to a Member State where the group does not carry on any 
other activity. The German domestic case law with respect to the concept of 
“business separation” may be referred to in this context. Pursuant to this concept, 
certain activities are considered to be business activities, even though they would 
normally be seen - on a stand-alone basis - as investment management activities or 
other activities pursuant to domestic law. The reason is that under certain 
circumstances the other activity may not be qualified differently from the business 
activity. If, for example, a person holds the ownership in certain tangible or intangible 
assets which are rented out to a company in which this person is the main 
shareholder, the rental income will be determined as business income. However, this 
requires that the assets used can be seen as essential assets for the company using 
the assets. This concept avoids a different qualification of activities by simply 
separating the activities. Clearly, this approach cannot be transferred directly to the 
“economic activity” under the right of establishment, but it is an example for a general 
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State. However, as already outlined earlier, this does not necessarily require, in my 
opinion, that the subsidiary cannot be directed and controlled from the parent 
company or cannot be the recipient of services provided by the parent company, but 
from the overall picture it must be clear, in my opinion, that the respective (intra-
group) functions are physically carried out by the subsidiary company within the host 
Member State.  
 
b.) The genuine nature of the activity provided by the subsidiary 
 
This is described by the Advocate General as “(...) a question of looking at the 
competence of the subsidiary’s staff in relation to the services provided and the level 
of decision-making in carrying out those services.” If it turns out that “(...) the 
subsidiary proves to be nothing but a mere tool of execution because the decisions 
necessary to carry out the services it is paid for are taken at another level, it is also 
right to consider that the subjection of those services to the tax sovereignty of the 
host State constitutes a wholly artificial arrangement.”17 In contrast to the first 
criterion which is related to the physical presence in the host Member State, the 
second criterion requires the “presence of decision-making.” Again, this does 
certainly not mean that the subsidiary is completely uninfluenced by the parent 
company, but it might be understood in a way that the decisions which are related to 
the provision of the services are actually taken by the responsible staff in the host 
Member State.  
 
c.) The economic value of that activity with regard to the parent company and the 
entire group 
 
The third criterion is, pursuant to the Advocate General, related to the value added by 
the subsidiary’s activity. This requires that the activities of the subsidiary are of “use” 
to the entire group.18 This is not the case if the services provided by the subsidiary 
“(...) have no economic substance in the light of the parent company’s activity. If that 
were the case, I think it can be accepted that there is a wholly artificial arrangement 
because there appears, in effect, to be no consideration for the payment by the 
parent company for the services in question. Payment for such services could 
therefore be viewed quite simply as a transfer of profits from the parent company to 
the subsidiary.”19 It seems to be clear from the statement of the Advocate General 
that the lower taxation itself is not sufficient to be considered an “added value” to the 
entire group.20 It is obvious that the separation between objectively useful services 
and those which are not objectively useful may be quite difficult. However, it can be 
assumed that the centralisation of activities which are usually in the scope of CFC 
taxation will most often have to be considered useful, at least in those cases where 
the services are not only related to the parent company but to a number of related 
companies and where certain synergy effects can be achieved. This is particularly 
true if the overall costs (e.g. for staff, premises) are lower than in the state of the 
parent company (other subsidiary companies). Of course, if one follows such a 
criterion, the argumentation with respect to an “added value” becomes difficult if the 
services are only provided to the parent company and, for example, the overall costs 
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leasing, renting, licensing or similar services. The latter services may even create a 
higher economic output in the CFC state than the mere financing services. The 
reason is that - in a typical situation - more functions have to be carried out in the 
CFC state in case of leasing, renting and licensing services than in case of mere 
financing services (this can be different, of course, in case of cash pooling and similar 
services). 
 
The above position is supported, in my opinion, by additional case law. In the 
Columbus Container decision,11 a case which dealt with a provision of the German 
Außensteuergesetz which is linked to the CFC rules, a Belgian limited partnership 
was responsible for the coordination of activities of a group of companies (Belgian 
coordination centre). The services covered, in particular, the centralisation of financial 
transactions and of the accounts, the financing of the liquidity of subsidiaries or 
branches, the computerisation of data and advertising and marketing activities.12 
Almost all of the income of the coordination centre was considered to be passive 
income under the respective German legislation.13 Also in this case, the ECJ did not 
see any necessity to deal with the question of economic activity. 
 
8.2.1.2. The Separation from Wholly Artificial Arrangements  
 
In his Opinion to the Cadbury Schweppes case Advocate General Léger proposes a 
case-by-case examination which has to be made for the separation of genuine 
economic activities which are carried on in the host Member State and wholly artificial 
arrangements which are merely intended to circumvent national legislation.14 In this 
respect, he follows to a large extent the criteria which were proposed by the 
Commission and the United Kingdom. The focus should therefore be on three criteria 
which are of particular relevance: (i) the degree of physical presence of the 
subsidiary in the host State, (ii) the genuine nature of the activity provided by the 
subsidiary, and (iii) the economic value of that activity with regard to the parent 
company and the entire group.15 
 
a.) The degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the host State 
 
According to Advocate General Léger, the first criterion relates to the question 
whether the subsidiary company is “(...) genuinely established in the host State.” This 
means “(...) examining whether the subsidiary has the premises, staff and equipment 
necessary to carry out the services provided to the parent company which have 
resulted in the reduction of the tax due in the State of origin. If that is not the case, 
the subjection of those services to the tax sovereignty of the host State does appear 
to be a wholly artificial arrangement designed to avoid tax.”16 Hence, the subsidiary 
must be capable of providing the services in question from within the host Member 
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State. However, as already outlined earlier, this does not necessarily require, in my 
opinion, that the subsidiary cannot be directed and controlled from the parent 
company or cannot be the recipient of services provided by the parent company, but 
from the overall picture it must be clear, in my opinion, that the respective (intra-
group) functions are physically carried out by the subsidiary company within the host 
Member State.  
 
b.) The genuine nature of the activity provided by the subsidiary 
 
This is described by the Advocate General as “(...) a question of looking at the 
competence of the subsidiary’s staff in relation to the services provided and the level 
of decision-making in carrying out those services.” If it turns out that “(...) the 
subsidiary proves to be nothing but a mere tool of execution because the decisions 
necessary to carry out the services it is paid for are taken at another level, it is also 
right to consider that the subjection of those services to the tax sovereignty of the 
host State constitutes a wholly artificial arrangement.”17 In contrast to the first 
criterion which is related to the physical presence in the host Member State, the 
second criterion requires the “presence of decision-making.” Again, this does 
certainly not mean that the subsidiary is completely uninfluenced by the parent 
company, but it might be understood in a way that the decisions which are related to 
the provision of the services are actually taken by the responsible staff in the host 
Member State.  
 
c.) The economic value of that activity with regard to the parent company and the 
entire group 
 
The third criterion is, pursuant to the Advocate General, related to the value added by 
the subsidiary’s activity. This requires that the activities of the subsidiary are of “use” 
to the entire group.18 This is not the case if the services provided by the subsidiary 
“(...) have no economic substance in the light of the parent company’s activity. If that 
were the case, I think it can be accepted that there is a wholly artificial arrangement 
because there appears, in effect, to be no consideration for the payment by the 
parent company for the services in question. Payment for such services could 
therefore be viewed quite simply as a transfer of profits from the parent company to 
the subsidiary.”19 It seems to be clear from the statement of the Advocate General 
that the lower taxation itself is not sufficient to be considered an “added value” to the 
entire group.20 It is obvious that the separation between objectively useful services 
and those which are not objectively useful may be quite difficult. However, it can be 
assumed that the centralisation of activities which are usually in the scope of CFC 
taxation will most often have to be considered useful, at least in those cases where 
the services are not only related to the parent company but to a number of related 
companies and where certain synergy effects can be achieved. This is particularly 
true if the overall costs (e.g. for staff, premises) are lower than in the state of the 
parent company (other subsidiary companies). Of course, if one follows such a 
criterion, the argumentation with respect to an “added value” becomes difficult if the 
services are only provided to the parent company and, for example, the overall costs 
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leasing, renting, licensing or similar services. The latter services may even create a 
higher economic output in the CFC state than the mere financing services. The 
reason is that - in a typical situation - more functions have to be carried out in the 
CFC state in case of leasing, renting and licensing services than in case of mere 
financing services (this can be different, of course, in case of cash pooling and similar 
services). 
 
The above position is supported, in my opinion, by additional case law. In the 
Columbus Container decision,11 a case which dealt with a provision of the German 
Außensteuergesetz which is linked to the CFC rules, a Belgian limited partnership 
was responsible for the coordination of activities of a group of companies (Belgian 
coordination centre). The services covered, in particular, the centralisation of financial 
transactions and of the accounts, the financing of the liquidity of subsidiaries or 
branches, the computerisation of data and advertising and marketing activities.12 
Almost all of the income of the coordination centre was considered to be passive 
income under the respective German legislation.13 Also in this case, the ECJ did not 
see any necessity to deal with the question of economic activity. 
 
8.2.1.2. The Separation from Wholly Artificial Arrangements  
 
In his Opinion to the Cadbury Schweppes case Advocate General Léger proposes a 
case-by-case examination which has to be made for the separation of genuine 
economic activities which are carried on in the host Member State and wholly artificial 
arrangements which are merely intended to circumvent national legislation.14 In this 
respect, he follows to a large extent the criteria which were proposed by the 
Commission and the United Kingdom. The focus should therefore be on three criteria 
which are of particular relevance: (i) the degree of physical presence of the 
subsidiary in the host State, (ii) the genuine nature of the activity provided by the 
subsidiary, and (iii) the economic value of that activity with regard to the parent 
company and the entire group.15 
 
a.) The degree of physical presence of the subsidiary in the host State 
 
According to Advocate General Léger, the first criterion relates to the question 
whether the subsidiary company is “(...) genuinely established in the host State.” This 
means “(...) examining whether the subsidiary has the premises, staff and equipment 
necessary to carry out the services provided to the parent company which have 
resulted in the reduction of the tax due in the State of origin. If that is not the case, 
the subjection of those services to the tax sovereignty of the host State does appear 
to be a wholly artificial arrangement designed to avoid tax.”16 Hence, the subsidiary 
must be capable of providing the services in question from within the host Member 
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opinion, to regard it as a wholly artificial arrangement on the basis of the degree of 
decision making in the host Member State. The third criterion is equally critical, 
because being of “use” for a multinational group does not say anything about the 
economic activity in the CFC state. In other words, there may be an economic output 
in the CFC state (pursuant to an isolated consideration) even though the activity as 
such - in the whole context - does not lead to an added value. The ‘three criteria 
approach’ suggested by the Advocate General also builds a bridge - if it were applied 
by the ECJ in cases dealing with direct taxation - to the more recent case law of the 
ECJ with respect to VAT. In the Part Service decision the ECJ considered the 
respective structure to be abusive - despite the existence of economic objectives.22 
Transferred to CFC legislation, the structure could - as a consequence - be 
considered artificial even if an economic activity is carried out be the CFC. However, 
as already outlined in chapter 4, I do not see that the case law with respect to direct 
and indirect taxation is completely aligned in this respect. From my perspective, there 
are no indications from the case law of the ECJ with respect to direct taxation which 
support a deviation from the necessity of a ‘wholly artificial arrangement which does 
not carry out any genuine economic activity in the host state’. However, I will come 
back to this question (and the Oy AA case) in section 8.2.5.7. 
 
However, even if the focus is on all of the three criteria and not only the first criterion, 
it is likely, in my opinion, that the typical intra-group service companies of 
multinational groups will not be identified as artificial arrangements since they usually 
fulfil the criteria. The same is true for any other type of capital intensive activities. I 
think it is also clear that one should not only concentrate on economic reasons for the 
investment, but also on other important reasons which might be relevant for a 
relocation of activities to other countries and which might prevail - from the 
perspective of the investor - over economic principles, e.g. a more favourable legal 
environment. However, those verifications (or similar verifications) have often already 
been carried out by the tax authorities of the Member States for the question whether 
the CFC rules are applicable or not. It was outlined earlier that, for example, such a 
separation was already required for German tax purposes under the “pre-Cadbury 
legislation” and, in this regard, the German approach is similar to the approach 
described by Advocate General Léger. The reason is that the CFC rules can only be 
applied to income actually derived by a foreign legal entity, and this requires the 
foreign legal entity to carry on a genuine activity in the respective state. If this is not 
the case, the income is either directly allocable to the domestic shareholder, since 
the legal entity is “ignored” (e.g. in case of a letterbox company), or the effective 
place of management of the legal entity is considered to be in Germany (e.g. if the 
management decisions are actually made in Germany and not in the other state). In 
both cases, the CFC rules are not applicable. The very purpose of CFC regimes is 
therefore the taxation of “real income” from genuine activities derived in the host 
state. In other words, if the services are not wholly artificial, they should not be 
subject to CFC taxation. However, if the services are wholly artificial, they will often 
not be subject to CFC taxation, either, because this situation might result in the 
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are higher in the Member State of secondary establishment compared to the Member 
State of primary establishment and if no other important reasons exist which support 
the investment decision. In my opinion, this does not mean that the payments made 
by the parent company cannot be seen as a consideration for the services provided, 
but the decision is not supported by economic principles or any other important 
reasons. The structure is therefore solely based on tax advantages (which - in such a 
case - apparently exceed the economic disadvantages). Nonetheless, I think the third 
criterion can only be considered in the overall context - together with the other criteria 
- and the establishment has to be assessed in its totality.  
 
d.) The decision of the ECJ 
 
It is important to note, however, that in the decision itself the ECJ only referred, in 
essence, to the first criterion and not (explicitly) to the second criterion and the third 
criterion. The ECJ outlined that “(...) in order for the legislation on CFCs to comply 
with Community law, the taxation provided for by that legislation must be excluded 
where, despite the existence of tax motives, the incorporation of a CFC reflects 
economic reality. That incorporation must correspond with an actual establishment 
intended to carry on genuine economic activities in the host Member State (...). As 
suggested by the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing, 
that finding must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third 
parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in 
terms of premises, staff and equipment. If checking those factors leads to the finding 
that the CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic 
activity in the territory of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be 
regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could 
be so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.”21 
 
Without any doubt, there is an important difference between an approach which 
solely focuses on the first criterion compared to an approach which focuses on the 
three criteria described by the Advocate General - based on the suggestion of the 
United Kingdom Government and the Commission. In my opinion, it is logical to 
concentrate on objective factors such as the physical existence in terms of premises, 
staff and equipment. If it turns out that the CFC does not carry out any genuine 
economic activity, it must be seen as a wholly artificial arrangement. The fact that the 
ECJ refers to letterbox or front subsidiaries shows, in my opinion, that the intention of 
the Court is to exclude exactly those arrangements where there is no genuine 
economic activity (in contrast to a low degree of economic activity). The latter aspect 
is important, because the second criterion and the third criterion do not necessarily 
exclude any economic activity in the host Member State. For example, the second 
criterion considers an arrangement as wholly artificial if the CFC is “a mere tool of 
execution.” This, however, is problematic: the direct influence of, for example, a 
parent company in another Member State on the decisions of the CFC should not 
necessarily result in the classification as a wholly artificial arrangement as long as the 
CFC carries out the services (physically) in the host Member State (i.e. executes the 
services). It is clear from Factortame that decisions can be taken in another Member 
State without being outside of the scope of the freedom of establishment. Thus, if the 
first criterion is fulfilled, i.e. services are physically carried out in the host Member 
State on the premises of the CFC with its own staff and equipment, it is difficult, in my 
                                            
21 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 65 to 68. 
CFC Legislation and European Union Law
409
   
 
opinion, to regard it as a wholly artificial arrangement on the basis of the degree of 
decision making in the host Member State. The third criterion is equally critical, 
because being of “use” for a multinational group does not say anything about the 
economic activity in the CFC state. In other words, there may be an economic output 
in the CFC state (pursuant to an isolated consideration) even though the activity as 
such - in the whole context - does not lead to an added value. The ‘three criteria 
approach’ suggested by the Advocate General also builds a bridge - if it were applied 
by the ECJ in cases dealing with direct taxation - to the more recent case law of the 
ECJ with respect to VAT. In the Part Service decision the ECJ considered the 
respective structure to be abusive - despite the existence of economic objectives.22 
Transferred to CFC legislation, the structure could - as a consequence - be 
considered artificial even if an economic activity is carried out be the CFC. However, 
as already outlined in chapter 4, I do not see that the case law with respect to direct 
and indirect taxation is completely aligned in this respect. From my perspective, there 
are no indications from the case law of the ECJ with respect to direct taxation which 
support a deviation from the necessity of a ‘wholly artificial arrangement which does 
not carry out any genuine economic activity in the host state’. However, I will come 
back to this question (and the Oy AA case) in section 8.2.5.7. 
 
However, even if the focus is on all of the three criteria and not only the first criterion, 
it is likely, in my opinion, that the typical intra-group service companies of 
multinational groups will not be identified as artificial arrangements since they usually 
fulfil the criteria. The same is true for any other type of capital intensive activities. I 
think it is also clear that one should not only concentrate on economic reasons for the 
investment, but also on other important reasons which might be relevant for a 
relocation of activities to other countries and which might prevail - from the 
perspective of the investor - over economic principles, e.g. a more favourable legal 
environment. However, those verifications (or similar verifications) have often already 
been carried out by the tax authorities of the Member States for the question whether 
the CFC rules are applicable or not. It was outlined earlier that, for example, such a 
separation was already required for German tax purposes under the “pre-Cadbury 
legislation” and, in this regard, the German approach is similar to the approach 
described by Advocate General Léger. The reason is that the CFC rules can only be 
applied to income actually derived by a foreign legal entity, and this requires the 
foreign legal entity to carry on a genuine activity in the respective state. If this is not 
the case, the income is either directly allocable to the domestic shareholder, since 
the legal entity is “ignored” (e.g. in case of a letterbox company), or the effective 
place of management of the legal entity is considered to be in Germany (e.g. if the 
management decisions are actually made in Germany and not in the other state). In 
both cases, the CFC rules are not applicable. The very purpose of CFC regimes is 
therefore the taxation of “real income” from genuine activities derived in the host 
state. In other words, if the services are not wholly artificial, they should not be 
subject to CFC taxation. However, if the services are wholly artificial, they will often 
not be subject to CFC taxation, either, because this situation might result in the 
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are higher in the Member State of secondary establishment compared to the Member 
State of primary establishment and if no other important reasons exist which support 
the investment decision. In my opinion, this does not mean that the payments made 
by the parent company cannot be seen as a consideration for the services provided, 
but the decision is not supported by economic principles or any other important 
reasons. The structure is therefore solely based on tax advantages (which - in such a 
case - apparently exceed the economic disadvantages). Nonetheless, I think the third 
criterion can only be considered in the overall context - together with the other criteria 
- and the establishment has to be assessed in its totality.  
 
d.) The decision of the ECJ 
 
It is important to note, however, that in the decision itself the ECJ only referred, in 
essence, to the first criterion and not (explicitly) to the second criterion and the third 
criterion. The ECJ outlined that “(...) in order for the legislation on CFCs to comply 
with Community law, the taxation provided for by that legislation must be excluded 
where, despite the existence of tax motives, the incorporation of a CFC reflects 
economic reality. That incorporation must correspond with an actual establishment 
intended to carry on genuine economic activities in the host Member State (...). As 
suggested by the United Kingdom Government and the Commission at the hearing, 
that finding must be based on objective factors which are ascertainable by third 
parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically exists in 
terms of premises, staff and equipment. If checking those factors leads to the finding 
that the CFC is a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine economic 
activity in the territory of the host Member State, the creation of that CFC must be 
regarded as having the characteristics of a wholly artificial arrangement. That could 
be so in particular in the case of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary.”21 
 
Without any doubt, there is an important difference between an approach which 
solely focuses on the first criterion compared to an approach which focuses on the 
three criteria described by the Advocate General - based on the suggestion of the 
United Kingdom Government and the Commission. In my opinion, it is logical to 
concentrate on objective factors such as the physical existence in terms of premises, 
staff and equipment. If it turns out that the CFC does not carry out any genuine 
economic activity, it must be seen as a wholly artificial arrangement. The fact that the 
ECJ refers to letterbox or front subsidiaries shows, in my opinion, that the intention of 
the Court is to exclude exactly those arrangements where there is no genuine 
economic activity (in contrast to a low degree of economic activity). The latter aspect 
is important, because the second criterion and the third criterion do not necessarily 
exclude any economic activity in the host Member State. For example, the second 
criterion considers an arrangement as wholly artificial if the CFC is “a mere tool of 
execution.” This, however, is problematic: the direct influence of, for example, a 
parent company in another Member State on the decisions of the CFC should not 
necessarily result in the classification as a wholly artificial arrangement as long as the 
CFC carries out the services (physically) in the host Member State (i.e. executes the 
services). It is clear from Factortame that decisions can be taken in another Member 
State without being outside of the scope of the freedom of establishment. Thus, if the 
first criterion is fulfilled, i.e. services are physically carried out in the host Member 
State on the premises of the CFC with its own staff and equipment, it is difficult, in my 
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starting point for changing the UK CFC rules and provides an opportunity to make the 
UK more (and not less) attractive for business. Morgan and Bird proposed to think 
about the Dutch concept of an ‘interest box’ regime which might be a “win-win” 
situation for taxpayers and government.33 Hahn, who was dealing in an article with 
the possible impact on the German CFC rules, stated that there might remain an 
“intersection” of the requirements determined by the ECJ and the application of the 
German CFC rules. This should be the case if there was no economic activity, 
especially in case of pure asset management. However, pursuant to Hahn, the 
‘activity catalogue’ of the German (transactional based) CFC rules cannot be 
upheld.34 In my opinion, and this was outlined above in some more detail, the 
exception for asset management activities seems to be mainly restricted to the mere 
holding of assets. Kraft and Bron - who also examined the German CFC rules in the 
light of the decision - came to the conclusion that any remaining possible doubts 
about conformity with EU law were swept away:  the German CFC rules can 
(factually) not be applied anymore. There is an immediate need for action of the 
legislator, but a very limited scope for action remains. According to Kraft and Bron,  
“the death bells are ringing” for the German CFC rules.35 A very similar conclusion 
was drawn by Thömmes and Nakhai.36 In essence, the prevailing view in 
international tax literature seems to be that there is not much room left for the “old 
type” CFC legislation within the EU. I fully agree with the prevailing view and believe 
that the lessons from Cadbury Schweppes should go beyond the implementation of 
the minimum adjustments required by the decision in order to comply with EU law, 
but should finally lead to a legislation which brings together all of the important 
elements identified in previous chapters. This is, most of all, the non-discriminatory 
combination of a horizontal and vertical separation of income instead of a mere 
horizontal separation of income.  
  
8.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment in Another Member State  
 
Based on the earlier conclusions, the concept of branch, agency or other 
establishment requires a place of business which has (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management, and (iii) the appropriate equipment for the 
performance of functions in the respective Member State of secondary 
establishment.37 In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Advocate General outlined 
that a subsidiary company must be genuinely established in the host Member State 
and must have the premises, staff and equipment which is necessary to carry out the 
services provided.38 Whether a CFC may fulfil these conditions strongly depends, of 
course, on the relevant facts and circumstances. However, in a typical situation the 
activity of an intra-group service company is structured in a way that the functions are 
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e.) Reactions in international tax literature to the Cadbury Schweppes decision 
 
There are a substantial number of articles dealing with the Cadbury Schweppes 
decision and it might be of interest, in this context, to refer to some of the reactions in 
international tax literature.23 Hume, for example, concluded that a reasonably high 
level of abuse is required for CFC rules to apply in an intra-EU context and therefore 
possibly only a very low level of economic activity would be necessary in the CFC 
state to avoid the application of the CFC rules.24 For Ronfeldt, Vinther and Werlauff 
the CFC rules should be applicable if moveable income is transferred artificially to the 
CFC, which is not actually existent in the CFC state, i.e. which is merely a “brass 
plate, a mail box, or a desk drawer.”25 From Evans and Delahunty it can be 
understood that the activity should go beyond the mere formal registration in the CFC 
state.26 Malherbe et al. concluded that, to comply with the freedom of establishment, 
CFC rules can only be applied to artificial constructions which are “tantamount to 
abuse of law.”27 Tomsett concluded that the decision may result in a significant 
narrowing of the scope of the CFC legislation of the Member States.28 For O’Shea it 
is highly likely that the United Kingdom CFC legislation has to be “radically 
overhauled” as the motive test is not in line with the requirements of the ECJ, i.e. is 
not limited to wholly artificial arrangements. He further stated that the Member States 
now had to come up with more proportionate CFC rules. In this respect, the fact that 
the ECJ uses the word “wholly” within its definition and the acceptance that tax 
mitigation is legitimate with the Internal Market through the use of the fundamental 
freedoms will cause, according to O’Shea, further problems for the Member States.29 
A similar conclusion was drawn by Whitehead who held that neither the United 
Kingdom’s CFC rules nor the CFC rules of other Member States - which do not have 
comparably extensive exemption provisions - can meet the ECJ requirements.30 He 
also identified the point that if the resident subsidiary is not actually resident in the 
other Member State, its management is conducted from within the Member State of 
the parent company in the UK, its establishment in the other Member State is 
‘fictitious’ and carries out no economic activities there, it should be a UK resident 
taxpayer anyway. In other words, the fact that the subsidiary is a CFC in the first 
place and therefore resident beyond the UK might seem to imply a sufficient level of 
establishment to meet the Court’s test for exemption.31 Rainer et al. also identified 
that the decision may not only have implications for further CFC cases in the UK, but 
also for other Member States which apply such legislation.32 The latter was stressed 
by Morgan and Bird, too. They further pointed out that the decision could be a 
                                            
23 See the overview of tax literature to the Cadbury Schweppes decision in chapter 4.  
24 Hume, Cadbury Schweppes - Implications for U.K. Corporates, Tax Planning International Review 2006.  
25 Ronfeldt / Vinther / Werlauff, CFC Rules Go Up in Smoke - With Retroactive Effect, Intertax 2007, page 45 
et seq. (47).  
26 Evans / Delahunty, E.U. Perspective on U.K. CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2007. 
27 Malherbe et al., Controlled Foreign Corporations in the EU After Cadbury Schweppes, Tax Management 
International Journal 2007, page 607 et seq.  
28 Tomsett, ECJ Rules UK CFC Legislation Contrary to EC Law, Intertax 2007, page 575.  
29 O’Shea, The UK’s CFC Rules and the Freedom of Establishment: Cadbury Schweppes Plc and its IFSC 
Subsidiaries - Tax Avoidance or Tax Mitigation?, EC Tax Review 2007, page 13 et seq. (32, 33).  
30 Whitehead explicitly referred to Sweden and Germany (see Whitehead, Practical Implications Arising from 
the European Court’s Recent Decisions Concerning CFC Legislation and Dividend Taxation, EC Tax Review 
2007, page 176 (181).  
31 Whitehead, Practical Implications Arising from the European Court’s Recent Decisions Concerning CFC 
Legislation and Dividend Taxation, EC Tax Review 2007, page 176 (181). See also Whitehead, What’s Your 
Motive?, Taxation 2006, page 682 et seq. (684).  
32 Rainer et al., ECJ Restricts Scope of CFC Legislation, Intertax 2006, page 636 et seq. (638).  
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starting point for changing the UK CFC rules and provides an opportunity to make the 
UK more (and not less) attractive for business. Morgan and Bird proposed to think 
about the Dutch concept of an ‘interest box’ regime which might be a “win-win” 
situation for taxpayers and government.33 Hahn, who was dealing in an article with 
the possible impact on the German CFC rules, stated that there might remain an 
“intersection” of the requirements determined by the ECJ and the application of the 
German CFC rules. This should be the case if there was no economic activity, 
especially in case of pure asset management. However, pursuant to Hahn, the 
‘activity catalogue’ of the German (transactional based) CFC rules cannot be 
upheld.34 In my opinion, and this was outlined above in some more detail, the 
exception for asset management activities seems to be mainly restricted to the mere 
holding of assets. Kraft and Bron - who also examined the German CFC rules in the 
light of the decision - came to the conclusion that any remaining possible doubts 
about conformity with EU law were swept away:  the German CFC rules can 
(factually) not be applied anymore. There is an immediate need for action of the 
legislator, but a very limited scope for action remains. According to Kraft and Bron,  
“the death bells are ringing” for the German CFC rules.35 A very similar conclusion 
was drawn by Thömmes and Nakhai.36 In essence, the prevailing view in 
international tax literature seems to be that there is not much room left for the “old 
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the minimum adjustments required by the decision in order to comply with EU law, 
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combination of a horizontal and vertical separation of income instead of a mere 
horizontal separation of income.  
  
8.2.1.3. Fixed Establishment in Another Member State  
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e.) Reactions in international tax literature to the Cadbury Schweppes decision 
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state.26 Malherbe et al. concluded that, to comply with the freedom of establishment, 
CFC rules can only be applied to artificial constructions which are “tantamount to 
abuse of law.”27 Tomsett concluded that the decision may result in a significant 
narrowing of the scope of the CFC legislation of the Member States.28 For O’Shea it 
is highly likely that the United Kingdom CFC legislation has to be “radically 
overhauled” as the motive test is not in line with the requirements of the ECJ, i.e. is 
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the ECJ uses the word “wholly” within its definition and the acceptance that tax 
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freedoms will cause, according to O’Shea, further problems for the Member States.29 
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comparably extensive exemption provisions - can meet the ECJ requirements.30 He 
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also for other Member States which apply such legislation.32 The latter was stressed 
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company’s decisions, it shows again that a shareholding of less than 50 percent - 
related to one single shareholder - does not per se lead to an exclusion from the right 
of establishment. In the Überseering case the ECJ made it clear that the foreign 
investment of two German nationals - who were the sole shareholders of Überseering 
B.V. - is covered by the right of establishment.45 It is very clear from Überseering that 
not the single shareholder (and its percentage of voting rights or shareholding) has to 
be referred to but the constellation has to be assessed in its totality.46 In the SGI 
case, the shareholding was only 34 percent and it seems that this was already 
sufficient as such - i.e. without considering the fact that there was also a link on 
management level - to fulfil the requirement of a definite influence on the company’s 
decisions.47 In the Columbus Container decision eight family members held - directly 
and indirectly through a German partnership - all shares in a Belgian limited 
partnership. It can be understood from the case that the direct participation of each 
family member was 10 percent plus an indirect participation of (all or some) family 
members - through the German partnership - which was not completely clear from 
the case.48 However, since the German partnership held 20 percent in the Belgian 
limited partnership (in total), the percentage of participation - at least for some family 
members - should be between 10 percent and 12.50 percent (maximum). It is also 
clear from the case that decisions concerning the Belgian limited partnership were 
taken through the same representative at the general meeting.49 Thus, an individual 
shareholder may rely on the freedom of establishment - even with a relatively small 
percentage of shareholding - as long as the majority of shareholders have the same - 
combined - interest and the shareholders are in a position to have definite influence 
on the company’s decisions. I do not see any reason why this general conclusion 
should not be transferred, without reservation, to the investment in a CFC.  
 
8.2.1.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It is the conclusion from previous chapters that the current taxation of income should 
be limited to the basic interest component. However, it is obvious that the 
requirements in order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment are 
not identical to the requirements for the application of a system which is based on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component. In other words, the latter system can 
be applicable also in those cases in which the freedom of establishment is not 
affected. This is mainly due to the following reasons: 
 
- The current taxation of the basic interest component does not necessarily 
require a definite influence on the company’s decisions. From a theoretical 
perspective, the system should be applied irrespective of the degree of 
influence and the percentage of shareholding and / or voting rights. A 
minimum participation may only be supported from an administrative 
                                            
45 Case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 7.   
46 The ECJ stated that “(…) it must be borne in mind that as a general rule the acquisition by one or more 
natural persons residing in a Member State of shares in a company incorporated and established in another 
Member State is covered by the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, provided that the 
shareholding does not confer on those natural persons definite influence over the company’s decisions and does 
not allow them to determine its activities” (case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 77).  
47 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraphs 34, 35.  
48 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 14.  
49 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 31. 
   
 
performed in the country of establishment for an indefinite period of time. The 
appearance of permanency should therefore not be an issue. The existence of a 
management for the exercising of the relevant functions has to be seen in relation to 
the respective activity, i.e. the performance of rather simple inter-company services 
certainly requires less management capacity in the Member State of secondary 
establishment than extensive production and sales activities. The same is basically 
true for the equipment of the company to provide the services. Thus, it is of utmost 
importance that the economic activity is clearly connected to a fixed place of 
business in the country of secondary establishment, even though the activity itself 
may be supported by the parent company situated in the Member State of principal 
establishment. According to Evans and Delahunty, a nexus to the Member State of 
residence of the CFC is required which goes beyond the mere formal registration. 
However, if there is such a nexus - through the pursuance of an activity which goes 
beyond the mere formal registration - the freedom of establishment should be 
engaged.39    
 
8.2.1.4. The Shareholding in the CFC  
 
It is clear from the case law outlined in chapter 4 that not each and every 
shareholding in a company established in another Member State comes within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment. It is required that the shareholding confers a 
definite influence on the company’s decisions and allows the shareholders to 
determine its activities.40 Pursuant to the ECJ, this is “self-evidently always the case 
wherever there is a 100% holding.”41 I have already made it clear that, in my opinion, 
the expressions “definite influence over the company’s decisions” and “allows the 
shareholders to determine its activities” have to be seen in the light of the commercial 
and company law of the respective Member State.42 However, this does not exclude, 
in my opinion, the possibility of a definite influence on a factual or contractual basis. 
To be more precise: definite influence can be derived from the domestic law of the 
Member State in question and may normally be determined by the percentage of 
shareholding or the voting rights (in case the voting rights differ from the percentage 
of shareholding). If the voting rights are not sufficient to formally influence the 
decisions, there may still be the possibility of a definite influence on another basis, 
e.g. contractual relationships. Furthermore, the ECJ obviously not only focuses on 
“control” but considers “management” as a factor which may be equally decisive for 
the overall assessment. In the ICI case the ECJ described control or management 
(and not control and management) as relevant factors for the exercising of the right of 
establishment. The case law shows that the ECJ does not formally consider the 
position of each shareholder involved in the transaction but takes into account the 
complete transaction. For example, ICI had a shareholding in the intermediate 
holding company - through which ICI exercised its right of establishment43 - of 49 
percent. In the X and Y case, two Swedish resident individuals owned together less 
than 100 percent in a Belgian company.44 Even though the ECJ left it up to the 
referring court to ascertain whether there was actually a definite influence on the 
                                            
39 Evans / Delahunty, E.U. Perspective on U.K. CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2007. 
40 See case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 22; case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 77; case C-436/00 (X and 
Y), paragraph 37.  
41 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 26.  
42 See in this respect also Advocate General Alber in his Opinion to the Baars case, paragraph 33.  
43 See case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30.  
44 The remaining percentage was held by a Maltese company. The Swedish residents X and Y did not have any 
proprietary interest in the Maltese company (see case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 15).  
CFC Legislation and European Union Law
413
   
 
company’s decisions, it shows again that a shareholding of less than 50 percent - 
related to one single shareholder - does not per se lead to an exclusion from the right 
of establishment. In the Überseering case the ECJ made it clear that the foreign 
investment of two German nationals - who were the sole shareholders of Überseering 
B.V. - is covered by the right of establishment.45 It is very clear from Überseering that 
not the single shareholder (and its percentage of voting rights or shareholding) has to 
be referred to but the constellation has to be assessed in its totality.46 In the SGI 
case, the shareholding was only 34 percent and it seems that this was already 
sufficient as such - i.e. without considering the fact that there was also a link on 
management level - to fulfil the requirement of a definite influence on the company’s 
decisions.47 In the Columbus Container decision eight family members held - directly 
and indirectly through a German partnership - all shares in a Belgian limited 
partnership. It can be understood from the case that the direct participation of each 
family member was 10 percent plus an indirect participation of (all or some) family 
members - through the German partnership - which was not completely clear from 
the case.48 However, since the German partnership held 20 percent in the Belgian 
limited partnership (in total), the percentage of participation - at least for some family 
members - should be between 10 percent and 12.50 percent (maximum). It is also 
clear from the case that decisions concerning the Belgian limited partnership were 
taken through the same representative at the general meeting.49 Thus, an individual 
shareholder may rely on the freedom of establishment - even with a relatively small 
percentage of shareholding - as long as the majority of shareholders have the same - 
combined - interest and the shareholders are in a position to have definite influence 
on the company’s decisions. I do not see any reason why this general conclusion 
should not be transferred, without reservation, to the investment in a CFC.  
 
8.2.1.5. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It is the conclusion from previous chapters that the current taxation of income should 
be limited to the basic interest component. However, it is obvious that the 
requirements in order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment are 
not identical to the requirements for the application of a system which is based on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component. In other words, the latter system can 
be applicable also in those cases in which the freedom of establishment is not 
affected. This is mainly due to the following reasons: 
 
- The current taxation of the basic interest component does not necessarily 
require a definite influence on the company’s decisions. From a theoretical 
perspective, the system should be applied irrespective of the degree of 
influence and the percentage of shareholding and / or voting rights. A 
minimum participation may only be supported from an administrative 
                                            
45 Case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 7.   
46 The ECJ stated that “(…) it must be borne in mind that as a general rule the acquisition by one or more 
natural persons residing in a Member State of shares in a company incorporated and established in another 
Member State is covered by the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, provided that the 
shareholding does not confer on those natural persons definite influence over the company’s decisions and does 
not allow them to determine its activities” (case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 77).  
47 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraphs 34, 35.  
48 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 14.  
49 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 31. 
   
 
performed in the country of establishment for an indefinite period of time. The 
appearance of permanency should therefore not be an issue. The existence of a 
management for the exercising of the relevant functions has to be seen in relation to 
the respective activity, i.e. the performance of rather simple inter-company services 
certainly requires less management capacity in the Member State of secondary 
establishment than extensive production and sales activities. The same is basically 
true for the equipment of the company to provide the services. Thus, it is of utmost 
importance that the economic activity is clearly connected to a fixed place of 
business in the country of secondary establishment, even though the activity itself 
may be supported by the parent company situated in the Member State of principal 
establishment. According to Evans and Delahunty, a nexus to the Member State of 
residence of the CFC is required which goes beyond the mere formal registration. 
However, if there is such a nexus - through the pursuance of an activity which goes 
beyond the mere formal registration - the freedom of establishment should be 
engaged.39    
 
8.2.1.4. The Shareholding in the CFC  
 
It is clear from the case law outlined in chapter 4 that not each and every 
shareholding in a company established in another Member State comes within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment. It is required that the shareholding confers a 
definite influence on the company’s decisions and allows the shareholders to 
determine its activities.40 Pursuant to the ECJ, this is “self-evidently always the case 
wherever there is a 100% holding.”41 I have already made it clear that, in my opinion, 
the expressions “definite influence over the company’s decisions” and “allows the 
shareholders to determine its activities” have to be seen in the light of the commercial 
and company law of the respective Member State.42 However, this does not exclude, 
in my opinion, the possibility of a definite influence on a factual or contractual basis. 
To be more precise: definite influence can be derived from the domestic law of the 
Member State in question and may normally be determined by the percentage of 
shareholding or the voting rights (in case the voting rights differ from the percentage 
of shareholding). If the voting rights are not sufficient to formally influence the 
decisions, there may still be the possibility of a definite influence on another basis, 
e.g. contractual relationships. Furthermore, the ECJ obviously not only focuses on 
“control” but considers “management” as a factor which may be equally decisive for 
the overall assessment. In the ICI case the ECJ described control or management 
(and not control and management) as relevant factors for the exercising of the right of 
establishment. The case law shows that the ECJ does not formally consider the 
position of each shareholder involved in the transaction but takes into account the 
complete transaction. For example, ICI had a shareholding in the intermediate 
holding company - through which ICI exercised its right of establishment43 - of 49 
percent. In the X and Y case, two Swedish resident individuals owned together less 
than 100 percent in a Belgian company.44 Even though the ECJ left it up to the 
referring court to ascertain whether there was actually a definite influence on the 
                                            
39 Evans / Delahunty, E.U. Perspective on U.K. CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2007. 
40 See case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 22; case C-208/00 (Überseering), paragraph 77; case C-436/00 (X and 
Y), paragraph 37.  
41 Case C-251/98 (Baars), paragraph 26.  
42 See in this respect also Advocate General Alber in his Opinion to the Baars case, paragraph 33.  
43 See case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 30.  
44 The remaining percentage was held by a Maltese company. The Swedish residents X and Y did not have any 
proprietary interest in the Maltese company (see case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 15).  
Chapter 8
414
   
 
shareholding of 34 percent was sufficient to come within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment) and in cases in which minority shareholders have a common interest 
and combine their shareholdings in order to exercise the respective influence (e.g. in 
the Columbus Container case the respective shareholders had an interest of about 
10 to 12.50 percent each). If these requirements are fulfilled, the shareholder can rely 
on the right of establishment. Thus, the investment in a CFC is, in principle, covered 
by Article 49 of the TFEU in the same way as any other secondary establishment. 
The critical aspect lies in the fact that the risk of tax avoidance is considered to be 
higher in case of passive and base company activities, i.e. the activities which are 
typically in the scope of CFC taxation, compared to active business activities which 
are provided to third parties. It is also clear, in my opinion, that the mere holding of 
assets, in whatever form, cannot be seen as an economic activity in the sense of 
Article 49 of the TFEU. In my opinion, a certain (minimum) economic output must be 
created in the host state. The separation from wholly artificial arrangements may 
therefore play an important role in case of CFC taxation. From the Cadbury 
Schweppes case it can be learned that an activity cannot be considered a wholly 
artificial arrangement if the subsidiary company is genuinely established in the host 
state and has the premises, staff and equipment necessary to carry out the services. 
It is not completely clear whether the further criteria outlined in the Opinion of the 
Advocate General play an additional role or not. The ECJ did not explicitly refer to 
these criteria. However, under the assumption that these (additional) criteria are 
equally important, it would be further required that the staff is competent to provide 
the services and that the decisions related to the services are actually taken by the 
responsible staff in the host Member State. This, however, would not require, in my 
opinion, that the subsidiary company cannot be directed from and controlled by the 
parent company or cannot be the recipient of services provided by the parent 
company, but from the overall picture it must be clear that the services are physically 
carried out by the subsidiary company in the host state and that the CFC is not a 
mere tool of execution. Based on the Opinion of the Advocate General, the services 
itself must have economic substance and cannot be (economically) “useless.” In an 
intra-group relationship, it would be necessary that the relocated services provide 
“added value” to the group. The latter criterion of an “added value” cannot be limited, 
in my opinion, to mere economic aspects, but should also encompass other important 
reasons which may compensate - from the perspective of the investor - for the 
economic disadvantages. In my opinion, the separation between investments which 
are “useful” and which create “added value” from those which are “useless” and 
which create “no added value” can be difficult. Due to the fact that the intention of 
saving taxes is not, as such, something which has to be considered abusive, I can 
hardly imagine that the ECJ will consider the latter element as a separate and 
isolated element in its examinations. For the question whether a genuine activity is 
carried out in the other Member State, the secondary establishment must be 
assessed in its totality. In my opinion, this is what the ECJ finally made in the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision. Furthermore, it is important to note that the ECJ case 
law with respect to direct and indirect taxation is not completely aligned. In my 
opinion, the conclusions from the VAT cases, like Part Service, do not change the 
settled case law with respect to the necessity of a ‘wholly artificial arrangement which 





   
 
perspective, but is neither required nor supported from an economic or equity 
perspective.  
 
- The current taxation of the basic interest component requires the CFC income 
to contain a separable financing element which is taxed in the residence state 
of the CFC. Such a situation was identified to be critical from an anti-
avoidance perspective. For this reason, the basic interest component which is 
related to the latter financing element should be, in my opinion, in the focus of 
any efficient anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the concept of a 
current taxation of income. However, for the application of the system of 
current taxation it should not really matter whether the activity of the CFC is to 
be qualified as an “economic activity” or as any other type of activity as long as 
the financing element is actually subject to taxation in the CFC state and is not 
subject to immediate taxation in the state of the shareholder (e.g. because of 
the fact that the effective place of management is considered to be in the state 
of residence of the shareholder). In this case, the actual situation is decisive 
and not just the mere theoretical classification of the activity.  
 
- Similar aspects are relevant for the term “fixed establishment” and “indefinite 
period.” Although this will most certainly not play a role for an investment in a 
CFC, it must be noted that the actual qualification under the legislation of the 
states involved does not necessarily have to comply with the meaning under 
the freedom of establishment.  
 
Thus, the investment in a CFC does not necessarily fall within the scope of Article 49 
of the TFEU. As a consequence, there may be no protection under the freedom of 
establishment in case of the “typical” CFC taxation according to chapter 6. The same 
can be true for an alternative system which focuses on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component, e.g. if the alternative system is applied to minority 
shareholdings.  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that if an alternative system which focuses on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component falls within the scope of Article 49 of 
the TFEU, it may still be the case that the application of such a system results in an 
(unjustified) restriction on the freedom of establishment. However, this will be outlined 
in section 8.2.5.  
 
8.2.1.6. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom of 
Establishment 
 
The case law of the ECJ shows that the requirements to come within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment are not very restrictive. What is required is the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member 
State for an indefinite period. What is further required in case of the secondary 
establishment in the form of a subsidiary company is that the shareholder has a 
definite influence on the company’s decisions which allows the shareholder to 
determine its activities. However, whether a definite influence exists or not must be 
seen, in my opinion, in the light of the commercial and company law of the respective 
Member State and can also be achieved on a factual or contractual basis. This does 
not necessarily require the majority shareholding of a single shareholder, but can 
also exist in case of substantial non-majority interests (e.g. in the SGI case a 
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shareholding of 34 percent was sufficient to come within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment) and in cases in which minority shareholders have a common interest 
and combine their shareholdings in order to exercise the respective influence (e.g. in 
the Columbus Container case the respective shareholders had an interest of about 
10 to 12.50 percent each). If these requirements are fulfilled, the shareholder can rely 
on the right of establishment. Thus, the investment in a CFC is, in principle, covered 
by Article 49 of the TFEU in the same way as any other secondary establishment. 
The critical aspect lies in the fact that the risk of tax avoidance is considered to be 
higher in case of passive and base company activities, i.e. the activities which are 
typically in the scope of CFC taxation, compared to active business activities which 
are provided to third parties. It is also clear, in my opinion, that the mere holding of 
assets, in whatever form, cannot be seen as an economic activity in the sense of 
Article 49 of the TFEU. In my opinion, a certain (minimum) economic output must be 
created in the host state. The separation from wholly artificial arrangements may 
therefore play an important role in case of CFC taxation. From the Cadbury 
Schweppes case it can be learned that an activity cannot be considered a wholly 
artificial arrangement if the subsidiary company is genuinely established in the host 
state and has the premises, staff and equipment necessary to carry out the services. 
It is not completely clear whether the further criteria outlined in the Opinion of the 
Advocate General play an additional role or not. The ECJ did not explicitly refer to 
these criteria. However, under the assumption that these (additional) criteria are 
equally important, it would be further required that the staff is competent to provide 
the services and that the decisions related to the services are actually taken by the 
responsible staff in the host Member State. This, however, would not require, in my 
opinion, that the subsidiary company cannot be directed from and controlled by the 
parent company or cannot be the recipient of services provided by the parent 
company, but from the overall picture it must be clear that the services are physically 
carried out by the subsidiary company in the host state and that the CFC is not a 
mere tool of execution. Based on the Opinion of the Advocate General, the services 
itself must have economic substance and cannot be (economically) “useless.” In an 
intra-group relationship, it would be necessary that the relocated services provide 
“added value” to the group. The latter criterion of an “added value” cannot be limited, 
in my opinion, to mere economic aspects, but should also encompass other important 
reasons which may compensate - from the perspective of the investor - for the 
economic disadvantages. In my opinion, the separation between investments which 
are “useful” and which create “added value” from those which are “useless” and 
which create “no added value” can be difficult. Due to the fact that the intention of 
saving taxes is not, as such, something which has to be considered abusive, I can 
hardly imagine that the ECJ will consider the latter element as a separate and 
isolated element in its examinations. For the question whether a genuine activity is 
carried out in the other Member State, the secondary establishment must be 
assessed in its totality. In my opinion, this is what the ECJ finally made in the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision. Furthermore, it is important to note that the ECJ case 
law with respect to direct and indirect taxation is not completely aligned. In my 
opinion, the conclusions from the VAT cases, like Part Service, do not change the 
settled case law with respect to the necessity of a ‘wholly artificial arrangement which 





   
 
perspective, but is neither required nor supported from an economic or equity 
perspective.  
 
- The current taxation of the basic interest component requires the CFC income 
to contain a separable financing element which is taxed in the residence state 
of the CFC. Such a situation was identified to be critical from an anti-
avoidance perspective. For this reason, the basic interest component which is 
related to the latter financing element should be, in my opinion, in the focus of 
any efficient anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the concept of a 
current taxation of income. However, for the application of the system of 
current taxation it should not really matter whether the activity of the CFC is to 
be qualified as an “economic activity” or as any other type of activity as long as 
the financing element is actually subject to taxation in the CFC state and is not 
subject to immediate taxation in the state of the shareholder (e.g. because of 
the fact that the effective place of management is considered to be in the state 
of residence of the shareholder). In this case, the actual situation is decisive 
and not just the mere theoretical classification of the activity.  
 
- Similar aspects are relevant for the term “fixed establishment” and “indefinite 
period.” Although this will most certainly not play a role for an investment in a 
CFC, it must be noted that the actual qualification under the legislation of the 
states involved does not necessarily have to comply with the meaning under 
the freedom of establishment.  
 
Thus, the investment in a CFC does not necessarily fall within the scope of Article 49 
of the TFEU. As a consequence, there may be no protection under the freedom of 
establishment in case of the “typical” CFC taxation according to chapter 6. The same 
can be true for an alternative system which focuses on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component, e.g. if the alternative system is applied to minority 
shareholdings.  
 
Moreover, it is important to note that if an alternative system which focuses on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component falls within the scope of Article 49 of 
the TFEU, it may still be the case that the application of such a system results in an 
(unjustified) restriction on the freedom of establishment. However, this will be outlined 
in section 8.2.5.  
 
8.2.1.6. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom of 
Establishment 
 
The case law of the ECJ shows that the requirements to come within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment are not very restrictive. What is required is the actual 
pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member 
State for an indefinite period. What is further required in case of the secondary 
establishment in the form of a subsidiary company is that the shareholder has a 
definite influence on the company’s decisions which allows the shareholder to 
determine its activities. However, whether a definite influence exists or not must be 
seen, in my opinion, in the light of the commercial and company law of the respective 
Member State and can also be achieved on a factual or contractual basis. This does 
not necessarily require the majority shareholding of a single shareholder, but can 
also exist in case of substantial non-majority interests (e.g. in the SGI case a 
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Article 56 of the TFEU confers rights not only on the provider of services but also on 
the recipient.51 Thus, the question arises whether the recipient of the services (e.g. in 
country B) can rely on the freedom to provide services regarding possible restrictions 
caused by the CFC legislation of Member State A. Article 56 (1) of the TFEU 
stipulates that “(…) restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Union 
shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a 
Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.” 
From Säger / Dennemeyer it is clear that “(…) Article 59 of the Treaty requires not 
only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the 
ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member 
States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar 
services.”52 In principle, it seems that a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
may not only be caused by the Member State of the recipient of the services and the 
Member State of the service provider, but also by a “third” Member State (in this case 
Member State A).  
 
In the Cadbury Schweppes case, Advocate General Léger had to deal with the 
submission of the applicant that the freedom to provide services might be affected. In  
his response, the Advocate General held that “(t)hese proceedings concern the 
compatibility with Community law of legislation of a Member State which attributes to 
a resident parent company the profits of its subsidiary established in another Member 
State when that subsidiary is subject to a much lower level of taxation in that State. 
The nature of the activity carried on by CSTS and CSTI is not specifically referred to 
by that legislation. The situation is therefore different from that in the Safir and 
Eurowings Luftverkehr cases (…). Admittedly, if the legislation at issue has the result 
that a resident company is dissuaded from establishing a subsidiary in another 
Member State, it also has the result that the supply of services by such a subsidiary 
out of that Member State is prevented. However, the latter restriction is a 
consequence of the hindrance of establishment. In the present case, it is exactly the 
freedom to establish a subsidiary in that Member State which is at the core of the 
proceedings. I do not therefore see the relevance of reliance on the rules on freedom 
to provide services as well. In any event, I do not believe that examination of the 
legislation at issue in the light of that freedom, in addition to freedom of 
establishment, can change the result of my analysis.” 53 The ECJ did not go into 
much detail of this question in the Cadbury Schweppes decision. The Court merely 
stated that the restrictive effects on the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital are an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on the 
freedom of establishment. Pursuant to the Court, this does not justify an independent 
examination of the first-mentioned two basic freedoms.54  
 
The conclusions of the Advocate General and the ECJ are certainly true in the 
relationship of the Member States A and C in case the investment is covered by the 
freedom of establishment. It seems to be clear from the examinations in chapter 4 
that, in such a situation, the freedom of establishment prevails over the freedom to 
                                            
51 See case C-294/97 (Eurowings), paragraph 34; cases 286/82 and 26/83 (Luisi and Carbone), paragraph 16.  
52 Case C-76/90 (Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd.), July 25, 1991, ECR 1991, page I-04221, paragraph 
12.  
53 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 35, 36. 
54 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 33.  
   
 
8.2.2. CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
In principle, the scope of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services is different. The freedom of establishment requires the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period whereas the freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit 
of an economic activity from either within the Member State of principal establishment 
to a recipient in another Member State or with a temporary link to the latter Member 
State. Without any doubt, the application of CFC rules generally requires the 
underlying income to be allocable to the company which carries on the activity in the 
host Member State. The investment in a CFC is therefore within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment if all of the required conditions are fulfilled, i.e. the 
shareholder has a definite influence on the company’s decisions and the company 
pursues an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State 
for an indefinite period. Hence, in the relationship between the Member State of 
principal establishment and the Member State of secondary establishment it is 
foremost Article 49 of the TFEU which is applicable - at least as long as it refers to 
the investment itself. However, it should not be overlooked that the CFC may provide 
services to (related and unrelated) non-resident recipients and even to the 
shareholder (parent company). These services might be negatively affected by the 
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The investment of company A in Member State C is, in general, covered by the 
freedom of establishment as long as the participation confers definite influence on 
the company’s decisions, and the services provided by the CFC are within the scope 
of the freedom to provide services. From the case law of the ECJ it is clear that 
                                            
50 The question whether the free movement of capital is affected strongly depends on the facts and 
circumstances. It was outlined earlier that - based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - the freedom of establishment 
may prevail over the free movement of capital (with the result that the latter freedom cannot be relied on). I will 
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Article 56 of the TFEU confers rights not only on the provider of services but also on 
the recipient.51 Thus, the question arises whether the recipient of the services (e.g. in 
country B) can rely on the freedom to provide services regarding possible restrictions 
caused by the CFC legislation of Member State A. Article 56 (1) of the TFEU 
stipulates that “(…) restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Union 
shall be prohibited in respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a 
Member State other than that of the person for whom the services are intended.” 
From Säger / Dennemeyer it is clear that “(…) Article 59 of the Treaty requires not 
only the elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the 
ground of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member 
States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of 
services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar 
services.”52 In principle, it seems that a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
may not only be caused by the Member State of the recipient of the services and the 
Member State of the service provider, but also by a “third” Member State (in this case 
Member State A).  
 
In the Cadbury Schweppes case, Advocate General Léger had to deal with the 
submission of the applicant that the freedom to provide services might be affected. In  
his response, the Advocate General held that “(t)hese proceedings concern the 
compatibility with Community law of legislation of a Member State which attributes to 
a resident parent company the profits of its subsidiary established in another Member 
State when that subsidiary is subject to a much lower level of taxation in that State. 
The nature of the activity carried on by CSTS and CSTI is not specifically referred to 
by that legislation. The situation is therefore different from that in the Safir and 
Eurowings Luftverkehr cases (…). Admittedly, if the legislation at issue has the result 
that a resident company is dissuaded from establishing a subsidiary in another 
Member State, it also has the result that the supply of services by such a subsidiary 
out of that Member State is prevented. However, the latter restriction is a 
consequence of the hindrance of establishment. In the present case, it is exactly the 
freedom to establish a subsidiary in that Member State which is at the core of the 
proceedings. I do not therefore see the relevance of reliance on the rules on freedom 
to provide services as well. In any event, I do not believe that examination of the 
legislation at issue in the light of that freedom, in addition to freedom of 
establishment, can change the result of my analysis.” 53 The ECJ did not go into 
much detail of this question in the Cadbury Schweppes decision. The Court merely 
stated that the restrictive effects on the free movement of services and the free 
movement of capital are an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on the 
freedom of establishment. Pursuant to the Court, this does not justify an independent 
examination of the first-mentioned two basic freedoms.54  
 
The conclusions of the Advocate General and the ECJ are certainly true in the 
relationship of the Member States A and C in case the investment is covered by the 
freedom of establishment. It seems to be clear from the examinations in chapter 4 
that, in such a situation, the freedom of establishment prevails over the freedom to 
                                            
51 See case C-294/97 (Eurowings), paragraph 34; cases 286/82 and 26/83 (Luisi and Carbone), paragraph 16.  
52 Case C-76/90 (Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd.), July 25, 1991, ECR 1991, page I-04221, paragraph 
12.  
53 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 35, 36. 
54 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 33.  
   
 
8.2.2. CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide Services 
 
In principle, the scope of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services is different. The freedom of establishment requires the actual pursuit of an 
economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period whereas the freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit 
of an economic activity from either within the Member State of principal establishment 
to a recipient in another Member State or with a temporary link to the latter Member 
State. Without any doubt, the application of CFC rules generally requires the 
underlying income to be allocable to the company which carries on the activity in the 
host Member State. The investment in a CFC is therefore within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment if all of the required conditions are fulfilled, i.e. the 
shareholder has a definite influence on the company’s decisions and the company 
pursues an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State 
for an indefinite period. Hence, in the relationship between the Member State of 
principal establishment and the Member State of secondary establishment it is 
foremost Article 49 of the TFEU which is applicable - at least as long as it refers to 
the investment itself. However, it should not be overlooked that the CFC may provide 
services to (related and unrelated) non-resident recipients and even to the 
shareholder (parent company). These services might be negatively affected by the 
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The investment of company A in Member State C is, in general, covered by the 
freedom of establishment as long as the participation confers definite influence on 
the company’s decisions, and the services provided by the CFC are within the scope 
of the freedom to provide services. From the case law of the ECJ it is clear that 
                                            
50 The question whether the free movement of capital is affected strongly depends on the facts and 
circumstances. It was outlined earlier that - based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - the freedom of establishment 
may prevail over the free movement of capital (with the result that the latter freedom cannot be relied on). I will 








   
 
be different in case of an alternative legislation which focuses on the current taxation 
of the basic interest component. In my opinion, an alternative legislation will not lead 
to a different conclusion, because the basic interest taxation will still be linked to the 
investment in another company and the income derived by this company, but will not 
be concentrated on the services provided. In other words, the application of CFC 
rules and the application of an alternative system which focuses on the basic interest 
component will both be covered by the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital, but not by the freedom to provide services.  
 
8.2.2.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide 
Services 
 
From the Cadbury Schweppes case it can be concluded that the restrictive effects on 
the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital are an unavoidable 
consequence of any restriction on the freedom of establishment which is caused by 
the application of CFC rules. This is certainly true for an investment which confers 
definite influence on the decisions of the CFC. The question arises whether the 
freedom to provide services can play a role in situations in which the freedom of 
establishment is not affected. In my opinion, there are two situations which are of 
particular interest. The first is the situation in which the services are provided to a 
shareholder who does not have definite influence on the decisions of the CFC. In this 
case, the free movement of capital should be affected and not the freedom to provide 
services. The reason is that the purpose of the CFC legislation is the targeting of 
certain investments and the result of such investments and does not directly focus on 
the provision of services. Based on the conclusions derived from the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ which was outlined in chapter 4, there seems to be no room - in this case - 
for any simultaneous application of the freedom to provide services. The second is 
the situation in which the services are provided to a recipient in another Member 
State who does not have any investment in the CFC. Here, the recipient of the 
services in the other Member State might fall within the scope of the freedom to 
provide services. However, if one follows the position of the ECJ in the Thin Cap 
GLO case, one should come to the conclusion that in such a situation a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services is an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on 
the freedom of establishment and / or, depending on the circumstances, the free 
movement of capital.  
 
8.2.3. CFC Legislation and the Free Movement of Capital 
 
Based on the earlier examinations, Article 63 of the TFEU does not only apply to 
direct investments which confer a definite influence on the company’s decisions and 
allows the shareholder to determine the activities of the company, but is equally 
applicable to portfolio investments without any significant interest in the company. 
The scope of Article 63 of the TFEU is therefore much broader than the scope of 
Article 49 of the TFEU and encompasses minor investments in CFCs as well. It is 
important to note that according to the explanatory notes to the nomenclature,60 
direct investments have the meaning of investments of all kinds by natural persons or 
commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to 
maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the 
entrepreneur or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to 
                                            
60 See Annex I to Council Directive 88/361/EEC, June 24, 1988.  
   
 
provide services and the free movement of capital. However, from the perspective of 
the service recipient in state B the situation might be different. Here, the freedom of 
establishment is not directly affected. Moreover, the question can be raised whether - 
in the relationship between companies A and C - the freedom to provide services 
prevails over the free movement of capital - or vice versa - in those cases in which 
the freedom of establishment is not affected, e.g. in case company A merely holds a 
minority interest in company C which does not provide definite influence over the 
company’s decisions. However, the question of priority is foremost a question of the 
purpose of the CFC legislation. In my opinion, the purpose of CFC legislation is the 
targeting of certain investments and the result of such investments and does not 
directly focus on the provision of services. For this reason, the investment in the CFC 
should - from the perspective of companies A and C - fall within the scope of the free 
movement of capital and not, simultaneously, within the freedom to provide 
services.55 From the perspective of the recipient of the services in Member State B 
there is no direct link to the investment activity.56 However, taking into account the 
outcome of the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case (Thin Cap GLO 
case)57 - which dealt with the UK thin cap rules in a number of different 
constellations, including loans granted by sister companies in Member States and 
non-member states - one can conclude that any restriction on the services provided 
towards a recipient in state B is an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment caused by the application of the CFC rules in state A.58 If 
the freedom of establishment is not affected, because according to the purpose of 
the legislation the rules shall be applied to participations irrespective of whether a 
definite influence exists or not (and, in case of a Member State, there is actually no 
definite influence on the decisions of the respective participation), the conclusion 
should be that any restriction on the services provided towards a recipient in state B 
is an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on the free movement of capital. The 
reason is that CFC rules, as mentioned above, target certain investments and the 
income derived through the investments, but not the services provided by the 
participants.59 If one follows the reasoning of the ECJ in the Thin Cap GLO case, an 
independent examination of the freedom to provide services would not be justified. 
Eventually, the freedom to provide services would be of no particular relevance in this 
context. 
 
8.2.2.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It seems that the freedom to provide services will most likely not be affected by the 
application of CFC rules. The reason is that CFC rules target certain investments but 
not the services provided by the CFC. For this reason, it seems that, based on the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, the freedom of establishment shall prevail over the freedom 
to provide services. In those cases in which not the freedom of establishment but the 
free movement of capital will be applicable, it is the latter freedom which will prevail 
over the freedom to provide services. The question arises whether this conclusion will 
                                            
55 Under the assumption, of course, that the freedom of establishment is not affected. 
56 The freedom to provide services confers rights not only to the provider of the services but also to the recipient 
of the services - similar to the free movement of capital which also confers rights to the investor and the (legal) 
person in which the investment is made.  
57 Case C-524/04 (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue), March 
13, 2007.  
58 See case C-524 /04 (Thin Cap GLO), paragraphs 33, 34 and 101 with respect to the UK thin cap rules.  
59 See in this respect also case C-524/04 (Thin Cap GLO), paragraphs 33 and 101.  
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be different in case of an alternative legislation which focuses on the current taxation 
of the basic interest component. In my opinion, an alternative legislation will not lead 
to a different conclusion, because the basic interest taxation will still be linked to the 
investment in another company and the income derived by this company, but will not 
be concentrated on the services provided. In other words, the application of CFC 
rules and the application of an alternative system which focuses on the basic interest 
component will both be covered by the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital, but not by the freedom to provide services.  
 
8.2.2.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Freedom to Provide 
Services 
 
From the Cadbury Schweppes case it can be concluded that the restrictive effects on 
the freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital are an unavoidable 
consequence of any restriction on the freedom of establishment which is caused by 
the application of CFC rules. This is certainly true for an investment which confers 
definite influence on the decisions of the CFC. The question arises whether the 
freedom to provide services can play a role in situations in which the freedom of 
establishment is not affected. In my opinion, there are two situations which are of 
particular interest. The first is the situation in which the services are provided to a 
shareholder who does not have definite influence on the decisions of the CFC. In this 
case, the free movement of capital should be affected and not the freedom to provide 
services. The reason is that the purpose of the CFC legislation is the targeting of 
certain investments and the result of such investments and does not directly focus on 
the provision of services. Based on the conclusions derived from the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ which was outlined in chapter 4, there seems to be no room - in this case - 
for any simultaneous application of the freedom to provide services. The second is 
the situation in which the services are provided to a recipient in another Member 
State who does not have any investment in the CFC. Here, the recipient of the 
services in the other Member State might fall within the scope of the freedom to 
provide services. However, if one follows the position of the ECJ in the Thin Cap 
GLO case, one should come to the conclusion that in such a situation a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services is an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on 
the freedom of establishment and / or, depending on the circumstances, the free 
movement of capital.  
 
8.2.3. CFC Legislation and the Free Movement of Capital 
 
Based on the earlier examinations, Article 63 of the TFEU does not only apply to 
direct investments which confer a definite influence on the company’s decisions and 
allows the shareholder to determine the activities of the company, but is equally 
applicable to portfolio investments without any significant interest in the company. 
The scope of Article 63 of the TFEU is therefore much broader than the scope of 
Article 49 of the TFEU and encompasses minor investments in CFCs as well. It is 
important to note that according to the explanatory notes to the nomenclature,60 
direct investments have the meaning of investments of all kinds by natural persons or 
commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to establish or to 
maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the 
entrepreneur or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to 
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provide services and the free movement of capital. However, from the perspective of 
the service recipient in state B the situation might be different. Here, the freedom of 
establishment is not directly affected. Moreover, the question can be raised whether - 
in the relationship between companies A and C - the freedom to provide services 
prevails over the free movement of capital - or vice versa - in those cases in which 
the freedom of establishment is not affected, e.g. in case company A merely holds a 
minority interest in company C which does not provide definite influence over the 
company’s decisions. However, the question of priority is foremost a question of the 
purpose of the CFC legislation. In my opinion, the purpose of CFC legislation is the 
targeting of certain investments and the result of such investments and does not 
directly focus on the provision of services. For this reason, the investment in the CFC 
should - from the perspective of companies A and C - fall within the scope of the free 
movement of capital and not, simultaneously, within the freedom to provide 
services.55 From the perspective of the recipient of the services in Member State B 
there is no direct link to the investment activity.56 However, taking into account the 
outcome of the Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case (Thin Cap GLO 
case)57 - which dealt with the UK thin cap rules in a number of different 
constellations, including loans granted by sister companies in Member States and 
non-member states - one can conclude that any restriction on the services provided 
towards a recipient in state B is an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment caused by the application of the CFC rules in state A.58 If 
the freedom of establishment is not affected, because according to the purpose of 
the legislation the rules shall be applied to participations irrespective of whether a 
definite influence exists or not (and, in case of a Member State, there is actually no 
definite influence on the decisions of the respective participation), the conclusion 
should be that any restriction on the services provided towards a recipient in state B 
is an unavoidable consequence of a restriction on the free movement of capital. The 
reason is that CFC rules, as mentioned above, target certain investments and the 
income derived through the investments, but not the services provided by the 
participants.59 If one follows the reasoning of the ECJ in the Thin Cap GLO case, an 
independent examination of the freedom to provide services would not be justified. 
Eventually, the freedom to provide services would be of no particular relevance in this 
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8.2.2.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It seems that the freedom to provide services will most likely not be affected by the 
application of CFC rules. The reason is that CFC rules target certain investments but 
not the services provided by the CFC. For this reason, it seems that, based on the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, the freedom of establishment shall prevail over the freedom 
to provide services. In those cases in which not the freedom of establishment but the 
free movement of capital will be applicable, it is the latter freedom which will prevail 
over the freedom to provide services. The question arises whether this conclusion will 
                                            
55 Under the assumption, of course, that the freedom of establishment is not affected. 
56 The freedom to provide services confers rights not only to the provider of the services but also to the recipient 
of the services - similar to the free movement of capital which also confers rights to the investor and the (legal) 
person in which the investment is made.  
57 Case C-524/04 (Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue), March 
13, 2007.  
58 See case C-524 /04 (Thin Cap GLO), paragraphs 33, 34 and 101 with respect to the UK thin cap rules.  
59 See in this respect also case C-524/04 (Thin Cap GLO), paragraphs 33 and 101.  
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Thus, if the purpose of the CFC legislation is the application to investments which 
confer a definite influence on the company’s decisions, it is the freedom of 
establishment which is to be examined exclusively. This, of course, can have the 
important consequence that the taxpayer cannot rely on the freedom of 
establishment, e.g. in case of an investment in a CFC in a non-member state, but 
cannot rely on the free movement of capital either, because the latter freedom will not 
be subject to examination - due to the fact that the purpose of the national legislation 
is the application to investments which confer definite influence on the company’s 
decisions.  
 
In my opinion, if the ECJ consistently applies the principles which were outlined in 
chapter 4 with respect to the “competition” among the basic freedoms, this can have 
a major impact on CFC investments in non-member states. The reason is that the 
CFC rules could be understood - at least with respect to the general application and a 
substantial part of the scope of such legislation - to focus on investments which 
confer a definite influence on the CFC situated in the other state. Even though it is 
clear from chapter 6 that the requirement of a majority shareholding is rather an 
exception, often some sort of controlling participation is still required for the general 
application of these rules. In any event, the structure of CFC legislation can be similar 
to the thin-cap legislation which was subject to verification in the Lasertec decision. In 
the latter case, the thin-cap legislation was (also) applicable to a participation of not 
more than 25 percent if the participation - independent from or in collaboration with 
other shareholders - conferred controlling influence. 63 Thus, if the purpose of the 
respective CFC legislation is the application to shareholdings which confer a definite 
influence over the decisions of the CFC, this will close the door for Article 63 of the 
TFEU in case of non-member states.  
 
On the other hand, the CFC rules are sometimes also applicable to certain types of 
passive income without requiring any minimum participation (e.g. in case of FIF type 
rules). Following the principles outlined in chapter 4, the ECJ should, in the latter 
situation, first examine the freedom of establishment if the actual participation confers 
definite influence over the company’s decisions. The reason is that, as outlined 
above, the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ does not prevail in case of CFC rules. 
However, if it turns out that Article 49 of the TFEU is not affected - because of an 
investment in a non-member state - the ECJ should, in a second step, examine the 
application of Article 63 of the TFEU. Hence, the structure of the respective CFC 
legislation can have an influence on the question whether Article 63 of the TFEU may 
be affected or not. From my perspective, the ECJ should examine in detail the 
national measure in the underlying case. If, for example, certain types of passive 
income are subject to CFC taxation irrespective of the percentage of shareholding 
and irrespective of any influence on the company, as in case of Germany for certain 
types of income, it should not matter whether the general CFC concept - with respect 
to other types of income - requires a controlling influence. It would be logical to 
“separate” the CFC legislation in such a case. This, of course, can have the 
consequence that Article 63 of the TFEU can be affected in one situation but not in 
another (even though it is related, in broader terms, to one and the same CFC 
concept of a single Member State).   
 
                                            
63 Case C-492/04 (Lasertec), paragraph 4.  
   
 
carry on an economic activity. Thus, the direct investment referred to in the 
nomenclature requires - in the same way as the freedom of establishment - the 
exercising of an economic activity. However, the non-exhaustive list contains - in 
addition to direct investments - a number of capital movements which do not require 
(and which are not connected to) an economic activity carried on in another Member 
State. In my opinion, the investment in a foreign company should therefore fall within 
the scope of the free movement of capital irrespective of the fact whether the foreign 
company carries on an economic activity or not. Of course, the absence of an 
economic activity may result in the conclusion that the investment is not to be 
considered a direct investment, but it would still be within the scope of the free 





















Here, the investment in the CFC might theoretically be within the scope of the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. Based on the 
conclusions in chapter 4, the freedom of establishment is only examined if the 
purpose of the national legislation is the application to investments which confer a 
definite influence over a company’s decisions. In contrast thereto, if the purpose of 
the legislation is the general application to portfolio and entrepreneurial investments, 
the freedom of establishment prevails over the free movement of capital if the actual 
investment confers definite influence over a company’s decisions and the purpose of 
the legislation is linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment. 
This is not the case if the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ of the national legislation 
is the decisive element.61 It is apparent, in my opinion, that the latter is not the case 
in CFC type legislations - which focus on the taxation of income realised by the legal 
entity in the other state. CFC rules, even if applied in case of minor holdings, are 
directly linked to the activity carried out in the other state and not just linked, for 
example, to a specific share transaction or restructuring element.62 Therefore, also in 
case of a broader CFC type legislation the ECJ should start examining Article 49 of 
the TFEU if the actual investment confers definite influence. I will come to that point 
in the following.  
                                            
61 See with respect to the ‘free movement of capital aspect’ case C-182/08 (Glaxo Wellcome), paragraph 50. 
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with respect to the “competition” among the basic freedoms show that in some 
situations the taxpayer may not be able to rely on the free movement of capital since 
the prevailing application of the freedom of establishment results in an exclusive 
examination of the latter freedom. At least, this is the case if the purpose of the 
national legislation is the application to investments which confer definite influence 
over the company’s decisions. Of course, this can be important in case of 
investments in non-member states where Article 49 of the TFEU is not affected and 
Article 63 of the TFEU will not be examined because of the fact that Article 49 of the 
TFEU (theoretically) prevails. However, it should be also clear, in my opinion, that the 
national legislation must be examined carefully in a CFC case and that the purpose 
of the legislation is not necessarily the same for the whole CFC concept. For 
example, the CFC rules can, in general, require definite influence over the company’s 
decisions but can also be applicable - e.g. with respect to certain types of income - 
irrespective of the percentage of shareholding and irrespective of any influence on 
the company (e.g. in case of FIF type rules). Here, it depends on the facts and 
circumstances in the underlying case and the exact provisions of the national 
legislation whether the door for the application of Article 63 of the TFEU is open or 
not. However, the existing case law of the ECJ leaves some uncertainty with respect 
to the application of Article 63 of the TFEU in a situation in which the parent company 
exercises definite influence over a non-member state CFC, but where the national 
legislation does not require definite influence. In general, the following differentiation 
can be made: 
 
A. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
requires definite influence over       the following basic 
the decisions of the CFC        freedoms are affected:  
       
 
a.) CFC in another Member State      Article 49 TFEU 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state                    --- 
 
 
B. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
does not require definite influence 
over the decisions of the CFC (e.g.      the following basic 
FIF type legislation)         freedoms are affected: 
 
 
a.) CFC in another Member State 
 
aa.) definite influence (actually)       Article 49 TFEU         
 
ab.) no definite influence (actually)      Article 63 TFEU 
 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state 
 
ba.) definite influence (actually)        Article 63 TFEU (uncertain)  
 
bb.) no definite influence (actually)      Article 63 TFEU       
   
 
I have to confess, though, that the answer to the question whether Article 63 of the 
TFEU is applicable in case the parent company exercises definite influence over a 
non-member state CFC, but where the national legislation does not require definite 
influence, is not completely clear. At least, some uncertainty was created by the 
decision in SGI, where the ECJ concluded that, in the respective situation, it was 
necessary to answer the questions referred solely in the light of the freedom of 
establishment.64 However, it is important to note that the situation in SGI was not 
related to investments in non-member states. Moreover, previous decisions like 
Holböck and Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation rather suggest, in my opinion, 
that Article 63 of the TFEU should still be applicable.65 Currently, some uncertainty  
remains, but the ECJ has the possibility to answer exactly this question in the 
pending case C-35/11, which is “part two” of the aforementioned Test Claimants in 
the FII Group Litigation case.66 
 
8.2.3.1. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
It seems to be obvious from the examination outlined above that the investment in 
the CFC falls within the scope of the free movement of capital - if there is no 
prevailing freedom which has to be examined first and which “closes the door” for the 
application of Article 63 of the TFEU. Thus, if the investment in the CFC is within the 
scope of the latter freedom, this should have consequences not only for the 
application of the “typical” CFC regimes according to chapter 6, but also for the 
application of any other system which focuses on a current taxation of income. In 
other words, an alternative system which focuses on the current taxation of the basic 
interest component can be within the scope of the free movement of capital under the 
circumstances described above. Of course, in the latter case it remains the question 
whether the application of the alternative system results in an (unjustified) restriction 
on the free movement of capital. This will be outlined in section 8.2.5. 
 
8.2.3.2. Conclusions Regarding CFC Legislation and the Free Movement of 
Capital 
 
The scope of the free movement of capital is much broader than the scope of the 
freedom of establishment. Article 63 of the TFEU not only encompasses 
shareholdings with definite influence over the company’s decisions, but also 
encompasses minority investments in foreign companies and other types of portfolio 
investments. Furthermore, the free movement of capital does not require the pursuit 
of an economic activity. In general, the investment in a CFC which does not provide 
definite influence over the company’s decisions is within the scope of the free 
movement of capital. However, the principles derived from the case law of the ECJ 
                                            
64 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraph 37.  
65 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 28-31 and case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Lititgation), 
paragraph 165.  
66 See with respect to the pending case C-35/11 also Philip Baker, UK: Forthcoming UK Case: FII GLO (Part 2), 
in Lang, Michael / Pistone, Pasquale / Schuch, Josef / Staringer, Claus / Storck, Alfred (eds.), ECJ - Recent 
Developments in Direct Taxation 2010, Series on International Tax Law, 2011, page 223 et seq.  One of the 
questions referred to the ECJ in case C-35/11is the following: “where the national legislation in question does 
not apply exclusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the dividend 
paying company, can a resident company rely upon Article 63 TFEU (formerly Article 56 EC) in respect of 
dividends received from a subsidiary over which it exercises decisive influence and which is resident in a third 
country?”  
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64 Case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraph 37.  
65 Case C-157/05 (Holböck), paragraphs 28-31 and case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Lititgation), 
paragraph 165.  
66 See with respect to the pending case C-35/11 also Philip Baker, UK: Forthcoming UK Case: FII GLO (Part 2), 
in Lang, Michael / Pistone, Pasquale / Schuch, Josef / Staringer, Claus / Storck, Alfred (eds.), ECJ - Recent 
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not apply exclusively to situations in which the parent company exercises decisive influence over the dividend 
paying company, can a resident company rely upon Article 63 TFEU (formerly Article 56 EC) in respect of 




   
 
income tax. Thus, in a “best case scenario” of a 100 percent shareholding in the 
CFC, an income attribution which is more or less equal to the legal result of the CFC, 
and an “optimal” ordinary tax credit, the disadvantage may be - at first glance - limited 
to the liquidity effect related to the additional tax burden and the administrative 
obligations which are related to the transfer of the financial means from the CFC to 
the domestic shareholder. However, an additional burden which is caused by the 
investment in a CFC are the compliance costs. The domestic taxpayer can be 
required to provide additional tax returns and calculations in order to determine the 
CFC income.70 The preparation of additional documents not only increases the total 
compliance costs but may also increase the tax risk of the domestic shareholder. 
Overall, it can be concluded that even in an optimal scenario the CFC income 
attribution still has negative consequences for the domestic shareholder. In a non-
optimal scenario, the CFC taxation may result in a double taxation of income. Of 
course, it is out of the question that an effect such as the double taxation of income 
caused by the mechanism of CFC taxation is a substantial restriction on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms. However, even negative effects of “minor 
importance,” like liquidity disadvantages and additional administrative burdens, are 
sufficient, in my opinion, to create an obstacle for the exercising of the right of 
establishment, the free movement of capital, and the freedom to provide services. In 
this context, the Safir case can be referred to where administrative obligations and 
liquidity disadvantages were put forward as arguments for a restriction caused by the 
legislation of the Member State in question. With respect to administrative obligations 
the Court pointed out that “(i)t is true that such obligations cannot in themselves be 
regarded as being contrary to Community law. However, those obligations, combined 
with the need to follow a centralised procedure, may dissuade interested persons 
from taking out capital life assurance companies not established in Sweden, since no 
particular action on their part would be called for if they took out such assurance with 
companies established in Sweden, the tax being levied in this case on the 
company.”71 Moreover, from a number of other cases it can be learned that a 
measure which leads to a cash-flow disadvantage can have a restrictive effect on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms.72  
 
A decision which may be helpful to support the conclusion that the application of CFC 
rules may have a restrictive effect is de Lasteyrie du Saillant: the case deals with 
French legislation concerning tax charged on an unrealised increase in the value of 
securities, which is due in the event of a taxpayer transferring his residence outside 
France for tax purposes.73 The increase in value to be determined shall be the 
difference between the value of the company securities at the date of transfer of 
residence outside France for tax purposes and the price at which they were acquired 
                                            
70 The fact that in most cases the CFC income has to be determined according to the domestic rules and not 
according to the rules of the state of residence of the CFC requires an additional computation which is solely 
made for the purpose of CFC income attribution. This, of course, leads to additional obligations for the 
shareholder in the CFC (see in this respect 6.6. of this study and Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on 
the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, 
page 58). This can result in the submission of separate tax returns in order to assess the attributable income (see 
in this respect, for example, paragraph 18 of the German Foreign Income Tax Act).  
71 Case C-118/96 (Safir), paragraph 26; see in more detail chapter 4.  
72 Case C-397/98 and C-410/98 (Metallgesellschaft and Others), paragraphs 44, 54 and 76; case C-436/00 (X 
and Y), paragraphs 36 to 38; case C-268/03 (De Baeck), paragraph 24; case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), 
paragraphs 32 to 34; case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraphs 96, 97, 153 and 
154; case C-347/04 (Rewe Zentralfinanz), paragraph 29.  
73 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 2.  
   
 
 
The differentiation is, of course, based on the above conclusion that the ‘free 
movement of capital aspect’ does not prevail in case of CFC type legislation. Overall, 
it is important to note that the CFC legislation as well as any alternative legislation 
which requires definite influence on the decisions of the CFC apparently does not - 
based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - fall within the scope of the free movement of 
capital.  
 
8.2.4. Additional Examinations 
 
8.2.4.1. Restrictions Caused by the Application of CFC Legislation  
 
Based on the case law of the ECJ, any restriction on the basic freedoms is 
prohibited, even if it is of limited scope or minor importance.67  The application of 
CFC rules has the effect that income (or a specific part of the income) which is 
realised through the foreign company is immediately attributed to the domestic 
shareholder and included in the domestic tax base. In effect, there is no possibility to 
shelter the income from domestic taxation - which is normally the case if the income 
is derived by a separate legal entity - and has therefore, at least, a negative effect 
from a liquidity perspective.68 It was already outlined in chapter 6 that the current 
taxation of CFC income may cause massive disadvantages compared to a purely 
domestic situation, e.g. in case of multiple tier structures, in cases where the 
domestic taxpayer is unable to credit the foreign income tax against the domestic 
income tax (for example in case of a domestic tax loss carry forward), and in similar 
situations. However, even in a “best case scenario” of an unrestricted ordinary tax 
credit, it will always lead to the result that the tax burden related to the CFC income is 
increased from the lower level of the country of secondary establishment to the 
higher level of the country of primary establishment. The domestic shareholder has to 
pay an additional tax on income which is legally derived by another person (legal 
entity) and which is therefore, in principle, outside of the availability of the domestic 
taxpayer. The domestic taxpayer either has to use his own funds69 to pay the 
additional income tax - which will then have a negative effect on the liquidity of the 
shareholder - or has to start the process of transferring the financial means from the 
CFC to the domestic shareholder, e.g. through a profit distribution. Even if one leaves 
aside the rather difficult situations in which other shareholders are involved, in which 
only a minority shareholding exists in the CFC, or situations in which the legal income 
of the CFC deviates considerably from the income determined according to the CFC 
rules, it will in any event require additional legal steps to make available (part of) the 
income which was subject to domestic taxation for the payment of the additional 
                                            
67 Case C-49/89 (Corsica Ferries France), ECR 1989 page 4441, paragraph 8; case C-34/98 (Commission of the 
European Community v French Republic), February 15, 2000, ECR 2000, page I-00995, paragraph 49: “(t)he 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital are fundamental Community provisions and any 
restriction, even minor, of that freedom is prohibited;” Case C-9/02 (Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillaint v 
Ministere de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie), March 11, 2004, ECR 2004, paragraph 43: “...a 
restriction on freedom of establishment is prohibited by Article 52 of the Treaty even if of limited scope or minor 
importance;” Case C-483/99 (Commission of the European Communities v French Republic), June 4, 2002, ECR 
2002 page I-04781, paragraph 21: “Those national rules, although applicable without distinction, create 
obstacles to the right of establishment of nationals of other Member States and to the free movement of capital 
within the Community, inasmuch as they are liable to impede, or render less attractive, the exercise of those 
freedoms.” 
68 This will be the case if the attribution of income causes additional income tax payments of the shareholder.  
69 Which also includes the re-financing of these funds, e.g. through a bank loan.   
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income tax. Thus, in a “best case scenario” of a 100 percent shareholding in the 
CFC, an income attribution which is more or less equal to the legal result of the CFC, 
and an “optimal” ordinary tax credit, the disadvantage may be - at first glance - limited 
to the liquidity effect related to the additional tax burden and the administrative 
obligations which are related to the transfer of the financial means from the CFC to 
the domestic shareholder. However, an additional burden which is caused by the 
investment in a CFC are the compliance costs. The domestic taxpayer can be 
required to provide additional tax returns and calculations in order to determine the 
CFC income.70 The preparation of additional documents not only increases the total 
compliance costs but may also increase the tax risk of the domestic shareholder. 
Overall, it can be concluded that even in an optimal scenario the CFC income 
attribution still has negative consequences for the domestic shareholder. In a non-
optimal scenario, the CFC taxation may result in a double taxation of income. Of 
course, it is out of the question that an effect such as the double taxation of income 
caused by the mechanism of CFC taxation is a substantial restriction on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms. However, even negative effects of “minor 
importance,” like liquidity disadvantages and additional administrative burdens, are 
sufficient, in my opinion, to create an obstacle for the exercising of the right of 
establishment, the free movement of capital, and the freedom to provide services. In 
this context, the Safir case can be referred to where administrative obligations and 
liquidity disadvantages were put forward as arguments for a restriction caused by the 
legislation of the Member State in question. With respect to administrative obligations 
the Court pointed out that “(i)t is true that such obligations cannot in themselves be 
regarded as being contrary to Community law. However, those obligations, combined 
with the need to follow a centralised procedure, may dissuade interested persons 
from taking out capital life assurance companies not established in Sweden, since no 
particular action on their part would be called for if they took out such assurance with 
companies established in Sweden, the tax being levied in this case on the 
company.”71 Moreover, from a number of other cases it can be learned that a 
measure which leads to a cash-flow disadvantage can have a restrictive effect on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms.72  
 
A decision which may be helpful to support the conclusion that the application of CFC 
rules may have a restrictive effect is de Lasteyrie du Saillant: the case deals with 
French legislation concerning tax charged on an unrealised increase in the value of 
securities, which is due in the event of a taxpayer transferring his residence outside 
France for tax purposes.73 The increase in value to be determined shall be the 
difference between the value of the company securities at the date of transfer of 
residence outside France for tax purposes and the price at which they were acquired 
                                            
70 The fact that in most cases the CFC income has to be determined according to the domestic rules and not 
according to the rules of the state of residence of the CFC requires an additional computation which is solely 
made for the purpose of CFC income attribution. This, of course, leads to additional obligations for the 
shareholder in the CFC (see in this respect 6.6. of this study and Arnold / Dibout, General Report, in Limits on 
the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, IFA 2001, 
page 58). This can result in the submission of separate tax returns in order to assess the attributable income (see 
in this respect, for example, paragraph 18 of the German Foreign Income Tax Act).  
71 Case C-118/96 (Safir), paragraph 26; see in more detail chapter 4.  
72 Case C-397/98 and C-410/98 (Metallgesellschaft and Others), paragraphs 44, 54 and 76; case C-436/00 (X 
and Y), paragraphs 36 to 38; case C-268/03 (De Baeck), paragraph 24; case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), 
paragraphs 32 to 34; case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraphs 96, 97, 153 and 
154; case C-347/04 (Rewe Zentralfinanz), paragraph 29.  
73 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 2.  
   
 
 
The differentiation is, of course, based on the above conclusion that the ‘free 
movement of capital aspect’ does not prevail in case of CFC type legislation. Overall, 
it is important to note that the CFC legislation as well as any alternative legislation 
which requires definite influence on the decisions of the CFC apparently does not - 
based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - fall within the scope of the free movement of 
capital.  
 
8.2.4. Additional Examinations 
 
8.2.4.1. Restrictions Caused by the Application of CFC Legislation  
 
Based on the case law of the ECJ, any restriction on the basic freedoms is 
prohibited, even if it is of limited scope or minor importance.67  The application of 
CFC rules has the effect that income (or a specific part of the income) which is 
realised through the foreign company is immediately attributed to the domestic 
shareholder and included in the domestic tax base. In effect, there is no possibility to 
shelter the income from domestic taxation - which is normally the case if the income 
is derived by a separate legal entity - and has therefore, at least, a negative effect 
from a liquidity perspective.68 It was already outlined in chapter 6 that the current 
taxation of CFC income may cause massive disadvantages compared to a purely 
domestic situation, e.g. in case of multiple tier structures, in cases where the 
domestic taxpayer is unable to credit the foreign income tax against the domestic 
income tax (for example in case of a domestic tax loss carry forward), and in similar 
situations. However, even in a “best case scenario” of an unrestricted ordinary tax 
credit, it will always lead to the result that the tax burden related to the CFC income is 
increased from the lower level of the country of secondary establishment to the 
higher level of the country of primary establishment. The domestic shareholder has to 
pay an additional tax on income which is legally derived by another person (legal 
entity) and which is therefore, in principle, outside of the availability of the domestic 
taxpayer. The domestic taxpayer either has to use his own funds69 to pay the 
additional income tax - which will then have a negative effect on the liquidity of the 
shareholder - or has to start the process of transferring the financial means from the 
CFC to the domestic shareholder, e.g. through a profit distribution. Even if one leaves 
aside the rather difficult situations in which other shareholders are involved, in which 
only a minority shareholding exists in the CFC, or situations in which the legal income 
of the CFC deviates considerably from the income determined according to the CFC 
rules, it will in any event require additional legal steps to make available (part of) the 
income which was subject to domestic taxation for the payment of the additional 
                                            
67 Case C-49/89 (Corsica Ferries France), ECR 1989 page 4441, paragraph 8; case C-34/98 (Commission of the 
European Community v French Republic), February 15, 2000, ECR 2000, page I-00995, paragraph 49: “(t)he 
free movement of goods, persons, services and capital are fundamental Community provisions and any 
restriction, even minor, of that freedom is prohibited;” Case C-9/02 (Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillaint v 
Ministere de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie), March 11, 2004, ECR 2004, paragraph 43: “...a 
restriction on freedom of establishment is prohibited by Article 52 of the Treaty even if of limited scope or minor 
importance;” Case C-483/99 (Commission of the European Communities v French Republic), June 4, 2002, ECR 
2002 page I-04781, paragraph 21: “Those national rules, although applicable without distinction, create 
obstacles to the right of establishment of nationals of other Member States and to the free movement of capital 
within the Community, inasmuch as they are liable to impede, or render less attractive, the exercise of those 
freedoms.” 
68 This will be the case if the attribution of income causes additional income tax payments of the shareholder.  
69 Which also includes the re-financing of these funds, e.g. through a bank loan.   
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difference lies in the fact that certain components which make up the value of 
shares are not taken into account on a yearly basis - under CFC rules - but 
only over a longer period of time. This might lead to the conclusion that the 
(theoretical) tax base pursuant to the French legislation at the moment of 
transfer is higher than the total number of income attributions pursuant to CFC 
rules at the same point in time. However, this is solely a timing difference: the 
CFC rules will finally also encompass those profits which are not realised on a 
regular basis but which are inherent in the assets of the company and the 
activity itself (e.g. goodwill).  
 
- The most significant difference lies in the fact that the French legislation in 
question provides the possibility for a suspension of the tax payment until the 
time of the transmission, redemption, repayment or cancellation of the 
company securities. This opens the possibility to pay the tax out of the 
proceeds derived from the actual sale of the shares (or similar transactions). 
Furthermore, if the shares are retransferred to France or sold after the 
expiration of five years, there will be no taxation of the increase in value of the 
shares. In general, there is no such possibility in case of CFC legislation. 
Here, the income is attributed to the domestic shareholder and consequently 
taxed on a regular basis. It does not play a role whether the income of the 
foreign company is available for the payment of the taxes or not and there is, 
in principle, no possibility for a suspension of the tax payment on the attributed 
income.  
 
- Obviously, the conditions related to the suspension of the tax payment 
constitute a restrictive effect. However, the French legislation provides, at 
least, different possibilities to avoid the actual tax payment. This is not the 
case for the taxes imposed through CFC rules. The extensive administrative 
obligations exist in case of the French legislation in question and in case of 
CFC regimes, and I do not think that the requirements are less restrictive in 
the latter case (taking into account that the additional tax returns etc. have to 
be submitted on a yearly basis).  
 
In my opinion, the statement of the ECJ can be easily transferred to CFC legislation: 
“(a) taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside French territory (in case of 
CFC legislation: wishing to invest outside the (…) territory), in exercise of the right 
guaranteed to him by Article 52 of the Treaty, is subjected to disadvantageous 
treatment in comparison to a person who maintains his residence in France (in case 
of CFC legislation: invests in the (…) territory). That taxpayer becomes liable (…) to 
tax on income which has not yet been realised and which he therefore does not 
have, whereas, if he remained in France (in case of CFC legislation: if he invests in 
(…) territory), increases in value (in case of CFC legislation the profits of the foreign 
company in the other Member State might be referred to) would become taxable only 
when, and to the extent that, they were actually realised. That difference in treatment 
(…) is likely to discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer (in case of 
CFC legislation: making such an investment).”79 It can certainly be concluded that - 
from the perspective of the domestic investor - the application of CFC legislation 
makes the investment in another Member State less attractive. It results in an 
immediate taxation of income and an overall increase in the income tax burden. 
                                            
79 See in this respect case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 46. 
   
 
by the taxpayer.74 Payment of the tax on the increase in value determined may be 
deferred until the time of the transmission, redemption, repayment or cancellation of 
the company securities concerned. However, the suspension of payment is subject to 
the condition that the taxpayer shall declare the amount of increase in value, applies 
for the benefit of suspension, designates a representative established in France 
authorised to receive communications concerning the basis of assessment, collection 
of the tax and any disputes relating thereto, and, before his departure abroad, 
constitutes with the official responsible for collection guarantees sufficient to ensure 
recovery of the debt by the Treasury. At the expiry of five years from the date of 
departure, or at the date on which the taxpayer retransfers his place of residence to 
France for tax purposes, if earlier, exoneration shall be automatically granted in so far 
as it relates to increases in value in relation to company securities which, at that date, 
remain in the ownership of the taxpayer.75 The guarantees may take the form of a 
cash payment into a Treasury suspense account, an acknowledgement of 
indebtedness in favour of the Treasury, the lodging of a deposit, securities, goods 
deposited at State-approved warehouses and subject to warrant endorsed in favour 
of the Treasury, by mortgage charges, by pledging of business assets.76 In its 
decision, the ECJ made it clear that a restriction on freedom of establishment is 
prohibited “(…) even if of limited scope and minor importance.”77 And even if the 
respective legislation “(…) does not prevent a French taxpayer from exercising his 
right of establishment, this provision is nevertheless of such a kind as to restrict the 
exercise of that right, having at the very least a dissuasive effect on taxpayers 
wishing to establish themselves in another Member State. A taxpayer wishing to 
transfer his tax residence outside French territory, in exercise of the right guaranteed 
to him by Article 52 of the Treaty, is subjected to disadvantageous treatment in 
comparison with a person who maintains his residence in France. That taxpayer 
becomes liable, simply by reason of such a transfer, to tax on income which has not 
yet been realised and which he therefore does not have, whereas, if he remained in 
France, increases in value would become taxable only when, and to the extent that, 
they were actually realised. That difference in treatment concerning the taxation of 
increases in value, which is capable of having considerable repercussions on the 
assets of a taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside France, is likely to 
discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer.”78  
 
A comparison of the French legislation in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case with the 
taxation according to CFC legislation shows, in my opinion, that the latter goes even 
further than the French legislation in question, i.e. CFC legislation usually has an 
effect which is more restrictive. The following aspects have to be taken into account: 
 
- The French legislation focuses on the increase in value of the shares at the 
moment when the taxpayer transfers his residence to another country. It is the 
accumulated profit, plus unrealised reserves and goodwill, which is, in 
essence, taken into account. In contrast thereto, the CFC legislation focuses 
on the taxation of the profit on a regular - yearly - basis. Thus, an important 
                                            
74 The taxation of the increase in value thus realised is subject to the condition that the rights in company profits 
held directly or indirectly by the transferor or the transferor’s spouse, their ascendants and descendants, must 
together exceed 25 percent of those company profits held at some time during the previous five years (see case 
C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 4).  
75 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 3. 
76 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 4. 
77 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 43. 
78 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraphs 45, 46. 
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difference lies in the fact that certain components which make up the value of 
shares are not taken into account on a yearly basis - under CFC rules - but 
only over a longer period of time. This might lead to the conclusion that the 
(theoretical) tax base pursuant to the French legislation at the moment of 
transfer is higher than the total number of income attributions pursuant to CFC 
rules at the same point in time. However, this is solely a timing difference: the 
CFC rules will finally also encompass those profits which are not realised on a 
regular basis but which are inherent in the assets of the company and the 
activity itself (e.g. goodwill).  
 
- The most significant difference lies in the fact that the French legislation in 
question provides the possibility for a suspension of the tax payment until the 
time of the transmission, redemption, repayment or cancellation of the 
company securities. This opens the possibility to pay the tax out of the 
proceeds derived from the actual sale of the shares (or similar transactions). 
Furthermore, if the shares are retransferred to France or sold after the 
expiration of five years, there will be no taxation of the increase in value of the 
shares. In general, there is no such possibility in case of CFC legislation. 
Here, the income is attributed to the domestic shareholder and consequently 
taxed on a regular basis. It does not play a role whether the income of the 
foreign company is available for the payment of the taxes or not and there is, 
in principle, no possibility for a suspension of the tax payment on the attributed 
income.  
 
- Obviously, the conditions related to the suspension of the tax payment 
constitute a restrictive effect. However, the French legislation provides, at 
least, different possibilities to avoid the actual tax payment. This is not the 
case for the taxes imposed through CFC rules. The extensive administrative 
obligations exist in case of the French legislation in question and in case of 
CFC regimes, and I do not think that the requirements are less restrictive in 
the latter case (taking into account that the additional tax returns etc. have to 
be submitted on a yearly basis).  
 
In my opinion, the statement of the ECJ can be easily transferred to CFC legislation: 
“(a) taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside French territory (in case of 
CFC legislation: wishing to invest outside the (…) territory), in exercise of the right 
guaranteed to him by Article 52 of the Treaty, is subjected to disadvantageous 
treatment in comparison to a person who maintains his residence in France (in case 
of CFC legislation: invests in the (…) territory). That taxpayer becomes liable (…) to 
tax on income which has not yet been realised and which he therefore does not 
have, whereas, if he remained in France (in case of CFC legislation: if he invests in 
(…) territory), increases in value (in case of CFC legislation the profits of the foreign 
company in the other Member State might be referred to) would become taxable only 
when, and to the extent that, they were actually realised. That difference in treatment 
(…) is likely to discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer (in case of 
CFC legislation: making such an investment).”79 It can certainly be concluded that - 
from the perspective of the domestic investor - the application of CFC legislation 
makes the investment in another Member State less attractive. It results in an 
immediate taxation of income and an overall increase in the income tax burden. 
                                            
79 See in this respect case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 46. 
   
 
by the taxpayer.74 Payment of the tax on the increase in value determined may be 
deferred until the time of the transmission, redemption, repayment or cancellation of 
the company securities concerned. However, the suspension of payment is subject to 
the condition that the taxpayer shall declare the amount of increase in value, applies 
for the benefit of suspension, designates a representative established in France 
authorised to receive communications concerning the basis of assessment, collection 
of the tax and any disputes relating thereto, and, before his departure abroad, 
constitutes with the official responsible for collection guarantees sufficient to ensure 
recovery of the debt by the Treasury. At the expiry of five years from the date of 
departure, or at the date on which the taxpayer retransfers his place of residence to 
France for tax purposes, if earlier, exoneration shall be automatically granted in so far 
as it relates to increases in value in relation to company securities which, at that date, 
remain in the ownership of the taxpayer.75 The guarantees may take the form of a 
cash payment into a Treasury suspense account, an acknowledgement of 
indebtedness in favour of the Treasury, the lodging of a deposit, securities, goods 
deposited at State-approved warehouses and subject to warrant endorsed in favour 
of the Treasury, by mortgage charges, by pledging of business assets.76 In its 
decision, the ECJ made it clear that a restriction on freedom of establishment is 
prohibited “(…) even if of limited scope and minor importance.”77 And even if the 
respective legislation “(…) does not prevent a French taxpayer from exercising his 
right of establishment, this provision is nevertheless of such a kind as to restrict the 
exercise of that right, having at the very least a dissuasive effect on taxpayers 
wishing to establish themselves in another Member State. A taxpayer wishing to 
transfer his tax residence outside French territory, in exercise of the right guaranteed 
to him by Article 52 of the Treaty, is subjected to disadvantageous treatment in 
comparison with a person who maintains his residence in France. That taxpayer 
becomes liable, simply by reason of such a transfer, to tax on income which has not 
yet been realised and which he therefore does not have, whereas, if he remained in 
France, increases in value would become taxable only when, and to the extent that, 
they were actually realised. That difference in treatment concerning the taxation of 
increases in value, which is capable of having considerable repercussions on the 
assets of a taxpayer wishing to transfer his tax residence outside France, is likely to 
discourage a taxpayer from carrying out such a transfer.”78  
 
A comparison of the French legislation in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case with the 
taxation according to CFC legislation shows, in my opinion, that the latter goes even 
further than the French legislation in question, i.e. CFC legislation usually has an 
effect which is more restrictive. The following aspects have to be taken into account: 
 
- The French legislation focuses on the increase in value of the shares at the 
moment when the taxpayer transfers his residence to another country. It is the 
accumulated profit, plus unrealised reserves and goodwill, which is, in 
essence, taken into account. In contrast thereto, the CFC legislation focuses 
on the taxation of the profit on a regular - yearly - basis. Thus, an important 
                                            
74 The taxation of the increase in value thus realised is subject to the condition that the rights in company profits 
held directly or indirectly by the transferor or the transferor’s spouse, their ascendants and descendants, must 
together exceed 25 percent of those company profits held at some time during the previous five years (see case 
C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 4).  
75 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 3. 
76 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 4. 
77 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraph 43. 
78 Case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillaint), paragraphs 45, 46. 
Chapter 8
428
   
 
subject to a lower level of taxation.”82 And “(t)he resulting disadvantage for resident 
companies (...) are such as to hinder the exercise of freedom of establishment by 
such companies, dissuading them from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a 
subsidiary in a Member State in which the latter is subject to such a level of taxation. 
They therefore constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment (...).” 83 The 
decision confirms, in principle, the conclusions which can already be drawn from the 
previous case law outlined above.  
 
Overall, the application of CFC rules has, in my opinion, a restrictive effect on the 
exercising of the right of establishment and the free movement of capital, 
respectively. Whether it also has a restrictive effect on the freedom to provide 
services from the perspective of the recipient of the services provided by the CFC, 
i.e. an indirect effect, depends on the respective legislation. For example, if the CFC 
legislation (of Member State A) is structured in a way that the provision of services to 
recipients in the country of residence of the CFC (country C) is outside of the scope 
of the CFC legislation, but the provision of services to recipients in other Member 
States (e.g. Member State B) is affected, a situation may be created which is 
disadvantageous for the recipient in Member State B (just due to the fact that the 
recipient is not resident in Member State C but in Member State B). The provision of 
services from within Member State C to Member State B is less attractive and may 
therefore not be offered to the conditions which are available for services provided 
solely within Member State C.84 The recipients in country B may therefore be forced 
to pay more for the services rendered than the recipients in country C - just because 
of the application of the CFC rules of country A. It may also be the case that the 
services are not fully available for recipients in country B. This can be the case if the 
CFC legislation follows an entity approach where it is decisive that the income of the 
CFC is mainly derived from activities in the country of residence (and / or certain 
active businesses). Overall, it can be concluded that the CFC legislation may also 
have a restrictive effect for the recipient of the services who is established in another 
Member State.  
 
8.2.4.2. The Pair of Comparison - Vertical and Horizontal Comparison? 
 
The most obvious pair of comparison in order to find out whether the cross-border 
investment in a CFC is subject to a different - restrictive - treatment in the Member 
State of primary establishment is certainly the direct comparison with a merely 
domestic investment. Thus, the comparison can be made between the tax treatment 
of a domestic taxpayer with a foreign subsidiary established in a country which 
triggers the CFC taxation and a domestic taxpayer with a hypothetical domestic 








                                            
82 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 45. 
83 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 46. 
84 However, this requires that the situation in Member State A is taken into account, too. The reason is that the 
tax burden in Member State C is the same for services provided to residents and non-residents.  
   
 
Moreover, the foreign investment creates additional administrative obligations in the 
Member State of principal establishment which would not exist in case of a purely 
domestic investment.80  
 
The restrictive effect becomes particularly obvious if the perspective of the Member 
State of the CFC, i.e. the Member State of secondary establishment, is taken into 
account, too. In the Verkooijen decision the ECJ concluded that the Dutch provision 
in question “(...) has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other 
Member States: it constitutes an obstacle to the raising of capital in the Netherlands 
since the dividends which such companies pay to Netherlands residents receive less 
favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by a company established in the 
Netherlands, so that their shares are less attractive to investors residing in the 
Netherlands than shares in companies which have their seat in that Member State.”81 
The investment in a foreign company which is classified as a CFC is definitely less 
attractive for investors resident in the country which applies the CFC regime. These 
investors might refrain from investing in the CFC country and decide to invest in the 
Member State of principal establishment or might decide to invest in another country 
which is outside of the scope of the domestic CFC regime (e.g. because the tax rate 
is above the domestic threshold of low-taxation). Such legislation therefore 
constitutes - similar to the Dutch legislation in the Verkooijen case - an obstacle to 
the raising of capital in the Member State which applies the CFC rules. The Member 
State of secondary establishment therefore has a competitive disadvantage not only 
compared to the Member State of principal establishment but also to the other 
Member States and even third countries which are not affected by the relevant 
legislation. One should always keep in mind that CFC legislation mainly focuses on 
income taxation. It will therefore specifically affect those countries with a reduced 
income tax rate (compared to the Member State which applies the CFC legislation). 
However, those countries are not necessarily to be classified as “tax havens.” Those 
countries may simply have a relatively low corporate income tax rate but a 
comparably high personnel income tax rate or value added tax rate. These “investor 
friendly regimes” - applied to residents and non-residents - are far from being a “tax 
haven.” In my opinion, it is quite obvious that from the perspective of the latter 
Member States the CFC legislation may create a serious obstacle for the attraction of 
capital investments.  
 
The outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case - the first decision of the ECJ which 
dealt with CFC legislation - is therefore not surprising to me with respect to the 
question whether a restriction on the freedom of establishment exists or not. The 
Court concluded that the “(...) difference in treatment creates a tax disadvantage for 
the resident company to which the legislation on CFCs is applicable. Even taking into 
account (...) the fact referred to by the national court that such a resident company 
does not pay, on the profits of a CFC within the scope of application of that 
legislation, more tax than that which would have been payable on those profits if they 
had been made by a subsidiary established in the United Kingdom, the fact remains 
that under such legislation the resident company is taxed on profits of another legal 
person. That is not the case for a resident company with a subsidiary taxed in the 
United Kingdom or a subsidiary established outside that Member State which is not 
                                            
80 In addition to the administrative obligations in the CFC country itself and the overall risks related to a foreign 
investment in general.  
81 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 35.  
CFC Legislation and European Union Law
429
   
 
subject to a lower level of taxation.”82 And “(t)he resulting disadvantage for resident 
companies (...) are such as to hinder the exercise of freedom of establishment by 
such companies, dissuading them from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a 
subsidiary in a Member State in which the latter is subject to such a level of taxation. 
They therefore constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment (...).” 83 The 
decision confirms, in principle, the conclusions which can already be drawn from the 
previous case law outlined above.  
 
Overall, the application of CFC rules has, in my opinion, a restrictive effect on the 
exercising of the right of establishment and the free movement of capital, 
respectively. Whether it also has a restrictive effect on the freedom to provide 
services from the perspective of the recipient of the services provided by the CFC, 
i.e. an indirect effect, depends on the respective legislation. For example, if the CFC 
legislation (of Member State A) is structured in a way that the provision of services to 
recipients in the country of residence of the CFC (country C) is outside of the scope 
of the CFC legislation, but the provision of services to recipients in other Member 
States (e.g. Member State B) is affected, a situation may be created which is 
disadvantageous for the recipient in Member State B (just due to the fact that the 
recipient is not resident in Member State C but in Member State B). The provision of 
services from within Member State C to Member State B is less attractive and may 
therefore not be offered to the conditions which are available for services provided 
solely within Member State C.84 The recipients in country B may therefore be forced 
to pay more for the services rendered than the recipients in country C - just because 
of the application of the CFC rules of country A. It may also be the case that the 
services are not fully available for recipients in country B. This can be the case if the 
CFC legislation follows an entity approach where it is decisive that the income of the 
CFC is mainly derived from activities in the country of residence (and / or certain 
active businesses). Overall, it can be concluded that the CFC legislation may also 
have a restrictive effect for the recipient of the services who is established in another 
Member State.  
 
8.2.4.2. The Pair of Comparison - Vertical and Horizontal Comparison? 
 
The most obvious pair of comparison in order to find out whether the cross-border 
investment in a CFC is subject to a different - restrictive - treatment in the Member 
State of primary establishment is certainly the direct comparison with a merely 
domestic investment. Thus, the comparison can be made between the tax treatment 
of a domestic taxpayer with a foreign subsidiary established in a country which 
triggers the CFC taxation and a domestic taxpayer with a hypothetical domestic 








                                            
82 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 45. 
83 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 46. 
84 However, this requires that the situation in Member State A is taken into account, too. The reason is that the 
tax burden in Member State C is the same for services provided to residents and non-residents.  
   
 
Moreover, the foreign investment creates additional administrative obligations in the 
Member State of principal establishment which would not exist in case of a purely 
domestic investment.80  
 
The restrictive effect becomes particularly obvious if the perspective of the Member 
State of the CFC, i.e. the Member State of secondary establishment, is taken into 
account, too. In the Verkooijen decision the ECJ concluded that the Dutch provision 
in question “(...) has a restrictive effect as regards companies established in other 
Member States: it constitutes an obstacle to the raising of capital in the Netherlands 
since the dividends which such companies pay to Netherlands residents receive less 
favourable tax treatment than dividends distributed by a company established in the 
Netherlands, so that their shares are less attractive to investors residing in the 
Netherlands than shares in companies which have their seat in that Member State.”81 
The investment in a foreign company which is classified as a CFC is definitely less 
attractive for investors resident in the country which applies the CFC regime. These 
investors might refrain from investing in the CFC country and decide to invest in the 
Member State of principal establishment or might decide to invest in another country 
which is outside of the scope of the domestic CFC regime (e.g. because the tax rate 
is above the domestic threshold of low-taxation). Such legislation therefore 
constitutes - similar to the Dutch legislation in the Verkooijen case - an obstacle to 
the raising of capital in the Member State which applies the CFC rules. The Member 
State of secondary establishment therefore has a competitive disadvantage not only 
compared to the Member State of principal establishment but also to the other 
Member States and even third countries which are not affected by the relevant 
legislation. One should always keep in mind that CFC legislation mainly focuses on 
income taxation. It will therefore specifically affect those countries with a reduced 
income tax rate (compared to the Member State which applies the CFC legislation). 
However, those countries are not necessarily to be classified as “tax havens.” Those 
countries may simply have a relatively low corporate income tax rate but a 
comparably high personnel income tax rate or value added tax rate. These “investor 
friendly regimes” - applied to residents and non-residents - are far from being a “tax 
haven.” In my opinion, it is quite obvious that from the perspective of the latter 
Member States the CFC legislation may create a serious obstacle for the attraction of 
capital investments.  
 
The outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case - the first decision of the ECJ which 
dealt with CFC legislation - is therefore not surprising to me with respect to the 
question whether a restriction on the freedom of establishment exists or not. The 
Court concluded that the “(...) difference in treatment creates a tax disadvantage for 
the resident company to which the legislation on CFCs is applicable. Even taking into 
account (...) the fact referred to by the national court that such a resident company 
does not pay, on the profits of a CFC within the scope of application of that 
legislation, more tax than that which would have been payable on those profits if they 
had been made by a subsidiary established in the United Kingdom, the fact remains 
that under such legislation the resident company is taxed on profits of another legal 
person. That is not the case for a resident company with a subsidiary taxed in the 
United Kingdom or a subsidiary established outside that Member State which is not 
                                            
80 In addition to the administrative obligations in the CFC country itself and the overall risks related to a foreign 
investment in general.  
81 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 35.  
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It is apparent from the earlier examinations that the current taxation of low-taxed 
income can be a disadvantage for the domestic taxpayer. The difference in the legal 
form (separate legal entity vs. branch) is, in principle, not an obstacle for the creation 
of such a pair of comparison. However, in contrast to the comparison between a 
foreign investment in a CFC and a domestic investment in a (hypothetical) subsidiary, 
the restrictive treatment of the investment in a CFC - in comparison to the investment 
in a foreign permanent establishment - is not caused by the cross-border investment 
as such.86 It is the state of the parent company which treats the investment in a 
foreign permanent establishment different from the investment in a foreign CFC. In 
this particular case, the income of the permanent establishment is exempt from 
domestic taxation, which may be an advantage if it relates to income which is taxed 
at a lower rate than in the state of primary establishment. However, at first glance the 
obligation of the state of primary establishment to provide for an equal treatment of 
the different forms of secondary establishment cannot be derived from the basic 
freedoms.87 The different treatment of an outbound investment by the Member State 
of primary establishment must not be mixed up with a different treatment of an 
inbound investment by the Member State of secondary establishment. In the latter 
case it is quite clear that the different treatment of resident and non-resident 
taxpayers requires a justification in order to be accepted under the basic freedoms.88  
The Marks & Spencer case could have been of particular relevance with respect to 
the question whether a horizontal comparison is acceptable or not.89 Here, the United 
Kingdom group relief prevents resident parent companies from reducing its taxable 
                                            
86 See with respect to the Marks & Spencer case: Cordewener / Dahlberg / Pistone / Reimer / Romano, The Tax 
Treatment of Foreign Losses: Ritter, M & S, and the Way Ahead (Part Two), European Taxation 2004, page 218 
et seq. (231). 
87 Cordewener, Europäische Grundfreiheiten und nationales Steuerrecht, page 831 et seq. 
88 See in this respect case C-307/97 (Saint Gobain); Cordewener / Dahlberg / Pistone / Reimer / Romano, The 
Tax Treatment of Foreign Losses: Ritter, M & S, and the Way Ahead (Part Two), European Taxation 2004, page 
218 et seq. (232).  





































The question arises whether it is possible to extend the comparison to foreign 
permanent establishments. This might be a comparison between a domestic 
taxpayer with a foreign subsidiary in a country which triggers the CFC taxation and a 
domestic taxpayer with a hypothetical foreign permanent establishment (horizontal 
comparison).85 In a purely domestic situation the income of the (domestic) permanent 
establishment is usually included in the income tax base of the (domestic) taxpayer, 
e.g. head-quarter company. In contrast, the income of the domestic subsidiary is, in 
principle, treated separately from the income of the parent company as long as no 
fiscal consolidation (or fiscal unity) exists between the two companies. Thus, there 
may even be a choice for the domestic parent company to consolidate the taxable 
income or to treat the taxable income of both entities completely separate. However, 
in a cross-border situation, it may be the case that the income of the foreign 
permanent establishment is exempt from domestic taxation (if the exemption method 
is applied), but the income of the foreign company is subject to CFC taxation. From 
the perspective of a domestic (parent) company - which is in the focus of the 
comparison - the foreign investment through a subsidiary company and a foreign 
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freedoms.87 The different treatment of an outbound investment by the Member State 
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case it is quite clear that the different treatment of resident and non-resident 
taxpayers requires a justification in order to be accepted under the basic freedoms.88  
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the question whether a horizontal comparison is acceptable or not.89 Here, the United 
Kingdom group relief prevents resident parent companies from reducing its taxable 
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income or to treat the taxable income of both entities completely separate. However, 
in a cross-border situation, it may be the case that the income of the foreign 
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In contrast to the horizontal comparison between a foreign subsidiary company and a 
foreign permanent establishment, it is the same (legal) form of secondary 
establishment which is compared. The comparison is, in substance, not different from 
the comparison with a hypothetical resident subsidiary. The reason is that the 
hypothetical resident subsidiary and the hypothetical non-resident subsidiary in a 
state where the CFC rules are not applicable are treated identically, at least as far as 
it relates to the question whether the income of the separate legal entity is to be 
attributed on a current basis to the resident shareholder or not. It shows, however, 
that the advantageous treatment of domestic investments is also granted to foreign 
investments if the CFC rules cannot be applied. This can make the restrictive effect 
of CFC rules even more visible. It opens the possibility to take advantage of lower tax 
rates in some states (which are above the domestic threshold for the application of 
CFC rules) but not in others (where the CFC rules apply). From the perspective of 
competition among Member States, the CFC state itself not only suffers a 
disadvantage in the direct relationship to the Member State which applies the CFC 
regime, but also in comparison to other states which are outside of the scope of the 
relevant regime. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, Advocate General Léger outlined 
that “(t)he legislation at issue provides that the profits of the controlled subsidiary may 
be included in the tax base of the parent company as they arise. It is therefore 
disadvantageous to the parent company to which it applies compared to, on the one 
hand, a resident company which has established its subsidiary in the United Kingdom 
and, on the other, a resident company which has established such a subsidiary in a 
Member State which does not have a sufficiently favourable regime to fall within its 
scope of application. In the first case, the resident company is never taxed on the 
profits of its domestic subsidiary. In the second case, the resident company is not 
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profits in the United Kingdom by setting off losses incurred in other Member States by 
non-resident subsidiary companies. In contrast thereto, the losses of foreign 
permanent establishments can be taken into account for the determination of the 
domestic tax base. This difference in treatment was referred to in the questions 
submitted by the High Court of Justice of England and Wales for a preliminary 
ruling.90 However, the ECJ concentrated its verification on a vertical comparison 
between resident and non-resident subsidiaries and made only a brief statement 
which made it clear that the analysis will not be affected by the indications set out in 
the second part of the first question (which also included the difference in treatment 
related to a permanent establishment).91 Hence, the difference in treatment between 
a foreign permanent establishment and a foreign subsidiary was, at least indirectly, 
addressed and accepted.  
 
From the Columbus Container decision - which is outlined in chapter 4 - it can be 
understood, in my opinion, that the Member State of primary establishment is solely 
obliged to ensure that comparable investments are treated equally. In the case itself, 
it was argued that the application of the national legislation in question leads to a 
distortion of the choice between the different types of establishments (in this case 
subsidiary vs. partnership).92 In its answer to this argument the Court stated that “(…) 
it must be recalled that the fiscal autonomy (…) also means that the Member States 
are at liberty to determine the conditions and the level of taxation for different types of 
establishments chosen by national companies or partnerships operating abroad, on 
condition that those companies or partnerships are not treated in a manner that is 
discriminatory in comparison with comparable national establishments.”93 This was 
subsequently confirmed in the X Holding case, where the Court made it clear that 
“(…) the Member State of origin is not obliged to apply the same tax scheme to non-
resident subsidiaries as that which it applies to foreign permanent establishments.”94 
In other words, the comparison should be limited to a vertical comparison and cannot 
be extended to a horizontal comparison between two different forms of 
establishment.95  
 
An additional question which can be raised is the question whether the comparison 
can be extended to a hypothetical subsidiary company in another Member State, i.e. 
whether a comparison can be made between the tax treatment of a domestic 
taxpayer with a foreign subsidiary established in a CFC country and a domestic 
taxpayer with a hypothetical foreign subsidiary in a country where the CFC rules are 








                                            
90 Case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), paragraph 26.  
91 Case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), paragraph 52. 
92 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 52.  
93 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 53.  
94 Case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraph 40.  
95 See in this respect also Thömmes, Übergang zur Hinzurechnungsmethode bei Betriebsstätten EG-
rechtskonform, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2008, page 1169 et seq. (1173). 
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90 Case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), paragraph 26.  
91 Case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), paragraph 52. 
92 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 52.  
93 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 53.  
94 Case C-337/08 (X Holding), paragraph 40.  
95 See in this respect also Thömmes, Übergang zur Hinzurechnungsmethode bei Betriebsstätten EG-
rechtskonform, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2008, page 1169 et seq. (1173). 
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border situation, the foreign income - based on the respective legislation - would also 
be added to the domestic income of the resident taxpayer and an ordinary tax credit 
would have to be granted. Thus, given the fact that the vertical comparison did not 
result in a different treatment, it would have been necessary - if the horizontal 
comparison of the same form of establishment was an acceptable and necessary 
method of comparison - to proceed with the comparison of a foreign permanent 
establishment which is exempt from taxation in Germany (because the tax rate in the 
respective state is not below 30 percent) and a foreign permanent establishment 
which results in a switch-over from the exemption method to the credit method 
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However, the ECJ did not make the horizontal comparison of the same form of 
establishment which, in my opinion, would have resulted in the identification of a 
different treatment. In other words, the limitation to a mere vertical comparison makes 
a real difference with respect to the identification of a different treatment - in contrast 
to the Cadbury Schweppes decision.103 It was submitted by Columbus that the 
national legislation in question leads to a distortion of the choice which companies 
and partnerships have to establish themselves in different Member States.104 
However, the ECJ rejected this argument with reference to the fiscal autonomy of the 
Member States.105 Therefore, it seems to be clear (now) from the Columbus 
Container decision that the horizontal comparison of the same form of establishment 
cannot be derived from EU law. It is worth mentioning that the ECJ, in its decision, 
                                            
103 See in this respect also the examinations made by Calderón and Baez in The Columbus Container Services 
ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination 
Principle, Intertax 2009, page 212 et seq.  
104 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 50. 











   
 
those profits are paid to it in the form of dividends.”96 At first glance - and having in 
mind the statement of the Advocate General - one can have the impression that, in its 
decision, the ECJ considered the existence of the two possibilities of comparison as 
well, i.e. the vertical comparison and the horizontal comparison of the same form of 
establishment. At least, in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the judgment the ECJ made 
‘comparisons’ where reference was made to “the United Kingdom or in a State in 
which it is not subject to a lower level of taxation” and “the United Kingdom or a 
subsidiary established outside that Member State which is not subject to a lower level 
of taxation”, respectively.97 The problem is, however, that it is not clear enough from 
the Cadbury Schweppes decision whether the ECJ really referred to the (additional) 
horizontal comparison of the same form of establishment or whether the statement in 
paragraphs 44 and 45 of the decision was just made without the intention of explicitly 
referring to the existence of such a possibility. Finally there was no need for a 
horizontal comparison since the vertical comparison was already sufficient to identify 
a different treatment. In international tax literature there are different positions with 
respect to the question whether the ECJ accepted the horizontal comparability. For 
example, Calderón and Baez concluded that the admission of horizontal 
comparability is not explicit or, at least, not as explicit as that contained in the Opinion 
of the Advocate General. However, there is - in contrast to previous cases - the 
recognition of horizontal pairs of comparison, although it is not entirely clear whether 
the two parts of the comparison criteria used by the ECJ are to be applied individually 
or cumulatively.98 According to Hohenwarter, the reasoning of the Court is - in 
comparison to the statement of the Advocate General - ‘less pronounced’.99 It seems 
that also the Confédération Fiscale Européenne (CFE) ECJ Task Force came to the 
conclusion that the ECJ made such a horizontal comparison.100 Other commentators, 
like Kessler, Eicke and also Kemmeren rejected the existence of a horizontal 
comparison in the Cadbury Schweppes case.101   
 
Eventually, it is the Columbus Container decision which gives an answer to the 
question whether the horizontal comparison of the same form of establishment is 
required or not. In contrast to Cadbury Schweppes, the vertical comparison (here 
related to a permanent establishment) did not result in a different treatment. The ECJ 
concluded that the national legislation did not make a distinction between the income 
taxation of a domestic permanent establishment and the income taxation of a foreign 
permanent establishment which was subject to an income tax rate below 30 
percent.102 In a purely domestic situation, the income of the German permanent 
establishment would be added to the income of the resident taxpayer. In a cross-
                                            
96 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 74.  
97 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 44, 45. 
98 Calderón / Baez, The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to 
Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle, Intertax 2009, page 212 et seq. (217); see in this 
respect also the Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi (case C-298/05 - Columbus Container), paragraph 
119.  
99 Hohenwarter, The Allocation of Taxing Rights in the Light of the Fundamental Freedoms of EC Law, in Tax 
Treaty Law and EC Law, page 101.  
100 Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Task Force on ECJ, Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v. 
Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, 6 December 2007, C-298/05 - April 2008, European Taxation 2008, page 541 et 
seq. (542).  
101 Kessler / Eicke, The Egg of Columbus Container: German Budget Sunny Side Up, Not Scrambled, Tax Notes 
International 2008, page 589; Kemmeren, The Internal Market Approach Should Prevail over the Single Country 
Approach, in A Vision of Taxes Within and Outside European Borders. Festschrift in Honour of Prof. Dr. Frans 
Vanistendael, 2008, page 576.  
102 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 39, 40.  
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comparison to the statement of the Advocate General - ‘less pronounced’.99 It seems 
that also the Confédération Fiscale Européenne (CFE) ECJ Task Force came to the 
conclusion that the ECJ made such a horizontal comparison.100 Other commentators, 
like Kessler, Eicke and also Kemmeren rejected the existence of a horizontal 
comparison in the Cadbury Schweppes case.101   
 
Eventually, it is the Columbus Container decision which gives an answer to the 
question whether the horizontal comparison of the same form of establishment is 
required or not. In contrast to Cadbury Schweppes, the vertical comparison (here 
related to a permanent establishment) did not result in a different treatment. The ECJ 
concluded that the national legislation did not make a distinction between the income 
taxation of a domestic permanent establishment and the income taxation of a foreign 
permanent establishment which was subject to an income tax rate below 30 
percent.102 In a purely domestic situation, the income of the German permanent 
establishment would be added to the income of the resident taxpayer. In a cross-
                                            
96 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 74.  
97 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 44, 45. 
98 Calderón / Baez, The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to 
Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle, Intertax 2009, page 212 et seq. (217); see in this 
respect also the Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi (case C-298/05 - Columbus Container), paragraph 
119.  
99 Hohenwarter, The Allocation of Taxing Rights in the Light of the Fundamental Freedoms of EC Law, in Tax 
Treaty Law and EC Law, page 101.  
100 Opinion Statement of the CFE ECJ Task Force on ECJ, Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v. 
Finanzamt Bielefeld-Innenstadt, 6 December 2007, C-298/05 - April 2008, European Taxation 2008, page 541 et 
seq. (542).  
101 Kessler / Eicke, The Egg of Columbus Container: German Budget Sunny Side Up, Not Scrambled, Tax Notes 
International 2008, page 589; Kemmeren, The Internal Market Approach Should Prevail over the Single Country 
Approach, in A Vision of Taxes Within and Outside European Borders. Festschrift in Honour of Prof. Dr. Frans 
Vanistendael, 2008, page 576.  
102 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 39, 40.  
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8.2.4.3. “Most-Favoured Nation” Treatment for CFC Investments? 
 
It is questionable whether the theoretical acceptance of a horizontal comparison 
between the tax treatment of a domestic taxpayer with a secondary establishment in 
a Member State where the CFC rules are applicable and a domestic taxpayer with a 
hypothetical secondary establishment in a Member State where the CFC rules are 
not applicable leads to any further perception. As already outlined above, the 
comparison can make the restrictive effect much more obvious, e.g. if the tax rates in 
both Member States are lower than the tax rate in the country of primary 
establishment and if the difference in treatment is only due to the low-taxation 
threshold stipulated in the domestic CFC legislation. If an investor strongly focuses 
on a lower taxation, the Member State which does not trigger the CFC taxation will be 
much more attractive than the Member State which triggers the CFC taxation and 
perhaps even more attractive than the Member State of primary establishment. The 
latter state, however, typically has the “bonus” of a residence state since the 
investment in a foreign country may lead to additional risks and administrative 
burdens. However, when it comes to the question of a “most-favoured nation” 
treatment based on a double tax convention, it must be noted that CFC rules are 
merely domestic provisions which are often not even mentioned in double tax 
conventions. Thus, the double tax conventions concluded by the residence state of 
the shareholder - the state which applies the CFC rules - may be the same for 
Member States which trigger CFC taxation and those which do not trigger such 
taxation. The differentiation is therefore solely based on national legislation. No 
favourable treatment is stipulated in a double tax convention with one Member State 
which may theoretically be transferred to the relationship with another Member State 
- supposing that such a “most favoured nation” treatment can be derived from EU law 
at all. Up to now, the most favoured nation treatment was not accepted by the ECJ. 
In the Columbus Container decision and the Block decision, the ECJ made it clear 
that, in the current stage of the development of EU law, the Member States are not 
obliged to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other 
Member States.111.  
 
8.2.4.4. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
One of the important questions is whether the application of a system which solely 
focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest component may result in a 
restriction on one or more of the basic freedoms - similar to (or even exactly like) the 
restriction caused by the application of the “typical” CFC regimes. From a mere 
technical perspective, both systems lead to a current taxation of income, i.e. the 
income is immediately attributed to the shareholder. It was concluded above that - 
based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - the “forced” attribution of income has a 
restrictive effect on investments in other countries (if the current attribution of income 
is not made in a non-discriminatory manner, i.e. if the legislation is not at the same 
time applicable in case of purely domestic investments). Thus, from a technical 
perspective there is, in principle, no substantial difference between an alternative 
system which focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest component and the 
CFC regimes outlined in chapter 6. Even if the alternative system does not result in 
                                            
111 Case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraph 51, case C-67/08 (Block), paragraph 31. See with respect to 
the most-favoured nation treatment and double tax conventions case C-376/03 (D) paragraphs 61, 62 and case C-
374/04 (ACT) paragraphs 88 to 91. 
   
 
did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi who concluded - also 
based on paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Cadbury Schweppes decision - that a 
horizontal comparison should be made.106 In fact, a number of authors criticised the 
different outcome of Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container.107 According to 
Calderón and Baez, the non-application of the ECJ’s case law on anti-avoidance 
rules to a case such as Columbus Container is difficult to understand.108 The 
Confédération Fiscale Européenne (CFE) ECJ Task Force comes to a similar 
conclusion. In their view, the ECJ should have taken the chance to make a more 
detailed and explanatory statement about the limits to the tax sovereignty of the 
Member States. If the Court had chosen the same comparator as in Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Court should then have enquired about possible justifications, in 
particular the need to prevent abusive practices. In contrast thereto, Meussen 
concluded that in Columbus Container no CFC legislation was at stake. Accordingly, 
the Cadbury Schweppes arguments do not apply in this case and it is not in violation 
of EU law to apply the credit method to counter low-tax jurisdictions, whilst, in 
general, foreign income is exempt from taxation.109 In my opinion, it is not so much 
the question whether the national legislation in Columbus Container can be seen as 
‘quasi CFC rules’ or not and whether, in case of a (theoretically) different treatment, 
the outcome would be similar to the outcome of Cadbury Schweppes. In fact, if the 
horizontal comparison is not possible, the outcome of the Columbus Container 
decision is - from a mere EU law perspective - completely understandable. However, 
I do not think that the Columbus Container decision is positive for the further 
development of an internal market, because it is obvious to me that such legislation 
can distort investment decisions - and this should not happen within an internal 
market. In other words, despite the fact that EU law apparently merely requires the 
vertical comparison and does not permit the horizontal comparison, it should still be 
the aim to eliminate any obstacles for an investment in another Member State. This, 
however, would be achieved much better with the admission of horizontal 
comparability. With respect to CFC cases, I fully agree with Advocate General Léger 
that if Member States were allowed to choose the other Member States in which its 
domestic companies may establish subsidiaries with the benefit of the tax regime 
applicable in the host Member State, this would “manifestly lead to a result contrary 




                                            
106 Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi (case C-298/05 - Columbus Container), paragraph 120. 
107 Calderón / Baez,  The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to 
Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle, Intertax 2009, page 212 et seq. (218); Opinion 
Statement of the CFE ECJ Task Force on ECJ, Columbus Container Services BVBA & Co v. Finanzamt 
Bielefeld-Innenstadt, 6 December 2007, C-298/05 - April 2008, European Taxation 2008, page 541 et seq. (542, 
543); Lang, Die Zukunft der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen im Lichte von Columbus Container, in Festschrift 
für Wolfram Reiss: zum 65. Geburtstag, 2008, page 679 et seq. (693); de la Feria, Prohibition of Abuse of 
(Community) Law: The Creation of a New General Principle of EC Law through Tax, Common Market Law 
Review 2008, page 432.  
108 Calderón / Baez, The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost Opportunity to 
Shed Light on the Scope of the Non-discrimination Principle, Intertax 2009, page 212 et seq. (218). 
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respect also Calderón / Baez, The Columbus Container Services ECJ Case and Its Consequences: A Lost 
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8.2.4.3. “Most-Favoured Nation” Treatment for CFC Investments? 
 
It is questionable whether the theoretical acceptance of a horizontal comparison 
between the tax treatment of a domestic taxpayer with a secondary establishment in 
a Member State where the CFC rules are applicable and a domestic taxpayer with a 
hypothetical secondary establishment in a Member State where the CFC rules are 
not applicable leads to any further perception. As already outlined above, the 
comparison can make the restrictive effect much more obvious, e.g. if the tax rates in 
both Member States are lower than the tax rate in the country of primary 
establishment and if the difference in treatment is only due to the low-taxation 
threshold stipulated in the domestic CFC legislation. If an investor strongly focuses 
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much more attractive than the Member State which triggers the CFC taxation and 
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favourable treatment is stipulated in a double tax convention with one Member State 
which may theoretically be transferred to the relationship with another Member State 
- supposing that such a “most favoured nation” treatment can be derived from EU law 
at all. Up to now, the most favoured nation treatment was not accepted by the ECJ. 
In the Columbus Container decision and the Block decision, the ECJ made it clear 
that, in the current stage of the development of EU law, the Member States are not 
obliged to adapt their own tax systems to the different systems of tax of the other 
Member States.111.  
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focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest component may result in a 
restriction on one or more of the basic freedoms - similar to (or even exactly like) the 
restriction caused by the application of the “typical” CFC regimes. From a mere 
technical perspective, both systems lead to a current taxation of income, i.e. the 
income is immediately attributed to the shareholder. It was concluded above that - 
based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ - the “forced” attribution of income has a 
restrictive effect on investments in other countries (if the current attribution of income 
is not made in a non-discriminatory manner, i.e. if the legislation is not at the same 
time applicable in case of purely domestic investments). Thus, from a technical 
perspective there is, in principle, no substantial difference between an alternative 
system which focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest component and the 
CFC regimes outlined in chapter 6. Even if the alternative system does not result in 
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did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi who concluded - also 
based on paragraphs 44 and 45 of the Cadbury Schweppes decision - that a 
horizontal comparison should be made.106 In fact, a number of authors criticised the 
different outcome of Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container.107 According to 
Calderón and Baez, the non-application of the ECJ’s case law on anti-avoidance 
rules to a case such as Columbus Container is difficult to understand.108 The 
Confédération Fiscale Européenne (CFE) ECJ Task Force comes to a similar 
conclusion. In their view, the ECJ should have taken the chance to make a more 
detailed and explanatory statement about the limits to the tax sovereignty of the 
Member States. If the Court had chosen the same comparator as in Cadbury 
Schweppes, the Court should then have enquired about possible justifications, in 
particular the need to prevent abusive practices. In contrast thereto, Meussen 
concluded that in Columbus Container no CFC legislation was at stake. Accordingly, 
the Cadbury Schweppes arguments do not apply in this case and it is not in violation 
of EU law to apply the credit method to counter low-tax jurisdictions, whilst, in 
general, foreign income is exempt from taxation.109 In my opinion, it is not so much 
the question whether the national legislation in Columbus Container can be seen as 
‘quasi CFC rules’ or not and whether, in case of a (theoretically) different treatment, 
the outcome would be similar to the outcome of Cadbury Schweppes. In fact, if the 
horizontal comparison is not possible, the outcome of the Columbus Container 
decision is - from a mere EU law perspective - completely understandable. However, 
I do not think that the Columbus Container decision is positive for the further 
development of an internal market, because it is obvious to me that such legislation 
can distort investment decisions - and this should not happen within an internal 
market. In other words, despite the fact that EU law apparently merely requires the 
vertical comparison and does not permit the horizontal comparison, it should still be 
the aim to eliminate any obstacles for an investment in another Member State. This, 
however, would be achieved much better with the admission of horizontal 
comparability. With respect to CFC cases, I fully agree with Advocate General Léger 
that if Member States were allowed to choose the other Member States in which its 
domestic companies may establish subsidiaries with the benefit of the tax regime 
applicable in the host Member State, this would “manifestly lead to a result contrary 
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8.2.5.2. The Loss of Tax Revenue and the Erosion of the Tax Base  
 
It is likely that Member States which offer lower income tax rates than other Member 
States attract capital investments from countries within the EU and from countries 
outside the EU. From the perspective of the Member States with a comparably high 
tax rate this may result in a loss of tax revenue and an erosion of the domestic tax 
base. CFC legislation is considered an instrument to avoid this effect by attributing 
the income derived through the foreign low-taxed company to the domestic taxpayer. 
The avoidance of a loss of tax revenue and an erosion of the tax base was often put 
forward in cases before the ECJ as a justification for restrictive measures of Member 
States. However, it is settled case law that this does not constitute a matter of 
overriding reason of public interest which may be relied upon in order to justify a 
restriction on the basic freedoms.113 In the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case the ECJ 
basically accepted that unrealised reserves  included in the shares may be 
transferred from France to another country which may ultimately result in a non-
taxation of the reserves. In case of CFC rules, the transfer of unrealised reserves 
does not play a (comparable) role. The CFC rules focus on income derived by the 
foreign company, i.e. the income is generated only after the actual foreign investment 
was made. In my opinion, there is a difference in quality between the two concepts 
and it is therefore very unlikely that a loss of tax receipts might be accepted by the 
ECJ in a CFC case - taking into account the outcome of the de Lasteyrie du Saillant 
case and the general non-acceptance in the other decisions.114  
 
8.2.5.3. The Lower Taxation in the CFC Country 
 
A justification which is based on a lower (or different) taxation in the other Member 
State can be of particular relevance in a CFC case. Based on the earlier 
examinations, the CFC rules of the Member States are only applicable in case of a 
lower taxation compared to the Member State which applies the respective rules, i.e. 
the income tax rate in the CFC country must to a certain extent deviate from the 
domestic income tax rate (or income tax burden). It is therefore likely that - in addition 
to the more general argument of a loss of tax revenue and an erosion of the domestic 
tax base - the argument of a lower taxation may play a separate role. Without any 
doubt, a compensatory taxation will not be accepted by the ECJ. This is clear from 
the existing case law related to the general compensation for advantages and the 
specific compensation for a lower (or different) taxation in another Member State.115 
Furthermore, the ECJ explicitly stated in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case that a loss 
of receipts caused by the movement of a taxpayer to another Member State which 
provides a tax system which is more advantageous for him cannot in itself justify a 
                                            
113 Case C-35/98 (Verkooijen), paragraph 48; case C-436/00 (X and Y), paragraph 50; case C-484/93 (Svensson 
and Gustavsson), paragraph 15; see also case C-288/89 (Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and 
Others v Commissariaat voor de Media), paragraph 11; case C-120/95 (Decker), paragraph 39; case C-158/96 
(Kohll), paragraph 41; case C-264/96 (ICI), paragraph 28, case C-397/98 and C-410/98 (Metallgesellschaft and 
Others), paragraph 59; case C-307/97 (Saint-Gobain), paragraph 50; case C-136/00 (Danner), paragraph 56; 
case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraph 53; case C-315/02 (Lenz), paragraph 40; case C-319/02 (Manninen), 
paragraph 49; case C-168/01 (Bosal Holding), paragraph 42; case C-9/02 (de Lasteyrie du Saillant), paragraph 
60. 
114 See the references in the previous footnote.  
115 With respect to the general compensation for advantages see case C-307/97 (Saint-Gobain), paragraph 51 and 
case C 270/83 (Commission v France), paragraph 21. With respect to the lower (or different) taxation see, in 
particular, case C-294/97 (Eurowings), paragraphs 43 to 45. The conclusions from Eurowings were confirmed in 
subsequent decisions, e.g. case C-422/01 (Skandia), paragraph 52; case C-136/00 (Danner), paragraph 56; case 
C-364/01 (Barbier), paragraph 37.  
   
 
the serious disadvantages which were described in the latter chapter, e.g. the double 
taxation of income which is caused by the existence of tax losses and multiple tier 
structures, negative effects can remain for the shareholder which are related to an 
immediate increase of the tax rate imposed on the basic interest component. At least, 
this is true if the income of the subsidiary was subject to a lower taxation than in the 
state of residence of the shareholder and, based on the theoretical concept, the state 
where the income was produced. However, the latter effect is inherent in the system 
and is exactly what is intended by the application of such an alternative legislation. I 
have already outlined earlier that there are important reasons from an economic and 
equity perspective to follow such a concept and I will come back to such a “limited” 
capital export neutrality approach in the EU context in some more detail below. 
However, if one follows the jurisprudence of the ECJ and its strict approach in this 
respect, it is very likely - despite all the positive aspects - that the alternative system 
would be qualified as having a restrictive effect on investments as well.  
 
8.2.5. Justifications for Restrictions Caused by CFC Legislation  
 
The arguments for a justification of a restriction on the basic freedoms which played a 
role in the case law of the ECJ and which may be relevant in the context of this study 
were outlined in some detail in chapter 4. It is, of course, theoretically possible that 
additional arguments will be put forward in a case dealing with CFC legislation - 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the underlying case. In the following, 
the arguments which might come up in CFC cases will be examined in some more 
detail. It will be verified whether a restriction on basic freedoms caused by the 
application of CFC rules and the application of an alternative system which focuses 
on the current taxation of the basic interest component may be justified under the rule 
of reason.  
 
8.2.5.1. The Cohesion of the Tax System  
 
Based on the examinations in chapter 4, the cohesion argument is not limited 
(anymore) to ‘one and the same taxpayer’ and ‘one and the same tax,’ but can also 
be relevant in a parent-subsidiary relationship. However, the question arises whether 
there can be a direct link between a tax advantage and disadvantage in CFC cases. 
Can the lower taxation in another country be considered, in general, as a “tax 
advantage” which should be “compensated” by a “tax disadvantage” in the residence 
state of the shareholder? I do not think that this can be assumed and I do not see 
any direct link between the “advantage” of a lower tax rate in another country and the 
compensating taxation of the shareholder. Furthermore, such a general 
compensation would not be in line with the principle of proportionality, which is 
equally relevant for a justification based on fiscal cohesion.112 Otherwise, any activity 
in a country with a lower taxation and within the broad range of activities which are 
marked as passive activities or base company activities would generally be subject to 
a compensatory taxation according to the principle of fiscal cohesion. In the Cadbury 
Schweppes case, the ECJ did not deal with the justification based on fiscal cohesion 
and it seems, therefore, that it will not play any role in CFC cases.  
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specific compensation for a lower (or different) taxation in another Member State.115 
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this is true if the income of the subsidiary was subject to a lower taxation than in the 
state of residence of the shareholder and, based on the theoretical concept, the state 
where the income was produced. However, the latter effect is inherent in the system 
and is exactly what is intended by the application of such an alternative legislation. I 
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equity perspective to follow such a concept and I will come back to such a “limited” 
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However, if one follows the jurisprudence of the ECJ and its strict approach in this 
respect, it is very likely - despite all the positive aspects - that the alternative system 
would be qualified as having a restrictive effect on investments as well.  
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role in the case law of the ECJ and which may be relevant in the context of this study 
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additional arguments will be put forward in a case dealing with CFC legislation - 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the underlying case. In the following, 
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the right to set up a subsidiary in the place of its choice within the Union. A Member 
State may not, therefore, treat differently its resident companies which establish 
subsidiaries in other Member States depending on the tax rate applicable in the host 
State. That interpretation would also run counter to the approach adopted by the 
Court in Eurowings Luftverkehr and Barbier, in which it was held that low taxation 
applicable in a Member State cannot justify unfavourable tax treatment by another 
Member State and a Community national cannot be deprived of the right to rely on 
the provisions of the Treaty on the ground that he is profiting from tax advantages 
which are legally provided by the rules in force in a Member State other than his 
State of residence.”122 In general, the ECJ followed the Opinion of the Advocate 
General and confirmed the (aforementioned) previous jurisprudence. The Court 
stated that “(t)he United Kingdom, supported by the Danish, German, French, 
Portuguese, Finnish and Swedish Governments, submits that the legislation on CFCs 
is intended to counter a specific type of tax avoidance involving the artificial transfer 
by a resident company of profits from the Member State in which they were made to 
a low-tax State by means of the establishment of a subsidiary in that State and the 
effecting of transactions intended primarily to make such a transfer to that subsidiary. 
In that respect, it is settled case-law that any advantage resulting from the low 
taxation to which a subsidiary established in a Member State other than the one in 
which the parent company was incorporated is subject cannot by itself authorise that 
Member State to offset that advantage by less favourable tax treatment of the parent 
company.” 123 It is therefore quite obvious that the mere fact that the tax rate is 
different in another Member State cannot be an acceptable justification for any 
restriction on the basic freedoms.  
 
8.2.5.4. The Principle of Territoriality  
 
As already outlined in chapter 4, it should be clear that it is impossible to deduce from 
the territoriality principle that profits and losses accruing to different taxpayers can be 
offset against each other.124 In case of CFC legislation, however, the income realised 
by a different taxpayer (subsidiary company) - resident in another country - is 
attributed to the domestic shareholder (parent company). Such an income attribution 
cannot be based, in my opinion, on the principle of territoriality. The income is 
economically and legally allocable to the subsidiary company and therefore subject to 
tax in the CFC country. Clearly, the income of the subsidiary company which is 
related to the activities in the Member State of the parent company can be taxed in 
the latter country in case of a permanent establishment. This, however, is a different 
situation. The principle of territoriality is therefore rather an argument against CFC 
taxation instead of a valid justification for the application of those rules. It is rather the 
contrary argument of world-wide taxation, i.e. the economic principle of capital export 
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restriction on the right of establishment.116 Why should this be different in case of an 
investment in a CFC country?  
 
It was rather obvious that the tax rate would play a role in the Cadbury Schweppes 
case. In his Opinion to the case, Advocate General Léger made some general 
statements in this respect. He held that “(...) it may also be inferred from the case-law 
that a Member State cannot hinder the exercise of the rights of freedom of movement 
in another Member State by using the pretext of a low level of taxation in that 
State.”117 And “(...) in the absence of Community harmonisation it must be accepted 
that there is competition between tax regimes of the various Member States. That 
competition, which is reflected in particular by great disparity between the Member 
States in the rates of taxation of company profits, may have a significant impact on 
the choice of location made by companies for their activities in the European Union. It 
may be regrettable that competition operates between the Member States in this field 
without restriction. That is, however, a political matter.”118 He also referred to the 
code of conduct and made it clear that the fact that the national legislation in question 
was identified as a harmful measure in the report of the Code of Conduct group 
cannot influence the scope of the rights conferred on economic operators by Articles 
43 and 48 of the EC Treaty (now Articles 49 and 54 of the TFEU).119 The same is 
true with respect to state aid: “(...) the Treaty contains specific provisions, in Articles 
87 EC and 88 EC, intended to check the compatibility of such a measure with the 
common market and to eliminate its harmful effects on that market. The fact that such 
a system does not comply with the rules of the Treaty cannot therefore entitle a 
Member State to take unilateral measures intended to counter its effects by limiting 
freedom of movement.”120 Overall, Advocate General Léger concluded that “(...) the 
harmful effects of a total absence of harmonisation of the rates of taxation of 
company profits call (...) for a political solution and do not appear to justify, in my 
opinion, calling into question the scope of the rights conferred by Articles 43 EC and 
48 EC, as defined by case-law. I therefore find that the establishment by a company 
which is resident for tax purposes in a Member State of a subsidiary in the 
International Financial Services Centre for the avowed purpose of enjoying the more 
favourable tax regime applicable there does not, in itself, constitute an abuse of 
freedom of establishment.”121  
 
In the context of examining the hindrance to the freedom of establishment, the 
Advocate General outlined that - in response to the argument that the disparity in the 
rates of corporation tax constituted an objective difference which, therefore, justified 
the differentiated treatment - such argumentation “(...) would be tantamount to 
conceding that a Member State is entitled, without infringing the rules of the Treaty, 
to choose the other Member States in which its domestic companies may establish 
subsidiaries with the benefit of the tax regime applicable in the host State. However, 
as the applicants and Ireland have submitted, such a situation would manifestly lead 
to a result contrary to the very notion of ‘single market.’ The fixing of rates of 
corporation tax falls (...) within the unfettered competence of each Member State and 
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC confer on every company in accordance with Article 48 EC 
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Irish Government put forward such an argument - which, however, was not directly 
linked to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision - and stated that the objective pursued 
by the United Kingdom CFC legislation could be attained by less restrictive 
measures, namely the exchange of information under Council Directive 77/799/EEC 
and the double tax convention concluded between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland.130 In his response to that argument, the Advocate General held that “(i)n view 
of the particular situation covered by the legislation in question, however, I am not 
convinced that exchange of information under Directive 77/799 could be as effective 
as the legislation at issue. Likewise, I do not share the view that that legislation 
should be regarded, owing to the presumption it introduces, of imposing an 
unreasonable burden on the companies to which it applies”131 And “(...) given the 
ease with which such services can be relocated, I do not find it excessive for a 
Member State to introduce a presumption of tax avoidance instead of relying on the 
subsequent communication of information. Second, the existence of such legislation 
has the advantage of contributing to the legal certainty of economic operators. It 
enables them to know in advance that, in the aforementioned case, there is a 
presumption of tax avoidance. Those operators are thus on notice that they must be 
able to show that their subsidiary is genuinely established in the host State and that 
the transactions with the subsidiary are real.”132 In this respect, it is important to note 
that the United Kingdom CFC legislation provides a substantial number of exceptions 
from current taxation. It is therefore likely that the number of potentially wholly 
artificial arrangements increases within the remaining types of investment (after the 
“filtering”). Here, the domestic taxpayer has the burden of proof and must show that 
the investments are in fact not wholly artificial arrangements but genuine activities 
which are carried out in the host Member State. Such an approach does not seem, in 
general, to be unreasonable. It was already determined in the Marks & Spencer case 
that - as a less restrictive measure - the taxpayer might be required to demonstrate 
that certain conditions are fulfilled in order to be allowed to deduct losses incurred by 
its non-resident subsidiaries.133 I agree with the position of the Advocate General that 
a system which is based on information exchange is definitely less effective than the 
application of CFC rules. Again, the argumentation was not explicitly based on the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, but it goes in a similar direction.  
 
8.2.5.7. The Aim of Preventing Tax Avoidance 
 
In the following, the justification which is based on the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance in CFC cases will be examined separately for the freedom of 
establishment and the free movement of capital. It is not required, in my opinion, to 
discuss the justification which is based on the aim of preventing tax avoidance 
separately for the freedom to provide services. In this regard, the result under Article 
56 of the TFEU should not be different from the result under Article 49 of the TFEU. 
 
a.) The freedom of establishment 
 
With respect to CFC legislation it is again quite informative to have a look at the de 
Lasteyrie du Saillant case. Here, the ECJ criticised that the French legislation in 
question cannot “(…) without greatly exceeding what is necessary in order to achieve 
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8.2.5.5. The Protection of a Balanced Allocation of the Power to Impose Taxes 
between Member States 
 
The protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States can, in my opinion, not be put forward as a valid argument in CFC 
cases. In fact, the allocation of the income which is related to the activity component 
and the risk component leads to the result that foreign income is taxed in the hands 
of the shareholder which should be, in my opinion, outside of the scope of taxation in 
the residence state of the shareholder. Moreover, chapter 6 shows that CFC rules 
can lead to a number of disadvantages for the taxpayer and often provide for a 
different treatment of positive and negative CFC income. Such regimes do not 
contribute, therefore, to a symmetrical system of taxation. In other words, the income 
derived through a CFC is by no means treated ‘as if the profits and losses are two 
sides of the same coin’.125 The balanced allocation of power is therefore rather an 
argument against the application of CFC regimes, but cannot be put forward in favour 
of the application of such regimes.  
 
8.2.5.6. The Effectiveness of Fiscal Supervision 
 
The justification which is based on the effectiveness of fiscal supervision was 
rejected in a number of cases.126 The reason is that the Council Directive 
77/799/EEC concerning mutual assistance by the competent authorities of the 
Member States in the field of direct taxation provides sufficient means to obtain all 
the necessary information related to the investment in other Member States.127 
However, it was outlined in chapter 4 that the Council Directive 77/799/EEC is only of 
relevance in the relationship between Member States and, therefore, a differentiation 
can be required with respect to a justification for a restriction in case of an investment 
in another Member State and an investment in a third country.128 Moreover, the fact 
that the obligation of information exchange may also be stipulated bilaterally, e.g. in 
double tax conventions, between Member States and between Member States and 
third countries, makes it - in my opinion - also necessary to differentiate between third 
countries. However, I will deal with the justifications in the context of investments in 
third countries separately in some more detail below. 
 
In principle, if the situation is related to an investment in another Member State there 
is nothing to prevent the tax authorities from requiring the taxpayer himself to provide 
all the necessary information related to his investments.129. Thus, if the focus is just 
on the investment in other Member States, the question arises whether the 
aforementioned tools (Council Directive 77/799/EEC, double tax convention, 
obligation of the taxpayer based on domestic legislation to provide all of the required 
information) are not less restrictive means to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision than the application of CFC rules. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the 
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for protectionism.139 An acceptable anti-avoidance legislation must, therefore, be 
concentrated on specific situations and arrangements and cannot be applied 
generally to a great number of situations which are not aimed at circumventing the 
law. In any event, the provision of genuine services by a subsidiary company to the 
parent company cannot be regarded, in itself, as tax avoidance.140 Those services 
will be determined under normal competitive conditions, i.e. transfer pricing rules 
apply to the provision of such inter-company services.141 The Advocate General 
therefore made a clear distinction between the services in question and the situation 
in the Marks & Spencer case where the ECJ accepted that the transfer of losses of a 
non-resident subsidiary to a resident parent company entails the risk of tax 
avoidance.142 He stated that “(t)he risk of tax avoidance in connection with such 
transactions is not therefore comparable to that which would be created by the 
transfer of losses of foreign subsidiaries to a resident parent company, at issue in the 
Marks and Spencer case, (...) since such a transfer of losses would be done by 
means of merely adjusting the accounts. Transactions between a CFC and its parent 
company which result in reducing the taxable profits of the latter can therefore be 
regarded as tax avoidance only if the establishment of that subsidiary and those 
transactions constitute (...) a wholly artificial arrangement aimed at circumventing 
national legislation. Likewise, in my view, the fact that a company centralises in 
another Member State with a low tax rate the carrying on of certain activities of use to 
the entire group and seeks by that means to reduce the group’s overall tax burden 
does not in itself constitute abuse. In such a case, as long as the subsidiary 
responsible for those intragroup services is carrying on genuine economic activity in 
the host State, under the tax sovereignty of which it falls, the territorial allocation of 
the Member States’ power to impose taxes is not, a priori, affected. The loss of 
taxable profits affecting the State of origin is the result of the economic activity which 
is carried out in the host State and taxed by that State.”143 The assessment whether 
there is a wholly artificial arrangement or not must be made on a case-by-case basis 
and cannot be generalised. The criteria which can be used for the separation 
between wholly artificial arrangements and non-artificial arrangements have been 
outlined earlier in some detail.  
 
The Advocate General examined further whether the United Kingdom CFC legislation 
is suitable for counteracting tax avoidance and whether it goes beyond what is 
necessary for that purpose. In this respect, it is not surprising that the legislation is 
considered to be suitable for guaranteeing the fulfilment of the purpose - given the 
fact that the low-taxed profit of the CFC is included in the domestic tax base of the 
parent company.144 Such an approach completely eliminates the effect of a lower 
taxation in the other country. The question whether the legislation goes beyond what 
is necessary to achieve that purpose is more sophisticated. As already mentioned 
earlier, the United Kingdom CFC legislation - in the version which was relevant for 
the decision in Cadbury Schweppes - provided a substantial number of exceptions to 
the current taxation of income. The CFC income was not subject to current taxation if 
the subsidiary followed an ‘acceptable distribution policy’, was engaged in certain 
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the aim which it pursues, assume an intention to circumvent French tax law on the 
part of every taxpayer who transfers his tax domicile outside France. Similarly, a 
taxpayer who sells his securities before the expiry of the five-year period following his 
departure from France will also be liable for the tax (…), even if he has no intention of 
returning to that Member State (…). Moreover, the objective envisaged, namely 
preventing a taxpayer from temporarily transferring his tax residence before selling 
securities with the sole aim of avoiding payment of the tax on increases in value due 
in France, may be achieved by measures that are less coercive or less restrictive of 
the freedom of establishment, relating specifically to the risk of such a temporary 
transfer. As the Advocate General has pointed out in paragraph 64 of his Opinion, 
the French authorities could, for example, provide for the taxation of taxpayers 
returning to France after realising their increases in value during a relatively brief stay 
in another Member State, which would avoid affecting the position of taxpayers 
having no aim other than the bona fide exercise of their freedom of establishment in 
another Member State. ”134 Pursuant to the Advocate General, “(t)he return after a 
short stay would show that it was temporary and would thwart exactly the conduct 
complained of by the French authorities, without affecting the situation of taxpayers 
whose only aim is to exercise in good faith their freedom of establishment (…). By 
collecting the tax on the date of return, which would take place, by definition, shortly 
after the sale of the shares in the course of a brief stay in another Member State, the 
Member State concerned would, so to speak, draw the appropriate conclusion from 
the sham location where the capital gain is realised in another Member State by 
treating it as if it had actually taken place in France.”135 Leaving aside the fact that 
such a legislative concept might be in conflict with a double tax convention concluded 
between France and the other Member State,136 the decision shows that it is clearly 
required to narrow the scope of the respective legislation to those cases in which the 
probability of abuse is very high. The fact that the taxpayer moves to another 
Member State, disposes his shares, and returns to France after a short stay in the 
other Member State is not necessarily an abusive arrangement. Therefore, the 
proposed legislation does not completely eliminate the possibility of arrangements 
being covered by the legislation which are not wholly artificial. However, the decision 
confirms the outcome of previous cases: legislation which generally applies to a great 
number of situations which are not aimed at the circumvention of domestic law 
cannot be justified by the aim of preventing tax avoidance.137  
 
Obviously, the focus on ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ also plays a key role in CFC 
cases. In this respect, it is again of great interest to have a look at the Cadbury 
Schweppes case and the position of Advocate General Léger in his Opinion to the 
case. It is clear from the case that the purpose of the United Kingdom CFC legislation 
is to “counteract tax avoidance.”138 The Advocate General made therefore a detailed 
verification whether the hindrance to the freedom of establishment may be justified by 
the counteraction of tax avoidance. In this respect, he made it clear that focusing on 
wholly artificial arrangements in the case law of the ECJ may be understood as being 
intended to prevent the counteraction of tax avoidance from being used as a pretext 
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whether the ‘motive test’ enables the taxpayer to provide this proof. From the 
perspective of the Advocate General, it is not sufficiently clear whether the motive 
test really provides for such a possibility. Thus, he concluded that “(...) we do not 
know for sure if the first limb of that test, regarding the services which have resulted 
in a significant reduction in the tax due in the United Kingdom, enables the taxpayer 
to exempt itself by providing proof of the reality of those services. Likewise, it is not 
clear whether the second limb relates to the subjective motives of those concerned or 
whether it can be satisfied where the taxpayer proves that the subsidiary is genuinely 
established in the host State. At this stage I am of the opinion that it is for the national 
court, which has the tax of determining the compatibility with Community law of its 
national law on CFCs, to assess whether the motive test may be given an 
interpretation which makes it possible to limit the application of that law to artificial 
arrangements intended to circumvent national law.”149  
 
It is not surprising that the ECJ - in the decision to the Cadbury Schweppes case - 
went exactly into the same direction. The Court confirmed, once more, that the mere 
fact of establishing a subsidiary company in another Member State cannot set up a 
general presumption of tax evasion or tax avoidance.150 A national measure 
restricting the freedom of establishment can be justified, though, if it specifically 
relates to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing national legislation.151 
Thus, if the CFC is just a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine 
economic activity in the territory of the host Member State - like, for example, in case 
of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary - it must be regarded as a wholly artificial 
arrangement which can be subject to CFC taxation. In contrast thereto, the 
investment must be excluded from CFC taxation if, despite the existence of tax 
motives, the incorporation of the CFC reflects economic reality.152 The Court stated 
that “(t)he resident company, which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an 
opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its 
activities are genuine.”153 This is, in my opinion, a very important and far reaching 
conclusion, because it makes it necessary, as already outlined above, that CFC 
legislation provides the possibility of rebutting the presumptions. However, such a 
possibility is usually not provided by CFC regimes - as described in chapter 6 - and it 
seems to me that it is not necessarily provided by the United Kingdom motive test, 
either. The reason is very simple: there may still be a genuine economic activity in 
the host Member State despite the fact that the main reasons for the structure were 
tax reasons. However, the ECJ concluded that it is up to the national court to 
determine whether the motive test leads to an interpretation which enables the 
taxation provided for by that legislation to be restricted to wholly artificial 
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‘exempt activities’, satisfied the ‘public quotation condition’, or the chargeable profits 
did not exceed a certain threshold. In addition, the legislation provided a ‘motive test’ 
which led to an exception from current taxation if the taxpayer fulfilled two conditions 
(i.e. both conditions had to be fulfilled at the same time): 
 
- the taxpayer must show that the reduction in United Kingdom tax was not the 
main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of those transactions; and 
 
- the taxpayer must show that it was not the main reason, or one of the main 
reasons, for the subsidiary’s existence in the accounting period to a achieve a 
reduction in United Kingdom tax by means of the diversion of profits. 
According to the legislation, a diversion of profits exists if it is reasonable to 
suppose that, had the subsidiary or any related non-United Kingdom resident 
company not existed, their receipts would have been received by, and been 
taxable in the hands of, a United Kingdom resident.145 
 
Given the ease with which such inter-company services can be relocated to other 
(low-tax) countries, the number of exceptions provided by the United Kingdom CFC 
legislation, and the fact that other measures - like information exchange based on the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC and on the respective double tax convention - are less 
effective, the Advocate General does not consider it excessive to introduce a 
presumption of tax avoidance instead of relying on the subsequent communication of 
information.146 As already stated earlier, the fact that the CFC regime only applies to 
low-tax countries and the fact that it offers a substantial number of exceptions 
ensures that there is a “filtering” of investments. In my opinion, the better the filtering, 
the higher the percentage of potentially wholly artificial arrangements in the 
remaining “basket of investments.” However, this exactly is, in my opinion, the crucial 
aspect: if there is no real filtering of investments, because the legislation is often 
applied in an undifferentiated way to investments in low-tax countries, the respective 
legislation cannot be considered to specifically focus on wholly artificial 
arrangements. On the other hand, even if the legislation provides a substantial 
number of exceptions, it cannot be excluded that investments which remain in the 
basket are nonetheless genuine activities which are carried out in the host Member 
State and which are far from having to be classified as wholly artificial arrangements. 
Therefore, it is unavoidable - and this is also the conclusion of the Advocate General 
- that there is a real possibility to show that the investments which remain in the 
basket (after the filtering) are nonetheless genuine activities. Hence, the Advocate 
General stated that “(...) what is important is that the presumption set up by the law in 
question may in fact be rebutted. As several Member states and the Commission 
have rightly noted, the fact that none of the first four exceptions apply and that the 
transactions between the subsidiary and its parent company have resulted in a 
significant reduction in the tax due in the United Kingdom does not suffice to show 
the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement.”147 And “(...) the taxable person must 
be able to provide that proof in accordance with the rules of evidence under national 
law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not thereby undermined.”148 
The decisive question in case of the United Kingdom CFC legislation is therefore 
                                            
145 It has to be noted, though, that the United Kingdom CFC legislation will be amended significantly. This will 
be outlined in section 8.5.4. 
146 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 136 to 140.  
147 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 143.  
148 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 145. 
CFC Legislation and European Union Law
447
   
 
whether the ‘motive test’ enables the taxpayer to provide this proof. From the 
perspective of the Advocate General, it is not sufficiently clear whether the motive 
test really provides for such a possibility. Thus, he concluded that “(...) we do not 
know for sure if the first limb of that test, regarding the services which have resulted 
in a significant reduction in the tax due in the United Kingdom, enables the taxpayer 
to exempt itself by providing proof of the reality of those services. Likewise, it is not 
clear whether the second limb relates to the subjective motives of those concerned or 
whether it can be satisfied where the taxpayer proves that the subsidiary is genuinely 
established in the host State. At this stage I am of the opinion that it is for the national 
court, which has the tax of determining the compatibility with Community law of its 
national law on CFCs, to assess whether the motive test may be given an 
interpretation which makes it possible to limit the application of that law to artificial 
arrangements intended to circumvent national law.”149  
 
It is not surprising that the ECJ - in the decision to the Cadbury Schweppes case - 
went exactly into the same direction. The Court confirmed, once more, that the mere 
fact of establishing a subsidiary company in another Member State cannot set up a 
general presumption of tax evasion or tax avoidance.150 A national measure 
restricting the freedom of establishment can be justified, though, if it specifically 
relates to wholly artificial arrangements aimed at circumventing national legislation.151 
Thus, if the CFC is just a fictitious establishment not carrying out any genuine 
economic activity in the territory of the host Member State - like, for example, in case 
of a ‘letterbox’ or ‘front’ subsidiary - it must be regarded as a wholly artificial 
arrangement which can be subject to CFC taxation. In contrast thereto, the 
investment must be excluded from CFC taxation if, despite the existence of tax 
motives, the incorporation of the CFC reflects economic reality.152 The Court stated 
that “(t)he resident company, which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an 
opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its 
activities are genuine.”153 This is, in my opinion, a very important and far reaching 
conclusion, because it makes it necessary, as already outlined above, that CFC 
legislation provides the possibility of rebutting the presumptions. However, such a 
possibility is usually not provided by CFC regimes - as described in chapter 6 - and it 
seems to me that it is not necessarily provided by the United Kingdom motive test, 
either. The reason is very simple: there may still be a genuine economic activity in 
the host Member State despite the fact that the main reasons for the structure were 
tax reasons. However, the ECJ concluded that it is up to the national court to 
determine whether the motive test leads to an interpretation which enables the 
taxation provided for by that legislation to be restricted to wholly artificial 
                                            
149 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 149, 150. The fact 
that the Advocate General refers in paragraph 150 to “artificial arrangements” instead of “wholly artificial 
arrangements” (like in paragraph 108) should not be of any relevance, because he finally concluded that the 
focus must be on “wholly artificial arrangements” (see paragraph 152). The ECJ does not consistently stick to 
the latter term in its subsequent case law, either. For example, in the SGI decision (case C-311/08) the ECJ used 
the word “purely” instead of “wholly” (paragraph 66) and even omitted the words “purely / wholly” and only 
referred to “artificial arrangements” (paragraphs 67, 71). However, in those situations where it was omitted the 
ECJ referred to previous decisions which included the words “purely / wholly”(e.g. the reference in paragraph 67 
of the SGI decision to paragraph 58 of the Oy AA decision). In my view, the fact that the words “purely / wholly” 
were omitted from time to time should not be understood as a change in the case law of the ECJ.     
150 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 50. 
151 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 51. 
152 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 65 to 68. 
153 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 70. 
   
 
‘exempt activities’, satisfied the ‘public quotation condition’, or the chargeable profits 
did not exceed a certain threshold. In addition, the legislation provided a ‘motive test’ 
which led to an exception from current taxation if the taxpayer fulfilled two conditions 
(i.e. both conditions had to be fulfilled at the same time): 
 
- the taxpayer must show that the reduction in United Kingdom tax was not the 
main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of those transactions; and 
 
- the taxpayer must show that it was not the main reason, or one of the main 
reasons, for the subsidiary’s existence in the accounting period to a achieve a 
reduction in United Kingdom tax by means of the diversion of profits. 
According to the legislation, a diversion of profits exists if it is reasonable to 
suppose that, had the subsidiary or any related non-United Kingdom resident 
company not existed, their receipts would have been received by, and been 
taxable in the hands of, a United Kingdom resident.145 
 
Given the ease with which such inter-company services can be relocated to other 
(low-tax) countries, the number of exceptions provided by the United Kingdom CFC 
legislation, and the fact that other measures - like information exchange based on the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC and on the respective double tax convention - are less 
effective, the Advocate General does not consider it excessive to introduce a 
presumption of tax avoidance instead of relying on the subsequent communication of 
information.146 As already stated earlier, the fact that the CFC regime only applies to 
low-tax countries and the fact that it offers a substantial number of exceptions 
ensures that there is a “filtering” of investments. In my opinion, the better the filtering, 
the higher the percentage of potentially wholly artificial arrangements in the 
remaining “basket of investments.” However, this exactly is, in my opinion, the crucial 
aspect: if there is no real filtering of investments, because the legislation is often 
applied in an undifferentiated way to investments in low-tax countries, the respective 
legislation cannot be considered to specifically focus on wholly artificial 
arrangements. On the other hand, even if the legislation provides a substantial 
number of exceptions, it cannot be excluded that investments which remain in the 
basket are nonetheless genuine activities which are carried out in the host Member 
State and which are far from having to be classified as wholly artificial arrangements. 
Therefore, it is unavoidable - and this is also the conclusion of the Advocate General 
- that there is a real possibility to show that the investments which remain in the 
basket (after the filtering) are nonetheless genuine activities. Hence, the Advocate 
General stated that “(...) what is important is that the presumption set up by the law in 
question may in fact be rebutted. As several Member states and the Commission 
have rightly noted, the fact that none of the first four exceptions apply and that the 
transactions between the subsidiary and its parent company have resulted in a 
significant reduction in the tax due in the United Kingdom does not suffice to show 
the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement.”147 And “(...) the taxable person must 
be able to provide that proof in accordance with the rules of evidence under national 
law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not thereby undermined.”148 
The decisive question in case of the United Kingdom CFC legislation is therefore 
                                            
145 It has to be noted, though, that the United Kingdom CFC legislation will be amended significantly. This will 
be outlined in section 8.5.4. 
146 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraphs 136 to 140.  
147 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 143.  
148 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 145. 
Chapter 8
448
   
 
such legislation to other states where group companies are established. 
Overall, it can be summarised that the Finnish legislation in the Oy AA case - 
applied in an international context - would provide almost unlimited 
possibilities of transferring income from Finland to other states and to reduce 
the Finnish tax base.  
 
- In my opinion, the most obvious justification for the restriction on the freedom 
of establishment caused by the Finnish legislation is the safeguarding of the 
balanced allocation of power to impose taxes between Member States. I have 
already made it clear in section 4.2.10.3.8. that, in my opinion, it was 
unnecessary to create a link to the justification based on the aim of preventing 
tax avoidance. In essence, the safeguarding of the balanced allocation of the 
power to impose taxes requires that not only the transfers without any 
economic reality are restricted, but also the transfers with an economic reality. 
For example, there may be very important and valid economic reasons why 
Oy AA transfers financial means to the company in the UK. However, in both 
cases it is difficult to argue that the Finnish domestic tax base has 
(necessarily) to be reduced by the amount of financial transfer. For this 
reason, the Finnish legislation - applied cross-border - may involve tax 
avoidance schemes, but this is only a part of the whole picture. It is therefore 
logical that the legislation cannot be specifically designed to target wholly 
artificial arrangements, because it must also exclude other (non-artificial) 
transfers from the tax advantage. Hence, it is completely misleading to put 
forward the aim of preventing tax avoidance in a situation in which another 
justification, namely the safeguarding of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States, requires a much broader scope. For this reason, I do not see 
that the settled case law with respect to the aim of preventing tax avoidance 
and the necessity of specifically designed measures to target wholly artificial 
arrangements was changed by the Oy AA decision.   
 
- The impact of CFC investments is by no means comparable to the impact 
which the Finnish legislation might have in an international context. CFC 
investments can lead to a transfer of income only by way of relocating 
functions and risks to another company in another state, but not merely 
because of an ‘income transfer’ decided by the taxpayer. The protection of the 
balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes is therefore, as already 
outlined above, of no relevance in case of CFC investments.  
 
b.) The free movement of capital 
 
Based on the earlier conclusions, the investment in the CFC will not be within the 
scope of the freedom of establishment but can be within the scope of the free 
movement of capital if the shareholder has just a minority interest in the CFC which 
does not provide definite influence over the company’s decisions. In my opinion, the 
outcome in such a situation should not be different. The taxpayer should still have the 
possibility to provide the proof that it is not just a wholly artificial arrangement. If the 
shareholder is able to do so, there is no possibility of treating the investment in the 
CFC different from any other domestic investment (or an investment in a third 
Member State) where the CFC rules are not applicable. Thus, if such an approach is 
appropriate and proportionate in the context of the freedom of establishment, there is 
no reason, in my opinion, why it should be different for the free movement of capital. 
   
 
arrangements.154 With respect to the United Kingdom CFC regime and the 
interpretation of the motive test it is therefore interesting to follow the (domestic) 
developments in the Vodafone case. Here, the High Court decided that Vodafone 
does not have to pay UK corporation tax on the attributed CFC income after the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision and 
ruled that the United Kingdom CFC regime should be interpreted as if it had a new 
exception for companies established in the EEA which carry on ‘genuine economic 
activities’ there. This means that the CFC rules will still apply to companies outside 
the EEA and also to EEA companies without genuine economic activities.155 In 
essence, the exception based on a genuine economic activity is therefore to be seen 
differently from the motive test established in the United Kingdom CFC legislation.   
 
The question arises whether the strict limitation for the application of CFC rules to 
‘wholly artificial arrangements’ is still valid after the more recent ECJ decisions in the 
field of indirect taxation (the Part Service case and the Ampliscientifica case) and 
direct taxation (the Oy AA case). In this regard, I have outlined in section 4.2.9. that a 
differentiation is required between the concept of abuse in cases dealing with indirect 
taxation and cases dealing with direct taxation. In VAT cases, the national court has 
to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the tax motive is essential 
compared to other non-tax explanations (such as economic objectives). For this 
reason, the structure can be considered abusive from a VAT perspective despite the 
fact that economic objectives exist (if the tax reasons are the principal aim of the 
structure).156 In contrast thereto, if a CFC is genuinely established in another state, it 
does not play a role whether or not the saving of (income) taxes was the principal aim 
of the relocation.157 In the latter case, it is only decisive whether or not the CFC is 
genuinely established in the other state. For this reason, I do not see that the more 
recent decisions of the ECJ in VAT cases change the outcome with respect to CFC 
investments.   
 
It is important to note, though, that in the Oy AA case - a case dealing with direct 
taxation - the ECJ considered the Finnish legislation in question to be proportionate 
despite the fact that the legislation was not restricted to wholly artificial arrangements. 
However, there are important aspects which have to be considered: 
 
- The Finnish legislation in the Oy AA case provided the possibility of making an 
intra-group financial transfer from the subsidiary company to the parent 
company (and vice versa) which can be treated - for tax purposes - as an 
expense of the transferor and income of the transferee. This gives the 
taxpayer(s) the opportunity to transfer income between group companies 
almost without any limitation. The financial transfer is neither related to the 
supply of services nor similar transactions and would not be restricted - in an 
international context - by transfer pricing rules.158 It is therefore obvious that 
the unrestricted acceptance of such legislation in a cross-border situation 
would allow the taxpayer(s) to shift income freely from the state which applies 
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155 See for further details: United Kingdom, Vodafone Loses UK Tax Appeal, European Tax Service (May) 
2009; see in this context also Coutinho, Vodafone 2: Does it Matter?, Tax Planning International Review (July) 
2008.  
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such legislation to other states where group companies are established. 
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international agreements - and have concluded many bilateral conventions based, in 
particular, on the model conventions on income and wealth tax drawn up by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’).” 160 However, 
this can only be understood as an acceptance of the OECD methods of eliminating 
double taxation, but not more than that. It can by no means be seen as the “green 
light” for the application of CFC rules which, of course, is not only a matter of 
avoidance of double taxation but, in essence, a matter of attribution and taxation of 
foreign income derived through a separate taxpayer.  
 
In the Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation case the ECJ again dealt with the 
application of the credit method in the light of the TFEU. One of the questions 
referred for a preliminary ruling by the national court was the question whether it is 
contrary to Article 49 or Article 63 of the TFEU to keep in force and apply measures 
which exempt dividends received by a resident company from another resident 
company from corporation tax and which subject dividends received by a resident 
company from a company resident in another Member State to corporation tax.161 
Thus, it is essentially the question whether the application of the credit method on 
dividends from foreign companies results in a less favourable treatment compared to 
the application of the exemption method on dividends from domestic companies. In 
its response, the ECJ repeated what had already been stated in the Keller Holding 
decision: despite the possibility under Directive 90/435/EEC to apply, alternatively, 
the credit method or the exemption method the decision “(…) may be exercised only 
in compliance with the fundamental provisions of the Treaty, in particular those 
relating to freedom of establishment.”162  Finally, the Court came to the conclusion 
that “(…) in the case of the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the 
fact that nationally-sourced dividends are subject to an exemption system and 
foreign-sourced dividends are subject to an imputation system does not contravene 
the principle of freedom of establishment (…), provided that the tax rate applied to 
foreign-sourced dividends is not higher than the rate applied to nationally-sourced 
dividends and that the tax credit is at least equal to the amount paid in the Member 
State of the company making the distribution, up to the limit of the tax charged in the 
Member State of the company receiving the dividends.”163 The outcome of this case 
is important since it opens the possibility for the Member States - under certain 
circumstances - to apply different methods for the avoidance of double taxation for 
cross-border dividends (credit method) and domestic dividends (exemption method). 
The aforementioned conclusion was, in principle, confirmed in the Columbus 
Container decision. Also in this case, the Court accepted that that the national 
legislation may choose between the two methods for the avoidance of double 
taxation of income derived through a PE, e.g. - like in this case - with a link to the tax 
rate in the PE state. However, such an approach requires that the taxation of the 
foreign PE income is not higher than the comparable taxation of domestic PE 
income. Thus, in both cases - Columbus Container and Test Claimants in the FII 
Group Litigation - the Court made it clear that the free choice of the state of residence 
to determine the method for the avoidance of double taxation requires that the 
amount of (dividend / PE) income is not subject to a tax disadvantage compared to a 
purely domestic situation. 
                                            
160 Case C-336/96 (Gilly), paragraphs 23, 24.  
161 Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraph 31.  
162 Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraph 46; case C-471/04 (Keller Holding), 
paragraph 45.  
163 Case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation), paragraph 57. 
   
 
The fact that the latter basic freedom does not explicitly require the carrying out of an 
economic activity does not change anything: if the CFC provides services to the 
shareholder, as is the case in Cadbury Schweppes, the aforementioned principles 
have to be fulfilled. The fact that Article 63 of the TFEU is affected and not Article 49 
of the TFEU - because of the lack of definite influence over the company’s decisions - 
should not lead to the outcome that there are less restrictive criteria with respect to 
the genuine establishment of the CFC in the other state. The fulfilment of the criteria 
shows that the CFC provides genuine services from within the state of establishment 
and, therefore, does not require any application of an anti-avoidance legislation 
(because there is no tax avoidance).  
 
If, for example, the sole purpose and activity of a subsidiary company in another state 
is the holding of certain assets without exercising any other functions, it has to be 
concluded - based on the principles outlined earlier - that this cannot be considered 
an economic activity and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the freedom of 
establishment. However, the investment can be covered by the free movement of 
capital since the exercising of an economic activity is not one of the requirements in 
order to come within the scope of Article 63 of the TFEU. However, this does not 
answer the question whether the anti-avoidance legislation can be applied on the 
income derived from the mere holding of assets or not. Here, the conclusions from 
the Cadbury Schweppes decision are equally important and relevant. For example, if 
it turns out that there is no physical presence of the CFC in the other state it can 
hardly be argued - under such circumstances - that the avoidance of income taxation 
in the state of residence of the shareholder must be accepted by the latter Member 
State. In such a case, the presumptions provided by CFC regimes are acceptable, in 
the same way as outlined above, and the taxpayer is obliged - and must have the 
right - to provide the proof that the structure in question is not a wholly artificial 
arrangement. 
 
8.2.5.8. The Principle of World-Wide Taxation  
 
It is obvious, in my opinion, that the principle of world-wide taxation (or fiscal 
neutrality) might be put forward as an argument for the application of CFC rules. The 
concept of world-wide taxation is based on the economic principle of capital export 
neutrality which was outlined in the earlier chapters. It is, in general, true that the ECJ 
accepted the principle of world-wide taxation and the OECD tax credit system as a 
method of eliminating double taxation within the EU in a number of cases.159 
However, this does not necessarily result in the acceptance of a regime which 
focuses on the piercing of the corporate veil of non-resident companies. In the Gilly 
case, for example, the Court stated that “(w)hilst abolition of double taxation within 
the Community is (…) one of the objectives of the Treaty, it must none the less be 
noted that (…) no unifying or harmonising measure for the elimination of double 
taxation has yet been adopted at Community level, nor have the Member States yet 
concluded any multilateral convention to that effect under Article 220 of the Treaty. 
The Member States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation on income 
and wealth with a view to eliminating double taxation - by means, inter alia, of 
                                            
159 Some of the cases dealt with the taxation of individuals, such as case C-279/93 (Schumacker), case C-336/96 
(Gilly), case C-391/97 (Gschwind) and case C-87/99 (Zurstrassen). Other cases dealt with the taxation of 
entities, such as case C-168/01 (Bosal Holding), case C-446/03 (Marks & Spencer), case C196/04 (Cadbury 
Schweppes), case C-446/04 (Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation) and case C-298/05 (Columbus 
Container). 
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more than the total amount which would have been paid by the economic unit 
comprising the parent company and its subsidiaries if those subsidiaries had been 
established in the United Kingdom does not affect that analysis. The fact does not 
eliminate the unequal treatment at the level of the parent companies.”167 In its 
decision, the ECJ finally confirmed the position of the Advocate General and held 
that “(e)ven taking into account (...) the fact (...) that such a resident company does 
not pay, on the profits of a CFC within the scope of application of that legislation, 
more tax than that which would have been payable on those profits if they had been 
made by a subsidiary established in the United Kingdom, the fact remains that under 
such legislation the resident company is taxed on profits of another legal person. 
That is not the case for a resident company with a subsidiary taxed in the United 
Kingdom or a subsidiary established outside that Member State which is not subject 
to a lower level of taxation.”168 Hence, the concept of fiscal neutrality - as put forward 
in this case - cannot be accepted as a justification for a restriction on the basic 
freedoms if it is applied in an inconsistent manner and therefore results in a different 
treatment - depending upon on the place of investment. Therefore, one of the 
important differences between Cadbury Schweppes and Columbus Container is the 
fact that in the latter case there is no different treatment of the income derived 
through a foreign PE and income derived through a domestic PE. In both situations, 
the income is directly attributed and taxed in the hands of the resident taxpayer 
(partner in the partnership). This is not true for the CFC legislation in Cadbury 
Schweppes: here, only the income of the CFC is attributed, but not the income of a 
comparable domestic entity.  
 
8.2.5.9. Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States 
 
The question whether the aforementioned justifications have to be seen in a different 
light for CFC investments in non-member states is of importance for investments 
which are within the scope of the free movement of capital. It was outlined in chapter 
4 that a differentiated approach towards third countries can, in principle, be required. 
The ECJ made this clear in a number of cases.169 However, it is still necessary, also 
in case of investments in third countries, for the restrictive measure to be appropriate 
and proportionate.170  
 
In the Cadbury Schweppes decision, the ECJ stated that “(t)he resident company, 
which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an opportunity to produce 
evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its activities are genuine.”171 
And “(i)n the light of the evidence furnished by the resident company, the competent 
national authorities have the opportunity, for the purposes of obtaining the necessary 
information on the CFC’s real situation, of resorting to the procedures for 
collaboration and exchange of information between national tax administrations 
introduced by legal instruments such as those referred to by Ireland in its written 
                                            
167 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04 - Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 76. 
168 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 45.  
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The acceptance of OECD principles in the jurisprudence of the ECJ is apparent, but 
this cannot be interpreted as a general compliance of the OECD model tax 
convention and the OECD principles with EU law.164 However, the question arises 
whether the Columbus Container decision already provides the basis for a general 
and systematic piercing of the corporate veil. The reason is that the Belgian limited 
partnership in the Columbus Container case is a hybrid entity which is considered an 
entity under Belgian law, but a transparent partnership under German law. However, 
in Columbus Container the Belgian partnership was considered to be transparent 
because of an ‘analogy comparison’ (Typenvergleich). That means the foreign 
organisation form is compared to the domestic organisation form and, based on that 
comparison, the qualification is made. Hence, what is treated to be transparent in a 
domestic situation would also be treated to be transparent in a cross-border situation 
- without considering the qualification in the host state. This leads to a comparable 
treatment of investments from the perspective of the state of residence of the 
shareholder. If the state of residence considered all foreign entities to be transparent 
(in order to ensure the current taxation of income) this would result in a different 
treatment of foreign and domestic entities and would therefore not be in line with EU 
law. In contrast thereto, if the residence state (theoretically) focused only on the 
qualification in the host state (instead of an analogy comparison), this would by no 
means provide any (broad) basis for the current taxation of income. Instead, it would 
result in a rather unstructured concept of income allocation which, again, would treat 
foreign and domestic activities differently. Overall, it seems that the Columbus 
Container decision is not the key for a general and systematic current taxation of 
income. 
 
The principle of world-wide taxation also played a role in the Cadbury Schweppes 
case. Here, the United Kingdom submitted that the legislation should be compared 
only to a United Kingdom resident company and, supported by other Member States, 
the legislation could not be considered discriminatory because the tax claimed from 
the company was no more than the total amount which would have been paid by that 
company and its subsidiaries if those subsidiaries had been established in the United 
Kingdom. The economic effect on Cadbury’s resources is thus the same in both 
cases.165 According to those Member States, the CFC legislation pursues an 
objective of fiscal neutrality, by arranging for the overall tax burden on the economic 
unit consisting of a United Kingdom parent company and its subsidiaries to be 
identical, irrespective of whether the subsidiaries are established in the United 
Kingdom or in another Member State.166 In response to this argument, Advocate 
General Léger stated that “(t)he fact that the tax claimed from Cadbury would be no 
                                            
164 See in this respect also the Opinion of the Advocate General to case C-324/00 (Lankhorst-Hohorst), 
paragraphs 80, 81. Advocate General Mischo pointed out that “(…) the fact that the rules are consistent with the 
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are in fact the same. Admittedly, noting precludes an interpretation the EC Treaty, so far as possible, in 
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taxation of dividends in the state of source and the state of residence, the ECJ made it clear that “(…) the Court 
does not have jurisdiction, under Article 234 EC, to rule on a possible infringement , by a contracting Member 
State, of provisions of bilateral conventions entered into by the Member States to eliminate or mitigate the 
negative effects of the coexistence of national regimes (…). Nor may the Court examine the relationship between 
a national measure and the provisions of a double tax convention (…) since that question does not fall within the 
scope of the interpretation of Community law” (case C-128/08 (Damseaux), paragraph 22). 
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more than the total amount which would have been paid by the economic unit 
comprising the parent company and its subsidiaries if those subsidiaries had been 
established in the United Kingdom does not affect that analysis. The fact does not 
eliminate the unequal treatment at the level of the parent companies.”167 In its 
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that “(e)ven taking into account (...) the fact (...) that such a resident company does 
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treatment - depending upon on the place of investment. Therefore, one of the 
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Schweppes: here, only the income of the CFC is attributed, but not the income of a 
comparable domestic entity.  
 
8.2.5.9. Justifications and the Investment in Non-Member States 
 
The question whether the aforementioned justifications have to be seen in a different 
light for CFC investments in non-member states is of importance for investments 
which are within the scope of the free movement of capital. It was outlined in chapter 
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In the Cadbury Schweppes decision, the ECJ stated that “(t)he resident company, 
which is best placed for that purpose, must be given an opportunity to produce 
evidence that the CFC is actually established and that its activities are genuine.”171 
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national authorities have the opportunity, for the purposes of obtaining the necessary 
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introduced by legal instruments such as those referred to by Ireland in its written 
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The acceptance of OECD principles in the jurisprudence of the ECJ is apparent, but 
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shareholder. If the state of residence considered all foreign entities to be transparent 
(in order to ensure the current taxation of income) this would result in a different 
treatment of foreign and domestic entities and would therefore not be in line with EU 
law. In contrast thereto, if the residence state (theoretically) focused only on the 
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means provide any (broad) basis for the current taxation of income. Instead, it would 
result in a rather unstructured concept of income allocation which, again, would treat 
foreign and domestic activities differently. Overall, it seems that the Columbus 
Container decision is not the key for a general and systematic current taxation of 
income. 
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the company was no more than the total amount which would have been paid by that 
company and its subsidiaries if those subsidiaries had been established in the United 
Kingdom. The economic effect on Cadbury’s resources is thus the same in both 
cases.165 According to those Member States, the CFC legislation pursues an 
objective of fiscal neutrality, by arranging for the overall tax burden on the economic 
unit consisting of a United Kingdom parent company and its subsidiaries to be 
identical, irrespective of whether the subsidiaries are established in the United 
Kingdom or in another Member State.166 In response to this argument, Advocate 
General Léger stated that “(t)he fact that the tax claimed from Cadbury would be no 
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exchange of information are justified by the need to guarantee the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision and are proportionate to the aim pursued. The Rimbaud decision 
goes into the same direction. In this case, there was no obligation on the tax 
authorities of Liechtenstein to provide any assistance to the French authorities. So 
the latter authorities did not have any possibility to examine the correctness of the 
information provided by the taxpayer. Consequently, the ECJ did not recognise the 
submission of information by the taxpayer (case-by-case assessment) to be the less 
restrictive measure.176 In his Opinion to the Prunus case, a case dealing with the 
relationship between France and the British Virgin Islands, the Advocate General 
comes to exactly the same conclusion.177 Overall, it is apparent that Member States 
do not necessarily have to rely (only) on the evidence provided by the taxpayer, but 
may request that this information can be examined. However, I do not see that the 
legal basis - in order to examine the evidence provided by the taxpayer - has to be 
derived exclusively from EU measures, such as directives. If other contractual 
obligations provide for a comparable legal basis for gathering such information, the 
strict limitation to EU measures would not be, in my opinion, proportionate. It would 
take away, in general, the possibility of providing proof that a genuine economic 
activity is carried out in the third country. The Commission v. Netherlands case 
makes it clear that an argumentation which is based on the fact that Directive 
77/799/EEC is not applicable in case of third countries (in this case Iceland and 
Norway) will not simply be accepted by the ECJ. The Court clearly recognised that 
the Dutch tax authorities must be in a position to verify compliance and, therefore, to 
gather information from the states involved. However, the respective legislation was 
not related to the conditions otherwise required in order to be entitled to the 
exemption from dividend taxation at source.178 In my opinion, the ECJ (indirectly) 
accepts the fact that there can be an information exchange on a bilateral basis which 
deviates from the one existent within the EU on the basis of Council Directive 
77/799/EEC but which may have the same effect. This was subsequently confirmed 
in the Commission v. Italy case.179   
 
In essence, it can be concluded that CFC regimes may require the taxpayer to prove 
that the activity is a genuine economic activity and that a legal basis for information 
exchange between the competent tax authorities exists. The latter element of 
information exchange is always existent in case of an investment in another Member 
State (due to the fact that the Council Directive 77/799/EEC applies), but must be 
identified country-by-country if the investment is made outside of the EU.    
 
8.2.5.10. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters 
 
As already outlined earlier, an alternative concept of current taxation of income 
should directly focus on the most critical element from an anti-avoidance perspective, 
namely the basic interest component. This is exactly the element in relation to which 
there is neither a justification from an economic perspective nor from an equity 
perspective for an exclusive taxation in the state of the intermediate (finance) 
                                            
176 Case C-72/09 (Rimbaud), paragraphs 47 to 51. However, see the criticism of Gutmann in Lang et al., ECJ - 
Recent Developments in Direct Taxation 2010, Linde 2011, page 89 et seq. (97).  
177 Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón, paragraphs 89 to 91. The ECJ did not deal with this question 
since the decision was based on the standstill clause of Article 64 (1) of the TFEU.  
178 Case C-521/07 (Commission v. Netherlands), paragraphs 47 to 49.  
179 Case C-540/07 (Commission v. Italy), paragraph 70. See for further details section 4.2.10.4. 
   
 
observations, namely Council Directive 77/799/EEC (...) and, in this case, the 
Convention between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland for the avoidance of 
double taxation (...).”172 Thus, if the CFC is established in a third country where an 
obligation exists to provide information in a manner similar to the obligations under 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC, e.g. on the basis of a double tax convention, one can 
certainly ask the question whether it is really necessary to have a different 
assessment of a possible justification for a restriction on the free movement of 
capital. In such a case, the resident taxpayer has, first, to provide proof that the CFC 
carries out genuine economic activities and that the structure is not merely a wholly 
artificial arrangement. If the taxpayer is not in a position to do so, the CFC rules shall 
be applicable. However, if the taxpayer can provide proof of a genuine economic 
activity and the tax authorities would like to gather, in addition, information from the 
state where the CFC is established, this can also be done on the basis of (bilateral) 
arrangements made between the two states. In the latter case, I do not see why a 
different assessment is required. In my opinion, the relevant factor should be that the 
other state has the obligation to provide the information which is actually needed for 
the decision whether the CFC rules have to be applied or not. The legal basis - 
directive and / or other (bilateral) arrangement - is, in my opinion, not decisive. On the 
other hand, if the state of residence of the shareholder in the CFC does not have any 
possibility of verifying the information of the taxpayer, e.g. in case of an investment in 
a tax haven where no arrangements for information exchange are existent, there is 
clearly a reason and a need for a differentiation. From my perspective, the allocation 
of the burden of proof to the taxpayer combined with the requirement of the existence 
of a legal basis for information exchange - and therefore the possibility of verifying 
the evidence provided by the taxpayer - ensures that genuine economic activities can 
be identified and separated from wholly artificial arrangements. Such an approach 
should comply with the principle of proportionality and the requirement that the least 
restrictive measures should be applied. This is, in any event, less restrictive than the 
general and undifferentiated application of CFC rules in case of third countries.  
 
In my opinion, the above considerations are supported by the A decision. In this 
case, the ECJ made it clear that the Directive 77/799/EEC establishes a framework 
of cooperation which does not exist between the competent authorities of the 
Member States and the competent authorities of a third country where the latter has 
given no undertaking of mutual assistance.173 According to the ECJ, it is therefore 
acceptable that the grant of a tax advantage is dependent on the possibility that the 
information submitted by the taxpayer can be verified by obtaining information from 
the competent authorities of the other country. If the third country is not under any 
contractual obligation to provide the relevant information, the tax advantage may be 
refused.174 In the A case, the only information which could be obtained from the 
Swiss authorities was the information needed to ensure proper application of the 
double tax convention concluded between Sweden and Switzerland. However, 
neither the convention nor the protocol contained a measure providing for an 
exchange of information comparable to that in Article 26 of the OECD-MTC.175 
Therefore, the ECJ finally concluded that the respective Swedish measures which 
required, in case of a third country, a double tax convention providing for an 
                                            
172 Case C-196/04 (Cadbury Schweppes), paragraph 71.  
173 Case C-101/05 (A), paragraph 61.  
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the latter authorities did not have any possibility to examine the correctness of the 
information provided by the taxpayer. Consequently, the ECJ did not recognise the 
submission of information by the taxpayer (case-by-case assessment) to be the less 
restrictive measure.176 In his Opinion to the Prunus case, a case dealing with the 
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comes to exactly the same conclusion.177 Overall, it is apparent that Member States 
do not necessarily have to rely (only) on the evidence provided by the taxpayer, but 
may request that this information can be examined. However, I do not see that the 
legal basis - in order to examine the evidence provided by the taxpayer - has to be 
derived exclusively from EU measures, such as directives. If other contractual 
obligations provide for a comparable legal basis for gathering such information, the 
strict limitation to EU measures would not be, in my opinion, proportionate. It would 
take away, in general, the possibility of providing proof that a genuine economic 
activity is carried out in the third country. The Commission v. Netherlands case 
makes it clear that an argumentation which is based on the fact that Directive 
77/799/EEC is not applicable in case of third countries (in this case Iceland and 
Norway) will not simply be accepted by the ECJ. The Court clearly recognised that 
the Dutch tax authorities must be in a position to verify compliance and, therefore, to 
gather information from the states involved. However, the respective legislation was 
not related to the conditions otherwise required in order to be entitled to the 
exemption from dividend taxation at source.178 In my opinion, the ECJ (indirectly) 
accepts the fact that there can be an information exchange on a bilateral basis which 
deviates from the one existent within the EU on the basis of Council Directive 
77/799/EEC but which may have the same effect. This was subsequently confirmed 
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In essence, it can be concluded that CFC regimes may require the taxpayer to prove 
that the activity is a genuine economic activity and that a legal basis for information 
exchange between the competent tax authorities exists. The latter element of 
information exchange is always existent in case of an investment in another Member 
State (due to the fact that the Council Directive 77/799/EEC applies), but must be 
identified country-by-country if the investment is made outside of the EU.    
 
8.2.5.10. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
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As already outlined earlier, an alternative concept of current taxation of income 
should directly focus on the most critical element from an anti-avoidance perspective, 
namely the basic interest component. This is exactly the element in relation to which 
there is neither a justification from an economic perspective nor from an equity 
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carries out genuine economic activities and that the structure is not merely a wholly 
artificial arrangement. If the taxpayer is not in a position to do so, the CFC rules shall 
be applicable. However, if the taxpayer can provide proof of a genuine economic 
activity and the tax authorities would like to gather, in addition, information from the 
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a tax haven where no arrangements for information exchange are existent, there is 
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of the burden of proof to the taxpayer combined with the requirement of the existence 
of a legal basis for information exchange - and therefore the possibility of verifying 
the evidence provided by the taxpayer - ensures that genuine economic activities can 
be identified and separated from wholly artificial arrangements. Such an approach 
should comply with the principle of proportionality and the requirement that the least 
restrictive measures should be applied. This is, in any event, less restrictive than the 
general and undifferentiated application of CFC rules in case of third countries.  
 
In my opinion, the above considerations are supported by the A decision. In this 
case, the ECJ made it clear that the Directive 77/799/EEC establishes a framework 
of cooperation which does not exist between the competent authorities of the 
Member States and the competent authorities of a third country where the latter has 
given no undertaking of mutual assistance.173 According to the ECJ, it is therefore 
acceptable that the grant of a tax advantage is dependent on the possibility that the 
information submitted by the taxpayer can be verified by obtaining information from 
the competent authorities of the other country. If the third country is not under any 
contractual obligation to provide the relevant information, the tax advantage may be 
refused.174 In the A case, the only information which could be obtained from the 
Swiss authorities was the information needed to ensure proper application of the 
double tax convention concluded between Sweden and Switzerland. However, 
neither the convention nor the protocol contained a measure providing for an 
exchange of information comparable to that in Article 26 of the OECD-MTC.175 
Therefore, the ECJ finally concluded that the respective Swedish measures which 
required, in case of a third country, a double tax convention providing for an 
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- the principle of world-wide taxation. 
 
In general, the examination shows that the above arguments cannot be accepted as 
a valid justification in a case dealing with CFC legislation. The argument which is 
based on the cohesion of the tax system, at least, lacks the required “direct link” 
between a tax advantage and a tax disadvantage. The arguments which are based 
on the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base as well as the lower 
taxation in the CFC country are not accepted by the ECJ, based on settled case law, 
because it finally comes down to a compensatory taxation. The principle of 
territoriality, the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between Member States as well as the effectiveness of fiscal supervision do not 
provide a sufficient basis for a possible justification, either. Given the fact that the 
CFC regimes are usually structured as an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation, 
the aim of preventing tax avoidance is certainly one of the most obvious arguments of 
justification. Nonetheless, the case law of the ECJ shows, in my opinion, that such 
legislation must focus on wholly artificial arrangements. From my perspective, this 
conclusion does not change due to the more recent decisions in Part Service and 
Ampliscientifica. The role of the tax motive is different in cases dealing with indirect 
taxation compared to cases dealing with direct taxation. In the first-mentioned cases, 
the national court has to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the 
tax motive is essential compared to other non-tax explanations. In cases dealing with 
direct taxation, the motive for a relocation of activities to another state does not play a 
role as long as the company is genuinely established in the other state. Moreover, I 
do not think that the outcome of Oy AA has any impact on this conclusion, either. The 
fact that the ECJ accepted in Oy AA that the Finnish legislation was proportionate - 
even though it did not solely focus on wholly artificial arrangements - was, in my 
opinion, merely because of the fact that the restriction was justified by the much 
broader concept of a protection of a balanced allocation of power to impose taxes 
between Member States. In other words, there was no possibility of a strict limitation 
to wholly artificial arrangements, because the protection of a balanced allocation of 
power required a restriction of artificial and non-artificial arrangements.  
 
However, the strict limitation to wholly artificial arrangements does not exist under the 
CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 and which have not been amended 
after the Cadbury Schweppes decision (and according to this decision). These CFC 
regimes are applicable in an undifferentiated manner to different types of low-taxed 
income and are actually intended to be applicable to income generated by controlled 
foreign companies in another state through genuine economic activities. This is true 
for CFC regimes which follow an entity approach and for those which follow a 
transactional approach. Such concepts can hardly be brought in line with the 
requirement of focusing on wholly artificial arrangements. The fact that some of the 
regimes provide certain exemptions from CFC taxation is not sufficient. For this 
reason, the (theoretically) valid justification which is based on the aim of preventing 
tax avoidance will not be proportional as long as the CFC regimes do not provide the 
possibility to submit evidence that the activity carried out in the other state is a 
genuine economic activity - and to be exempt from CFC taxation in this situation. 
Finally, the principle of world-wide taxation must, after a more detailed analysis, also 
be rejected since the structure of CFC legislation does not consistently reflect the 
principle of capital export neutrality, but is merely an anti-avoidance concept. 
 
   
 
company. However, it was also concluded that, on the other hand, there is no 
justification for a current taxation of the other components, i.e. the risk component 
and the activity component. For this reason, there is a clear difference between the 
alternative concept and the CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6. The latter 
regimes focus - after a mere horizontal separation of income - on the current taxation 
of all income components. However, the decisive question is whether this difference 
is of any relevance for the ECJ, given the fact that - according to the case law of the 
ECJ - the legislation should have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial 
arrangements aimed at circumventing the domestic tax law. A legislation which is 
generally applied to a great number of situations which are not aimed at the 
circumvention of the domestic tax law cannot be justified on the basis of the aim of 
preventing tax avoidance. It is apparent, though, that the alternative concept does not 
(and should not) have the focus on wholly artificial arrangements but on income 
derived through genuine economic activities. This, and nothing else, should be the 
scope of the alternative legislation. For this reason, I do not see any realistic chance 
that the most obvious argument in a CFC case - which was rejected in the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision - would be accepted by the ECJ in the context of an alternative 
legislation which solely focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. Similar aspects are true for the other arguments outlined above which 
were (or which might be) put forward in a CFC case. The different treatment of the 
income components is most certainly not enough to provide a basis for a different 
assessment of the respective justifications under the TFEU as long as there is still 
the element of current taxation of income included. Of course, as a consequence, a 
system of current taxation of income - which is, in my opinion, undoubtedly required 
under the existing international legal framework - is to be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner to income derived through resident and non-resident entities. 
In any event, I will come back to a “limited” capital export neutrality approach in some 
more detail below.  
 
8.2.5.11. Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for Restrictions Caused by 
CFC Legislation  
 
Based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ there can be a number of possible 
justifications under the rule of reason which are likely to come up in one way or 
another in cases dealing with CFC legislation. The following arguments for a 
justification of a restriction on the basic freedoms were examined in this context: 
 
- the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
- the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base; 
 
- the lower taxation in the CFC country, 
 
- the principle of territoriality; 
 
- the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States; 
 
- the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
- the aim of preventing tax avoidance;  
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- the principle of world-wide taxation. 
 
In general, the examination shows that the above arguments cannot be accepted as 
a valid justification in a case dealing with CFC legislation. The argument which is 
based on the cohesion of the tax system, at least, lacks the required “direct link” 
between a tax advantage and a tax disadvantage. The arguments which are based 
on the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base as well as the lower 
taxation in the CFC country are not accepted by the ECJ, based on settled case law, 
because it finally comes down to a compensatory taxation. The principle of 
territoriality, the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between Member States as well as the effectiveness of fiscal supervision do not 
provide a sufficient basis for a possible justification, either. Given the fact that the 
CFC regimes are usually structured as an anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation, 
the aim of preventing tax avoidance is certainly one of the most obvious arguments of 
justification. Nonetheless, the case law of the ECJ shows, in my opinion, that such 
legislation must focus on wholly artificial arrangements. From my perspective, this 
conclusion does not change due to the more recent decisions in Part Service and 
Ampliscientifica. The role of the tax motive is different in cases dealing with indirect 
taxation compared to cases dealing with direct taxation. In the first-mentioned cases, 
the national court has to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the 
tax motive is essential compared to other non-tax explanations. In cases dealing with 
direct taxation, the motive for a relocation of activities to another state does not play a 
role as long as the company is genuinely established in the other state. Moreover, I 
do not think that the outcome of Oy AA has any impact on this conclusion, either. The 
fact that the ECJ accepted in Oy AA that the Finnish legislation was proportionate - 
even though it did not solely focus on wholly artificial arrangements - was, in my 
opinion, merely because of the fact that the restriction was justified by the much 
broader concept of a protection of a balanced allocation of power to impose taxes 
between Member States. In other words, there was no possibility of a strict limitation 
to wholly artificial arrangements, because the protection of a balanced allocation of 
power required a restriction of artificial and non-artificial arrangements.  
 
However, the strict limitation to wholly artificial arrangements does not exist under the 
CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 and which have not been amended 
after the Cadbury Schweppes decision (and according to this decision). These CFC 
regimes are applicable in an undifferentiated manner to different types of low-taxed 
income and are actually intended to be applicable to income generated by controlled 
foreign companies in another state through genuine economic activities. This is true 
for CFC regimes which follow an entity approach and for those which follow a 
transactional approach. Such concepts can hardly be brought in line with the 
requirement of focusing on wholly artificial arrangements. The fact that some of the 
regimes provide certain exemptions from CFC taxation is not sufficient. For this 
reason, the (theoretically) valid justification which is based on the aim of preventing 
tax avoidance will not be proportional as long as the CFC regimes do not provide the 
possibility to submit evidence that the activity carried out in the other state is a 
genuine economic activity - and to be exempt from CFC taxation in this situation. 
Finally, the principle of world-wide taxation must, after a more detailed analysis, also 
be rejected since the structure of CFC legislation does not consistently reflect the 
principle of capital export neutrality, but is merely an anti-avoidance concept. 
 
   
 
company. However, it was also concluded that, on the other hand, there is no 
justification for a current taxation of the other components, i.e. the risk component 
and the activity component. For this reason, there is a clear difference between the 
alternative concept and the CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6. The latter 
regimes focus - after a mere horizontal separation of income - on the current taxation 
of all income components. However, the decisive question is whether this difference 
is of any relevance for the ECJ, given the fact that - according to the case law of the 
ECJ - the legislation should have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial 
arrangements aimed at circumventing the domestic tax law. A legislation which is 
generally applied to a great number of situations which are not aimed at the 
circumvention of the domestic tax law cannot be justified on the basis of the aim of 
preventing tax avoidance. It is apparent, though, that the alternative concept does not 
(and should not) have the focus on wholly artificial arrangements but on income 
derived through genuine economic activities. This, and nothing else, should be the 
scope of the alternative legislation. For this reason, I do not see any realistic chance 
that the most obvious argument in a CFC case - which was rejected in the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision - would be accepted by the ECJ in the context of an alternative 
legislation which solely focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. Similar aspects are true for the other arguments outlined above which 
were (or which might be) put forward in a CFC case. The different treatment of the 
income components is most certainly not enough to provide a basis for a different 
assessment of the respective justifications under the TFEU as long as there is still 
the element of current taxation of income included. Of course, as a consequence, a 
system of current taxation of income - which is, in my opinion, undoubtedly required 
under the existing international legal framework - is to be applied in a non-
discriminatory manner to income derived through resident and non-resident entities. 
In any event, I will come back to a “limited” capital export neutrality approach in some 
more detail below.  
 
8.2.5.11. Conclusions Regarding the Justifications for Restrictions Caused by 
CFC Legislation  
 
Based on the jurisprudence of the ECJ there can be a number of possible 
justifications under the rule of reason which are likely to come up in one way or 
another in cases dealing with CFC legislation. The following arguments for a 
justification of a restriction on the basic freedoms were examined in this context: 
 
- the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
- the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base; 
 
- the lower taxation in the CFC country, 
 
- the principle of territoriality; 
 
- the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States; 
 
- the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
- the aim of preventing tax avoidance;  
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domestic legislation must be seen in the context of the Directive and in the light of the 
intention of the Directive. Although the new paragraph 1 a does not explicitly deal 
with CFC taxation but only with hybrid entities, the situation after the amendment 
seems to be different from the situation before. I do not see any reason why the 
taxation of a hybrid entity should lead to an obligation to provide for an avoidance of 
double taxation under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive but not the current allocation of 
CFC income. According to Helminen, if the domestic concept was based on a 
fictitious distribution approach, the different treatment of regular and fictitious 
distributions would jeopardize the object and the purpose of the Directive and would 
conflict with the need of loyalty within the EU. With respect to Member States which 
do not follow a fictitious distribution approach, but an approach which is based on 
disregarding the foreign corporate entity, one should also conclude - especially after 
the amendment of the Directive regarding hybrid entities - that the income allocation 
is covered by the Directive. At least, this should be true as long as the CFC takes one 
of the forms listed in the Annex, is resident and subject to corporate tax in the host 
state without having the possibility of an option of being exempt from taxation.181 In 
fact, a number of authors considered the Parent-Subsidiary Directive to be applicable 
in case of CFC legislation already before the amendment of the Directive.182  
 
With respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the conclusion of the Advocate 
General Léger in the Cadbury Schweppes decision is quite interesting. In his Opinion 
to the case the Advocate General outlined that he does “(...) not think that secondary 
legislation contains provisions relevant to this examination” and “(s)o far as concerns 
(...) the provisions of Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States, they are not relevant in this case since they are designed 
solely to set up a common system as regards the taxation of profits distributed by a 
subsidiary. Those provisions do not relate to a system such as that provided for by 
the United Kingdom legislation on CFCs, which attributes to the parent company the 
profits of its foreign subsidiary as they arise.”183 This, without any doubt, is a clear 
statement against the application of the provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
in CFC cases, at least according to the original version of the Directive. However, it is 
equally clear that this statement is only true regarding the classification of the income 
attribution as profit distributions. However, after the amendment to the Directive the 
scope of the latter is much wider. Of course, the concept of CFC taxation can neither 
be seen as a (fictitious) profit distribution by the subsidiary company nor can it be 
seen as the taxation of a hybrid entity (since most regimes typically consider the legal 
entity in question to be non-transparent). It is basically a system of taxing income on 
a current basis which is derived, at least in most cases, through the non-transparent 
subsidiary company. Pursuant to Maisto, the Directive should, in principle, cover 
deemed distributions of profit. However, the rules referring to hybrid entities apply to 
situations in which the transparency derives from the assessment of the legal 
characteristics of that subsidiary based on the law under which it is constituted. 
Hence, transparency which is derived from the application of CFC rules is basically 
                                            
181 Helminen, Is There a Future for CFC-Regimes in the EU?, Intertax 2005, page 117 et seq. (119).    
182 Scherer, Doppelbesteuerung und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1995, page 226; Helminen, The Dividend 
Concept in International Taxation, 1999, page 209; Helminen, Dividend Equivalent Benefits and the Concept of 
Profit Distribution of the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive, EC Tax Review 2000, page 161 et seq. (164); FEE 
Position Paper, April 2002, page 15; Brokelind, Ten Years of Application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, EC 
Tax Review 2003, page 158 et seq. (163, 166).     
183 Opinion of the Advocate General Léger (case C-196/04), paragraphs 6 and 7.  
   
 
With respect to investments in third countries, one may conclude that the taxpayer is 
required to prove that the activity is a genuine economic activity carried out in the 
respective state and that a legal basis for information exchange between the 
competent authorities exists. Of course, in contrast to an investment in another 
Member State - where the Council Directive 77/799/EEC is applicable - the latter 
requirement is not necessarily fulfilled in case of investments in third countries. 
However, the legal framework according to which the obligation for information 
exchange is stipulated between the respective countries should be secondary as 
long as the Member State of the shareholder has the legal possibility of gathering the 
necessary information. In other words, the obligation for information exchange can be 
based on a double tax convention and need not be derived exclusively from EU 
directives. This has the consequence that - with respect to possible justifications - a 
differentiation can be required between the investment in Member States and the 
investment in third countries. The latter is of particular relevance for investments in 
tax havens where no obligation for information exchange exists.  
 
8.3. CFC Legislation and Secondary European Union Law 
 
8.3.1. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
It was outlined in chapter 4 that a deemed dividend should fall, in the same way as a 
regular dividend, within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. With respect to 
the application of CFC rules and the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive it is 
important to have a closer look at the amended version of the Directive which now 
also refers to transparent entities. The new paragraph 1 a states that “(n)othing in this 
Directive shall prevent the State of the parent company from considering a subsidiary 
to be fiscally transparent on the basis of that State’s assessment of the legal 
characteristics of that subsidiary arising from the law under which it is constituted and 
therefore from taxing the parent company on its share of the profits of its subsidiary 
as and when those profits arise. In this case the State of the parent company shall 
refrain from taxing the distributed profits of the subsidiary. When assessing the 
parent company’s share of the profits of its subsidiary as they arise the State of the 
parent company shall either exempt those profits or authorise the parent company to 
deduct from the amount of tax due that fraction of the corporation tax related to the 
parent company’s share of profits and paid by its subsidiary and any lower-tier 
subsidiary, subject to the condition that at each tier a company and its lower-tier 
subsidiary meet the requirements provided for in Articles 2 and 3, up to the limit of 
the amount of the corresponding tax due.”180 In other words, the scope of the 
Directive is now much wider and also encompasses (i) the current taxation of income 
derived by a hybrid entity and (ii) stipulates an obligation for an exemption in the 
latter cases for subsequent (actual) distributions. Thus, there seems to be a clear 
separation between profit distributions of a subsidiary company, on the one hand, 
and income allocations which are related to hybrid entities, on the other hand. 
Theoretically, the question whether the application of CFC rules is within the scope of 
the Directive or not cannot be restricted to the CFC regimes which follow a deemed-
dividend approach. It is very clear that it is equally relevant for those regimes which 
follow a piercing-the-veil approach. However, it seems to be obvious from the case 
law outlined in chapter 4 that it is not the domestic classification which is relevant for 
the question whether a CFC regime falls within the scope of the Directive, but that the 
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domestic legislation must be seen in the context of the Directive and in the light of the 
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seems to be different from the situation before. I do not see any reason why the 
taxation of a hybrid entity should lead to an obligation to provide for an avoidance of 
double taxation under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive but not the current allocation of 
CFC income. According to Helminen, if the domestic concept was based on a 
fictitious distribution approach, the different treatment of regular and fictitious 
distributions would jeopardize the object and the purpose of the Directive and would 
conflict with the need of loyalty within the EU. With respect to Member States which 
do not follow a fictitious distribution approach, but an approach which is based on 
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state without having the possibility of an option of being exempt from taxation.181 In 
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With respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the conclusion of the Advocate 
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to the case the Advocate General outlined that he does “(...) not think that secondary 
legislation contains provisions relevant to this examination” and “(s)o far as concerns 
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system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States, they are not relevant in this case since they are designed 
solely to set up a common system as regards the taxation of profits distributed by a 
subsidiary. Those provisions do not relate to a system such as that provided for by 
the United Kingdom legislation on CFCs, which attributes to the parent company the 
profits of its foreign subsidiary as they arise.”183 This, without any doubt, is a clear 
statement against the application of the provisions of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
in CFC cases, at least according to the original version of the Directive. However, it is 
equally clear that this statement is only true regarding the classification of the income 
attribution as profit distributions. However, after the amendment to the Directive the 
scope of the latter is much wider. Of course, the concept of CFC taxation can neither 
be seen as a (fictitious) profit distribution by the subsidiary company nor can it be 
seen as the taxation of a hybrid entity (since most regimes typically consider the legal 
entity in question to be non-transparent). It is basically a system of taxing income on 
a current basis which is derived, at least in most cases, through the non-transparent 
subsidiary company. Pursuant to Maisto, the Directive should, in principle, cover 
deemed distributions of profit. However, the rules referring to hybrid entities apply to 
situations in which the transparency derives from the assessment of the legal 
characteristics of that subsidiary based on the law under which it is constituted. 
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With respect to investments in third countries, one may conclude that the taxpayer is 
required to prove that the activity is a genuine economic activity carried out in the 
respective state and that a legal basis for information exchange between the 
competent authorities exists. Of course, in contrast to an investment in another 
Member State - where the Council Directive 77/799/EEC is applicable - the latter 
requirement is not necessarily fulfilled in case of investments in third countries. 
However, the legal framework according to which the obligation for information 
exchange is stipulated between the respective countries should be secondary as 
long as the Member State of the shareholder has the legal possibility of gathering the 
necessary information. In other words, the obligation for information exchange can be 
based on a double tax convention and need not be derived exclusively from EU 
directives. This has the consequence that - with respect to possible justifications - a 
differentiation can be required between the investment in Member States and the 
investment in third countries. The latter is of particular relevance for investments in 
tax havens where no obligation for information exchange exists.  
 
8.3. CFC Legislation and Secondary European Union Law 
 
8.3.1. The Parent-Subsidiary Directive 
 
It was outlined in chapter 4 that a deemed dividend should fall, in the same way as a 
regular dividend, within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. With respect to 
the application of CFC rules and the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive it is 
important to have a closer look at the amended version of the Directive which now 
also refers to transparent entities. The new paragraph 1 a states that “(n)othing in this 
Directive shall prevent the State of the parent company from considering a subsidiary 
to be fiscally transparent on the basis of that State’s assessment of the legal 
characteristics of that subsidiary arising from the law under which it is constituted and 
therefore from taxing the parent company on its share of the profits of its subsidiary 
as and when those profits arise. In this case the State of the parent company shall 
refrain from taxing the distributed profits of the subsidiary. When assessing the 
parent company’s share of the profits of its subsidiary as they arise the State of the 
parent company shall either exempt those profits or authorise the parent company to 
deduct from the amount of tax due that fraction of the corporation tax related to the 
parent company’s share of profits and paid by its subsidiary and any lower-tier 
subsidiary, subject to the condition that at each tier a company and its lower-tier 
subsidiary meet the requirements provided for in Articles 2 and 3, up to the limit of 
the amount of the corresponding tax due.”180 In other words, the scope of the 
Directive is now much wider and also encompasses (i) the current taxation of income 
derived by a hybrid entity and (ii) stipulates an obligation for an exemption in the 
latter cases for subsequent (actual) distributions. Thus, there seems to be a clear 
separation between profit distributions of a subsidiary company, on the one hand, 
and income allocations which are related to hybrid entities, on the other hand. 
Theoretically, the question whether the application of CFC rules is within the scope of 
the Directive or not cannot be restricted to the CFC regimes which follow a deemed-
dividend approach. It is very clear that it is equally relevant for those regimes which 
follow a piercing-the-veil approach. However, it seems to be obvious from the case 
law outlined in chapter 4 that it is not the domestic classification which is relevant for 
the question whether a CFC regime falls within the scope of the Directive, but that the 
                                            
180 Council Directive 2003/123/EC, dated December 22, 2003, new paragraph 1a.  
Chapter 8
460
   
 
rules.189 Moreover, Brokelind takes the position that Member States are only able to 
use such an ‘anti-abuse’ clause to prevent the most serious cases of abuse, leaving 
aside the tax avoidance cases.190 Overall, the ‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 1 (2) of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not have the effect, in my opinion, that the 
current allocation of income according to CFC regimes is excluded from the 
protection of the Directive.  
 
However, the impact of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive should not be overestimated: 
the avoidance of double taxation related to the attributed income by the provision of 
an ordinary tax credit as well as the subsequent exemption is already offered by 
almost all CFC regimes (alternatively the subsequent credit of the previous income 
taxes, as in the case of the United Kingdom). For this reason, the obligations which 
are established by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive should not result, at least in most 
cases, to amendments to the respective CFC regimes. Nonetheless, the Directive 
becomes an additional limitation for changing the structure of CFC regimes.  
 
8.3.2. The Interest and Royalty Directive  
 
The Interest and Royalty Directive191 is of no relevance, in my opinion, for the 
attributable CFC income, because the latter income is - leaving aside the 
classification of the attributable income - not subject to withholding taxation.192 The 
reason is that the current attribution of income is based on unilateral measures of the 
Member State of primary establishment without any actual payments (distributions) of 
the foreign company. The (subsequent) payments, however, are dividend payments 
which are within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive - if the requirements are 
fulfilled - but which are not in the scope of the Interest and Royalty Directive. Despite 
this conclusion, however, the latter Directive may still be of importance in the context 
of CFC taxation. The reason is very simple: if the Interest and Royalty Directive 
provides for an exemption from withholding taxation, this takes away the possibility 
for Member States of applying a (limited) taxation at source. This, however, can 
support low-tax states and certain structures which are usually in the focus of CFC 
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not in the scope of the new paragraph.184 Looking at the mere wording of the new 
paragraph, one might certainly come to such a conclusion. However, it would be 
neither logical nor consistent, after the amendment to the Directive, if the provisions 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive did not cover the application of CFC regimes. The 
reason is that those regimes can be seen as being in between the dividend taxation 
and the taxation of hybrid entities. The current attribution of CFC income requires (at 
least) the application of the credit method for the avoidance of double taxation - in the 
same way as the current allocation of income in case of a hybrid entity. Moreover, the 
distribution of profits of a subsidiary company to a parent company in another 
Member State - after the current income taxation according to a CFC regime - 
requires an exemption from the double taxation in the state of the parent company.185  
 
Another point which might be raised in this context is the question whether the 
application of the CFC rules is covered by the ‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 1 (2) of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Article 1 (2) states that the Directive shall not 
preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the 
prevention of fraud or abuse. In this regard, it is important to note that this clause 
should have the purpose of avoiding that a taxpayer enjoys the advantages of the 
Directive merely by the establishment of an abusive structure, i.e. in situations where, 
under normal circumstances, the taxpayer would not be protected by the Directive.186 
However, if the CFC investment in another Member State is not just a wholly artificial 
arrangement, the regular profit distributions are, in principle, protected by the 
Directive. Why should the application of CFC rules - which merely creates an income 
allocation before the actual distribution takes place - result in a different treatment? 
Why should the tax credit be required in the first case but not in the second case? 
Such a differentiation cannot be derived from the fact that CFC rules can be seen - 
from the perspective of the Member States which apply such legislation - as anti-
avoidance or anti-deferral measures. Helminen concluded that CFC regimes cannot 
be regarded as regimes which are covered by Article 1 (2) of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, because without a CFC regime, there would not even be a distribution that 
would qualify for under the Directive.187 Only if an abusive arrangement leads to the 
conclusion that the actual dividends may not fall within the Directive, the same should 
be true for fictitious dividends.188 According to Brokelind, Article 1 (2) of the Directive 
has no existence of its own. Any refusal to grant a favourable tax regime must be 
supported by a specific proviso within the Directive, and this is not the case for CFC 
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rules.189 Moreover, Brokelind takes the position that Member States are only able to 
use such an ‘anti-abuse’ clause to prevent the most serious cases of abuse, leaving 
aside the tax avoidance cases.190 Overall, the ‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 1 (2) of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not have the effect, in my opinion, that the 
current allocation of income according to CFC regimes is excluded from the 
protection of the Directive.  
 
However, the impact of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive should not be overestimated: 
the avoidance of double taxation related to the attributed income by the provision of 
an ordinary tax credit as well as the subsequent exemption is already offered by 
almost all CFC regimes (alternatively the subsequent credit of the previous income 
taxes, as in the case of the United Kingdom). For this reason, the obligations which 
are established by the Parent-Subsidiary Directive should not result, at least in most 
cases, to amendments to the respective CFC regimes. Nonetheless, the Directive 
becomes an additional limitation for changing the structure of CFC regimes.  
 
8.3.2. The Interest and Royalty Directive  
 
The Interest and Royalty Directive191 is of no relevance, in my opinion, for the 
attributable CFC income, because the latter income is - leaving aside the 
classification of the attributable income - not subject to withholding taxation.192 The 
reason is that the current attribution of income is based on unilateral measures of the 
Member State of primary establishment without any actual payments (distributions) of 
the foreign company. The (subsequent) payments, however, are dividend payments 
which are within the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive - if the requirements are 
fulfilled - but which are not in the scope of the Interest and Royalty Directive. Despite 
this conclusion, however, the latter Directive may still be of importance in the context 
of CFC taxation. The reason is very simple: if the Interest and Royalty Directive 
provides for an exemption from withholding taxation, this takes away the possibility 
for Member States of applying a (limited) taxation at source. This, however, can 
support low-tax states and certain structures which are usually in the focus of CFC 
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taxation see: Kessler / Eicker / Schindler, Hinzurechnung von Dauerschuldzinsen nach § 8 Nr. 1 GewStG 
verstößt gegen die Zins- / Lizenzgebühren-Richtlinie, Internationales Steuerrecht 2004, page 678 et seq.; Kempf 
/ Straubinger, Nochmals: Die EU-Zins- / Lizenzrichtlinie und § 8 Nr. 1 GewStG, Internationales Steuerrecht 
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not in the scope of the new paragraph.184 Looking at the mere wording of the new 
paragraph, one might certainly come to such a conclusion. However, it would be 
neither logical nor consistent, after the amendment to the Directive, if the provisions 
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive did not cover the application of CFC regimes. The 
reason is that those regimes can be seen as being in between the dividend taxation 
and the taxation of hybrid entities. The current attribution of CFC income requires (at 
least) the application of the credit method for the avoidance of double taxation - in the 
same way as the current allocation of income in case of a hybrid entity. Moreover, the 
distribution of profits of a subsidiary company to a parent company in another 
Member State - after the current income taxation according to a CFC regime - 
requires an exemption from the double taxation in the state of the parent company.185  
 
Another point which might be raised in this context is the question whether the 
application of the CFC rules is covered by the ‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 1 (2) of 
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Article 1 (2) states that the Directive shall not 
preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the 
prevention of fraud or abuse. In this regard, it is important to note that this clause 
should have the purpose of avoiding that a taxpayer enjoys the advantages of the 
Directive merely by the establishment of an abusive structure, i.e. in situations where, 
under normal circumstances, the taxpayer would not be protected by the Directive.186 
However, if the CFC investment in another Member State is not just a wholly artificial 
arrangement, the regular profit distributions are, in principle, protected by the 
Directive. Why should the application of CFC rules - which merely creates an income 
allocation before the actual distribution takes place - result in a different treatment? 
Why should the tax credit be required in the first case but not in the second case? 
Such a differentiation cannot be derived from the fact that CFC rules can be seen - 
from the perspective of the Member States which apply such legislation - as anti-
avoidance or anti-deferral measures. Helminen concluded that CFC regimes cannot 
be regarded as regimes which are covered by Article 1 (2) of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, because without a CFC regime, there would not even be a distribution that 
would qualify for under the Directive.187 Only if an abusive arrangement leads to the 
conclusion that the actual dividends may not fall within the Directive, the same should 
be true for fictitious dividends.188 According to Brokelind, Article 1 (2) of the Directive 
has no existence of its own. Any refusal to grant a favourable tax regime must be 
supported by a specific proviso within the Directive, and this is not the case for CFC 
                                            
184 Maisto, The 2003 Amendments to the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive: What’s Next?, EC Tax Review 2004, 
page 164 et seq. (175).  
185 This should be equally true in a situation where the income is (indirectly) allocated through the revaluation of 
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186 See in this respect also Helminen, Is There a Future for CFC-Regimes in the EU?, Intertax 2005, page 117 et 
seq. (119); Helminen, Dividend Equivalent Benefits and the Concept of Profit Distribution of the EC Parent-
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and B. Without any doubt, the abolition of withholding taxation may in certain 
situations lead to administrative advantages for the taxpayer and can avoid the 
double taxation of income. However, the aforementioned example shows that it can 
create situations which underline that an alternative approach to CFC legislation is 
still required.  
 
Similar to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the question can be raised whether the 
‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty Directive may be of 
relevance in this context. Article 5 states that “(t)his Directive shall not preclude the 
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of 
fraud or abuse”193 and “Member States may, in the case of transactions for which the 
principal motive or one of the principal motives is tax evasion, tax avoidance or 
abuse, withdraw the benefits of this Directive or refuse to apply this Directive.”194 In 
the structure outlined above it is (again) assumed that company C is the beneficial 
owner of the income received. There is no artificial relocation of activities and income 
to state C and therefore no abusive (and no fraudulent) arrangement.195 Similar to 
Article 1 (2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty 
Directive should protect the Member States from the effect of ‘directive shopping’.196 
In the latter case, the Member States should have the possibility of refusing the 
advantages conferred by the Directive. However, I do not see - under the 
assumptions described above - that Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty Directive can 
have a direct or indirect impact on the application of CFC rules in state A. This is, in 
my opinion, outside of the scope of the Directive. 
 
8.3.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters  
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive are both of 
relevance for an alternative system which is based on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component. In case of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it can be 
concluded, in my opinion, that this Directive is generally applicable in case of a 
current taxation of income derived through a CFC and it should not really matter how 
the legislation is structured in detail, i.e. whether it is a “typical” CFC legislation, a 
concept which is based on the revaluation of shares or an alternative legislation 
which follows the current taxation of the basic interest component. In my opinion, 
there is no basis to come to a different conclusion for the alternative concept since in 
both cases it is the attribution of (all or part of) the income realised through a 
subsidiary company. Furthermore, this has the consequence that an alternative 
legislation has to provide for the elimination of double taxation for the currently 
attributed income and has to exempt the income which was already taxed in the state 
of the shareholder in case of a subsequent profit distribution. This means for the 
basic interest taxation that the latter system should, at least, provide for an ordinary 
tax credit (because an exemption would not make any sense under such an 
approach) and the subsequent - actual - distribution of the part of the income which is 
related to the basic interest component has to be exempt from taxation.  
                                            
193 Article 5 (1) of the Interest and Royalty Directive.  
194 Article 5 (2) of the Interest and Royalty Directive.  
195 See with respect to the differentiation between ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’ Müller, The Interest & 
Royalty Directive, Tax Planning International European Union Focus (June) 2005.  
196 See with respect to ‘directive shopping’ also Brokelind, Royalty Payments: Unresolved Issues in the Interest 
and Royalties Directive, European Taxation 2004, page 252 et seq. (256).  
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The structure in the example is one of the structures which are covered by the 
Interest and Royalty Directive. Article 3 (b) of the Interest and Royalty Directive states 
that “a company is an “associated company” of a second company if, at least: (i) the 
first company has a direct minimum holding of 25% in the capital of the second 
company, or (ii) the second company has a direct minimum holding of 25% in the 
capital of the first company, or (iii) a third company has a direct minimum holding of 
25% both in the capital of the first company and in the capital of the second 
company. Holdings must involve only companies resident in Community territory. 
However, Member States shall have the option of replacing the criterion of a 
minimum holding in the capital with that of a minimum holding of voting rights.” Thus, 
the interest and royalty payments from company B to company C (sister company) 
should be exempt from withholding taxation in Member State B if parent company A 
holds a minimum participation of 25 percent in company B and in company C. If it is 
assumed that the withholding tax rate in Member State B for interest and royalty 
payments to Member State C is 5 percent, e.g. according to the double tax 
convention between these two states, and if it is further assumed that Member State 
C is a low-tax state with an income tax rate of 10 percent, it is quite obvious that the 
position of Member State C is considerably improved. In effect, the non-deduction of 
withholding tax in Member State B increases the net income tax imposed in Member 
State C from 5 percent to 10 percent, because no tax credit is necessary anymore. If 
the taxable income of such intra-group service companies is an important factor for 
the economy of Member State C, the latter Member State could even consider a 
reduction of the overall corporate income tax rate in order to attract additional service 
companies. Indirectly, this would be financed by the fact that no withholding tax is 
deducted in Member State B and therefore no crediting of such taxes is required 
anymore. Of course, a CFC taxation in state A would eliminate any potential 
advantage which might be caused by the non-deduction of withholding tax in state B 
and a theoretical reduction of the corporate income taxation in state C. However, the 
picture is different if the existing CFC rules cannot be applied anymore - due to the 
fact that they are not in line with the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital - and therefore any reduction of the income tax rate in state C 
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and B. Without any doubt, the abolition of withholding taxation may in certain 
situations lead to administrative advantages for the taxpayer and can avoid the 
double taxation of income. However, the aforementioned example shows that it can 
create situations which underline that an alternative approach to CFC legislation is 
still required.  
 
Similar to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the question can be raised whether the 
‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty Directive may be of 
relevance in this context. Article 5 states that “(t)his Directive shall not preclude the 
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the prevention of 
fraud or abuse”193 and “Member States may, in the case of transactions for which the 
principal motive or one of the principal motives is tax evasion, tax avoidance or 
abuse, withdraw the benefits of this Directive or refuse to apply this Directive.”194 In 
the structure outlined above it is (again) assumed that company C is the beneficial 
owner of the income received. There is no artificial relocation of activities and income 
to state C and therefore no abusive (and no fraudulent) arrangement.195 Similar to 
Article 1 (2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty 
Directive should protect the Member States from the effect of ‘directive shopping’.196 
In the latter case, the Member States should have the possibility of refusing the 
advantages conferred by the Directive. However, I do not see - under the 
assumptions described above - that Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty Directive can 
have a direct or indirect impact on the application of CFC rules in state A. This is, in 
my opinion, outside of the scope of the Directive. 
 
8.3.3. The Outcome of the Examination Tested to the Principles Derived from 
Previous Chapters  
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest and Royalty Directive are both of 
relevance for an alternative system which is based on the current taxation of the 
basic interest component. In case of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it can be 
concluded, in my opinion, that this Directive is generally applicable in case of a 
current taxation of income derived through a CFC and it should not really matter how 
the legislation is structured in detail, i.e. whether it is a “typical” CFC legislation, a 
concept which is based on the revaluation of shares or an alternative legislation 
which follows the current taxation of the basic interest component. In my opinion, 
there is no basis to come to a different conclusion for the alternative concept since in 
both cases it is the attribution of (all or part of) the income realised through a 
subsidiary company. Furthermore, this has the consequence that an alternative 
legislation has to provide for the elimination of double taxation for the currently 
attributed income and has to exempt the income which was already taxed in the state 
of the shareholder in case of a subsequent profit distribution. This means for the 
basic interest taxation that the latter system should, at least, provide for an ordinary 
tax credit (because an exemption would not make any sense under such an 
approach) and the subsequent - actual - distribution of the part of the income which is 
related to the basic interest component has to be exempt from taxation.  
                                            
193 Article 5 (1) of the Interest and Royalty Directive.  
194 Article 5 (2) of the Interest and Royalty Directive.  
195 See with respect to the differentiation between ‘tax evasion’ and ‘tax avoidance’ Müller, The Interest & 
Royalty Directive, Tax Planning International European Union Focus (June) 2005.  
196 See with respect to ‘directive shopping’ also Brokelind, Royalty Payments: Unresolved Issues in the Interest 
and Royalties Directive, European Taxation 2004, page 252 et seq. (256).  
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The structure in the example is one of the structures which are covered by the 
Interest and Royalty Directive. Article 3 (b) of the Interest and Royalty Directive states 
that “a company is an “associated company” of a second company if, at least: (i) the 
first company has a direct minimum holding of 25% in the capital of the second 
company, or (ii) the second company has a direct minimum holding of 25% in the 
capital of the first company, or (iii) a third company has a direct minimum holding of 
25% both in the capital of the first company and in the capital of the second 
company. Holdings must involve only companies resident in Community territory. 
However, Member States shall have the option of replacing the criterion of a 
minimum holding in the capital with that of a minimum holding of voting rights.” Thus, 
the interest and royalty payments from company B to company C (sister company) 
should be exempt from withholding taxation in Member State B if parent company A 
holds a minimum participation of 25 percent in company B and in company C. If it is 
assumed that the withholding tax rate in Member State B for interest and royalty 
payments to Member State C is 5 percent, e.g. according to the double tax 
convention between these two states, and if it is further assumed that Member State 
C is a low-tax state with an income tax rate of 10 percent, it is quite obvious that the 
position of Member State C is considerably improved. In effect, the non-deduction of 
withholding tax in Member State B increases the net income tax imposed in Member 
State C from 5 percent to 10 percent, because no tax credit is necessary anymore. If 
the taxable income of such intra-group service companies is an important factor for 
the economy of Member State C, the latter Member State could even consider a 
reduction of the overall corporate income tax rate in order to attract additional service 
companies. Indirectly, this would be financed by the fact that no withholding tax is 
deducted in Member State B and therefore no crediting of such taxes is required 
anymore. Of course, a CFC taxation in state A would eliminate any potential 
advantage which might be caused by the non-deduction of withholding tax in state B 
and a theoretical reduction of the corporate income taxation in state C. However, the 
picture is different if the existing CFC rules cannot be applied anymore - due to the 
fact that they are not in line with the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital - and therefore any reduction of the income tax rate in state C 






Company C (CFC) 
 -service provider- 
Chapter 8
464
   
 
those regimes. However, the Directive becomes an additional limitation for changing 
the structure of CFC regimes. 
 
Secondly, there can be an indirect influence on CFC regimes through secondary EU 
law. The latter is true, for example, in case of the Interest and Royalty Directive. The 
examination shows that the abolition of withholding taxation in certain situations 
clearly supports the structures which are typically in the focus of CFC regimes. The 
‘anti-abuse’ clause of Article 5 of the Interest and Royalty Directive does not have, in 
my opinion, any effect on the CFC structures, because there is typically no artificial 
relocation of activities and income which might be qualified as abusive or fraudulent 
arrangement. The non-existence of a withholding tax credit (due to the fact that there 
is no withholding tax) on the level of an intermediate finance company may 
considerably improve the situation of the country where the intermediate finance 
company is established. Moreover, the abolition of a withholding taxation in the 
country where the income is produced is, despite all administrative simplifications, 
contrary to the economic and equity principles derived from chapters 2 and 3. The 
concept of the Interest and Royalty Directive may therefore result in the fostering of 
group structures which include intermediate finance companies by granting 
“withholding tax incentives.” In my opinion, this is one of the reasons - together with 
the conclusions from previous chapters - why there is still a need for an alternative 
legislation as a replacement for the existing CFC regimes. The examination shows 
that the conclusions with respect to CFC legislation and the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive / the Interest and Royalty Directive can be easily transferred to an 
alternative legislation which focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component.  
 
8.4. The Dilemma of the Member States 
 
The dilemma of the Member States which apply a CFC regime is apparent: either 
they provide for an “escape clause” for genuine economic activities which are carried 
on in the other state or the CFC legislation will not be in line with the freedom of 
establishment (alternatively - depending on the situation - the free movement of 
capital). One could now start thinking about possible approaches with a number of 
standardised exemptions from CFC taxation (as in case of the United Kingdom CFC 
legislation which was examined in the Cadbury Schweppes case) and an additional 
escape clause for the taxpayer. However, I do not think that this would really solve 
the problem. The reason is very simple: the Member States which apply CFC 
legislation want to tax the income which is derived by the CFC from a genuine activity 
in the other state. This is exactly the income which is in the focus of CFC taxation! As 
already outlined earlier, the criteria which were put forward by the Advocate General 
in the Cadbury Schweppes case are those which are sometimes used for the 
identification of abusive structures under national legislation - but not CFC legislation. 
However, those abusive structures do not usually trigger the application of CFC rules 
but lead to other tax consequences. For example, wholly artificial arrangements such 
as the interposition of “letterbox companies” often have the consequence that the 
income is directly allocable to the domestic shareholder and the interposition of the 
legal entity is “ignored” for tax purposes. That means the income is deemed to be 
derived directly by the shareholder. If this is the case, the CFC regime does not play 
any role since the income is already taxed in the state of the shareholder based on 
another anti-abuse measure. Another important case is the “decision making” in the 
Member State of the shareholder: if the CFC is actually managed from within the 
   
 
 
In addition, the conclusion with respect to the Interest and Royalty Directive clearly 
supports an efficient and target-oriented anti-avoidance legislation which focuses on 
the basic interest component. The reason is that the Interest and Royalty Directive 
safeguards (also) the critical structures which involve intermediate (finance) 
companies by providing exemption from withholding taxation for interest and royalty 
payments to the latter companies. This leads to the result that there is a complete 
switch from a limited source-based taxation of the basic interest component to a non-
taxation of the basic interest component in the state of source. This is self-evidently 
not the outcome which is supported by economic and equity principles which 
theoretically request the taxation according to the principle of capital import neutrality 
in the state where the income was produced. Although the limited taxation in the 
state of source is not the optimal scenario, either, it is nonetheless an approach 
which goes in the right direction. For this reason, the Interest and Royalty Directive 
has negative “side effects” which can make the relocation of the basic interest 
component - and therefore the most critical element from an anti-avoidance 
perspective - more attractive. In this respect, there is an increased necessity for an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is in line with primary and secondary EU 
law.  
 
8.3.4. Conclusions Regarding the Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the Interest 
and Royalty Directive  
 
The examination shows that secondary EU law does not play an equally important 
role for the application of CFC regimes as primary EU law. Nonetheless, the CFC 
regimes may still be influenced by secondary EU law. Firstly, the concept of CFC 
regimes can be directly within the scope of a Directive. For example, the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive is, in my opinion, also relevant for the application of CFC 
regimes. The reason is that the amended version of the Directive not only covers 
profit distributions but also the current taxation of income derived through a hybrid 
entity. In my opinion, the current taxation of income according to CFC regimes is 
somewhere “in between” these two concepts. Clearly, the current taxation of income 
according to CFC regimes can neither be seen as the taxation of a profit distribution 
nor as a taxation of income derived through a hybrid entity. However, it would be 
neither logical nor consistent, in my opinion, to consider the income attribution which 
is related to a non-transparent entity to be outside of the scope of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive under these circumstances - and I do not think that this was the 
intention. Moreover, it is not possible, in my opinion, to disallow the application of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive to CFC income attributions on the basis of Article 1 (2) of 
the Directive, either. The latter clause should have the purpose of avoiding that a 
taxpayer enjoys the advantages of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive merely by the 
establishment of an abusive structure, i.e. in situations where, under normal 
circumstances, the taxpayer would not be protected by the Directive. This, however, 
is usually not an issue in case of CFC investments. Overall, the most important 
consequence of such a conclusion is the requirement - based on the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive - to provide the elimination of double taxation either by an 
exemption of the attributed income or by the provision of an ordinary tax credit and to 
grant an exemption from income taxation for profit distributions which were already 
subject to current taxation in case of a hybrid entity. In general, this is already 
granted by almost all of the existing CFC regimes and it does not seem that, in this 
respect, the requirements in the Directive go beyond what is already provided under 
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those regimes. However, the Directive becomes an additional limitation for changing 
the structure of CFC regimes. 
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concept of the Interest and Royalty Directive may therefore result in the fostering of 
group structures which include intermediate finance companies by granting 
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regimes can be directly within the scope of a Directive. For example, the Parent-
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according to CFC regimes can neither be seen as the taxation of a profit distribution 
nor as a taxation of income derived through a hybrid entity. However, it would be 
neither logical nor consistent, in my opinion, to consider the income attribution which 
is related to a non-transparent entity to be outside of the scope of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive under these circumstances - and I do not think that this was the 
intention. Moreover, it is not possible, in my opinion, to disallow the application of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive to CFC income attributions on the basis of Article 1 (2) of 
the Directive, either. The latter clause should have the purpose of avoiding that a 
taxpayer enjoys the advantages of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive merely by the 
establishment of an abusive structure, i.e. in situations where, under normal 
circumstances, the taxpayer would not be protected by the Directive. This, however, 
is usually not an issue in case of CFC investments. Overall, the most important 
consequence of such a conclusion is the requirement - based on the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive - to provide the elimination of double taxation either by an 
exemption of the attributed income or by the provision of an ordinary tax credit and to 
grant an exemption from income taxation for profit distributions which were already 
subject to current taxation in case of a hybrid entity. In general, this is already 
granted by almost all of the existing CFC regimes and it does not seem that, in this 
respect, the requirements in the Directive go beyond what is already provided under 
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widened to countries outside of the EU. Here, it is simply impossible for high-tax 
Member States to compete with all types of low-tax regimes offered all around the 
globe.200 In principle, I fully support tax competition, but it must be clearly 
differentiated between sound competition among states which leads to an efficient 
allocation of resources (and therefore also capital) and harmful competition which is 
triggered by those countries and territories which have an over-proportional 
advantage from the inflow of capital and mobile investments to the detriment of other 
states. Without any doubt, there should not be any kind of “race to the bottom” if it is 
not clearly supported by economic principles.201 However, since it is, in practice, very 
difficult to find a border line between sound and harmful competition, I consider it 
necessary that Member States should have the possibility to apply legislation which 
focuses on the taxation of income related to mobile investments.202 Such legislation, 
however, should be in line not only with the economic and equity principles outlined 
in previous chapters, but also, of course, with the basic freedoms and the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ. Thus, it seems that an approach which focuses on the 
taxation of the basic interest component of capital for certain mobile investments - 
without making a differentiation based on the place of investment - could be a very 
efficient approach which fulfils the aforementioned requirements and which does not, 
at the same time, restrict sound competition.   
 
8.5. The Reaction of Member States to Comply With European Union Law 
 
In the following, I will outline some of the amendments to national legislation and 
(legislative) proposals which were made in order to comply with EU law - especially 




With effect from January 1, 2009 the Finnish CFC legislation was amended in order 
to be in line with EU law. The new section 2a of the Finnish CFC regime makes it 
clear that the regime shall not apply to an entity resident in an EEA state or a tax 
treaty state whose tax system does not differ substantially from the Finnish tax 
system, provided that an exchange of information is possible with the other state. The 
latter information exchange may be based on a bilateral agreement concluded 
between Finland and the other state. In addition, the exclusion from CFC taxation 
requires that the entity is actually established and that a genuine economic activity is 
carried on in the other state. Currently - and if the latter requirement of a genuine 
economic activity is fulfilled - the exclusion applies to all EEA state except 
Liechtenstein and to all tax treaty states except those whose tax system differs 
substantially from the Finnish system. This is the case if the corporate tax in the other 
state is on average less than 75 percent of the corresponding Finnish tax determined 
according to the Finnish tax rules (which is now expressly stipulated in the CFC 
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201 See section 2.4. regarding the underlying economic principles.  
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Member State of the shareholder, it usually results in the taxation of the non-resident 
company in the latter Member State. Such a decision is based on the fact that the 
effective place of management is most often the decisive element for the question 
which state has the right to tax the income of the legal entity. Moreover, and in 
addition to these cases, it is important to note that transfer pricing rules play a 
supporting role, too. Services without economic value might already be subject to 
transfer pricing adjustments - in the cases in which the CFC itself is, in general, 
accepted by the domestic legislation of the Member State which applies the CFC 
rules. However, the aforementioned aspects are, at the same time, relevant criteria in 
the EU case law for a differentiation between wholly artificial arrangements and non-
artificial arrangements. Thus, by separating the abusive structures - under national 
legislation - from those which are subject to CFC taxation, the Member States clearly 
show that they have the intention to currently tax income from genuine economic 
activities. The latter income can neither be considered to be abusively shifted to a 
non-resident entity in a low-tax country nor can it be corrected according to transfer 
pricing principles. Of course, in most cases the Member States do not, in principle, 
classify the whole income as income which is currently attributable to the domestic 
shareholder, but this is not the point.197 The important aspect is that the ECJ clarified 
that the income which is typically marked as CFC income by the Member States is 
not necessarily linked to wholly artificial arrangements. Thus, if the CFC derives 
income from a genuine economic activity in another state and the taxpayer is able to 
provide the proof for such an activity, there is no possibility for the Member States of 
taxing this income on a current basis if they do not extend, at the same time, the 
legislation in an undifferentiated manner to situations which are currently outside of 
the CFC regimes, i.e. to income derived by domestic companies and to income 
derived by companies in other states which currently do not trigger the CFC taxation. 
In other words, the problem lies in the fact that the escape clause would essentially 
result in an exemption of income from CFC taxation which is obviously seen, by the 
Member States which apply those rules, as “the main target” of CFC regimes. For 
this reason, I doubt that the implementation of an escape clause is an appropriate 
solution for a great number of Member States. 
 
In principle, it is understandable that Member States with a comparably high tax rate 
want to protect their tax revenues and want to stop the erosion of the domestic tax 
base in favour of low-tax countries. Some of the smaller Member States offer lower 
tax rates which attract, in particular, capital investments which are usually classified 
as “passive” investments. A situation like in the Cadbury Schweppes case not only 
leads to the result that the interest income from the financing activities which is 
related to third countries is not taxable in the United Kingdom, but also leads to the 
result that the domestic tax base is reduced by interest paid to the CFC. Thus, 
especially the mobile activities can be re-located very easily from one state to 
another state.198 It is obvious that the re-location of such mobile activities is, in 
particular, attracted by lower tax rates and the tax rate differences between the high-
tax states and the low-tax states.199 The situation is particularly difficult if the scope is 
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classify the whole income as income which is currently attributable to the domestic 
shareholder, but this is not the point.197 The important aspect is that the ECJ clarified 
that the income which is typically marked as CFC income by the Member States is 
not necessarily linked to wholly artificial arrangements. Thus, if the CFC derives 
income from a genuine economic activity in another state and the taxpayer is able to 
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legislation in an undifferentiated manner to situations which are currently outside of 
the CFC regimes, i.e. to income derived by domestic companies and to income 
derived by companies in other states which currently do not trigger the CFC taxation. 
In other words, the problem lies in the fact that the escape clause would essentially 
result in an exemption of income from CFC taxation which is obviously seen, by the 
Member States which apply those rules, as “the main target” of CFC regimes. For 
this reason, I doubt that the implementation of an escape clause is an appropriate 
solution for a great number of Member States. 
 
In principle, it is understandable that Member States with a comparably high tax rate 
want to protect their tax revenues and want to stop the erosion of the domestic tax 
base in favour of low-tax countries. Some of the smaller Member States offer lower 
tax rates which attract, in particular, capital investments which are usually classified 
as “passive” investments. A situation like in the Cadbury Schweppes case not only 
leads to the result that the interest income from the financing activities which is 
related to third countries is not taxable in the United Kingdom, but also leads to the 
result that the domestic tax base is reduced by interest paid to the CFC. Thus, 
especially the mobile activities can be re-located very easily from one state to 
another state.198 It is obvious that the re-location of such mobile activities is, in 
particular, attracted by lower tax rates and the tax rate differences between the high-
tax states and the low-tax states.199 The situation is particularly difficult if the scope is 
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jurisprudence of the ECJ, especially in accordance with the ICI decision and the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision. Hence, if it can be proven that, despite any tax 
motives, the CFC is actually established in another Member State, the French CFC 
rules shall not be applicable.207 Thus, it seems that the criteria which were derived 
from the jurisprudence of the ECJ in cases dealing with direct taxation were 
considered, but not the conclusions from VAT cases.208 As already outlined earlier, 
this is, in my opinion, an appropriate approach. It has to be noted, though, that the 
aforementioned concept applies to participations held by French corporations, but not 
by French individual shareholders. It is therefore obvious that the legislation does not, 
in the latter case, comply with EU law.209 It is worth mentioning that the French CFC 
rules were supplemented - with effect as of 2010 - by rules which target investments 
in non-cooperative jurisdictions.210 Under these rules, dividends, interest, royalties 
and payments for services made to entities located in a non-cooperative jurisdiction 
will be subject to a 50 percent withholding tax. Moreover, dividends received from 





The German tax authorities issued an Administrative Circular in January 2007 which 
clarifies the impact of this decision on the German CFC rules.212 It is not really 
surprising to me that the tax authorities did not see the necessity to refrain, in 
general, from the application of the German CFC rules, but made it clear that the 
provisions of the German Foreign Income Tax Act are, in principle, still applicable. 
The CFC rules are no longer applied to income derived by companies in EU / EEA 
states if the latter companies carry on a genuine economic activity in the respective 
states. However, this is not true for states which do not provide appropriate 
procedures for collaboration and exchange of information. However, in order to be 
exempt from CFC taxation on the basis of the carrying on of a genuine economic 
activity, the taxpayer has to provide evidence that 
 
a.) the company participates - in the state where the company is established or 
where the company has its place of management - in the course of its ordinary 
business on an active, permanent and lasting basis in the local market; 
 
b.) the company employs the management and other personnel in the host state 
on a permanent basis; 
 
c.)  the personnel of the company must be qualified to carry out the functions 
assigned to the company in their own responsibility and independently;  
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regime).203 The tax treaty states which differ substantially from Finland’s tax system 
are included in a list which shall be up-dated from time to time.204  
 
In order to identify whether the foreign entity is actually established in the other state 
and carries on genuine economic activities the following factors shall be considered: 
 
1.) the company has the premises and equipment which are necessary for its 
activities available for its own use in its residence state;  
 
2.) the company has sufficient personnel available for its own use in its residence 
state and the personnel has the power to independently carry on the business 
of the company; and 
 
3.) the personnel independently makes the decisions concerning the daily 
activities of the company.205 
 
However, the evaluation has to be made on the basis of all objective factors that are 
ascertainable by third parties. In principle, with the revised CFC legislation Finland 
follows the Cadbury Schweppes decision. Moreover, the necessity of an information 
exchange clause in a tax treaty is in line with previous conclusions regarding the CFC 
investment in third countries and the case law of the ECJ, e.g. the A case. However, I 
do not see why it is necessary to maintain a link to the tax rate in a third country. If a 
tax treaty is established between Finland and the other state which provides for an 
exchange of information, I do not think that it is required to stipulate, in addition, a 
minimum threshold for the corporate tax rate in the CFC state. 
 
The revised legislation is now also applicable to permanent establishments, i.e. 
foreign permanent establishments and foreign legal entities can both be in the focus 
of the Finnish CFC regime. In addition, the participation requirement has been 
increased to 25 percent shareholding in the CFC. A Finnish resident taxpayer may 
now be taxed on CFC income only if he has at least a shareholding of 25 percent in 
the CFC. Further changes are related to the type of income under domestic law, the 
elimination of double taxation and the tax loss carry forward limitation. The latter 
limitation was extended from five years to ten years and now complies with the 




The French CFC legislation already provides for an “EU entity exemption” to a 
shareholding in the foreign entity which does not constitute a wholly artificial 
arrangement intended to escape French tax normally payable. According to the 
guidelines to the French legislation, published in 2007, the notion of “wholly artificial 
arrangement” must be assessed with regard to the objective criteria arising out of the 
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any event, participations which are within the scope of the free movement of capital, 
but may also effect non-majority participations which might still be within the scope of 
the freedom of establishment, e.g. in case of substantial shareholdings216 Thus, the 
German focus on a majority holding of resident taxpayers (whether they are related 
parties or not), does not necessarily comply with the jurisprudence of the ECJ.217 For 
example, this can result in a situation where a German resident with a 50 percent 
participation in a CFC does not have the possibility of providing evidence of a 
genuine economic activity (because there are no additional German resident 
shareholders), but a participation of 5 percent provides the latter possibility, because 
the CFC is dominated by German (unrelated) shareholders - and therefore the 
general rule applies. In essence, the German approach outlined in the Administrative 
Circular seems to be inconsistent and not fully in line with the requirements 
determined by the ECJ.  
 
With effect of January 1, 2008, the German Foreign Income Tax Act was amended in 
order to consider the outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes decision.218 The legislative 
amendment now provides the possibility for an exemption from CFC taxation if the 
taxpayer can provide evidence that the CFC carries out a genuine economic activity 
in the host Member State. The limitation to EU/EEA States as well as the necessity of 
appropriate procedures for collaboration and exchange of information reflects, in 
essence, what was already stated in the Administrative Circular. However, in contrast 
to the Administrative Circular, no further details are included in the amended 
legislation which specify the requirements and which provide guidance with respect 
to the term “genuine economic activity.” It is therefore not unlikely that the elements 
which are outlined in the Administrative Circular are still considered valid criteria from 
the perspective of the tax authorities for the separation between genuine economic 
activities and wholly artificial arrangements.219 Insofar, the criticism outlined above 
remains and the legislative changes would not result in any improvement with respect 
to the question of compatibility with EU law. However, the clear restriction with 
respect to income from capital investment - which was explicitly stated in the 
Administrative Circular - is not as clear anymore in the amended legislation. Instead, 
it is now stated that only income which is derived through the activity of the CFC itself 
can be allocated to the genuine economic activity and only to the extent that the 
arm’s length principle was taken into account. It seems that the legislator tries to 
have a “back door” for the application of the CFC rules to income from capital 
investments.220 At least, the preparatory work shows that it is intended to make a 
separation of the activities instead of accepting that a certain economic activity - 
within the foreign entity - leads to the result that the total income is exempt from CFC 
taxation. For example, if the personnel of the CFC provides a number of group 
services (which can be seen as a genuine economic activity carried on in the 
respective state) and, in addition, financial means are ‘routed’ through the CFC, but 
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d.) the income is created through the company’s own activities; 
 
e.) if the services are provided to related parties, they must result in an additional 
economic value for the recipient of the services and the employment of capital 
for the services must be in an appropriate relation to the economic value which 
is created by the services. 
 
Apparently, the tax authorities refer - to a certain extent - to the test suggested by the 
Advocate General in the Cadbury Schweppes case.213 However, it has to be noted 
that (i) the Court did not explicitly refer to the (complete) test but rather focused on 
the physical presence in the host Member State and that (ii) the German 
requirements go too far and do not correspond to the conclusions of the ECJ: the 
decision neither requires that the activity is related to the local market (see letter a) 
nor any appropriate relation of the employment of capital to the economic value 
created by the services of the CFC (see letter e). Another important point is the fact 
that the German rules considerably restricted the test by not accepting the provision 
of evidence - and therefore the possibility of being exempt from CFC taxation in case 
of a genuine economic activity - in the following situations:  
 
- The income was subject to CFC taxation only because of section 7 (6) of the 
German Foreign Income Tax Act. This means that income from capital 
investment was subject to CFC taxation (without the possibility of providing the 
aforementioned evidence) if the participation of German resident taxpayers 
was up to 50 percent. If the participation exceeded 50 percent, the general 
rule applied and the provision of evidence was possible.  
 
- The income was derived through a company which is established outside of 
the EU / EEA. 
 
- The income was derived through a permanent establishment outside of the EU 
/ EEA.  
 
In German tax literature the question was raised whether the first-mentioned 
exception resulted in a general exclusion from the possibility of providing evidence of 
a genuine economic activity for income from capital investment.214 However, this 
would have had the consequence that the Circular would not be in line with the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision, because it was exactly this type of income which was 
in the focus of the latter decision. However, it seems that the references and the word 
‘only’ makes it clear that the exception is limited to income from capital investments 
where the participation of German residents in the CFC is up to 50 percent.215 In 
other words, if the CFC derives income from capital investment and the German 
residents hold a participation which does not exceed 50 percent, there is no 
possibility of providing evidence for a genuine economic activity. This would affect, in 
                                            
213 See in this respect also Rainer / Müller, Remarks to the German Administrative Circular, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2007, page 151 et seq. (152).  
214 Köplin / Sedemund, Das BMF-Schreiben vom 8.1.2007 - untauglich, die EG-Rechtswidrigkeit der deutschen 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung nach Cadbury Schweppes zu beseitigen!, Betriebs-Berater 2007, page 244 et seq. 
(247). 
215 See in this regard also Schönfeld in Flick / Wassermeyer / Baumhoff, Außensteuerrecht, Kommentar, Vor §§ 
7-14, paragraph  312; Haun / Käshammer / Reiser, Das BMF-Schreiben vom 8.1.2007 zur 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung - eine erste Analyse, GmbH-Rundschau 2007, page 184 et seq. (187).  
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any event, participations which are within the scope of the free movement of capital, 
but may also effect non-majority participations which might still be within the scope of 
the freedom of establishment, e.g. in case of substantial shareholdings216 Thus, the 
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With effect of January 1, 2008, the German Foreign Income Tax Act was amended in 
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216 See, for example, the SGI case in which a shareholding of 34 percent was sufficient to come within the scope 
of the freedom of establishment (case C-311/08 (SGI), paragraphs 34, 35). 
217 See in this regard also Köhler / Eicker, Kritische Anmerkungen zum BMF-Schreiben „Cadbury Schweppes“ 
v. 8.1.2007, Deutsches Steuerrecht 2007, page 331 et seq. (332).  
218 Section 8 (2) of the German Foreign Income Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz).  
219 The intention was, however, to replace the Administrative Circular by the legislative changes. This is clearly 
stated in the Circular itself.  
220 However, see in this respect the position of Goebel / Palm who concluded that the revised legislation might be 
seen, at least from the ‘mere wording’, as a motive test which can be in line with the requirements determined by 
the ECJ in the Cadbury Schweppes decision (see Goebel / Palm, Der Motivtest - Rettungsanker der deutschen 
Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung?, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 720 et seq. (726).   
   
 
 
d.) the income is created through the company’s own activities; 
 
e.) if the services are provided to related parties, they must result in an additional 
economic value for the recipient of the services and the employment of capital 
for the services must be in an appropriate relation to the economic value which 
is created by the services. 
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the EU / EEA. 
 
- The income was derived through a permanent establishment outside of the EU 
/ EEA.  
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would have had the consequence that the Circular would not be in line with the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision, because it was exactly this type of income which was 
in the focus of the latter decision. However, it seems that the references and the word 
‘only’ makes it clear that the exception is limited to income from capital investments 
where the participation of German residents in the CFC is up to 50 percent.215 In 
other words, if the CFC derives income from capital investment and the German 
residents hold a participation which does not exceed 50 percent, there is no 
possibility of providing evidence for a genuine economic activity. This would affect, in 
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8.5.5. The United Kingdom 
 
The United Kingdom, which is directly affected by the Cadbury Schweppes decision, 
responded very soon with a proposal for changes of the CFC legislation. The 
approach included in the Draft Finance Bill 2007 follows a completely different and 
innovative route which comes, in general, closer to the proposals which can be 
derived from chapters 2 and 3, i.e. a separation of the income components instead of 
a mere separation according to the type of income. However, similar to the German 
approach, the United Kingdom proposed legislative changes deviating, in my opinion, 
from the conclusions which can be derived from the Cadbury Schweppes decision. 
The HMRC Draft Guidance on the Changes to Controlled Foreign Companies 
Rules225 outlines that “the ECJ decided that CFC rules pursue a legitimate aim and 
are compatible with European law - so long as they are not applied to the profits of 
genuine economic activities undertaken in an actual establishment in another 
Member State.”226 And “the Government is satisfied that the UK’s CFC legislation is 
compatible with European law as interpreted by the ECJ in Cadbury Schweppes. But 
the Government recognises that there may be circumstances at the margins where it 
may not be entirely clear.”227 Theoretically, it would have been obvious - after the 
Cadbury Schweppes decision - to simply clarify the “motive test” or, if necessary, 
change it to a test which grants an exemption from CFC taxation in case of genuine 
economic activities, i.e. to provide the possibility for the taxpayer of proving that the 
CFC carries on a genuine economic activity. Instead, it was decided to retain the 
system of current taxation and to provide for the deduction of a “specific amount” 
from the total amount of attributed income which reflects the “net economic value” 
created by the personnel of the CFC. The “net economic value” is defined as “the real 
economic profit to the group as a whole created directly by the work of individuals 
working for the CFC in an EEA state, after allowing the full economic costs to the 
group of carrying out the work.”228 The HMRC Draft Guidance explains that “(...) the 
distinction within a CFC is, in essence, between profits, that arise from labour and 
those that arise from capital. Profits from labour tend to be created where the 
activities are located. Profits from capital are mobile and have no automatic link with 
where the activities take place and can be (and often are) diverted elsewhere. For the 
purposes of the new rules, therefore, in respect of profits not already exempt 
because one of the existing exemptions in the rules applies, the profits identified as 
arising form “genuine economic activities” are those created by the labour of the 
individuals working for the CFC in its EEA business establishment(s). Profits from 
capital will rarely, for these purposes, constitute profits from “genuine economic 
activities.” Further, activities that are entirely intra-group and, of themselves add no 
value to the group (e.g. intra-group lending) cannot give rise to profits of “genuine 
economic activities.” By definition, they simply move value from one part of the group 
to another.”229 It is stated further that “(t)he value of the work must be assessed in 
relation to its actual content and the competence and level of independence/authority 
of the person carrying out the work. For example, works that has minimal content and 
                                            
225 HMRC Draft Guidance, December 6, 2006, Changes to Controlled Foreign Companies Rules (can be found 
under www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2006/controlled-foreign-companies.pdf.). See also Schönfeld, Reaktion der 
britischen Regierung auf “Cadbury Schweppes”: Geplante Änderungen der britischen CFC-Rules und deren 
Vereinbarkeit mit EG-rechtlichen Vorgaben, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 199 et seq.; Taylor / Sykes, 
Controlled Foreign Companies and Foreign Profits, British Tax Review 2007, page 609 et seq. 
226 HMRC Draft Guidance, paragraph 4.  
227 HMRC Draft Guidance, paragraph 6. 
228 HMRC Draft Guidance, paragraph 21. 
229 HMRC Draft Guidance, paragraphs 17 to 19. 
   
 
the decisions which are necessary in the latter context are made by the parent 
company, this should still result in the CFC taxation of the interest income (but not in 




The Italian CFC legislation applies not only to “black-listed” jurisdictions but also to 
“non-black-listed” jurisdictions if the effective tax rate imposed on the CFC is at least 
50 percent lower than the tax rate the CFC would have been subject to in a 
comparable domestic situation and if certain passive and intra-group service income 
exceeds 50 percent of the income of the CFC. The rules for entities in “non-black 
listed” jurisdictions do not apply if the resident taxpayer obtains a ruling of the Italian 
tax authorities which states that the CFC does not constitute an artificial structure 
aimed at receiving an improper tax benefit.221  
 
In case of “black-listed” jurisdictions it is important to note that the exemption in case 
of an “effective business activity” now also requires the activity to be mainly carried 
out in the respective market of establishment.222 Thus, the Italian legislation, in 
essence, provides some sort of exemption from CFC taxation for business activities. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that the exemption is completely dependent on the 
ruling of the tax authorities and one can certainly argue that such a procedure may 
still represent an excessive burden - compared to domestic investments and 
investments in other states. Moreover, it is still open to which extent the concept of 
an “effective business activity” from the perspective of the Italian tax authorities 
complies with the differentiation provided by the ECJ in the Cadbury Schweppes 
decision.223 At least, a ruling which was described in an article of Bardini shows that 
the interpretation of the Italian tax authorities does not necessarily comply with the 
earlier conclusions in this chapter. In the latter ruling, the exemption from CFC 
taxation could not be obtained since the CFC, established in Switzerland, sold 
products which were neither produced in Switzerland nor sold on the Swiss market. 
Thus, the fact that the CFC did not do business in the market of establishment 
resulted in the conclusion of the Italian tax authorities that there was no sufficient 
interpenetration of the CFC in the territory of establishment. According to the Italian 
tax authorities, such a requirement can be directly inferred from the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision.224 Overall, the Italian tax authorities request a direct link of the 
business activity to the market of establishment. As already outlined earlier, such a 




                                            
221 See Scarioni / Muni, The New Italian CFC Rules: EU Holding Companies Challenge the ‘Artificial 
Arrangement’ Assessment, Intertax 2010, page 527 et seq.; Mayr, Auswirkungen der aktuellen 
Steueränderungen - Neuerungen im italienischen Steuerrecht 2010, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2010, page 
131 et seq.; Mayr, Maßnahmen des italienischen Gesetzgebers - Die Entwicklungen des italienischen 
Außensteuerrechts 2010, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2010, page 670 et seq. (679). 
222 Mayr, Maßnahmen des italienischen Gesetzgebers - Die Entwicklungen des italienischen Außensteuerrechts 
2010, Internationale Wirtschafts-Briefe 2010, page 670 et seq. (679). 
223 See in this respect Lovells’ International Tax Team, Impact of Cadbury Schweppes on CFC Legislation, Tax 
Planning International Review 2007.  
224 See Bardini, The Fine Line between Anti-Abuse Measures and the Delimitation of a Member State’s Tax 
Jurisdiction: The Italian Case, European Taxation 2010, page 374 et seq. (377). Essentially, Bardini comes to the 
conclusion that the new Italian CFC rules are not in full compliance with established EU principles.  
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latter state also takes the direct risk related to, for example, an interest-bearing loan. 
If this is the case, a symmetrical approach requires the income taxation of the risk 
elements in the CFC state (and not, in addition, in the United Kingdom - because the 
CFC regime does not take into account - directly - the negative income which might 
be created through the taking over of the risks). Furthermore, it is important to 
recognise that such a concept is not in line with the Cadbury Schweppes decision.234 
Based on the latter decision, the CFC regime should not be applied in case of 
genuine economic activities. Thus, if the carrying on of an activity can be classified as 
such a genuine economic activity, the complete activity should be exempt from CFC 
taxation. The activity cannot be separated into income from capital and income from 
labour work - as long as it is not done in a non-discriminatory manner. However, this 
is exactly the point: the concept is still limited to low-taxed non-resident companies 
and is not applicable to domestic companies. The revised CFC regime would, 
therefore, still lead to a CFC taxation of all or almost all of the income derived from an 
activity which was subject to verification in the Cadbury Schweppes case.235 
 
In June 2007 the United Kingdom tax authorities issued a consultative document with 
the title “Taxation of the Foreign Profits of Companies: A Discussion Document.”236 
The document contains, amongst others, fundamental changes to the United 
Kingdom CFC rules. Interestingly, the discussion document considerably deviates 
from the aforementioned described concept included in the HMRC Draft Guidance of 
December 2006. In fact, what the tax authorities now propose is not only a switch 
from an entity approach to a transactional approach regime, but also the broadening 
of the scope of the legislation to companies resident in the United Kingdom.237 The 
latter, of course, is a major step towards a CFC regime (which shall then be called 
“CC regime”) which might be in line with the basic freedoms of the TFEU. The tainted 
income is - according to the discussion document - separated as follows:  
 
- Passive (or investment) income. This income encompasses dividends, 
interest, annuities (and other purchased income streams), royalties, rents, and 
other income of similar nature.238 “Participation dividends” are exempt from CC 
taxation.239  
 
                                            
234 See in this respect also Schönfeld, Reaktion der britischen Regierung auf „Cadbury Schweppes”: Geplante 
Änderungen der britischen CFC-Rules und deren Vereinbarkeit mit EG-rechtlichen Vorgaben, Internationales 
Steuerrecht 2007, page 199 et seq.  
235 It has to be noted that on 17 December 2007 a revised version of the Draft Guidance was published and 
superseded the original guidance. The Revised Draft Guidance sets out further detail on the “effectively 
managed” condition of the “exempt activity test” as well as expands on the distinction drawn in the original 
guidance between profits created in another Member State and those profits merely “diverted” to another 
Member State from elsewhere. The Revised Draft Guidance also contains additional examples. The document is 
still called ‘Draft Guidance’. See with respect to the Revised Draft Guidance also Persoff, HMRC Revised Draft 
Guidance on Controlled Foreign Companies Rules, EC Tax Review 2008, page 96.  
236 Taxation of the Foreign Profits of Companies: A Discussion Document, June 2007, HM Treasury / HM 
Revenue & Customs. The document can be found on the Treasury website at: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk.  
237 Discussion document, paragraph 4.7 et seq. See with respect to the proposal also Evans / Delahunty, E.U. 
Perspective on U.K. CFC Rules, Tax Planning International Review 2007 ; Malherbe et al., Controlled Foreign 
Corporations in the EU after Cadbury Schweppes, Tax Management International Journal 2007, page 607 et 
seq. ; Taylor / Sykes, Controlled Foreign Companies and Foreign Profits, British Tax Review 2007, page 609 et 
seq. ; Deuchar / Steel, UK Throws Out Controlled Foreign Companies Regime, International Tax Review 2008, 
page 41 et seq. 
238 Discussion document, paragraphs 4.20 - 4.22.  
239 Discussion document, paragraph 4.27.  
   
 
nominally (or notionally) relates to capital or assets placed artificially in the CFC may 
have some intrinsic value; however this value will be limited and very marginal when 
compared to the value of the profits that arise form the capital or assets. In such 
circumstances, the profits in the CFC largely come from the diversion of profits to it, 
rather than those profits being created by its work. Such diversion of profits may be 
achieved, for example, by placing capital or other assets, such as intangible assets, 
in the CFC; or by arranging capital to accumulate in a CFC, or ownership of new 
intellectual property to arise in a CFC. Such profits do not constitute “net economic 
value” to the group created directly by the work of the staff in the CFC. A useful guide 
is that the “net economic value” should equate to what the group would be prepared 
to pay to a third party to undertake the work done by staff working for the CFC in the 
relevant state(s), over and above the full economic costs of undertaking the work.”230 
The HMRC Draft Guidance also contains examples to clarify the respective 
approach. Here, it is outlined that, in the first example, the profits realised by 
operating a call centre in a CFC state may result in a complete deduction from the 
chargeable profits. The work of the call centre employees is considered to directly 
create value for the group by contributing to the delivery of its business.231 In the 
second example, the CFC is equipped with equity and passes the funds on to other 
group companies, on the directions of the UK parent, in the form of interest-bearing 
loans. The CFC rents an office and pays two employees of a group company in the 
same Member State to carry out the necessary administration. In this example, the 
income from the loans is no net economic value to the group as a whole. The loans 
simply transfer value from one part of the group to another. Even if there were any 
value, it would be - according to the Draft Guidance - attributable solely to the 
location of capital in the CFC and not to any work done by staff of the CFC. Thus, a 
deduction is not to be granted.232 In the third example, the CFC employs a small 
team of staff to undertake work involved in the administering of intellectual property - 
which was placed in the CFC - and receiving royalties. Pursuant to the Draft 
Guidance, little of the income from the intellectual property can be considered to 
constitute net economic value created directly by the individuals working for the CFC 
in the other state. This is because the real economic value arises not from the 
administrative work carried out by the CFC’s staff but from the legal ownership of the 
intellectual property by the CFC. In this case, a deduction may only be granted to the 
extent which reflects an arm’s length net return for the administrative work 
undertaken in the CFC.233  
 
Again, the concept can be seen as innovative and it goes into a similar direction as 
the basic interest approach. However, the limitation of the deduction to the net 
economic value - as defined in the Draft Guidance - is not, in my opinion, sufficient 
from an economic and equity point of view. Here, I will not repeat what was outlined 
in earlier chapters, but it is obvious that the concept overlooks the fact that the capital 
provided may create income in a third country (e.g. if the funds are provided to 
another group company outside the CFC state and outside the United Kingdom). In 
this case, the income should be subject to income taxation where the income is 
produced, but this is neither the United Kingdom nor the CFC state. However, if this 
is not the case - because of the fact that the interest income is not subject to a 
source-based taxation - the income will be, first of all, taxed in the CFC state. The 
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latter state also takes the direct risk related to, for example, an interest-bearing loan. 
If this is the case, a symmetrical approach requires the income taxation of the risk 
elements in the CFC state (and not, in addition, in the United Kingdom - because the 
CFC regime does not take into account - directly - the negative income which might 
be created through the taking over of the risks). Furthermore, it is important to 
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taxation. The activity cannot be separated into income from capital and income from 
labour work - as long as it is not done in a non-discriminatory manner. However, this 
is exactly the point: the concept is still limited to low-taxed non-resident companies 
and is not applicable to domestic companies. The revised CFC regime would, 
therefore, still lead to a CFC taxation of all or almost all of the income derived from an 
activity which was subject to verification in the Cadbury Schweppes case.235 
 
In June 2007 the United Kingdom tax authorities issued a consultative document with 
the title “Taxation of the Foreign Profits of Companies: A Discussion Document.”236 
The document contains, amongst others, fundamental changes to the United 
Kingdom CFC rules. Interestingly, the discussion document considerably deviates 
from the aforementioned described concept included in the HMRC Draft Guidance of 
December 2006. In fact, what the tax authorities now propose is not only a switch 
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of the scope of the legislation to companies resident in the United Kingdom.237 The 
latter, of course, is a major step towards a CFC regime (which shall then be called 
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income is - according to the discussion document - separated as follows:  
 
- Passive (or investment) income. This income encompasses dividends, 
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other income of similar nature.238 “Participation dividends” are exempt from CC 
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nominally (or notionally) relates to capital or assets placed artificially in the CFC may 
have some intrinsic value; however this value will be limited and very marginal when 
compared to the value of the profits that arise form the capital or assets. In such 
circumstances, the profits in the CFC largely come from the diversion of profits to it, 
rather than those profits being created by its work. Such diversion of profits may be 
achieved, for example, by placing capital or other assets, such as intangible assets, 
in the CFC; or by arranging capital to accumulate in a CFC, or ownership of new 
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value” to the group created directly by the work of the staff in the CFC. A useful guide 
is that the “net economic value” should equate to what the group would be prepared 
to pay to a third party to undertake the work done by staff working for the CFC in the 
relevant state(s), over and above the full economic costs of undertaking the work.”230 
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extent which reflects an arm’s length net return for the administrative work 
undertaken in the CFC.233  
 
Again, the concept can be seen as innovative and it goes into a similar direction as 
the basic interest approach. However, the limitation of the deduction to the net 
economic value - as defined in the Draft Guidance - is not, in my opinion, sufficient 
from an economic and equity point of view. Here, I will not repeat what was outlined 
in earlier chapters, but it is obvious that the concept overlooks the fact that the capital 
provided may create income in a third country (e.g. if the funds are provided to 
another group company outside the CFC state and outside the United Kingdom). In 
this case, the income should be subject to income taxation where the income is 
produced, but this is neither the United Kingdom nor the CFC state. However, if this 
is not the case - because of the fact that the interest income is not subject to a 
source-based taxation - the income will be, first of all, taxed in the CFC state. The 
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which provides services exclusively to group companies in other countries (including 
the UK).247 
 
In the Finance Bill 2009 the ‘foreign profits package’ was introduced after a long 
period of consultation, but contains rather minor changes to the United Kingdom CFC 
legislation.248 The exemption from apportionment for profits of a foreign company that 
qualifies as a holding company under the exempt activities test was removed. The 
same was true for the exemption based on an ‘acceptable distribution policy.’ It is 
important to note that - in addition to the amendments to the CFC legislation - the 
new legislation also treats foreign and UK distributions in the same way. Distributions 
will be exempt if they fall into an exempt class and if anti-avoidance provisions do not 
apply.  Further amendments with respect to the CFC regime are included in the 
Finance Bill 2011. A new exemption for foreign-to-foreign intra-group trading activities 
shall be introduced. In order to qualify for the exemption under the latter rule, the 
following conditions have to be satisfied:249 
 
- the CFC must have a business establishment in its territory of residence; 
 
- the CFC’s business must not include substantial non-exempt activities; 
 
- the CFC must not have a significant  connection with the UK; and 
 
- the CFC must not have more than 5 percent gross income arising from financing or 
intellectual property. 
 
Moreover, an additional exemption is included for CFCs with a main business of 
intellectual property exploitation if the intellectual property and the CFC have minimal 
business connection with the UK. Further amendments are, inter alia, related to the 
de minimis exemption (increase in the threshold) and the extension of transitional 
rules for superior and non-local holding companies.250  
 
In June 2011 the UK Treasury published a consultation paper which includes detailed 
proposals for how the new CFC regime will operate.251 The general idea of the new 
concept is the protection against artificial diversion of profits from the UK to low tax 
jurisdictions, with a focus on monetary assets and intellectual property.252 Profits 
arising from genuine economic activities and profits where there is no artificial 
diversion of UK profits shall not be taxed. Under the proposed concept, a CFC is a 
company that is (i) under UK control, (ii) is resident outside the UK and (iii) has profits 
which are taxed at a lower effective rate than if it were resident in the UK.253 The 
definition of “UK control” should determine that a foreign company is treated as 
                                            
247 At least, this is the conclusion for CFC type legislation on the basis of the examinations in chapters 4 and 8.   
248 See the Budget 2009 (and related information) which was published on April 22, 2009. This can be found on 
the HM Revenue & Customs website at www.hmrc.gov.uk. 
249 See the overview in E&Y International Tax Services, International Tax Update: Finance Bill 2011, December 
2010; Deloitte, Controlled Foreign Company Regimes Essentials, 2011, country report UK; see also the HM 
Treasury / HM Revenue & Customs report “CFC Interim Improvements” which can be found on the HM 
Revenue & Customs website at www.hmrc.gov.uk.  
250 see the HM Treasury / HM Revenue & Customs report “CFC Interim Improvements.” 
251 HM Treasury / HM Revenue & Customs, Consultation on Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) Reform, 
June 30, 2011. The intention is that the new rules will be introduced in Finance Act 2012.    
252 Consultation paper, page 6.  
253 Consultation paper, page 12.  
   
 
- Other mobile income. The latter encompasses sales income from deliveries to 
or from the UK or from affiliates where the goods are not delivered into the 
CFC’s territory of residence; and intra-group / UK-derived sales or service 
income from “wholesale, distributive, financial or service” businesses.240  
 
Exemptions from the attribution of passive income are provided for income from 
genuine active finance business (banking, financial, insurance activity and property 
investment businesses) and certain intra-group interest.241 The exemption for intra-
group interest applies to interest from other affiliates provided that it was paid out of 
profits not covered by the CC rules and the receiving company was appropriately 
capitalised and, for example, does not have more equity than would be expected for 
a typical intra-group lender.242 Further exemptions shall be provided for certain 
specified income from intra-group transactions within the same country, for identical 
income (to exempt from charge passive income that was incidental to a subsidiary’s 
main trade) and for conduit income (to exempt passive income that was received in a 
fiduciary capacity for financing that does not involve the avoidance of UK withholding 
tax).243  
 
It is proposed that the regime shall be applicable in case of participations of at least 
10 percent and it is planned, therefore, to “modernise the definition of control.”244 
However, it is planned to exclude smaller businesses from the CC regime (or, 
alternatively, to have a more limited application in case of smaller businesses).245 
The attributable income shall be calculated on the basis of UK GAAP.246 It is 
important to note, though, that it is apparently the tainted income which is attributed 
to the shareholder without any deduction of a “specific amount” which reflects the 
“net economic value” (as originally described in the HMRC Draft Guidance). The 
latter is, in my opinion, a step backwards from a concept which reflects economic 
necessity, because the legislation which is now proposed in the discussion document 
can be seen as a typical transactional approach regime. On the other hand, the 
application of the system to resident and non-resident participations is a substantial - 
and necessary - improvement. I have already outlined earlier that there seems to be 
no option to a non-discriminatory approach for CFC type legislation. A decision with 
respect to the compatibility with EU law can only be made on the basis of a more 
concrete concept. However, looking at the different elements, it might be critical to 
provide an exemption for certain specified income from intra-group transactions 
within the same country. Essentially, this might result - in case of a UK based 
multinational company - in a great number of exemptions from CC taxation within the 
UK, but results in a CC taxation for income derived through a foreign service centre 
                                            
240 Discussion document, paragraphs 4.28 - 4.30.  
241 Discussion document, paragraphs 4.23 - 4.24.  
242 Discussion document, paragraph 4.25.  
243 Discussion document, paragraph 4.26.  
244 Discussion document, paragraph 4.16. A 10 percent threshold for a “controlling influence” does not 
necessarily correspond to what is to be understood as a “definite influence” under Article 49 of the TFEU. For 
example, the general threshold in the German legislation which was in the focus in Lasertec required a 
“substantial holding” which was a holding of more than 25 percent (case C-492/04 (Lasertec), paragraph 21). 
See 4.2.7.1 for more details.   
245 Discussion document, paragraph 1.9 and Annex C. Smaller businesses are those with fewer than 50 
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group interest applies to interest from other affiliates provided that it was paid out of 
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main trade) and for conduit income (to exempt passive income that was received in a 
fiduciary capacity for financing that does not involve the avoidance of UK withholding 
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It is proposed that the regime shall be applicable in case of participations of at least 
10 percent and it is planned, therefore, to “modernise the definition of control.”244 
However, it is planned to exclude smaller businesses from the CC regime (or, 
alternatively, to have a more limited application in case of smaller businesses).245 
The attributable income shall be calculated on the basis of UK GAAP.246 It is 
important to note, though, that it is apparently the tainted income which is attributed 
to the shareholder without any deduction of a “specific amount” which reflects the 
“net economic value” (as originally described in the HMRC Draft Guidance). The 
latter is, in my opinion, a step backwards from a concept which reflects economic 
necessity, because the legislation which is now proposed in the discussion document 
can be seen as a typical transactional approach regime. On the other hand, the 
application of the system to resident and non-resident participations is a substantial - 
and necessary - improvement. I have already outlined earlier that there seems to be 
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manufacturing trade, and (iii) a more general exemption for a CFC carrying on 
commercial activities. The latter exemption would cover (1.) trading and certain 
business activities between a CFC and other foreign companies (whether or not 
connected), (2.) trading and certain business activities between a CFC and UK 
persons (whether or not connected), where there is no arrangement in place to 
artificially divert profit from the UK, (3.) trading activities relating to the exploitation of 
foreign IP which does not pose a significant risk to the UK tax base. A CFC which is 
engaged to a substantial extent (“around 20 percent”) in investment activities would 
not be able to benefit from the exemption. In each case the CFC would need to meet 
a local management condition. Incidental finance income that arises from the working 
capital of that business will be exempt. Also in this case, a number of different 
options are outlined.263 IP income will be exempt if it is related to the holding and 
exploitation of foreign IP which has not been transferred from the UK, nor has 
significant economic connection with the UK. Moreover, the exemption will also be 
available for local IP that is integral to a genuine overseas manufacturing trade and 
for royalty income that is incidental / ancillary to the trade.264  
 
e.) Finance company rules 
 
The finance company rules include a partial exemption for certain overseas financing 
activities. Essentially, this will result in an effective UK tax rate of 1/4 of the regular 
UK rate on profits from overseas intra-group finance income. Different design options 
are presented and the annex includes a number of illustrative examples in order to 
understand the mechanism. The CFC would need to meet a local management 
condition.265   
 
f.) General purpose exemption  
 
The general purpose exemption fulfils, in principle, the role of the motive test in the 
current UK CFC rules and can be applied in order to exempt profits that have not 
been artificially diverted from the UK. This exemption will consider the facts and 
circumstances to assess whether any profits have been artificially diverted. There will 
be no default assumption that profits received by a CFC would have arisen in the UK 
if the CFC did not exist. In those cases where profits have been artificially diverted to 
a CFC, only the profits that have been diverted from the UK to avoid tax will be 
subject to an apportionment. Profits arising from genuine foreign to foreign business 
activity will be exempt.266  
 
g.) Sector specific rules  
 
The consultation paper includes sector specific exemption rules for insurers and 
banks.267 
 
Looking at the concept outlined in the consultation paper, it seems that - despite the 
substantial number of changes within the regime - this is merely an amendment to 
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controlled by the person or persons that control the economic rights over the assets 
or income of the company, whether through the ability to direct the affairs of the 
company or otherwise. In this regard, three alternatives are presented in the 
consultation paper: a principles-based approach, an accounting standards approach 
and a more mechanical approach.254 The definition of “resident outside the UK” will 
follow the generally established residence principles and the “lower effective tax rate” 
will be determined on the basis of a 75 percent threshold. That means it is intended 
to maintain the low level of tax test according to which the foreign company is low-
taxed if the actual tax paid is less than 75 percent of the amount which would have 
been paid if the foreign company were resident in the UK.255 The proposed 
exemptions from CFC taxation are the following:256 
 
a.) Low profits exemption 
 
The consultation paper presents a number of options for an exemption of CFCs 
which are facing a relatively low profit. The options include a general threshold with a 
limit on investment income,257 a variable threshold which depends on the size of the 
group,258 and a general threshold without any additional limitations for certain types 
of income and irrespective of the size of the group.259 In addition, the de minimis 
exemption for CFCs with chargeable profits of up to 50,000 British Pounds may be 
retained.260  
 
b.) Excluded countries exemption 
 
The idea of the excluded countries exemption is to provide a proxy for the lower level 
of tax test by exempting CFCs that are located in jurisdictions with tax regimes that 
have broadly similar rates and bases to the UK.261 The consultation paper does not 
specify which countries will be included in such a “white list.”  
 
c.) Temporary period exemption 
 
The intention is to provide a temporary period exemption for entities that are brought 
within the CFC rules as a result of a commercial acquisition or certain group 
reorganisation. The proposal is an exemption for up to three years for potential CFCs 
which come under UK control as a result of the aforementioned transactions.262  
 
d.) Territorial business exemptions 
 
The territorial business exemptions are proposed to be separated as follows: (i) an 
exemption based on the CFC passing a profits rate safe harbour (a margin of 10 
percent or less on its operating expenses), (ii) an exemption for a CFC carrying on a 
                                            
254 Consultation paper, pages 15, 16.  
255 Consultation paper, pages 16, 17.  
256 There is no requirement to apply the exemptions in a specific order and a CFC may qualify for more than one 
of the exemptions (see consultation paper, page 12).  
257 The amount proposed is 500,000 British Pounds (general threshold) and capping investment income at 50,000 
British Pounds or 10 percent of the total income.  
258 A range between 200,000 British Pounds and 1,000,000 British Pounds is proposed.  
259 The amount proposed is 200,000 British Pounds.  
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of income and irrespective of the size of the group.259 In addition, the de minimis 
exemption for CFCs with chargeable profits of up to 50,000 British Pounds may be 
retained.260  
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of tax test by exempting CFCs that are located in jurisdictions with tax regimes that 
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With effect of January 1, 2008 the Swedish CFC legislation was amended by 
introducing a new provision which states that the owner of a CFC is excluded from 
CFC taxation if the foreign legal entity “constitutes an actual establishment from 
which activities conducted for business reasons are carried out.”272 This shall be true 
for establishments within the EEA. According to the new provision, the following three 
factors should be taken into consideration for the latter assessment: 
 
1.) whether, in its home state, the foreign legal entity has premises and 
equipment to the extent necessary for conducting the business; 
 
2.) whether, in its home state, the foreign legal entity has staff with the 
degree of competence necessary for independently conducting the 
business; and 
 
3.) whether the staff is free to independently make decisions in matters 
relevant to the ongoing business.273 
  
It is important to note that all relevant circumstances have to be considered and, 
therefore, the examination is not limited to the aforementioned factors. That means 
the fact that an establishment lacks one (or even more) of the factors does not 
automatically lead to a CFC taxation if the taxpayer is in a position to provide (other) 
evidence of an actual establishment from which activities conducted for business 
reasons are carried out. Furthermore, even though the phrase “activities conducted 
for business reasons” does not necessarily comply with the terminology of the ECJ in 
Cadbury Schweppes, the preparatory work to the new provision stressed that the 
wording of the Swedish legislation must not be interpreted as more far-reaching than 
what is allowed by Cadbury Schweppes.274 Hence, the Swedish approach seems to 
follow closely the lines of the ECJ in the Cadbury Schweppes case. Of course, such 
measures will most certainly result in a CFC legislation which is in line with EU law. 
However, this will not result, as already outlined above, in an optimal structure from 
an anti-avoidance perspective, an economic perspective, an equity perspective and 
an internal market perspective.  
                                            
272 See with respect to the revised Swedish CFC legislation: Pihlgren, New Proposed CFC Legislation, 
International Tax Review 2007; Mutén, Schweden: Hinzurechnung, DBA mit Marokko, USA und “Nordisches” 
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which are actually established within the EEA and are conducting activities motivated by business reasons (see 
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KPMG Tax News Flash-Europe, Sweden: Proposal to Change the CFC Rules, Would Impose Additional 
Restrictions Concerning “the White List”, no. 2010-24, May 19, 2010).  
   
 
the “CFC type” rules but not the introduction of an innovative system, for example on 
the basis of the HMRC Draft Guidance published in 2006. Even though new elements 
are included, one might still get the impression that there was no real intention to 
deviate too much from the general principles of the usual CFC type elements. I share 
the view of Hardwick and Bouwer who stated that “given the similarities between 
these proposals and the existing CFC regime, one may be forgiven for questioning 
whether a wholesale reform of the rules is really needed.”268  Clearly, what has to be 
achieved by the reform is the compliance with EU law and, in this regard, the 
consultation paper comes to the conclusion that this is the case.269 In my view, the 
above exemptions a.) - e.) and g.) are not sufficient to restrict the application to 
wholly artificial arrangements. The key might be the general purpose exemption (f.) 
which does not include a default assumption and only focuses on profits that - 
according to the understanding of the UK Treasury - have been artificially diverted to 
a CFC. However, it is more than questionable whether this really leads to a limitation 
to wholly artificial arrangements. In other words, the question is whether the concept 
does not, again, also (partially) target genuine economic activities which only in the 
eyes of the UK Treasury are to be seen as wholly artificial arrangements. In my 
opinion, it is not unlikely that the latter will happen and there are a number of 




The revised Danish approach focuses on a widening of the regime to tainted income 
derived through resident and non-resident companies without any link to the effective 
tax rate or tax burden.271 In other words, the Danish approach treats domestic and 
foreign tainted income “equally disadvantageous” - compared to non-tainted income - 
by taxing such income on a current basis. In addition, the Danish CFC regime applies 
to an ownership of more than 50 percent and only to subsidiaries which derive more 
than 50 percent financial income. Further, the regime applies if more than 10 percent 
of the subsidiary’s assets are “financial assets.” It is likely, in my opinion, that the ECJ 
will accept such an approach - due to the fact that the CFC regime is equally 
applicable to tainted income derived by resident and non-resident subsidiaries. I do 
not think that the ECJ will take into account the fact that such an approach will often 
result in an increase of the tax rate for income produced in the CFC country which 
theoretically requires - from an economic and equity perspective - a source based 
taxation. It seems to me that such a compromise “weakens” the regime from an anti-
avoidance perspective without gaining anything from an economic and equity 
perspective. Further, such an approach does (still) not reflect properly the idea and 
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UK Tax Alert, July 1, 2011.  
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270 See in this regard Hardwick / Bouwer, Plus Ca Change…? Full Reform of the Controlled Foreign Company 
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Dänemark: Ausdehnung der Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung auf das Inland?, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, 
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a.) there are insufficiently valid economic or commercial reasons for the profit 
attribution, which therefore does not reflect economic reality; 
b.) the incorporation does not essentially correspond with an actual 
establishment intended to carry on genuine economic activities; 
c.) there is no proportionate correlation between the activities apparently carried 
on by the CFC and the extent to which it physically exists in terms of 
premises, staff and equipment; 
d.) the non-resident company is overcapitalised, it has significantly more capital 
than it needs to carry on its activity; 
e.) the taxpayer has entered into arrangements which are devoid of economic 
reality, serve little or no business purpose or which might be contrary to 
general business interests, if not entered into for the purpose of avoiding tax. 
 
Looking at the Cadbury Schweppes decision, the indicators outlined in the Resolution 
are not surprising and may certainly be helpful to identify artificial structures and 
therefore to separate artificial from non-artificial structures. However, if a Member 
State wishes to keep a CFC regime which solely focuses on non-resident entities, the 
latter regime has to provide for an escape clause for genuine economic activities. As 
outlined earlier, the “typical” CFC regimes are not restricted to income from merely 
artificial arrangements, but also focus on income from non-artificial arrangements.  
For this reason, I do not think that the Resolution is a big step forward towards a 
broader solution which is in line with economic and equity principles as well as the 
concept and the idea of an internal market.   
 
8.8. The “Limited” Capital Export Neutrality Approach 
 
8.8.1. General Aspects 
 
Based on the earlier examinations it can be concluded that economic and equity 
aspects require income to be taxed in the state in which the income-producing 
activity is carried on, i.e. where the income is actually produced.282 This is a clear 
statement in favour of a concept which is based on the principle of capital import 
neutrality. Of course, this should be particularly true within the EU where the 
objective of an internal market was described in Article 26 (2) of the TFEU as “(...) an 
area without frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties.” The possibility of 
an unrestricted investment of a resident of one Member State in another Member 
State with a strict source-based taxation in the Member State of secondary 
establishment would certainly come closer to the objective of an internal market than 
the application of the principle of world-wide taxation in the Member State of primary 
establishment. The differentiation may be less relevant in cases in which the Member 
State of primary establishment imposes a lower taxation than the Member State of 
secondary establishment, but in the opposite case, the principle of world-wide 
taxation may have a distorting effect on the investment in the Member State of 
secondary establishment. The income derived in the latter state would finally be 
subject to the higher taxation of the Member State of primary establishment and this 
might hamper the (income) tax competition among Member States. Tax competition - 
as long as it cannot be considered harmful through the establishment of special tax 
regimes and “ring-fencing” regimes - is one of the important factors to improve 
                                            
282 See chapters 2 and 3.  
   
 
 
8.6. Limitation to European Union and European Economic Area States? 
 
It is interesting to see that the additional exemptions in the revised CFC regimes are 
usually granted in case of investments in EU Member States and EEA States, but 
they are sometimes not granted to the same extent in case of investments in third 
countries. According to the Finnish, German and United Kingdom CFC rules, it is 
required - in case of EEA States - that these States offer appropriate procedures for 
collaboration and the exchange of information between national tax 
administrations.275 In practice, this means that the additional exemptions are 
applicable to EU Member States and the EEA States Iceland and Norway, but 
apparently not to investments in Liechtenstein.276 In this regard, it is worth noting that 
the EEA Treaty contains freedoms which are, in substance, identical to the freedoms 
of the Treaties. This, at least, was clarified by the EFTA Court in the Focus Bank 
decision277 and by the ECJ in the Ospelt und Schlössle Weissenberg decision.278 
Thus, it is in principle consistent to treat the (additional) EEA States in the same way 
as EU Member States with respect to a possible exemption from CFC taxation. 
However, it was concluded in section 8.2.5.9. that the Member States which apply 
CFC rules can request that the taxpayer proves that the activity is a genuine 
economic activity and that a legal basis for information exchange between the 
competent tax authorities exists. For this reason, it does not really make a difference 
whether an EEA State or a third state is ‘uncooperative’ and does not provide a basis 
for information exchange. In both cases the information exchange can be requested 
as a valid criterion to provide an exemption from CFC taxation.279 
 
8.7. The Council Resolution on Coordination of the CFC Rules within the 
European Union 
 
In June 2010 the Council of the European Union published a Resolution on the 
coordination of CFC and thin capitalisation rules within the EU.280 In essence, what is 
recommended in this Resolution is that Member States adopt some guiding principles 
with respect to the application of CFC and thin capitalisation rules. For CFC rules, the 
Resolution presents a non-exhaustive list of indicators which suggest that profits are 
artificially diverted to a CFC. The indicators listed in the Resolution are the 
following:281  
 
                                            
275 See with respect to Germany the Administrative Circular, January 8, 2007 (IV B 4 - S 1351 - 1/07) and the 
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31.  
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Schweppes”: Geplante Änderungen der britischen CFC-Rules und deren Vereinbarkeit mit EG-rechtlichen 
Vorgaben, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 199 et seq. (200); Rainer / Müller, Remarks to the German 
Administrative Circular, Internationales Steuerrecht 2007, page 151.  
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(Commission v. Netherlands), paragraphs 47 to 49, case C-72/09 (Rimbaud), paragraphs 47 to 51 and the 
Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón to case C-384/09 (Prunus), paragraphs 89 to 91. See also 8.2.5.9. 
for further details.    
280 Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalisation rules within the European Union. The Council Resolution was published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union on 16 June 2010 (2010/C 156/01). 
281 See part A of the Council Resolution.  
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neutrality fits the idea and the concept of an internal market much better than the 
principle of capital export neutrality, one must not overlook the fact that the ECJ 
accepted the credit method for the avoidance of double taxation (and therefore to a 
certain extent the principle of capital export neutrality) as a system which can be 
applied within the EU for the elimination of double taxation.288  
 
8.8.2. The Necessary Differentiation  
 
The preference for the principle of capital import neutrality is one thing, the existing 
legal environment in the light of the OECD-MTC another. The question whether the 
principle of capital export neutrality can play an acceptable - perhaps limited - role in 
the EU can only be answered with a more differentiated view. In this respect, it is 
important to recognise that the ECJ, in principle, accepted the allocation of taxing 
rights based on the OECD-MTC. In the Gilly case, the Court stated that “(w)hilst 
abolition of double taxation within the Community is (…) one of the objectives of the 
Treaty, it must none the less be noted that (…) no unifying or harmonising measure 
for the elimination of double taxation has yet been adopted at Community level, nor 
have the Member States yet concluded any multilateral convention (...). The Member 
States are competent to determine the criteria for taxation on income and wealth with 
a view to eliminating double taxation - by means, inter alia, of international 
agreements - and have concluded many bilateral conventions based, in particular, on 
the model conventions on income and wealth tax drawn up by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’).”289 Clearly, the fact that certain 
tax rules are consistent with the provisions of the OECD-MTC does not necessarily 
mean that they comply with the basic freedoms of the TFEU.290 However, there is no 
reason to assume that - for example - the allocation rules of Articles 7, 10, 11, 12 and 
21 of the OECD-MTC, as such, are not in line with the TFEU. It was outlined earlier 
that the allocation of taxing rights according to the aforementioned articles is one of 
the main reasons for the necessity of an anti-deferral legislation.  
 
In general, if a resident investor of one Member State (Member State A) carries on a 
business activity in another Member State (Member State B) through a subsidiary 
company, the income of this subsidiary company should be taxed in the Member 
State where the income-producing activity is carried on. This is required by economic 
and equity considerations, and one could argue that it is equally required by the idea 
and the concept of an internal market (see above).291 If the double tax convention 
between the two Member States is drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC, the 
income will be taxed in the Member State of secondary establishment as long as no 
permanent establishment exists in the Member State of primary establishment (or 
any other state).292 Hence, as long as the income of the subsidiary company is 
produced in the Member State of secondary establishment and not distributed to the 
shareholder, it will be subject to income taxation in the Member State of secondary 
establishment only. Based on the arguments above, the Member State which 
provides the benefits for the income production should receive the right to tax the 
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efficiency within the EU. However, the reduction of the income tax rate in one 
Member State may only have the effect of attracting capital if the Member State of 
the investor provides for a tax system which allows the investor to take advantage of 
the lower tax rate. In principle, the Member State which provides for a reduction of 
the domestic tax rate should be rewarded for its efforts to improve the overall 
efficiency by being granted the sole right to tax the income produced within its 
borders. 
 
In its case law the ECJ made it very clear that any compensatory taxation is not 
acceptable. For example, in the Eurowings case, the Court stated that the “(...) 
difference of treatment can also not be justified by the fact that the lessor established 
in another Member State is there subject to lower taxation. Any tax advantage 
resulting for providers of services from the low taxation to which they are subject in 
the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another Member 
State to justify less favourable treatment in tax matters given to recipients of services 
established in the latter State. As the Commission rightly observed, such 
compensatory tax arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single 
market.”283 In his Opinion to the Eurowings case Advocate General Mischo pointed 
out that “(i)f differences in the direct taxation of undertakings could be “neutralised” 
by compensatory levies imposed by Member States on intra-Community movements 
of goods, services and capital, little would remain of those fundamental freedoms. 
Virtually all goods and services moving between Member States would be subject to 
one compensatory levy or another. Member States and undertakings must in 
principle accept differences in fiscal charges in the same way as differences in social 
charges or labour costs.”284 A similar statement was made by Advocate General 
Léger in the Cadbury Schweppes case.285 With respect to the question whether a 
differentiation could be made on the basis of the tax rate in the other Member State 
the Advocate General held that “(...) such a situation would manifestly lead to a result 
contrary to the very notion of “single market”286 and “(t)he fixing of rates of 
corporation tax falls (...) within the unfettered competence of each Member State and 
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC confer on every company in accordance with Article 48 EC 
the right to set up a subsidiary in the place of its choice within the Union. A Member 
State may not, therefore, treat differently its resident companies which establish 
subsidiaries in other Member States depending n the tax rate applicable in the host 
State.” 287 Thus, any compensatory taxation (or “neutralisation”), i.e. the imposition of 
a higher domestic taxation just because of the fact that the tax rate in the other 
Member State is lower, is clearly prohibited. However, the prohibition of a 
compensatory taxation and therefore the recognition of the tax rates of another 
Member State should by no means lead to the conclusion that the principle of capital 
export neutrality has to be rejected under all circumstances and in any situation. 
Despite the clear preference for the application of the principle of capital import 
neutrality from an economic perspective and equity perspective - as outlined in 
previous chapters - and the fact that, in my opinion, the principle of capital import 
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neutrality fits the idea and the concept of an internal market much better than the 
principle of capital export neutrality, one must not overlook the fact that the ECJ 
accepted the credit method for the avoidance of double taxation (and therefore to a 
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tax rules are consistent with the provisions of the OECD-MTC does not necessarily 
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21 of the OECD-MTC, as such, are not in line with the TFEU. It was outlined earlier 
that the allocation of taxing rights according to the aforementioned articles is one of 
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State where the income-producing activity is carried on. This is required by economic 
and equity considerations, and one could argue that it is equally required by the idea 
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between the two Member States is drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC, the 
income will be taxed in the Member State of secondary establishment as long as no 
permanent establishment exists in the Member State of primary establishment (or 
any other state).292 Hence, as long as the income of the subsidiary company is 
produced in the Member State of secondary establishment and not distributed to the 
shareholder, it will be subject to income taxation in the Member State of secondary 
establishment only. Based on the arguments above, the Member State which 
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efficiency within the EU. However, the reduction of the income tax rate in one 
Member State may only have the effect of attracting capital if the Member State of 
the investor provides for a tax system which allows the investor to take advantage of 
the lower tax rate. In principle, the Member State which provides for a reduction of 
the domestic tax rate should be rewarded for its efforts to improve the overall 
efficiency by being granted the sole right to tax the income produced within its 
borders. 
 
In its case law the ECJ made it very clear that any compensatory taxation is not 
acceptable. For example, in the Eurowings case, the Court stated that the “(...) 
difference of treatment can also not be justified by the fact that the lessor established 
in another Member State is there subject to lower taxation. Any tax advantage 
resulting for providers of services from the low taxation to which they are subject in 
the Member State in which they are established cannot be used by another Member 
State to justify less favourable treatment in tax matters given to recipients of services 
established in the latter State. As the Commission rightly observed, such 
compensatory tax arrangements prejudice the very foundations of the single 
market.”283 In his Opinion to the Eurowings case Advocate General Mischo pointed 
out that “(i)f differences in the direct taxation of undertakings could be “neutralised” 
by compensatory levies imposed by Member States on intra-Community movements 
of goods, services and capital, little would remain of those fundamental freedoms. 
Virtually all goods and services moving between Member States would be subject to 
one compensatory levy or another. Member States and undertakings must in 
principle accept differences in fiscal charges in the same way as differences in social 
charges or labour costs.”284 A similar statement was made by Advocate General 
Léger in the Cadbury Schweppes case.285 With respect to the question whether a 
differentiation could be made on the basis of the tax rate in the other Member State 
the Advocate General held that “(...) such a situation would manifestly lead to a result 
contrary to the very notion of “single market”286 and “(t)he fixing of rates of 
corporation tax falls (...) within the unfettered competence of each Member State and 
Articles 43 EC and 48 EC confer on every company in accordance with Article 48 EC 
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State may not, therefore, treat differently its resident companies which establish 
subsidiaries in other Member States depending n the tax rate applicable in the host 
State.” 287 Thus, any compensatory taxation (or “neutralisation”), i.e. the imposition of 
a higher domestic taxation just because of the fact that the tax rate in the other 
Member State is lower, is clearly prohibited. However, the prohibition of a 
compensatory taxation and therefore the recognition of the tax rates of another 
Member State should by no means lead to the conclusion that the principle of capital 
export neutrality has to be rejected under all circumstances and in any situation. 
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neutrality from an economic perspective and equity perspective - as outlined in 
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produced in the first-mentioned Member State. Even if one takes into account the 
risks related to the investment of subsidiary company C, it becomes obvious that the 
basic interest component which was outlined in chapters 2 and 3 is completely 
unconnected to Member State C.299 Again, it is absolutely clear, in my opinion, that 
the income which is actually produced in Member State C should be taxed in the 
latter state and not in Member States A or B - even if it is just a minor portion of the 
allocable income. This is an approach which is based on the principle of capital 
import neutrality and the recognition of the tax rate applicable in the respective 
Member States. Income which is produced in a particular Member State should be 
taxed according to the principles and the tax rate of this Member State and should 
not be attributed - based on the principle of capital export neutrality - to any other 
Member State. However, if the Member States B and C stipulate a different allocation 
of taxing rights in their double tax convention, the question arises whether EU law 
requires that this has to be recognised by Member State A, too. With respect to the 
income which is related to the basic interest component it is difficult to argue that this 
portion of income must be taxed in Member State C instead of Member State A from 
an EU law perspective. This portion of income is neither produced in Member State C 
nor is it required to compensate for any additional risks taken in the latter Member 
State. It is just the result of an allocation of taxing rights stipulated in the double tax 
convention between Member States B and C. Furthermore, the limitation to taxation 
in Member State C does not lead to an efficient allocation of capital. The contrary 
might be true if Member State C is a country with a relatively low income tax rate. If 
Member State C has concluded comparable double tax conventions with other 
Member States, this might attract equity investments from those Member States (and 
third countries) with the purpose of routing the financial means to the places where 
they are actually utilised for an income-producing activity. However, equity is 
transformed into loan amounts as well as tangible and intangible assets in Member 
State C which are subsequently made available to the contract partners by way of 
loan agreements, leasing agreements, licensing agreements and similar agreements. 
This will then have the effect of a shifting of taxing rights from the high-tax Member 
States to the low-tax Member State C. Again, the contract partners are usually not 
established in Member State C, with the effect that the equity investment of - for 
example - Member State A will finally be utilised in Member State B for an income 
producing activity. Such a “clustering” of equity investments in a particular Member 
State - with the effect of a shifting of taxing rights - will by no means lead to an 
efficient allocation of capital. Or, at least, the place of (final) economic investment will 
not go hand in hand with the place where the income-producing activity is finally 
subject to tax.300 In my opinion, this does not have anything to do with the question 
whether an economic activity is carried on in the Member State of the CFC or not. 
The underlying assumption in all of these considerations is that (at least) a minor 
economic activity is carried on in the CFC state. However, the taxable income 
derived by the entity in state C is higher than the sum of income which is related to 
the functions “physically conducted” in this Member State and the portion of income 
to cover the risks involved in the activity. However, it was outlined earlier that the 
limited activity in the Member State C is not necessarily problematic with respect to 
the question whether the activity is within the scope of a basic freedom or not.301 
Overall, it can be concluded that a strict source-based taxation comes closer to the 
concept of an internal market. However, to the extent that income is shifted from the 
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“fruits” of the activities.293 If it is a Member State with a low level of taxation, it will be 
rewarded for its improvement of the overall efficiency.294 Otherwise, i.e. if the 
Member State with the low level of taxation does not receive the sole right to tax the 
income, this might seriously distort the capital investments among Member States 
with the effect of hampering (sound) tax competition. Again, the reduction of tax rates 
can only pay off for the respective Member State if it leads to an unrestricted taxation 
of income in the latter Member State. Any protectionist approach followed by the 
Member State of primary establishment, e.g. through an undifferentiated application 
of CFC rules, would hamper the overall improvement of efficiency.295  
 
However, the situation will be different if an additional subsidiary company comes into 
play - in another (third) Member State (Member State C) - with the main purpose of 
providing capital to the other subsidiary company in Member State B. If it is assumed 
that all of the three Member States involved have concluded double tax conventions 
with each other which are drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC, there might be a 
shifting of taxing rights which is neither in line with the economic and equity 
considerations nor with the preferred solution of a source-based taxation in an 
internal market.296 In this respect, it is important to note that it is not the provision of 
capital in the form of equity which is relevant here, but the provision of capital in the 
form of loan amounts, the investment in bonds, the leasing and renting out of assets, 
the licensing out of intangible assets (e.g. rights), and similar contractual 
relationships and services. They all have in common that a substantial amount of 
income related to these activities is not taxed in the Member State where the income 
is produced (here: Member State B), but in the Member State where the service 
provider carries on its activities (Member State C). This is due to the fact that the 
double tax convention between the Member States B and C - which is based on the 
OECD-MTC - provides for an allocation of taxing rights related to the total amount of 
income, or at least a substantial amount of income, to Member State C.297 This can 
be based, inter alia, on Article 7 of the OECD-MTC (e.g. in case of leasing income 
which is related to tangible assets), Article 11 of the OECD-MTC (e.g. in case of 
interest income related to loan amounts and the investment in bonds - with a limited 
taxation at source), or Article 12 of the OECD-MTC (e.g. in case of royalty income 
related to intangible assets). The allocation of taxing rights is - in this situation - solely 
based on the double tax convention between the Member States B and C. However, 
from the perspective of Member State A it is obvious that just the direct relationship 
A-B and A-C is covered by the respective double tax conventions (and not B-C), and 
it is theoretically required - in the same way as outlined above - that the income 
produced in Member State B is to be taxed in Member State B, and that the income 
produced in Member State C is to be taxed in Member State C.298 However, this is 
not the outcome of this triangular situation, at least not with respect to the total 
amount of income. Based on the earlier examinations, a substantial part of the 
income is produced in Member State B, but not taxed in this Member State (due to 
the allocation of the taxing rights in the double tax convention between Member 
States B and C). In contrast thereto, Member State C taxes the complete amount of 
income received from Member State B, even though only a minor portion is actually 
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produced in the first-mentioned Member State. Even if one takes into account the 
risks related to the investment of subsidiary company C, it becomes obvious that the 
basic interest component which was outlined in chapters 2 and 3 is completely 
unconnected to Member State C.299 Again, it is absolutely clear, in my opinion, that 
the income which is actually produced in Member State C should be taxed in the 
latter state and not in Member States A or B - even if it is just a minor portion of the 
allocable income. This is an approach which is based on the principle of capital 
import neutrality and the recognition of the tax rate applicable in the respective 
Member States. Income which is produced in a particular Member State should be 
taxed according to the principles and the tax rate of this Member State and should 
not be attributed - based on the principle of capital export neutrality - to any other 
Member State. However, if the Member States B and C stipulate a different allocation 
of taxing rights in their double tax convention, the question arises whether EU law 
requires that this has to be recognised by Member State A, too. With respect to the 
income which is related to the basic interest component it is difficult to argue that this 
portion of income must be taxed in Member State C instead of Member State A from 
an EU law perspective. This portion of income is neither produced in Member State C 
nor is it required to compensate for any additional risks taken in the latter Member 
State. It is just the result of an allocation of taxing rights stipulated in the double tax 
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third countries) with the purpose of routing the financial means to the places where 
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transformed into loan amounts as well as tangible and intangible assets in Member 
State C which are subsequently made available to the contract partners by way of 
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State - with the effect of a shifting of taxing rights - will by no means lead to an 
efficient allocation of capital. Or, at least, the place of (final) economic investment will 
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subject to tax.300 In my opinion, this does not have anything to do with the question 
whether an economic activity is carried on in the Member State of the CFC or not. 
The underlying assumption in all of these considerations is that (at least) a minor 
economic activity is carried on in the CFC state. However, the taxable income 
derived by the entity in state C is higher than the sum of income which is related to 
the functions “physically conducted” in this Member State and the portion of income 
to cover the risks involved in the activity. However, it was outlined earlier that the 
limited activity in the Member State C is not necessarily problematic with respect to 
the question whether the activity is within the scope of a basic freedom or not.301 
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of CFC rules, would hamper the overall improvement of efficiency.295  
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4.) The examination shows that the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital prevail over the freedom to provide services. This is not only 
true in cases where the services of the CFC are directed towards the shareholder in 
the CFC, but also in cases where the services are provided to a recipient in another 
state who does not have any investment in the CFC. The freedom to provide services 
is therefore of no particular relevance in the context of this study.  
 
5.) The free movement of capital plays a less important role in the case law of the 
ECJ than it could be expected from its very broad scope of application. The reason is 
that - based on the case law of the ECJ - there are important situations where the 
freedom of establishment prevails over the free movement of capital. The following 
differentiation can be made: 
 
 
A. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
requires definite influence over       the following basic 
the decisions of the CFC        freedoms are affected:  
       
 
a.) CFC in another Member State      Article 49 TFEU 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state                    --- 
 
 
B. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
does not require definite influence 
over the decisions of the CFC (e.g.      the following basic 
FIF type legislation)         freedoms are affected: 
 
 
a.) CFC in another Member State 
 
aa.) definite influence (actually)       Article 49 TFEU      
 
ab.) no definite influence (actually)      Article 63 TFEU 
 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state 
 
ba.) definite influence (actually)        Article 63 TFEU (uncertain) 
 
bb.) no definite influence (actually)      Article 63 TFEU       
 
 
6.) The question whether the CFC legislation can result in a restriction on the 
exercising of the aforementioned basic freedoms can be answered in the affirmative. 
In fact, there are a number of possible restrictions which can be caused by the 
application of CFC rules and which are dependent on the situation of the shareholder 
who is subject to CFC taxation. Most of the disadvantages were already identified in 
the case law of the ECJ as restrictions on one or more of the basic freedoms. The 
   
 
Member State where it is produced to an intermediate Member State where capital is 
transformed from equity into “services,” and where the income can neither be seen 
as a compensation for the exercising of functions in the intermediate Member State 
nor as a compensation for the taking over of certain risks, there is, in my opinion, no 
requirement from an EU law perspective to tax this particular portion of income in the 
Member State of the intermediate subsidiary company.  
 
This becomes particularly obvious if the services of subsidiary company C are also 
provided to the parent company in Member State A, e.g. by the provision of financial 
services. If the double tax convention is based on the OECD-MTC, the interest 
payments would normally reduce the tax base in Member State A and would be 
taxable in Member State C. Here, the equity originates from Member State A and is 
transformed from equity into “services” in Member State C. A certain amount of 
income is now allocable to Member State C - merely through the effect of 
transformation - and reduces the tax base in Member State A, even though it is quite 
clear that the income-producing activity, i.e. the activity which “creates” the interest, is 
carried on in Member State A. Clearly, all accompanying activities which are 
“physically conducted” in Member State C should be taxed in this Member State. In 
addition, it can be argued that the risk compensation should be taxed in Member 
State C, too, since a possible default will reduce the domestic tax base in the latter 
Member State. However, there is - in my opinion - no comparable argument for the 
income taxation of the basic interest component in Member State C. This would not 
have anything to do with an efficient allocation of capital. It is just the result based on 
the bilateral convention concluded between the two Member States A and C. 
However, this should not preclude Member State A - neither from an EU law 
perspective nor from the perspective of the underlying double tax convention - from 
taxing the basic interest income on a current basis according to the principle of 
capital export neutrality.  
 
8.9. Conclusions  
 
1.) The primary EU law has a significant influence on the CFC regimes of the 
Member States. The investment in companies which trigger the application of CFC 
rules may be in the scope of the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital. Theoretically, the activities of the CFC might also be - 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case - in the scope of the freedom 
to provide services.  
 
2.) In order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment the CFC must 
pursue a genuine economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member 
State for an indefinite period. The mere holding of assets cannot be considered an 
economic activity, but a certain (minimum) economic output is required in the host 
Member State. In principle, the mobile activities which were described in previous 
chapters are also covered by the freedom of establishment as long as the 
aforementioned requirements are fulfilled. In essence, the investment in a CFC is not 
to be seen differently from any other investment in a foreign company. 
 
3.) In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the first case dealing with CFC legislation, the 
ECJ made it clear - based on settled case law - that an activity cannot be considered 
a wholly artificial arrangement if the CFC is genuinely established in the host Member 
State and has the premises, staff and equipment necessary to carry out the services.  
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law of the ECJ nor the subsequent Oy AA decision. In VAT cases, the national court 
has to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the tax motive is 
essential compared to the non-tax explanations (such as economic objectives). For 
this reason, the structure can be considered abusive from a VAT perspective despite 
the fact that economic objectives exist. In contrast thereto, if a CFC is genuinely 
established in another state, it does not play a role whether or not the saving of 
(income) taxes was the principal aim of the relocation. With respect to the Oy AA 
decision - a case dealing with a provision of the Finnish corporate income tax system 
- I have made it clear that, in my opinion, the fact that the ECJ accepted a system 
which was not specifically designed to target wholly artificial arrangements is only 
due to the fact that the justification was (also) based on the protection of a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. From my 
perspective, it was completely misleading to put forward the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance in a situation where another justification requires a much broader scope - 
and which may therefore also require an acceptance in case of genuine economic 
activities. The subsequent decision in X Holding is in line with the above conclusions. 
The reason is that the ECJ considered the need to safeguard the allocation of the 
power to impose taxes between Member States to be a valid and ‘exclusive’ 
justification which does not have to be accompanied by another justification    
 
10.) The requirement of giving the taxpayer the possibility of submitting evidence that 
the CFC carries out a genuine economic activity should be equally relevant for 
investments in non-member states. However, based on the case law of the ECJ, the 
Member States may require that a legal basis exists for information exchange 
between the competent tax authorities of the respective Member State and the non-
member state where the investment was made, e.g. based on a double tax 
convention. Such an additional requirement is needed because of the fact that the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC is not applicable in case of non-member states. An 
information exchange clause ensures, therefore, that the information provided by the 
taxpayer can be verified. Overall, there are some cases dealing with the latter aspect 
in relation to non-member states and it is obvious that the existence or non-existence 
of an information exchange clause may be decisive for the question whether a 
restriction can be justified or not. However, it is my understanding that the existence 
of an information exchange clause on a bilateral basis is to be taken into account as 
well and - depending on the situation - may have the same relevance for the ECJ as 
the Council Directive 77/799/EEC.   
 
11.) The CFC regimes can be directly and indirectly influenced by secondary EU law. 
A direct influence exists, in my opinion, in case of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
The amended version of the latter Directive not only covers profit distributions but 
also the current taxation of income derived through a hybrid entity. In my opinion, it 
would be neither logical nor consistent to consider the CFC income attribution to be 
outside of the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive determines that either the exemption method or the credit method has to be 
applied for the elimination of double taxation. In case of a hybrid entity, the 
subsequent profit distribution - which was already subject to a current taxation of 
income - should be exempt from domestic taxation. In general, the latter mechanisms 
are already offered by almost all CFC regimes and I do not expect substantial 
changes which are based on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. However, the Directive 
becomes an additional limitation for changing the structure of CFC regimes. 
 
   
 
restrictions may range from liquidity and administrative disadvantages to a massive 
double taxation of income. 
 
7.) In order to identify a restriction which is caused by the application of CFC rules, it 
is important to determine the appropriate pair of comparison. The examination shows 
that the pair of comparison has to be limited to a mere vertical comparison and 
cannot be extended to a horizontal comparison.   
 
8.) The examination further shows that the theoretical acceptance of a horizontal 
comparison would not result in an obligation for the Member State of primary 
establishment to provide for a “most-favoured nation” treatment. Firstly, up to now the 
most favoured nation treatment has not been accepted by the ECJ and, secondly, 
the CFC rules are solely national legislation - and not tax treaty provisions - which do 
not provide any basis, in my opinion, for such a far-reaching obligation.  
 
9.) A number of possible arguments for the justification of a restriction on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms can come up in a CFC case. The following 
arguments were identified and examined in this context.  
 
- the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
- the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base; 
 
- the lower taxation in the CFC country, 
 
- the principle of territoriality; 
 
- the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States; 
 
- the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
- the aim of preventing tax avoidance;  
 
- the principle of world-wide taxation. 
 
The examination shows that the above arguments cannot be accepted as a valid 
justification in a CFC case. Given the fact that the CFC regimes are usually 
structured as anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation, the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance is certainly one of the most obvious arguments. However, it is clear from 
the Cadbury Schweppes case and previous decisions that such legislation must 
focus on wholly artificial arrangements. Clearly, this is not the case for the CFC 
regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 and which have not been amended after - 
and according to - the Cadbury Schweppes decision. These CFC regimes are 
applicable in an undifferentiated manner to different types of low-taxed income and 
are actually intended to be applicable to income derived from genuine economic 
activities. For this reason, the aforementioned CFC concepts will not be proportional 
as long as they do not provide the shareholder with the possibility of submitting 
evidence that the activity carried out in the other state is a genuine economic activity 
- and to be exempt from CFC taxation in such a situation. From my perspective, the 
outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case is neither mitigated through the VAT case 
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- France: the French CFC regime provides for an EU entity exemption to a 
shareholding in the foreign entity which does not constitute a wholly artificial 
arrangement intended to escape French tax. The notion of a wholly artificial 
arrangement must be assessed with regard to the objective criteria arising 
from the ECJ case law. The exception applies to participations held by French 
corporations, but not by French individual shareholders. 
 
- Germany: the amended CFC regime grants an exemption from CFC taxation 
for EU/EEA state if the taxpayer can provide evidence that the CFC carries out 
a genuine economic activity in the host state. In addition, it is required that an 
appropriate procedure for collaboration and exchange of information is 
established between Germany and the other state. It remains unclear what is 
actually meant by genuine economic activity. Moreover, it is stated that only 
income which is derived through the activity of the CFC itself can be allocated 
to the genuine economic activity and only to the extent that the arm’s length 
principle is taken into account.  
 
- Italy: the CFC regime does not result in a current allocation of income if it can 
be demonstrated that the entity carries out an “effective business activity.” 
However, it has to be noted that the latter activity is not necessarily the same 
as the “genuine economic activity” which was described in the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision. Moreover, the exemption from CFC taxation is 
completely dependent on a positive ruling of the Italian tax authorities.  
 
- The United Kingdom: different proposals for an amendment of the CFC regime 
have been discussed. The proposals range from the rather innovative system 
of a deduction of the “net economic value” from the allocable amount of 
income (which essentially results in a vertical separation of income) to the 
switch from the exemption method to the transactional method and the 
application to resident and non-resident entities. A concrete proposal for a new 
CFC regime was published in June 2011 which, however, seems to be an 
amendment to the “CFC type” rules but not the introduction of an innovative 
system. In my view, it is more than questionable whether the proposed regime 
can really restrict the application to wholly artificial arrangements.    
 
- Denmark: the revised regime is now applicable to resident and non-resident 
entities without any link to the effective tax rate. The regime shall apply to 
participations of more than 50 percent and only to subsidiaries which derive 
more than 50 percent financial income and which have at least 10 percent 
financial assets. The undifferentiated and non-discriminatory approach does 
not provide an exemption for genuine economic activities carried out by the 
respective entity.  
 
- Sweden: the new Swedish regime grants an exemption from CFC taxation if 
the foreign entity “constitutes an actual establishment from which activities 
conducted for business reasons are carried out.” In this regard, several factors 
shall be taken into account for the assessment. According to the preparatory 
work of the revised legislation, the provision must not be interpreted as more 
far-reaching than what is allowed by the Cadbury Schweppes decision. The 
revised legislation will be relevant for establishments within the EEA.  
 
   
 
12.) An indirect influence of secondary EU law exists in case of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive. The examination shows that the abolition of a limited source-based 
taxation (withholding taxation) may clearly support the structures which are typically 
in the focus of CFC regimes. The non-existence of a withholding tax credit (due to the 
fact that there is no withholding tax) on the level of an intermediate finance company 
may considerably improve the situation of the state where the latter company is 
established. Moreover, the abolition of a withholding taxation in the country where the 
income is produced is, despite all administrative simplifications, contrary to the 
economic and equity principles derived from chapters 2 and 3. 
 
13.) In my opinion, the case law of the ECJ results in a dilemma for those Member 
States which apply CFC regimes: either they provide an “escape clause” for genuine 
economic activities or the CFC regimes, in their current structure, will not be in line 
with the freedom of establishment and / or the free movement of capital. The 
examination in previous chapters shows that it is the intention of the CFC regimes to 
currently tax income derived from genuine economic activities and not necessarily 
from wholly artificial arrangements. The latter arrangements are usually covered by 
other anti-abuse measures. For this reason, I do not think that the implementation of 
an escape clause for genuine economic activities is an appropriate solution for a 
great number of these Member States.  
 
14.) In principle, it is understandable that Member States with a comparably high tax 
rate want to protect their tax revenues and want to stop the erosion of the domestic 
tax base in favour of low-tax countries and territories. However, it is equally clear that 
“tax competition” should be supported as long as it is sound competition among 
states which leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Such competition is clearly 
supported by the economic and equity principles outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
However, this has to be separated from harmful competition which is triggered by 
countries and territories which have an over-proportional advantage from the inflow of 
capital and mobile investments to the detriment of other states. In the latter case, the 
state or territory which attracts the capital is usually merely an intermediate location 
and the income - based on the employment of such capital - is produced outside of 
this state or territory. The latter situation is not supported by the economic and equity 
principles outlined in previous chapters and the Member State should have the 
possibility of applying legislation which - directly - targets the structures which result 
in such harmful competition. In my opinion, the taxation of the basic interest 
component of capital for certain mobile investments - without making a differentiation 
based on the place of investment - could be a very efficient approach without 
restricting sound competition.    
 
15.) The approaches of the Member States in order to comply with EU law and, in 
particular, the Cadbury Schweppes decision are different. This can be shown by the 
following country examples:  
 
- Finland: the amended CFC regime provides an exemption from CFC taxation 
for entities which are established in an EEA state or a tax treaty state whose 
tax system does not differ substantially from the Finnish tax system, provided 
that an exchange of information is possible with the other state. In addition, it 
is required that the entity is actually established and carries on a genuine 
economic activity in the host state.  
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particular, the Cadbury Schweppes decision are different. This can be shown by the 
following country examples:  
 
- Finland: the amended CFC regime provides an exemption from CFC taxation 
for entities which are established in an EEA state or a tax treaty state whose 
tax system does not differ substantially from the Finnish tax system, provided 
that an exchange of information is possible with the other state. In addition, it 
is required that the entity is actually established and carries on a genuine 




   
 




In my opinion, the previous chapters show clearly that there is no room for a broad 
CFC-type anti-avoidance legislation in the European Union which, at the same time, 
fulfils the requirements under the TFEU and takes into account important economic 
and equity principles. This does not mean, however, that there is no necessity for and 
no possibility of a current taxation of income, but it requires Member States to follow 
a more “balanced” approach which refrains from one-sided restrictions (e.g. because 
of the income tax rate). It is unlikely, however, that all of those Member States which 
currently apply CFC regimes will be in a position to strictly follow the ECJ by limiting 
such legislation to merely abusive structures, i.e. wholly artificial arrangements. As I 
have stated earlier, the limitation to wholly artificial arrangements would change the 
focus and the aim of such legislation completely. On the one hand, I think that some 
of the latter Member States simply cannot afford to follow the route opened by the 
ECJ. On the other hand, the undifferentiated current taxation of income generated by 
resident and non-resident companies - based on the transactional approach or the 
entity approach - may not be the appropriate solution, either. However, it is clear that 
the Member States which follow the “typical” CFC regimes outlined in chapter 6 are 
forced to react and to adapt their regimes in one way or another. The regimes which 
are not in line with the conclusions drawn from Cadbury Schweppes have to be 
amended at least in a way which either limits the scope to wholly artificial 
arrangements or  which extends the application to resident entities.  
 
From my perspective, what is really required - and what is going beyond a ‘minimal’ 
adaption of CFC regimes - is an anti-avoidance approach which can be applied in an 
internal market and which combines EU law requirements with economic and equity 
principles. The legislation must be effective in targeting the avoidance of domestic 
taxation but, at the same time, must not disturb the efficient allocation of capital. This, 
however, cannot be achieved through a concept which merely focuses on the 
separation of certain types of income (or a concept which does not provide for any 
separation), but only through a concept which also takes into account the separation 
of specific income components. In other words, it must be a concept which provides a 
system of horizontal and vertical separation of income. In the following, I will outline 
the main aspects, elements and the conceptual framework - based on the 
conclusions of the previous chapters - before going into detail regarding an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation.  
 
9.2. The Anti-Avoidance Aspects 
 
It is obvious from the earlier examinations that the existing CFC regimes are not in 
line with EU law if they are solely applied to low-taxed non-resident entities. However, 
it is equally clear that specific anti-avoidance rules which focus on merely artificial 
arrangements cannot provide an appropriate substitute for CFC legislation. The 
implementation of service companies in low-tax states cannot be seen as artificial - at 
least not in general.1 One should always keep in mind that the main purpose of CFC 
rules is often not the targeting of artificial structures but the current taxation of low-
taxed income which is retained in foreign legal entities and is therefore sheltered from 
                                            
1 See in this respect the outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case which was outlined earlier. 
   
 
16.) From my perspective, the strict limitation of an exemption from CFC taxation to 
EU Member States and EEA States should not be acceptable from an EU law 
perspective. Depending on the situation, the free movement of capital may require an 
unrestricted access to non-member states. Of course, the requirements for 
investments in non-member states may partially deviate from those which are 
needed in case of investments in other Member States, e.g. with respect to the 
existence of an information exchange between the respective states, but this cannot 
lead to the outcome that an exemption from CFC taxation, for example based on the 
existence of a genuine economic activity, is - in general - not granted to the 
shareholder (i.e. even if the additional requirements are fulfilled).  
 
17.) The examination shows that the principle of capital import neutrality fits the idea 
and the concept of an internal market much better than the principle of capital export 
neutrality. The Member State which provides the benefits for the income production 
should have the right to tax the “fruits” of the activities. If it is a Member State with a 
low level of taxation, it will be rewarded for its improvement of the overall efficiency. 
Otherwise, i.e. if the Member State with the low level of taxation does not receive the 
sole right to tax the income, this might seriously distort the capital investments among 
Member States with the effect of hampering (sound) tax competition. Any 
protectionist approach followed by the Member State of primary establishment, e.g. 
through the undifferentiated application of CFC rules, would hamper the overall 
improvement of efficiency. This is fully in line with the conclusions drawn in this 
chapter and in previous chapters. 
 
18.) However, the (theoretical) preference for the principle of capital import neutrality 
is one thing, the existing legal environment in the light of the OECD-MTC another. 
Thus, as long as the residence-based taxation is the prevailing system for income 
from capital intensive mobile activities, there is still the possibility of shifting income 
from the latter activities to intermediate companies in low-tax states - with the effect 
that the right to tax the total amount of income is also shifted to the latter states. This, 
however, is neither in line with the conclusions drawn in previous chapters nor with 
the idea and the concept of an internal market.  
 
19.) In my opinion, the conclusions from this chapter and the previous chapters 
clearly support, in my opinion, the concept of a “limited” capital export neutrality 
approach, i.e. an approach which focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. It seems to me that this is the only possibility of bringing together the 
essential elements of an internal market with the previous conclusions and the needs 
of Member States for an acceptable anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) regime. Such an 
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is one thing, the existing legal environment in the light of the OECD-MTC another. 
Thus, as long as the residence-based taxation is the prevailing system for income 
from capital intensive mobile activities, there is still the possibility of shifting income 
from the latter activities to intermediate companies in low-tax states - with the effect 
that the right to tax the total amount of income is also shifted to the latter states. This, 
however, is neither in line with the conclusions drawn in previous chapters nor with 
the idea and the concept of an internal market.  
 
19.) In my opinion, the conclusions from this chapter and the previous chapters 
clearly support, in my opinion, the concept of a “limited” capital export neutrality 
approach, i.e. an approach which focuses on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. It seems to me that this is the only possibility of bringing together the 
essential elements of an internal market with the previous conclusions and the needs 
of Member States for an acceptable anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) regime. Such an 














   
 
certain group of companies). The fact that the portion of income is related to the 
economic output created by personnel in the CFC state excludes, in my opinion, the 
possibility that this portion of income can be qualified as “abusively” shifted to another 
state - at least, this is true as long as the relocation of activities cannot be considered 
completely “useless” and without any value for the group. In this respect, one should 
clearly follow the principle of capital import neutrality and avoid any current taxation 
of such income in the Member State of the shareholder. Apart from the fact that such 
a taxation would be contrary to the concept of an internal market, it is - in my opinion 
- rather obvious that the portion of income which is related to the economic output 
created by the activity of CFC personnel is usually less mobile than other income 
components, especially the income which is related to the employment of capital. 
Thus, it is less likely, in my opinion, that activities which are strongly based on the 
activity of personnel are relocated to other countries merely for tax reasons. But even 
if the lower taxation is the triggering factor for the relocation, the effect which may be 
achieved - compared to the administrative, legal and other burdens which go hand in 
hand with such relocation - seems to be rather insignificant. In my opinion, this is 
supported by transfer pricing principles: the complex and important group activities 
(e.g. R&D activities) typically require a higher margin from a transfer pricing point of 
view. Even though the higher margin provides the possibility of shifting more income 
to another state, it is equally clear that especially those activities require highly skilled 
personnel, appropriate facilities, and a legal and administrative environment which 
supports the activities. This makes the activities less mobile and it is therefore rather 
unlikely, or at least less likely, that they are solely relocated for tax reasons. 
However, the less complex and less important group activities (e.g. a call centre) may 
only achieve - based on transfer pricing principles - a lower margin. Thus, the mobility 
increases but the profit margin decreases. This, again, is not the result a tax planner 
wants to achieve. It was outlined earlier that it is much more effective to relocate 
capital intensive activities in order to make sure that a substantial amount of (interest) 
income is allocable to the low-tax state. Apart from the higher degree of income 
related to the employment of capital, the services still require the carrying out of an 
activity which is physically conducted by personnel in the CFC state. With respect to 
the activities which are usually in the focus of CFC regimes (e.g. financing activities, 
leasing activities, licensing activities), it can certainly be concluded that the part which 
is carried out by personnel is often a rather less complex activity. Nonetheless, the 
aforementioned principles are equally applicable in case of capital intensive services: 
the income which is related to the economic output created by personnel in the CFC 
country should be taxed in the state where the income is produced. This decision 
should be independent from the question whether the overall income is increased by 
elements which are related to, for example, the employment of capital. An acceptable 
and efficient approach - especially in the context of an internal market - requires a 
separation of those elements. 
 
9.2.2. Income Related to the Risk Component 
 
The income which is related to the compensation of the (increased) risk of the 
investment is not produced by the activity of personnel in the CFC state.5 It is 
produced in the state where the activity is carried on and where the capital (either in 
the form of financial means or in the form of tangible or intangible assets) is 
employed for an income producing activity. Of course, the aforementioned activities 
                                            
5 In case the investment is made outside of the state of residence of the CFC.  
   
 
domestic taxation.2 The CFC rules are measures against the erosion of the domestic 
tax base towards low-tax countries and can therefore clearly be seen as anti-
avoidance (anti-deferral) measures which are considered necessary by a large 
number of European Member States. However, the accumulation of low-taxed 
income within the foreign legal entity as such cannot be considered “abusive” in a 
stricter sense - this is already clear from the existing case law of the ECJ. But the 
aforementioned “clustering” of equity investments in low-tax states with a subsequent 
switch to debt investments3 in triangular cases may have a negative effect for high-
tax Member States and does not improve and support the efficient allocation of 
capital within the European Union. In fact, it may lead to inefficient capital allocations. 
In order to target such structures - or rather the negative effect of such structures - it 
is from an anti-avoidance perspective neither necessary nor acceptable to allocate all 
of the income derived by the foreign legal entity to the domestic shareholder. What is 
required, however, is an additional separation of income components - instead of a 
mere separation of active and passive income. In this regard, the following 
differentiation of income components should be made: 
 
o income related to an activity physically conducted in the state of the service 
company (activity component); 
 
o income related to the compensation of risks which are related to the capital 
investment (risk component); 
 
o income related to the basic interest component of capital (basic interest 
component). 
 
All of the three components are usually included in the income which is related to 
services where the main purpose is the provision of capital.4 It is obvious from the 
examinations in previous chapters that there is, in principle, a justification for a 
different treatment of the three income components from the perspective of the 
residence state of the shareholder. In my opinion, the horizontal and vertical 
separation of income can be the key for an efficient anti-avoidance system which is in 
line with EU law. In the following, I will briefly come back to the three income 
components and subsequently describe an alternative system. 
 
9.2.1. Income Related to the Activity Component 
 
The portion of income which is (directly or indirectly) related to an activity physically 
conducted by personnel in the state of the CFC should not be in the focus of any 
current taxation of income. This should not only be true for income which is related to 
production and trading activities, but also for any type of service activities, 
irrespective of whether the activities are provided to related or unrelated parties. The 
latter differentiation between related or unrelated parties does not make much sense 
- from an economic perspective - since the economic output created in the CFC state 
is independent from this differentiation. Moreover, it should not be decisive whether 
the activity can be seen as an important or less important activity (e.g. within a 
                                            
2 At least, this is the conclusion derived from chapter 5 (see, inter alia. section 5.5.) and chapter 6 (where the 
various types and the specific elements of European CFC and FIF rules are described).  
3 Directly (e.g. by loan agreements) or indirectly (e.g. by leasing agreements, royalty agreements).  
4 The income components are, of course, also included in services where the main purpose is not the provision of 
capital, but where capital is employed for the provision of services. 
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either the exemption of the income related to the compensation or the taking into 
account of positive and negative income. However, if the risk compensation and the 
theoretical risks are balanced out, there is - in the long run - not much income 
potential which might be shifted to the low-tax state. “Balanced out” would 
theoretically mean that the risk compensation is as high as the theoretical risk over a 
longer period of time. The positive result which can theoretically be achieved is the 
over-compensation for the willingness to take the increased risk. However, this 
supposes a perfect market and an extremely high diversification rate. Studies show 
that even though the default rate of corporate bonds may be low (depending on the 
risk category), there is a significant likelihood that the losses caused by an 
unexpected default are very high.12 It is difficult to compensate for these losses 
through the investment in other corporate bonds since the positive income which can 
be derived from these investments is limited. According to Amato and Remolona, an 
asymmetrical allocation exists between the positive income which may be achieved 
by the investment in corporate bonds and the extraordinary high losses. This is one 
of the main reasons why it is extremely difficult to diversify the investment in 
corporate bonds.13 In fact, pursuant to Amato and Remolona, the diversification of 
investments in corporate bonds requires an extraordinary large number of different 
bonds.14 In addition, the possibility of diversification is further restricted by the high 
degree of default correlation. There are two important factors which are relevant for 
the correlation: the risk category and the activity in the same field of business.15 The 
higher the likelihood of default (because of a certain risk category), the higher the 
likelihood that it affects two companies (within the same risk category) at the same 
time. This is mainly due to a so-called “asset-correlation.” For companies within a 
high-risk category, a small decrease in value of the assets owned by the companies 
is sufficient to bring them into a situation of default.16 The correlation is further 
increased when companies carry on their activities in the same field of business. The 
latter is, in my opinion, rather obvious: if two companies carry on their activities in the 
same business sector, it is likely that both companies will be affected if the economic 
environment in this particular sector deteriorates. Overall, Amato and Remolona have 
shown in their study that the lack of diversification and the lack of compensation of 
the permanent risk of unexpected defaults are most likely the reasons why the 
interest spread between the low-risk corporate bond investments and the high-risk 
investments (within certain categories) is higher than the mere statistical likelihood of 
                                            
12 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(63).  
13 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(63). 
14 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(64). Even the extension of the corporate bond portfolio from 100 different bonds to 300 different bonds does not 
lead to an appropriate diversification. The probability of losses is three times higher than the losses which can 
statistically be expected within a (theoretical) completely diversified portfolio.  
15 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(68); Zhou, Default Correlation: An Analytical Result, FEDS paper 1997-27, Federal Reserve Board; Gersbach / 
Lipponer, Firm Defaults and the Correlation Effect, European Financial Management, Vol. 9, pages 361-377; see 
also Das / Fong / Geng, Impact of Correlated Default Risk on Credit Portfolios, Journal of Fixed Income, 
December 2001, pages 9-19; Elton / Gruber / Agrawal / Mann, Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds, 
Journal of Finance, February 2001, pages 247-277.   
16 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(68); Zhou, Default Correlation: An Analytical Result, FEDS paper 1997-27, Federal Reserve Board; Gersbach / 
Lipponer, Firm Defaults and the Correlation Effect, European Financial Management, Vol. 9, page 361-377. 
   
 
of the CFC personnel are not free of risks. However, the compensation should be 
included in the income directly related to these activities and must be seen separately 
from the risks involved in the investment itself. Clearly, it is the decision of the 
person(s) in the CFC state which matters (e.g. in case of an asset management 
activity) and this function must therefore be compensated appropriately. However, 
the subsequent (increased) payment for the compensation of a certain investment 
risk is only indirectly related to the decisions of the CFC-management. It is paid 
because of the decision to take a higher risk, but it is nonetheless a direct 
compensation for the risk itself. What the asset manager tries to achieve is either a 
higher return on investment when taking comparable risks (e.g. within a certain risk 
category) or a comparable rate of return by taking a lower risk than normally required. 
Again, this must find expression in the income related to the asset management 
activity. But it has to be seen differently from the risk compensation as such. 
 
For example, if a company had decided in October 2008 to invest in 4.750% Turkish 
state bonds with maturity date in 2012, the expected yield would be 7.60 percent.6 In 
contrast thereto, the investment in 4.250% German state bonds with maturity date in 
2012 would only result in a yield of 3.60 percent - which is a difference of about 400 
basis points.7 However, the state bonds of Turkey are rated Ba3 and the state bonds 
of Germany are rated Aaa by Moody’s.8 The difference in interest rate is due to the 
increased risk which is involved in the investment in bonds which are rated Ba3 
compared to bonds which are rated Aaa. It is a direct compensation for the increased 
likelihood that the interest payments and the repayment of the Ba3 bonds at a later 
point in time is less secure than the investment in the Aaa bonds.9 It is therefore 
obvious that the income of the company may be increased simply by taking over 
additional risks, but this may be seen as a premium which compensates for the 
default of the debtor. Thus, if a double tax convention between the debtor state and 
the creditor state allocates the taxing rights to the latter state (as is the case in the 
OECD-MTC - apart from a possible limited taxation at source by way of withholding 
taxation), the creditor state should also take into account the possible losses caused 
by the default of the debtor.10 If, in such a situation, the state of the shareholder taxes 
the positive income on a current basis which is related to the risk compensation, but 
excludes the losses from domestic taxation, it leads to an asymmetrical taxation of 
income. It would take away part of the income - through a higher taxation - which is 
required for the compensation of losses.11 Hence, a symmetrical approach requires 
                                            
6 4.750% Turkey 2005 (XS0223369322), maturity date July 06, 2012, the yield was determined on October 13, 
2008 (see Boerse Online , 43/2008, page 108).  
7 4.250% Bundesobligation 2007 (DE0001141513), maturity date October 12, 2012, the yield was determined on 
October 13, 2008 (see Boerse Online, 43/2008, page 108).  
8 See Boerse Online, 43/2008, page 108; the rating AAA (Standard & Poor’s) / Aaa (Moody’s) is the highest 
rating and reflects the lowest possible investment risk. The debtor is in a very good financial position. In 
contrast, the rating BB+, BB, BB- (Standard & Poor’s) / Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 (Moody’s) contains speculative 
elements. The long-term financial situation of the debtor is not secured.  
9 Statistically, the default risks of bonds within the investment grade sector are clearly lower than those of the 
high yield sector. See in this respect also the analysis of Zeuner, News aus den Finanzmärkten, Sind 
Unternehmensanleihen attraktiv?, November 18, 2008, which can be found in the internet under 
www.vpbank.com. In this analysis, the average default risk of the investment grade bonds for 2009 is calculated 
to be 6 percent and of the high yield bonds to be 16 percent.  
10 However, it has to be noted again that the risk itself is connected to the state of the debtor and an optimal 
scenario would therefore require the taxation in the state of the debtor (see in this respect especially chapter 2 
and chapter 3).  
11 In case the tax rate in the state of the asset management company is lower than in the residence state of the 
shareholder.  
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either the exemption of the income related to the compensation or the taking into 
account of positive and negative income. However, if the risk compensation and the 
theoretical risks are balanced out, there is - in the long run - not much income 
potential which might be shifted to the low-tax state. “Balanced out” would 
theoretically mean that the risk compensation is as high as the theoretical risk over a 
longer period of time. The positive result which can theoretically be achieved is the 
over-compensation for the willingness to take the increased risk. However, this 
supposes a perfect market and an extremely high diversification rate. Studies show 
that even though the default rate of corporate bonds may be low (depending on the 
risk category), there is a significant likelihood that the losses caused by an 
unexpected default are very high.12 It is difficult to compensate for these losses 
through the investment in other corporate bonds since the positive income which can 
be derived from these investments is limited. According to Amato and Remolona, an 
asymmetrical allocation exists between the positive income which may be achieved 
by the investment in corporate bonds and the extraordinary high losses. This is one 
of the main reasons why it is extremely difficult to diversify the investment in 
corporate bonds.13 In fact, pursuant to Amato and Remolona, the diversification of 
investments in corporate bonds requires an extraordinary large number of different 
bonds.14 In addition, the possibility of diversification is further restricted by the high 
degree of default correlation. There are two important factors which are relevant for 
the correlation: the risk category and the activity in the same field of business.15 The 
higher the likelihood of default (because of a certain risk category), the higher the 
likelihood that it affects two companies (within the same risk category) at the same 
time. This is mainly due to a so-called “asset-correlation.” For companies within a 
high-risk category, a small decrease in value of the assets owned by the companies 
is sufficient to bring them into a situation of default.16 The correlation is further 
increased when companies carry on their activities in the same field of business. The 
latter is, in my opinion, rather obvious: if two companies carry on their activities in the 
same business sector, it is likely that both companies will be affected if the economic 
environment in this particular sector deteriorates. Overall, Amato and Remolona have 
shown in their study that the lack of diversification and the lack of compensation of 
the permanent risk of unexpected defaults are most likely the reasons why the 
interest spread between the low-risk corporate bond investments and the high-risk 
investments (within certain categories) is higher than the mere statistical likelihood of 
                                            
12 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(63).  
13 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(63). 
14 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(64). Even the extension of the corporate bond portfolio from 100 different bonds to 300 different bonds does not 
lead to an appropriate diversification. The probability of losses is three times higher than the losses which can 
statistically be expected within a (theoretical) completely diversified portfolio.  
15 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(68); Zhou, Default Correlation: An Analytical Result, FEDS paper 1997-27, Federal Reserve Board; Gersbach / 
Lipponer, Firm Defaults and the Correlation Effect, European Financial Management, Vol. 9, pages 361-377; see 
also Das / Fong / Geng, Impact of Correlated Default Risk on Credit Portfolios, Journal of Fixed Income, 
December 2001, pages 9-19; Elton / Gruber / Agrawal / Mann, Explaining the Rate Spread on Corporate Bonds, 
Journal of Finance, February 2001, pages 247-277.   
16 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(68); Zhou, Default Correlation: An Analytical Result, FEDS paper 1997-27, Federal Reserve Board; Gersbach / 
Lipponer, Firm Defaults and the Correlation Effect, European Financial Management, Vol. 9, page 361-377. 
   
 
of the CFC personnel are not free of risks. However, the compensation should be 
included in the income directly related to these activities and must be seen separately 
from the risks involved in the investment itself. Clearly, it is the decision of the 
person(s) in the CFC state which matters (e.g. in case of an asset management 
activity) and this function must therefore be compensated appropriately. However, 
the subsequent (increased) payment for the compensation of a certain investment 
risk is only indirectly related to the decisions of the CFC-management. It is paid 
because of the decision to take a higher risk, but it is nonetheless a direct 
compensation for the risk itself. What the asset manager tries to achieve is either a 
higher return on investment when taking comparable risks (e.g. within a certain risk 
category) or a comparable rate of return by taking a lower risk than normally required. 
Again, this must find expression in the income related to the asset management 
activity. But it has to be seen differently from the risk compensation as such. 
 
For example, if a company had decided in October 2008 to invest in 4.750% Turkish 
state bonds with maturity date in 2012, the expected yield would be 7.60 percent.6 In 
contrast thereto, the investment in 4.250% German state bonds with maturity date in 
2012 would only result in a yield of 3.60 percent - which is a difference of about 400 
basis points.7 However, the state bonds of Turkey are rated Ba3 and the state bonds 
of Germany are rated Aaa by Moody’s.8 The difference in interest rate is due to the 
increased risk which is involved in the investment in bonds which are rated Ba3 
compared to bonds which are rated Aaa. It is a direct compensation for the increased 
likelihood that the interest payments and the repayment of the Ba3 bonds at a later 
point in time is less secure than the investment in the Aaa bonds.9 It is therefore 
obvious that the income of the company may be increased simply by taking over 
additional risks, but this may be seen as a premium which compensates for the 
default of the debtor. Thus, if a double tax convention between the debtor state and 
the creditor state allocates the taxing rights to the latter state (as is the case in the 
OECD-MTC - apart from a possible limited taxation at source by way of withholding 
taxation), the creditor state should also take into account the possible losses caused 
by the default of the debtor.10 If, in such a situation, the state of the shareholder taxes 
the positive income on a current basis which is related to the risk compensation, but 
excludes the losses from domestic taxation, it leads to an asymmetrical taxation of 
income. It would take away part of the income - through a higher taxation - which is 
required for the compensation of losses.11 Hence, a symmetrical approach requires 
                                            
6 4.750% Turkey 2005 (XS0223369322), maturity date July 06, 2012, the yield was determined on October 13, 
2008 (see Boerse Online , 43/2008, page 108).  
7 4.250% Bundesobligation 2007 (DE0001141513), maturity date October 12, 2012, the yield was determined on 
October 13, 2008 (see Boerse Online, 43/2008, page 108).  
8 See Boerse Online, 43/2008, page 108; the rating AAA (Standard & Poor’s) / Aaa (Moody’s) is the highest 
rating and reflects the lowest possible investment risk. The debtor is in a very good financial position. In 
contrast, the rating BB+, BB, BB- (Standard & Poor’s) / Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 (Moody’s) contains speculative 
elements. The long-term financial situation of the debtor is not secured.  
9 Statistically, the default risks of bonds within the investment grade sector are clearly lower than those of the 
high yield sector. See in this respect also the analysis of Zeuner, News aus den Finanzmärkten, Sind 
Unternehmensanleihen attraktiv?, November 18, 2008, which can be found in the internet under 
www.vpbank.com. In this analysis, the average default risk of the investment grade bonds for 2009 is calculated 
to be 6 percent and of the high yield bonds to be 16 percent.  
10 However, it has to be noted again that the risk itself is connected to the state of the debtor and an optimal 
scenario would therefore require the taxation in the state of the debtor (see in this respect especially chapter 2 
and chapter 3).  




   
 
directly secured by the patent right). Nevertheless, what is important in this context is 
the fact that a licensing or leasing agreement - or any other similar agreement - also 
contains an interest component. This interest component contains, similar to the 
interest payments in case of a loan agreement, a risk compensation element which is 
related to the capital invested. In my opinion, it is quite obvious that the income which 
is connected to the risk component - irrespective of whether it is related to investment 
in bonds, loan amounts, tangible assets and intangible assets - is most likely not the 
decisive factor for the relocation of income to other (low-tax) jurisdictions. At least, it 
is not the factor, in my opinion, which makes the relocation particularly attractive. 
Moreover, the fact that the income related to the risk component and the losses 
caused by the realisation of the particular risk are linked, requires an anti-avoidance 
legislation which focuses on a current taxation of this component to take into account 
the positive and negative results and not only to be limited to positive income. This, 
however, is most certainly less attractive for the Member States which apply such an 
anti-avoidance regime since the final outcome is not properly predictable. In my 
opinion, if a Member State taxes the risk component on a current basis, it is equally 
required to provide for an immediate relief in case of a realisation of the respective 
risks. For example, if the risk component included in the interest income derived from 
a corporate bond is attributed to the domestic shareholder on a regular (yearly) basis 
- and taxed according to the domestic tax system - the Member State should be 
obliged to provide for an immediate relief if the corporate bond cannot be repaid. 
Otherwise, the interest income will be taxed year by year and, in the worst case, the 
default will not have any relief-effect in the state of the shareholder. For this reason, 
the shareholder should be able, in this particular case, to offset the negative income 
from the default of the debtor with (other) positive domestic income. This, of course, 
requires the current income attribution not to be kept separately from the regular 
income taxation.  
 
9.2.3. Income Related to the Basic Interest Component 
 
It was outlined earlier that the OECD-MTC supports the relocation of income from the 
state where the income is produced to the intermediate state of the CFC by allocating 
taxing rights (mainly) based on the principle of residence. It is quite simple to 
incorporate a CFC with equity and to “transform” the equity into inter-company debts 
only on the level of the CFC. This is particularly effective if the CFC carries on an 
activity which requires large amounts of capital investment. This can be financing 
activities, leasing activities, licensing activities, or similar activities, in which the 
capital investment is the most substantial part of the activities. The basic interest 
component is therefore, in my opinion, the only factor which may be achieved (and 
taxed) in the intermediate CFC state without exercising any relevant function in this 
state and without taking a credit risk. In other words, all other income components - 
apart from the basic interest component - can only be achieved through the 
exercising of functions or the taking over of risks. It is, in my opinion, the most mobile 
and flexible part of the total income. The fact that legal entities are typically 
considered to be non-transparent separate taxpayers combined with a network of 
double tax conventions which are based on the OECD-MTC provides for nearly 
unlimited possibilities of allocating this particular portion of income to the states which 
are the most attractive from a tax point of view. However, the exclusive right to tax 
the basic interest component in the residence state of the CFC is neither in line with 
economic principles nor with equity principles. Moreover, the latter is by no means 
supported by the idea and the concept of an internal market. An efficient anti-
   
 
default.17 From my perspective, what is typically seen as the compensation for the 
willingness to take the higher risk is therefore - in a broader sense - also an element 
of risk compensation.  
 
Clearly, the relocation of income related to an investment activity - and therefore the 
taking over of risks by the asset management company - is easier than the relocation 
of income related to business functions which are solely (or mainly) based on the 
activity of personnel. However, the “net result” which can be seen as the risk 
compensation minus the losses caused by the actual realisation of risks is difficult to 
estimate and therefore, in my opinion, not particularly attractive for any planned - “tax 
driven” - relocation of income to a low-tax state. This, however, requires a balance 
between the theoretical risks and the compensation for taking over of the risks. Only 
if this balance is distorted, it may be much more attractive (or less attractive - 
depending on the situation) to relocate the income related to the taking over of risks 
to another state. I will go into more detail regarding that aspect below. However, 
under the assumption that a balance exists between the theoretical risks and the 
compensation of the risks, it seems to be less likely that this portion of income is 
shifted to a low-tax state just because of the positive result which may statistically be 
achieved by the over-compensation for the willingness to take the risk.  
 
What is true for the investment in bonds is, in principle, equally true for the granting of 
inter-company loan amounts to other group companies. The interest expenses which 
have to be charged have to be stipulated based on transfer pricing principles (the 
arm’s length principle). It is, however, much more difficult to clearly find out the 
appropriate percentage - compared to corporate bonds or state bonds which are 
listed publicly. Nonetheless, it is theoretically required to determine an appropriate 
risk compensation which is related to the debtor and its activities. For example, if 
parent company A (in state A) structures the financing of the group companies (e.g. 
in state B) through a subsidiary company C (CFC in state C), the interest payments 
between companies B and C have to fulfil the arm’s length requirements. If company 
B is not able to operate successfully in state B and the parent company decides to 
liquidate the subsidiary company, this will directly affect the inter-company loan C-B. 
Thus, the losses caused by the default of company B should be taken into 
consideration in state C (and not directly in state A). In contrast, if the financing is 
directly provided by the parent company A, the risk compensation included in the 
interest payment will be subject to tax in state A. Again, a possible default of 
subsidiary company B should - in this alternative - directly affect the domestic tax 
base in state A. This is, in the same way as outlined above with respect to the 
investment in bonds, a consistent and symmetrical approach.  
 
The investment in tangible and intangible assets by the CFC in order to provide these 
assets to another (group) company by way of licensing agreements, leasing 
agreements, or similar agreements, is a bit more complex than the investment in 
bonds or the granting of loan amounts. The risks involved may be slightly different 
and not necessarily limited to the contract partner. For example, a patent right 
acquired by the CFC which is provided to the group company B may - after a 
possible default of company B - still be useable by another company. In this case, the 
risk may be lower than in the situation where a loan amount is granted to company B 
in order to purchase the patent right directly (and where the loan amount is not 
                                            
17 Amato / Remolona, Das Rätsel der Bonitätsaufschläge, BIZ-Quartalsbericht, December 2003, page 57 et seq. 
(69, 70). 
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is not the factor, in my opinion, which makes the relocation particularly attractive. 
Moreover, the fact that the income related to the risk component and the losses 
caused by the realisation of the particular risk are linked, requires an anti-avoidance 
legislation which focuses on a current taxation of this component to take into account 
the positive and negative results and not only to be limited to positive income. This, 
however, is most certainly less attractive for the Member States which apply such an 
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requires the current income attribution not to be kept separately from the regular 
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state where the income is produced to the intermediate state of the CFC by allocating 
taxing rights (mainly) based on the principle of residence. It is quite simple to 
incorporate a CFC with equity and to “transform” the equity into inter-company debts 
only on the level of the CFC. This is particularly effective if the CFC carries on an 
activity which requires large amounts of capital investment. This can be financing 
activities, leasing activities, licensing activities, or similar activities, in which the 
capital investment is the most substantial part of the activities. The basic interest 
component is therefore, in my opinion, the only factor which may be achieved (and 
taxed) in the intermediate CFC state without exercising any relevant function in this 
state and without taking a credit risk. In other words, all other income components - 
apart from the basic interest component - can only be achieved through the 
exercising of functions or the taking over of risks. It is, in my opinion, the most mobile 
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considered to be non-transparent separate taxpayers combined with a network of 
double tax conventions which are based on the OECD-MTC provides for nearly 
unlimited possibilities of allocating this particular portion of income to the states which 
are the most attractive from a tax point of view. However, the exclusive right to tax 
the basic interest component in the residence state of the CFC is neither in line with 
economic principles nor with equity principles. Moreover, the latter is by no means 
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activity of personnel. However, the “net result” which can be seen as the risk 
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estimate and therefore, in my opinion, not particularly attractive for any planned - “tax 
driven” - relocation of income to a low-tax state. This, however, requires a balance 
between the theoretical risks and the compensation for taking over of the risks. Only 
if this balance is distorted, it may be much more attractive (or less attractive - 
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have to be charged have to be stipulated based on transfer pricing principles (the 
arm’s length principle). It is, however, much more difficult to clearly find out the 
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listed publicly. Nonetheless, it is theoretically required to determine an appropriate 
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assets to another (group) company by way of licensing agreements, leasing 
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risk may be lower than in the situation where a loan amount is granted to company B 
in order to purchase the patent right directly (and where the loan amount is not 
                                            




   
 
corporate level without taking into account the fact that there are, of course, tax rate 
differences between domestic corporations and domestic individual shareholders. 
Thus, if the basic interest component is not only attributable to legal entities but also 
to individual shareholders, the principle of neutrality is equally relevant for domestic 
and foreign investments. In other words, the principle of neutrality is not sufficient to 
justify the restrictive application of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is 
based on the taxation of the basic interest component and which is limited to non-
resident companies. However, the application of an alternative system to resident 
and non-resident companies in a non-discriminative manner can quite easily lead to 
the outcome that the administrative burden caused by such legislation goes far 
beyond of any (positive) anti-avoidance effect. In this regard, one has to keep in mind 
that it is not only the extension to resident companies but also to non-resident 
companies (and countries) which were outside of the scope of existing CFC rules 
because of the tax rate. In order to find a balance between the (positive) anti-
avoidance effect and the (negative) additional administrative burden caused by the 
non-discriminative application of such legislation, it is required, in my opinion, to limit 
the scope to those activities where the risk of tax avoidance - in the manner 
described earlier - is relatively high. It is therefore necessary to define, in general, 
capital intensive activities (“tainted activities”) which should be in the focus of an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation. In addition, the system itself should provide 
exemptions from current taxation of income for those situations in which the risk of 
tax avoidance is reduced. Of course, this has to be made in a non-discriminatory 
manner as well.  
 
In case of an alternative legislation which targets certain types of investment in a 
non-discriminatory manner it might be misleading to define the company which 
carries on such activities as a “controlled foreign company”18 or “CFC.” In the 
following, however, the latter term will still be used occasionally whenever it is 
appropriate. Even though it is not unlikely that the activities which mainly focus on the 
provision of capital and which should finally be within the scope of an alternative anti-
avoidance legislation more often come up in low-tax countries than in high-tax 
countries, the latter countries cannot be excluded from the scope of the legislation. In 
this respect, the better abbreviation for those activities might be “CSC” -which can be 
derived from “capital service company.” Without any doubt, capital services may 
theoretically encompass a great number of different types of services, and many of 
them will not be (and should not be) within the scope of such legislation, but the 
advantage of a different term is the fact that it neither refers to “control” nor to 
“foreign” companies. Both aspects cannot be decisive for an alternative concept of a 
current taxation of income.19 What is really decisive, however, is the term “capital” 
since it is provided to another (related or unrelated) party mostly in the form of 
“services.” Of course, there may be a “grey area” regarding the differentiation 
between services and, for example, sales transactions, but this should not play a 
significant role. The question whether an alternative legislation should be limited to 
companies, or whether it may also be applied in case of transparent partnerships and 
permanent establishments, will be outlined below in some detail. What is clear, 
however, is the fact that such legislation will be required for all types of non-
transparent entities. The reason is that the latter entities provide the possibility of the 
re-location and sheltering of the basic interest component. Thus, since non-
transparent entities will be, in any event, the main target of an alternative anti-
                                            
18 Or “controlled foreign corporation.”  
19 At least, this is true as long as “control” is to be understood as having the majority of shares or voting rights.  
   
 
avoidance legislation within the European Union should therefore clearly focus on 
this particular income component.  
 
9.3. The Elements of an Alternative Concept to CFC Legislation 
 
9.3.1. The Basic Interest Taxation 
 
An alternative concept to the existing CFC regimes in the European Union should be 
based on the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters and the general principle of 
the separation of income into the three different components outlined above. In my 
opinion, an approach which solely focuses on (i) certain (“tainted”) activities and (ii) 
the basic interest component is less burdensome compared to the typical CFC 
legislation. The reason is that such an approach exactly focuses on the decisive 
element, namely the interest component which is related to the capital itself, and 
does not include any other income components in the system of current taxation. In 
my opinion, this is the only possibility of combining CFC type elements with the 
concept of an internal market and of improving the efficient allocation of capital 
among Member States. It is self-evident that the alternative concept must be in line 
with EU law, especially the basic freedoms stipulated in the TFEU. This requires, in 
my opinion, a non-discriminatory application to cross-border and domestic 
investments. In the following, I will clarify the important elements of such legislation 
before going into detail regarding the proposed concept itself. 
 
9.3.2. The Requirement of a Non-Discriminatory Approach  
 
The fact that the current taxation of the basic interest component - under certain 
circumstances - is in line with the concept of an internal market does not mean that 
the application can be limited to non-resident companies. It is clear from the previous 
chapters that the current taxation of income leads to a restriction of the basic 
freedoms. This should not only be true in case of a complete income allocation but 
also for the allocation of the basic interest component - and therefore only a part of 
the total income. In spite of all arguments in favour of such a system it is unlikely that 
the ECJ, based on the case law outlined in chapters 4 and 8, would accept the 
current taxation of the basic interest component to be limited to non-resident 
companies and not to include resident companies. Any argumentation for a 
justification which is based on the aim of preventing tax avoidance would fail since 
the proposed alternative system should be applicable to capital investments which 
are the basis for “real” services and, therefore, cannot offer an escape clause for 
genuine activities carried on in another state. This would be contrary to the idea and 
the purpose of the system. The argumentation based on neutrality (or the principle of 
world-wide taxation) would certainly not be accepted by the ECJ, either. Of course, 
the argumentation in case of limiting the current taxation to the basic interest 
component is different compared to a typical CFC case in which the total amount of 
income (or the total amount of passive or base company income) is attributed to the 
shareholder. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the ECJ would clearly focus on the 
different treatment and the fact that tax neutrality might also play a role in a merely 
domestic context. If this is the case, why should tax neutrality only be of importance 
in a cross-border situation? The outcome of the ECJ case law shows that an 
argumentation which is based on the fact that the income tax rates are different in 
other countries compared to income tax rates in a respective Member State is not 
accepted as a valid criterion. Moreover, one cannot merely focus on the domestic 
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corporate level without taking into account the fact that there are, of course, tax rate 
differences between domestic corporations and domestic individual shareholders. 
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to individual shareholders, the principle of neutrality is equally relevant for domestic 
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18 Or “controlled foreign corporation.”  
19 At least, this is true as long as “control” is to be understood as having the majority of shares or voting rights.  
   
 
avoidance legislation within the European Union should therefore clearly focus on 
this particular income component.  
 
9.3. The Elements of an Alternative Concept to CFC Legislation 
 
9.3.1. The Basic Interest Taxation 
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are the basis for “real” services and, therefore, cannot offer an escape clause for 
genuine activities carried on in another state. This would be contrary to the idea and 
the purpose of the system. The argumentation based on neutrality (or the principle of 
world-wide taxation) would certainly not be accepted by the ECJ, either. Of course, 
the argumentation in case of limiting the current taxation to the basic interest 
component is different compared to a typical CFC case in which the total amount of 
income (or the total amount of passive or base company income) is attributed to the 
shareholder. Nonetheless, it seems to me that the ECJ would clearly focus on the 
different treatment and the fact that tax neutrality might also play a role in a merely 
domestic context. If this is the case, why should tax neutrality only be of importance 
in a cross-border situation? The outcome of the ECJ case law shows that an 
argumentation which is based on the fact that the income tax rates are different in 
other countries compared to income tax rates in a respective Member State is not 
accepted as a valid criterion. Moreover, one cannot merely focus on the domestic 
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related to the provision of capital is usually still the predominant element. In general, 
the purpose of finance companies is to provide financial means to other (group) 
companies which, in turn, employ the financial means for an income-producing 
activity mainly outside of the CSC state. The high degree of mobility and flexibility 
makes it quite simple for a multinational group to allocate such financing functions to 
the state where the treatment of the interest income - the main element - is 
particularly attractive, i.e. where it is taxed at a low rate. It is therefore clear to me 
that a legislation which focuses on the avoidance of the “clustering” of equity in a 
particular state mainly for tax reasons must concentrate on capital intensive activities 
with a significant interest component. In this respect, it is absolutely clear that 
financing activities must be in the focus of such legislation. This should not only be 
true for the typical intra-group financing activities but also for portfolio investments in 
interest-bearing bonds, issued by related and unrelated parties.  
 
9.3.3.2. Licensing Activities 
 
Licensing activities, i.e. the exploitation of intangible property owned by the CSC 
which is utilised by related or unrelated parties, can be very similar to the mere 
financing activities. At least, this is the case if the CSC is only interposed in order to 
acquire the intangible property which is subsequently used by a - predetermined - 
partner for its own business activities. Here, the main purpose is the investment in 
the intangible property and the making available of the property to another company - 
which would otherwise be forced to purchase the intangible property directly (and to 
refinance the amount of investment). However, the licensing activities can go beyond 
a mere financing activity. This would be the case, inter alia, if the CSC was actively 
involved in the purchasing of intangible property from third parties and the searching 
of potential third party customers for the exploitation of those rights. In this case, the 
service character can be much more important and encompasses a greater part of 
the overall income derived by the CSC. In any case, the licensing income (or royalty 
income) contains additional elements compared to the income from financing 
activities. In addition to the compensation for the services provided (and the coverage 
of the related expenses) - which can also be seen as the compensation for the 
entrepreneurial risks - and the compensation for the interest related to the capital 
invested, it is especially the amortisation of the investment and the maintenance of 
the investment which must be covered by the licensing (or royalty) payments. The 
latter two elements are normally not of particular importance in case of mere 
financing activities. Even though the earlier examinations show that most of the 
elements should be allocable, from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective, to the state where the service company carries on its activities, this is 
not true for the interest component. However, the importance of the capital 
investments - and therefore the interest component - makes it necessary that the 
licensing activities are also in the focus of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation.  
 
9.3.3.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property 
 
In principle, what is true for licensing activities is equally true for leasing and renting 
activities. The most important difference is certainly the fact that licensing activities 
are related to intangible property whereas leasing and renting activities are related to 
tangible property. Thus, the scope of a service company which focuses on leasing 
and renting activities might be wider than that of service companies which are solely 
limited to licensing activities. However, this depends mainly on the activities of the 
   
 
avoidance legislation it is appropriate, in my opinion, to refer simply to “companies.” 
Therefore, the term “CSC” will be used in the following to describe a resident or non-
resident entity which should be in the focus of an alternative anti-avoidance 
legislation. 
 
9.3.3. The Separation of Activities 
 
It is obvious that not each and every investment requires a current attribution of 
income to the shareholder from an anti-avoidance perspective. However, it is equally 
clear to me that a differentiation based on “active income” and “passive income” is 
not an appropriate solution. In my opinion, the active-passive differentiation is rather 
artificial and ignores the fact that any income, irrespective of whether it is marked as 
active or passive, must finally be produced. Thus, even if an activity - e.g. within a 
certain group structure - is considered to be a passive activity, it will finally be part of 
an overall activity which produces “new” income. This might theoretically be different 
if income between related parties is only “artificially” created and allocated. However, 
such a situation would have to be considered abusive and, in addition, the profit 
allocation would most likely not be in line with international transfer pricing principles. 
Therefore, under the assumption that income is allocated appropriately between 
related parties based on transfer pricing principles (e.g. the arm’s length principle), 
each portion of income derived by the parties involved (e.g. on different group levels) 
is directly or indirectly the result of an “active” activity. Consequently, it does not 
make any sense, from my perspective, to separate the activities which are directly or 
indirectly involved in the income producing process - no matter how significant or 
insignificant they are - into “good” income (typically active income) and “bad” income 
(typically passive income). Thus, if the aim is to support - as far as possible - the 
principle of capital import neutrality and to exclude the income actually produced by 
the CSC from any current taxation, the focus must be on substantial capital 
investments which are made in the CSC state but which are actually utilised by 
another party for an income producing activity. Moreover, there must be a strict 
limitation to the attribution of the basic interest component instead of the attribution of 
income based on an active-passive differentiation. In the following, the types of 
activities are outlined in which the core of the activity encompasses the provision of 
capital to another party, either in the form of financial means or in the form of tangible 
or intangible property. These activities can be seen as tainted activities which should 
be in the focus of the proposed basic interest taxation.   
 
9.3.3.1. Financing Activities 
 
Financing activities are certainly among the most mobile business activities. The 
income which is related to the accompanying service element - and which is 
physically conducted by CSC personnel in the respective state - is often of minor 
importance compared to the income element which is related to the interest 
payments. Depending on the structure, a group finance activity (e.g. cash pooling 
activity) can be carried out almost automatically and in an extreme case there may be 
very few persons involved in dealing with substantial financial transfers. In such an 
extreme case, the interest income may encompass nearly all of the income derived 
by the CSC. In other cases, the financing activity may be concentrated in a group 
finance centre which provides different types of services, including cash pooling and 
re-financing activities. In the latter situation, the service element which is related to 
personnel in the CSC state may be of more importance, but the income which is 
Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation
505
   
 
related to the provision of capital is usually still the predominant element. In general, 
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the overall income derived by the CSC. In any case, the licensing income (or royalty 
income) contains additional elements compared to the income from financing 
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financing activities. Even though the earlier examinations show that most of the 
elements should be allocable, from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective, to the state where the service company carries on its activities, this is 
not true for the interest component. However, the importance of the capital 
investments - and therefore the interest component - makes it necessary that the 
licensing activities are also in the focus of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation.  
 
9.3.3.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property 
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are related to intangible property whereas leasing and renting activities are related to 
tangible property. Thus, the scope of a service company which focuses on leasing 
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avoidance legislation it is appropriate, in my opinion, to refer simply to “companies.” 
Therefore, the term “CSC” will be used in the following to describe a resident or non-
resident entity which should be in the focus of an alternative anti-avoidance 
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It is obvious that not each and every investment requires a current attribution of 
income to the shareholder from an anti-avoidance perspective. However, it is equally 
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not an appropriate solution. In my opinion, the active-passive differentiation is rather 
artificial and ignores the fact that any income, irrespective of whether it is marked as 
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each portion of income derived by the parties involved (e.g. on different group levels) 
is directly or indirectly the result of an “active” activity. Consequently, it does not 
make any sense, from my perspective, to separate the activities which are directly or 
indirectly involved in the income producing process - no matter how significant or 
insignificant they are - into “good” income (typically active income) and “bad” income 
(typically passive income). Thus, if the aim is to support - as far as possible - the 
principle of capital import neutrality and to exclude the income actually produced by 
the CSC from any current taxation, the focus must be on substantial capital 
investments which are made in the CSC state but which are actually utilised by 
another party for an income producing activity. Moreover, there must be a strict 
limitation to the attribution of the basic interest component instead of the attribution of 
income based on an active-passive differentiation. In the following, the types of 
activities are outlined in which the core of the activity encompasses the provision of 
capital to another party, either in the form of financial means or in the form of tangible 
or intangible property. These activities can be seen as tainted activities which should 
be in the focus of the proposed basic interest taxation.   
 
9.3.3.1. Financing Activities 
 
Financing activities are certainly among the most mobile business activities. The 
income which is related to the accompanying service element - and which is 
physically conducted by CSC personnel in the respective state - is often of minor 
importance compared to the income element which is related to the interest 
payments. Depending on the structure, a group finance activity (e.g. cash pooling 
activity) can be carried out almost automatically and in an extreme case there may be 
very few persons involved in dealing with substantial financial transfers. In such an 
extreme case, the interest income may encompass nearly all of the income derived 
by the CSC. In other cases, the financing activity may be concentrated in a group 
finance centre which provides different types of services, including cash pooling and 
re-financing activities. In the latter situation, the service element which is related to 
personnel in the CSC state may be of more importance, but the income which is 
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principles outlined in previous chapters. Hence, there is - in those cases where the 
double tax conventions are drafted along the lines of the OECD-MTC - no necessity 
for any current allocation of income to the residence state of the shareholder of the 
CSC. Of course, in the rather atypical situation of an allocation of taxing rights to the 
CSC state there is no reason for a different treatment of income from moveable and 
immovable property. Therefore, a logical approach might be to take into account, in 
general, the basic interest income from the leasing and renting activities related to 
immovable property and to provide for an exemption from the current taxation of 
income if the latter income is subject to a source-based taxation instead of a 
residence-based taxation.  
 
9.3.3.5. Other Activities Related to Capital Services 
 
Cases may exist in which the activities of the CSC cannot be clearly identified as one 
of the aforementioned services. However, the activity can be seen, in substance, as 
the direct or indirect provision of financial means, or the capital investment in tangible 
or intangible property, which are not utilised for an income-producing activity of the 
CSC itself, but for an income-producing activity of another party. This does not 
necessarily need to be considered a (mere) service activity but can also be seen, 
legally or factually, as a transaction where the ownership of the property is 
transferred to the contract partner. For example, a “sale and purchase agreement” 
related to the transfer of property allows the purchaser to pay the amount included in 
the agreement by instalments over a period of ten years. Let us assume in this 
example that the agreement itself does not contain any information on interest 
included in the total amount. It is apparent, though, that such an agreement must 
nonetheless be separated into the respective elements, including the provision of 
financial means for a certain period of time, and the latter element has to be within 
the scope of the CSC legislation.  
 
Thus, the focus must be, in general, on all those services and transactions which 
contain an interest element related to capital which is not directly or indirectly utilised 
for an income-producing activity of the CSC. Here, the economic output created by 
the capital employed is not created in the hands of the CSC, but in the hands of 
another party.  
 
9.3.3.6. Other Service Activities and Trading Activities  
 
Other service activities - and theoretically also trading activities - which are not to a 
large extent related to the provision of financial means or the provision of tangible or 
intangible property for the utilisation by another party should be outside of the scope 
of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation. In those cases, the capital investments 
are made for the purpose of creating income by the CSC itself and not by another 
party. In other words, the CSC produces “new” income by employing capital and 
personnel and is therefore “responsible” for the economic output. In contrast thereto, 
the income related to the activities outlined above is to a large extent based on the 
economic output created by another party. In my opinion, the fact that the activities 
may be of less significance in the overall context or may be solely provided to related 
parties is of no particular relevance. As already outlined above, the production of 
income cannot be separated into “good” and “bad” income based on the significance 
of the activities or the relationship of the parties involved in the transactions. Of 
course, the question arises where to draw the line between services which have to be 
   
 
multinational group. For example, in a pharmaceutical group the investment in 
intangible property may be even more important than the investment in tangible 
property. Another point which may be of relevance is the fact that licensing payments 
can be subject to a limited taxation at source in some states - although this is not 
provided for in Article 12 of the OECD-MTC. The leasing and renting activities which 
are related to tangible property are subject to tax, based on Article 7 of the OECD-
MTC, in the state where the activity is carried on. Thus, as long as no permanent 
establishment exists in another state, the taxing rights are allocable to the residence 
state of the CSC. Overall, the fact that the income related to leasing and renting 
activities may be strongly influenced by substantial capital investments requires, in 
my opinion, that those activities have to be in the focus of an alternative anti-
avoidance approach - in the same way as financing activities and licensing activities.  
 
Another aspect which should be mentioned in this context is the differentiation 
between ‘finance lease’ and ‘operating lease’. IAS 17 defines finance lease as “a 
lease that transfers substantially all the risks and rewards incidental to ownership of 
an asset. Title may or may not eventually be transferred.”20 There are specific 
elements which have to be taken into account for the classification as finance 
lease.21 If the examination of the arrangement shows that the lease is to be classified 
as finance lease, the underlying asset is to be capitalised in the books of the lessee. 
As a consequence, the lessor shows in his books, from an IAS accounting 
perspective, a receivable and not the underlying asset.22 Essentially, the lessor still 
provides services to the lessee, but an important part of the transaction is the transfer 
of an asset. The subsequent payments of the lessee have to be separated into an 
amount which relates to the reduction of the outstanding liability of the lessee and an 
amount which relates to the finance charge.23 In contrast to a finance lease, an 
operating lease is a (pure) service arrangement which does not result in a transfer of 
the underlying asset.24 Thus, depending on the leasing arrangement, the accounting 
consequences are quite different. The IAS/IFRS rules are one example, but countries 
may have similar rules under local GAAP and / or tax law which provide for 
comparable separations of the payments.25 It is obvious that both arrangements - 
finance lease and operating lease - have to be, in principle, covered by the 
respective legislation.26  
 
9.3.3.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 
 
The leasing and renting activities which are related to immovable property can be 
even more capital intensive than the investment in movable property. Thus, there is - 
in principle - no reason to qualify those services differently from the aforementioned 
services. However, as already outlined in earlier chapters, the taxing rights for the 
income from immovable property is, based on Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC, 
allocable to the state of source and not to the state of residence of the CSC. This is a 
result which is, at least as long as it refers to the interest component, in line with the 
                                            
20 IAS 17, paragraph 4.  
21 IAS 17, paragraphs 10, 11.  
22 IAS 17, paragraphs 20, 36.  
23 IAS 17, paragraph 25.  
24 IAS 17, paragraphs 4, 33 and 49.  
25 For example, in Germany the tax authorities issued an administrative circular which deals with the separation 
and the treatment of leasing activities (administrative circular of the Ministry of Finance, dated 19.04.1971 - VI 
B/2-S 2170-31/1, BStBl. 1971 I page 264). 
26 With respect to a finance lease, this is true for the service element (not for the transfer of property as such). 
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economic output created by another party. In my opinion, the fact that the activities 
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can be subject to a limited taxation at source in some states - although this is not 
provided for in Article 12 of the OECD-MTC. The leasing and renting activities which 
are related to tangible property are subject to tax, based on Article 7 of the OECD-
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9.3.3.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 
 
The leasing and renting activities which are related to immovable property can be 
even more capital intensive than the investment in movable property. Thus, there is - 
in principle - no reason to qualify those services differently from the aforementioned 
services. However, as already outlined in earlier chapters, the taxing rights for the 
income from immovable property is, based on Article 6 (1) of the OECD-MTC, 
allocable to the state of source and not to the state of residence of the CSC. This is a 
result which is, at least as long as it refers to the interest component, in line with the 
                                            
20 IAS 17, paragraph 4.  
21 IAS 17, paragraphs 10, 11.  
22 IAS 17, paragraphs 20, 36.  
23 IAS 17, paragraph 25.  
24 IAS 17, paragraphs 4, 33 and 49.  
25 For example, in Germany the tax authorities issued an administrative circular which deals with the separation 
and the treatment of leasing activities (administrative circular of the Ministry of Finance, dated 19.04.1971 - VI 
B/2-S 2170-31/1, BStBl. 1971 I page 264). 
26 With respect to a finance lease, this is true for the service element (not for the transfer of property as such). 
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however, would still provide the possibility of shifting “active” income, based on 
incorrect transfer prices, to low-tax states. Similar aspects would apply in case of an 
entity approach: it would either lead to a complete allocation of CFC income, which 
would neutralise the effect of profit shifting, or to a complete exemption from CFC 
taxation (“all-or-nothing”). In the latter case, the non-existence of transfer pricing rules 
would strongly support the profit shifting. It is therefore absolutely clear that transfer 
pricing principles support any anti-avoidance legislation, especially by providing a 
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Of course, this is also true for an alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is 
concentrated on the taxation of the basic interest component. It was already stated 
earlier that there can be a correlation between the complexity of functions and the 
portion of profit (or compensation) allocable to these functions. The higher the 
complexity, the more likely it is that the arm’s length profit share increases. In 
contrast, a rather simple and less complex function should lead to a lower profit share 
(or compensation). This should be true as long as it refers to the economic output 
created by personnel. Similar aspects apply to the taking over of risks: the higher the 
risks involved, the higher the premium which should cover these risks. In case of 
capital investments, it may be assumed that the interest component and the 
amortisation of the investments find expression in the prices for the services 
provided. Clearly, it may be the case that market prices exist which can make it 
impossible to allocate all of the cost components to the customers. However, in 
general, the supplier of services should be in a position - at least in the long run - to 
determine prices which cover all cost components and the entrepreneurial risks. 
What is important here is the fact that the economic output created in an inter-
company relationship is subject to verifications based on transfer pricing principles. 
Thus, the simple and less complex functions - which are usually easier to relocate to 
other states - can only lead to a relatively minor shifting of profits from one state to 
another. This is a clear and “natural” limitation provided by transfer pricing principles 
and requires, from my perspective, no additional support from any specific anti-
avoidance legislation. Therefore, if a company decides to relocate such inter-
company functions and to produce the respective income in another state, the 
income allocable to the latter state should be limited to the arm’s length portion of 
income. However, the profit which can be shifted to another state can be substantially 
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within the scope of the CSC rules because of the large extent of capital services and 
those which should be outside of the scope of the CSC rules because of the 
significant extent of other - non-capital service - activities. The latter aspect will be 
part of the section dealing with the exemption from CSC taxation.27    
 
9.3.3.7. The Combination of Different Activities 
 
It may be the case that the CSC carries on different types of activities and that the 
aforementioned tainted activities are accompanied by other - non-tainted - activities. 
In this case, a differentiation and separation between tainted and non-tainted 
activities is necessary in order to identify the basic interest component of the tainted 
activities. In any event, the extent of tainted activities carried on by the CSC cannot 
lead to an “infection” of the non-tainted activities. There is no need to change the 
classification of the activity just because of the fact that the CSC combines different 
activities within a single entity. This is a logical approach, in my opinion, if the system 
is not only based on the separation according to the type of income but also on the 
separation of income components (horizontal and vertical separation). The alternative 
anti-avoidance legislation must therefore provide for the possibility of a proper 
determination of the basic interest component.  
 
9.3.4. The Role of Transfer Pricing Principles 
 
It is obvious from the examinations made in previous chapters that transfer pricing 
rules cannot be a substitute for CFC legislation or comparable measures. The reason 
is that transfer pricing rules, in substance, focus on appropriate income allocation 
among related parties - based on the arm’s length principle - in order to ensure that 
the parties involved receive a compensation (or receive a profit share) which is 
comparable to those in a third party relationship. The transfer pricing rules therefore 
mainly concentrate on the transactions itself and do not deal with the subsequent 
utilisation of income (only to the extent that the income is again utilised for the 
generation of new income - and is therefore again part of a transaction). However, 
the question whether the income, once earned, may be distributed to the shareholder 
or retained on the level of the corporation is usually not an issue which is of 
importance from a transfer pricing perspective. The same is true for the question 
whether the taxing rights for a specific part of the income should be allocable - from 
an equity perspective or an economic perspective - to another state. Hence, if the 
services provided by the CSC to related parties are remunerated appropriately, i.e. in 
the same way as in case of unrelated parties, the transfer pricing requirements are 
fulfilled.  
 
Nonetheless, transfer pricing rules are of utmost importance as a supporting element 
for an alternative anti-avoidance legislation. The theoretical non-existence of transfer 
pricing rules - and in particular the arm’s length principle - would most likely have the 
effect that multinational groups would try to allocate a higher portion of income to low-
tax states to the detriment of high-tax states. Clearly, an approach which focuses on 
the total and current allocation of foreign income neutralises such an effect. However, 
even the far-reaching existing CFC rules cannot completely compensate the effect of 
the (theoretical) non-existence of transfer pricing rules. The reason is that the CFC 
rules which follow a transactional approach focus on “passive” income. This, 
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9.3.5.1.2. The Appropriate Benchmark 
 
Pursuant to the definition stipulated in previous chapters, the basic interest 
component should encompass the actual real interest rate and the actual inflation 
rate on a “rolling” basis, i.e. on the basis of permanent adjustments. The basic 
interest component should therefore not encompass credit risks, liquidity risks and 
expectations related to the future development of interest and inflation rates. If the 
basic interest component shall be the decisive element for a current taxation of 
income, it is important to clarify how - and on which basis - the component can be 
established. From my perspective, there are different possibilities to create a link 
between the basic interest rate (as a rate for the current attribution of income) and an 
existing market rate. 
 
a.) Short-term state bonds with highest rating category 
 
One possibility can be the reference to the yield of short-term state bonds with the 
highest rating category within the investment grade. This would be a short-term rating 
of, for example, A-1+ (Standard & Poor’s), F1+ (Fitch) and P-1 (Moody’s) as well as a 
long-term rating of AAA (Standard & Poor’s / Fitch) and Aaa (Moody’s), 
respectively.28 Of course, even the highest rating category is not completely free of 
any risk and irrational market developments.29 The influence of irrational market 
developments can be reduced if the rate is not determined on a specific day, but is 
determined as an average of a certain period (e.g. month) and, in addition, is linked 
to an index instead of a concrete (single) state bond. The latter would also avoid, or 
at least reduce, any effects of (possible) illiquidity.  
 
b.) Interbank money-market rates  
 
Another possibility can be the link to interbank money-market rates, such as the 
Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate).30 The Euribor is the rate at which euro 
interbank term deposits within the euro zone are offered by one prime bank to 
another prime bank. The banks which are included in the Euribor panel must be 
banks of first class credit standing, high ethical standards and excellent reputation.31 
The Euribor is determined on a daily basis32 and contains a significant number of 
quotes. For the determination of the rate, the highest and lowest 15 percent of the 
quotes are eliminated and the remaining quotes will be averaged and rounded to 
three decimal places. The offers (quotes) are made for one to three weeks and one 
                                            
28 See with respect to the different categories of the major rating agencies in the internet: 
http://www.standardandpoors.com, http://www.fitchratings.com and http://www.moodys.com. 
29 The risk in the highest rating category is substantially reduced but not completely eliminated. There is always 
a potential risk that the (economic) situation becomes worse with the effect that the rating of a given state will be 
downgraded. The latter, of course, results in an increase in interest spreads (higher risks) and may lead to market 
irritations. The most prominent examples from the recent past in Europe are Spain, Portugal and Greece (see 
Bloomberg, Spain’s Rating Downgraded to Aa2 by Moody’s Over Bank Cost Concerns, March 10, 2011; BBC 
News - Business, Portugal Hit by Debt Downgrade from Ratings Agency, March 16, 2011; The Guardian, 
Financial Markets Tumble After Fitch Downgrades Greece’s Credit Rating, December 8, 2009; Reuters, S&P 
Downgrades Greece Rating, Says May Cut Again, March 29, 2011.). Even the United States of America are 
affected by discussions and announcements with respect to a potential downgrade in the future (see Money 
Morning, Does the United States Still Deserve its “AAA” Credit Rating?, April 11, 2011; The Washington Post, 
Standard & Poor’s Financial Storm Warning, April 19, 2011).  
30 See in this respect also http://www.euribor.org.  
31 See article 1 of the Euribor Code of Conduct.  
32 Of course, with the exception of weekends and bank holidays.  
   
 
increased by providing capital services or capital intensive services. The reason is 
that the arm’s length considerations require a compensation for the capital invested 
or granted. The higher the capital provided, the higher the compensation. The rather 
simple and less complex functions can therefore lead to high profit allocations if 
substantial amounts of capital are involved. Also in this case, the transfer pricing 
rules can have a restrictive effect, but they cannot (and basically should not) avoid - 
as already stated above - that an arm’s length interest component is allocable to the 
state of the service company, just because of the fact that a substantial amount of 
capital is invested or granted.  
 
9.3.5. The Separation of Income   
 
Under the existing CFC rules it is in most cases the actual amount of income (in case 
of the transactional approach it is the actual amount of tainted income) which is 
determined according to the tax legislation of the state which applies the CFC rules. 
This leads to the result that - once determined as allocable CFC income - all of the 
income components are subject to domestic taxation, i.e. a vertical separation of 
income does not take place. I have already outlined earlier that, in my opinion, such 
an approach is neither in line with equity and economic principles, nor with the idea 
and the concept of an internal market. In my view, the latter aspects require a current 
allocation to be strictly limited to the income component which is not produced by the 
CFC and which may otherwise, i.e. without a current taxation, attract capital in a non-
efficient manner. However, one of the decisive questions is how to separate the 
income component which should be taxed on a current basis from those income 
components which should be outside of the system of current taxation.  
 
9.3.5.1. The Basic Interest Component 
 
9.3.5.1.1. General Aspects 
 
Based on the earlier examinations, the basic interest component can be seen as the 
element which may be achieved by the investor as a minimum compensation, i.e. an 
investment without taking any relevant credit risks and any additional inflation and 
liquidity risks. The separation of the basic interest component from the other 
components could be made by a (separate) valuation of all components included in 
the income stream of the CSC, or by calculating a certain percentage on the amount 
of capital which is provided by the CSC to another party. The first alternative, i.e. the 
valuation of all of the separate components, would be, in my opinion, a quite 
complicated and unpractical approach. It presupposes that the separate components 
can be properly estimated and the basic interest component can be identified 
appropriately. However, such an approach would only partially be supported by 
transfer pricing principles since those rules typically focus on the total amount of 
income related to a certain transaction and not on the single income components 
included. Hence, I do not think that such an approach can be an appropriate basis for 
an alternative anti-avoidance legislation, especially if the system is to be structured 
as simple as possible and is not to be more complicated than the existing CFC 
regimes. The second alternative, i.e. the calculation of a certain percentage on the 
amount of capital investment, “ignores” the other components. In principle, such an 
approach avoids any complicated separation of income but requires the 
determination of an interest rate which reflects the basic interest component. In this 
case, an appropriate benchmark is required. 
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as simple as possible and is not to be more complicated than the existing CFC 
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purpose of earning positive income in the CSC state without any genuine risk for the 
CSC, there would be no necessity to provide for an exclusive taxation in the CSC 
state. In this respect, I am referring to the fact that other group companies (in a 
multinational structure) may step in to take over the risk if it turns out that the risk 
becomes reality and before it leads to losses of the CSC. From a tax planning 
perspective it can, of course, be attractive to earn the positive income in the low-tax 
state and to deduct the negative income from the tax base in the high-tax state. The 
difficulty is - from an anti-avoidance perspective - that it is unclear whether the group 
follows such a plan of relieving the CSC from the potential risk until a restructuring 
takes place and the risk becomes reality. For this reason, it is quite obvious that the 
state which applies a CSC regime has to have an accompanying transfer pricing 
legislation and other legislation which avoid a situation which allows the taxpayers to 
replace functions and transfer risks without triggering the corresponding tax 
implications.35 To put it more precisely, if - for example - a domestic group company 
replaces the non-resident CSC - which acts as a finance company (loan provider) - in 
a situation in which the borrower comes into financial difficulties, it is apparent that 
the transfer has to be made on an arm’s length basis. This should lead to the 
consequence that the transfer does not only have to be compensated appropriately 
(e.g. guarantee payments, increased interest rates) but, depending on the situation, 
might even result in a non-deductibility of the subsequent losses in case of a default. 
Again, these are flanking transfer pricing and anti-avoidance measures in order to 
prevent the undermining of the CSC regime (and other domestic legislation).  
 
9.3.5.3. The Activity Component (Related to the Services) 
 
Based on the earlier examinations, there is no reason whatsoever for a current 
attribution of the portion of income to the shareholder which is related to an activity 
physically conducted in the state of the CSC. This was already outlined above in 
some detail. A concept which is limited to the current taxation of the basic interest 
component provides, essentially, for the possibility of taxing the risk component 
related to the capital investment and the income related to the service activity in the 
state where the activity is carried on and not - on a current basis - in the state of the 
shareholder in the CSC.  
 
9.3.6. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income 
 
An important question which has to be clarified is the question to whom the income 
should be currently attributed. In general, the existing CFC rules most often attribute 
the income to the lowest domestic (group) level, i.e. not necessarily to the individual 
(ultimate) domestic shareholder but rather to the domestic subsidiary company which 
holds the shares in the CFC directly or indirectly through the interposition of other 
non-resident companies. In those cases, the domestic legal entity leads to a kind of 
“sheltering” from immediate taxation in the hands of the individual shareholder. Of 
course, from an anti-avoidance perspective one could take the position that it is 
sufficient to attribute the income to the domestic legal entity in order to ensure that it 
is taxed according to domestic tax rules and that the domestic corporate income tax 
rate is imposed on the respective income. In this case, the subsequent taxation on 
the level of the individual shareholder solely depends on the decision of the 
distribution of the retained earnings to the resident shareholder. However, such an 
                                            
35 This is equally true for the application of a CFC regime.  
   
 
to twelve months. Based on the daily rates, a monthly average (based on the daily 
rates) will be calculated and determined as well. The Euribor has the advantage that 
a high number of quotes are included and the rate therefore reflects - to the greatest 
possible extent - the market conditions. Moreover, the risks involved in the rates for 
one to three weeks are substantially reduced. However, it is clear that the rates are 
not completely free of risks and should, therefore, be slightly higher, in average, than 
the rates which are based on an index of highest quality state bonds with a 
comparable term.  
 
c.) Basic rates of the European Central Bank 
 
In principle, it is also possible to refer to one of the basic rates determined by the 
European Central Bank, i.e. the main refinancing operations minimum bid rate, the 
marginal lending facility or the deposit facility.33 The main disadvantage of the rates 
determined by the European Central Bank is the fact that the rates are not 
determined on a daily basis, but on a less regular basis.34   
 
d.) Solution  
 
It is important to bring together the requirements based on economic and equity 
principles and the anti-avoidance aspects - also with respect to practicability. It would 
be hardly manageable to determine the rate for the current taxation of income on a 
daily or weekly basis. Even the monthly determination would be quite unpractical. 
Here, I think it would make more sense to make a “compromise” and to determine the 
rate in advance for the whole financial year. This means, however, that the rate which 
is based on such a compromise must include some expectations, e.g. with respect to 
the development of the interest and inflation rate.  
 
In my opinion, a practical approach could be the focus on the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the financial year for 
which the basic interest rate should be applicable. For example, if the financial year is 
equal to the calendar year, the average rate of the month of December will be 
applicable for the whole subsequent financial year. The Euribor rate has the 
advantage that it is based on a substantial number of quotes - and reflects therefore 
the market interest rate. Moreover, the Euribor is often used, in practice, as a basis 
for the determination of interest rates in loan agreements and similar agreements. 
For this reason, it seems to me that such an approach does not give away too much 
from the basic economic and equity principles and, at the same time, retains the 
elements of an efficient anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation.   
  
9.3.5.2. The Risk Component (Related to the Capital Investment) 
 
The income which is related to the risk component is certainly a difficult element from 
an anti-avoidance perspective. The problem lies in the fact that the income which is 
related to the risk component should be exempt from any current taxation in the state 
of the shareholder if an actual risk is taken over by the CSC which must be 
compensated for. However, if the situation is just artificial, i.e. merely created for the 
                                            
33 See the ECB website for further details (www.ecb.int).  
34 The frequency of historical interest rate adjustments is presented on the aforementioned ECB website. The 
number of adjustments per year (and category) in the period 1999-2010 ranges from only one adjustment to 
seven adjustments.   
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9.3.6. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income 
 
An important question which has to be clarified is the question to whom the income 
should be currently attributed. In general, the existing CFC rules most often attribute 
the income to the lowest domestic (group) level, i.e. not necessarily to the individual 
(ultimate) domestic shareholder but rather to the domestic subsidiary company which 
holds the shares in the CFC directly or indirectly through the interposition of other 
non-resident companies. In those cases, the domestic legal entity leads to a kind of 
“sheltering” from immediate taxation in the hands of the individual shareholder. Of 
course, from an anti-avoidance perspective one could take the position that it is 
sufficient to attribute the income to the domestic legal entity in order to ensure that it 
is taxed according to domestic tax rules and that the domestic corporate income tax 
rate is imposed on the respective income. In this case, the subsequent taxation on 
the level of the individual shareholder solely depends on the decision of the 
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Here, I think it would make more sense to make a “compromise” and to determine the 
rate in advance for the whole financial year. This means, however, that the rate which 
is based on such a compromise must include some expectations, e.g. with respect to 
the development of the interest and inflation rate.  
 
In my opinion, a practical approach could be the focus on the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the financial year for 
which the basic interest rate should be applicable. For example, if the financial year is 
equal to the calendar year, the average rate of the month of December will be 
applicable for the whole subsequent financial year. The Euribor rate has the 
advantage that it is based on a substantial number of quotes - and reflects therefore 
the market interest rate. Moreover, the Euribor is often used, in practice, as a basis 
for the determination of interest rates in loan agreements and similar agreements. 
For this reason, it seems to me that such an approach does not give away too much 
from the basic economic and equity principles and, at the same time, retains the 
elements of an efficient anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation.   
  
9.3.5.2. The Risk Component (Related to the Capital Investment) 
 
The income which is related to the risk component is certainly a difficult element from 
an anti-avoidance perspective. The problem lies in the fact that the income which is 
related to the risk component should be exempt from any current taxation in the state 
of the shareholder if an actual risk is taken over by the CSC which must be 
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(1) Indirect shareholding of individual A in companies B and C (through intermediate companies). 
(2) Financing, leasing, renting and / or licensing services provided by company C to company B.  
(3) Allocation of the basic interest component.  
 
If the basic interest income is generally allocable to the ultimate domestic - individual 
or juridical - taxpayer, it does not make any difference whether the participation in the 
CSC is held directly through the individual shareholder A or indirectly through the 
interposition of resident or non-resident legal entities. Theoretically, if the participation 
in the CSC is held through a domestic permanent establishment of a non-resident 
individual or non-resident corporation, the income may also be allocable to the 
domestic permanent establishment.  
 
9.3.7. The Application to Permanent Establishments and Transparent Entities?  
 
It is obvious that any type of “anti-deferral” legislation (CFC regimes or alternative 
anti-avoidance legislation) should foremost concentrate on legal entities which 
provide the possibility of sheltering the income derived from tainted activities. Apart 
from possible classification conflicts, it is a common approach that legal entities are 
considered separate taxpayers and are therefore non-transparent for income tax 
purposes. In contrast thereto, the treatment of income which is derived directly 
through the domestic taxpayer in another state is dependent on several factors. An 
effect which is similar to the sheltering of income may only be achieved if the income 
is derived through a permanent establishment (or transparent partnership), i.e. is 
actually attributable to the PE (or transparent PS), and the exemption method is 
applied for the avoidance of double taxation instead of the credit method. The latter 
method would, of course, have the effect of an immediate taxation of the tainted 
income according to the tax rules and the tax rate of the state of residence. It was 
outlined in previous chapters that the allocation of tainted property to the foreign PE 
can be more difficult than the allocation to a separate legal entity. This is particularly 
true for tainted activities which might be seen as “core functions” of the head office if 
the residence state does not agree with the allocation to the foreign PE. However, 
even if the tainted property is allocated to the PE, the income may be taxed in the 
residence state either under the regular system (e.g. in the United Kingdom) or based 
on domestic or treaty rules which require a switch-over from the exemption method to 
the credit method under certain circumstances (e.g. the activity clauses in the 
German double tax conventions).38 The avoidance aspect in case of permanent 
establishments (and transparent partnerships) can therefore be less important - at 
least in some of the Member States - compared to the investment in legal entities. 
This, however, is only true as long as it is the domestic taxpayer who (directly) carries 
on an activity which leads to a permanent establishment or who (directly) participates 
in a transparent partnership. In contrast thereto, the PE/PS of a subsidiary company, 
i.e. of a different taxpayer, may create similar anti-avoidance concerns like the 





                                            
38 With respect to the German activity clauses see, inter alia, Wassermeyer, Der Wirrwarr mit den 
Aktivitätsklauseln im deutschen Abkommensrecht, Internationales Steuerrecht 2000, page 65 et seq.  
   
 
approach overlooks the fact that the basic interest component is - by definition - 
strongly connected to the capital investments made by the different shareholders on 
the different group levels. It is obvious, especially from an equity perspective, that an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation should focus on the ultimate domestic 
shareholder and should by no means be restricted to the direct shareholder. Such an 
approach encompasses, therefore, the individual shareholders and the corporate 
shareholders (e.g. if the shareholders of the legal entity are non-residents) as well as 
permanent establishments (in case the shares are allocable to the domestic 
permanent establishment) and partnerships. Essentially, such a system allocates the 
risk-free interest component to the ultimate domestic shareholder within a chain of 
corporations or a chain of corporations and individuals (or partnerships).36 It is as if 
the domestic taxpayer had granted the capital investment (in whatever form) directly 
to the respective recipient of the services, but without taking any additional risks. This 
is exactly what the system wants to achieve: the taxation of the basic interest 
component - nothing more, nothing less. All of the other income elements should be 
taxable on the lower levels - either where they are produced or where the risk is 
taken directly (i.e. has the direct “tax effect”). In principle, it is not relevant how many 
(group) levels are interposed between the shareholder who is subject to the current 
taxation of income and the legal entity which derives the tainted income. The 
uninterrupted application to all (domestic) participants in the line of shareholding 
ensures the optimal effect from an anti-avoidance perspective.37 This will be 
illustrated below where the credit system is outlined in detail. Moreover, such an 
approach may be of particular importance if permanent establishments and 
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(1) Indirect shareholding of individual A in companies B and C (through intermediate companies). 
(2) Financing, leasing, renting and / or licensing services provided by company C to company B.  
(3) Allocation of the basic interest component.  
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anti-avoidance legislation) should foremost concentrate on legal entities which 
provide the possibility of sheltering the income derived from tainted activities. Apart 
from possible classification conflicts, it is a common approach that legal entities are 
considered separate taxpayers and are therefore non-transparent for income tax 
purposes. In contrast thereto, the treatment of income which is derived directly 
through the domestic taxpayer in another state is dependent on several factors. An 
effect which is similar to the sheltering of income may only be achieved if the income 
is derived through a permanent establishment (or transparent partnership), i.e. is 
actually attributable to the PE (or transparent PS), and the exemption method is 
applied for the avoidance of double taxation instead of the credit method. The latter 
method would, of course, have the effect of an immediate taxation of the tainted 
income according to the tax rules and the tax rate of the state of residence. It was 
outlined in previous chapters that the allocation of tainted property to the foreign PE 
can be more difficult than the allocation to a separate legal entity. This is particularly 
true for tainted activities which might be seen as “core functions” of the head office if 
the residence state does not agree with the allocation to the foreign PE. However, 
even if the tainted property is allocated to the PE, the income may be taxed in the 
residence state either under the regular system (e.g. in the United Kingdom) or based 
on domestic or treaty rules which require a switch-over from the exemption method to 
the credit method under certain circumstances (e.g. the activity clauses in the 
German double tax conventions).38 The avoidance aspect in case of permanent 
establishments (and transparent partnerships) can therefore be less important - at 
least in some of the Member States - compared to the investment in legal entities. 
This, however, is only true as long as it is the domestic taxpayer who (directly) carries 
on an activity which leads to a permanent establishment or who (directly) participates 
in a transparent partnership. In contrast thereto, the PE/PS of a subsidiary company, 
i.e. of a different taxpayer, may create similar anti-avoidance concerns like the 
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approach overlooks the fact that the basic interest component is - by definition - 
strongly connected to the capital investments made by the different shareholders on 
the different group levels. It is obvious, especially from an equity perspective, that an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation should focus on the ultimate domestic 
shareholder and should by no means be restricted to the direct shareholder. Such an 
approach encompasses, therefore, the individual shareholders and the corporate 
shareholders (e.g. if the shareholders of the legal entity are non-residents) as well as 
permanent establishments (in case the shares are allocable to the domestic 
permanent establishment) and partnerships. Essentially, such a system allocates the 
risk-free interest component to the ultimate domestic shareholder within a chain of 
corporations or a chain of corporations and individuals (or partnerships).36 It is as if 
the domestic taxpayer had granted the capital investment (in whatever form) directly 
to the respective recipient of the services, but without taking any additional risks. This 
is exactly what the system wants to achieve: the taxation of the basic interest 
component - nothing more, nothing less. All of the other income elements should be 
taxable on the lower levels - either where they are produced or where the risk is 
taken directly (i.e. has the direct “tax effect”). In principle, it is not relevant how many 
(group) levels are interposed between the shareholder who is subject to the current 
taxation of income and the legal entity which derives the tainted income. The 
uninterrupted application to all (domestic) participants in the line of shareholding 
ensures the optimal effect from an anti-avoidance perspective.37 This will be 
illustrated below where the credit system is outlined in detail. Moreover, such an 
approach may be of particular importance if permanent establishments and 
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PE (or a transparent PS). Nevertheless, such an approach must find expression in 
the respective double tax conventions and should not unilaterally be implemented as 
an exception to the exemption of income. Overall, it may be concluded that even 
though economic and equity principles support the application of the basic interest 
taxation in the aforementioned situations, there is, in principle, the requirement of a 
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In this example, a subsidiary company (company C) is interposed between company 
A and the PE in state C (alternative 3) and state D (alternative 4), respectively. This 
is an important deviation from the previous example since company A and company 
C are different taxpayers. Here, the activities carried on through the PE in state C 
and state D are connected to company C and are, therefore, separated from 
company A. The non-identity of the taxpayers opens the possibility for the application 
of the basic interest taxation to the tainted activities of company C - with or without a 
PE - and normally without any infringement of the double tax convention concluded 
between the two states.39 In other words, the basic interest component connected to 
the tainted activities of company C in state C and state D may be subject to current 
allocation to the shareholders in state A. Of course, the procedure may be more 
difficult if the tainted activity is split over two different states (alternative 4), but this 
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From the perspective of company A, the purely domestic situation (alternative 1) 
normally leads to a consolidated taxation of company A which encompasses the 
income of the company including the portion which is derived through the permanent 
establishment - at least for corporate income tax purposes. The cross-border 
constellation (alternative 2) strongly depends, as described above, on the general 
approach of state A regarding the allocation of tainted property (and therefore tainted 
income) and the method of eliminating double taxation. If state A applies the credit 
method for the avoidance of double taxation, the income of the PE will be subject to 
domestic taxation. In contrast thereto, if state A accepts the allocation of tainted 
property to the other state and applies the exemption method for the avoidance of 
double taxation, the effect would be similar to the sheltering of income in case of a 
separate legal entity. If the exemption of income in the latter situation is based on the 
double tax convention concluded between state A and state C, any attribution of 
income to the first-mentioned state based on specific domestic (anti-avoidance) 
legislation - which basically leads to the (partial) application of the credit method 
instead of the exemption method - would not be in line with the respective double tax 
convention and would finally result in a tax treaty override. In my opinion, this would 
not only be true for the actual (tainted) income derived by the PE but would be 
equally relevant for any basic interest component which, essentially, represents part 
of the total income derived by the PE. In general, the argumentation for the 
application of the basic interest approach and the principles outlined in previous 
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double taxation, the effect would be similar to the sheltering of income in case of a 
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income to the first-mentioned state based on specific domestic (anti-avoidance) 
legislation - which basically leads to the (partial) application of the credit method 
instead of the exemption method - would not be in line with the respective double tax 
convention and would finally result in a tax treaty override. In my opinion, this would 
not only be true for the actual (tainted) income derived by the PE but would be 
equally relevant for any basic interest component which, essentially, represents part 
of the total income derived by the PE. In general, the argumentation for the 
application of the basic interest approach and the principles outlined in previous 













   
 
in a position - if necessary against the votes of all other shareholders - to decide on 
the management of the company and therefore influence the business activities. He 
may have access to all the information related to the company and its activities and 
can decide whether the company distributes its profits to the shareholders or not. For 
this reason, it is apparent from an anti-avoidance perspective that the shareholder 
with voting rights of more than 50 percent should be subject to current taxation.40 If 
the percentage of voting rights differs from the percentage of shareholding in a way 
that only the shareholding is more than 50 percent (and the voting rights are equal to 
50 percent or less than 50 percent), this should be equally sufficient for the question 
of income allocation. Even though the shareholder has, in this particular situation, not 
the same degree of influence, the majority in the equity of the company reflects a 
substantial capital investment (in relation to the overall investment). Essentially, it is 
the capital investment which is the basis for earning the risk-free interest component 
and it should therefore be considered to be an equally important factor - despite the 
limited influence in this situation. The problem is, however, that such a high threshold 
provides more possibilities of avoiding the application of the anti-avoidance rules, e.g. 
by splitting the shareholding 50:50 with another party. Of course, international groups 
would prefer to have wholly owned subsidiary service companies instead of joint 
ventures with unrelated parties for the provision of financial or other services. The 
majority requirement would therefore certainly encompass a substantial number of 
investments. However, the existing CFC rules within the European Union show that 
the majority requirement is rather exceptional. That means, in most of the Member 
States there is either a lower threshold or other - alternative - criteria exist which may 
trigger the application of the respective CFC rules.41  
 
9.3.8.2. The Non-Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding 
 
In principle, there is a difference between 50 percent voting rights (or shareholding) 
and a percentage below 50 percent. The 50 percent threshold requires a consensus 
between two 50:50 shareholders (or a particular group of shareholders) and therefore 
confers a more important position than minority rights, i.e. a percentage below 50 
percent. However, the 50 percent shareholder cannot - under all circumstances - 
enforce his position. The influence itself naturally decreases with the percentage of 
voting rights (and / or shareholding) in the company. Any percentage which is below 
50 percent allows, theoretically, that another shareholder (or a particular group of 
shareholders) may act - at least to a certain extent - against the position of the 
minority shareholder. However, the question is whether this is of any significance for 
the current taxation of income. In contrast to the existing CFC rules, the proposed 
alternative legislation will be applicable, if certain conditions are fulfilled, to income 
which is derived by resident and non-resident companies. The restrictive effect which 
may be caused by the allocation of income is therefore equally burdensome for 
shareholders in resident and non-resident companies. This is, as described 
separately, an important prerequisite from an EU law perspective. In addition, the 
focus on the basic interest component - instead of passive income, base company 
income et cetera - should be in line with the ability-to-pay principle as well. However, 
                                            
40 In this case it is required, though, that there is any interest in the respective entity (taking into account also 
constructive ownership rules). Clearly, in case of more than 50 percent voting rights it is rather unlikely that 
there is no (direct or indirect) interest in the respective entity. But from a theoretical standpoint the current 
taxation of income requires an interest in the CSC (otherwise no capital  would be invested by the respective 
person which produces an interest component and which could be allocated to this person).  
41 See chapter 6 for more details to the ownership requirement in the Member States.  
   
 
should not be examined in further detail at this point in time since the practical 
aspects of such a legislation will be outlined below. 
 
From the perspective of the individual shareholder A, the activities carried on through 
the PE are in all four alternatives connected to separate taxpayers, namely company 
A (alternatives 1 and 2) and company C (alternatives 3 and 4). Therefore, if an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation not only focuses on the direct shareholder in the 
resident or non-resident company which carries on the tainted activities, but also on 
the indirect shareholder, there should not be an obstacle for an income allocation 
caused by the double tax convention concluded between state A and state C. Thus, 
a basic interest taxation which is based on the tainted activity of company A and its 
PE activities in state C (alternative 2) should not result in a tax treaty override as long 
as the allocation is limited to the individual shareholder A (a separate taxpayer) and 
does not encompass company A (one and the same taxpayer). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the strict focus on legal entities should also encompass the activities 
of these legal entities carried on by permanent establishments - irrespective of the 
group level. In the alternatives above, this ensures a consistent allocation of the 
basic interest component to the individual shareholder A (in all four alternatives) and 
to company A (in alternatives 3 and 4). Hence, what must be excluded from the 
current allocation to the shareholder is the income which is explicitly exempt from 
domestic taxation on the basis of a double tax convention. This prevents state A from 
taxing the income of the permanent establishment in the hands of company A in 
alternative 2. Overall, it can be concluded that the inclusion of the indirect (ultimate) 
domestic shareholder in the basic interest taxation extends the application of the anti-
avoidance approach to “indirect” permanent establishments and the indirect 
participation in transparent entities. This ensures that constellations are covered by 
the proposed anti-avoidance legislation which can have a comparable effect like the 
“income sheltering” of legal entities, but without resulting in an infringement of the 
double tax conventions (tax treaty override).  
 
9.3.8. The Percentage of Voting Rights or Shareholding 
 
On the one hand, it is clear from the previous chapters that there is no need from an 
economic and equity perspective to provide for a certain minimum participation in 
order to apply a system which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. On the other hand, it seems that it is not necessarily required from an 
anti-avoidance perspective nor feasible from an administrative perspective to allocate 
the basic interest component to each and every shareholder, no matter how small the 
percentage of participation in the company actually is. Of course, a certain minimum 
percentage of voting rights or shareholding opens the possibility of avoiding the 
application of the rules by holding a percentage slightly below the threshold. For this 
reason, it is important to find a balance between a minimum threshold from an anti-
avoidance perspective and the acceptable threshold from an administrative 
perspective.  
 
9.3.8.1. The Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding  
 
The requirement of majority voting rights or, alternatively, majority shareholding is 
certainly the “maximum threshold,” i.e. there is - at least from my perspective - no 
reason to apply a higher threshold than a majority threshold. A shareholder with 
voting rights of more than 50 percent has a decisive influence on the company. He is 
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in a position - if necessary against the votes of all other shareholders - to decide on 
the management of the company and therefore influence the business activities. He 
may have access to all the information related to the company and its activities and 
can decide whether the company distributes its profits to the shareholders or not. For 
this reason, it is apparent from an anti-avoidance perspective that the shareholder 
with voting rights of more than 50 percent should be subject to current taxation.40 If 
the percentage of voting rights differs from the percentage of shareholding in a way 
that only the shareholding is more than 50 percent (and the voting rights are equal to 
50 percent or less than 50 percent), this should be equally sufficient for the question 
of income allocation. Even though the shareholder has, in this particular situation, not 
the same degree of influence, the majority in the equity of the company reflects a 
substantial capital investment (in relation to the overall investment). Essentially, it is 
the capital investment which is the basis for earning the risk-free interest component 
and it should therefore be considered to be an equally important factor - despite the 
limited influence in this situation. The problem is, however, that such a high threshold 
provides more possibilities of avoiding the application of the anti-avoidance rules, e.g. 
by splitting the shareholding 50:50 with another party. Of course, international groups 
would prefer to have wholly owned subsidiary service companies instead of joint 
ventures with unrelated parties for the provision of financial or other services. The 
majority requirement would therefore certainly encompass a substantial number of 
investments. However, the existing CFC rules within the European Union show that 
the majority requirement is rather exceptional. That means, in most of the Member 
States there is either a lower threshold or other - alternative - criteria exist which may 
trigger the application of the respective CFC rules.41  
 
9.3.8.2. The Non-Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding 
 
In principle, there is a difference between 50 percent voting rights (or shareholding) 
and a percentage below 50 percent. The 50 percent threshold requires a consensus 
between two 50:50 shareholders (or a particular group of shareholders) and therefore 
confers a more important position than minority rights, i.e. a percentage below 50 
percent. However, the 50 percent shareholder cannot - under all circumstances - 
enforce his position. The influence itself naturally decreases with the percentage of 
voting rights (and / or shareholding) in the company. Any percentage which is below 
50 percent allows, theoretically, that another shareholder (or a particular group of 
shareholders) may act - at least to a certain extent - against the position of the 
minority shareholder. However, the question is whether this is of any significance for 
the current taxation of income. In contrast to the existing CFC rules, the proposed 
alternative legislation will be applicable, if certain conditions are fulfilled, to income 
which is derived by resident and non-resident companies. The restrictive effect which 
may be caused by the allocation of income is therefore equally burdensome for 
shareholders in resident and non-resident companies. This is, as described 
separately, an important prerequisite from an EU law perspective. In addition, the 
focus on the basic interest component - instead of passive income, base company 
income et cetera - should be in line with the ability-to-pay principle as well. However, 
                                            
40 In this case it is required, though, that there is any interest in the respective entity (taking into account also 
constructive ownership rules). Clearly, in case of more than 50 percent voting rights it is rather unlikely that 
there is no (direct or indirect) interest in the respective entity. But from a theoretical standpoint the current 
taxation of income requires an interest in the CSC (otherwise no capital  would be invested by the respective 
person which produces an interest component and which could be allocated to this person).  
41 See chapter 6 for more details to the ownership requirement in the Member States.  
   
 
should not be examined in further detail at this point in time since the practical 
aspects of such a legislation will be outlined below. 
 
From the perspective of the individual shareholder A, the activities carried on through 
the PE are in all four alternatives connected to separate taxpayers, namely company 
A (alternatives 1 and 2) and company C (alternatives 3 and 4). Therefore, if an 
alternative anti-avoidance legislation not only focuses on the direct shareholder in the 
resident or non-resident company which carries on the tainted activities, but also on 
the indirect shareholder, there should not be an obstacle for an income allocation 
caused by the double tax convention concluded between state A and state C. Thus, 
a basic interest taxation which is based on the tainted activity of company A and its 
PE activities in state C (alternative 2) should not result in a tax treaty override as long 
as the allocation is limited to the individual shareholder A (a separate taxpayer) and 
does not encompass company A (one and the same taxpayer). Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the strict focus on legal entities should also encompass the activities 
of these legal entities carried on by permanent establishments - irrespective of the 
group level. In the alternatives above, this ensures a consistent allocation of the 
basic interest component to the individual shareholder A (in all four alternatives) and 
to company A (in alternatives 3 and 4). Hence, what must be excluded from the 
current allocation to the shareholder is the income which is explicitly exempt from 
domestic taxation on the basis of a double tax convention. This prevents state A from 
taxing the income of the permanent establishment in the hands of company A in 
alternative 2. Overall, it can be concluded that the inclusion of the indirect (ultimate) 
domestic shareholder in the basic interest taxation extends the application of the anti-
avoidance approach to “indirect” permanent establishments and the indirect 
participation in transparent entities. This ensures that constellations are covered by 
the proposed anti-avoidance legislation which can have a comparable effect like the 
“income sheltering” of legal entities, but without resulting in an infringement of the 
double tax conventions (tax treaty override).  
 
9.3.8. The Percentage of Voting Rights or Shareholding 
 
On the one hand, it is clear from the previous chapters that there is no need from an 
economic and equity perspective to provide for a certain minimum participation in 
order to apply a system which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. On the other hand, it seems that it is not necessarily required from an 
anti-avoidance perspective nor feasible from an administrative perspective to allocate 
the basic interest component to each and every shareholder, no matter how small the 
percentage of participation in the company actually is. Of course, a certain minimum 
percentage of voting rights or shareholding opens the possibility of avoiding the 
application of the rules by holding a percentage slightly below the threshold. For this 
reason, it is important to find a balance between a minimum threshold from an anti-
avoidance perspective and the acceptable threshold from an administrative 
perspective.  
 
9.3.8.1. The Majority Voting Rights or Shareholding  
 
The requirement of majority voting rights or, alternatively, majority shareholding is 
certainly the “maximum threshold,” i.e. there is - at least from my perspective - no 
reason to apply a higher threshold than a majority threshold. A shareholder with 
voting rights of more than 50 percent has a decisive influence on the company. He is 
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least not against the position of the majority shareholders - is not decisive in this 
respect.   
 
9.3.8.3. The Application of a Financial Threshold  
 
The question may be raised whether the 25 percent rule should be the only decisive 
threshold in situations in which the shareholder invested a substantial amount of 
capital in the company but without holding the required percentage of shares. 
Clearly, the actual influence (not necessarily the legal influence) achieved by an 
investment of 10,000,000 Euro is most likely greater than in case of an investment of 
10,000 Euro, even if the percentage of shareholding may be the same in both 
cases.46 The same is true for the effect of such an investment in a low-tax state (or 
even a tax haven). The financial advantage of sheltering (interest) income which is 
related to 10,000,000 Euro of capital investment is, of course, much greater than in 
case of 10,000 Euro of capital investment. One might be tempted to agree that the 
amount of investment - and not only the percentage of investment - should have an 
influence on the decision whether or not the tainted activity should be subject to 
current taxation. However, it should not be overlooked that any actual influence which 
may be achieved by a higher amount of investment cannot really be measured 
appropriately. It has always to be seen in the overall context. The aforementioned 
10,000,000 Euro investment in a publicly listed multinational company may confer 
less shareholder rights than the 10,000 Euro investment in a small company. 
However, the possibility of gathering all the necessary information for the application 
of the proposed alternative anti-avoidance legislation is crucial. The reference to a 25 
percent shareholding ensures that the investment of the respective shareholder is 
always seen in the overall context and clearly reflects a portion of shareholding which 
may be seen as a relatively important shareholding (irrespective of the absolute 
amount of shareholding). In my opinion, an alternative legislation should therefore 
stick to a minimum percentage of shareholding (or alternatively voting rights) and 
should not apply an alternative - absolute - financial threshold.47  
 
9.3.8.4. The Related Parties to the Shareholder  
 
It is obvious that constructive ownership rules are necessary to avoid the 
circumvention of the application of CSC rules. For this reason, it is necessary to 
define the parties which are related to a shareholder. The allocation itself can only be 
made to shareholders, i.e. the persons who have an interest in the CSC (and not only 
voting rights). However, for the determination of the degree of (direct and indirect) 
influence in the CSC - and therefore the question whether the respective threshold is 
reached or exceeded - it is important to take into account the parties which are 
related to a shareholder. Of course, related parties can be individuals as well as 
juridical persons and do not have to be resident in the state which applies the CSC 
regime. However, it is not unlikely that the tax law of a given state already provides a 
definition of what is meant by ‘related parties’ (e.g. in the general tax code) and which 
may be relevant for a number of different purposes. Moreover, it could also be 
possible to refer - at least partially - to a definition outside of the tax laws, e.g. 
                                            
46 For example, if the share capital in the first-mentioned case is 50,000,000 Euro and in the second-mentioned 
case 50,000 Euro. It will be a shareholding of 20 percent in either case.   
47 In contrast thereto, an absolute amount could be applied for the decision whether the activity should be exempt 
from current taxation (or not) in order to avoid that minor investments fall within the scope of such legislation 
(see later on in more detail).  
   
 
the fact that the income allocation is based on property of a different legal entity and 
different taxpayer requires the shareholder - in order to submit the required 
information (via tax return) and to calculate the respective tax base - to be in a 
position to gather this information. If the respective shareholder just holds a few 
shares among hundreds or thousands of other shareholders, it may be difficult to 
receive the information. In such a case, it is questionable whether the aim pursued 
with such legislation and the burden for the taxpayer to gather the required details for 
the determination of the tax base (including the compliance costs) is in an acceptable 
relation, i.e. whether it is proportionate. If the taxpayer is unable to gather the 
necessary information, the tax administration itself will finally have to apply for an 
information exchange with the other Member State in which the non-resident legal 
entity carries on its activities (or, in a domestic context, with the tax office responsible 
for the resident legal entity). Otherwise, the taxpayer or the tax authorities would 
have to make an estimation of the taxable income which, of course, cannot be an 
acceptable result.  
 
Therefore, the threshold should be high enough to find an appropriate balance 
between the obligations of the taxpayers and the interest of the Member State to tax 
part of the income on a current basis. The earlier examinations show that the 
threshold of the existing CFC rules varies considerably, but is in most cases - related 
to a single shareholder or a group of related shareholders - clearly below 50 
percent.42 A threshold for the application of CFC rules which is often applied in the 
Member States is 10 percent and 25 percent.43 This may also be dependent on the 
respective company law. At least, the latter percentage may provide the possibility of 
blocking decisions of great importance and can therefore be seen as a significant 
participation.44 Even a participation of 10 percent may in some Member States confer 
rights which exceed those of shareholders with a lower participation and which are 
unable to reach the threshold.45 In my opinion, it is less likely, especially in case of 
multinational enterprises, that activities are combined in a way that the respective 
investor holds a percentage of less than 25 percent in a CFC just in order to achieve 
an advantage which is limited to the deferral of the domestic taxation on the basic 
interest component. Such a percentage of voting rights or shareholding would 
definitely limit the influence on the management of the company and the daily 
business and can hardly be imagined as a widespread structure (just for tax 
purposes). In this respect, I think that a percentage of 25 percent (voting rights or 
shareholding) can be an appropriate threshold and an acceptable balance between 
the necessity of an anti-avoidance legislation and the position of the shareholder. 
The percentage should be high enough to have influence on the participation and to 
gather the information required for the taxation of the basic interest component. 
Moreover, a threshold of 25 percent avoids the application to small and insignificant 
shareholdings and therefore avoids inappropriate compliance costs and 
administrative costs which are not proportionate to the aim pursued. The fact that a 
percentage of 25 percent may be not sufficient to decide on a profit distribution - at 
                                            
42 See chapter 6 for more details. 
43 See chapter 6 for more details.  
44 For example, the amendment of the statutes of a German Aktiengesellschaft requires a majority of at least three 
quarters of the voting rights which are present at the shareholders’ meeting (§ 179 (2) AktG). The same is true 
for the increase in the share capital (§ 182 (1) AktG). A participation of 25 percent is therefore sufficient to block 
important decisions.  
45 For example, the German GmbH-Gesetz confers the right to shareholders with a percentage of at least 10 
percent (combined) to request a shareholders’ meeting (§ 50 (1) GmbHG).  
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least not against the position of the majority shareholders - is not decisive in this 
respect.   
 
9.3.8.3. The Application of a Financial Threshold  
 
The question may be raised whether the 25 percent rule should be the only decisive 
threshold in situations in which the shareholder invested a substantial amount of 
capital in the company but without holding the required percentage of shares. 
Clearly, the actual influence (not necessarily the legal influence) achieved by an 
investment of 10,000,000 Euro is most likely greater than in case of an investment of 
10,000 Euro, even if the percentage of shareholding may be the same in both 
cases.46 The same is true for the effect of such an investment in a low-tax state (or 
even a tax haven). The financial advantage of sheltering (interest) income which is 
related to 10,000,000 Euro of capital investment is, of course, much greater than in 
case of 10,000 Euro of capital investment. One might be tempted to agree that the 
amount of investment - and not only the percentage of investment - should have an 
influence on the decision whether or not the tainted activity should be subject to 
current taxation. However, it should not be overlooked that any actual influence which 
may be achieved by a higher amount of investment cannot really be measured 
appropriately. It has always to be seen in the overall context. The aforementioned 
10,000,000 Euro investment in a publicly listed multinational company may confer 
less shareholder rights than the 10,000 Euro investment in a small company. 
However, the possibility of gathering all the necessary information for the application 
of the proposed alternative anti-avoidance legislation is crucial. The reference to a 25 
percent shareholding ensures that the investment of the respective shareholder is 
always seen in the overall context and clearly reflects a portion of shareholding which 
may be seen as a relatively important shareholding (irrespective of the absolute 
amount of shareholding). In my opinion, an alternative legislation should therefore 
stick to a minimum percentage of shareholding (or alternatively voting rights) and 
should not apply an alternative - absolute - financial threshold.47  
 
9.3.8.4. The Related Parties to the Shareholder  
 
It is obvious that constructive ownership rules are necessary to avoid the 
circumvention of the application of CSC rules. For this reason, it is necessary to 
define the parties which are related to a shareholder. The allocation itself can only be 
made to shareholders, i.e. the persons who have an interest in the CSC (and not only 
voting rights). However, for the determination of the degree of (direct and indirect) 
influence in the CSC - and therefore the question whether the respective threshold is 
reached or exceeded - it is important to take into account the parties which are 
related to a shareholder. Of course, related parties can be individuals as well as 
juridical persons and do not have to be resident in the state which applies the CSC 
regime. However, it is not unlikely that the tax law of a given state already provides a 
definition of what is meant by ‘related parties’ (e.g. in the general tax code) and which 
may be relevant for a number of different purposes. Moreover, it could also be 
possible to refer - at least partially - to a definition outside of the tax laws, e.g. 
                                            
46 For example, if the share capital in the first-mentioned case is 50,000,000 Euro and in the second-mentioned 
case 50,000 Euro. It will be a shareholding of 20 percent in either case.   
47 In contrast thereto, an absolute amount could be applied for the decision whether the activity should be exempt 
from current taxation (or not) in order to avoid that minor investments fall within the scope of such legislation 
(see later on in more detail).  
   
 
the fact that the income allocation is based on property of a different legal entity and 
different taxpayer requires the shareholder - in order to submit the required 
information (via tax return) and to calculate the respective tax base - to be in a 
position to gather this information. If the respective shareholder just holds a few 
shares among hundreds or thousands of other shareholders, it may be difficult to 
receive the information. In such a case, it is questionable whether the aim pursued 
with such legislation and the burden for the taxpayer to gather the required details for 
the determination of the tax base (including the compliance costs) is in an acceptable 
relation, i.e. whether it is proportionate. If the taxpayer is unable to gather the 
necessary information, the tax administration itself will finally have to apply for an 
information exchange with the other Member State in which the non-resident legal 
entity carries on its activities (or, in a domestic context, with the tax office responsible 
for the resident legal entity). Otherwise, the taxpayer or the tax authorities would 
have to make an estimation of the taxable income which, of course, cannot be an 
acceptable result.  
 
Therefore, the threshold should be high enough to find an appropriate balance 
between the obligations of the taxpayers and the interest of the Member State to tax 
part of the income on a current basis. The earlier examinations show that the 
threshold of the existing CFC rules varies considerably, but is in most cases - related 
to a single shareholder or a group of related shareholders - clearly below 50 
percent.42 A threshold for the application of CFC rules which is often applied in the 
Member States is 10 percent and 25 percent.43 This may also be dependent on the 
respective company law. At least, the latter percentage may provide the possibility of 
blocking decisions of great importance and can therefore be seen as a significant 
participation.44 Even a participation of 10 percent may in some Member States confer 
rights which exceed those of shareholders with a lower participation and which are 
unable to reach the threshold.45 In my opinion, it is less likely, especially in case of 
multinational enterprises, that activities are combined in a way that the respective 
investor holds a percentage of less than 25 percent in a CFC just in order to achieve 
an advantage which is limited to the deferral of the domestic taxation on the basic 
interest component. Such a percentage of voting rights or shareholding would 
definitely limit the influence on the management of the company and the daily 
business and can hardly be imagined as a widespread structure (just for tax 
purposes). In this respect, I think that a percentage of 25 percent (voting rights or 
shareholding) can be an appropriate threshold and an acceptable balance between 
the necessity of an anti-avoidance legislation and the position of the shareholder. 
The percentage should be high enough to have influence on the participation and to 
gather the information required for the taxation of the basic interest component. 
Moreover, a threshold of 25 percent avoids the application to small and insignificant 
shareholdings and therefore avoids inappropriate compliance costs and 
administrative costs which are not proportionate to the aim pursued. The fact that a 
percentage of 25 percent may be not sufficient to decide on a profit distribution - at 
                                            
42 See chapter 6 for more details. 
43 See chapter 6 for more details.  
44 For example, the amendment of the statutes of a German Aktiengesellschaft requires a majority of at least three 
quarters of the voting rights which are present at the shareholders’ meeting (§ 179 (2) AktG). The same is true 
for the increase in the share capital (§ 182 (1) AktG). A participation of 25 percent is therefore sufficient to block 
important decisions.  
45 For example, the German GmbH-Gesetz confers the right to shareholders with a percentage of at least 10 
percent (combined) to request a shareholders’ meeting (§ 50 (1) GmbHG).  
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allocation of income it is the decisive influence which should be relevant for the 
classification.48  
 
What was outlined above are the ‘related parties’ mainly for the purpose of avoiding 
the circumvention of CSC taxation and therefore the calculation whether the CSC 
threshold is reached or exceeded (see also the constructive ownership rules in the 
following). It may be the case, however, that the definition of ‘related parties’ is also 
required for other purposes, e.g. when it comes to the exemption provisions. Even 
though there will be no difference regarding a.) and b.), it can be possible that the 
requirement under c.) has to be structured differently. To put it more precisely, if 
there is an exemption from CSC taxation for certain services provided towards 
unrelated parties, it may be necessary to set a different threshold. Instead of being a 
related party in case of majority interest / voting rights, the threshold could already be 
set at a lower percentage. Again, this depends very much on the respective provision 
and the risk of tax avoidance involved.   
 
9.3.8.5. Constructive Ownership Rules 
 
The stipulation of a fixed percentage of shareholding or voting rights requires 
additional rules in order to avoid the circumvention of such legislation. This is 
particularly true if the threshold is relatively high. Otherwise, it would be too simple to 
split the shareholding over certain related parties (e.g. family members) in order to 
avoid the current taxation of income. For example, if the 100 percent shareholding in 
company C could be allocated to five family members, all of the shareholders could 
have a percentage of shareholding (or voting rights) which is below 25 percent. 
Again, it must be clear that the proposed legislation should not be a penalty for the 
investment in certain activities, but should only lead to a limited taxation in the state 
of residence. Equity aspects require, in my opinion, that a circumvention of the 
proposed legislation should be avoided as much as possible. Of course, this will not 
always be the case, especially if the (personal or contractual) relationships between 
shareholders are not disclosed and open for verification. However, the most obvious 
situations should be targeted by the constructive ownership rules. These are, in my 
opinion, family relationships and the factual or contractual influence on certain 
individuals or legal persons. The shareholders must be obliged by law to disclose 
common shareholdings and contractual arrangements in order to open the possibility 
of verifying the application of the basic interest taxation. Therefore, if two or more 
related persons hold shares in a company which carries on tainted activities, and the 
combined shareholding is at least 25 percent, the shareholding requirement is 
fulfilled. The question arises whether in such a situation the current attribution of 
income should be made to each of the related shareholders or whether there should 
be - an additional - minimum threshold for the income attribution. For example, if 
each of the two related shareholders A and AA hold directly 24 percent in company 
C, i.e. together 48 percent, it is rather obvious that the basic interest income should 
be allocated to both shareholders, 24 percent to A and 24 percent to AA. However, if 
shareholder A holds 24 percent and shareholder AA holds one percent, the 
constructive ownership rules should lead to the outcome that the 25 percent 
                                            
48 Even though the decisive influence may, depending on the situation, already exist in case of a shareholding 
which is below a majority shareholding, it is just simpler - for this purpose - to have a clear separation and a 
clearly defined requirement. For this reason, it is again helpful to focus alternatively on shareholding / voting 
rights, i.e. if one of the two confers majority influence (majority shareholding or majority voting rights), the 
requirement is fulfilled.  
   
 
definitions provided by accounting standards. In such a case, it may be possible to 
(partially) refer to definitions which are already existent. In general, the scope of the 
‘related parties’ for CSC purposes should, in my opinion, encompass the following 
persons: 
 
a.) Persons who are related through family membership 
 
In case of an individual person it seems to me that members of a family - up to a 
certain degree - should fall within the definition. This should be the partner (wife, 
husband, engaged couple, registered partner), the family relatives in straight 
succession (parents, children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren), the siblings 
(brothers, sisters), the children of the siblings and the partners of the siblings. It 
should also include the siblings of the parents as well as foster parents and foster 
children. More distant relatives should be outside of the definition of ‘related parties.’ 
In the aforementioned cases it can be assumed that there is such a close (family) 
relationship that the influence of the person in question and the related persons on 
the CSC (by voting rights, shareholdings) cannot be seen strictly isolated from each 
other.   
 
b.) Persons who are related through factual or contractual arrangements 
 
There may be situations in which the shareholder in the CSC has certain factual or 
contractual arrangements with other individual or juridical persons who hold shares or 
voting rights in the CSC. If such arrangements determine a decisive influence on the 
decisions of the other party / parties, it is obvious that in such a case the combined 
interest in the CSC has to be taken into account for the calculation whether the 
threshold is reached or exceeded. 
 
c.) Persons who are related through shareholding structures  
 
Based on the previous arguments and conclusions with respect to the appropriate 
threshold in section 9.3.8.1. and 9.3.8.2., shareholdings and / or voting rights of at 
least 25 percent shall be decisive for the application of the CSC regime. Later on it 
will be outlined how the threshold shall be calculated in a group structure where 
entities are interposed between the (ultimate) shareholder and the CSC and this will, 
therefore, not be outlined in this context. However, it is clear that the interposition of 
entities which are (partially) held by persons described under a.) and b.) should result 
in the same treatment as a direct holding, i.e. the percentage should be calculated by 
taking into account the related party interest. On the other hand, a participation of 25 
percent in an intermediary entity should not automatically result in the 
aforementioned combined calculation if the remaining participation of 75 percent in 
the intermediary entity are held by unrelated parties. In other words, the substantial 
shareholding in an intermediary entity should not be enough to ‘infect’ the whole 
entity. However, if the shareholder in the intermediary entity has a decisive influence 
by way of majority rights (shareholding and / or voting rights), it seems to be 
necessary - similar to b.) - that the whole shareholding / voting rights of the 
intermediary entity is part of the percentage calculation to determine whether the 
threshold is reached or exceeded. In my opinion, it is helpful to set - for this particular 
purpose - a clear ‘majority requirement’, because in contrast to the threshold for the 
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allocation of income it is the decisive influence which should be relevant for the 
classification.48  
 
What was outlined above are the ‘related parties’ mainly for the purpose of avoiding 
the circumvention of CSC taxation and therefore the calculation whether the CSC 
threshold is reached or exceeded (see also the constructive ownership rules in the 
following). It may be the case, however, that the definition of ‘related parties’ is also 
required for other purposes, e.g. when it comes to the exemption provisions. Even 
though there will be no difference regarding a.) and b.), it can be possible that the 
requirement under c.) has to be structured differently. To put it more precisely, if 
there is an exemption from CSC taxation for certain services provided towards 
unrelated parties, it may be necessary to set a different threshold. Instead of being a 
related party in case of majority interest / voting rights, the threshold could already be 
set at a lower percentage. Again, this depends very much on the respective provision 
and the risk of tax avoidance involved.   
 
9.3.8.5. Constructive Ownership Rules 
 
The stipulation of a fixed percentage of shareholding or voting rights requires 
additional rules in order to avoid the circumvention of such legislation. This is 
particularly true if the threshold is relatively high. Otherwise, it would be too simple to 
split the shareholding over certain related parties (e.g. family members) in order to 
avoid the current taxation of income. For example, if the 100 percent shareholding in 
company C could be allocated to five family members, all of the shareholders could 
have a percentage of shareholding (or voting rights) which is below 25 percent. 
Again, it must be clear that the proposed legislation should not be a penalty for the 
investment in certain activities, but should only lead to a limited taxation in the state 
of residence. Equity aspects require, in my opinion, that a circumvention of the 
proposed legislation should be avoided as much as possible. Of course, this will not 
always be the case, especially if the (personal or contractual) relationships between 
shareholders are not disclosed and open for verification. However, the most obvious 
situations should be targeted by the constructive ownership rules. These are, in my 
opinion, family relationships and the factual or contractual influence on certain 
individuals or legal persons. The shareholders must be obliged by law to disclose 
common shareholdings and contractual arrangements in order to open the possibility 
of verifying the application of the basic interest taxation. Therefore, if two or more 
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48 Even though the decisive influence may, depending on the situation, already exist in case of a shareholding 
which is below a majority shareholding, it is just simpler - for this purpose - to have a clear separation and a 
clearly defined requirement. For this reason, it is again helpful to focus alternatively on shareholding / voting 
rights, i.e. if one of the two confers majority influence (majority shareholding or majority voting rights), the 
requirement is fulfilled.  
   
 
definitions provided by accounting standards. In such a case, it may be possible to 
(partially) refer to definitions which are already existent. In general, the scope of the 
‘related parties’ for CSC purposes should, in my opinion, encompass the following 
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In the aforementioned cases it can be assumed that there is such a close (family) 
relationship that the influence of the person in question and the related persons on 
the CSC (by voting rights, shareholdings) cannot be seen strictly isolated from each 
other.   
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indirectly related to the activities. Such “auxiliary” property is, in general, to be treated 
as non-tainted property. This simplifies the approach and is, in my opinion, justifiable. 
For example, the computers, office furniture et cetera which is related to a leasing 
activity supports directly the activity component and only indirectly the basic interest 
component. One might even argue that the auxiliary property is not required for 
earning the interest component, but only for earning the activity component.  
 
It is obvious that the simplest approach in determining the calculation basis is the 
reference to the balance sheet of the legal entity and the book value of the property 
(including loan amounts). The basis can be calculated as an average between the 
book value at the beginning of the financial year (which is the book value at the end 
of the preceding year) and the end of the financial year. For property which was 
purchased or sold within the financial year, adjustments have to be made regarding 
the interest calculation period. That means, for the property which was purchased, for 
example, at the end of October, the calculation basis is to be determined as the 
average amount of the purchase price at the end of October and the book value at 
the end of the year. The interest, however, is only to be calculated for a two-month 
period (November and December) instead of a twelve-month period.49 The same 
principles apply for property which was sold within the financial year. In this case, the 
interest calculation is to be limited to the period between the beginning of the year 
and the date of disposal. For simplification reasons, the calculation of the interest 
might be separated into a twelve-month period, i.e. the calculation starts with the 
month following the acquisition and ends with the month preceding the disposal of 
the property. The problem is, however, that the book value of the property does not 
necessarily reflect the economic lifetime and does not necessarily go hand in hand 
with the amortisation component included in the payments. For example, if the 
depreciation period for certain property in the financial statements of the entity is only 
five years, but the economic lifetime and the period of amortisation which underlies 
the contractual arrangement is ten years, the concentration on the (average) book 
value would not lead to an appropriate result. In this case, the basic interest 
calculated on the book value would be too low since the period of capital investment 
exceeds the period of depreciation in the financial statements.50 In contrast thereto, if 
the depreciation period is five years and the amortisation period which underlies the 
contractual arrangement is five years, too, the period of capital investment and the 
period of depreciation would be identical. Thus, the interest calculation would be 
correct, despite the fact that the economic lifetime is ten years. It may be 
questionable, in the latter example, whether the stipulation of the (e.g. leasing) 
payments would be in line with transfer pricing principles. It is obvious that the 
contractual relationships must, first of all, fulfil the arm’s length requirement. If this is 
not the case, income adjustments are necessary. However, even if the payments are 
not accepted as completely tax deductible in the respective period - due to the fact 
that, for example, the leasing payments are considered to be too high - there is still 
an increased cash flow which reduces the overall amount of capital investment in the 
state of the service company and therefore reduces the basis for the basic interest 
                                            
49 Under the assumption that the financial year is equal to the calendar year.  
50 It makes a substantial difference whether a specific asset is depreciated over a period of five years or over a 
period of ten years when the (average) book value is the basis for the calculation of the basic interest component. 
A five year straight-line depreciation brings the book value to zero at the end of year five (and therefore the 
calculation basis is zero after year five) whereas in case of a ten year straight-line depreciation the book value at 
the end of year five is still 50 percent of the original value.  
   
 
requirement is fulfilled. The additional question is whether the current income 
allocation should be limited to shareholder A (24 percent) or whether a current 
income allocation should also encompass shareholder AA (one percent). At least, it is 
clear to me that the one percent income allocation cannot be added to shareholder A 
(which would result in a 25 percent income allocation). This would be, in my opinion, 
a non-acceptable approach since shareholder A is - although related - not the legal 
owner of 25 percent but only 24 percent. Thus, the maximum income attribution 
should be 24 percent. What remains is the question whether one percent of the basic 
interest income should be attributed to shareholder AA or whether - for administrative 
reasons - a minimum percentage for the income allocation should be required. From 
my perspective, I do not see the necessity for such an additional threshold just for the 
purpose of income attribution. If it turns out - due to the constructive ownership rules - 
that the general ownership threshold of 25 percent is reached or exceeded, the basic 
interest income should be allocated to all of the related shareholders - but not (other) 
unrelated shareholders - irrespective of the actual percentage of shareholding. Such 
an approach avoids additional possibilities of circumventing the alternative legislation, 
e.g. by allocating small percentages of shareholding over a great number of related 
parties, and ensures that the legislation does not become too complex.  
 
9.4. The Anti-Avoidance Concept of Capital Service Company (CSC) Legislation 
 
9.4.1. The Determination of the Basic Interest Rate  
 
Based on the earlier examinations, the basic interest rate for the CSC taxation should 
be determined once a year, preferably before or right at the beginning of the financial 
year of the entity which carries on the tainted activities. Following the proposal which 
was made earlier in this chapter, the rate shall be based on the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the respective financial 
year. This rate shall be applicable for the whole financial year. 
 
9.4.2. The Determination of the Tax Base 
 
The proposed alternative approach does not directly focus on the total income 
derived by the legal entity but only on the basic interest income related to certain 
property which is made available to the recipients of the services (tainted property). 
In the following, I will go into detail regarding the determination of the tax base for the 
calculation of the basic interest component. In this respect, I will start with the 
description of the system in general before dealing with “mixed” activities, debt 
financing and the determination of the net calculation basis. 
 
9.4.2.1. The Determination of the Calculation Basis of the Property 
 
The basis for the calculation of the basic interest component is, in general, the total 
amount of assets which are provided by the legal entity to another party - be it a 
related or an unrelated party. The assets are not directly employed for an income-
producing activity of the legal entity itself but for an activity of another party (tainted 
property). The assets are related to financing, leasing, renting, licensing or similar 
activities - as already stipulated above - and encompass tangible and intangible 
property. In my opinion, there should be a clear and strict separation between tainted 
and non-tainted property. Only the property which is directly made available to 
another party shall be considered tainted property, but not the assets which are only 
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correct, despite the fact that the economic lifetime is ten years. It may be 
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Based on the earlier examinations, the basic interest rate for the CSC taxation should 
be determined once a year, preferably before or right at the beginning of the financial 
year of the entity which carries on the tainted activities. Following the proposal which 
was made earlier in this chapter, the rate shall be based on the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the respective financial 
year. This rate shall be applicable for the whole financial year. 
 
9.4.2. The Determination of the Tax Base 
 
The proposed alternative approach does not directly focus on the total income 
derived by the legal entity but only on the basic interest income related to certain 
property which is made available to the recipients of the services (tainted property). 
In the following, I will go into detail regarding the determination of the tax base for the 
calculation of the basic interest component. In this respect, I will start with the 
description of the system in general before dealing with “mixed” activities, debt 
financing and the determination of the net calculation basis. 
 
9.4.2.1. The Determination of the Calculation Basis of the Property 
 
The basis for the calculation of the basic interest component is, in general, the total 
amount of assets which are provided by the legal entity to another party - be it a 
related or an unrelated party. The assets are not directly employed for an income-
producing activity of the legal entity itself but for an activity of another party (tainted 
property). The assets are related to financing, leasing, renting, licensing or similar 
activities - as already stipulated above - and encompass tangible and intangible 
property. In my opinion, there should be a clear and strict separation between tainted 
and non-tainted property. Only the property which is directly made available to 
another party shall be considered tainted property, but not the assets which are only 
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Example: the loan account of the financial service company is subject to changes 
during the year 01. The amounts are in Euro.  
 
Loan account at the beginning of the year 01: 100 
 
Loan balance: 100 (20 days per year) 100 x 20 =     2,000 
Loan balance: 300 (50 days per year) 300 x 50 =   15,000 
Loan balance: 425 (80 days per year) 425 x 80 =   34,000 
Loan balance: 400 (30 days per year) 400 x 30 =   12,000 
Loan balance: 500 (90 days per year) 500 x 90 =   45,000 
Loan balance: 800 (90 days per year) 800 x 90 =   72,000 
 
Average (weighted) amount during the year 01 (tax base): 180,000 / 360 = 500 
 
Loan account at the end of the year 01:  800 
 
In the example, the basic interest component is to be calculated on the average 
(weighted) amount of 500 Euro (for the year 01) and is currently allocable to the 
domestic shareholder in the financial service company. 
 
Extraordinary write-downs on the principal amount which are related to the risk of the 
debtor cannot have any impact on the calculation basis as long as the contract is still 
in place and to the extent that the contractual payments does not amortise the capital 
investment. This is true for all of the aforementioned types of financing. In general, it 
can be concluded that it is the average amount of book value which has to be taken 
into account for the determination of the calculation basis - corrected in case of 
extraordinary adjustments of the book value. With respect to changes in foreign 
currency, it is appropriate - especially from the perspective of simplification and 
practicability - to accept a revaluation included in the balance sheet of the CSC. 
 
9.4.2.1.2. Licensing Activities  
 
In general, it can be concluded that the book value is, from a simplification 
perspective, the ideal calculation basis. The reason is that it can easily be derived 
form the accounting system of the service company. However, this requires not only 
that the depreciation which is taken into account is derived from the expected 
economic lifetime of the property, but also that the value is in line with the 
amortisation element included in the licensing payments, i.e. the original value 
reduced by the amortisation payments. The optimal situation can therefore be shown 
by the following equation: 
 
book value = economic value = original value minus amortisation 
 
The problem is, however, that this is often not the case. It is, in particular, the tax 
depreciation of the property which may deviate from the economic depreciation, e.g. 
because of increased depreciation rates, declining depreciation, special depreciation 
rules for tax purposes, et cetera. Moreover, it is the amortisation element which is 
decisive for the question of how much capital is actually provided to the service 
recipient during the contractual period and not the book value. However, it can be 
very difficult to estimate the amortisation element, especially if it is related to 
intangible property.  
   
 
calculation.51 However, one should not forget that the possibilities of increasing the 
deductible expenses, e.g. in the high-tax state, without coming into conflict with 
transfer-pricing principles are limited. Moreover, it is worth noting that the proposed 
calculation basis is not identical to the fair market value of - for example - the 
respective property. The fair market value can be influenced by a number of 
additional (economic) factors which may result in considerable ups and downs during 
the lifetime of the property. However, what is important for the determination of the 
calculation basis in this context is not a ‘mark-to-market’ value at specific points in 
time, but a value which reflects, as much as possible, the average amount of capital 
provided during the contractual period (e.g. through a leasing agreement). 
 
In any event, the difficulties in determining the calculation basis are not completely 
identical for all types of tainted property. For this reason, the approach will be 
discussed separately for the different types of activity.  
 
9.4.2.1.1. Financing Activities 
 
The concentration on the book value is certainly a feasible approach for the provision 
of loan amounts, the investment in bonds and similar types of investment. This is 
particularly true for long-term loans without any permanent changes of the principal 
amount. In this case, the calculation basis may simply be derived from the balance 
sheet of the service company. In case of fixed monthly payments (interest and 
amortisation), the average amount of outstanding loan amounts can also be 
determined without much effort. However, it is clear that such fixed payments lead to 
the result that the amortisation element which is included in the payments increases 
as soon as the interest element decreases. Thus, the amortisation element at the 
beginning of the year is lower than at the end of the year. For simplification reasons - 
and in favour of the taxpayer - it shall be acceptable to consider an average amount 
which is based on a linear reduction of the loan amount. The situation can become a 
bit more difficult if a permanent cash transfer takes place (e.g. in case of cash pooling 
activities). Here, the average outstanding loan amount cannot be derived from the 
balance sheet, but the tax base must be determined by taking into account the 
average weighted outstanding amount of loan during the financial year, e.g. by 
considering the outstanding amount per day. Although this information cannot be 
derived directly from the financial statements, it can be derived quite easily from the 












                                            
51 At least in those cases in which the capital is not reinvested in tainted property. Essentially, what is important 
in the example is the period and the amount of capital provided by the service company. The higher the 
amortisation element, the lower the average amount of capital provided during the contractual period. Of course, 
a lower average amount of capital results in a lower calculation basis for the basic interest component.  
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51 At least in those cases in which the capital is not reinvested in tainted property. Essentially, what is important 
in the example is the period and the amount of capital provided by the service company. The higher the 
amortisation element, the lower the average amount of capital provided during the contractual period. Of course, 
a lower average amount of capital results in a lower calculation basis for the basic interest component.  
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amortisation is not easily available. Of course, it is available, but not as easily as the 
book value and the economic value, but requires additional information. From a 
practical point of view it is therefore difficult to rely, in general, on the value after 
amortisation. From an anti-avoidance perspective it seems to be acceptable, in my 
opinion, to take into account the basis of 800 Euro instead of 900 Euro. Essentially, 
the lower amortisation rate has the effect that the income derived by the service 
provider is lower than it should be - based on the economic value. However, this is 
only true as long as no additional (deferred) payment is required at the end of the 
contractual period which compensates for the difference. I will come back to that 
aspect below in the context of leasing services where such additional payments can 
play an important role. In other words, it is acceptable, not only from a simplicity 
perspective but also from an anti-avoidance perspective, to rely on the average 
economic value - which can be the adjusted average book value of the property - to 
determine the calculation basis for the basic interest taxation.  
 
Example: the acquisition price of the intangible assets was 1,000 Euro. The book 
value for tax purposes after the first year is 700 Euro (300 Euro of declining 
depreciation for the first year). The economic value is 800 Euro (200 Euro of 
theoretical economic depreciation per year). The amortisation component is 250 
Euro. 
 
Figure  6: 
 
 

















(1) Book value of 700 Euro after one year (300 Euro of depreciation). 
(2) Economic value of 800 Euro after one year (200 Euro of theoretical depreciation). 
(3) Value of 750 Euro after one year of amortisation (250 Euro of amortisation). 
 
In principle, what was outlined above is equally true in this alternative. However, in 
contrast to the example above, the economic value after one year (800 Euro) is 
higher than the acquisition value after taking into account the amortisation element 
(750 Euro). The focus on the economic value can therefore lead to the result that the 
capital actually provided to the service recipient is lower than the basis of interest 
calculation. Nonetheless, the general presumption should be that the economic value 











   
 
For this reason, it seems to be advisable to start with the book value, as the basic 
element, and to compare the book value with the economic value - and the 
depreciation based on the expected economic lifetime. If the book value deviates 
from the economic value, it is necessary to make adjustments in order to end up with 
the (deviating) economic value. The country which applies the anti-avoidance 
legislation should focus on its own economic depreciation rates which are based on 
the expected economic lifetime of the intangible property and which should normally 
be reflected by “regular” and straight line depreciation. The advantage of such an 
approach is that the economic depreciation should come closer to any (arm’s length) 
amortisation in a contractual relationship than the tax depreciation in the state of 
residence of the CSC which can be influenced by a number of other aspects. 
Nonetheless, it is theoretically necessary to compare the adjusted book value (= 
economic value) with the original value after taking into account the actual 
amortisation payments. The latter step, however, is quite an unpractical and difficult 
approach. For this reason, I propose the subsequent procedure which shall be 
illustrated by an example:  
 
Example: the acquisition price of the intangible assets was 1,000 Euro. The book 
value for tax purposes after the first year is 700 Euro (300 Euro of declining 
depreciation for the first year). The economic value is 800 Euro (200 Euro of 























(1) Book value of 700 Euro after one year (300 Euro of depreciation). 
(2) Economic value of 800 Euro after one year (200 Euro of theoretical depreciation). 
(3) Value of 900 Euro after one year of amortisation (100 Euro of amortisation). 
  
For the determination of the calculation basis it is first required to make an 
adjustment of the book value for tax purposes and increase the book value to the 
higher economic value of 800 Euro. The latter value should then be compared to the 
original value after taking into account the amortisation of 100 Euro - which is a value 
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amortisation is not easily available. Of course, it is available, but not as easily as the 
book value and the economic value, but requires additional information. From a 
practical point of view it is therefore difficult to rely, in general, on the value after 
amortisation. From an anti-avoidance perspective it seems to be acceptable, in my 
opinion, to take into account the basis of 800 Euro instead of 900 Euro. Essentially, 
the lower amortisation rate has the effect that the income derived by the service 
provider is lower than it should be - based on the economic value. However, this is 
only true as long as no additional (deferred) payment is required at the end of the 
contractual period which compensates for the difference. I will come back to that 
aspect below in the context of leasing services where such additional payments can 
play an important role. In other words, it is acceptable, not only from a simplicity 
perspective but also from an anti-avoidance perspective, to rely on the average 
economic value - which can be the adjusted average book value of the property - to 
determine the calculation basis for the basic interest taxation.  
 
Example: the acquisition price of the intangible assets was 1,000 Euro. The book 
value for tax purposes after the first year is 700 Euro (300 Euro of declining 
depreciation for the first year). The economic value is 800 Euro (200 Euro of 
theoretical economic depreciation per year). The amortisation component is 250 
Euro. 
 
Figure  6: 
 
 

















(1) Book value of 700 Euro after one year (300 Euro of depreciation). 
(2) Economic value of 800 Euro after one year (200 Euro of theoretical depreciation). 
(3) Value of 750 Euro after one year of amortisation (250 Euro of amortisation). 
 
In principle, what was outlined above is equally true in this alternative. However, in 
contrast to the example above, the economic value after one year (800 Euro) is 
higher than the acquisition value after taking into account the amortisation element 
(750 Euro). The focus on the economic value can therefore lead to the result that the 
capital actually provided to the service recipient is lower than the basis of interest 
calculation. Nonetheless, the general presumption should be that the economic value 











   
 
For this reason, it seems to be advisable to start with the book value, as the basic 
element, and to compare the book value with the economic value - and the 
depreciation based on the expected economic lifetime. If the book value deviates 
from the economic value, it is necessary to make adjustments in order to end up with 
the (deviating) economic value. The country which applies the anti-avoidance 
legislation should focus on its own economic depreciation rates which are based on 
the expected economic lifetime of the intangible property and which should normally 
be reflected by “regular” and straight line depreciation. The advantage of such an 
approach is that the economic depreciation should come closer to any (arm’s length) 
amortisation in a contractual relationship than the tax depreciation in the state of 
residence of the CSC which can be influenced by a number of other aspects. 
Nonetheless, it is theoretically necessary to compare the adjusted book value (= 
economic value) with the original value after taking into account the actual 
amortisation payments. The latter step, however, is quite an unpractical and difficult 
approach. For this reason, I propose the subsequent procedure which shall be 
illustrated by an example:  
 
Example: the acquisition price of the intangible assets was 1,000 Euro. The book 
value for tax purposes after the first year is 700 Euro (300 Euro of declining 
depreciation for the first year). The economic value is 800 Euro (200 Euro of 























(1) Book value of 700 Euro after one year (300 Euro of depreciation). 
(2) Economic value of 800 Euro after one year (200 Euro of theoretical depreciation). 
(3) Value of 900 Euro after one year of amortisation (100 Euro of amortisation). 
  
For the determination of the calculation basis it is first required to make an 
adjustment of the book value for tax purposes and increase the book value to the 
higher economic value of 800 Euro. The latter value should then be compared to the 
original value after taking into account the amortisation of 100 Euro - which is a value 















   
 
a.) Upfront payments 
 
In the same way as described above, the economic value should be the underlying 
value for the determination of the calculation basis. However, it is clear that upfront 
payments made by the recipient of the services reduce the capital investment made 
by the service company (and therefore also the capital provided to the service 
recipient). For this reason, the upfront payments have to be deducted from the 
amount of investment (e.g. acquisition value) in order to avoid an excessive 
calculation basis. Such a treatment does not necessarily require the upfront payment 
to be considered, under accounting rules of the state of the service company, a 
reduction of the acquisition value of the property concerned. The approach is equally 
relevant for payments which are treated, from an accounting perspective, as deferred 
leasing income. In any event, the amount of investment - reduced by the upfront 
payment - is to be depreciated over the economic lifetime of the property according to 




                 
        acquisition value - to be  
                            reduced by the amount of 
                                 upfront payment 
 
 
                       calculation basis - to be  
                                     reduced by depreciation based  
        on the economic lifetime of the  






b.) Deferred payments 
 
The deferral of payments to the end of the contractual period has the effect that the 
average amount of capital provided during that period is increased. The most 
extreme case is certainly the situation in which the regular service payments do not 
encompass any amortisation element, e.g. if the total value of the property is 
compensated at the end of the contractual period through a one-time payment. It is 
absolutely clear that the calculation basis cannot simply be derived from the 
economic value in such a situation. In this extreme case, the capital provided remains 
unchanged during the contractual period and the calculation basis is, in theory, the 
result of the respective economic value - reduced by depreciation - plus the 
difference to the original (acquisition) value. In other words, the calculation basis 
remains the same during the whole contractual period. However, what is more likely, 
in practice, is the situation in which only part of the acquisition value is compensated 
regularly during the contractual period and a final (reduced) compensation is due at 
the end of the period. That means the regular service payments contain an 
amortisation element which is lower than the depreciation based on the economic 





















   
 
third party relationship the expected economic lifetime plays an important role for the 
determination of any amortisation payments. However, the taxpayer should have the 
possibility of providing the evidence that the amortisation rate is different. If the 
taxpayer can do so, the lower value is to be taken into account. Based on the 
aforementioned conclusions, the calculation basis can be determined as the average 
economic value, i.e. typically stipulated as the average of the value at the beginning 
of the financial year and the end of the financial year.  
 
Example: intangible property; depreciation period four years (straight line 
depreciation); expected economic lifetime five years; acquisition of the property at the 





beginning of the   end of the year 01/  end of the year 02: 
year 01:     beginning of the   
    year 02: 
 
book value: 1,000   book value: 750  book value: 500  
 
adjusted value   adjusted value  adjusted value 
based on expected   based on expected  based on expected 




tax base:                     900 (year 01)     700 (year 02) 
 
 
The calculation basis for the year 01 is an amount of 900 Euro and for the year 02 an 
amount of 700 Euro. Extraordinary write-downs on the property, e.g. on the basis of 
an impairment test, should not have any impact on the calculation basis as long as 
the contract is still in place and to the extent that the contractual payments do not 
amortise the capital investment.  
 
9.4.2.1.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property 
 
Essentially, the leasing and renting services provided by the CSC do not have to be 
treated differently from the licensing services, i.e. the determination of the calculation 
basis follows the same pattern. However, what can be different is the fact that leasing 
and renting services may require upfront payments or additional payments at the end 
of the contractual period. The latter can be deferred leasing payments as well as the 
purchase price for the transfer of the property to the recipient of the services. This, of 
course, leads either to an immediate reduction of the capital provided52 or to an 
increase in the average amount of capital provided.53 The question arises how to 
deal with these situations within the proposed system of CSC taxation and the 
determination of the calculation basis. 
 
                                            
52 In case of an upfront payment.  
53 In case of an additional payment at the end of the contractual period.  
Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation
531
   
 
a.) Upfront payments 
 
In the same way as described above, the economic value should be the underlying 
value for the determination of the calculation basis. However, it is clear that upfront 
payments made by the recipient of the services reduce the capital investment made 
by the service company (and therefore also the capital provided to the service 
recipient). For this reason, the upfront payments have to be deducted from the 
amount of investment (e.g. acquisition value) in order to avoid an excessive 
calculation basis. Such a treatment does not necessarily require the upfront payment 
to be considered, under accounting rules of the state of the service company, a 
reduction of the acquisition value of the property concerned. The approach is equally 
relevant for payments which are treated, from an accounting perspective, as deferred 
leasing income. In any event, the amount of investment - reduced by the upfront 
payment - is to be depreciated over the economic lifetime of the property according to 
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                       calculation basis - to be  
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b.) Deferred payments 
 
The deferral of payments to the end of the contractual period has the effect that the 
average amount of capital provided during that period is increased. The most 
extreme case is certainly the situation in which the regular service payments do not 
encompass any amortisation element, e.g. if the total value of the property is 
compensated at the end of the contractual period through a one-time payment. It is 
absolutely clear that the calculation basis cannot simply be derived from the 
economic value in such a situation. In this extreme case, the capital provided remains 
unchanged during the contractual period and the calculation basis is, in theory, the 
result of the respective economic value - reduced by depreciation - plus the 
difference to the original (acquisition) value. In other words, the calculation basis 
remains the same during the whole contractual period. However, what is more likely, 
in practice, is the situation in which only part of the acquisition value is compensated 
regularly during the contractual period and a final (reduced) compensation is due at 
the end of the period. That means the regular service payments contain an 
amortisation element which is lower than the depreciation based on the economic 





















   
 
third party relationship the expected economic lifetime plays an important role for the 
determination of any amortisation payments. However, the taxpayer should have the 
possibility of providing the evidence that the amortisation rate is different. If the 
taxpayer can do so, the lower value is to be taken into account. Based on the 
aforementioned conclusions, the calculation basis can be determined as the average 
economic value, i.e. typically stipulated as the average of the value at the beginning 
of the financial year and the end of the financial year.  
 
Example: intangible property; depreciation period four years (straight line 
depreciation); expected economic lifetime five years; acquisition of the property at the 





beginning of the   end of the year 01/  end of the year 02: 
year 01:     beginning of the   
    year 02: 
 
book value: 1,000   book value: 750  book value: 500  
 
adjusted value   adjusted value  adjusted value 
based on expected   based on expected  based on expected 




tax base:                     900 (year 01)     700 (year 02) 
 
 
The calculation basis for the year 01 is an amount of 900 Euro and for the year 02 an 
amount of 700 Euro. Extraordinary write-downs on the property, e.g. on the basis of 
an impairment test, should not have any impact on the calculation basis as long as 
the contract is still in place and to the extent that the contractual payments do not 
amortise the capital investment.  
 
9.4.2.1.3. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Movable Property 
 
Essentially, the leasing and renting services provided by the CSC do not have to be 
treated differently from the licensing services, i.e. the determination of the calculation 
basis follows the same pattern. However, what can be different is the fact that leasing 
and renting services may require upfront payments or additional payments at the end 
of the contractual period. The latter can be deferred leasing payments as well as the 
purchase price for the transfer of the property to the recipient of the services. This, of 
course, leads either to an immediate reduction of the capital provided52 or to an 
increase in the average amount of capital provided.53 The question arises how to 
deal with these situations within the proposed system of CSC taxation and the 
determination of the calculation basis. 
 
                                            
52 In case of an upfront payment.  
53 In case of an additional payment at the end of the contractual period.  
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year. In this example, the calculation basis is - for the whole contractual period and in 
the absence of any amortisation payment made by the service recipient - equal to the 




                 
          
                            calculation basis 
                                 (e.g. after year 2) 
 
 
                         
                                       
          






Example: the acquisition value of the property which is subject to a leasing 
arrangement is 100 Euro. The contractual leasing period and the expected economic 
lifetime are 10 years. The (final) payment which has to be made by the recipient of 
the services at the end of the contractual period is 50 Euro. The regular monthly 
payments of the service recipient encompass all the of the other elements of the 





      01         02         03          04        05         06         07         08          09       10      (years) 
 
 
                amortisation    
                (simplified)56 
 
 
      (economic 
                 value) 
100       90         80         70         60         50         40        30         20         10          0 
 
 
In contrast to the example above, the service payments include a reduced 
amortisation element. For this reason, only 2.50 Euro have to be added to the 
average economic value of 95 Euro in the year 01 (instead of 5 Euro). In the 
subsequent years, the average economic value has to be increased by 5 Euro per 
year (instead of 10 Euro). The underlying - simplified - assumption is that the lack of 
amortisation (which is in this alternative 50% of the regular amortisation) is to be 
allocated on a straight line basis. The total amount added to the average economic 
                                            





















   
 
contract terminates. In the latter case, the calculation basis is in-between the 
economic value (reduced by depreciation) and the original acquisition value. In the 
same way as described above, it is necessary to follow a rather simple and practical 
concept in order to avoid complicated mathematical determinations on a case-by-
case basis. For this reason, it makes sense to stick to the economic value and to add 
a portion of the deferred payment to the tax base in order to take into account the 
increased amount of capital provided during the contractual period. In this regard, it is 
important to recognise the difference between the situation where the amortisation 
element included in the service payments remains unchanged during the contractual 
period - which can be the case if the service payments are adjusted during the 
contractual period in order to reflect the lower interest component - and the situation 
where the amortisation element increases over time while the interest element 
decreases (in case of unadjusted service payments). In favour of simplicity and 
practicability - and in favour of the taxpayer - the system may accept a straight line 
amortisation even if it is, from a mathematical perspective, not completely correct. 
Thus, it is acceptable, in my opinion, to add the portion of the deferred payment - 
calculated on a straight line basis - to the respective average economic value.  
 
Example: the acquisition value of the property which is subject to a leasing 
arrangement is 100 Euro. The contractual leasing period and the expected economic 
lifetime are 10 years. The (final) payment which has to be made by the recipient of 
the services at the end of the contractual period is 100 Euro. The regular monthly 
payments of the service recipient encompass all of the other elements of the leasing 












       (economic 
                 value) 
100       90         80         70         60         50         40        30         20         10          0 
 
 
In this example, the economic value after one year is 90 Euro and the calculation 
basis for year 01 would be 95 Euro - under the assumption of a regular amortisation 
and a deferred payment of zero. However, the fact that a (final) payment of 100 Euro 
has to be made at the end of the 10 year period requires - as outlined above - that an 
amount of 5 Euro has to be added to the average economic value of 95 Euro. In the 
subsequent year 02, an amount of 15 Euro (5 Euro + 10 Euro)54 has to be added to 
the average economic value of 85 Euro. In the following years, the amount which has 
to be added to the average economic value increases by 10 Euro each year (up to 95 
Euro in year 10). Hence, the total amount added to the average economic value over 
the period of 10 years is 500 Euro55 - which results in an average of 50 Euro per 
                                            
54 The amount of 15 Euro is half of the difference of the year 01 (10 x ½) plus the difference between the average 
amount of the year 01 (95 Euro) and the average amount of the year 02 (85 Euro).  
55 5+15+25+35+45+55+65+75+85+95=500.  
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year. In this example, the calculation basis is - for the whole contractual period and in 
the absence of any amortisation payment made by the service recipient - equal to the 
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Example: the acquisition value of the property which is subject to a leasing 
arrangement is 100 Euro. The contractual leasing period and the expected economic 
lifetime are 10 years. The (final) payment which has to be made by the recipient of 
the services at the end of the contractual period is 50 Euro. The regular monthly 
payments of the service recipient encompass all the of the other elements of the 
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                 value) 
100       90         80         70         60         50         40        30         20         10          0 
 
 
In contrast to the example above, the service payments include a reduced 
amortisation element. For this reason, only 2.50 Euro have to be added to the 
average economic value of 95 Euro in the year 01 (instead of 5 Euro). In the 
subsequent years, the average economic value has to be increased by 5 Euro per 
year (instead of 10 Euro). The underlying - simplified - assumption is that the lack of 
amortisation (which is in this alternative 50% of the regular amortisation) is to be 
allocated on a straight line basis. The total amount added to the average economic 
                                            





















   
 
contract terminates. In the latter case, the calculation basis is in-between the 
economic value (reduced by depreciation) and the original acquisition value. In the 
same way as described above, it is necessary to follow a rather simple and practical 
concept in order to avoid complicated mathematical determinations on a case-by-
case basis. For this reason, it makes sense to stick to the economic value and to add 
a portion of the deferred payment to the tax base in order to take into account the 
increased amount of capital provided during the contractual period. In this regard, it is 
important to recognise the difference between the situation where the amortisation 
element included in the service payments remains unchanged during the contractual 
period - which can be the case if the service payments are adjusted during the 
contractual period in order to reflect the lower interest component - and the situation 
where the amortisation element increases over time while the interest element 
decreases (in case of unadjusted service payments). In favour of simplicity and 
practicability - and in favour of the taxpayer - the system may accept a straight line 
amortisation even if it is, from a mathematical perspective, not completely correct. 
Thus, it is acceptable, in my opinion, to add the portion of the deferred payment - 
calculated on a straight line basis - to the respective average economic value.  
 
Example: the acquisition value of the property which is subject to a leasing 
arrangement is 100 Euro. The contractual leasing period and the expected economic 
lifetime are 10 years. The (final) payment which has to be made by the recipient of 
the services at the end of the contractual period is 100 Euro. The regular monthly 
payments of the service recipient encompass all of the other elements of the leasing 
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                 value) 
100       90         80         70         60         50         40        30         20         10          0 
 
 
In this example, the economic value after one year is 90 Euro and the calculation 
basis for year 01 would be 95 Euro - under the assumption of a regular amortisation 
and a deferred payment of zero. However, the fact that a (final) payment of 100 Euro 
has to be made at the end of the 10 year period requires - as outlined above - that an 
amount of 5 Euro has to be added to the average economic value of 95 Euro. In the 
subsequent year 02, an amount of 15 Euro (5 Euro + 10 Euro)54 has to be added to 
the average economic value of 85 Euro. In the following years, the amount which has 
to be added to the average economic value increases by 10 Euro each year (up to 95 
Euro in year 10). Hence, the total amount added to the average economic value over 
the period of 10 years is 500 Euro55 - which results in an average of 50 Euro per 
                                            
54 The amount of 15 Euro is half of the difference of the year 01 (10 x ½) plus the difference between the average 
amount of the year 01 (95 Euro) and the average amount of the year 02 (85 Euro).  
55 5+15+25+35+45+55+65+75+85+95=500.  
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9.4.2.1.5. Other Activities 
 
It should be clear that the aforementioned principles should be applicable in the 
same way to property which is not formally provided by way of loan agreements, 
licensing agreements, leasing agreements et cetera, but by way of transactions 
which are - in substance - comparable to such activities. It may also be the case that 
the provision of capital is not immediately visible from the balance sheet of the CSC. 
For example, leasing agreements may be seen by the state of the CSC - due to the 
atypical terms of the underlying agreement - as a sale of the property instead of a 
service agreement. In this case, the property may not be included in the balance 
sheet anymore, but - instead - receivables which have the character of loan amounts. 
Of course, the principles described above remain valid and can be applied equally to 
those situations, but it might be more difficult, in practice, to draw the right 
conclusions and to determine the calculation basis. 
 
9.4.2.2. Possible Limitations and the Determination of the Net Calculation Basis   
 
The calculation basis of the property concerned is one thing, but the actual 
investment of the shareholder in the respective legal entity another. The simplest 
case is certainly the situation in which the calculation basis of the property is exactly 
as high as the amount of capital invested by the shareholder. However, this is rather 
a theoretical scenario, at least if a period of more than one year is taken into account. 
In the latter case, it is much more likely that the calculation basis deviates from the 
amount of investment of the shareholder, i.e. the calculation basis is higher or lower. 
It may be higher if, for example, the earnings from the activity are re-invested and not 






  shareholder investment: 1,000  







  calculation basis of the property utilised for 
  tainted activities: 1,500 (1,000 shareholder 




The question arises whether the basic interest component should be calculated on 
the amount of 1,500 Euro or whether it should be limited to 1,000 Euro, which is the 
original investment of the shareholder (and which is therefore not identical to the total 
amount of equity of company C). The question is, in my opinion, not very difficult to 
answer since the origin of the capital invested in the property concerned is not 




   
 
value over the period of 10 years is 250 Euro57 - and therefore an average of 25 Euro 
per year. Again, it must be repeated once more that the assumption of a straight line 
(or linear) amortisation is not always mathematically correct, but it is a simpler and 
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c.) Other cases 
 
In general, it is possible that the contractual arrangements contain a mixture of pre-
payments and deferred payments. In those cases, the principles outlined above have 
to be applied in order to determine the appropriate calculation basis for the taxation 
of the basic interest component, i.e. the upfront payment has to be deducted - in 
advance - from the acquisition value of the property and the deferred payment is to 
be added to the (reduced) average economic value. There are, in principle, no 
additional difficulties involved in those “mixed” cases and the respective approaches 
can be applied in combination. For any other “atypical” cases it should be clear that 
the calculation starts with the economic value. Based on the latter value, adjustments 
have to be made in order to reflect the differences to the “typical” cases and to end 
up with an appropriate calculation basis.  
 
9.4.2.1.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 
 
In this context, the leasing and renting activities related to immovable property are 
mainly related to land and real estate, because intangible property is already covered 
by the licensing activities described above. In principle, there are no additional 
aspects which require an approach which is different from the system outlined above. 
Therefore, the calculation basis of land and real estate is to be determined on the 
basis of the economic lifetime of the property. With respect to land, it is likely that 
there is no “planned” decrease in the economic value, i.e. no regular depreciation 
can be applied. In this case, the calculation basis remains unadjusted during the 
contractual period. For real estate, there is no difference to the principles stipulated 
above for movable property.  
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9.4.2.1.5. Other Activities 
 
It should be clear that the aforementioned principles should be applicable in the 
same way to property which is not formally provided by way of loan agreements, 
licensing agreements, leasing agreements et cetera, but by way of transactions 
which are - in substance - comparable to such activities. It may also be the case that 
the provision of capital is not immediately visible from the balance sheet of the CSC. 
For example, leasing agreements may be seen by the state of the CSC - due to the 
atypical terms of the underlying agreement - as a sale of the property instead of a 
service agreement. In this case, the property may not be included in the balance 
sheet anymore, but - instead - receivables which have the character of loan amounts. 
Of course, the principles described above remain valid and can be applied equally to 
those situations, but it might be more difficult, in practice, to draw the right 
conclusions and to determine the calculation basis. 
 
9.4.2.2. Possible Limitations and the Determination of the Net Calculation Basis   
 
The calculation basis of the property concerned is one thing, but the actual 
investment of the shareholder in the respective legal entity another. The simplest 
case is certainly the situation in which the calculation basis of the property is exactly 
as high as the amount of capital invested by the shareholder. However, this is rather 
a theoretical scenario, at least if a period of more than one year is taken into account. 
In the latter case, it is much more likely that the calculation basis deviates from the 
amount of investment of the shareholder, i.e. the calculation basis is higher or lower. 
It may be higher if, for example, the earnings from the activity are re-invested and not 
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The question arises whether the basic interest component should be calculated on 
the amount of 1,500 Euro or whether it should be limited to 1,000 Euro, which is the 
original investment of the shareholder (and which is therefore not identical to the total 
amount of equity of company C). The question is, in my opinion, not very difficult to 
answer since the origin of the capital invested in the property concerned is not 




   
 
value over the period of 10 years is 250 Euro57 - and therefore an average of 25 Euro 
per year. Again, it must be repeated once more that the assumption of a straight line 
(or linear) amortisation is not always mathematically correct, but it is a simpler and 
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c.) Other cases 
 
In general, it is possible that the contractual arrangements contain a mixture of pre-
payments and deferred payments. In those cases, the principles outlined above have 
to be applied in order to determine the appropriate calculation basis for the taxation 
of the basic interest component, i.e. the upfront payment has to be deducted - in 
advance - from the acquisition value of the property and the deferred payment is to 
be added to the (reduced) average economic value. There are, in principle, no 
additional difficulties involved in those “mixed” cases and the respective approaches 
can be applied in combination. For any other “atypical” cases it should be clear that 
the calculation starts with the economic value. Based on the latter value, adjustments 
have to be made in order to reflect the differences to the “typical” cases and to end 
up with an appropriate calculation basis.  
 
9.4.2.1.4. Leasing and Renting Activities Related to Immovable Property 
 
In this context, the leasing and renting activities related to immovable property are 
mainly related to land and real estate, because intangible property is already covered 
by the licensing activities described above. In principle, there are no additional 
aspects which require an approach which is different from the system outlined above. 
Therefore, the calculation basis of land and real estate is to be determined on the 
basis of the economic lifetime of the property. With respect to land, it is likely that 
there is no “planned” decrease in the economic value, i.e. no regular depreciation 
can be applied. In this case, the calculation basis remains unadjusted during the 
contractual period. For real estate, there is no difference to the principles stipulated 
above for movable property.  
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Following the pattern outlined above, it would not make much sense to stick to the 
original investment of 1,000 Euro instead of the actual calculation basis of the 
property of 800 Euro. In the situation in which company C is compensated for the 
economic depreciation (e.g. in a leasing or licensing agreement), and taking into 
account the particular aspects which may be of relevance for the determination of the 
tax base, it is required, in my opinion, to ignore the higher shareholder investment 
and to concentrate solely on the lower calculation basis of the property in question. 
One must be aware that the (total) interest component included in the calculation of 
the service arrangement takes into account the amortisation payments during the 
contractual period, i.e. the interest component decreases. Hence, it would neither be 
economically required to stick to the original amount of investment nor would it be 
required from an anti-avoidance perspective. Again, this case must be separated 
from a situation in which the property is, for example, (temporarily) reduced by 
depreciation which is based on an impairment test. In those cases, the calculation 
basis itself will not be reduced as long as the contractual relationship is still in place 
and the payments are actually made.  
 
Apart from these rather clear situations, one has to be aware that “real life” is much 
more complex. For example, it is not unlikely that part of the property is re-financed 
by loan amounts, and that the legal entity carries on “mixed” activities, i.e. part of the 
property is used for tainted activities and part of the property is used for non-tainted 
activities (and both activities might be partly re-financed). It is absolutely clear that 
any alternative anti-avoidance legislation has to provide for an economically and 
legally acceptable solution in these situations, too, but should nonetheless follow an 












   
 
calculation or not. In other words, the fact that the 1,000 Euro shareholder investment 
and the 500 Euro retained earnings originate from previously generated income 
which was either within or outside of the scope of the basic interest taxation is of no 
relevance whatsoever for the decision which has to be made regarding the newly 
generated income from the tainted activities and the calculation basis. Moreover, the 
decision for retaining the earnings on the corporate level for further investments 
instead of distributing the proceeds to the shareholder can be seen, in my opinion, as 
another investment decision of the shareholder which does usually not affect the 
book value of the investment of the shareholder. The latter, however, is of no 
importance for the overall assessment. It is therefore justifiable - and from my 
perspective even required - to focus, in the example, on a calculation basis of 1,500 
Euro instead of the original 1,000 Euro. In addition, it has to be noted that any 
limitation would considerably “soften” the anti-avoidance element. This is particularly 
true in those cases where a significant service element and / or a significant risk 
element is included and where the profits are relatively high. Here, the basic interest 
component (computed on the lower calculation basis) would play an insignificant role 
after a few years. For example, if an original investment increases from 1,000 Euro to 
3,000 Euro - through the re-investment of profits - and the basic interest component 
is only calculated on the original investment of 1,000 Euro, the effect of income 
allocation would be very limited. If the basic interest component is 4 percent, for 
example, it would only be 1.33 percent in relation to the actual amount of investment 
of 3,000 Euro (1/3 of 4 percent) which is now the basis for generating the positive 
income. Thus, it is also from an anti-avoidance perspective obvious that there should 
not be any limitation whatsoever to the original amount of investment by ignoring the 
subsequent re-investment of income on the level of the legal entity which carries out 
the tainted activities. However, it may be possible that the overall calculation basis is 
reduced and is below the original shareholder investment. This can be the case, inter 
alia, if the activity leads to negative income or if the positive income is distributed to 
the shareholder but the property is subject to depreciation and therefore the 
calculation basis is reduced on a yearly basis. The latter may also be true in a 
situation where the positive income is not distributed but invested by the legal entity 
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Following the pattern outlined above, it would not make much sense to stick to the 
original investment of 1,000 Euro instead of the actual calculation basis of the 
property of 800 Euro. In the situation in which company C is compensated for the 
economic depreciation (e.g. in a leasing or licensing agreement), and taking into 
account the particular aspects which may be of relevance for the determination of the 
tax base, it is required, in my opinion, to ignore the higher shareholder investment 
and to concentrate solely on the lower calculation basis of the property in question. 
One must be aware that the (total) interest component included in the calculation of 
the service arrangement takes into account the amortisation payments during the 
contractual period, i.e. the interest component decreases. Hence, it would neither be 
economically required to stick to the original amount of investment nor would it be 
required from an anti-avoidance perspective. Again, this case must be separated 
from a situation in which the property is, for example, (temporarily) reduced by 
depreciation which is based on an impairment test. In those cases, the calculation 
basis itself will not be reduced as long as the contractual relationship is still in place 
and the payments are actually made.  
 
Apart from these rather clear situations, one has to be aware that “real life” is much 
more complex. For example, it is not unlikely that part of the property is re-financed 
by loan amounts, and that the legal entity carries on “mixed” activities, i.e. part of the 
property is used for tainted activities and part of the property is used for non-tainted 
activities (and both activities might be partly re-financed). It is absolutely clear that 
any alternative anti-avoidance legislation has to provide for an economically and 
legally acceptable solution in these situations, too, but should nonetheless follow an 












   
 
calculation or not. In other words, the fact that the 1,000 Euro shareholder investment 
and the 500 Euro retained earnings originate from previously generated income 
which was either within or outside of the scope of the basic interest taxation is of no 
relevance whatsoever for the decision which has to be made regarding the newly 
generated income from the tainted activities and the calculation basis. Moreover, the 
decision for retaining the earnings on the corporate level for further investments 
instead of distributing the proceeds to the shareholder can be seen, in my opinion, as 
another investment decision of the shareholder which does usually not affect the 
book value of the investment of the shareholder. The latter, however, is of no 
importance for the overall assessment. It is therefore justifiable - and from my 
perspective even required - to focus, in the example, on a calculation basis of 1,500 
Euro instead of the original 1,000 Euro. In addition, it has to be noted that any 
limitation would considerably “soften” the anti-avoidance element. This is particularly 
true in those cases where a significant service element and / or a significant risk 
element is included and where the profits are relatively high. Here, the basic interest 
component (computed on the lower calculation basis) would play an insignificant role 
after a few years. For example, if an original investment increases from 1,000 Euro to 
3,000 Euro - through the re-investment of profits - and the basic interest component 
is only calculated on the original investment of 1,000 Euro, the effect of income 
allocation would be very limited. If the basic interest component is 4 percent, for 
example, it would only be 1.33 percent in relation to the actual amount of investment 
of 3,000 Euro (1/3 of 4 percent) which is now the basis for generating the positive 
income. Thus, it is also from an anti-avoidance perspective obvious that there should 
not be any limitation whatsoever to the original amount of investment by ignoring the 
subsequent re-investment of income on the level of the legal entity which carries out 
the tainted activities. However, it may be possible that the overall calculation basis is 
reduced and is below the original shareholder investment. This can be the case, inter 
alia, if the activity leads to negative income or if the positive income is distributed to 
the shareholder but the property is subject to depreciation and therefore the 
calculation basis is reduced on a yearly basis. The latter may also be true in a 
situation where the positive income is not distributed but invested by the legal entity 






















   
 
financial statements of the legal entity. The same should be true for the interest 
bearing liabilities if the legal entity re-finances part of its financing, leasing or 
licensing services with long-term debts which are not subject to changes or which are 
just reduced by regular amortisation within the financial year. However, the 
determination of the average amount of outstanding debts may require additional 
information if the liabilities are subject to permanent changes, e.g. in case of a cash 
pooling activity with other group companies. In this case, the determination of the 
average amount should follow exactly the same principles as outlined above with 
respect to the determination of the calculation basis for the loan receivables in a cash 
pooling structure. In the example, the average amount of equity is 1,500 Euro and 
the average amount of debts is 500 Euro. This would lead to the following general 
conclusion regarding the financing of the activities of the legal entity with equity and 
interest bearing liabilities: 
 
1,500 Euro / 2,000 Euro (= 75 percent) is financed by equity, and 
 
 500 Euro / 2,000 Euro (= 25 percent) is financed by interest bearing liabilities. 
 
The non-interest bearing (current) liabilities are left aside for the calculation. The 
latter are typically of no relevance for the long-term re-financing and, therefore, 
should not be taken into account for the determination of the calculation basis. In 
other words, what matters is the ratio between the equity of the company and the 
interest bearing liabilities. Thus, based on such an approach, the equity element 
within the total (average) amount of interest bearing liabilities plus equity is 75 
percent. The latter percentage can now be applied to the calculation basis of the 
tainted property in order to determine the net calculation basis. The calculation basis 
of the non-tainted property (300 Euro) is of no relevance in this respect and need not 
be calculated.  
 
1,700 Euro calculation basis x 0.75 = 1,275 Euro net calculation basis. 
 
In the example, the basic interest rate is to be applied to the net calculation basis of 
1,275 Euro and not on the amount of 1,700 Euro. It is important to note, however, 
that any adjustment of the calculation basis compared to the actual book value, e.g. 
because of an extraordinary high depreciation rate, should have an effect on the 
amount of equity applied for the determination of the ratio, too. For example, if it is 
assumed that the book value of the tainted property is 1,700 Euro and the calculation 
basis is 2,100 Euro - because of an increased depreciation which had to be corrected 
- the adjustment of 400 Euro should also increase the average amount of equity 
which is applied for the determination of the ratio. In principle, it may be concluded 
that such an equity adjustment is required in those cases where the difference had 
any effect on the equity of the legal entity, i.e. in particular in those cases where the 
difference is due to a profit and loss effective measure (as is the case for the 
increased depreciation). In those cases where the calculation basis substantially 
deviates from the book value just because of the fact that the average value of the 
property within the year is considerably higher than the book value at the end of the 
year, there is no necessity for a corresponding adjustment of the equity or debt basis. 
The reason is that in such a situation the simultaneous calculation of the average 
amount of equity and interest bearing liabilities reflects this deviation, too. For 
example, if the calculation basis of the cash-pooling receivables of the legal entity is 
5,000 Euro, but the book value at the end of the year is only 1,000 Euro, the average 
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       average amount of equity of company C: 1,500 
       (including retained earnings) 




       investment in tainted property / calculation basis: 1,700 
       (assumption: calculation basis = book value of the property) 
 
       investment in non-tainted property /  
   (theoretical) calculation basis: 300 (= book value) 
 
 
In this example, the investment in tainted property (1,700 Euro) and non-tainted 
property (300 Euro) is refinanced by equity (1,500 Euro) and debts (500 Euro). 
Whether it is possible to allocate the amount of equity and debts directly to the 
respective property depends on the facts and circumstances. However, if the 
company carries on its activities in a low-tax state, it is not unlikely - from a tax 
planning perspective - that the non-tainted property is financed by equity investments 
and that the tainted income is, as much as possible, based on debt financing. This 
might lead to a reduction of tainted income under some of the existing CFC rules and 
increases the amount of positive income which is outside of the scope of such 
legislation. The same effect would exist under the proposed alternative anti-
avoidance legislation if the rules follow strictly the debt-equity allocation of the 
taxpayer. However, since it is quite obvious that the debt-equity allocation can be 
easily influenced to the detriment of the state of the shareholder, the mechanism 
should follow a rather strict and simple pattern of debt-equity allocation. In this 
respect, it is important to note (and to repeat) that the allocation of the basic interest 
component is less restrictive than other regimes which follow the typical CFC pattern 
and which are based on the attribution of income generated by the service company 
without any vertical separation of this income. The effect of an allocation of equity to 
the tainted property (instead of the non-tainted property) for the purpose of 
determining the tax base merely has the effect that the basic interest component 
increases. This may lead - in a worst case scenario for the shareholder - to the 
calculation of the basic interest component on property which is used for a non-
tainted activity. Clearly, this is not intended by the alternative regime, but it solely 
leads to a limited interest taxation on the property without taxing the total amount of 
income derived through the legal entity (which might otherwise be the case under a 
CFC regime). Hence, from an anti-avoidance perspective it seems to be justifiable to 
provide for a debt-equity allocation to the property of the legal entity which is based 
on the ratio between the average amount of equity and the average amount of 
interest bearing liabilities within the respective year. The determination of the average 
amount of equity should not be very difficult if there are no substantial and complex 
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financial statements of the legal entity. The same should be true for the interest 
bearing liabilities if the legal entity re-finances part of its financing, leasing or 
licensing services with long-term debts which are not subject to changes or which are 
just reduced by regular amortisation within the financial year. However, the 
determination of the average amount of outstanding debts may require additional 
information if the liabilities are subject to permanent changes, e.g. in case of a cash 
pooling activity with other group companies. In this case, the determination of the 
average amount should follow exactly the same principles as outlined above with 
respect to the determination of the calculation basis for the loan receivables in a cash 
pooling structure. In the example, the average amount of equity is 1,500 Euro and 
the average amount of debts is 500 Euro. This would lead to the following general 
conclusion regarding the financing of the activities of the legal entity with equity and 
interest bearing liabilities: 
 
1,500 Euro / 2,000 Euro (= 75 percent) is financed by equity, and 
 
 500 Euro / 2,000 Euro (= 25 percent) is financed by interest bearing liabilities. 
 
The non-interest bearing (current) liabilities are left aside for the calculation. The 
latter are typically of no relevance for the long-term re-financing and, therefore, 
should not be taken into account for the determination of the calculation basis. In 
other words, what matters is the ratio between the equity of the company and the 
interest bearing liabilities. Thus, based on such an approach, the equity element 
within the total (average) amount of interest bearing liabilities plus equity is 75 
percent. The latter percentage can now be applied to the calculation basis of the 
tainted property in order to determine the net calculation basis. The calculation basis 
of the non-tainted property (300 Euro) is of no relevance in this respect and need not 
be calculated.  
 
1,700 Euro calculation basis x 0.75 = 1,275 Euro net calculation basis. 
 
In the example, the basic interest rate is to be applied to the net calculation basis of 
1,275 Euro and not on the amount of 1,700 Euro. It is important to note, however, 
that any adjustment of the calculation basis compared to the actual book value, e.g. 
because of an extraordinary high depreciation rate, should have an effect on the 
amount of equity applied for the determination of the ratio, too. For example, if it is 
assumed that the book value of the tainted property is 1,700 Euro and the calculation 
basis is 2,100 Euro - because of an increased depreciation which had to be corrected 
- the adjustment of 400 Euro should also increase the average amount of equity 
which is applied for the determination of the ratio. In principle, it may be concluded 
that such an equity adjustment is required in those cases where the difference had 
any effect on the equity of the legal entity, i.e. in particular in those cases where the 
difference is due to a profit and loss effective measure (as is the case for the 
increased depreciation). In those cases where the calculation basis substantially 
deviates from the book value just because of the fact that the average value of the 
property within the year is considerably higher than the book value at the end of the 
year, there is no necessity for a corresponding adjustment of the equity or debt basis. 
The reason is that in such a situation the simultaneous calculation of the average 
amount of equity and interest bearing liabilities reflects this deviation, too. For 
example, if the calculation basis of the cash-pooling receivables of the legal entity is 
5,000 Euro, but the book value at the end of the year is only 1,000 Euro, the average 
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In this example, the investment in tainted property (1,700 Euro) and non-tainted 
property (300 Euro) is refinanced by equity (1,500 Euro) and debts (500 Euro). 
Whether it is possible to allocate the amount of equity and debts directly to the 
respective property depends on the facts and circumstances. However, if the 
company carries on its activities in a low-tax state, it is not unlikely - from a tax 
planning perspective - that the non-tainted property is financed by equity investments 
and that the tainted income is, as much as possible, based on debt financing. This 
might lead to a reduction of tainted income under some of the existing CFC rules and 
increases the amount of positive income which is outside of the scope of such 
legislation. The same effect would exist under the proposed alternative anti-
avoidance legislation if the rules follow strictly the debt-equity allocation of the 
taxpayer. However, since it is quite obvious that the debt-equity allocation can be 
easily influenced to the detriment of the state of the shareholder, the mechanism 
should follow a rather strict and simple pattern of debt-equity allocation. In this 
respect, it is important to note (and to repeat) that the allocation of the basic interest 
component is less restrictive than other regimes which follow the typical CFC pattern 
and which are based on the attribution of income generated by the service company 
without any vertical separation of this income. The effect of an allocation of equity to 
the tainted property (instead of the non-tainted property) for the purpose of 
determining the tax base merely has the effect that the basic interest component 
increases. This may lead - in a worst case scenario for the shareholder - to the 
calculation of the basic interest component on property which is used for a non-
tainted activity. Clearly, this is not intended by the alternative regime, but it solely 
leads to a limited interest taxation on the property without taxing the total amount of 
income derived through the legal entity (which might otherwise be the case under a 
CFC regime). Hence, from an anti-avoidance perspective it seems to be justifiable to 
provide for a debt-equity allocation to the property of the legal entity which is based 
on the ratio between the average amount of equity and the average amount of 
interest bearing liabilities within the respective year. The determination of the average 
amount of equity should not be very difficult if there are no substantial and complex 






   
 
difference between a shareholding which represents one quarter of the total 
investments on the one hand, and a shareholding - although substantial from the 
perspective of the absolute amount - which represents just a small fraction of the total 
investments on the other hand.  
 
However, the question arises whether the minimum percentage should be relevant 
only for the investment in the entity which carries on the tainted activities or whether it 
should be a minimum requirement for the shareholding in all of the intermediate 
companies. The approach followed by the existing CFC regimes is not uniform in this 
respect.58 Thus, one possibility is to follow a system according to which the 
shareholder must have a direct or indirect participation of at least 25 percent 
(shareholding or voting rights) in the entity which carries on the tainted activities and - 
in case of multiple-tier structures - in all of the intermediate holdings. This ensures an 
uninterrupted chain of shareholdings with a participation of at least 25 percent, and 
therefore a consistent influence on the tainted activities independent from the number 
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amount of loan payables will most certainly also be higher than the book value at the 
end of the year. It is absolutely clear that such a simplified allocation rule does not 
necessarily fit in any situation and under all circumstances. However, it provides a 
method which, in my opinion, is simpler than most of the existing CFC rules and 
which leads to an appropriate allocation of interest bearing liabilities in order to 
determine the net calculation basis for the application of the basic interest rate.  
 
9.4.3. Permanent Establishments and Transparent Entities  
 
The conclusion that the tainted property which is allocable to the PE of a legal entity 
or to a transparent PS has to be taken into account for the CSC taxation raises the 
question whether the property of the PE (PS) should be treated separately from the 
property of the legal entity or whether it has to be consolidated for all of the required 
calculations. From my perspective, it is simpler, at least with respect to PE (PS) 
activities which are carried on in a state which is different from the state of the 
headquarter company, to separate the property of the PE (PS) from the property of 
the headquarter company. Essentially, the position would be similar to an alternative 
situation where the PE (PS) is replaced by a non-transparent legal entity. This does 
not only provide for an equal treatment of PE (PS) and non-transparent legal entities, 
but also seems to be a more practical approach compared to any solution which is 
based on consolidation. One should not forget that a separation of the calculation 
basis is required anyway since the amount of taxes imposed on the basic interest 
income is most likely not identical in the two states involved. Thus, it makes some 
sense, in my opinion, to consider the allocation of the property - which has to be 
made anyway in order to fulfil the requirements of the tax jurisdictions involved - and 
to start on such a basis. In other words, the allocation of the tainted property of the 
PE (PS) and the legal entity to the jurisdictions involved follows the property 
allocation which has to be made for income tax purposes. The same should be true 
for the question of how much of the interest bearing liabilities are allocable to the PE 
and the headquarter company. Such an approach ensures that the basis for deriving 
the actual taxable income and the net calculation basis for the basic interest 
component are consistently allocated to the respective states (PE / PS state and 
headquarter state). The separation is not only required if tainted property is held by 
the headquarter company and the PE (PS), but is equally required if only one of the 
two parties carries on a tainted activity (and the other party carries on a non-tainted 
activity).  
 
9.4.4. The Percentage of Shareholding or Voting Rights in the CSC 
 
Pursuant to the principles outlined earlier, the current taxation of the basic interest 
component under the CSC system should only be applied if the 25 percent threshold 
(shareholding or voting rights) in the respective entity is reached or exceeded. That 
means, the CSC legislation should be applicable if one of the two percentages - 
either the percentage of shareholding or the percentage of voting rights - is at least 
25 percent. The differentiation between the percentage of shareholding and the 
percentage of voting rights ensures that any substantial shareholding falls within the 
scope of the alternative legislation. Although the lower percentage of voting rights 
may reduce the influence of the shareholder, the 25 percent shareholding still 
represents a significant portion of investment in the company. As already described 
earlier, I do not see the necessity for an absolute financial threshold in addition to the 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights. There is, in my opinion, a substantial 
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difference between a shareholding which represents one quarter of the total 
investments on the one hand, and a shareholding - although substantial from the 
perspective of the absolute amount - which represents just a small fraction of the total 
investments on the other hand.  
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should be a minimum requirement for the shareholding in all of the intermediate 
companies. The approach followed by the existing CFC regimes is not uniform in this 
respect.58 Thus, one possibility is to follow a system according to which the 
shareholder must have a direct or indirect participation of at least 25 percent 
(shareholding or voting rights) in the entity which carries on the tainted activities and - 
in case of multiple-tier structures - in all of the intermediate holdings. This ensures an 
uninterrupted chain of shareholdings with a participation of at least 25 percent, and 
therefore a consistent influence on the tainted activities independent from the number 
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amount of loan payables will most certainly also be higher than the book value at the 
end of the year. It is absolutely clear that such a simplified allocation rule does not 
necessarily fit in any situation and under all circumstances. However, it provides a 
method which, in my opinion, is simpler than most of the existing CFC rules and 
which leads to an appropriate allocation of interest bearing liabilities in order to 
determine the net calculation basis for the application of the basic interest rate.  
 
9.4.3. Permanent Establishments and Transparent Entities  
 
The conclusion that the tainted property which is allocable to the PE of a legal entity 
or to a transparent PS has to be taken into account for the CSC taxation raises the 
question whether the property of the PE (PS) should be treated separately from the 
property of the legal entity or whether it has to be consolidated for all of the required 
calculations. From my perspective, it is simpler, at least with respect to PE (PS) 
activities which are carried on in a state which is different from the state of the 
headquarter company, to separate the property of the PE (PS) from the property of 
the headquarter company. Essentially, the position would be similar to an alternative 
situation where the PE (PS) is replaced by a non-transparent legal entity. This does 
not only provide for an equal treatment of PE (PS) and non-transparent legal entities, 
but also seems to be a more practical approach compared to any solution which is 
based on consolidation. One should not forget that a separation of the calculation 
basis is required anyway since the amount of taxes imposed on the basic interest 
income is most likely not identical in the two states involved. Thus, it makes some 
sense, in my opinion, to consider the allocation of the property - which has to be 
made anyway in order to fulfil the requirements of the tax jurisdictions involved - and 
to start on such a basis. In other words, the allocation of the tainted property of the 
PE (PS) and the legal entity to the jurisdictions involved follows the property 
allocation which has to be made for income tax purposes. The same should be true 
for the question of how much of the interest bearing liabilities are allocable to the PE 
and the headquarter company. Such an approach ensures that the basis for deriving 
the actual taxable income and the net calculation basis for the basic interest 
component are consistently allocated to the respective states (PE / PS state and 
headquarter state). The separation is not only required if tainted property is held by 
the headquarter company and the PE (PS), but is equally required if only one of the 
two parties carries on a tainted activity (and the other party carries on a non-tainted 
activity).  
 
9.4.4. The Percentage of Shareholding or Voting Rights in the CSC 
 
Pursuant to the principles outlined earlier, the current taxation of the basic interest 
component under the CSC system should only be applied if the 25 percent threshold 
(shareholding or voting rights) in the respective entity is reached or exceeded. That 
means, the CSC legislation should be applicable if one of the two percentages - 
either the percentage of shareholding or the percentage of voting rights - is at least 
25 percent. The differentiation between the percentage of shareholding and the 
percentage of voting rights ensures that any substantial shareholding falls within the 
scope of the alternative legislation. Although the lower percentage of voting rights 
may reduce the influence of the shareholder, the 25 percent shareholding still 
represents a significant portion of investment in the company. As already described 
earlier, I do not see the necessity for an absolute financial threshold in addition to the 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights. There is, in my opinion, a substantial 
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In the multiple-tier structure above, the shareholding on a higher group level must be 
100 percent in order to end up with an indirect participation of 25 percent in company 
C. This ensures the access to the information which is required for the calculation of 
the basic interest component similar to a direct shareholding of the individual and 
corporate shareholders of state A in company C. Of course, if the percentage of 
combined shareholding of company B and company D is higher than 25 percent, the 
percentages on a higher level may be below 100 percent. For example, if it is 
assumed that company B holds 50 percent instead of 24 percent and the 
shareholding of company D remains unchanged, the shareholding of company A in 
company B may be reduced to 48 percent (instead of 100 percent) without being 
outside of the scope of the current income attribution. If the direct shareholding of 
company B in company C is 99 percent, the shareholding of company A in company 
B may even be reduced to 25 percent in order to fulfil the shareholding 
requirement.61 Such an approach sets a threshold which is higher than in case of a 
requirement which focuses on the 25 percent minimum threshold on each of the 
intermediate levels. It is obvious, however, that it may very well lead to the result that 
the legislation may be applied to company A but not necessarily to the individual 
shareholder A if the latter holds a percentage which is below 100 percent - and 
therefore does not reach an indirect shareholding of 25 percent in company C. 
                                            










   
 
In this example, the basic interest component would be allocable to company A and 
the individual shareholder A, since both shareholders hold an uninterrupted 
participation of at least 25 percent in the intermediate companies and in the company 
on the lowest tier which carries on the tainted activities. Shareholder A holds 25 
percent in company A which, in turn, holds 25 percent in company B and in company 
D. The latter two companies hold together at least 25 percent in company C (24 
percent plus 1 percent). Essentially, the individual shareholder A has always - alone 
or combined - the influence of a one-quarter shareholding. However, there are two 
aspects which should not be overlooked: first, the actual percentage of (indirect) 
shareholding of the individual shareholder A in company C is only 1.5625 percent59 
and the actual percentage of (indirect) shareholding of company A in company C is 
only 6.25 percent.60 The percentage of income allocable to the shareholders in state 
A is therefore extremely low. In this case, it may be theoretically required to stipulate 
a minimum participation in order to ensure that the administrative burden is 
proportionate to the aim pursued. Second, the individual shareholder A not only has 
the burden of gathering the necessary information with his 25 percent (indirect) 
participation in company C but must also enforce his interest - to fulfil his obligations - 
in all of the intermediate companies. Overall, it seems to me that both factors 
combined - the “watering down” of the percentage of participation and the 
administrative obstacle - do not really support such an approach. In my opinion, the 
focus should solely be on the percentage of participation in the company which 
carries on the tainted activities. In other words, the respective shareholder must have 
a direct or indirect participation of 25 percent in the CSC. The shareholding in the 
intermediate company is, in principle, not decisive. Mathematically, however, it is 

























                                            
59 Which is the result of ¼ x ¼ x 25 percent in company C.  
60 Which is the result of ¼ x 25 percent in company C.  
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In the multiple-tier structure above, the shareholding on a higher group level must be 
100 percent in order to end up with an indirect participation of 25 percent in company 
C. This ensures the access to the information which is required for the calculation of 
the basic interest component similar to a direct shareholding of the individual and 
corporate shareholders of state A in company C. Of course, if the percentage of 
combined shareholding of company B and company D is higher than 25 percent, the 
percentages on a higher level may be below 100 percent. For example, if it is 
assumed that company B holds 50 percent instead of 24 percent and the 
shareholding of company D remains unchanged, the shareholding of company A in 
company B may be reduced to 48 percent (instead of 100 percent) without being 
outside of the scope of the current income attribution. If the direct shareholding of 
company B in company C is 99 percent, the shareholding of company A in company 
B may even be reduced to 25 percent in order to fulfil the shareholding 
requirement.61 Such an approach sets a threshold which is higher than in case of a 
requirement which focuses on the 25 percent minimum threshold on each of the 
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shareholder A if the latter holds a percentage which is below 100 percent - and 
therefore does not reach an indirect shareholding of 25 percent in company C. 
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59 Which is the result of ¼ x ¼ x 25 percent in company C.  
60 Which is the result of ¼ x 25 percent in company C.  
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achieve, especially in those cases in which not only one recipient of the capital 
services is involved but a large number of recipients in different states. It would 
require the separation of the tainted property of a company and the creation of a link 
between the tainted property and the state where it is actually utilised for an income-
producing activity. In my opinion, this would result in an extremely complex system 
which would be very difficult to handle from an administrative point of view. 
Therefore, the question must be raised whether it is acceptable to apply the regular 
tax rate applicable in the residence state of the shareholder to the total amount of 
attributed income without any limitation to the tax rate which would theoretically be 
applicable in the state where the income is actually produced. From my perspective, 
the answer can be in the affirmative in those cases in which - in the direct relationship 
between the state where the tainted property is utilised and the state of the 
shareholder which applies the anti-avoidance legislation - the right to tax the interest 
component is allocated to the state of residence and not to the state of source 
(leaving aside the limited taxation by way of withholding tax). In fact, this is the 
approach under the OECD-MTC. Here, it is clearly acceptable, in my opinion, that the 
residence state applies - in the context of the proposed anti-avoidance legislation - 
the regular domestic rate and does not provide a limitation to the tax rate of the 
source state. However, the situation is different if the residence state has concluded 
a tax treaty which provides for a strict source-based taxation. In those cases, the 
non-restriction to the income tax rate in the state of income production may only be 
justified by administrative reasons and the importance of the anti-deferral legislation 
for the state of residence.  
 
Figure 18:  
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In this example, it would be acceptable, in my opinion, that state A taxes the basic 
interest component without any limitation to the corporate income tax rate which 
would theoretically be applicable in state D. In other words, the basic interest income 
(but not more!) would be taxed, in essence, like any other income derived directly by 








   
 
Essentially, it strictly ensures that only a minimum calculative percentage of 25 
percent triggers the income allocation and, at the same time, ensures that the income 
allocation as such - under normal circumstances - is not lower than 25 percent of the 
basic interest component calculated on the tainted property of company C. In my 
opinion, the latter mechanism of calculating the minimum threshold for the application 
of the anti-avoidance legislation can be considered an appropriate approach which 
supports the balance between administrative obligations and the safeguarding of the 
current taxation of income.  
 
9.4.5. The Allocation of Income to the Shareholder  
 
If the aforementioned requirements are fulfilled, the basic interest rate is to be 
calculated on the net calculation basis and is to be attributed to the domestic 
shareholder. From a practical perspective it may be advisable - or even required - to 
attribute the basic interest income to the shareholder only after the end of the 
financial year of the company which carries on the tainted activities. Thus, if the 
financial year of the latter company and the financial year of the shareholder are 
identical, the income calculated on the tainted property should be included in the tax 
base of the domestic shareholder in the subsequent tax period and not in the same 
tax period. This provides sufficient time for the domestic shareholder to gather the 
necessary information for the respective tax assessment. For example, if company C 
has a financial year which is equal to the calendar year, the basic interest income of 
the year 01 should be included in the tax base of the domestic shareholder in year 02 
(assumption: tax year of the domestic shareholder is equal to the calendar year, too). 
For financial years which deviate from the calendar year, the basic interest income 
should also be attributed to the shareholder immediately after the end of the financial 
year, and should therefore be included in the tax year which is open at that point in 
time. For example, if the financial year 02/03 of company C ends at the end of April 
03, the basic interest income should be included in the tax year 03 - if it is still open 
and not closed on or before April 03. In the latter case, the basic interest income 
should be included in the subsequent period 03/04. In any case, if two (or more) 
domestic taxpayers are involved in a multiple-tier structure, and the amount of 
income is not only attributed to the corporate shareholder but also, for example, to an 
individual shareholder who holds the shares in the domestic company, the proposed 
legislation should ensure that one and the same basic interest component is included 
in one and the same tax period for all of the domestic taxpayers which are in “the 
same line of shareholding.” The latter may be of particular importance for a 
consistent relief from double taxation under the proposed tax credit system.  
 
Also in this case one should (again) keep in mind that the proposed legislation of a 
current taxation of income should not lead to any penalisation of activities but should 
merely ensure the proper taxation of the basic interest component.  
 
9.4.6. Limitation of the Income Tax Rate? 
 
It was outlined in previous chapters that the income should be taxed in the state in 
which it is actually produced and that a source-based taxation would therefore be the 
optimal result from an economic and equity perspective. Any taxation in the state of 
the intermediate service company or the state of residence of the shareholder should, 
theoretically, be restricted to the tax rate which would be applied in the state where 
the income is produced. It seems to me, however, that this might be very difficult to 
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financial year of the company which carries on the tainted activities. Thus, if the 
financial year of the latter company and the financial year of the shareholder are 
identical, the income calculated on the tainted property should be included in the tax 
base of the domestic shareholder in the subsequent tax period and not in the same 
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necessary information for the respective tax assessment. For example, if company C 
has a financial year which is equal to the calendar year, the basic interest income of 
the year 01 should be included in the tax base of the domestic shareholder in year 02 
(assumption: tax year of the domestic shareholder is equal to the calendar year, too). 
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time. For example, if the financial year 02/03 of company C ends at the end of April 
03, the basic interest income should be included in the tax year 03 - if it is still open 
and not closed on or before April 03. In the latter case, the basic interest income 
should be included in the subsequent period 03/04. In any case, if two (or more) 
domestic taxpayers are involved in a multiple-tier structure, and the amount of 
income is not only attributed to the corporate shareholder but also, for example, to an 
individual shareholder who holds the shares in the domestic company, the proposed 
legislation should ensure that one and the same basic interest component is included 
in one and the same tax period for all of the domestic taxpayers which are in “the 
same line of shareholding.” The latter may be of particular importance for a 
consistent relief from double taxation under the proposed tax credit system.  
 
Also in this case one should (again) keep in mind that the proposed legislation of a 
current taxation of income should not lead to any penalisation of activities but should 
merely ensure the proper taxation of the basic interest component.  
 
9.4.6. Limitation of the Income Tax Rate? 
 
It was outlined in previous chapters that the income should be taxed in the state in 
which it is actually produced and that a source-based taxation would therefore be the 
optimal result from an economic and equity perspective. Any taxation in the state of 
the intermediate service company or the state of residence of the shareholder should, 
theoretically, be restricted to the tax rate which would be applied in the state where 
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     Alternative 1   Alternative 2 
 
 
               A    tax base 100   tax base 100 
     x 40% tax = 40  x 25% tax = 25 
     ./. 30 tax credit  ./. 25 (max.) tax credit 
     = 10 tax burden  = 0 tax burden 
 
 
     tax base 100   tax base 100 
     x 30% tax = 30  x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit  ./. 10 tax credit 






     basic interest   basic interest 
     component 100  component 100 
     x 10% tax    x 10% tax 




The simplified example shows that the overall tax burden is influenced by the state 
which applies the highest tax rate and, within this state, by the differences in the 
taxation between the individual shareholder and the corporate shareholder. In the 
first alternative, it is the income tax of the individual shareholder A (40 percent) which 
is responsible for the overall and final tax burden imposed on the basic interest 
component. The tax burden on the intermediate level (30 percent) is “neutralised” 
completely. In the second alternative, the tax burden is influenced by the tax rate 
applicable on the intermediate level since the taxation is higher (30 percent) than on 
the level of the ultimate individual shareholder in state A (25 percent instead of 40 
percent in the first alternative). This is the result of the consistent application of an 
ordinary tax credit system. In general, the result would be the same if additional 
companies are interposed between A and the CSC, as long as the tax burden is not 
higher than 40 percent (first alternative) and 30 percent (second alternative), 
respectively. However, this is only true as long as the intermediate companies and 
the ultimate individual shareholder are in a position to credit the income taxes 
imposed on the respective lower group level. Otherwise, the overall income tax 
burden might be increased considerably.  
 
b.) The modified mechanism for the alternative anti-avoidance legislation  
 
It should not be overlooked that an anti-avoidance legislation which focuses on the 
current attribution of income is different from the “normal” procedure which is 
applicable in case of profits derived by a separate legal entity. In principle, such 






   
 
(e.g. financing services) directly to the recipient in state D. The procedure of income 
allocation as well as the tax credit system will be outlined in the following.  
 
9.4.7. The Tax Credit System  
 
Any system which focuses on the current allocation of income should not have  
negative effects for the domestic shareholder - apart from the fact that the allocable 
income might be taxed at a higher rate (e.g. if the allocable income is derived by an 
entity in a low-tax state). The latter effect of a higher income tax burden on the basic 
interest component is an effect which is immanent in the system and required by 
economic and equity principles.62 Apart from this effect, however, there is no reason 
to treat this allocated income different from any other income or to allow a systematic 
double taxation just because of the fact that the income is currently attributed to the 
shareholder. One should always keep in mind that such a system should not have 
any kind of penalty effect for the investor. There is neither any requirement nor any 
justification for a disadvantageous treatment. It is therefore very important that the 
state which applies such legislation provides for an appropriate (modified) system of 
relief from double taxation of income in order to avoid any distortions. It was outlined 
earlier that this is not necessarily provided for in case of existing CFC regimes, e.g. if 
the domestic shareholder derives negative income or has a tax loss carry forward 
available, if the CFC itself generates negative income, and - in particular - if multiple-
tier structures are involved.63 However, it would be too simple, in my opinion, to 
accept a double taxation of income caused by the non-crediting of income taxes in 
cases where, for example, tax losses (or tax loss carry forwards) are involved - no 
matter on which group level. This is of particular importance in a system in which the 
income attribution is not limited to the direct shareholder but also includes the indirect 
domestic shareholder, e.g. the individual shareholder. Thus, an alternative anti-
avoidance legislation requires a current attribution of the basic interest component 
combined with a strict and consistent system of elimination of the double taxation of 
income.  
 
a.) The general mechanism of the tax credit system 
 
The general mechanism should be based on an ordinary tax credit system - as 
proposed in chapter 6 - where the income taxes imposed on a lower level are 
consistently taken into account. A system which provides for a full tax credit, i.e. the 
reimbursement of an exceeding tax burden, is neither systematically required nor is it 
very realistic to be implemented in a cross-border situation as long as each Member 
State focuses on its own budget without any intra-EU compensation among Member 
States. In principle, the mechanism leads to a (total) tax burden which is equal to the 
highest tax rate applied within the group structure. This can be the income tax rate of 
the ultimate individual shareholder or - in a multiple-tier structure - the corporate 
income tax rate of a company established in a high tax state and interposed between 





                                            
62 At least to the extent that the income derived through the intermediate company is subject to a lower taxation 
than in the state of residence of the shareholder and the state where the income was produced.  
63 See chapter 6 for more details.  
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income attribution is not limited to the direct shareholder but also includes the indirect 
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avoidance legislation requires a current attribution of the basic interest component 
combined with a strict and consistent system of elimination of the double taxation of 
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a.) The general mechanism of the tax credit system 
 
The general mechanism should be based on an ordinary tax credit system - as 
proposed in chapter 6 - where the income taxes imposed on a lower level are 
consistently taken into account. A system which provides for a full tax credit, i.e. the 
reimbursement of an exceeding tax burden, is neither systematically required nor is it 
very realistic to be implemented in a cross-border situation as long as each Member 
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highest tax rate applied within the group structure. This can be the income tax rate of 
the ultimate individual shareholder or - in a multiple-tier structure - the corporate 
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62 At least to the extent that the income derived through the intermediate company is subject to a lower taxation 
than in the state of residence of the shareholder and the state where the income was produced.  
63 See chapter 6 for more details.  
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The application of a (preliminary) flat tax on the level of the individual shareholder A 
has the effect that, in this example, no additional income tax burden exists in the first 
step of income allocation. Thus, the overall income tax burden in the structure 
amounts to 30 Euro (or 30 percent). If the intermediate company is established in 
another state, e.g. in state B instead of state A, the outcome depends on the 
corporate income tax rate in state B. If the rate is above 30 percent, there would be 
no additional income tax payment for the individual shareholder A, either (first step). 
If the rate is below 30 percent, the difference between the flat rate of 30 percent in 
state A and the effective income tax in state B would have to be paid by the individual 
shareholder. The same would be true if shareholder A holds the participation in 
company C directly, i.e. without the interposition of company A. In this case, the 
additional income tax payment of shareholder A would be 20 Euro instead of 0 Euro 
(first step).  
 
c.) The modified mechanism in case of tax losses of the shareholder(s) in the CSC 
 
In my opinion, an alternative anti-avoidance system must provide for a consistent 
elimination of double taxation. This is not only true for those cases in which positive 
income is generated by the group entities, but all the more in those cases in which 
the crediting of income taxes is usually impossible, e.g. in case of negative income if 
no income tax burden of the group entity itself arises in the respective tax period.65 If 
the system fails to provide for an appropriate relief, as is the case for most of the 
                                            






   
 
of income and, second, with the treatment of subsequent distributions (or the 
subsequent disposal of shares). The second step should finally lead to a treatment of 
the income component which is not different from any other income generated by a 
(domestic or foreign) legal entity and which is finally distributed to the ultimate 
shareholder. The second step will be discussed separately. Regarding the current 
taxation of income - in the first step - it is important to note that the approach outlined 
here goes further than the typical CFC legislation. The reason is that the income 
attribution in the proposed system is not only made to the direct shareholder but also 
to the indirect (ultimate) domestic shareholder.64 The important question is, however, 
whether the income in the hands of the individual shareholder should be taxed 
according to his personal income tax rate, which can be based on a progressive 
system, or whether a (preliminary) flat rate should be applied. In my opinion, the 
taxation under a progressive system is not necessarily required in the first step of 
income allocation since the income will be determined and taxed separately (in a 
different schedule - see below) and will be subject to a “final” taxation as soon as the 
income is actually distributed to the individual shareholder. However, the system 
should lead to a strict current taxation of the basic interest component in the hands of 
the individual shareholder, no matter how many entities are interposed between the 
shareholder and the CSC in question. That means, the interposition of loss-making 
entities - or entities with a tax loss carry forward - should not have the effect of a 
complete sheltering of income attribution to the shareholder on a higher level, be it a 
corporate shareholder or an individual shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore 
obvious that the individual shareholder, even if he only indirectly participates in the 
respective “tainted” activities, should be integrated in the system of current income 
allocation. On the other hand, the system might have a distorting effect if the 
individual shareholder is subject to a personnel income taxation which is based on a 
progressive system. The latter system can have the effect of a higher income 
taxation than in case of a system in which the taxation only occurs when the legal 
entity actually distributes the respective income. Therefore, it seems to be acceptable 
to determine - only in the first step of income allocation - a fixed percentage of 
income tax (flat income tax rate) which can, for reason of simplification, be derived 
from the corporate income tax rate of the state which applies the anti-avoidance 
legislation. Only the subsequent distribution shall then be subject to income taxation 
according to the regular system applied in the residence state of the shareholder. 
The difference between the income taxes paid in the first step and the income taxes 
paid in the second step should be taken into account (e.g. credited against the 













                                            
64 In case the participation threshold is reached or exceeded.  
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state A and the effective income tax in state B would have to be paid by the individual 
shareholder. The same would be true if shareholder A holds the participation in 
company C directly, i.e. without the interposition of company A. In this case, the 
additional income tax payment of shareholder A would be 20 Euro instead of 0 Euro 
(first step).  
 
c.) The modified mechanism in case of tax losses of the shareholder(s) in the CSC 
 
In my opinion, an alternative anti-avoidance system must provide for a consistent 
elimination of double taxation. This is not only true for those cases in which positive 
income is generated by the group entities, but all the more in those cases in which 
the crediting of income taxes is usually impossible, e.g. in case of negative income if 
no income tax burden of the group entity itself arises in the respective tax period.65 If 
the system fails to provide for an appropriate relief, as is the case for most of the 
                                            






   
 
of income and, second, with the treatment of subsequent distributions (or the 
subsequent disposal of shares). The second step should finally lead to a treatment of 
the income component which is not different from any other income generated by a 
(domestic or foreign) legal entity and which is finally distributed to the ultimate 
shareholder. The second step will be discussed separately. Regarding the current 
taxation of income - in the first step - it is important to note that the approach outlined 
here goes further than the typical CFC legislation. The reason is that the income 
attribution in the proposed system is not only made to the direct shareholder but also 
to the indirect (ultimate) domestic shareholder.64 The important question is, however, 
whether the income in the hands of the individual shareholder should be taxed 
according to his personal income tax rate, which can be based on a progressive 
system, or whether a (preliminary) flat rate should be applied. In my opinion, the 
taxation under a progressive system is not necessarily required in the first step of 
income allocation since the income will be determined and taxed separately (in a 
different schedule - see below) and will be subject to a “final” taxation as soon as the 
income is actually distributed to the individual shareholder. However, the system 
should lead to a strict current taxation of the basic interest component in the hands of 
the individual shareholder, no matter how many entities are interposed between the 
shareholder and the CSC in question. That means, the interposition of loss-making 
entities - or entities with a tax loss carry forward - should not have the effect of a 
complete sheltering of income attribution to the shareholder on a higher level, be it a 
corporate shareholder or an individual shareholder. In my opinion, it is therefore 
obvious that the individual shareholder, even if he only indirectly participates in the 
respective “tainted” activities, should be integrated in the system of current income 
allocation. On the other hand, the system might have a distorting effect if the 
individual shareholder is subject to a personnel income taxation which is based on a 
progressive system. The latter system can have the effect of a higher income 
taxation than in case of a system in which the taxation only occurs when the legal 
entity actually distributes the respective income. Therefore, it seems to be acceptable 
to determine - only in the first step of income allocation - a fixed percentage of 
income tax (flat income tax rate) which can, for reason of simplification, be derived 
from the corporate income tax rate of the state which applies the anti-avoidance 
legislation. Only the subsequent distribution shall then be subject to income taxation 
according to the regular system applied in the residence state of the shareholder. 
The difference between the income taxes paid in the first step and the income taxes 
paid in the second step should be taken into account (e.g. credited against the 













                                            
64 In case the participation threshold is reached or exceeded.  
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carry forward of shareholder A is 150 Euro, the payment of 5 Euro income tax can be 
postponed. If the positive income in the following year is 250 Euro (without any 
inclusion of a current income attribution), the tax loss carry forward of 150 Euro can 
be offset completely against the positive income of 250 Euro and a positive balance 
of 100 Euro remains which is subject to tax in state A. The positive balance now has 
the consequence of triggering the payment of 5 Euro tax related to the attribution in 
year 01 after the submission of the tax return for the subsequent year. In effect, the 
positive income of 100 Euro (250 Euro minus 150 Euro tax loss carry forward) 
triggers the “regular” domestic income taxation of, for example, 40 Euro (40 percent) 
plus the 5 Euro tax which was originally postponed. However, this does not mean 
that the amount is taxed with 45 percent, but it is just the “simultaneous” effect of 
taxing the positive income of 100 Euro according to the ability-to-pay principle, on the 
one hand, and triggering the payment of the additional 5 Euro which was determined 
in an earlier period on the basic interest component included in the investment in 
company C, on the other hand. In principle, the outcome would be the same if the 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     income tax determination may be subject to  
     adjustments - depending on the situation of  
     company A (preliminary tax determination) 
 
 
     tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     payment can be postponed until the tax loss carry 




     basic interest component 






What was outlined above with respect to the tax treatment of the individual 
shareholder A in case of tax losses is equally true for the tax treatment of the 
subsidiary company A, i.e. the tax payment of 20 Euro can be postponed until the 
losses are actually utilised. If it turns out that the losses cannot be utilised, e.g. due to 
the fact that company A has to be liquidated before the losses can be offset, the 
corporate income tax of 20 Euro would not have to be paid by company A at all. The 
tax treatment of shareholder A, in turn, strongly depends on the situation of company 
A. The current attribution of income to shareholder A triggers an income taxation of 






   
 
existing CFC regimes, the current attribution of income may lead to a substantially 
higher income tax burden than (i) in a fictitious situation where the income is 
generated directly by the ultimate shareholder or (ii) in a situation where the income 
is not currently allocable to the shareholder but can be distributed (and taxed) 
according to the decision of the shareholder(s) in the respective entity. Again, it must 
be clear that the system should lead to an immediate taxation of the basic interest 
component in the hands of the (ultimate) shareholder, but not if the consequence is a 




               
      A     tax loss carry forward  
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 25 tax credit = 5 tax burden 
     payment can be postponed until the tax loss carry
     forward is utilised  
 
      
     tax base 100 x 25% tax = 25 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 15 tax burden 
     (assumption: effective tax rate of 25% instead of   
     30% / alternatively: the company is established in    




     basic interest component 






Instead of an offsetting of the attributable income with the tax losses of shareholder A 
it seems to be more consistent to make a separate calculation of the theoretical tax 
burden as if no tax losses were existent. This requires, however, a separate schedule 
(or “box”) for the current taxation of the basic interest component. In this case, the tax 
losses (or the tax loss carry forward) of shareholder A remain unaffected by the 
income attribution. The payment of the final tax burden of 5 Euro - after the crediting 
of the corporate income tax of 25 Euro (in this example it shall be assumed that the 
effective tax rate is below 30 percent) - should be postponed, by application of the 
domestic taxpayer A, to a subsequent tax period in which the positive income - 
without taking into account the current income attribution - exceeds the tax losses 
(the tax loss carry forward). In other words, the taxes imposed on the current income 
attribution should only be paid as soon as the losses are completely offset and 
shareholder A is in a position to pay the amount of tax on the corresponding positive 
income. Practically, the payment could be due after the finalisation of the tax return 
for the respective year (when a positive income balance exists for the first time after 
the current income attribution). If it is assumed - in the example - that the income 
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carry forward of shareholder A is 150 Euro, the payment of 5 Euro income tax can be 
postponed. If the positive income in the following year is 250 Euro (without any 
inclusion of a current income attribution), the tax loss carry forward of 150 Euro can 
be offset completely against the positive income of 250 Euro and a positive balance 
of 100 Euro remains which is subject to tax in state A. The positive balance now has 
the consequence of triggering the payment of 5 Euro tax related to the attribution in 
year 01 after the submission of the tax return for the subsequent year. In effect, the 
positive income of 100 Euro (250 Euro minus 150 Euro tax loss carry forward) 
triggers the “regular” domestic income taxation of, for example, 40 Euro (40 percent) 
plus the 5 Euro tax which was originally postponed. However, this does not mean 
that the amount is taxed with 45 percent, but it is just the “simultaneous” effect of 
taxing the positive income of 100 Euro according to the ability-to-pay principle, on the 
one hand, and triggering the payment of the additional 5 Euro which was determined 
in an earlier period on the basic interest component included in the investment in 
company C, on the other hand. In principle, the outcome would be the same if the 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     income tax determination may be subject to  
     adjustments - depending on the situation of  
     company A (preliminary tax determination) 
 
 
     tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     payment can be postponed until the tax loss carry 




     basic interest component 






What was outlined above with respect to the tax treatment of the individual 
shareholder A in case of tax losses is equally true for the tax treatment of the 
subsidiary company A, i.e. the tax payment of 20 Euro can be postponed until the 
losses are actually utilised. If it turns out that the losses cannot be utilised, e.g. due to 
the fact that company A has to be liquidated before the losses can be offset, the 
corporate income tax of 20 Euro would not have to be paid by company A at all. The 
tax treatment of shareholder A, in turn, strongly depends on the situation of company 
A. The current attribution of income to shareholder A triggers an income taxation of 






   
 
existing CFC regimes, the current attribution of income may lead to a substantially 
higher income tax burden than (i) in a fictitious situation where the income is 
generated directly by the ultimate shareholder or (ii) in a situation where the income 
is not currently allocable to the shareholder but can be distributed (and taxed) 
according to the decision of the shareholder(s) in the respective entity. Again, it must 
be clear that the system should lead to an immediate taxation of the basic interest 
component in the hands of the (ultimate) shareholder, but not if the consequence is a 




               
      A     tax loss carry forward  
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 25 tax credit = 5 tax burden 
     payment can be postponed until the tax loss carry
     forward is utilised  
 
      
     tax base 100 x 25% tax = 25 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 15 tax burden 
     (assumption: effective tax rate of 25% instead of   
     30% / alternatively: the company is established in    




     basic interest component 






Instead of an offsetting of the attributable income with the tax losses of shareholder A 
it seems to be more consistent to make a separate calculation of the theoretical tax 
burden as if no tax losses were existent. This requires, however, a separate schedule 
(or “box”) for the current taxation of the basic interest component. In this case, the tax 
losses (or the tax loss carry forward) of shareholder A remain unaffected by the 
income attribution. The payment of the final tax burden of 5 Euro - after the crediting 
of the corporate income tax of 25 Euro (in this example it shall be assumed that the 
effective tax rate is below 30 percent) - should be postponed, by application of the 
domestic taxpayer A, to a subsequent tax period in which the positive income - 
without taking into account the current income attribution - exceeds the tax losses 
(the tax loss carry forward). In other words, the taxes imposed on the current income 
attribution should only be paid as soon as the losses are completely offset and 
shareholder A is in a position to pay the amount of tax on the corresponding positive 
income. Practically, the payment could be due after the finalisation of the tax return 
for the respective year (when a positive income balance exists for the first time after 
the current income attribution). If it is assumed - in the example - that the income 









   
 
before the losses of the individual shareholder A are utilised, the 20 Euro income tax 
have to be paid to the tax authorities in state A. This would have the consequence of 
an adjustment of the preliminary tax determination of shareholder A. The additional 
tax burden of A would be zero (instead of 20 Euro). However, if the tax burden was 
not zero, in an alternative scenario where the final tax credit is below 30 Euro, 
shareholder A might still apply for a postponement of the tax payment until his own 
tax loss carry forward is utilised.  
 
d.) The modified mechanism in case of tax losses of the CSC 
 
The concept of income allocation under the alternative system is based on the idea 
of the current taxation of the basic interest component of capital. The actual income 
derived by the activity is only secondary. Depending on the risks taken by the service 
provider (in the example company C), there may be years in which the positive 
income derived by the activity considerably exceeds the basic interest component 
allocated to the shareholder. However, the risks taken by the entity may also result in 
negative income. In principle, the losses should be excluded from the considerations 
in the same way as the (positive) risk component is excluded from any income 
allocation. This would be a consistent approach. However, one should not overlook 
the fact that the system is foremost an anti-avoidance system. Thus, the consistent 
and permanent allocation of the basic interest component is required, but not 
necessarily the payment of the income taxes imposed on that particular portion of 
income as long as the actual positive result of the service entity does not exceed the 
negative income derived from its activities. If the result of company C is permanently 
negative, there is no necessity to impose the additional income taxes on the basic 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 0 tax credit = 30 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 




     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 0 tax credit = 30 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 





      
     negative income / tax loss carry forward 









   
 
on the attributed income as long as the tax loss carry forward is not utilised must be 
taken into account. It should lead to a (preliminary) limitation of the tax credit for 
shareholder A to the corporate income tax paid in state C of 10 percent. Thus, there 
are, in principle, two possible scenarios in subsequent years:  
 
o The tax loss carry forward of company A is utilised. In this case, the tax 
burden of company A is final and payable to the tax administration in state A 
(20 Euro). This has the consequence that the preliminary taxation of 
shareholder A is to be adjusted. Instead of a tax credit of 10 Euro a final tax 
credit of 30 Euro is to be taken into account. The effect is a repayment of 20 
Euro income tax which was originally paid by shareholder A.  
 
o The tax loss carry forward of company A cannot be utilised. In this case, the 
tax burden of company A will be adjusted. This has the consequence that the 
preliminary taxation of shareholder A becomes a final tax assessment.  
 
The result of such a dependency is the consistent avoidance of double taxation of 
income, on the hand, and the safeguarding of a current taxation of the basic interest 





                 A    tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 
     of the income tax payment 
 
 
     tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 





      basic interest component 






The situation in which two (or more) shareholders suffer tax losses simultaneously (or 
have tax loss carry forwards available) is not substantially different from the previous 
example. Here, both taxpayers (company A and individual A) may apply for a 
postponement of the payment of the income taxes. In both cases, the 10 percent tax 
paid in state C is to be taken into account, although this is solely determined on a 
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before the losses of the individual shareholder A are utilised, the 20 Euro income tax 
have to be paid to the tax authorities in state A. This would have the consequence of 
an adjustment of the preliminary tax determination of shareholder A. The additional 
tax burden of A would be zero (instead of 20 Euro). However, if the tax burden was 
not zero, in an alternative scenario where the final tax credit is below 30 Euro, 
shareholder A might still apply for a postponement of the tax payment until his own 
tax loss carry forward is utilised.  
 
d.) The modified mechanism in case of tax losses of the CSC 
 
The concept of income allocation under the alternative system is based on the idea 
of the current taxation of the basic interest component of capital. The actual income 
derived by the activity is only secondary. Depending on the risks taken by the service 
provider (in the example company C), there may be years in which the positive 
income derived by the activity considerably exceeds the basic interest component 
allocated to the shareholder. However, the risks taken by the entity may also result in 
negative income. In principle, the losses should be excluded from the considerations 
in the same way as the (positive) risk component is excluded from any income 
allocation. This would be a consistent approach. However, one should not overlook 
the fact that the system is foremost an anti-avoidance system. Thus, the consistent 
and permanent allocation of the basic interest component is required, but not 
necessarily the payment of the income taxes imposed on that particular portion of 
income as long as the actual positive result of the service entity does not exceed the 
negative income derived from its activities. If the result of company C is permanently 
negative, there is no necessity to impose the additional income taxes on the basic 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 0 tax credit = 30 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 




     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 0 tax credit = 30 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 





      
     negative income / tax loss carry forward 









   
 
on the attributed income as long as the tax loss carry forward is not utilised must be 
taken into account. It should lead to a (preliminary) limitation of the tax credit for 
shareholder A to the corporate income tax paid in state C of 10 percent. Thus, there 
are, in principle, two possible scenarios in subsequent years:  
 
o The tax loss carry forward of company A is utilised. In this case, the tax 
burden of company A is final and payable to the tax administration in state A 
(20 Euro). This has the consequence that the preliminary taxation of 
shareholder A is to be adjusted. Instead of a tax credit of 10 Euro a final tax 
credit of 30 Euro is to be taken into account. The effect is a repayment of 20 
Euro income tax which was originally paid by shareholder A.  
 
o The tax loss carry forward of company A cannot be utilised. In this case, the 
tax burden of company A will be adjusted. This has the consequence that the 
preliminary taxation of shareholder A becomes a final tax assessment.  
 
The result of such a dependency is the consistent avoidance of double taxation of 
income, on the hand, and the safeguarding of a current taxation of the basic interest 





                 A    tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
     preliminary tax determination and postponement 
     of the income tax payment 
 
 
     tax loss carry forward 
     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 





      basic interest component 






The situation in which two (or more) shareholders suffer tax losses simultaneously (or 
have tax loss carry forwards available) is not substantially different from the previous 
example. Here, both taxpayers (company A and individual A) may apply for a 
postponement of the payment of the income taxes. In both cases, the 10 percent tax 
paid in state C is to be taken into account, although this is solely determined on a 








   
 
     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03   Year 04 
 
income of company C     300    (100)   (500)     900 
 
basic interest component     100     100     100      100 
 
taxation of company A       20        -        -         - 
(without any postponement)         
100 x 30% = 30 ./. 10 tax                                 
 
preliminary tax company A         -       30       30         - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A           -        -                    -                    60 
300 x 30% = 90 ./. 30 tax (in 04)                                                  
 
 
In this example, the basic interest income of the year 01 is subject to final taxation 
(without any postponement). Theoretically, the accumulated income at the end of the 
year 02 is still positive (300 Euro minus 100 Euro). Nevertheless, the alternative 
system should provide for a postponement of the taxation of the basic interest 
component (years 02 / 03) until the positive income in subsequent years is high 
enough to cover the losses of the previous years. Such an approach does not look at 
the situation and the positive income of company C in previous years and the 
question whether the income was accumulated in the company or distributed to the 
shareholder. This is a forward looking approach to keep the legislation as simple as 
possible and to “start counting” from the year in which the loss was realised. Hence, 
the basic interest income of the years 02 and 03 will be subject to final taxation in the 
year 04 together with the basic interest income of the year 04. Overall, the additional 
corporate income tax in state A (after tax credit) for the years 01-04 amounts to 80 
Euro.  
 
e.) The modified mechanism and the simultaneous application of anti-avoidance 
legislation in a multiple-tier structure  
 
The system of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation should be prepared for the 
simultaneous application of other anti-avoidance regimes, at least inasmuch as it 
refers to the same amount of allocable income. Based on the earlier examinations, it 
is the state of the shareholder on a higher tier which should take into account a 
comparable legislation - and therefore the income taxation - on a lower tier. However, 
this should not be limited to a system which focuses on the current attribution of 
income (e.g. CFC rules) but also on a system which taxes the subsequent distribution 
on a lower tier according to the credit method instead of the exemption method. What 
was mentioned above with respect to losses is equally relevant in a structure in which 
a third state is involved (in addition to the state where the entity is established and 
which carries on the tainted activities). Overall, it should be very clear that the 
application of a system which is based on the current taxation of income derived 
through another entity can quite easily lead to a substantial double taxation of income 
in a multiple-tier structure. It is therefore of utmost importance that the legislation 
provides for an appropriate relief from double taxation. The system should by no 
means be restricted to a specific tax period, as is very often the case, but should 
   
 
 
In the example, company A and shareholder A can apply for a postponement of the 
payment of income taxes based on the preliminary tax determination. However, the 
postponement is strictly dependent on the situation of company C. As soon as the 
income of company C is positive and the positive income exceeds the existing tax 
loss carry forward in state C, the preliminary tax determination has to be adjusted 
(since the taxes imposed in state C have to be taken into account) and the income 
tax in relation to the positive income would have to be paid to the tax authorities in 
state A. The question may be raised whether the 30 percent corporate income tax of 
company A should already be credited against the 30 percent income tax of 
individual A. Without such a crediting, both assessments are made on the same 
basis and without taking into account the corporate income taxes of company A. In 
my opinion, the crediting of the income taxes should be directly linked to the actual 
payment. In other words, if company A applies for a postponement of the payment of 
the corporate income taxes, the crediting of the taxes should be postponed, too. In 
contrast thereto, if company A actually pays the corporate income taxes determined 
preliminarily, the individual shareholder A should be allowed to credit the 30 percent 
corporate income taxes in the context of the preliminary tax assessment. In any case, 
the problem is not significant, since both shareholders can apply for the 
postponement of the income tax payment. The effect over a period of three years 
may be illustrated in the following (the impact for the individual shareholder A is left 
aside for reason of simplification - the consequences may be derived from the 
previous examples): 
 
     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03 
 
 
income of company C    (300)    200     500 
 
basic interest component     100     100     100 
 
preliminary tax company A      30       30                   - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A        -         -                  60       
300 x 30% = 90 ./.30 tax (in 03)                     
 
 
However, this calculation should be equally relevant in a situation in which the losses 
occur after a period of positive income. In such a case, the taxation should 
nonetheless be subject to postponement until the negative income is offset by 
subsequent positive income (by application of the shareholder). In the following 
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     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03   Year 04 
 
income of company C     300    (100)   (500)     900 
 
basic interest component     100     100     100      100 
 
taxation of company A       20        -        -         - 
(without any postponement)         
100 x 30% = 30 ./. 10 tax                                 
 
preliminary tax company A         -       30       30         - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A           -        -                    -                    60 
300 x 30% = 90 ./. 30 tax (in 04)                                                  
 
 
In this example, the basic interest income of the year 01 is subject to final taxation 
(without any postponement). Theoretically, the accumulated income at the end of the 
year 02 is still positive (300 Euro minus 100 Euro). Nevertheless, the alternative 
system should provide for a postponement of the taxation of the basic interest 
component (years 02 / 03) until the positive income in subsequent years is high 
enough to cover the losses of the previous years. Such an approach does not look at 
the situation and the positive income of company C in previous years and the 
question whether the income was accumulated in the company or distributed to the 
shareholder. This is a forward looking approach to keep the legislation as simple as 
possible and to “start counting” from the year in which the loss was realised. Hence, 
the basic interest income of the years 02 and 03 will be subject to final taxation in the 
year 04 together with the basic interest income of the year 04. Overall, the additional 
corporate income tax in state A (after tax credit) for the years 01-04 amounts to 80 
Euro.  
 
e.) The modified mechanism and the simultaneous application of anti-avoidance 
legislation in a multiple-tier structure  
 
The system of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation should be prepared for the 
simultaneous application of other anti-avoidance regimes, at least inasmuch as it 
refers to the same amount of allocable income. Based on the earlier examinations, it 
is the state of the shareholder on a higher tier which should take into account a 
comparable legislation - and therefore the income taxation - on a lower tier. However, 
this should not be limited to a system which focuses on the current attribution of 
income (e.g. CFC rules) but also on a system which taxes the subsequent distribution 
on a lower tier according to the credit method instead of the exemption method. What 
was mentioned above with respect to losses is equally relevant in a structure in which 
a third state is involved (in addition to the state where the entity is established and 
which carries on the tainted activities). Overall, it should be very clear that the 
application of a system which is based on the current taxation of income derived 
through another entity can quite easily lead to a substantial double taxation of income 
in a multiple-tier structure. It is therefore of utmost importance that the legislation 
provides for an appropriate relief from double taxation. The system should by no 
means be restricted to a specific tax period, as is very often the case, but should 
   
 
 
In the example, company A and shareholder A can apply for a postponement of the 
payment of income taxes based on the preliminary tax determination. However, the 
postponement is strictly dependent on the situation of company C. As soon as the 
income of company C is positive and the positive income exceeds the existing tax 
loss carry forward in state C, the preliminary tax determination has to be adjusted 
(since the taxes imposed in state C have to be taken into account) and the income 
tax in relation to the positive income would have to be paid to the tax authorities in 
state A. The question may be raised whether the 30 percent corporate income tax of 
company A should already be credited against the 30 percent income tax of 
individual A. Without such a crediting, both assessments are made on the same 
basis and without taking into account the corporate income taxes of company A. In 
my opinion, the crediting of the income taxes should be directly linked to the actual 
payment. In other words, if company A applies for a postponement of the payment of 
the corporate income taxes, the crediting of the taxes should be postponed, too. In 
contrast thereto, if company A actually pays the corporate income taxes determined 
preliminarily, the individual shareholder A should be allowed to credit the 30 percent 
corporate income taxes in the context of the preliminary tax assessment. In any case, 
the problem is not significant, since both shareholders can apply for the 
postponement of the income tax payment. The effect over a period of three years 
may be illustrated in the following (the impact for the individual shareholder A is left 
aside for reason of simplification - the consequences may be derived from the 
previous examples): 
 
     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03 
 
 
income of company C    (300)    200     500 
 
basic interest component     100     100     100 
 
preliminary tax company A      30       30                   - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A        -         -                  60       
300 x 30% = 90 ./.30 tax (in 03)                     
 
 
However, this calculation should be equally relevant in a situation in which the losses 
occur after a period of positive income. In such a case, the taxation should 
nonetheless be subject to postponement until the negative income is offset by 
subsequent positive income (by application of the shareholder). In the following 











   
 
scenario, the anti-avoidance legislation of state A should strictly follow the procedure 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
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     ./. 10 tax credit = 20 tax burden 
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     CFC legislation of state B 
     tax loss carry forward 
     offsetting of the 100 attributed income with the 
     tax loss carry forward - 0 tax burden but reduction  





     basic interest component 






The fact that the income is attributed to company B and offset with the tax loss carry 
forward may lead to a double taxation of income in subsequent tax periods if - at the 
same time - the income is currently attributed to company A.66 As soon as the tax 
loss carry forward is utilised, the formerly attributed income will be subject to tax in 
state B. Leaving aside a possible interest advantage which may exist through the 
timing difference between the year in which the income is attributed and the year in 
which the income tax is actually payable, and under the assumption that the 10 
percent income tax imposed in state C can be deducted from the attributable income 
in state B, the future income tax burden in state B in relation to the formerly attributed 
income would be 31.5 percent.67 Hence, without any adjustment of the preliminary 
tax determination in state A, the same amount of income would lead to a taxation in 
state C of 10 percent, in state A of additional 20 percent and in state B of 31.5 
                                            
66 Leaving aside the fact that a double taxation may already exist in state B because of the non-existence of a tax 
credit for the income tax imposed in state C (in the absence of a roll-over system).  








   
 






                 A    tax base 100 x 30% = 30 




     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 







     CFC legislation of state B 
     tax base 100 x 35% tax = 35 
     ./. 10 tax credit = 25 tax burden  
     actual tax base might be higher /  





     basic interest component 






The mechanism applied in the example follows the pattern outlined above. State A 
provides an ordinary tax credit up to the amount assessed for company A. The 
exceeding amount of 5 percent of the taxable income cannot be credited. In effect, 
the taxable income of 100 Euro is subject to an overall income taxation of 35 percent. 
It is important to note, however, that the income of 100 Euro is most likely not 
identical to the total amount which is subject to taxation in state C and subject to CFC 
taxation in state B. It is just the overlapping amount which reflects the basic interest 
component and which is - in this example - subject to income taxation in all of the 
three states. Although the tax base in state C and state B might be higher, the 
exceeding amount of income is not subject to income taxation in state A and remains, 
therefore, unaffected. Clearly, this is one of the rather less complex situations since 
the current attribution of income takes place in the same tax period. The situation 
becomes more difficult in an alternative scenario where it is assumed that company B 
has a tax loss carry forward available and the attributed income (based on the CFC 
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scenario, the anti-avoidance legislation of state A should strictly follow the procedure 
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The fact that the income is attributed to company B and offset with the tax loss carry 
forward may lead to a double taxation of income in subsequent tax periods if - at the 
same time - the income is currently attributed to company A.66 As soon as the tax 
loss carry forward is utilised, the formerly attributed income will be subject to tax in 
state B. Leaving aside a possible interest advantage which may exist through the 
timing difference between the year in which the income is attributed and the year in 
which the income tax is actually payable, and under the assumption that the 10 
percent income tax imposed in state C can be deducted from the attributable income 
in state B, the future income tax burden in state B in relation to the formerly attributed 
income would be 31.5 percent.67 Hence, without any adjustment of the preliminary 
tax determination in state A, the same amount of income would lead to a taxation in 
state C of 10 percent, in state A of additional 20 percent and in state B of 31.5 
                                            
66 Leaving aside the fact that a double taxation may already exist in state B because of the non-existence of a tax 
credit for the income tax imposed in state C (in the absence of a roll-over system).  
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double taxation. The latter will only occur as soon as the income generated by 
company C is actually distributed to the shareholder in state B. The legislation of 
state A should therefore provide for an adjustment of the tax assessment of company 
A as soon as the profit distribution of company C is subject to tax in state B. This will 
have the effect that the basic interest component is subject to an income tax of 25 
percent (35 percent minus 10 percent tax credit) in state B and, in turn, the income 
tax will be reduced to zero in state A. The overall tax burden imposed on the income 
will finally amount to 35 percent - which reflects the higher corporate income tax rate 
of state B. Needless to state that the mechanism is equally required for the general 
application of the credit method in state B and for an anti-avoidance approach which 
switches from the exemption method to the credit method only under certain 
circumstances, e.g. if company C derives income from certain activities. 
 
In principle, what was described above with respect to the difference between the 
actual income derived by company C and the basic interest component is equally 
relevant for those cases in which - in addition to the basic interest taxation - an 
income allocation according to CFC rules (e.g. in state B) takes place. Again, the 
focus must still be on the basic interest component and may not be influenced by a 
higher or lower income determined in states B and C (apart from the preliminary tax 
determination and a possible postponement of tax payments). 
 
 
     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03 
 
 
income of company C     300     (100)    600 
 
CFC taxation in state B     300          0     600 
(subject to 35% income tax)     
 
basic interest component     100      100     100 
 
taxation of company A         0                    -         - 
(without any postponement) 
100 x 30% = 30 ./. 30 tax (max.)        
 
preliminary tax company A           -         30        - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A         -          -         0 
200 x 30% = 60 ./. 60 tax (max.)  
 
 
As a result, the corporate income taxation in state B is taken into account in the same 
way as the corporate income taxation in state C. Due to the fact that the tax rate in 
state B exceeds the tax rate in state A, the final tax burden in state A is zero. This is 
an appropriate result since the anti-avoidance legislation should not have the effect 




   
 
percent, i.e. a total of 61.5 percent which is just caused by the current attribution of 
income and without taking into account any potential consequences which may come 
up - in addition - as soon as the underlying income is actually distributed in 
subsequent years. The anti-avoidance system applied in state A should therefore 
clearly provide for a subsequent adjustment of the preliminary tax determination as 
soon as company B starts paying income tax on its positive income in order to avoid 
the massive over-taxation of income. The respective adjustment would then lead to 
an income tax burden of zero in state A (for company A and individual shareholder 
A). In this case, the income will still be taxed with 41.5 percent, which is more than in 
a situation where no tax loss carry forward is involved, but this is solely due to the 





                 A    tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 
     ./. 30 tax credit = 0 tax burden 
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     preliminary tax determination   
     (no postponement of the income tax payment) 
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     dividend income will be subject to tax  
     (application of the credit method for dividend 
     income)      
            
            
            
            
            
     basic interest component    
     100 x 10% tax = 10 tax burden   
            
            
    
 
 
The problems involved in this example are quite similar to the problems in the 
example above. At the moment of income allocation to company A, there will be no 
                                            
68 In a “perfect system” state B should take into account the 10 percent tax imposed on the income derived in 
state C to avoid any unnecessary double taxation of income. However, if this is not the case, the CSC legislation 
in state A has to step in and provide for a relief from double taxation. The reason is that the proposed system 
should not lead to a penalisation of foreign investments. Moreover, from an anti-avoidance perspective there is 
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double taxation. The latter will only occur as soon as the income generated by 
company C is actually distributed to the shareholder in state B. The legislation of 
state A should therefore provide for an adjustment of the tax assessment of company 
A as soon as the profit distribution of company C is subject to tax in state B. This will 
have the effect that the basic interest component is subject to an income tax of 25 
percent (35 percent minus 10 percent tax credit) in state B and, in turn, the income 
tax will be reduced to zero in state A. The overall tax burden imposed on the income 
will finally amount to 35 percent - which reflects the higher corporate income tax rate 
of state B. Needless to state that the mechanism is equally required for the general 
application of the credit method in state B and for an anti-avoidance approach which 
switches from the exemption method to the credit method only under certain 
circumstances, e.g. if company C derives income from certain activities. 
 
In principle, what was described above with respect to the difference between the 
actual income derived by company C and the basic interest component is equally 
relevant for those cases in which - in addition to the basic interest taxation - an 
income allocation according to CFC rules (e.g. in state B) takes place. Again, the 
focus must still be on the basic interest component and may not be influenced by a 
higher or lower income determined in states B and C (apart from the preliminary tax 
determination and a possible postponement of tax payments). 
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(without any postponement) 
100 x 30% = 30 ./. 30 tax (max.)        
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(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A         -          -         0 
200 x 30% = 60 ./. 60 tax (max.)  
 
 
As a result, the corporate income taxation in state B is taken into account in the same 
way as the corporate income taxation in state C. Due to the fact that the tax rate in 
state B exceeds the tax rate in state A, the final tax burden in state A is zero. This is 
an appropriate result since the anti-avoidance legislation should not have the effect 




   
 
percent, i.e. a total of 61.5 percent which is just caused by the current attribution of 
income and without taking into account any potential consequences which may come 
up - in addition - as soon as the underlying income is actually distributed in 
subsequent years. The anti-avoidance system applied in state A should therefore 
clearly provide for a subsequent adjustment of the preliminary tax determination as 
soon as company B starts paying income tax on its positive income in order to avoid 
the massive over-taxation of income. The respective adjustment would then lead to 
an income tax burden of zero in state A (for company A and individual shareholder 
A). In this case, the income will still be taxed with 41.5 percent, which is more than in 
a situation where no tax loss carry forward is involved, but this is solely due to the 
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The problems involved in this example are quite similar to the problems in the 
example above. At the moment of income allocation to company A, there will be no 
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     tax base 100 x 30% tax = 30 







     basic interest component (related to activities in 
     state C) 50 x 10% tax = 5 tax burden 
     income of the PE (credit method - related to the  
     basic interest component) 50 x 10% tax = 5  






     basic interest component (related to PE activities) 





In this example, the tainted activities are carried on by company C in state C and in 
state D - in the latter case through a PE. It shall be assumed that state C applies the 
credit method for the avoidance of double taxation caused by the inclusion of the PE 
income in the domestic tax base. The income derived through the PE is subject to 
income taxation of 15 percent in state D and income taxation of 10 percent in state C. 
An ordinary tax credit system would therefore result in no additional income taxation 
in state C, i.e. the 50 Euro of basic interest income derived in state D are subject to 
an overall income tax burden in states C and D of 7.50 Euro (15 percent). The basic 
interest income derived in state C is subject to 10 percent taxation. If it is assumed 
that it is also 50 Euro, it would result in a 5 Euro income tax burden imposed in state 
C. In state A, the basic interest income of 100 Euro (50 Euro related to state D and 
50 Euro related to state C) is subject to a 30 percent income taxation. However, due 
to the crediting of 7.50 Euro income tax (state D) and 5 Euro income tax (state C) the 
additional taxes imposed in state A and payable to the tax authorities are only 17.50 
Euro. Hence, what remains is a total tax burden of 30 percent. In fact, the final result 
would not be different if state C does not apply the credit method but the exemption 
method, since the tax credit in state A would also be 12.50 Euro. In this case, the 
outcome would be comparable to a situation in which the tainted income is derived by 
two separate legal entities in state C and state D (without any PE).  
 
The separation of the activities of the PE from the activities of the headquarter 
company is not only important for the exact determination of the income tax burden, 










   
 
 
f.) The modified mechanism and classification conflicts 
 
It was outlined in chapter 6 that the application of CFC rules to transparent and non-
transparent entities (and permanent establishments) - which is the case in some 
states - as well as the classification conflicts in this context may lead to a double 
taxation of income. However, if the principles described above are applied 
consistently, these conflicts should not cause serious difficulties within the proposed 
concept of an alternative anti-avoidance legislation. For example, if state A classifies 
company C as a non-transparent legal entity, but subsidiary company B (in the 
structure outlined above) considers company C to be a transparent entity, the risk of 
double taxation mainly depends on the method of avoidance of double taxation in 
state B. If the latter state applies the exemption method, the income will not be 
subject to double taxation at all. However, if state B does not exempt the income of 
the transparent entity but applies the credit method for the avoidance of double 
taxation, it is obvious that state A should credit the amount of income tax imposed in 
state B in the same way as previously described in case of the simultaneous 
application of a CFC taxation in state B. In this particular situation, there is no 
significant difference with respect to the crediting of income taxes imposed in state B 
on income of a transparent entity (from the perspective of state B) and the income 
taxes imposed in state B on attributed income according to a CFC regime.  
 
g.) The modified mechanism and the application to permanent establishments and 
transparent entities  
 
What is true for the classification conflicts is equally true for permanent 
establishments and entities which are classified as transparent by all of the states 
involved, i.e. where no classification conflict exists. In those cases, the basic interest 
component may have to be determined for the activities of the legal entity and the 
activities which are carried on through the PE (PS). Here, it is important to identify the 
income taxes imposed on the respective income and the respective treatment of the 
PE (PS) income in the state of the legal entity (in case the PE (PS) state deviates 
from the state of the legal entity). In other words, the general principle described 
earlier must be applied: the higher-tier state must take into account the treatment on 
the lower group level. Again, the question whether the legal entity in question applies 
the credit method or the exemption method for the income derived by the PE (PS) is 
of particular importance for the crediting of the income taxes in the state which 
applies the current taxation of the basic interest component. In principle, the outcome 
should not be different from a situation in which the tainted activity is carried on by 
two lower-tier legal entities (which are non-transparent). This can be illustrated by the 
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b.) The subsequent profit distributions to an individual shareholder 
 
The fact that the income is allocated not only to the corporate shareholder but, in 
addition, to the individual shareholder - combined with the application of a 
(preliminary) flat income tax which is derived from the domestic corporate income tax 
rate - requires a different approach regarding the subsequent dividends. The concept 
mainly depends on the general system of dividend taxation of the shareholder in the 
residence state. For example, if the latter state follows a tax credit system for 
individual shareholders, the dividend income will be taxed at the personal income tax 
rate of the recipient. Here, the crediting of income taxes may not be limited to the 
corporate income tax imposed on the income of the dividend paying company but 
should take into account the (additional) income taxes paid in the residence state of 
the shareholder on the previously attributed income. The same should be true if the 
residence state does not provide for a tax credit. In such a case, the dividend income 
itself might be taxed at reduced rates which typically reflect the fact that the income 
was already subject to tax on a corporate level, e.g. under a “half- or partial income 
tax” system. In those cases, the dividend income should be taxed under the regular 
(reduced income tax) system, but the income taxes imposed on the previous income 
attribution should be taken into account, too. The avoidance of double taxation and, 
in particular, the equal treatment of current and non-current income attribution 
requires the system to provide for a full tax credit and not just an ordinary tax credit. 
This should not be too difficult for the residence state of the individual shareholder 
since the full tax credit is solely related to the reimbursement of domestic income 




     Year 01   Year 02 
 
 
                 A    tax base 100  tax base 90 
     x 30% tax = 30  x 25% tax = 22.50 
     ./. 10 tax credit  ./. 20 tax credit (01) 
     = 20 tax burden  = 2.50 tax burden 
 
 
     basic interest  profit distribution of the 
     component 100  net amount of the basic 
     x 10% tax   interest component 




In this example, the subsequent dividend payment will be taxable in state A pursuant 
to the regular system of dividend taxation, e.g. with a reduced tax base or - like in this 
example - with a reduced tax rate (e.g. 50 percent income tax rate x ½). However, in 
addition to the regular treatment in the hands of shareholder A, the previous income 
taxation in year 01 must be taken into account. In my opinion, the simplest way is to 




   
 
company (or both) suffer tax losses. This will usually not be an issue if the PE and 
the headquarter company are located in one and the same state, but will be of 
utmost importance if two (or more) tax jurisdictions are involved - like in the example 
above. Here, it is advisable to follow an approach which is based on the strict 
separation of activities in the same way as in case of separate legal entities. In other 
words, the basic interest calculation should be made, at least, on a country by 
country basis, no matter whether a legal entity is involved or a PE (PS). Of course, if 
there is more than one entity / PE which carries on the activities in the respective 
state, the calculation is to be made for each of the respective entities / PE. The 
equalisation of legal entity and PE - for purposes of income attribution and credit 
mechanism - is certainly the best way, in my opinion, to avoid the over-taxation of 
income and to ensure the appropriate crediting of income taxes.  
 
9.4.8. The Treatment of Subsequent Profit Distributions  
 
The treatment of dividends should be strongly dependent on the previous taxation of 
the attributed income. Otherwise, there is an increased likelihood of a double taxation 
of income, first, by attributing and taxing the basic interest component in the hands of 
the shareholder and, second, by taxing the subsequent dividends which theoretically 
also encompass - indirectly - the basic interest component. Any partial relief or any 
restriction in the form of a time limit, as is the case under some of the CFC regimes, 
is by no means acceptable. This might otherwise lead to a treatment of the particular 
income component which is worse than the treatment of any other type of income 
generated - directly or indirectly - by the shareholder. Again, the current taxation of 
income should not have any other effect than the immediate inclusion of the income 
component in the domestic tax base - without any negative “side effects.” In the 
alternative system, however, the avoidance of double taxation caused by subsequent 
dividend payments requires a separate approach depending upon whether the 
recipient of the dividend payment is a legal entity or an individual shareholder.  
 
a.) The subsequent profit distributions to a legal entity  
 
Based on the approach outlined above - which involves company A as the corporate 
shareholder in the service company C - the simplest way would be to exempt the 
subsequent profit distribution of company C from any income taxation in the hands of 
the corporate shareholder up to the amount of previously attributed income.69 For 
example, if the basic interest income of 100 Euro was already taxed in state A with 
30 percent (30 Euro minus 10 Euro tax credit = 20 Euro), a subsequent distribution of 
100 Euro should not be subject to corporate income taxation in state A. However, it 
should be clear, as already stated in previous chapters, that the exemption should 
not be limited to 95 percent of the dividend distribution but should encompass the 
complete 100 percent. In this situation, there is - in the same way as in case of the 
existing CFC regimes - no necessity and no justification for the treatment of a certain 
pre-determined percentage as taxable income in order to cover, for example, the 
expenses related to income exempt from taxation in state A. The reason is that the 
subsequent exemption of the dividend payment - to the extent it refers to the 
previous income allocation - is just a necessary means for the avoidance of the 
double taxation of income, i.e. the income is already taxed in state A and, for this 
reason, the related expenses should be deductible without any limitation.  
                                            
69 If the dividend distribution is not in general exempt from income taxation. In case of a general exemption 
there is no need for a separate rule on a corporate level.  
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b.) The subsequent profit distributions to an individual shareholder 
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addition, to the individual shareholder - combined with the application of a 
(preliminary) flat income tax which is derived from the domestic corporate income tax 
rate - requires a different approach regarding the subsequent dividends. The concept 
mainly depends on the general system of dividend taxation of the shareholder in the 
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rate of the recipient. Here, the crediting of income taxes may not be limited to the 
corporate income tax imposed on the income of the dividend paying company but 
should take into account the (additional) income taxes paid in the residence state of 
the shareholder on the previously attributed income. The same should be true if the 
residence state does not provide for a tax credit. In such a case, the dividend income 
itself might be taxed at reduced rates which typically reflect the fact that the income 
was already subject to tax on a corporate level, e.g. under a “half- or partial income 
tax” system. In those cases, the dividend income should be taxed under the regular 
(reduced income tax) system, but the income taxes imposed on the previous income 
attribution should be taken into account, too. The avoidance of double taxation and, 
in particular, the equal treatment of current and non-current income attribution 
requires the system to provide for a full tax credit and not just an ordinary tax credit. 
This should not be too difficult for the residence state of the individual shareholder 
since the full tax credit is solely related to the reimbursement of domestic income 
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taxation in year 01 must be taken into account. In my opinion, the simplest way is to 




   
 
company (or both) suffer tax losses. This will usually not be an issue if the PE and 
the headquarter company are located in one and the same state, but will be of 
utmost importance if two (or more) tax jurisdictions are involved - like in the example 
above. Here, it is advisable to follow an approach which is based on the strict 
separation of activities in the same way as in case of separate legal entities. In other 
words, the basic interest calculation should be made, at least, on a country by 
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of income, first, by attributing and taxing the basic interest component in the hands of 
the shareholder and, second, by taxing the subsequent dividends which theoretically 
also encompass - indirectly - the basic interest component. Any partial relief or any 
restriction in the form of a time limit, as is the case under some of the CFC regimes, 
is by no means acceptable. This might otherwise lead to a treatment of the particular 
income component which is worse than the treatment of any other type of income 
generated - directly or indirectly - by the shareholder. Again, the current taxation of 
income should not have any other effect than the immediate inclusion of the income 
component in the domestic tax base - without any negative “side effects.” In the 
alternative system, however, the avoidance of double taxation caused by subsequent 
dividend payments requires a separate approach depending upon whether the 
recipient of the dividend payment is a legal entity or an individual shareholder.  
 
a.) The subsequent profit distributions to a legal entity  
 
Based on the approach outlined above - which involves company A as the corporate 
shareholder in the service company C - the simplest way would be to exempt the 
subsequent profit distribution of company C from any income taxation in the hands of 
the corporate shareholder up to the amount of previously attributed income.69 For 
example, if the basic interest income of 100 Euro was already taxed in state A with 
30 percent (30 Euro minus 10 Euro tax credit = 20 Euro), a subsequent distribution of 
100 Euro should not be subject to corporate income taxation in state A. However, it 
should be clear, as already stated in previous chapters, that the exemption should 
not be limited to 95 percent of the dividend distribution but should encompass the 
complete 100 percent. In this situation, there is - in the same way as in case of the 
existing CFC regimes - no necessity and no justification for the treatment of a certain 
pre-determined percentage as taxable income in order to cover, for example, the 
expenses related to income exempt from taxation in state A. The reason is that the 
subsequent exemption of the dividend payment - to the extent it refers to the 
previous income allocation - is just a necessary means for the avoidance of the 
double taxation of income, i.e. the income is already taxed in state A and, for this 
reason, the related expenses should be deductible without any limitation.  
                                            
69 If the dividend distribution is not in general exempt from income taxation. In case of a general exemption 
there is no need for a separate rule on a corporate level.  
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     Year 01   Year 02 
 
 
                 A    tax base 100  tax base 70 
     x 30% tax = 30  x 25% tax = 17.50  
     ./. 30 tax credit  ./. 0 tax credit 
     = 0 tax burden  = 17.50 tax burden 
 
 
     tax base 100   full exemption of 
     x 30% tax = 30  the dividend income / 
     ./. 10 tax credit  assumption: distribution 
     = 20 tax burden  to shareholder A = 70 




     basic interest  profit distribution of the 
     component 100  net amount of the basic 
     x 10% tax   interest component 





Following the mechanism described above, the dividend income should be 
completely exempt from taxation in the hands of company A. The subsequent 
distribution to shareholder A should be taxed pursuant to the regular system, but by 
providing a full tax credit for the income taxes already paid in state A. In the example, 
the income taxes imposed on the income attributed to shareholder A in the year 01 
are zero and therefore no credit is available in year 02. Theoretically, however, the 
full tax credit (in those cases in which an actual tax credit is available) should be 
provided for a dividend of 70 Euro (and not only in case of a dividend of 90 Euro or 
100 Euro). The reason is that the additional taxation on the level of company A 
should be taken into account for this calculation as well. The basic interest 
component is therefore reduced by the amount of income tax in state C of 10 Euro 
and in state A of 20 Euro. The net amount is therefore only 70 Euro. This is what 
theoretically remains for any (final) profit distribution to the individual shareholder A. 
If, in the example, the subsequent distribution of company A is 90 Euro, the amount 
of 70 Euro would still be the amount which allows the complete crediting of previous 
income taxes paid by the individual shareholder A, and the exceeding amount of 20 
Euro would be subject to regular dividend taxation (without any further income tax 
credit). For dividend payments of company A which are below 70 Euro, a pro rata tax 
credit shall be provided.  
 
9.4.9. The Treatment of a Subsequent Disposal of Shares 
 
Obviously, what is true for subsequent profit distributions should be equally true for 







   
 
to an overall tax burden in state A of 22.50 Euro (on 90 Euro dividend income).70 Of 
course, only 90 Euro may actually be distributed related to the basic interest 
component of year 01. Thus, the full tax credit should be provided in case of a 90 
Euro dividend distribution and not only in case of a distribution which is as high as 
the previous gross income attribution. Such a mechanism would lead to a 
comparable treatment of the alternative anti-avoidance legislation (after profit 
distribution) and the regular system of profit distribution in the state of the 
shareholder A. The important difference, however, is the “timing effect”, i.e. the basic 
interest component will be subject to an immediate taxation in state A but the final tax 
burden will only be determined as soon as the actual profit distribution - related to this 
particular portion of income - takes place.71 If the tax rate in year 02 is only 15 
percent (instead 25 percent), the crediting of the 20 Euro income tax will lead to a 
reimbursement of 6.50 Euro and therefore to a final tax burden of 15 percent on 90 
Euro (13.50 Euro). Such a mechanism is especially important in case of tax losses of 
shareholder A in the year of profit distribution if the dividend income is offset with the 
tax losses and no income tax will be imposed in year 02 (but in subsequent years). 
Only a full reimbursement of the previous income taxes will lead to a neutral and 
undistorted tax result - but without jeopardising the aim of the anti-avoidance 























                                            
70 Under the assumption that the half- or partial income tax system is only taxing the actual amount of 
distribution (without any tax gross-up). In any event, the full tax credit of 20 Euro does not require - under the 
CSC system - the gross-up of the dividend income from 90 Euro to 100 Euro.  
71 As already described earlier, the income allocation is to be made to the ultimate domestic shareholder and 
subject to a flat income tax (separate schedule). This can lead to the consequence that no additional income tax is 
imposed on this first step of allocation, but only on the second step (actual distribution). From my perspective, 
this is a consistent approach which avoids any distortion caused by the application of a higher personnel income 
tax rate on the attributed income (first step) under a progressive tax system. In my view, this does not open the 
possibility for (unacceptable) deferral planning, because it keeps the tax rate applied to the domestic individual 
shareholder at least on the level of the domestic legal entity (no matter whether the income was derived through 
a domestic CSC or a CSC in another state).     
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reimbursement of 6.50 Euro and therefore to a final tax burden of 15 percent on 90 
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70 Under the assumption that the half- or partial income tax system is only taxing the actual amount of 
distribution (without any tax gross-up). In any event, the full tax credit of 20 Euro does not require - under the 
CSC system - the gross-up of the dividend income from 90 Euro to 100 Euro.  
71 As already described earlier, the income allocation is to be made to the ultimate domestic shareholder and 
subject to a flat income tax (separate schedule). This can lead to the consequence that no additional income tax is 
imposed on this first step of allocation, but only on the second step (actual distribution). From my perspective, 
this is a consistent approach which avoids any distortion caused by the application of a higher personnel income 
tax rate on the attributed income (first step) under a progressive tax system. In my view, this does not open the 
possibility for (unacceptable) deferral planning, because it keeps the tax rate applied to the domestic individual 
shareholder at least on the level of the domestic legal entity (no matter whether the income was derived through 
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theoretical income tax which might be imposed in state C on that income in 
subsequent years in order to avoid any double taxation of income (the underlying 
rate should be the rate which is applicable in year 03). If it is assumed that the 
purchaser of the shares is the unrelated company AA, the further procedure should 
be as follows: 
 
     Year 03 Year 04 Year 05 
 
income of company C         0     100     600 
 
basic interest component     100     100     100 
 
preliminary tax company AA      30                   -                    - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
preliminary tax company AA        -                30                  - 
(without any postponement)       
 
final calculation for company AA        -                    -       60 
300 x 30% = 90 ./. 30 tax (in 05) 
 
 
Under the assumption that the tax losses of company C can be utilised after the 
change in ownership in the shares, another more differentiated approach is required. 
The income of company C in the year 03 is zero. For this reason, the income tax on 
the basic interest component is subject to a preliminary tax determination and the 
payment may be postponed. The income in the year 04 is exactly as high as the 
basic interest component. However, still no income tax is payable on the income of 
100 Euro since the positive income is to be offset with the existing tax loss carry 
forward of -200 Euro. The income tax determination in state A should therefore also 
be made on a preliminary basis in order to ensure that the assessment may be 
adjusted as soon as taxes are imposed in subsequent years. However, in contrast to 
the treatment in the year 03 there is no necessity to provide for a postponement of 
the income tax payment in state A. Even though the loss of -200 Euro originates from 
the activities of company C, there is absolutely no necessity to grant the relief of a 
later tax payment. This is mainly due to anti-avoidance considerations in order to 
avoid that tax losses are transferred from one shareholder to another shareholder 
just as tax planning tools. Again, there is no question about the fact that the losses 
should still be available after the transfer of the shares and that the income tax 
burden in subsequent years may lead to a correction of the preliminary determination 
of the income taxes imposed on the basic interest component. But this does not 
necessarily require the postponement of income taxation in state A. As a general 
rule, the postponement should be provided to the extent that the basic interest 
income exceeds the actual income derived during the period of shareholding. 
 
With respect to the question whether capital gains realised by the seller should be 
exempt from taxation or not it is again important - similar to the treatment of 
subsequent profit distributions - to follow a separate approach for capital gains of 
corporate shareholders and individual shareholders.  
 
 
   
 
income should be strictly avoided. An economic double taxation might occur if the 
income is attributed to the shareholder - without any actual distribution - and is 
therefore subsequently included in a possible capital gain realised by the disposal of 
shares, too. Another aspect which could play a role if the shares are sold to a third 
party is a preliminary tax determination which was subject to postponement, e.g. 
because of the fact that the CSC suffered tax losses. Here, the capital gain realised 
must be taken into consideration for the question whether the negative result of the 
service company - which allows the postponement of taxes imposed on the basic 
interest component - is offset by the subsequent positive income. The latter income 
would normally trigger the payment of the income taxes to the tax authorities to the 
extent the positive income exceeds the negative income. Therefore, in case of a 
disposal of shares the focus cannot only be on the actual result of the service 
company in question but the “additional” (future) positive income which is already 
prospected in the higher share price must be taken into account as well. This 
additional income included in the share price is therefore of relevance for the 
question whether the preliminary income tax is now payable to the tax authorities - 
because the overall positive income exceeds the amount of negative income - or 
whether an adjustment has to be made since the source of income is not existent 
anymore and the positive result is not high enough to cover the basic interest 
component calculated on a yearly basis.  
 
 
     Year 01 Year 02 Year 03 
 
income of company C     (100)   (100) 
 
basic interest component      100     100 
 
capital gain realised on         -        -     100 
January 1 of the year 03  
 
preliminary tax company A       30                30                   - 
(subject to postponement) 
 
final calculation for company A            -                   -                   20 
100 x 30% = 30 ./. 10 tax credit 
 
 
In this example, company C generates a negative income in year 01 and year 02 and 
no income tax is imposed in state C. For this reason, the assessment of the basic 
interest component is made on a preliminary basis and is subject to postponement. 
At the beginning of year 03 the shareholder realises a capital gain of 100 Euro from 
the disposal of the investment. Thus, despite the negative income, the final act - 
namely the disposal of the shares - realises an overall positive income for the 
shareholder. For this reason, a final taxation has to be made. Following the 
mechanism described earlier in this chapter there should be no income tax credit, 
because no actual income tax is paid at that point in time in state C. However, due to 
the fact that the shares are sold to another party and therefore the source of income 
will not be existent anymore for company A, a decision has to be made regarding the 
postponement of taxes and the question whether a tax credit is ultimately to be 
granted or not. In this particular case, it seems to be acceptable to deduct the 
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In this example, company C generates a negative income in year 01 and year 02 and 
no income tax is imposed in state C. For this reason, the assessment of the basic 
interest component is made on a preliminary basis and is subject to postponement. 
At the beginning of year 03 the shareholder realises a capital gain of 100 Euro from 
the disposal of the investment. Thus, despite the negative income, the final act - 
namely the disposal of the shares - realises an overall positive income for the 
shareholder. For this reason, a final taxation has to be made. Following the 
mechanism described earlier in this chapter there should be no income tax credit, 
because no actual income tax is paid at that point in time in state C. However, due to 
the fact that the shares are sold to another party and therefore the source of income 
will not be existent anymore for company A, a decision has to be made regarding the 
postponement of taxes and the question whether a tax credit is ultimately to be 
granted or not. In this particular case, it seems to be acceptable to deduct the 
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tax legislation of state A - provoke some tax planning structures (step-up structures). 
However, the risk is certainly minimised through the percentage of shareholding 
generally required and the constructive ownership rules.  
 
9.4.10. Exemptions from CSC Taxation  
 
The fact that the basic interest taxation only focuses on services which provide 
capital to other parties already considerably limits the scope of application. 
Nonetheless, the compliance burden connected with such legislation should not be 
underestimated and should therefore be proportionate to the purpose followed by 
such a regime. In this respect, it should not be overlooked that the legislation is 
applicable to resident and non-resident taxpayers and simultaneously to corporate 
and individual shareholders. Hence, it is obvious that such far-reaching legislation 
should not be applied to each and every capital service provided by the respective 
legal entity, e.g. if the capital services are of minor importance in the overall context 
and subordinate to the other activities carried on by the taxpayer. Another exemption 
which is also granted under the existing CFC regimes is the exemption of services 
mainly provided to unrelated parties.72 Even though the economic aspects of the 
basic interest taxation are equally relevant in the latter case, the anti-avoidance 
aspects are less important if, for example, the capital services are provided by banks, 
insurance companies, major leasing companies et cetera. The compliance aspects 
may therefore support an exemption in those cases as well. In the following, the 
proposed exemptions under the alternative regime will be outlined.  
 
9.4.10.1. Exemption Based on a Property-Ratio  
 
The basic interest taxation focuses on a rate of return calculated on tainted property 
and ignores, at least to a certain extent, the actual (total) income derived from the 
tainted activities.73 The fact that the property of the legal entity plays a key role in the 
determination of the tax base suggests that it may also be used as the decisive factor 
- or one of the decisive factors - for the answer to the question whether the activity 
should be exempt from basic interest taxation or not. If the tainted property is only of 
minor importance within the overall activity of the respective entity, it is certainly 
acceptable to refrain from the current taxation of the basic interest component. A 
simple method can be the comparison of the book value of the tainted property with 
the book value of the non-tainted property, and if the latter exceeds a certain 
percentage of the total property of the legal entity, an exemption should be granted. 
In other words, if a substantial part of the tangible and intangible property - based on 
book value - in the balance sheet of the legal entity is employed for non-tainted 
activities, there will be no current taxation of income. Clearly, one could argue that it 
might be better to take into account the adjusted value of the property for the 
comparison (which was described earlier as the calculation basis). However, in my 
opinion, the basis for the comparison should be as simple as possible since it 
theoretically has to be applied to a great number of cases. Here, it is important to 
identify immediately whether the investment should be exempt from current taxation 
or not. Thus, I would even suggest concentrating just on the book value of the 
property in the financial statement of the company at the beginning and at the end of 
                                            
72 See in this regard also section 9.3.8.4.   
73 This, however, is only true as long as the actual income derived from the service activities exceeds the basic 
interest component. However, if the income is lower, e.g. in case of tax losses, this fact will be taken into 
account by way of postponing tax payments and determining tax assessments on a preliminary basis.  
   
 
a.) The subsequent disposal of shares through a legal entity 
 
The capital gains realised on a corporate level should be exempt from taxation as far 
as the income was previously attributed to the shareholder before the disposal of the 
shares. In other words, the income which was already subject to current taxation 
should not be taxed again in the context of the disposal. This is not really a problem 
for those states which provide for a general exemption of capital gains, as long as it 
is completely exempt, i.e. to 100 percent. Any limitation to a 95 percent exemption is 
not sufficient and has the consequence of a partial double taxation (see the previous 
comments in this respect). For states which do not provide for an exemption of 
capital gains it is necessary to deduct the formerly attributed income from the tax 
base of the income from capital gains. For example, if 300 Euro were currently 
attributed to the corporate shareholder during the period of shareholding and the 
capital gain realised by the disposal of the shares is 500 Euro, the taxable income of 
500 Euro should be reduced by the formerly attributed 300 Euro. Thus, only 200 Euro 
are finally subject to capital gains taxation. However, if the attributable income of 300 
Euro was already distributed to company A and the dividend income was treated as 
tax exempt income (before the disposal and pursuant to the mechanism described 
above), there is no need for an additional exemption since there will be no double 
taxation of income. In principle, such a procedure is not only relevant in case of the 
direct sale of the shares in company C, but is equally relevant for the sale of 
intermediate shareholdings. This, however, should not be a problem since the 
amount of adjustment is in any case connected to the previous income attribution - 
irrespective of whether it is a direct or indirect shareholding.  
 
b.) The subsequent disposal of shares through an individual shareholder 
 
The capital gains realised through the disposal of shares in the hands of the 
individual shareholder are to be treated similar to the dividends received by an 
individual shareholder. That means the capital gains should be taxed according to 
the regular system in state A and should not be exempt from taxation (if it is not 
already exempt according to the regular system). The income taxes imposed on the 
previously attributed income have to be credited against the income taxes imposed 
on the income from capital gains. An exceeding tax credit is to be reimbursed (full tax 
credit system). This ensures that the capital gains taxation is largely unaffected by 
the former income attribution and no distortions will exist because of the preliminary 
flat income tax which was imposed on the attributed income. The final income tax 
burden will represent the personal income tax rate of shareholder A. Clearly, if a 
profit distribution takes place before the disposal of the shares, the income tax on the 
basic interest component will be credited first against the income tax on the profit 
distribution. Only the attributed income (and the respective credit) which is not 
“eliminated” through profit distributions will be taken into account for the subsequent 
capital gains taxation. The question could be raised whether the credit should be 
separated in those cases in which only a certain percentage of the shares is sold, i.e. 
the credit is equal to the percentage of disposal, or whether the credit should be 
granted up to the amount of income of capital gains - irrespective of the percentage 
of shareholding. In the latter case, the total amount of credit will be utilised as soon 
as the disposal of (part of) the shares results in a capital gain which is as high as the 
formerly attributed income less the amount of income tax paid in state C (or in the 
intermediate state B). Both approaches can be applied in practice, although it is not 
completely ruled out that the second-mentioned approach might - depending on the 
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opinion, the basis for the comparison should be as simple as possible since it 
theoretically has to be applied to a great number of cases. Here, it is important to 
identify immediately whether the investment should be exempt from current taxation 
or not. Thus, I would even suggest concentrating just on the book value of the 
property in the financial statement of the company at the beginning and at the end of 
                                            
72 See in this regard also section 9.3.8.4.   
73 This, however, is only true as long as the actual income derived from the service activities exceeds the basic 
interest component. However, if the income is lower, e.g. in case of tax losses, this fact will be taken into 
account by way of postponing tax payments and determining tax assessments on a preliminary basis.  
   
 
a.) The subsequent disposal of shares through a legal entity 
 
The capital gains realised on a corporate level should be exempt from taxation as far 
as the income was previously attributed to the shareholder before the disposal of the 
shares. In other words, the income which was already subject to current taxation 
should not be taxed again in the context of the disposal. This is not really a problem 
for those states which provide for a general exemption of capital gains, as long as it 
is completely exempt, i.e. to 100 percent. Any limitation to a 95 percent exemption is 
not sufficient and has the consequence of a partial double taxation (see the previous 
comments in this respect). For states which do not provide for an exemption of 
capital gains it is necessary to deduct the formerly attributed income from the tax 
base of the income from capital gains. For example, if 300 Euro were currently 
attributed to the corporate shareholder during the period of shareholding and the 
capital gain realised by the disposal of the shares is 500 Euro, the taxable income of 
500 Euro should be reduced by the formerly attributed 300 Euro. Thus, only 200 Euro 
are finally subject to capital gains taxation. However, if the attributable income of 300 
Euro was already distributed to company A and the dividend income was treated as 
tax exempt income (before the disposal and pursuant to the mechanism described 
above), there is no need for an additional exemption since there will be no double 
taxation of income. In principle, such a procedure is not only relevant in case of the 
direct sale of the shares in company C, but is equally relevant for the sale of 
intermediate shareholdings. This, however, should not be a problem since the 
amount of adjustment is in any case connected to the previous income attribution - 
irrespective of whether it is a direct or indirect shareholding.  
 
b.) The subsequent disposal of shares through an individual shareholder 
 
The capital gains realised through the disposal of shares in the hands of the 
individual shareholder are to be treated similar to the dividends received by an 
individual shareholder. That means the capital gains should be taxed according to 
the regular system in state A and should not be exempt from taxation (if it is not 
already exempt according to the regular system). The income taxes imposed on the 
previously attributed income have to be credited against the income taxes imposed 
on the income from capital gains. An exceeding tax credit is to be reimbursed (full tax 
credit system). This ensures that the capital gains taxation is largely unaffected by 
the former income attribution and no distortions will exist because of the preliminary 
flat income tax which was imposed on the attributed income. The final income tax 
burden will represent the personal income tax rate of shareholder A. Clearly, if a 
profit distribution takes place before the disposal of the shares, the income tax on the 
basic interest component will be credited first against the income tax on the profit 
distribution. Only the attributed income (and the respective credit) which is not 
“eliminated” through profit distributions will be taken into account for the subsequent 
capital gains taxation. The question could be raised whether the credit should be 
separated in those cases in which only a certain percentage of the shares is sold, i.e. 
the credit is equal to the percentage of disposal, or whether the credit should be 
granted up to the amount of income of capital gains - irrespective of the percentage 
of shareholding. In the latter case, the total amount of credit will be utilised as soon 
as the disposal of (part of) the shares results in a capital gain which is as high as the 
formerly attributed income less the amount of income tax paid in state C (or in the 
intermediate state B). Both approaches can be applied in practice, although it is not 
completely ruled out that the second-mentioned approach might - depending on the 
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arises whether more than 75 percent should be related to service contracts, 
investment in property, or income. In my opinion, either the percentage of the 
property of the company or, alternatively, the percentage of income may be referred 
to. However, the reference to the percentage of income might be simpler and is 
therefore to be preferred. The number of service contracts is most certainly not the 
appropriate basis for this decision since it may open the possibility of influencing and 
even circumventing the current taxation more easily than in the other cases (e.g. by 
providing a great number of capital services to unrelated parties which require a 
relatively modest capital investment and by providing few capital services to related 
parties which require substantial capital investments), and it might therefore lead to 
unacceptable distortions.  
 
9.4.10.4. Exemption Based on a General Financial Threshold 
 
It is certainly recommendable to provide, in addition, for an exemption which refers to 
an absolute amount of tainted investment which is unconnected to a property-ratio or 
income-ratio. This ensures that not each and every minor amount of tainted 
investment is subject to current taxation which is certainly required from an 
administrative perspective. In this respect it could make sense to refer to the net 
calculation basis, i.e. the (adjusted) book value of the tainted property minus the 
portion of debts allocable to the investment (= net calculation basis). If the net 
calculation basis does not exceed a certain financial threshold at the beginning and 
at the end of the financial year, there will be no current taxation of income. From my 
perspective, the threshold could be set within a range of 100,000 Euro and 500,000 
Euro. Even though the proposed range seems to be relatively high compared to the 
thresholds provided for in the existing CFC regimes, one has to be aware of the fact 
that the scope of application is much broader since the legislation is not restricted to 
low-tax income derived by a foreign company but is instead applicable to foreign and 
domestic tainted activities without any reference to the tax rate.  
 
9.4.10.5. Exemption Based on Income Taxation at Source 
 
The basic interest component is calculated on the tainted property of the company 
and is therefore, in principle, not directly connected to the actual income derived by 
the tainted activities. Based on the general principles outlined in previous chapters, it 
seems to be rather evident that the basic interest component should not be allocated 
to the shareholder if it is subject to source-based taxation in the state where the 
recipient of the services carries on its income-producing activities, and if the income 
is completely tax exempt in the state of the service provider. In such an optimal 
scenario, there is no need for any current taxation of income, neither from an equity 
and economic perspective nor from an anti-avoidance perspective. Even though the 
system of income allocation would in any event be subject to limitation to the positive 
taxable income it is nonetheless required to provide for an explicit exemption in case 
of a strict source-based taxation. In the latter case, the actual income might even be 
higher than the basic interest component, but is not subject to any residence-based 
taxation in the state of the service provider. However, it must be kept in mind that a 





   
 
the financial year in question. If the property ratio is fulfilled at the beginning and at 
the end of the year, there will be no current taxation of income. The verification is to 
be made on a yearly basis. Such an approach ensures that only entities which 
heavily rely on the provision of capital services come within the scope of the current 
taxation of income. I consider the exemption rule based on a property-ratio as the 
basic rule for the decision whether the activity of the company in question should be 
subject to current taxation or not. However, since the rule theoretically has to be 
applied to each and every investment, the taxpayer has to submit a tax return if the 
property-ratio is not fulfilled instead of applying for an exemption on a regular basis. 
The decisive element, of course, is the percentage which should be applied. In my 
opinion, the percentage should be in a range between 50 percent and a maximum of 
75 percent of the total book value. That means, if the non-tainted property exceeds 
50 percent (or alternatively up to more than 75 percent) of the total property - based 
on the book value - there should be no current taxation of income.   
 
9.4.10.2. Exemption Based on an Income-Ratio 
 
It may be the case that a company combines a highly profitable activity which 
requires a relatively low investment in tangible and intangible property (e.g. 
consulting services) with capital intensive tainted services. Here, the reliance on the 
investment in property will most certainly lead to a current taxation of income based 
on the property-ratio even though the actual income derived by the entity might 
theoretically mainly consist of income derived from the non-tainted activity. In those 
cases, it may be justified to provide for an (additional) exemption from current 
taxation - even though the property-ratio is not fulfilled - if the taxpayer can provide 
evidence that the actual income from non-tainted activities exceeds the income from 
tainted activities (including all income components). The threshold when the 
exemption is to be granted could be - similar to the property-ratio - in a range 
between 50 percent and 75 percent. In other words, if the income from non-tainted 
activities exceeds 50 percent (or alternatively up to more than 75 percent) of the total 
income, the exemption is provided even if the property-ratio is not fulfilled. Similar to 
the property-ratio, the calculation is to be made for the income derived within the 
respective financial year in question and it should be based - similar to the existing 
CFC rules - on the tax rules of the state which applies the legislation. In addition, 
certain extraordinary elements would have to be eliminated for the comparison (e.g. 
capital gains from the disposal of assets).   
 
9.4.10.3. Exemption Based on the Classification of the Service Recipients 
 
An exemption which is based on the classification of the recipients of the services as 
related or unrelated party may be justified by the reduced risk of tax avoidance and 
the limitation of compliance costs. It would be highly complex, time consuming and 
expensive to calculate the basic interest component, for example, on property held by 
banks, insurance companies and major leasing and rental companies. The latter 
companies would very often not fulfil the exemption requirements under the property-
ratio and the income-ratio since they provide exactly those services which are in the 
focus of the basic interest taxation. Given the immense investments in those cases, it 
may be acceptable to set the threshold higher than the minimum percentage in case 
of the property-ratio and the income-ratio. Thus, the exemption may be granted if the 
tainted services provided to unrelated parties encompass more than 75 percent of 
the total tainted services provided to related and unrelated parties. Here, the question 
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arises whether more than 75 percent should be related to service contracts, 
investment in property, or income. In my opinion, either the percentage of the 
property of the company or, alternatively, the percentage of income may be referred 
to. However, the reference to the percentage of income might be simpler and is 
therefore to be preferred. The number of service contracts is most certainly not the 
appropriate basis for this decision since it may open the possibility of influencing and 
even circumventing the current taxation more easily than in the other cases (e.g. by 
providing a great number of capital services to unrelated parties which require a 
relatively modest capital investment and by providing few capital services to related 
parties which require substantial capital investments), and it might therefore lead to 
unacceptable distortions.  
 
9.4.10.4. Exemption Based on a General Financial Threshold 
 
It is certainly recommendable to provide, in addition, for an exemption which refers to 
an absolute amount of tainted investment which is unconnected to a property-ratio or 
income-ratio. This ensures that not each and every minor amount of tainted 
investment is subject to current taxation which is certainly required from an 
administrative perspective. In this respect it could make sense to refer to the net 
calculation basis, i.e. the (adjusted) book value of the tainted property minus the 
portion of debts allocable to the investment (= net calculation basis). If the net 
calculation basis does not exceed a certain financial threshold at the beginning and 
at the end of the financial year, there will be no current taxation of income. From my 
perspective, the threshold could be set within a range of 100,000 Euro and 500,000 
Euro. Even though the proposed range seems to be relatively high compared to the 
thresholds provided for in the existing CFC regimes, one has to be aware of the fact 
that the scope of application is much broader since the legislation is not restricted to 
low-tax income derived by a foreign company but is instead applicable to foreign and 
domestic tainted activities without any reference to the tax rate.  
 
9.4.10.5. Exemption Based on Income Taxation at Source 
 
The basic interest component is calculated on the tainted property of the company 
and is therefore, in principle, not directly connected to the actual income derived by 
the tainted activities. Based on the general principles outlined in previous chapters, it 
seems to be rather evident that the basic interest component should not be allocated 
to the shareholder if it is subject to source-based taxation in the state where the 
recipient of the services carries on its income-producing activities, and if the income 
is completely tax exempt in the state of the service provider. In such an optimal 
scenario, there is no need for any current taxation of income, neither from an equity 
and economic perspective nor from an anti-avoidance perspective. Even though the 
system of income allocation would in any event be subject to limitation to the positive 
taxable income it is nonetheless required to provide for an explicit exemption in case 
of a strict source-based taxation. In the latter case, the actual income might even be 
higher than the basic interest component, but is not subject to any residence-based 
taxation in the state of the service provider. However, it must be kept in mind that a 





   
 
the financial year in question. If the property ratio is fulfilled at the beginning and at 
the end of the year, there will be no current taxation of income. The verification is to 
be made on a yearly basis. Such an approach ensures that only entities which 
heavily rely on the provision of capital services come within the scope of the current 
taxation of income. I consider the exemption rule based on a property-ratio as the 
basic rule for the decision whether the activity of the company in question should be 
subject to current taxation or not. However, since the rule theoretically has to be 
applied to each and every investment, the taxpayer has to submit a tax return if the 
property-ratio is not fulfilled instead of applying for an exemption on a regular basis. 
The decisive element, of course, is the percentage which should be applied. In my 
opinion, the percentage should be in a range between 50 percent and a maximum of 
75 percent of the total book value. That means, if the non-tainted property exceeds 
50 percent (or alternatively up to more than 75 percent) of the total property - based 
on the book value - there should be no current taxation of income.   
 
9.4.10.2. Exemption Based on an Income-Ratio 
 
It may be the case that a company combines a highly profitable activity which 
requires a relatively low investment in tangible and intangible property (e.g. 
consulting services) with capital intensive tainted services. Here, the reliance on the 
investment in property will most certainly lead to a current taxation of income based 
on the property-ratio even though the actual income derived by the entity might 
theoretically mainly consist of income derived from the non-tainted activity. In those 
cases, it may be justified to provide for an (additional) exemption from current 
taxation - even though the property-ratio is not fulfilled - if the taxpayer can provide 
evidence that the actual income from non-tainted activities exceeds the income from 
tainted activities (including all income components). The threshold when the 
exemption is to be granted could be - similar to the property-ratio - in a range 
between 50 percent and 75 percent. In other words, if the income from non-tainted 
activities exceeds 50 percent (or alternatively up to more than 75 percent) of the total 
income, the exemption is provided even if the property-ratio is not fulfilled. Similar to 
the property-ratio, the calculation is to be made for the income derived within the 
respective financial year in question and it should be based - similar to the existing 
CFC rules - on the tax rules of the state which applies the legislation. In addition, 
certain extraordinary elements would have to be eliminated for the comparison (e.g. 
capital gains from the disposal of assets).   
 
9.4.10.3. Exemption Based on the Classification of the Service Recipients 
 
An exemption which is based on the classification of the recipients of the services as 
related or unrelated party may be justified by the reduced risk of tax avoidance and 
the limitation of compliance costs. It would be highly complex, time consuming and 
expensive to calculate the basic interest component, for example, on property held by 
banks, insurance companies and major leasing and rental companies. The latter 
companies would very often not fulfil the exemption requirements under the property-
ratio and the income-ratio since they provide exactly those services which are in the 
focus of the basic interest taxation. Given the immense investments in those cases, it 
may be acceptable to set the threshold higher than the minimum percentage in case 
of the property-ratio and the income-ratio. Thus, the exemption may be granted if the 
tainted services provided to unrelated parties encompass more than 75 percent of 
the total tainted services provided to related and unrelated parties. Here, the question 
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same state. Here, the taxation - even though it may still be based on the principle of 
residence - is imposed “at the right place,” namely in the state where the income is 
actually produced. In the example above, this would lead to the result that not only 
the services (1) and (2) are exempt from the current taxation of the basic interest 
component, but also the services provided within state C (3). Consistently, it would 
also result in an exemption of the services provided within state A, e.g. services 
provided by company A towards another resident company. This, however, is a 
“delicate” issue from an EU law perspective since it can be argued that the current 
taxation of income - even if it is limited to the basic interest component - can be seen 
as a restriction on the exercising of basic freedoms. It is therefore of utmost 
importance that such restrictive measures are applied in a manner which treats 
purely domestic transactions comparably restrictive as cross-border transactions. 
This is the main reason why the proposed anti-avoidance legislation should not make 
any differentiation between domestic and foreign tainted activities. The provision of 
an (additional) exemption from current taxation for tainted services which are 
rendered within the state where the income is actually produced would make perfect 
sense from a tax policy perspective. However, there can be situations in which such 
an exemption could result in a restriction of cross-border investments compared to 





     Alternative 1      Alternative 2 
 
 























































           (2) 
 
 
           (1)       (3) 








(1) Inter-company services provided by company C to company B. 
(2) Inter-company services provided by company C to company A. 
(3) Inter-company services provided by company C to company CC (no cross-border services). 
 
In the example, the services of company C are provided towards companies A, B and 
CC. Under the assumption that the services have to be classified as tainted activities, 
and that the services are subject to a residence-based taxation in state C, the basic 
interest component will be calculated on the tainted property of company C and will 
be attributed to the shareholder in state A. The residence-based taxation of the 
tainted activities is clearly supported by the OECD-MTC. However, if it is assumed 
that the double tax conventions between the states A-C and B-C provide for a strict 
source-based taxation in the state of the recipient of the services, there should be no 
income allocation of the basic interest component. Thus, the underlying property for 
the services (1) and (2) should be excluded from the calculation basis. What remains 
is the taxation of the services provided to company CC (3). In the latter case, the 
services are rendered in a merely domestic context and will, therefore, be subject to 
income taxation in state C. However, the question arises whether an exemption may 
be granted in those cases, too, in which the state of residence and the state of 
source are identical, i.e. if the taxation of the tainted income takes place in the state 
where the income is actually produced. Such an exemption would be supported by 
the general principles outlined in previous chapters but might be a problem from an 
EU law perspective. This question will be verified in the following.  
 
9.4.10.6. One Step Further: Exemption for Cases where the State of Source is 
Identical to the State of Residence? 
 
It was outlined in previous chapters that the taxation in the state where the income is 
produced is the preferable result from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective. It is therefore quite obvious that the question arises whether the current 
taxation of income should take place in cases in which the service provider and the 
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same state. Here, the taxation - even though it may still be based on the principle of 
residence - is imposed “at the right place,” namely in the state where the income is 
actually produced. In the example above, this would lead to the result that not only 
the services (1) and (2) are exempt from the current taxation of the basic interest 
component, but also the services provided within state C (3). Consistently, it would 
also result in an exemption of the services provided within state A, e.g. services 
provided by company A towards another resident company. This, however, is a 
“delicate” issue from an EU law perspective since it can be argued that the current 
taxation of income - even if it is limited to the basic interest component - can be seen 
as a restriction on the exercising of basic freedoms. It is therefore of utmost 
importance that such restrictive measures are applied in a manner which treats 
purely domestic transactions comparably restrictive as cross-border transactions. 
This is the main reason why the proposed anti-avoidance legislation should not make 
any differentiation between domestic and foreign tainted activities. The provision of 
an (additional) exemption from current taxation for tainted services which are 
rendered within the state where the income is actually produced would make perfect 
sense from a tax policy perspective. However, there can be situations in which such 
an exemption could result in a restriction of cross-border investments compared to 
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(1) Inter-company services provided by company C to company B. 
(2) Inter-company services provided by company C to company A. 
(3) Inter-company services provided by company C to company CC (no cross-border services). 
 
In the example, the services of company C are provided towards companies A, B and 
CC. Under the assumption that the services have to be classified as tainted activities, 
and that the services are subject to a residence-based taxation in state C, the basic 
interest component will be calculated on the tainted property of company C and will 
be attributed to the shareholder in state A. The residence-based taxation of the 
tainted activities is clearly supported by the OECD-MTC. However, if it is assumed 
that the double tax conventions between the states A-C and B-C provide for a strict 
source-based taxation in the state of the recipient of the services, there should be no 
income allocation of the basic interest component. Thus, the underlying property for 
the services (1) and (2) should be excluded from the calculation basis. What remains 
is the taxation of the services provided to company CC (3). In the latter case, the 
services are rendered in a merely domestic context and will, therefore, be subject to 
income taxation in state C. However, the question arises whether an exemption may 
be granted in those cases, too, in which the state of residence and the state of 
source are identical, i.e. if the taxation of the tainted income takes place in the state 
where the income is actually produced. Such an exemption would be supported by 
the general principles outlined in previous chapters but might be a problem from an 
EU law perspective. This question will be verified in the following.  
 
9.4.10.6. One Step Further: Exemption for Cases where the State of Source is 
Identical to the State of Residence? 
 
It was outlined in previous chapters that the taxation in the state where the income is 
produced is the preferable result from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective. It is therefore quite obvious that the question arises whether the current 
taxation of income should take place in cases in which the service provider and the 
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In this example, the services rendered by company AA and company B are both 
considered to be tainted activities which are subject to a current taxation of the basic 
interest component in state A. The services rendered by company C are also 
considered to be tainted services which, in principle, lead to an attribution of income 
to the domestic shareholders in state A. However, in the latter case, the services are 
rendered to a recipient in the same state (company CC) which - in this example - 
utilises the services for an income-producing activity in state C.75 From a tax policy 
perspective, the income could therefore be exempt from domestic taxation in state A. 
This is not only true for the non-tainted income of company CC but is equally true for 
the tainted income of company C. It must be noted that state A, in general, does not 
provide for a more favourable treatment of the cross-border services rendered by the 
domestic company AA. In fact, those services are subject to current taxation in the 
same way as the services rendered by company B (alternative 2) and, in principle, 
those of company C (alternative 3). However, since the latter company provides the 
services to a recipient in the same state which utilises the respective services for an 
income-producing activity in state C, an exemption from the current taxation of 
income produced in that state might be granted. Such an exemption would, of 
course, also be granted to company B if the requirements are fulfilled. At first glance, 
                                            
75 It is assumed that an additional entity in state C (company CC) is needed and that the activities cannot be 





























   
 
If, in the example, the services provided by company AA (alternative 1) were be 
exempt from any current income allocation to the corporate shareholder A and the 
individual shareholder A, it might be argued that this creates an advantage for purely 
domestic investments compared to cross-border investments (alternative 2) in which 
the basic interest component would be currently allocated to the corporate and the 
individual shareholder in state A. Based on the earlier arguments in favour of the 
current allocation of the basic interest income it may certainly be concluded that this 
particular transaction, i.e. the equity investment in a foreign company which is 
subsequently re-located back to the state where the equity investment comes from, is  
a transaction which strongly supports the argument that the risk-free interest 
component should be taxed in state A. Not only that it leads to a (limited) taxation in 
the state where the income is actually produced, it is also of great importance from 
an anti-avoidance perspective. The non-attribution of the basic interest component 
would not only shelter the income related to the capital investment from domestic 
taxation but would also create an additional reduction of the domestic tax base 
through the acceptance of the service payments as deductible business expenses in 
state A (which includes again an interest component). However, the mere fact that 
the equity investment is made by a resident company and that the subsequent 
services are rendered to a resident company cannot be considered abusive. Such a 
constellation in which the investor and the recipient of the services are resident in 
one and the same state is quite normal and may not be seen as an indication for tax 
abuse and tax avoidance. Even if the domestic shareholder and the recipient of the 
services are one and the same taxpayer, i.e. the recipient of the services (in 
alternative 2) is company A (or individual A) and not company AAA, this cannot be 
seen as abusive just due to the fact that the domestic investor is not only a 
shareholder in the subsidiary company but is, at the same time, involved in a 
business relationship with the latter company.74 It is therefore quite obvious - 
especially from the examinations in previous chapters - that a differentiation cannot 
be made based on the argument of tax abuse and tax avoidance. The same is 
basically true with respect to a justification based on the protection of a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. The current 
taxation of the basic interest component only in case of alternative 2 cannot be 
explained by the necessity of a symmetrical treatment of income and I do not think 
that the ECJ would follow such an argumentation (even in case of a limitation to the 
basic interest component).  
 
However, the question arises whether the alternative legislation could provide for an 
exemption of the basic interest taxation for services rendered within a certain state 
(e.g. state C) but without providing the same exemption to cross-border services and 
to domestic services. In other words, the services provided by non-resident 
companies to recipients in the same state for an income-producing activity carried on 
in this state would be exempt from current taxation whereas cross-border services 
(for example A-C or B-C) and purely domestic services (within state A) are subject to 
current taxation of the basic interest component. Theoretically, this could lead to an 
unfavourable treatment of purely domestic services compared to services rendered 
within another state, but it would not lead to an unfavourable treatment of cross-
border services (related to Member State A) compared to merely domestic services.  
  
 
                                            
74 See in this respect also Advocate General Léger, Opinion of the Advocate General (case C-196/04 - Cadbury 
Schweppes plc), paragraphs 106 to 109.  
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In this example, the services rendered by company AA and company B are both 
considered to be tainted activities which are subject to a current taxation of the basic 
interest component in state A. The services rendered by company C are also 
considered to be tainted services which, in principle, lead to an attribution of income 
to the domestic shareholders in state A. However, in the latter case, the services are 
rendered to a recipient in the same state (company CC) which - in this example - 
utilises the services for an income-producing activity in state C.75 From a tax policy 
perspective, the income could therefore be exempt from domestic taxation in state A. 
This is not only true for the non-tainted income of company CC but is equally true for 
the tainted income of company C. It must be noted that state A, in general, does not 
provide for a more favourable treatment of the cross-border services rendered by the 
domestic company AA. In fact, those services are subject to current taxation in the 
same way as the services rendered by company B (alternative 2) and, in principle, 
those of company C (alternative 3). However, since the latter company provides the 
services to a recipient in the same state which utilises the respective services for an 
income-producing activity in state C, an exemption from the current taxation of 
income produced in that state might be granted. Such an exemption would, of 
course, also be granted to company B if the requirements are fulfilled. At first glance, 
                                            
75 It is assumed that an additional entity in state C (company CC) is needed and that the activities cannot be 





























   
 
If, in the example, the services provided by company AA (alternative 1) were be 
exempt from any current income allocation to the corporate shareholder A and the 
individual shareholder A, it might be argued that this creates an advantage for purely 
domestic investments compared to cross-border investments (alternative 2) in which 
the basic interest component would be currently allocated to the corporate and the 
individual shareholder in state A. Based on the earlier arguments in favour of the 
current allocation of the basic interest income it may certainly be concluded that this 
particular transaction, i.e. the equity investment in a foreign company which is 
subsequently re-located back to the state where the equity investment comes from, is  
a transaction which strongly supports the argument that the risk-free interest 
component should be taxed in state A. Not only that it leads to a (limited) taxation in 
the state where the income is actually produced, it is also of great importance from 
an anti-avoidance perspective. The non-attribution of the basic interest component 
would not only shelter the income related to the capital investment from domestic 
taxation but would also create an additional reduction of the domestic tax base 
through the acceptance of the service payments as deductible business expenses in 
state A (which includes again an interest component). However, the mere fact that 
the equity investment is made by a resident company and that the subsequent 
services are rendered to a resident company cannot be considered abusive. Such a 
constellation in which the investor and the recipient of the services are resident in 
one and the same state is quite normal and may not be seen as an indication for tax 
abuse and tax avoidance. Even if the domestic shareholder and the recipient of the 
services are one and the same taxpayer, i.e. the recipient of the services (in 
alternative 2) is company A (or individual A) and not company AAA, this cannot be 
seen as abusive just due to the fact that the domestic investor is not only a 
shareholder in the subsidiary company but is, at the same time, involved in a 
business relationship with the latter company.74 It is therefore quite obvious - 
especially from the examinations in previous chapters - that a differentiation cannot 
be made based on the argument of tax abuse and tax avoidance. The same is 
basically true with respect to a justification based on the protection of a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. The current 
taxation of the basic interest component only in case of alternative 2 cannot be 
explained by the necessity of a symmetrical treatment of income and I do not think 
that the ECJ would follow such an argumentation (even in case of a limitation to the 
basic interest component).  
 
However, the question arises whether the alternative legislation could provide for an 
exemption of the basic interest taxation for services rendered within a certain state 
(e.g. state C) but without providing the same exemption to cross-border services and 
to domestic services. In other words, the services provided by non-resident 
companies to recipients in the same state for an income-producing activity carried on 
in this state would be exempt from current taxation whereas cross-border services 
(for example A-C or B-C) and purely domestic services (within state A) are subject to 
current taxation of the basic interest component. Theoretically, this could lead to an 
unfavourable treatment of purely domestic services compared to services rendered 
within another state, but it would not lead to an unfavourable treatment of cross-
border services (related to Member State A) compared to merely domestic services.  
  
 
                                            
74 See in this respect also Advocate General Léger, Opinion of the Advocate General (case C-196/04 - Cadbury 
Schweppes plc), paragraphs 106 to 109.  
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that Member States are, in practice, rather reluctant to grant an exemption provision 
in the aforementioned manner. Moreover, it would have to be verified whether such 
an approach can eventually raise constitutional questions in Member State A. It 
should not be overlooked that - from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective - the exemption from current taxation in the state where the income is 
produced should be equally relevant for the investor in Member State A (i.e. the 
individual shareholder in Member State A who invests in a domestic company which 
carries on tainted activities only in Member State A). Overall, based on the above 
conclusions and the case law of the ECJ, it is necessary to follow a strict and 
consistent anti-avoidance approach which should have the consequence that the 
basic interest component is, in general, to be taxed in all of the alternative scenarios.  
 
9.4.10.7. Other Exemption Provisions 
 
The exemption rules provided for in the context of CFC regimes cannot simply be 
transferred to the alternative anti-avoidance legislation. For example, a “motive test” 
does not really fit into the proposed system. The reason is that the intention of the 
taxpayer for the provision of certain services is irrelevant for the decision whether it 
should be currently taxed or not. In other words, the mere fact that capital services 
are rendered to another party is no reason whatsoever to make a distinction which is 
based on the motive of the taxpayer. Moreover, it should be clear that an exemption 
provision cannot be connected to the tax rate of a particular state and should not be 
based on the existence or non-existence of double tax conventions. The alternative 
legislation requires a consistent application to foreign and domestic tainted 
investments without “picking out” certain states.  
 
The question may be raised whether an “acceptable distribution policy” might be a 
logical and acceptable reason for an exemption provision. Clearly, the full distribution 
of the profit generated by the company which carries on the tainted activities on a 
regular basis would make an anti-deferral provision obsolete - because there is no 
deferral. However, the decisive factor should not be the regular and full (or almost 
full) distribution of the profits, but rather the income which is related to the basic 
interest component. The reason is that the company which operates in another state 
should have the possibility of re-investing its profits and should not be obliged to 
distribute the income which is related to the activity component and the risk 
component. This, of course, is especially important if a substantial tax rate difference 
exists between the state in which the tainted activity is carried on and the state of 
residence of the shareholder. Furthermore, the implementation of such an exemption 
provision might be difficult and would make the application of the regime rather more 
complicated. This is, in particular, due to the fact that the proposed system does not 
only focus on the direct shareholder but also on the indirect shareholder. The system 
should therefore, in my opinion, not necessarily provide an exemption which is 
directly connected to the distribution policy of the respective entity.  
 
In any event, the exemption provisions outlined above can theoretically be 
differentiated further - depending on the situation and the approach followed by the 
respective Member State. For example, the percentages for property ratio, income 
ratio et cetera can be higher or lower and can, therefore, increase or decrease the 
number of cases which are subject to CSC taxation. It is also possible to make a 
further differentiation with respect to the exemption based on the classification of the 
service recipients. For example, the proposed exemption may be restricted to banks, 
   
 
the regime applied by state A leads to an equally restrictive treatment of domestic 
and foreign (tainted) investments. It is therefore, in principle, not a one-sided 
restrictive treatment of cross-border investments in favour of domestic investments. It 
may rather be seen as the implementation of additional requirements for the activities 
“behind the border” which can even lead to a more favourable situation compared to 
the investment in state A. In this particular case, the investment in state B may be “as 
unattractive as the domestic investment in state A” for the purposes of rendering the 
services to company CC. However, the criterion applied for an exemption in state B is 
the same as for state C. In other words, the restrictive regime of state A applies to all 
tainted activities, no matter whether the activities are carried on in state A, B or C, but 
it opens the possibility of applying for an exemption if the services are provided within 
the state where the income is actually produced (with the important exception for 
services provided within state A). Theoretically, the anti-avoidance system of state A 
applies consistently to all foreign investments and the exemption is granted to all 
foreign activities under the same conditions.   
 
Even though it is apparent from the case law of the ECJ that national legislation does 
not have to stand a direct comparison of an investment in two different Member 
States (horizontal comparison) in order to comply with the basic freedoms, it remains 
questionable whether the different treatment is in line with the concept and the idea 
of an internal market.76 This is not a question of an infringement of one or more basic 
freedoms, but a more general question. Looking at the situation here, especially the 
situation of the aforementioned alternative 2 compared to alternative 3, it is obvious 
that the investment in Member State B is less attractive compared to the investment 
in Member State C. However, the different treatment of an investment in Member 
State B is not caused by objective criteria which always - and under all circumstances 
- leads to an unfavourable treatment of an investment in Member State B, but it is just 
due to the fact that the recipient of the services is, in this particular case, not 
established in the same Member State as the service provider. For example, if 
Member State C is a huge market and the Member States A and B are rather small 
markets, it may be the case that a large number of potential customers in Member 
State C require different types of services which also attract investors of Member 
States A and B. If the investor in Member State A has the choice to invest in Member 
State B or in Member State C - in order to provide the services to recipients in 
Member State C - the exemption provision outlined above can clearly support the 
investment in Member State C to the detriment of Member State B. In other words, 
the national legislation of Member State A would make, in this particular case, the 
investment in Member State B (and theoretically even the investment in Member 
State A) less attractive compared to the investment in Member State C. Moreover, it 
may be more attractive for company B to provide services within Member State B 
since it would not result in an immediate income allocation to the parent company A. 
For company CC, this could have the effect that services of companies established in 
Member State B are not available to the same extent or the services are available 
under different conditions. In any event, it is possible that company CC, as the 
recipient of the services, can be negatively affected by the legislation of Member 
State A.  
 
In addition, it is questionable whether such a “self-restriction” in favour of the country 
of investment can be more than just a theoretical consideration. It can be assumed 
                                            
76 See section 8.2.4.2. with regard to the necessity of a vertical / horizontal comparison.  
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that Member States are, in practice, rather reluctant to grant an exemption provision 
in the aforementioned manner. Moreover, it would have to be verified whether such 
an approach can eventually raise constitutional questions in Member State A. It 
should not be overlooked that - from an equity perspective and an economic 
perspective - the exemption from current taxation in the state where the income is 
produced should be equally relevant for the investor in Member State A (i.e. the 
individual shareholder in Member State A who invests in a domestic company which 
carries on tainted activities only in Member State A). Overall, based on the above 
conclusions and the case law of the ECJ, it is necessary to follow a strict and 
consistent anti-avoidance approach which should have the consequence that the 
basic interest component is, in general, to be taxed in all of the alternative scenarios.  
 
9.4.10.7. Other Exemption Provisions 
 
The exemption rules provided for in the context of CFC regimes cannot simply be 
transferred to the alternative anti-avoidance legislation. For example, a “motive test” 
does not really fit into the proposed system. The reason is that the intention of the 
taxpayer for the provision of certain services is irrelevant for the decision whether it 
should be currently taxed or not. In other words, the mere fact that capital services 
are rendered to another party is no reason whatsoever to make a distinction which is 
based on the motive of the taxpayer. Moreover, it should be clear that an exemption 
provision cannot be connected to the tax rate of a particular state and should not be 
based on the existence or non-existence of double tax conventions. The alternative 
legislation requires a consistent application to foreign and domestic tainted 
investments without “picking out” certain states.  
 
The question may be raised whether an “acceptable distribution policy” might be a 
logical and acceptable reason for an exemption provision. Clearly, the full distribution 
of the profit generated by the company which carries on the tainted activities on a 
regular basis would make an anti-deferral provision obsolete - because there is no 
deferral. However, the decisive factor should not be the regular and full (or almost 
full) distribution of the profits, but rather the income which is related to the basic 
interest component. The reason is that the company which operates in another state 
should have the possibility of re-investing its profits and should not be obliged to 
distribute the income which is related to the activity component and the risk 
component. This, of course, is especially important if a substantial tax rate difference 
exists between the state in which the tainted activity is carried on and the state of 
residence of the shareholder. Furthermore, the implementation of such an exemption 
provision might be difficult and would make the application of the regime rather more 
complicated. This is, in particular, due to the fact that the proposed system does not 
only focus on the direct shareholder but also on the indirect shareholder. The system 
should therefore, in my opinion, not necessarily provide an exemption which is 
directly connected to the distribution policy of the respective entity.  
 
In any event, the exemption provisions outlined above can theoretically be 
differentiated further - depending on the situation and the approach followed by the 
respective Member State. For example, the percentages for property ratio, income 
ratio et cetera can be higher or lower and can, therefore, increase or decrease the 
number of cases which are subject to CSC taxation. It is also possible to make a 
further differentiation with respect to the exemption based on the classification of the 
service recipients. For example, the proposed exemption may be restricted to banks, 
   
 
the regime applied by state A leads to an equally restrictive treatment of domestic 
and foreign (tainted) investments. It is therefore, in principle, not a one-sided 
restrictive treatment of cross-border investments in favour of domestic investments. It 
may rather be seen as the implementation of additional requirements for the activities 
“behind the border” which can even lead to a more favourable situation compared to 
the investment in state A. In this particular case, the investment in state B may be “as 
unattractive as the domestic investment in state A” for the purposes of rendering the 
services to company CC. However, the criterion applied for an exemption in state B is 
the same as for state C. In other words, the restrictive regime of state A applies to all 
tainted activities, no matter whether the activities are carried on in state A, B or C, but 
it opens the possibility of applying for an exemption if the services are provided within 
the state where the income is actually produced (with the important exception for 
services provided within state A). Theoretically, the anti-avoidance system of state A 
applies consistently to all foreign investments and the exemption is granted to all 
foreign activities under the same conditions.   
 
Even though it is apparent from the case law of the ECJ that national legislation does 
not have to stand a direct comparison of an investment in two different Member 
States (horizontal comparison) in order to comply with the basic freedoms, it remains 
questionable whether the different treatment is in line with the concept and the idea 
of an internal market.76 This is not a question of an infringement of one or more basic 
freedoms, but a more general question. Looking at the situation here, especially the 
situation of the aforementioned alternative 2 compared to alternative 3, it is obvious 
that the investment in Member State B is less attractive compared to the investment 
in Member State C. However, the different treatment of an investment in Member 
State B is not caused by objective criteria which always - and under all circumstances 
- leads to an unfavourable treatment of an investment in Member State B, but it is just 
due to the fact that the recipient of the services is, in this particular case, not 
established in the same Member State as the service provider. For example, if 
Member State C is a huge market and the Member States A and B are rather small 
markets, it may be the case that a large number of potential customers in Member 
State C require different types of services which also attract investors of Member 
States A and B. If the investor in Member State A has the choice to invest in Member 
State B or in Member State C - in order to provide the services to recipients in 
Member State C - the exemption provision outlined above can clearly support the 
investment in Member State C to the detriment of Member State B. In other words, 
the national legislation of Member State A would make, in this particular case, the 
investment in Member State B (and theoretically even the investment in Member 
State A) less attractive compared to the investment in Member State C. Moreover, it 
may be more attractive for company B to provide services within Member State B 
since it would not result in an immediate income allocation to the parent company A. 
For company CC, this could have the effect that services of companies established in 
Member State B are not available to the same extent or the services are available 
under different conditions. In any event, it is possible that company CC, as the 
recipient of the services, can be negatively affected by the legislation of Member 
State A.  
 
In addition, it is questionable whether such a “self-restriction” in favour of the country 
of investment can be more than just a theoretical consideration. It can be assumed 
                                            
76 See section 8.2.4.2. with regard to the necessity of a vertical / horizontal comparison.  
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income will not be the decisive element for an investment decision. The proposed 
CSC legislation is, therefore, based on such a non-discriminatory approach by 
allocating to the resident shareholder the basic interest component which is related to 
tainted activities carried on through resident and non-resident entities. This is not 
necessarily the simplest approach - because it increases the overall administrative 
burden for taxpayers and tax authorities - but it is the approach which is required by 
EU law. Even though I think there are important arguments in favour of a basic 
interest taxation which makes a differentiation between domestic and foreign 
investments, as already outlined earlier, it is obvious from the case law of the ECJ 
that those arguments cannot justify the restriction on the relevant basic freedoms. 
Therefore, the non-discriminatory system of income allocation focuses on certain 
capital services and must be supported by non-discriminatory exemption provisions 
in order to limit the application of the CSC system to investments which entail an 
increased risk of tax avoidance. The key factors of the CSC legislation to ensure the 
compliance with the basic freedoms, the concept and the idea of an internal market 
and, at the same time, the effectiveness of the anti-avoidance system are 
 
o the limitation to tainted activities which entail - from the perspective of the state 
which applies such legislation - an increased risk of tax avoidance; 
 
o the application of the system in a non-discriminatory manner to tainted 
activities carried on through resident and non-resident entities; 
 
o the strict limitation of the current allocation of income to the basic interest 
component; 
 
o the granting of non-discriminatory exemption provisions; 
 
It must be clear that the non-discriminatory approach requires more than just the 
application to income derived by resident and non-resident entities. It is important 
that the whole concept does not provide for differences in the treatment of the basic 
interest taxation which is due to the tax credit system, tax losses, multiple-tier 
structures, et cetera. In other words, the legislation must provide for an equal 
treatment under all circumstances. For this reason, the CSC legislation provides for a 
current taxation of the basic interest component which is largely unconnected to the 
regular income taxation of the shareholder and which ensures, therefore, an equal 
treatment of income allocated from foreign tainted activities and domestic tainted 
activities.  
 
a.) Limitation to tainted activities 
 
The fact that the proposed CSC legislation solely focuses on certain types of capital 
service activities (tainted activities) should not be a problem from the perspective of 
primary EU law. In my opinion, there is no obligation which can be derived from EU 
law which requires the Member States to treat all types of activities in the same 
manner for income tax purposes. In essence, what the proposed CSC legislation 
does is to provide for a current taxation of the basic interest component derived from 
tainted activities under certain circumstances. The legislation neither leads to a 
systematic double taxation of income nor creates any other comparable 
disadvantage. Moreover, the subsequent profit distribution finally combines the 
(special) system of CSC taxation with the regular income tax system. Thus, the CSC 
   
 
insurance companies, leasing companies and comparable institutions but may 
exclude certain asset management activities from the exemption provision. This 
would lead to a further “fine-tuning” of tainted activities with a higher or lower risk of 
tax avoidance.  
 
9.4.11. The Litmus Test: CSC Legislation, Internal Market and EU Law 
 
Apart from the fact that the proposed alternative anti-avoidance legislation should be 
in line with the economic and equity principles, it is of utmost importance that the 
legislation complies with the concept of an internal market and the primary and 
secondary EU law - especially the basic freedoms stipulated in the TFEU. The 
requirements and the critical aspects have been examined in some detail in previous 
chapters, and this was taken into account for the drafting of the proposed CSC 
legislation. It is absolutely clear that the CSC concept must, first of all, fulfil its 
purpose of an efficient anti-avoidance system which is fully in line with EU law. If this 
is not the case, the legislation cannot be applied. However, apart from these “hard 
factors” of primary and secondary EU law it also seems to be important that the 
proposed CSC legislation complies with the idea and the concept of an internal 
market.  
 
9.4.11.1. The Compliance with the Concept of an Internal Market 
 
The current taxation of the basic interest component in case of tainted activities is, in 
my opinion and as already stated earlier, not only completely in line with the idea and 
the concept of an internal market, but it may even be considered to be necessary to 
avoid inefficient structures and inefficient capital allocations. This, of course, is 
particularly important in those cases in which the basic interest income is produced in 
another state, i.e. not in the state where the service company carries on its activities. 
However, I have to confess that the current taxation of the basic interest component 
which is produced in the state of the service company, although not by the same 
entity, is only the second-best solution. Nevertheless, the fact that any other 
approach would be almost impossible to implement and, in my opinion, would lead to 
situations which are not in line with the concept of an internal market, makes it 
necessary to partially deviate from the theoretical requirements. However, the strict 
limitation of the current taxation of income to the basic interest component reduces 
the problem considerably. What prevails, in my opinion, is the positive effect of such 
legislation for an internal market as a whole. Thus, the proposed CSC legislation is 
an anti-avoidance system which supports the concept and the further development of 
the European Union.  
 
9.4.11.2. The Compliance with Primary European Union Law  
 
It is obvious that the current allocation of income is a legislative measure which can 
have a restrictive effect on investments and can therefore influence the decision of 
the place of investment. This is not only true for income allocations under a CFC 
regime but can be also true for (limited) income allocations under a CSC regime. 
However, the fact that the current allocation of income is the core element of the 
proposed anti-avoidance legislation, it is necessary that the system is structured in a 
non-discriminative manner. This ensures that the investment in companies which 
carry on certain types of tainted activities is always treated in the same manner, no 
matter in which country the activity is carried on. In this case, the current allocation of 
Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation
579
   
 
income will not be the decisive element for an investment decision. The proposed 
CSC legislation is, therefore, based on such a non-discriminatory approach by 
allocating to the resident shareholder the basic interest component which is related to 
tainted activities carried on through resident and non-resident entities. This is not 
necessarily the simplest approach - because it increases the overall administrative 
burden for taxpayers and tax authorities - but it is the approach which is required by 
EU law. Even though I think there are important arguments in favour of a basic 
interest taxation which makes a differentiation between domestic and foreign 
investments, as already outlined earlier, it is obvious from the case law of the ECJ 
that those arguments cannot justify the restriction on the relevant basic freedoms. 
Therefore, the non-discriminatory system of income allocation focuses on certain 
capital services and must be supported by non-discriminatory exemption provisions 
in order to limit the application of the CSC system to investments which entail an 
increased risk of tax avoidance. The key factors of the CSC legislation to ensure the 
compliance with the basic freedoms, the concept and the idea of an internal market 
and, at the same time, the effectiveness of the anti-avoidance system are 
 
o the limitation to tainted activities which entail - from the perspective of the state 
which applies such legislation - an increased risk of tax avoidance; 
 
o the application of the system in a non-discriminatory manner to tainted 
activities carried on through resident and non-resident entities; 
 
o the strict limitation of the current allocation of income to the basic interest 
component; 
 
o the granting of non-discriminatory exemption provisions; 
 
It must be clear that the non-discriminatory approach requires more than just the 
application to income derived by resident and non-resident entities. It is important 
that the whole concept does not provide for differences in the treatment of the basic 
interest taxation which is due to the tax credit system, tax losses, multiple-tier 
structures, et cetera. In other words, the legislation must provide for an equal 
treatment under all circumstances. For this reason, the CSC legislation provides for a 
current taxation of the basic interest component which is largely unconnected to the 
regular income taxation of the shareholder and which ensures, therefore, an equal 
treatment of income allocated from foreign tainted activities and domestic tainted 
activities.  
 
a.) Limitation to tainted activities 
 
The fact that the proposed CSC legislation solely focuses on certain types of capital 
service activities (tainted activities) should not be a problem from the perspective of 
primary EU law. In my opinion, there is no obligation which can be derived from EU 
law which requires the Member States to treat all types of activities in the same 
manner for income tax purposes. In essence, what the proposed CSC legislation 
does is to provide for a current taxation of the basic interest component derived from 
tainted activities under certain circumstances. The legislation neither leads to a 
systematic double taxation of income nor creates any other comparable 
disadvantage. Moreover, the subsequent profit distribution finally combines the 
(special) system of CSC taxation with the regular income tax system. Thus, the CSC 
   
 
insurance companies, leasing companies and comparable institutions but may 
exclude certain asset management activities from the exemption provision. This 
would lead to a further “fine-tuning” of tainted activities with a higher or lower risk of 
tax avoidance.  
 
9.4.11. The Litmus Test: CSC Legislation, Internal Market and EU Law 
 
Apart from the fact that the proposed alternative anti-avoidance legislation should be 
in line with the economic and equity principles, it is of utmost importance that the 
legislation complies with the concept of an internal market and the primary and 
secondary EU law - especially the basic freedoms stipulated in the TFEU. The 
requirements and the critical aspects have been examined in some detail in previous 
chapters, and this was taken into account for the drafting of the proposed CSC 
legislation. It is absolutely clear that the CSC concept must, first of all, fulfil its 
purpose of an efficient anti-avoidance system which is fully in line with EU law. If this 
is not the case, the legislation cannot be applied. However, apart from these “hard 
factors” of primary and secondary EU law it also seems to be important that the 
proposed CSC legislation complies with the idea and the concept of an internal 
market.  
 
9.4.11.1. The Compliance with the Concept of an Internal Market 
 
The current taxation of the basic interest component in case of tainted activities is, in 
my opinion and as already stated earlier, not only completely in line with the idea and 
the concept of an internal market, but it may even be considered to be necessary to 
avoid inefficient structures and inefficient capital allocations. This, of course, is 
particularly important in those cases in which the basic interest income is produced in 
another state, i.e. not in the state where the service company carries on its activities. 
However, I have to confess that the current taxation of the basic interest component 
which is produced in the state of the service company, although not by the same 
entity, is only the second-best solution. Nevertheless, the fact that any other 
approach would be almost impossible to implement and, in my opinion, would lead to 
situations which are not in line with the concept of an internal market, makes it 
necessary to partially deviate from the theoretical requirements. However, the strict 
limitation of the current taxation of income to the basic interest component reduces 
the problem considerably. What prevails, in my opinion, is the positive effect of such 
legislation for an internal market as a whole. Thus, the proposed CSC legislation is 
an anti-avoidance system which supports the concept and the further development of 
the European Union.  
 
9.4.11.2. The Compliance with Primary European Union Law  
 
It is obvious that the current allocation of income is a legislative measure which can 
have a restrictive effect on investments and can therefore influence the decision of 
the place of investment. This is not only true for income allocations under a CFC 
regime but can be also true for (limited) income allocations under a CSC regime. 
However, the fact that the current allocation of income is the core element of the 
proposed anti-avoidance legislation, it is necessary that the system is structured in a 
non-discriminative manner. This ensures that the investment in companies which 
carry on certain types of tainted activities is always treated in the same manner, no 
matter in which country the activity is carried on. In this case, the current allocation of 
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irrespective of whether the foreign income tax rate is higher or lower (e.g. in case of 
tax losses). However, the fact that it is most often the investment in low-tax countries 
which triggers an additional income tax payment is only due to the tax credit system: 
it limits the crediting of income taxes to the taxes actually imposed on the respective 
income. Of course, such a credit system can make the investment in a low-tax 
country less attractive compared to a system which provides for a complete 
exemption from domestic taxation. But this is not the point. The decisive question is 
whether the domestic legislation provides for a different treatment of two comparable 
situations, i.e. taxation of the income in one case but exemption of the income in 
another. Again, the CSC legislation clearly follows a non-discriminatory approach and 
taxes all tainted activities - under the same circumstances - according to an identical 
system. Moreover, it should not be overlooked in this respect that the CSC legislation 
is strictly limited to the current taxation of the basic interest component. That means, 
all other income elements can take advantage of a lower taxation in the respective 
country. Thus, if the exercising of functions in the low-tax country is more attractive 
than in the state of residence of the shareholder, this will not be influenced by the 
proposed CSC legislation since the latter provides for an exemption of the activity 
component and the risk component. This is, in my opinion, a differentiation of some 
relevance: one should not forget that any foreign investment, even if it is an 
investment in another Member State, is still accompanied by additional risks and 
uncertainties (which are, inter alia, related to the fact that the investment is in another 
country), additional administrative obligations, additional expenses, et cetera. If, in 
such a situation, the investor cannot take advantage of the lower tax rate with respect 
to the income related to the activity component and the risk component, it may clearly 
influence his decision whether he should invest abroad or whether he should invest 
in the state of residence. For this reason, a legislation which focuses on the current 
taxation of the total amount of income derived by resident and non-resident entities 
follows, at least at first glance, a non-discriminatory approach. But at the end the 
legislation will influence the investment decision more than it should within an internal 
market environment. Moreover, in contrast to the general application of the credit 
system, e.g. in case of permanent establishments, the non-discriminative application 
of CFC regimes still makes a differentiation between different types of income. The 
combination of defining certain types of tainted income - be it under a transactional 
approach CFC regime or under an entity approach CFC regime - and the complete 
attribution of income is a critical mixture. It can have the effect that it affects some 
Member States more than others, namely those which attract - based on the 
insufficient infrastructure - rather low-function capital services instead of sophisticated 
service activities and production activities. Of course, this is not the main issue here, 
but it cannot be ignored in an internal market. Hence, the proposed CSC legislation 
with its strict limitation to the basic interest income has far less influence on any 
investment decision than the regular taxation of foreign permanent establishments of 
“credit countries” and a (theoretical) CFC legislation which is extended in a non-
discriminatory manner to foreign and domestic tainted income. In my opinion, the 
consistent and non-discriminatory application of the credit method - in the context of 
the proposed CSC legislation - is not, therefore, contrary to primary EU law.  
 
9.4.11.3. The Compliance with Secondary European Union Law 
 
Based on the conclusions drawn in chapter 8, it seems that secondary EU law does 
not play a role which is comparable to the role of primary EU law for the application of 
CFC and CSC rules. However, if the (revised) Parent-Subsidiary Directive is 
   
 
legislation leads to a temporary difference which is solely caused by the effect of an 
immediate income allocation (and taxation). Again, the fact that such a system is only 
applied to situations which entail - from the perspective of the Member States which 
apply such legislation - an increased risk of tax avoidance, is in line with the basic 
freedoms of the TFEU as long as the system is applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner to foreign and domestic tainted activities.  
 
b.) The “tax rate effect” of the credit method  
 
The proposed CSC legislation provides for an allocation of the basic interest 
component to the ultimate domestic shareholder(s). These can be individuals as well 
as legal entities - including non-residents which hold the shares in the CSC through a 
permanent establishment in the country which applies the CSC legislation. In case of 
individuals, a (preliminary) flat income tax rate will be applied which can be derived - 
depending on the system of the respective Member State - from the domestic 
corporate income tax rate. It is absolutely clear that the tax burden of the domestic 
shareholder, in the first step, strongly depends on the taxes imposed on the basic 
interest income on the lower (group) level. For example, if the tainted income is 
derived by a resident legal entity, it may be the case that there is no additional 
income tax burden imposed on the resident individual shareholder since the 
corporate income tax rate and the flat income tax on the current income attribution is 
in both cases - for example - 30 percent. Here, the tax credit is exactly as high as the 
corporate income tax levied on the basic interest component. The same will be true if 
the tainted activities are carried on in a state where the corporate income tax is 
higher than in the state of the resident shareholder. The ordinary income tax credit 
system will provide for a tax credit up to the amount levied in the other state(s). Thus, 
if the corporate income tax rate is 35 percent, there will be - in a typical situation 
without tax losses et cetera - no additional income tax payments in the residence 
state of the shareholder. In contrast thereto, if the tax rate in the state where the 
tainted activities are carried on is only 10 percent, this will have the effect that the 
shareholder can only credit the 10 percent against the 30 percent domestic income 
tax - with the consequence of an additional tax of 20 percent. Of course, the strict 
application to domestic and foreign investments as well as the consistent application 
of an ordinary tax credit system may lead to the outcome that in a merely domestic 
context the additional income tax will be zero - in a typical situation - whereas it will 
most often lead to additional income tax payments on the attributed income if it is 
related to tainted activities in a country with a lower income tax rate. The question is 
whether this can still be a critical element which has a restrictive effect on tainted 
investments in a particular country with an income tax rate which is lower than the 
domestic (flat) income tax rate - even though the system is, in principle, applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. 
 
In order to answer this question it is very important to keep in mind that the lower (or 
different) taxation - in contrast to the situation in the Cadbury Schweppes case or the 
Eurowings case - is not the decisive element for the application of the CSC taxation. 
Instead, it is only the fact that the entity carries on tainted activities. This - and 
nothing else - is the triggering factor for the current income allocation which imposes 
additional administrative obligations for the shareholder - no matter whether it is a 
resident or non-resident entity which carries on the activities - and which results in an 
immediate taxation for the domestic shareholder. Theoretically, there may be an 
additional income tax payment in case of foreign and domestic investments - 
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irrespective of whether the foreign income tax rate is higher or lower (e.g. in case of 
tax losses). However, the fact that it is most often the investment in low-tax countries 
which triggers an additional income tax payment is only due to the tax credit system: 
it limits the crediting of income taxes to the taxes actually imposed on the respective 
income. Of course, such a credit system can make the investment in a low-tax 
country less attractive compared to a system which provides for a complete 
exemption from domestic taxation. But this is not the point. The decisive question is 
whether the domestic legislation provides for a different treatment of two comparable 
situations, i.e. taxation of the income in one case but exemption of the income in 
another. Again, the CSC legislation clearly follows a non-discriminatory approach and 
taxes all tainted activities - under the same circumstances - according to an identical 
system. Moreover, it should not be overlooked in this respect that the CSC legislation 
is strictly limited to the current taxation of the basic interest component. That means, 
all other income elements can take advantage of a lower taxation in the respective 
country. Thus, if the exercising of functions in the low-tax country is more attractive 
than in the state of residence of the shareholder, this will not be influenced by the 
proposed CSC legislation since the latter provides for an exemption of the activity 
component and the risk component. This is, in my opinion, a differentiation of some 
relevance: one should not forget that any foreign investment, even if it is an 
investment in another Member State, is still accompanied by additional risks and 
uncertainties (which are, inter alia, related to the fact that the investment is in another 
country), additional administrative obligations, additional expenses, et cetera. If, in 
such a situation, the investor cannot take advantage of the lower tax rate with respect 
to the income related to the activity component and the risk component, it may clearly 
influence his decision whether he should invest abroad or whether he should invest 
in the state of residence. For this reason, a legislation which focuses on the current 
taxation of the total amount of income derived by resident and non-resident entities 
follows, at least at first glance, a non-discriminatory approach. But at the end the 
legislation will influence the investment decision more than it should within an internal 
market environment. Moreover, in contrast to the general application of the credit 
system, e.g. in case of permanent establishments, the non-discriminative application 
of CFC regimes still makes a differentiation between different types of income. The 
combination of defining certain types of tainted income - be it under a transactional 
approach CFC regime or under an entity approach CFC regime - and the complete 
attribution of income is a critical mixture. It can have the effect that it affects some 
Member States more than others, namely those which attract - based on the 
insufficient infrastructure - rather low-function capital services instead of sophisticated 
service activities and production activities. Of course, this is not the main issue here, 
but it cannot be ignored in an internal market. Hence, the proposed CSC legislation 
with its strict limitation to the basic interest income has far less influence on any 
investment decision than the regular taxation of foreign permanent establishments of 
“credit countries” and a (theoretical) CFC legislation which is extended in a non-
discriminatory manner to foreign and domestic tainted income. In my opinion, the 
consistent and non-discriminatory application of the credit method - in the context of 
the proposed CSC legislation - is not, therefore, contrary to primary EU law.  
 
9.4.11.3. The Compliance with Secondary European Union Law 
 
Based on the conclusions drawn in chapter 8, it seems that secondary EU law does 
not play a role which is comparable to the role of primary EU law for the application of 
CFC and CSC rules. However, if the (revised) Parent-Subsidiary Directive is 
   
 
legislation leads to a temporary difference which is solely caused by the effect of an 
immediate income allocation (and taxation). Again, the fact that such a system is only 
applied to situations which entail - from the perspective of the Member States which 
apply such legislation - an increased risk of tax avoidance, is in line with the basic 
freedoms of the TFEU as long as the system is applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner to foreign and domestic tainted activities.  
 
b.) The “tax rate effect” of the credit method  
 
The proposed CSC legislation provides for an allocation of the basic interest 
component to the ultimate domestic shareholder(s). These can be individuals as well 
as legal entities - including non-residents which hold the shares in the CSC through a 
permanent establishment in the country which applies the CSC legislation. In case of 
individuals, a (preliminary) flat income tax rate will be applied which can be derived - 
depending on the system of the respective Member State - from the domestic 
corporate income tax rate. It is absolutely clear that the tax burden of the domestic 
shareholder, in the first step, strongly depends on the taxes imposed on the basic 
interest income on the lower (group) level. For example, if the tainted income is 
derived by a resident legal entity, it may be the case that there is no additional 
income tax burden imposed on the resident individual shareholder since the 
corporate income tax rate and the flat income tax on the current income attribution is 
in both cases - for example - 30 percent. Here, the tax credit is exactly as high as the 
corporate income tax levied on the basic interest component. The same will be true if 
the tainted activities are carried on in a state where the corporate income tax is 
higher than in the state of the resident shareholder. The ordinary income tax credit 
system will provide for a tax credit up to the amount levied in the other state(s). Thus, 
if the corporate income tax rate is 35 percent, there will be - in a typical situation 
without tax losses et cetera - no additional income tax payments in the residence 
state of the shareholder. In contrast thereto, if the tax rate in the state where the 
tainted activities are carried on is only 10 percent, this will have the effect that the 
shareholder can only credit the 10 percent against the 30 percent domestic income 
tax - with the consequence of an additional tax of 20 percent. Of course, the strict 
application to domestic and foreign investments as well as the consistent application 
of an ordinary tax credit system may lead to the outcome that in a merely domestic 
context the additional income tax will be zero - in a typical situation - whereas it will 
most often lead to additional income tax payments on the attributed income if it is 
related to tainted activities in a country with a lower income tax rate. The question is 
whether this can still be a critical element which has a restrictive effect on tainted 
investments in a particular country with an income tax rate which is lower than the 
domestic (flat) income tax rate - even though the system is, in principle, applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner. 
 
In order to answer this question it is very important to keep in mind that the lower (or 
different) taxation - in contrast to the situation in the Cadbury Schweppes case or the 
Eurowings case - is not the decisive element for the application of the CSC taxation. 
Instead, it is only the fact that the entity carries on tainted activities. This - and 
nothing else - is the triggering factor for the current income allocation which imposes 
additional administrative obligations for the shareholder - no matter whether it is a 
resident or non-resident entity which carries on the activities - and which results in an 
immediate taxation for the domestic shareholder. Theoretically, there may be an 
additional income tax payment in case of foreign and domestic investments - 
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and unnecessary administrative burdens. In this case, the anti-avoidance (anti-
deferral) target has already been achieved.  
 
However, if the tax treaty provides the possibility for the application of the credit 
method in order to avoid the double taxation of income generated through a PE, but 
the state of the headquarter company follows the exemption method, there is no 
obstacle for the application of the CSC taxation. Here, it is not only justified but even 
necessary to tax the basic interest component - just like in case of a non-transparent 
legal entity. The latter approach is therefore by no means restricted by the relevant 
tax treaty.  
 
The situation is different, however, if the tax treaty explicitly provides for the 
application of the exemption method in order to avoid the double taxation of PE 
income. In this case, the CSC taxation would not be in line with the tax treaty - 
because the part of the income which is related to the basic interest component is 
taxed according to the credit method. In essence, the CSC taxation applied to PE 
income would result in a treaty-override. Of course, the question is whether the 
treaty-override would have any direct and immediate consequences. From an EU law 
perspective, the fact that the CSC taxation results in a treaty-override does not affect 
the outcome with respect to an examination of an infringement of the basic freedoms 
under the TFEU. This is particularly clear from the Columbus Container decision - a 
case which deals with the taxation of PE income and which is very similar to the 
application of CSC rules. In this case, the ECJ concluded that the Court may not 
examine the relationship between a national measure and the provisions of a tax 
treaty since that question does not fall within the scope of EU law.78 However, even if 
we leave aside the fact that there will be no consequences from an EU law 
perspective, it is obvious that a state which entered into tax treaty with another state 
should not contravene the provisions of the tax treaty through the application of 
national measures. So, in order to apply the proposed CSC rules it is advisable - in 
this particular situation in which the PE income shall otherwise be exempt from 
taxation according to the treaty provisions - to refer to the application of such 
legislation. This seems to be the only possibility of avoiding a treaty-override.  
 
In summary, it is only the latter situation in which the tax treaty explicitly provides for 
the application of the exemption method which requires the concrete reference to the 
CSC taxation. However, it is equally clear that the application of the CSC taxation is 
less “aggressive” - also in the light of the relationship with the other contracting state - 
than the typical CFC legislation which usually focuses on all (vertical) income 
components. Moreover, there are clear economic and equity reasons behind the 
current taxation according to the CSC legislation. Therefore, I consider it less likely 
that the application of the CSC legislation results in serious conflicts between the tax 
treaty partners. This is all the more the case if one takes into account that the current 
taxation is also strictly limited in case the income is generated through the 
interposition of non-transparent entities, i.e. if basically no explicit reference in the tax 
treaty is required. This should not be understood as a suggestion or a justification for 
a tax treaty-override, but it shows that the overall impact of such an override is very 
limited. However, one may even see it from a different angle: the fact that the CSC 
regime solely focuses on the basic interest component might open the door for an 
argument - supported by economic and equity reasons - to amend the respective 
                                            
78 See in this respect case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 46, 47 and case C-141/99 (Amid), 
paragraph 18. This was later on confirmed in case C-128/08 (Damseaux), paragraph 22.  
   
 
applicable to the current attribution of income, and it seems that this is the case, the 
system is required to provide for the elimination of double taxation by applying the 
exemption method or the credit method. It was already stated above that the 
proposed CSC legislation ensures a consistent elimination of double taxation - even 
in critical cases (e.g. existing tax losses) - by separating the concept of current 
taxation of income from the “regular” tax system. Thus, the proposed concept goes 
further than the typical tax credit system applied in the field of international taxation. 
In my opinion, the proposed system should, therefore, be fully in line with the 
requirements of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.  
 
9.4.12. CSC Legislation and the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
9.4.12.1. CSC Taxation and Non-Transparent Entities   
 
In chapter 7 it was concluded that the OECD-MTC does not prevent the application of 
a system which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest component. In 
my opinion, the allocation of the latter component to the resident shareholder does 
not result in a juridical double taxation of income, because it refers to two different 
taxpayers (the CSC and the shareholder in the CSC). Thus, there is, in principle, no 
necessity to amend a tax treaty which is based on the OECD-MTC in order to apply 
such legislation. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that - in contrast to the typical 
CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 - the CSC legislation provides for a 
horizontal and vertical separation of income and, therefore, taxes only a fraction of 
the income derived through the interposition of the CSC. In addition, a number of 
exemptions are provided under the proposed legislation. Overall, it is very unlikely - 
at least if more than one year is taken into account - that the income attributed under 
the CSC regime will be identical to the income derived by the CSC. Beside the strictly 
legal question, one can certainly argue that there is - from a political perspective - a 
clear difference between the application of a system which taxes the complete 
income of another entity (as may be the case under the typical CFC regimes, 
especially under the entity approach regimes) and the basic interest taxation. The 
latter system shows that the state which applies the CSC regime has no intention of 
taxing all or almost all of the income derived through the entity established in the 
other contracting state.  
 
9.4.12.2. CSC Taxation and Permanent Establishments  
 
The picture is a bit different if the activity is carried out through a permanent 
establishment (PE) in another state.77 As already outlined earlier in this chapter, the 
consequences depend very much on the fact whether the tax treaty determines the 
application of the credit method or the exemption method for the avoidance of double 
taxation of income generated through a PE. If the tax treaty (i) provides for the 
application of the credit method and (ii) the state of the headquarter company taxes 
the income of the PE according to the credit method, there is basically no room for a 
basic interest taxation of the tainted activity. The reason is that all income 
components (including the basic interest component) are already taxed in the state of 
the headquarter company. Of course, this is a non-optimal scenario, but a calculation 
of the basic interest component which is separated from the allocable income (and 
taxed separately) would not result in any advantage - but rather a lot of confusion 
                                            
77 This, of course, encompasses also transparent entities which are usually seen as permanent establishments in 
the tax treaty context.  
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and unnecessary administrative burdens. In this case, the anti-avoidance (anti-
deferral) target has already been achieved.  
 
However, if the tax treaty provides the possibility for the application of the credit 
method in order to avoid the double taxation of income generated through a PE, but 
the state of the headquarter company follows the exemption method, there is no 
obstacle for the application of the CSC taxation. Here, it is not only justified but even 
necessary to tax the basic interest component - just like in case of a non-transparent 
legal entity. The latter approach is therefore by no means restricted by the relevant 
tax treaty.  
 
The situation is different, however, if the tax treaty explicitly provides for the 
application of the exemption method in order to avoid the double taxation of PE 
income. In this case, the CSC taxation would not be in line with the tax treaty - 
because the part of the income which is related to the basic interest component is 
taxed according to the credit method. In essence, the CSC taxation applied to PE 
income would result in a treaty-override. Of course, the question is whether the 
treaty-override would have any direct and immediate consequences. From an EU law 
perspective, the fact that the CSC taxation results in a treaty-override does not affect 
the outcome with respect to an examination of an infringement of the basic freedoms 
under the TFEU. This is particularly clear from the Columbus Container decision - a 
case which deals with the taxation of PE income and which is very similar to the 
application of CSC rules. In this case, the ECJ concluded that the Court may not 
examine the relationship between a national measure and the provisions of a tax 
treaty since that question does not fall within the scope of EU law.78 However, even if 
we leave aside the fact that there will be no consequences from an EU law 
perspective, it is obvious that a state which entered into tax treaty with another state 
should not contravene the provisions of the tax treaty through the application of 
national measures. So, in order to apply the proposed CSC rules it is advisable - in 
this particular situation in which the PE income shall otherwise be exempt from 
taxation according to the treaty provisions - to refer to the application of such 
legislation. This seems to be the only possibility of avoiding a treaty-override.  
 
In summary, it is only the latter situation in which the tax treaty explicitly provides for 
the application of the exemption method which requires the concrete reference to the 
CSC taxation. However, it is equally clear that the application of the CSC taxation is 
less “aggressive” - also in the light of the relationship with the other contracting state - 
than the typical CFC legislation which usually focuses on all (vertical) income 
components. Moreover, there are clear economic and equity reasons behind the 
current taxation according to the CSC legislation. Therefore, I consider it less likely 
that the application of the CSC legislation results in serious conflicts between the tax 
treaty partners. This is all the more the case if one takes into account that the current 
taxation is also strictly limited in case the income is generated through the 
interposition of non-transparent entities, i.e. if basically no explicit reference in the tax 
treaty is required. This should not be understood as a suggestion or a justification for 
a tax treaty-override, but it shows that the overall impact of such an override is very 
limited. However, one may even see it from a different angle: the fact that the CSC 
regime solely focuses on the basic interest component might open the door for an 
argument - supported by economic and equity reasons - to amend the respective 
                                            
78 See in this respect case C-298/05 (Columbus Container), paragraphs 46, 47 and case C-141/99 (Amid), 
paragraph 18. This was later on confirmed in case C-128/08 (Damseaux), paragraph 22.  
   
 
applicable to the current attribution of income, and it seems that this is the case, the 
system is required to provide for the elimination of double taxation by applying the 
exemption method or the credit method. It was already stated above that the 
proposed CSC legislation ensures a consistent elimination of double taxation - even 
in critical cases (e.g. existing tax losses) - by separating the concept of current 
taxation of income from the “regular” tax system. Thus, the proposed concept goes 
further than the typical tax credit system applied in the field of international taxation. 
In my opinion, the proposed system should, therefore, be fully in line with the 
requirements of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.  
 
9.4.12. CSC Legislation and the OECD Model Tax Convention 
 
9.4.12.1. CSC Taxation and Non-Transparent Entities   
 
In chapter 7 it was concluded that the OECD-MTC does not prevent the application of 
a system which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest component. In 
my opinion, the allocation of the latter component to the resident shareholder does 
not result in a juridical double taxation of income, because it refers to two different 
taxpayers (the CSC and the shareholder in the CSC). Thus, there is, in principle, no 
necessity to amend a tax treaty which is based on the OECD-MTC in order to apply 
such legislation. Moreover, one has to keep in mind that - in contrast to the typical 
CFC regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 - the CSC legislation provides for a 
horizontal and vertical separation of income and, therefore, taxes only a fraction of 
the income derived through the interposition of the CSC. In addition, a number of 
exemptions are provided under the proposed legislation. Overall, it is very unlikely - 
at least if more than one year is taken into account - that the income attributed under 
the CSC regime will be identical to the income derived by the CSC. Beside the strictly 
legal question, one can certainly argue that there is - from a political perspective - a 
clear difference between the application of a system which taxes the complete 
income of another entity (as may be the case under the typical CFC regimes, 
especially under the entity approach regimes) and the basic interest taxation. The 
latter system shows that the state which applies the CSC regime has no intention of 
taxing all or almost all of the income derived through the entity established in the 
other contracting state.  
 
9.4.12.2. CSC Taxation and Permanent Establishments  
 
The picture is a bit different if the activity is carried out through a permanent 
establishment (PE) in another state.77 As already outlined earlier in this chapter, the 
consequences depend very much on the fact whether the tax treaty determines the 
application of the credit method or the exemption method for the avoidance of double 
taxation of income generated through a PE. If the tax treaty (i) provides for the 
application of the credit method and (ii) the state of the headquarter company taxes 
the income of the PE according to the credit method, there is basically no room for a 
basic interest taxation of the tainted activity. The reason is that all income 
components (including the basic interest component) are already taxed in the state of 
the headquarter company. Of course, this is a non-optimal scenario, but a calculation 
of the basic interest component which is separated from the allocable income (and 
taxed separately) would not result in any advantage - but rather a lot of confusion 
                                            
77 This, of course, encompasses also transparent entities which are usually seen as permanent establishments in 
the tax treaty context.  
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administrative burden would increase dramatically. However, even if the system is 
amended properly in order to avoid that each and every transaction is subject to 
current taxation (e.g. by providing additional exemptions) it would still be against the 
idea and the concept of an internal market. The reason is that all of the passive and 
base company income which is now allocated in a non-discriminatory manner 
contains elements which should by no means be subject to immediate taxation in the 
hands of the shareholder. The fact that the application of the CFC rules is not limited 
anymore to low-taxed countries but also encompasses “medium-“ and high-tax 
countries increases the problem. Overall, the non-discriminatory income allocation 
based on a transactional CFC system leads to a disadvantageous treatment of the 
activity component and the risk component included in certain types of passive and 
base company income. The question whether the determination of the allocable 
income under the CSC regime is simpler than the determination of the tainted income 
under a non-discriminatory (amended) transactional CFC regime cannot be 
answered in general and for all situations. Both systems require detailed information 
related to the company which carries on the tainted activities and both systems 
require some sort of detailed calculation - either in order to determine the tax base for 
the basic interest component or to determine the tainted income itself. However, the 
CSC legislation focuses on the separation of tainted and non-tainted property and the 
simplified allocation of liabilities to the respective property whereas the CFC 
legislation requires the separation of income and the detailed allocation of expenses 
to the respective income. In my opinion, the latter approach goes further and can 
become more complicated since it theoretically requires the correct allocation of all 




                                       
     non-tainted               tainted income 
      income             
 
        activity component 
 
        risk component (capital) 
 
        basic interest component (capital) 





(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the CSC regime.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
The figure shows that the horizontal separation of income leads to a complete 
allocation of all income components included in the tainted activities under the 
transactional based CFC taxation. In contrast thereto, the vertical separation under 
   
 
double tax convention and to explicitly include the possibility of applying the 
respective regime.  
 
9.4.13. CSC Legislation vs. CFC Legislation 
 
Theoretically, there can be different reactions of the Member States on the outcome 
of the Cadbury Schweppes case. It may lead to an increased political pressure for 
the introduction of an EU wide minimum income tax rate or for comparable measures 
of harmonisation. It may also lead to the political request for a uniform approach 
related to low-tax countries outside of the EU. The final outcome from a political 
perspective, however, is difficult to estimate and it is quite likely that a common 
European approach can only be achieved in the long run. The immediate unilateral 
reactions of the Member States which can be expected are, in my opinion, either the 
adjustment of CFC rules in a way which complies with the requirements derived from 
the Cadbury Schweppes case - i.e. the implementation of a possibility for the 
taxpayer of proving that the structure is not merely artificial - or the extension of the 
existing CFC rules to comparable domestic investments and investments in other 
(high-tax) countries. As already outlined earlier, the first-mentioned reaction has the 
effect of changing the scope of the legislation completely. It is therefore rather 
unlikely, in my opinion, that all of the Member States which apply CFC regimes will 
follow such an approach. However, it can be expected, in my opinion, that Member 
States extend (or try to extend) their CFC regimes in a non-discriminatory manner to 
domestic investments and investments in other (high-tax) countries. It is worth noting 
in this context that the Council of the European Union published a Resolution on the 
coordination of CFC and thin capitalisation rules within the EU.79 With regard to CFC 
rules, the Resolution recommends that Member States adopt some guiding principles 
for the application of CFC rules.80 However,  the Resolution merely presents a list of 
indicators for the identification of artificial arrangements. Thus, it can be a helpful 
element to align the approach of the Member States with respect to the separation of 
artificial structures from non-artificial structures, but not really more than that. For this 
reason, it is important to understand and to highlight the main differences between 
CFC legislation - which is extended in the manner outlined above - and the proposed 
system of CSC legislation.  
 
9.4.13.1. CSC Legislation vs. Transactional Approach Income Allocation  
 
The non-discriminatory application of a CFC regime which is based on the 
transactional approach means, essentially, that certain types of passive income and 
base company income are allocable to the domestic shareholder - irrespective of 
whether they are related to income derived by a resident or non-resident entity. I 
doubt that the transactional countries are able to transfer the existing discriminatory 
system to a non-discriminatory system without making substantial amendments, in 
particular with respect to the definition of passive income, base company income and 
the granting of additional exemptions. For example, the rendering of inter-company 
services is an important issue within national and multinational groups. If the mere 
fact that a company provides (any type of) services to a resident or non-resident 
related company leads to the application of the (amended) CFC rules, the 
                                            
79 Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalisation rules within the European Union. The Council Resolution was published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union on 16 June 2010 (2010/C 156/01). 
80 See part A of the Council Resolution and section 8.7. of this study.  
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administrative burden would increase dramatically. However, even if the system is 
amended properly in order to avoid that each and every transaction is subject to 
current taxation (e.g. by providing additional exemptions) it would still be against the 
idea and the concept of an internal market. The reason is that all of the passive and 
base company income which is now allocated in a non-discriminatory manner 
contains elements which should by no means be subject to immediate taxation in the 
hands of the shareholder. The fact that the application of the CFC rules is not limited 
anymore to low-taxed countries but also encompasses “medium-“ and high-tax 
countries increases the problem. Overall, the non-discriminatory income allocation 
based on a transactional CFC system leads to a disadvantageous treatment of the 
activity component and the risk component included in certain types of passive and 
base company income. The question whether the determination of the allocable 
income under the CSC regime is simpler than the determination of the tainted income 
under a non-discriminatory (amended) transactional CFC regime cannot be 
answered in general and for all situations. Both systems require detailed information 
related to the company which carries on the tainted activities and both systems 
require some sort of detailed calculation - either in order to determine the tax base for 
the basic interest component or to determine the tainted income itself. However, the 
CSC legislation focuses on the separation of tainted and non-tainted property and the 
simplified allocation of liabilities to the respective property whereas the CFC 
legislation requires the separation of income and the detailed allocation of expenses 
to the respective income. In my opinion, the latter approach goes further and can 
become more complicated since it theoretically requires the correct allocation of all 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.   
(4) Grey area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation. 
(5) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under a transactional approach CFC taxation and 
under the CSC regime.  
(6) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
The figure shows that the horizontal separation of income leads to a complete 
allocation of all income components included in the tainted activities under the 
transactional based CFC taxation. In contrast thereto, the vertical separation under 
   
 
double tax convention and to explicitly include the possibility of applying the 
respective regime.  
 
9.4.13. CSC Legislation vs. CFC Legislation 
 
Theoretically, there can be different reactions of the Member States on the outcome 
of the Cadbury Schweppes case. It may lead to an increased political pressure for 
the introduction of an EU wide minimum income tax rate or for comparable measures 
of harmonisation. It may also lead to the political request for a uniform approach 
related to low-tax countries outside of the EU. The final outcome from a political 
perspective, however, is difficult to estimate and it is quite likely that a common 
European approach can only be achieved in the long run. The immediate unilateral 
reactions of the Member States which can be expected are, in my opinion, either the 
adjustment of CFC rules in a way which complies with the requirements derived from 
the Cadbury Schweppes case - i.e. the implementation of a possibility for the 
taxpayer of proving that the structure is not merely artificial - or the extension of the 
existing CFC rules to comparable domestic investments and investments in other 
(high-tax) countries. As already outlined earlier, the first-mentioned reaction has the 
effect of changing the scope of the legislation completely. It is therefore rather 
unlikely, in my opinion, that all of the Member States which apply CFC regimes will 
follow such an approach. However, it can be expected, in my opinion, that Member 
States extend (or try to extend) their CFC regimes in a non-discriminatory manner to 
domestic investments and investments in other (high-tax) countries. It is worth noting 
in this context that the Council of the European Union published a Resolution on the 
coordination of CFC and thin capitalisation rules within the EU.79 With regard to CFC 
rules, the Resolution recommends that Member States adopt some guiding principles 
for the application of CFC rules.80 However,  the Resolution merely presents a list of 
indicators for the identification of artificial arrangements. Thus, it can be a helpful 
element to align the approach of the Member States with respect to the separation of 
artificial structures from non-artificial structures, but not really more than that. For this 
reason, it is important to understand and to highlight the main differences between 
CFC legislation - which is extended in the manner outlined above - and the proposed 
system of CSC legislation.  
 
9.4.13.1. CSC Legislation vs. Transactional Approach Income Allocation  
 
The non-discriminatory application of a CFC regime which is based on the 
transactional approach means, essentially, that certain types of passive income and 
base company income are allocable to the domestic shareholder - irrespective of 
whether they are related to income derived by a resident or non-resident entity. I 
doubt that the transactional countries are able to transfer the existing discriminatory 
system to a non-discriminatory system without making substantial amendments, in 
particular with respect to the definition of passive income, base company income and 
the granting of additional exemptions. For example, the rendering of inter-company 
services is an important issue within national and multinational groups. If the mere 
fact that a company provides (any type of) services to a resident or non-resident 
related company leads to the application of the (amended) CFC rules, the 
                                            
79 Council Resolution of 8 June 2010 on coordination of the Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and thin 
capitalisation rules within the European Union. The Council Resolution was published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union on 16 June 2010 (2010/C 156/01). 
80 See part A of the Council Resolution and section 8.7. of this study.  
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(4) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation and under 
the CSC regime.  
(5) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In this case, the entity approach CFC legislation allocates the total amount of income 
derived by the service company to the resident shareholder. Thus, the general 
differentiation between active activities and passive activities does not play a role 
anymore as soon as the latter activities prevail within the total activities carried on by 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives mainly non-tainted income.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.  
(4) Striped area: subject to income allocation under the CSC regime only.  
(5) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In contrast thereto, the income derived by the service company is normally excluded 
from CFC taxation if the tainted (or passive) activity is not the “main” activity. The 
treatment under the CSC system strongly depends on the exemption provisions 
which have been proposed. If the property-ratio and income-ratio are stipulated, for 
example, at 75 percent, it may be the case that the income would not be subject to 
CFC taxation, but the basic interest component would still be subject to CSC 
taxation. However, if the income of the entity is almost completely derived from non-
tainted activities, it may also be the case that neither the CFC regime nor the CSC 
regime results in an income attribution. The differences here are first of all related to 
the question how to set an appropriate threshold under both concepts, CFC and CSC 
taxation. However, the CSC system provides - in addition to income and recipient 
related exemptions and a general threshold - an exemption provision which is directly 
connected to the capital invested in tainted property (because the latter is eventually 
the calculation basis for the attributable basic interest component). It is therefore 
obvious that the property ratio is an important element for the determination of an 
exemption from CSC taxation. A property ratio, though, does not (and cannot) play a 
similar role under a typical CFC regime. The reason is that the income attribution 
under a CFC regime is disconnected from the underlying (tainted) property and a 
change in this regard would require a conceptual change in the CFC systems.    
         
 
   
 
the CSC taxation only allocates the basic interest component (grey-striped area). The 
assumption that the definition of passive and base company activities under the CFC 
taxation is identical to the definition of tainted activities under the CSC taxation is, of 
course, not always true. However, an overlapping is very likely.  
 
9.4.13.2. CSC Legislation vs. Entity Approach Income Allocation 
 
What makes the non-discriminatory entity approach different from the non-
discriminatory transactional approach is the fact that either all of the income 
generated through the resident or non-resident entity is allocable to the shareholder 
or nothing is allocable to the shareholder. Thus, the decisive factor is the extent of 
certain activities within the total activities carried on by the entity. If the tainted 
activities encompass a substantial part of the activities, this will lead to the current 
taxation of all income derived by the entity. In other words, if the tainted activities are 
dominating, this can “infect” the whole income generated by the respective entity. In 
the latter case, the effect is worse than in case of a transactional system since it 
taxes income on a current basis which is otherwise not subject to current taxation at 
all. Therefore, if the non-discriminatory transactional approach is not in line with the 
idea and the concept of an internal market, this will be all the more true for the non-
discriminatory entity approach. Of course, an all-or-nothing approach has the 
advantage of avoiding the complicated separation of income and the allocation of 
expenses to the tainted and non-tainted activities. However, simplification can only 
be the decisive element if it is not - at the same time - contrary to the basic principles 
of an internal market. The increased number of exemptions in case of CSC 
legislation has a different effect compared to the all-or-nothing concept of an entity 
approach CFC legislation. The exemption rules lead to the outcome that either 
nothing will be taxed on a current basis or the basic interest component will be taxed 
on a current basis. In contrast thereto, the entity approach CFC legislation has the 
effect that either nothing will be taxed on a current basis or everything will be taxed 
on a current basis. Again, this is a non-acceptable approach within an internal market 
- even if it is applied without discrimination. 
 
Figure 35: 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives mainly tainted income. 
(3) Grey area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation 
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(4) Grey-striped area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation and under 
the CSC regime.  
(5) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In this case, the entity approach CFC legislation allocates the total amount of income 
derived by the service company to the resident shareholder. Thus, the general 
differentiation between active activities and passive activities does not play a role 
anymore as soon as the latter activities prevail within the total activities carried on by 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives mainly non-tainted income.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.  
(4) Striped area: subject to income allocation under the CSC regime only.  
(5) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.  
 
In contrast thereto, the income derived by the service company is normally excluded 
from CFC taxation if the tainted (or passive) activity is not the “main” activity. The 
treatment under the CSC system strongly depends on the exemption provisions 
which have been proposed. If the property-ratio and income-ratio are stipulated, for 
example, at 75 percent, it may be the case that the income would not be subject to 
CFC taxation, but the basic interest component would still be subject to CSC 
taxation. However, if the income of the entity is almost completely derived from non-
tainted activities, it may also be the case that neither the CFC regime nor the CSC 
regime results in an income attribution. The differences here are first of all related to 
the question how to set an appropriate threshold under both concepts, CFC and CSC 
taxation. However, the CSC system provides - in addition to income and recipient 
related exemptions and a general threshold - an exemption provision which is directly 
connected to the capital invested in tainted property (because the latter is eventually 
the calculation basis for the attributable basic interest component). It is therefore 
obvious that the property ratio is an important element for the determination of an 
exemption from CSC taxation. A property ratio, though, does not (and cannot) play a 
similar role under a typical CFC regime. The reason is that the income attribution 
under a CFC regime is disconnected from the underlying (tainted) property and a 
change in this regard would require a conceptual change in the CFC systems.    
         
 
   
 
the CSC taxation only allocates the basic interest component (grey-striped area). The 
assumption that the definition of passive and base company activities under the CFC 
taxation is identical to the definition of tainted activities under the CSC taxation is, of 
course, not always true. However, an overlapping is very likely.  
 
9.4.13.2. CSC Legislation vs. Entity Approach Income Allocation 
 
What makes the non-discriminatory entity approach different from the non-
discriminatory transactional approach is the fact that either all of the income 
generated through the resident or non-resident entity is allocable to the shareholder 
or nothing is allocable to the shareholder. Thus, the decisive factor is the extent of 
certain activities within the total activities carried on by the entity. If the tainted 
activities encompass a substantial part of the activities, this will lead to the current 
taxation of all income derived by the entity. In other words, if the tainted activities are 
dominating, this can “infect” the whole income generated by the respective entity. In 
the latter case, the effect is worse than in case of a transactional system since it 
taxes income on a current basis which is otherwise not subject to current taxation at 
all. Therefore, if the non-discriminatory transactional approach is not in line with the 
idea and the concept of an internal market, this will be all the more true for the non-
discriminatory entity approach. Of course, an all-or-nothing approach has the 
advantage of avoiding the complicated separation of income and the allocation of 
expenses to the tainted and non-tainted activities. However, simplification can only 
be the decisive element if it is not - at the same time - contrary to the basic principles 
of an internal market. The increased number of exemptions in case of CSC 
legislation has a different effect compared to the all-or-nothing concept of an entity 
approach CFC legislation. The exemption rules lead to the outcome that either 
nothing will be taxed on a current basis or the basic interest component will be taxed 
on a current basis. In contrast thereto, the entity approach CFC legislation has the 
effect that either nothing will be taxed on a current basis or everything will be taxed 
on a current basis. Again, this is a non-acceptable approach within an internal market 
- even if it is applied without discrimination. 
 
Figure 35: 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). The vertical 
separation of the non-tainted income is not required, because no element is included which should be 
subject to the current taxation of income in the state of the shareholder. 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives mainly tainted income. 
(3) Grey area: subject to income allocation under an entity approach CFC taxation 
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for a system of fiscal unity (fiscal consolidation) only for domestic legal entities, like in 
the Marks & Spencer case, it may also influence the CFC regime. If the resident 
entity can be part of such a fiscal unity system, the negative CFC income could be 
offset with positive income of the parent company. In contrast thereto, there is no 
possibility of a fiscal unity in case of a non-resident entity, with the effect that the 
positive income would be included (similar to a fiscal unity) but the negative income 
would be excluded. Here, the issue is not the existence or non-existence of a cross-
border fiscal unity system as such, but the application of a CFC regime in 
combination with the system of fiscal unity. This is an undesirable result, because it 
finally means that national legislation like CFC rules can be structured in a non-
discriminatory manner but additional (different) legislation eliminates, e.g. by electing 
a domestic fiscal unity system, (part of) the restrictive effects only for resident 
entities. There is no indication from the existing ECJ case law that the effects 
resulting from the aforementioned combination as such lead to an unjustifiable 
infringement of the relevant basic freedoms. However, it finally remains a situation 
which is, in my view, contrary to the concept and the idea of an internal market.    
 
Hence, what the Member State which applies the CFC regime should do - if the 
asymmetrical treatment of income is not to be changed - is either to extend the fiscal 
unity system to non-resident CFCs or to exclude the resident CFCs from such a 
system. Both alternatives require a substantial change of the transactional approach 
CFC regimes as well as of the entity approach CFC regimes. This is not the case 
with regard to the proposed CSC concept, because the latter does not provide for an 
asymmetrical income allocation. Moreover, it is apparent from the case law of the 
ECJ that there is, in principle, no necessity to extend the fiscal unity system to non-
resident entities - which leads to the consequence that there is no pressure on 
Member States to generally extend the fiscal unity system.82  
 
In my opinion, it is therefore consistent to separate the system of current income 
taxation from the “regular” system. It seems that this provides the possibility of 
ensuring that the currently attributed income is by no means treated worse than 
income which is not currently attributed but distributed at a later point in time. This is 
an important aspect if one takes the view that the current attribution of income should 
just have the effect of an immediate taxation but not an additional “penalty effect.” 
This exactly is the idea of the basic interest taxation and it can be achieved by the 
proposed concept of CSC taxation but not, in my opinion, by CFC regimes. As 
already outlined earlier, the mixing of current income taxation with the regular 
taxation may lead to a number of difficulties which eventually result in a double 
taxation of income and in the aforementioned “penalty effect.” The latter effect is, 
inter alia, caused by the insufficient tax credit system, the exclusion of negative 
income, and the insufficient consideration (on a higher tier) of CFC regimes and 
similar regimes applied on a lower group level. Here, I do not want to repeat the 
aspects which have been outlined in this chapter and in previous chapters but it 
seems to be out of the question that CFC legislation remains - even if it is applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner - an anti-avoidance legislation which can be extremely 
burdensome for the taxpayer because of the “side-effects” and not merely because of 
the current taxation of income. If such a non-optimal system for low-tax countries is 
transferred to medium- and high-tax countries, it is more than likely that it may lead to 
additional distortions of the investment decisions. Of course, one might argue that the 
                                            
82 See with regard to the application of a fiscal unity system to non-resident entities also case C-231/05 (Oy AA) 
and case C-337/08 (X Holding). See section 4.2.10.3.6. for further details. 
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(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives almost all income from non-tainted activities.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.  
(4) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.   
 
In this situation, the non-tainted activity encompasses almost all of the activities of 
the CSC. For this reason, the income is neither subject to current taxation under an 
entity approach based CFC regime nor subject to CSC taxation (if the proposed 
exemption provisions are taken into account).  
 
9.4.13.3. The Abolition of the Low-Taxation Requirement  
 
The abolition of the link to a lower income tax rate, as one of the requirements for the 
application of CFC rules, is unavoidable for a non-discriminatory approach which 
applies equally to certain types of income derived by resident and non-resident 
entities. This was already mentioned above. The consequence is clear: it increases, 
in general, the amount of allocable income since it not only encompasses the 
activities of low-taxed entities but also the activities of “medium-“ and high-taxed 
entities.81 What is more important, however, is the fact that an amended CFC regime 
which also applies to resident entities increases, at the same time, the income 
allocation which is related to the activity and the risk component. That means there 
will be an additional allocation of income if an identity exists between the place where 
the entity carries on its activities and the place where the income is produced. Of 
course, this goes into the wrong direction if one follows the concept of capital import 
neutrality.  
 
9.4.13.4. The Income Allocation and Tax Credit System  
 
It has been shown that the inclusion of the allocated income in the tax base of the 
shareholder under the transactional and entity approach CFC regimes can create 
substantial difficulties and is - at least as far as it relates to the asymmetrical 
treatment of negative income in some countries - not in line with the basic freedoms. 
However, even the extension of those regimes in a non-discriminatory manner does 
not necessarily solve the problem. For example, if the domestic legislation provides 
                                            
81 At least, this is true as long as the number of exemptions is not increased in the context of a non-
discriminatory system.  
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for a system of fiscal unity (fiscal consolidation) only for domestic legal entities, like in 
the Marks & Spencer case, it may also influence the CFC regime. If the resident 
entity can be part of such a fiscal unity system, the negative CFC income could be 
offset with positive income of the parent company. In contrast thereto, there is no 
possibility of a fiscal unity in case of a non-resident entity, with the effect that the 
positive income would be included (similar to a fiscal unity) but the negative income 
would be excluded. Here, the issue is not the existence or non-existence of a cross-
border fiscal unity system as such, but the application of a CFC regime in 
combination with the system of fiscal unity. This is an undesirable result, because it 
finally means that national legislation like CFC rules can be structured in a non-
discriminatory manner but additional (different) legislation eliminates, e.g. by electing 
a domestic fiscal unity system, (part of) the restrictive effects only for resident 
entities. There is no indication from the existing ECJ case law that the effects 
resulting from the aforementioned combination as such lead to an unjustifiable 
infringement of the relevant basic freedoms. However, it finally remains a situation 
which is, in my view, contrary to the concept and the idea of an internal market.    
 
Hence, what the Member State which applies the CFC regime should do - if the 
asymmetrical treatment of income is not to be changed - is either to extend the fiscal 
unity system to non-resident CFCs or to exclude the resident CFCs from such a 
system. Both alternatives require a substantial change of the transactional approach 
CFC regimes as well as of the entity approach CFC regimes. This is not the case 
with regard to the proposed CSC concept, because the latter does not provide for an 
asymmetrical income allocation. Moreover, it is apparent from the case law of the 
ECJ that there is, in principle, no necessity to extend the fiscal unity system to non-
resident entities - which leads to the consequence that there is no pressure on 
Member States to generally extend the fiscal unity system.82  
 
In my opinion, it is therefore consistent to separate the system of current income 
taxation from the “regular” system. It seems that this provides the possibility of 
ensuring that the currently attributed income is by no means treated worse than 
income which is not currently attributed but distributed at a later point in time. This is 
an important aspect if one takes the view that the current attribution of income should 
just have the effect of an immediate taxation but not an additional “penalty effect.” 
This exactly is the idea of the basic interest taxation and it can be achieved by the 
proposed concept of CSC taxation but not, in my opinion, by CFC regimes. As 
already outlined earlier, the mixing of current income taxation with the regular 
taxation may lead to a number of difficulties which eventually result in a double 
taxation of income and in the aforementioned “penalty effect.” The latter effect is, 
inter alia, caused by the insufficient tax credit system, the exclusion of negative 
income, and the insufficient consideration (on a higher tier) of CFC regimes and 
similar regimes applied on a lower group level. Here, I do not want to repeat the 
aspects which have been outlined in this chapter and in previous chapters but it 
seems to be out of the question that CFC legislation remains - even if it is applied in a 
non-discriminatory manner - an anti-avoidance legislation which can be extremely 
burdensome for the taxpayer because of the “side-effects” and not merely because of 
the current taxation of income. If such a non-optimal system for low-tax countries is 
transferred to medium- and high-tax countries, it is more than likely that it may lead to 
additional distortions of the investment decisions. Of course, one might argue that the 
                                            
82 See with regard to the application of a fiscal unity system to non-resident entities also case C-231/05 (Oy AA) 
and case C-337/08 (X Holding). See section 4.2.10.3.6. for further details. 





                non-tainted                        tainted  




risk component (capital) 
 
basic interest component (capital) 
        (exemption rule applies) 




(1) “Income block” divided into non-tainted and tainted income (horizontal) and into the three different 
income components which are of importance for capital intensive activities (vertical). 
(2) Assumption: tainted activities under the CFC regimes = tainted activities under the CSC regime. 
The entity derives almost all income from non-tainted activities.  
(3) White area: not subject to income allocation.  
(4) The size of the three income components is just an assumption.   
 
In this situation, the non-tainted activity encompasses almost all of the activities of 
the CSC. For this reason, the income is neither subject to current taxation under an 
entity approach based CFC regime nor subject to CSC taxation (if the proposed 
exemption provisions are taken into account).  
 
9.4.13.3. The Abolition of the Low-Taxation Requirement  
 
The abolition of the link to a lower income tax rate, as one of the requirements for the 
application of CFC rules, is unavoidable for a non-discriminatory approach which 
applies equally to certain types of income derived by resident and non-resident 
entities. This was already mentioned above. The consequence is clear: it increases, 
in general, the amount of allocable income since it not only encompasses the 
activities of low-taxed entities but also the activities of “medium-“ and high-taxed 
entities.81 What is more important, however, is the fact that an amended CFC regime 
which also applies to resident entities increases, at the same time, the income 
allocation which is related to the activity and the risk component. That means there 
will be an additional allocation of income if an identity exists between the place where 
the entity carries on its activities and the place where the income is produced. Of 
course, this goes into the wrong direction if one follows the concept of capital import 
neutrality.  
 
9.4.13.4. The Income Allocation and Tax Credit System  
 
It has been shown that the inclusion of the allocated income in the tax base of the 
shareholder under the transactional and entity approach CFC regimes can create 
substantial difficulties and is - at least as far as it relates to the asymmetrical 
treatment of negative income in some countries - not in line with the basic freedoms. 
However, even the extension of those regimes in a non-discriminatory manner does 
not necessarily solve the problem. For example, if the domestic legislation provides 
                                            
81 At least, this is true as long as the number of exemptions is not increased in the context of a non-
discriminatory system.  
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law and the basic freedoms. As already mentioned above, this is not necessarily the 
case. Moreover, the conclusion “the more income is allocated, the higher the anti-
avoidance effect” is contrary to the idea and the concept of an internal market. In 
contrast to the existing CFC regimes, the CSC taxation only focuses on the basic 
interest component of capital which is, in my opinion, the decisive factor for the 
relocation of income to other countries based on tax reasons. In addition, the system 
provides for exemptions from current taxation if the risk of tax avoidance is reduced. 
Even though tax reasons may theoretically play a role in case of the other income 
components, too, there are substantial economic and equity arguments for taxing 
these components in the host state. Hence, in an internal market the anti-avoidance 
legislation - which, in this case, has the effect of making a foreign investment in a 
low-tax country less attractive - should clearly be restricted to the income component 
and the circumstances which contain the highest (theoretical) risk of tax avoidance. 
The “full insurance mentality” of taxing the total amount of income of a non-resident 
entity in the hands of the shareholder on a current basis - be it the tainted income 
under a transactional approach CFC system or the total income under an entity 
approach CFC system - is not compatible with the philosophy of an internal market 
which has, as one of its main purposes, the aim of fostering the efficient allocation of 
capital. The proposed CSC system follows a “softer” concept which provides for a 
postponement of income tax payments and preliminary tax assessments under 
certain circumstances in order to ensure that the basic interest income is not subject 
to double taxation and to avoid the income taxation in situations in which the anti-
avoidance aspect retreats into the background. The latter can be the case, for 
example, if the service company suffers permanent losses from its activities and does 
not pay any income tax. The constant calculation and attribution of the basic interest 
component to the resident shareholder should, in such a case, not lead to an 
immediate and irrevocable imposition of taxes. For this reason, a postponement of 
income tax payments in combination with a preliminary tax assessment ensures that 
the income tax in the hands of the resident shareholder must only be paid if income 
taxes are finally imposed on the attributed income on the level of the service 
company. If this is not the case, e.g. because the service company is to be liquidated 
before achieving a positive result, there is no reason from an anti-avoidance 
perspective to stick to an income taxation of the basic interest component in the 
residence state of the shareholder. Thus, such a softer concept does not mean that 
the approach is less effective. It solely means that the concept provides for additional 
relief within a strict and consistent system in case it would otherwise lead to a result 
which is not intended by the legislation. Again, one must keep in mind that the 
current taxation of income should by no means lead to a penalisation of certain 
investments and activities. The CFC taxation normally follows a different concept. 
The entity approach (all-or-nothing approach) mixes the active and passive income 
and allocates the total positive amount to the resident shareholder or exempts the 
total positive amount from income allocation. The transactional approach allocates 
the positive amount of passive income and often does not sufficiently consider a 
possible negative amount of active income derived by the service company. This, by 
itself, may have a distorting effect on investments in companies which carry on 
“mixed” activities. As already described above, the CFC regimes may be amended in 
order to come closer to the proposed CSC system, but the differences in the general 
conceptual framework are so substantial that, in my opinion, the systems cannot be 
aligned.83 Thus, I am convinced that the basic interest taxation under a CSC system 
                                            
83 See section 9.4.13.4. 
   
 
CFC regimes could be adapted step by step to come closer to the proposed CSC 
concept. Clearly, the adjustment of some elements would be an improvement, e.g. 
the abolition of an asymmetrical treatment of income allocation and the insufficient 
credit system. However, this would by no means result in an alignment of the two 
systems since they have very basic and methodological differences in the conceptual 
framework. The most important differences are the horizontal and vertical separation 
of income elements and the focus on the tainted assets for the determination of the 
attributable income under the CSC concept (to a large extent unconnected to the 
actual determination of the CFC income). The latter is something which is not 
existent under the typical CFC regimes and would require such a massive change of 
the regimes that it seems to be simpler to draft a completely new concept. In other 
words, a substantial amendment of the CFC regimes is, in my opinion, not an 
alternative to the CSC concept.  
 
9.4.13.5. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income 
 
If an anti-avoidance legislation is restricted to the taxation of the basic interest 
component, it is clear that it must be structured as efficiently as possible. This not 
only requires, as outlined above, that the income allocation is treated separately from 
the regular income tax system and that the tax credit system provides for a complete 
and consistent elimination of double taxation, but it also requires, in my opinion, that 
the income is allocated to the ultimate resident shareholders and not only to the 
lowest domestic group level. For this reason, the CSC legislation is structured in a 
way that the income is allocated up to the highest domestic group level - if possible to 
the ultimate individual domestic shareholder. The system of CSC legislation does not 
allow resident entities with tax losses (or tax loss carry forwards) to be interposed for 
the purpose of offsetting positive attributable income with negative income of the 
respective entity. Thus, as long as one of the resident direct and indirect 
shareholders is subject to regular income taxation - since no tax losses are available 
- it will result in the taxation of the attributable CSC income, even if one or more of 
the lower-tier resident entities between the respective shareholder and the CSC are 
in a loss position. In my opinion, this is a consistent and acceptable result which 
clearly leads to a strengthening of the anti-avoidance legislation. The latter effect can 
typically not be achieved through the existing CFC rules. Possible distortions can be 
avoided by applying a (preliminary) flat income tax rate on the attributable income 
which can be derived from the domestic corporate income tax rate. The subsequent 
mechanism of dividend payment or the disposal of shares finally results in a complete 
equalisation of currently attributed income and income which was not currently 
attributed but distributed later on (or the shares in the company were sold). That 
means the current income attribution under the CSC system will not result in a 
different (final) tax burden compared to the regular system. 
 
9.4.13.6. Once Again: Effectiveness and Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
 
It is obvious that Member States which apply CFC regimes might be tempted to 
extend such legislation to resident and non-resident entities without focusing on the 
income tax rate and by retaining the transactional or entity approach CFC system. 
The reason is clear: the more income is attributed to the shareholder, the less likely 
the relocation of activities to low-tax countries is. The fact that the system is applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner could give the Member States the impression that - 
although accompanied by higher administrative burden - the system is in line with EU 
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law and the basic freedoms. As already mentioned above, this is not necessarily the 
case. Moreover, the conclusion “the more income is allocated, the higher the anti-
avoidance effect” is contrary to the idea and the concept of an internal market. In 
contrast to the existing CFC regimes, the CSC taxation only focuses on the basic 
interest component of capital which is, in my opinion, the decisive factor for the 
relocation of income to other countries based on tax reasons. In addition, the system 
provides for exemptions from current taxation if the risk of tax avoidance is reduced. 
Even though tax reasons may theoretically play a role in case of the other income 
components, too, there are substantial economic and equity arguments for taxing 
these components in the host state. Hence, in an internal market the anti-avoidance 
legislation - which, in this case, has the effect of making a foreign investment in a 
low-tax country less attractive - should clearly be restricted to the income component 
and the circumstances which contain the highest (theoretical) risk of tax avoidance. 
The “full insurance mentality” of taxing the total amount of income of a non-resident 
entity in the hands of the shareholder on a current basis - be it the tainted income 
under a transactional approach CFC system or the total income under an entity 
approach CFC system - is not compatible with the philosophy of an internal market 
which has, as one of its main purposes, the aim of fostering the efficient allocation of 
capital. The proposed CSC system follows a “softer” concept which provides for a 
postponement of income tax payments and preliminary tax assessments under 
certain circumstances in order to ensure that the basic interest income is not subject 
to double taxation and to avoid the income taxation in situations in which the anti-
avoidance aspect retreats into the background. The latter can be the case, for 
example, if the service company suffers permanent losses from its activities and does 
not pay any income tax. The constant calculation and attribution of the basic interest 
component to the resident shareholder should, in such a case, not lead to an 
immediate and irrevocable imposition of taxes. For this reason, a postponement of 
income tax payments in combination with a preliminary tax assessment ensures that 
the income tax in the hands of the resident shareholder must only be paid if income 
taxes are finally imposed on the attributed income on the level of the service 
company. If this is not the case, e.g. because the service company is to be liquidated 
before achieving a positive result, there is no reason from an anti-avoidance 
perspective to stick to an income taxation of the basic interest component in the 
residence state of the shareholder. Thus, such a softer concept does not mean that 
the approach is less effective. It solely means that the concept provides for additional 
relief within a strict and consistent system in case it would otherwise lead to a result 
which is not intended by the legislation. Again, one must keep in mind that the 
current taxation of income should by no means lead to a penalisation of certain 
investments and activities. The CFC taxation normally follows a different concept. 
The entity approach (all-or-nothing approach) mixes the active and passive income 
and allocates the total positive amount to the resident shareholder or exempts the 
total positive amount from income allocation. The transactional approach allocates 
the positive amount of passive income and often does not sufficiently consider a 
possible negative amount of active income derived by the service company. This, by 
itself, may have a distorting effect on investments in companies which carry on 
“mixed” activities. As already described above, the CFC regimes may be amended in 
order to come closer to the proposed CSC system, but the differences in the general 
conceptual framework are so substantial that, in my opinion, the systems cannot be 
aligned.83 Thus, I am convinced that the basic interest taxation under a CSC system 
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CFC regimes could be adapted step by step to come closer to the proposed CSC 
concept. Clearly, the adjustment of some elements would be an improvement, e.g. 
the abolition of an asymmetrical treatment of income allocation and the insufficient 
credit system. However, this would by no means result in an alignment of the two 
systems since they have very basic and methodological differences in the conceptual 
framework. The most important differences are the horizontal and vertical separation 
of income elements and the focus on the tainted assets for the determination of the 
attributable income under the CSC concept (to a large extent unconnected to the 
actual determination of the CFC income). The latter is something which is not 
existent under the typical CFC regimes and would require such a massive change of 
the regimes that it seems to be simpler to draft a completely new concept. In other 
words, a substantial amendment of the CFC regimes is, in my opinion, not an 
alternative to the CSC concept.  
 
9.4.13.5. The Taxpayers Subject to Current Taxation of Income 
 
If an anti-avoidance legislation is restricted to the taxation of the basic interest 
component, it is clear that it must be structured as efficiently as possible. This not 
only requires, as outlined above, that the income allocation is treated separately from 
the regular income tax system and that the tax credit system provides for a complete 
and consistent elimination of double taxation, but it also requires, in my opinion, that 
the income is allocated to the ultimate resident shareholders and not only to the 
lowest domestic group level. For this reason, the CSC legislation is structured in a 
way that the income is allocated up to the highest domestic group level - if possible to 
the ultimate individual domestic shareholder. The system of CSC legislation does not 
allow resident entities with tax losses (or tax loss carry forwards) to be interposed for 
the purpose of offsetting positive attributable income with negative income of the 
respective entity. Thus, as long as one of the resident direct and indirect 
shareholders is subject to regular income taxation - since no tax losses are available 
- it will result in the taxation of the attributable CSC income, even if one or more of 
the lower-tier resident entities between the respective shareholder and the CSC are 
in a loss position. In my opinion, this is a consistent and acceptable result which 
clearly leads to a strengthening of the anti-avoidance legislation. The latter effect can 
typically not be achieved through the existing CFC rules. Possible distortions can be 
avoided by applying a (preliminary) flat income tax rate on the attributable income 
which can be derived from the domestic corporate income tax rate. The subsequent 
mechanism of dividend payment or the disposal of shares finally results in a complete 
equalisation of currently attributed income and income which was not currently 
attributed but distributed later on (or the shares in the company were sold). That 
means the current income attribution under the CSC system will not result in a 
different (final) tax burden compared to the regular system. 
 
9.4.13.6. Once Again: Effectiveness and Anti-Avoidance Legislation 
 
It is obvious that Member States which apply CFC regimes might be tempted to 
extend such legislation to resident and non-resident entities without focusing on the 
income tax rate and by retaining the transactional or entity approach CFC system. 
The reason is clear: the more income is attributed to the shareholder, the less likely 
the relocation of activities to low-tax countries is. The fact that the system is applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner could give the Member States the impression that - 
although accompanied by higher administrative burden - the system is in line with EU 
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over of these risks. Any current taxation of this income component would take away 
part of the risk coverage in the state of the service company. Theoretically, this 
makes it necessary that the negative income - caused by the realisation of these 
risks - is taken into account in the state of the shareholder in the same way in order 
to avoid any asymmetrical taxation of income. In my opinion, a consistent approach 
would require the immediate offsetting of this negative income with other - positive - 
income of the shareholder. The net result related to the risk component is therefore 
difficult to predict, at least over a longer period of time, and seems to me less 
attractive for any tax based relocation. From the perspective of the Member States 
which apply the anti-avoidance regime, the uncertainties related to this particular 
income component reduce the effect of a current income allocation and make the 
system less efficient. Overall, the conclusion in such a non-optimal scenario of a 
taxation of the risk component in the residence state of the service company is to 
exclude the latter component from any current taxation in the hands of the 
shareholder.  
 
7.) The basic interest component is, in the same way as the other two components, 
an income element which should be taxed, in general, in the state where the income 
is produced. However, the allocation of the taxing rights to the residence state of the 
service company - based on double tax conventions - leads to the result that the 
basic interest component is neither taxed on the level of the company which 
produces the income nor in the state where the income is produced - at least in those 
cases where the state of residence of the service company is different from the state 
where the service recipient carries on the income-producing activity. In contrast to the 
activity component, the basic interest component can quite easily - and without any 
serious obstacles - be relocated from one state to another and to the place where the 
income taxation is most favourable. It is therefore by far the most flexible and mobile 
component. In contrast to the risk component, the basic interest component is not a 
compensation for the risk coverage and the taking over of risks. It is just the basic 
interest element which is related to the capital investment and can therefore be 
taxed, theoretically, and in the absence of the taxation in the state of income 
production, in the residence state of the service company as well as in the residence 
state of the shareholder. The current taxation of the basic interest component is 
therefore, in my opinion, an efficient tool in order to target the erosion of the tax base 
which is related to this particular income element.  
 
8.) Such an anti-avoidance approach is supported by transfer pricing principles (e.g. 
the OECD transfer pricing guidelines), but it is obvious that the transfer pricing 
principles cannot be seen as a substitute for an anti-avoidance legislation which 
focuses on the current taxation of income. 
 
9.) An alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the current taxation of 
the basic interest component has to take into account a number of aspects, 
especially the following: 
 
o The legislation must be applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to 
income generated by resident and non-resident entities in order to be in 
line with EU law. 
 
o The determination of “tainted activities” in order to limit the application 
to capital services which entail an increased risk of tax avoidance. This 
   
 
is, in contrast to CFC legislation, a feasible way of structuring a broad and effective 




1.) The idea and the concept of an internal market do not, in general, preclude the 
limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality by taxing the basic 
interest component on a current basis.  
 
2.) The residence-based taxation of the basic interest component in the state of an 
intermediate service company can have a “clustering effect” in favour of low-tax 
states. That means the positive tax effect can attract equity investments in low-tax 
states which will subsequently, on the level of the service company, be transformed 
into capital services, i.e. a switch from equity investments to all types of capital 
services in order to take advantage of the allocation of taxing rights under double tax 
conventions which follow the pattern of the OECD-MTC. The current taxation of the 
basic interest component - and therefore the limited application of the principle of 
capital export neutrality - can target the “clustering effect” and can therefore support 
an efficient allocation of capital among states. 
 
3.) The taxation of the basic interest component requires a vertical and horizontal 
separation of income components instead of a merely horizontal separation of 
income. The latter approach of a horizontal separation is the typical approach under 
the existing CFC regimes.  
 
4.) The vertical separation of income components seems to be particularly interesting 
from an anti-avoidance perspective, because not all of the income components are 
equally relevant in this respect. Therefore, I propose the separation into three 
different components: 
 
o income related to an activity physically conducted in the state of the 
service company (activity component); 
 
o income related to the compensation of risks which are related to the 
capital investment (risk component); 
 
o income related to the basic interest component of capital (basic interest 
component). 
 
5.) The activity component should be taxed strictly according to the principle of 
capital import neutrality and should therefore be subject to income taxation in the 
state where the income is actually produced. If this is the residence state of the 
service company, it should be subject to income taxation in the latter state only. The 
income should not be subject to any current taxation in the hands of the shareholder.  
 
6.) The risk component should be taxed in the state where the income is produced, 
too. However, most often the risk component is allocated - based on the underlying 
double tax convention - to the residence state of the service company which provides 
the capital (e.g. in the form of loan agreements, licensing agreements, leasing 
agreements, and similar agreements). In this case, the risk component is a 
compensation for the increased risks involved in the capital investment and the taking 
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over of these risks. Any current taxation of this income component would take away 
part of the risk coverage in the state of the service company. Theoretically, this 
makes it necessary that the negative income - caused by the realisation of these 
risks - is taken into account in the state of the shareholder in the same way in order 
to avoid any asymmetrical taxation of income. In my opinion, a consistent approach 
would require the immediate offsetting of this negative income with other - positive - 
income of the shareholder. The net result related to the risk component is therefore 
difficult to predict, at least over a longer period of time, and seems to me less 
attractive for any tax based relocation. From the perspective of the Member States 
which apply the anti-avoidance regime, the uncertainties related to this particular 
income component reduce the effect of a current income allocation and make the 
system less efficient. Overall, the conclusion in such a non-optimal scenario of a 
taxation of the risk component in the residence state of the service company is to 
exclude the latter component from any current taxation in the hands of the 
shareholder.  
 
7.) The basic interest component is, in the same way as the other two components, 
an income element which should be taxed, in general, in the state where the income 
is produced. However, the allocation of the taxing rights to the residence state of the 
service company - based on double tax conventions - leads to the result that the 
basic interest component is neither taxed on the level of the company which 
produces the income nor in the state where the income is produced - at least in those 
cases where the state of residence of the service company is different from the state 
where the service recipient carries on the income-producing activity. In contrast to the 
activity component, the basic interest component can quite easily - and without any 
serious obstacles - be relocated from one state to another and to the place where the 
income taxation is most favourable. It is therefore by far the most flexible and mobile 
component. In contrast to the risk component, the basic interest component is not a 
compensation for the risk coverage and the taking over of risks. It is just the basic 
interest element which is related to the capital investment and can therefore be 
taxed, theoretically, and in the absence of the taxation in the state of income 
production, in the residence state of the service company as well as in the residence 
state of the shareholder. The current taxation of the basic interest component is 
therefore, in my opinion, an efficient tool in order to target the erosion of the tax base 
which is related to this particular income element.  
 
8.) Such an anti-avoidance approach is supported by transfer pricing principles (e.g. 
the OECD transfer pricing guidelines), but it is obvious that the transfer pricing 
principles cannot be seen as a substitute for an anti-avoidance legislation which 
focuses on the current taxation of income. 
 
9.) An alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the current taxation of 
the basic interest component has to take into account a number of aspects, 
especially the following: 
 
o The legislation must be applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to 
income generated by resident and non-resident entities in order to be in 
line with EU law. 
 
o The determination of “tainted activities” in order to limit the application 
to capital services which entail an increased risk of tax avoidance. This 
   
 
is, in contrast to CFC legislation, a feasible way of structuring a broad and effective 




1.) The idea and the concept of an internal market do not, in general, preclude the 
limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality by taxing the basic 
interest component on a current basis.  
 
2.) The residence-based taxation of the basic interest component in the state of an 
intermediate service company can have a “clustering effect” in favour of low-tax 
states. That means the positive tax effect can attract equity investments in low-tax 
states which will subsequently, on the level of the service company, be transformed 
into capital services, i.e. a switch from equity investments to all types of capital 
services in order to take advantage of the allocation of taxing rights under double tax 
conventions which follow the pattern of the OECD-MTC. The current taxation of the 
basic interest component - and therefore the limited application of the principle of 
capital export neutrality - can target the “clustering effect” and can therefore support 
an efficient allocation of capital among states. 
 
3.) The taxation of the basic interest component requires a vertical and horizontal 
separation of income components instead of a merely horizontal separation of 
income. The latter approach of a horizontal separation is the typical approach under 
the existing CFC regimes.  
 
4.) The vertical separation of income components seems to be particularly interesting 
from an anti-avoidance perspective, because not all of the income components are 
equally relevant in this respect. Therefore, I propose the separation into three 
different components: 
 
o income related to an activity physically conducted in the state of the 
service company (activity component); 
 
o income related to the compensation of risks which are related to the 
capital investment (risk component); 
 
o income related to the basic interest component of capital (basic interest 
component). 
 
5.) The activity component should be taxed strictly according to the principle of 
capital import neutrality and should therefore be subject to income taxation in the 
state where the income is actually produced. If this is the residence state of the 
service company, it should be subject to income taxation in the latter state only. The 
income should not be subject to any current taxation in the hands of the shareholder.  
 
6.) The risk component should be taxed in the state where the income is produced, 
too. However, most often the risk component is allocated - based on the underlying 
double tax convention - to the residence state of the service company which provides 
the capital (e.g. in the form of loan agreements, licensing agreements, leasing 
agreements, and similar agreements). In this case, the risk component is a 
compensation for the increased risks involved in the capital investment and the taking 
Chapter 9
594
   
 
avoided. From an anti-avoidance perspective, the problem is reduced 
by the fact that the alternative legislation is also applied to indirect 
shareholdings - and therefore to the individual or corporate taxpayer 
behind the company which has a permanent establishment - and by the 
fact that the allocation of tainted activities to a transparent entity or 
permanent establishment is more difficult than in case of a non-
transparent entity which is to be considered a separate legal entity.  
 
o The alternative legislation should not be applied to each and every 
resident shareholder. A certain minimum threshold is necessary to 
ensure that the shareholder has sufficient influence on the activities of 
the respective company and to gather the information required for the 
current taxation of income. Here, it is important to find an appropriate 
balance between the necessity of an anti-avoidance legislation and the 
administrative burdens for the taxpayer. The percentage which was 
identified as an appropriate threshold is 25 percent. The threshold 
should be linked to the percentage of shareholding and the percentage 
of voting rights. Thus, if either the percentage of shareholding or the 
percentage of voting rights is reached or exceeded, the legislation 
should be applicable. The legislation does not require, in my opinion, an 
additional “absolute” financial threshold. In this respect, exemption 
provisions for minor investments can be provided. 
 
o There is a need to define the persons who have to be classified as 
‘related parties’ to the shareholder. In my opinion, the following persons 
have to be within in this category: (i) persons who are related through 
family membership, (ii) persons who are related through factual or 
contractual arrangements and (iii) persons who are related through 
shareholding structures. 
 
o The stipulation of a minimum threshold makes it necessary to 
implement constructive ownership rules in order to avoid that the 
minimum percentage of shareholding or voting rights is circumvented. 
 
10.) Therefore, based on the conclusions drawn in this chapter and in previous 
chapters, and taking into account the aforementioned aspects, I propose an anti-
avoidance legislation which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. The main elements can be summarised as follows: 
 
o The proposed concept shall be named “capital service company 
legislation” or “CSC legislation” since it is applied to capital service 
activities (tainted activities). 
 
o The tainted activities are financing activities, licensing activities, leasing 
and renting activities related to movable and immovable property, and 
any other activities which are related to the provision of capital which is 
utilised not by the entity itself but by another party and which includes a 
financing element. 
 
o The CSC legislation is applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to 
resident and non-resident entities which carry on tainted activities. 
   
 
reduces the scope of application to the activities in which the basic 
interest component plays an important role and reduces, at the same 
time, the administrative burden which may be caused by such 
legislation. The tainted activities should encompass financing activities, 
licensing activities, leasing and renting activities related to movable and 
immovable property, and any other activities which are related to the 
provision of capital which is utilised not by the company itself but by 
another party and which includes a financing element.  
 
o The separation of the basic interest component from the total amount of 
income derived from the activities is quite complex and difficult. A 
simpler and more practical approach is the determination of a 
percentage which can be applied on the capital invested in tainted 
property. The benchmark for the determination of the basic interest 
component might be derived from the yield of high quality state bonds, 
inter-bank rates (e.g. Euribor) or European Central Bank basic rates. In 
my opinion, a compromise is required to bring together the 
requirements based on economic and equity principles and the anti-
avoidance aspects. Such a compromise can be the determination of a 
rate which is applicable for the whole year instead of a rate which is 
adjusted regularly. Of course, such a rate will also include expectations, 
e.g. with respect to the development of the interest and inflation rate. 
From my perspective, the 12 months Euribor which is determined, as 
an average, for the month preceding the financial year for which the 
rate should be applicable can be an appropriate benchmark.  
 
o The risk component is to be excluded from the current income taxation - 
as outlined above - if it can reasonably be assured that the system may 
not be circumvented or otherwise significantly manipulated to the 
detriment of the Member State which applies such legislation. Normally, 
this is not the case, but it may depend on the legislative framework of 
the Member State which applies such legislation. If necessary, the latter 
Member State has to amend its legislation in this respect. 
 
o A consistent approach makes it necessary, in my opinion, that such 
legislation is not only applied to the direct shareholder in the company 
which carries on the tainted activities, but also to the ultimate resident - 
direct or indirect - shareholder. This can be an individual shareholder, a 
permanent establishment of a non-resident shareholder, or a corporate 
shareholder.  
 
o The question has to be answered whether the alternative anti-
avoidance legislation should only be applied to non-transparent entities 
or whether it should also be applied to transparent entities and 
permanent establishments. The reason is that the application of the 
exemption method for income derived by foreign transparent entities 
and permanent establishments can have an effect which comes close 
to the sheltering of income. However, the extension of the legislation to 
non-transparent entities and permanent establishments - with the 
consequence of a switch from the exemption method to the credit 
method - may result in a tax treaty override which, of course, has to be 
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avoided. From an anti-avoidance perspective, the problem is reduced 
by the fact that the alternative legislation is also applied to indirect 
shareholdings - and therefore to the individual or corporate taxpayer 
behind the company which has a permanent establishment - and by the 
fact that the allocation of tainted activities to a transparent entity or 
permanent establishment is more difficult than in case of a non-
transparent entity which is to be considered a separate legal entity.  
 
o The alternative legislation should not be applied to each and every 
resident shareholder. A certain minimum threshold is necessary to 
ensure that the shareholder has sufficient influence on the activities of 
the respective company and to gather the information required for the 
current taxation of income. Here, it is important to find an appropriate 
balance between the necessity of an anti-avoidance legislation and the 
administrative burdens for the taxpayer. The percentage which was 
identified as an appropriate threshold is 25 percent. The threshold 
should be linked to the percentage of shareholding and the percentage 
of voting rights. Thus, if either the percentage of shareholding or the 
percentage of voting rights is reached or exceeded, the legislation 
should be applicable. The legislation does not require, in my opinion, an 
additional “absolute” financial threshold. In this respect, exemption 
provisions for minor investments can be provided. 
 
o There is a need to define the persons who have to be classified as 
‘related parties’ to the shareholder. In my opinion, the following persons 
have to be within in this category: (i) persons who are related through 
family membership, (ii) persons who are related through factual or 
contractual arrangements and (iii) persons who are related through 
shareholding structures. 
 
o The stipulation of a minimum threshold makes it necessary to 
implement constructive ownership rules in order to avoid that the 
minimum percentage of shareholding or voting rights is circumvented. 
 
10.) Therefore, based on the conclusions drawn in this chapter and in previous 
chapters, and taking into account the aforementioned aspects, I propose an anti-
avoidance legislation which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. The main elements can be summarised as follows: 
 
o The proposed concept shall be named “capital service company 
legislation” or “CSC legislation” since it is applied to capital service 
activities (tainted activities). 
 
o The tainted activities are financing activities, licensing activities, leasing 
and renting activities related to movable and immovable property, and 
any other activities which are related to the provision of capital which is 
utilised not by the entity itself but by another party and which includes a 
financing element. 
 
o The CSC legislation is applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to 
resident and non-resident entities which carry on tainted activities. 
   
 
reduces the scope of application to the activities in which the basic 
interest component plays an important role and reduces, at the same 
time, the administrative burden which may be caused by such 
legislation. The tainted activities should encompass financing activities, 
licensing activities, leasing and renting activities related to movable and 
immovable property, and any other activities which are related to the 
provision of capital which is utilised not by the company itself but by 
another party and which includes a financing element.  
 
o The separation of the basic interest component from the total amount of 
income derived from the activities is quite complex and difficult. A 
simpler and more practical approach is the determination of a 
percentage which can be applied on the capital invested in tainted 
property. The benchmark for the determination of the basic interest 
component might be derived from the yield of high quality state bonds, 
inter-bank rates (e.g. Euribor) or European Central Bank basic rates. In 
my opinion, a compromise is required to bring together the 
requirements based on economic and equity principles and the anti-
avoidance aspects. Such a compromise can be the determination of a 
rate which is applicable for the whole year instead of a rate which is 
adjusted regularly. Of course, such a rate will also include expectations, 
e.g. with respect to the development of the interest and inflation rate. 
From my perspective, the 12 months Euribor which is determined, as 
an average, for the month preceding the financial year for which the 
rate should be applicable can be an appropriate benchmark.  
 
o The risk component is to be excluded from the current income taxation - 
as outlined above - if it can reasonably be assured that the system may 
not be circumvented or otherwise significantly manipulated to the 
detriment of the Member State which applies such legislation. Normally, 
this is not the case, but it may depend on the legislative framework of 
the Member State which applies such legislation. If necessary, the latter 
Member State has to amend its legislation in this respect. 
 
o A consistent approach makes it necessary, in my opinion, that such 
legislation is not only applied to the direct shareholder in the company 
which carries on the tainted activities, but also to the ultimate resident - 
direct or indirect - shareholder. This can be an individual shareholder, a 
permanent establishment of a non-resident shareholder, or a corporate 
shareholder.  
 
o The question has to be answered whether the alternative anti-
avoidance legislation should only be applied to non-transparent entities 
or whether it should also be applied to transparent entities and 
permanent establishments. The reason is that the application of the 
exemption method for income derived by foreign transparent entities 
and permanent establishments can have an effect which comes close 
to the sheltering of income. However, the extension of the legislation to 
non-transparent entities and permanent establishments - with the 
consequence of a switch from the exemption method to the credit 
method - may result in a tax treaty override which, of course, has to be 
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o The current allocation of income requires the application of an ordinary 
tax credit system which ensures a consistent relief from double 
taxation. The income attribution should not lead to a “penalty effect” for 
the shareholder, but should solely provide for the current taxation of the 
basic interest component. It is therefore required that the income 
attribution is separated from the regular domestic taxation of the 
shareholder and that the tax credit mechanism is modified. Without the 
latter separation and modification, the system might lead to a treatment 
which is, at least in some situations, less favourable compared to the 
treatment of income which is either derived directly by the shareholder 
or by a legal entity which is not subject to current taxation. This is 
particularly true in case of losses (of the shareholder, the CSC, or 
intermediate companies) and multiple-tier structures if different systems 
are applied simultaneously. Therefore, the proposed CSC legislation 
follows a concept which provides for the possibility of a preliminary tax 
determination and a postponement of tax payments in certain situations 
and under certain circumstances. 
 
o The attributed income is subject to tax at the highest domestic (group) 
level. This can be a legal entity, an individual shareholder, or a 
permanent establishment of a non-resident investor (which therefore 
also encompasses transparent partnerships). 
 
o If the income is attributed to an individual shareholder, it will be taxed at 
a flat rate which is derived from the domestic corporate income tax rate 
and not according to the (progressive) personnel income tax rate of the 
shareholder. 
 
o The taxation according to the “regular” personnel income tax system of 
the individual shareholder will be made as soon as the income is 
actually distributed - with a full crediting of the previously imposed 
(preliminary) flat income tax. Finally, this ensures an identical treatment 
of currently attributed income and non-currently attributed income. 
 
o The CSC legislation also provides for a consistent relief from double 
taxation in case of subsequent profit distributions and the subsequent 
disposal of shares.  
 
o The system provides for a number of exemptions from the current 
taxation of income in order to reduce the administrative burden and to 
limit the scope of such legislation, as much as possible, to the situations 
and structures in which the risk of tax avoidance - from the perspective 
of the state which applies the CSC legislation - is increased. The 
exemption provisions have to be seen individually, i.e. if the conditions 
for one of the exemption provisions are fulfilled, there will be no income 
allocation under the CSC regime. The following exemptions have been 
proposed: 
 
• Exemption based on a property-ratio: an exemption should be 
granted if the non-tainted property in the balance sheet of the 
   
 
 
o The basic interest rate is to be derived from the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the 
financial year for which the basic interest rate should be applicable. 
This rate should be applicable for the whole financial year of the entity 
which carries on the tainted activities.  
 
o The basis for the calculation of the attributable income is, in general, 
the average book value of the tainted property in the balance sheet of 
the CSC (calculation basis). However, adjustments have to be made if 
the book value deviates from the average economic value - based on 
the expected economic lifetime of the property concerned. Adjustments 
are also required in case of extraordinary write-downs and similar 
measures as well as in case of contractual provisions which lead to an 
increase or a decrease in the average amount of capital provided 
during the contractual period. The underlying assumption is that the 
economic value reflects the amortisation in an agreement which is 
based on the arm’s length principle. The taxpayer has the possibility of 
providing the evidence that the value after amortisation is lower than 
the average economic value. The calculation basis does not necessarily 
reflect the fair market value of the respective property. What is 
important for the determination of the calculation basis is not a ‘mark-to-
market’ value at specific points in time, but a value which reflects, as 
much as possible, the average amount of capital provided during the 
contractual period. 
 
o In case the activities are (partly) debt-financed, the calculation basis 
has to be reduced. The percentage of equity-financed investments 
which are related to the tainted property has to be determined based on 
the ratio of the total average amount of equity to the total average 
amount of equity plus the total average amount of interest-bearing 
debts. The equity-percentage has to be applied to the calculation basis 
in order to end up with the net calculation basis. 
 
o The CSC legislation is to be applied to direct and indirect participations 
in non-transparent legal entities and to permanent establishments of 
those entities as well as to the participations of the latter entities in 
transparent partnerships. The allocation of tainted and non-tainted 
property between the state of the headquarter company and the state of 
the PE (PS) follows the allocation which has to be made for income tax 
purposes.  
 
o The CSC legislation applies to direct and indirect shareholdings of at 
least 25 percent (percentage of shareholding or, alternatively, 
percentage of voting rights). The requirement of a 25 percent threshold 
applies to the investment in the CSC itself, i.e. even in case of multiple-
tier structures the shareholder is required to hold a participation of at 
least 25 percent in the CSC.   
 
o The basic interest income is allocable to the shareholder after the end 
of the financial year of the CSC. 
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o The current allocation of income requires the application of an ordinary 
tax credit system which ensures a consistent relief from double 
taxation. The income attribution should not lead to a “penalty effect” for 
the shareholder, but should solely provide for the current taxation of the 
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shareholder and that the tax credit mechanism is modified. Without the 
latter separation and modification, the system might lead to a treatment 
which is, at least in some situations, less favourable compared to the 
treatment of income which is either derived directly by the shareholder 
or by a legal entity which is not subject to current taxation. This is 
particularly true in case of losses (of the shareholder, the CSC, or 
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allocation under the CSC regime. The following exemptions have been 
proposed: 
 
• Exemption based on a property-ratio: an exemption should be 
granted if the non-tainted property in the balance sheet of the 
   
 
 
o The basic interest rate is to be derived from the 12 months Euribor 
which is determined, as an average, for the month preceding the 
financial year for which the basic interest rate should be applicable. 
This rate should be applicable for the whole financial year of the entity 
which carries on the tainted activities.  
 
o The basis for the calculation of the attributable income is, in general, 
the average book value of the tainted property in the balance sheet of 
the CSC (calculation basis). However, adjustments have to be made if 
the book value deviates from the average economic value - based on 
the expected economic lifetime of the property concerned. Adjustments 
are also required in case of extraordinary write-downs and similar 
measures as well as in case of contractual provisions which lead to an 
increase or a decrease in the average amount of capital provided 
during the contractual period. The underlying assumption is that the 
economic value reflects the amortisation in an agreement which is 
based on the arm’s length principle. The taxpayer has the possibility of 
providing the evidence that the value after amortisation is lower than 
the average economic value. The calculation basis does not necessarily 
reflect the fair market value of the respective property. What is 
important for the determination of the calculation basis is not a ‘mark-to-
market’ value at specific points in time, but a value which reflects, as 
much as possible, the average amount of capital provided during the 
contractual period. 
 
o In case the activities are (partly) debt-financed, the calculation basis 
has to be reduced. The percentage of equity-financed investments 
which are related to the tainted property has to be determined based on 
the ratio of the total average amount of equity to the total average 
amount of equity plus the total average amount of interest-bearing 
debts. The equity-percentage has to be applied to the calculation basis 
in order to end up with the net calculation basis. 
 
o The CSC legislation is to be applied to direct and indirect participations 
in non-transparent legal entities and to permanent establishments of 
those entities as well as to the participations of the latter entities in 
transparent partnerships. The allocation of tainted and non-tainted 
property between the state of the headquarter company and the state of 
the PE (PS) follows the allocation which has to be made for income tax 
purposes.  
 
o The CSC legislation applies to direct and indirect shareholdings of at 
least 25 percent (percentage of shareholding or, alternatively, 
percentage of voting rights). The requirement of a 25 percent threshold 
applies to the investment in the CSC itself, i.e. even in case of multiple-
tier structures the shareholder is required to hold a participation of at 
least 25 percent in the CSC.   
 
o The basic interest income is allocable to the shareholder after the end 
of the financial year of the CSC. 
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• The strict limitation of the current taxation of income to the basic 
interest component. 
 
• No difference in the treatment of the basic interest income which 
is caused by the tax credit system, existing tax losses, multiple-
tier structures et cetera.  
 
• The granting of non-discriminatory exemption provisions. 
 
o Secondary EU law does not play a comparably important role. 
However, if the (revised) Parent-Subsidiary Directive is applicable to the 
current attribution of income under a CFC or CSC system, the 
respective system is required to provide for the elimination of double 
taxation either by applying the exemption method or the credit method. 
This is clearly the case for the proposed CSC legislation.  
 
11.) The outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case can provoke different reactions of 
Member States and may lead to an increased political pressure for the introduction of 
an EU wide minimum income tax rate or for comparable measures of harmonisation. 
The final outcome from a political perspective, however, is difficult to estimate and it 
is quite likely that a common European approach can only be achieved in the long 
run. The immediate unilateral reactions which can be expected - and which can 
already be noticed - are either the adjustment of CFC rules in a way which complies 
with the requirements derived from the Cadbury Schweppes case, or the extension of 
existing CFC rules to comparable domestic investments and investments in other 
(high-tax) countries. However, due to the fact that a concept which is based on the 
conclusions of the Cadbury Schweppes decision would change the scope of the 
legislation significantly, it can be expected that some of the regimes will rather be 
extended to resident and non-resident entities instead of providing an “escape 
clause”. The Council of the European Union published a Resolution on the 
coordination of CFC rules which recommends that Member States adopt some 
guiding principles for the application of these rules. However, the Resolution only 
presents a list of indicators for the identification of artificial arrangements. This can be 
helpful to align the approach of the Member States with respect to the separation of 
artificial structures from non-artificial structures - but not more than that. 
 
12.) The CSC legislation only results in a conflict with a tax treaty which is based on 
the OECD-MTC if (i) the legislation is applied to income generated through a PE in 
the other contracting state and (ii) the tax treaty explicitly provides for the application 
of the exemption method (and not the credit method) in order to avoid the double 
taxation of PE income. Only in this case, it is required to explicitly refer to the 
application of the CSC legislation in order to avoid a tax treaty-override. However, it 
is apparent that the application of the CSC taxation is less “aggressive” - also in the 
light of the relationship with the other contracting state - than the typical CFC regimes 
which usually focus on all (vertical) income components. Together with the clear 
economic and equity reasons behind such legislation it seems to be less likely that 
the application of the CSC taxation results in serious conflicts with the other treaty 
partner. This should not be understood as a suggestion or a justification for a tax 
treaty-override, but it shows that the overall impact of such an override is very limited. 
One may even see it from a different angle: the fact that the CSC regime solely 
   
 
CSC - based on book value - prevails. I have proposed a 
percentage which should be in a range between more than 50 
percent (minimum) and more than 75 percent (maximum).  
 
• Exemption based on an income ratio: similar to the property-
ratio, an exemption should be granted if the income from non-
tainted activities encompasses more than 50 percent (minimum) 
and more than 75 percent (maximum) of the total income of the 
CSC. 
 
• Exemption based on the classification of the service recipients: 
the tainted activities should be exempt from current taxation of 
income if the services are provided - to a significant percentage - 
to unrelated parties. This should be the case if more than 75 
percent of the income from tainted activities is related to services 
provided towards unrelated parties.  
 
• Exemption based on a general financial threshold: in order to 
avoid that each and every minor amount of tainted investment is 
subject to current taxation, it seems to be acceptable to stipulate 
a financial threshold as an absolute amount. In my opinion, the 
threshold should refer to the net calculation basis of the tainted 
property (in total) and should be within a range of 100,000 Euro 
to 500,000 Euro. Thus, if the net calculation basis of the tainted 
property does not exceed the threshold, no income attribution is 
required.  
 
• Exemption based on income taxation at source: in those cases in 
which the basic interest component is not subject to taxation in 
the state of residence of the service company, but in the state of 
source, there is no necessity to calculate the basic interest 
component. 
 
o It is of utmost importance that the proposed CSC legislation complies 
with the idea and the concept of an internal market and primary and 
secondary EU law. The current taxation of the basic interest component 
under the CSC system clearly supports, in my opinion, the efficient 
allocation of capital among Member States and other countries and is 
therefore fully in line with the idea and the concept of an internal 
market. 
 
o The main aspects to ensure the effectiveness of the legislation and the 
compliance with primary EU law are the following: 
 
• The limitation to tainted activities which entail - from the 
perspective of the state which applies the legislation - an 
increased risk of tax avoidance (capital service activities). 
 
• The application of the system in a non-discriminatory manner to 
tainted activities carried on through resident and non-resident 
entities. 
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CSC - based on book value - prevails. I have proposed a 
percentage which should be in a range between more than 50 
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a financial threshold as an absolute amount. In my opinion, the 
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property (in total) and should be within a range of 100,000 Euro 
to 500,000 Euro. Thus, if the net calculation basis of the tainted 
property does not exceed the threshold, no income attribution is 
required.  
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o It is of utmost importance that the proposed CSC legislation complies 
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secondary EU law. The current taxation of the basic interest component 
under the CSC system clearly supports, in my opinion, the efficient 
allocation of capital among Member States and other countries and is 
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market. 
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discriminatory legislation and may therefore theoretically be in line with 
the basic freedoms of the TFEU.  
 
o The CFC legislation often focuses on the lowest domestic group level, 
i.e. does not allocate the income to the ultimate domestic shareholder. 
This opens the possibility for structures which minimise the anti-
avoidance effect. In contrast thereto, the proposed CSC legislation 
focuses on the shareholder on the highest domestic group level, be it 
an individual shareholder or a corporate shareholder. 
 
o The mechanism of CFC legislation can result in significant distortions, 
with the effect that the overall tax burden caused by the CFC income 
allocation is higher than a comparable dividend distribution. The CSC 
legislation is based on a two-step approach: first, the current allocation 
of the basic interest component and, second, the regular dividend 
distribution (or the disposal of shares). Both steps are linked closely in 
order to avoid any double taxation of income.  
 
o The proposed CSC legislation follows an approach which is “softer” 
compared to CFC legislation, but without being less effective. The 
system focuses on the direct and indirect shareholder, but taxes the 
basic interest income only if the income is finally subject to tax in the 
CSC state. The system provides for postponements of tax payments 
and preliminary assessments to ensure the avoidance of double 
taxation, and to ensure that currently attributed income is not treated 
worse than any other income which is not subject to current taxation (no 

























   
 
focuses on the basic interest component might open the door for an argument - 
supported by economic and equity reasons - to amend the respective double tax 
convention and to explicitly include the possibility of applying the CSC regime. 
 
13.) It is important to understand and to highlight the main differences between CFC 
legislation - which is extended in the manner described above - and the proposed 
CSC legislation. The most significant aspects can be summarised as follows: 
 
o The extension of a transactional approach CFC legislation to resident 
entities may lead to an extraordinary administrative burden, especially 
in those cases in which all types of income from inter-company services 
are in the focus of the respective legislation. For this reason, a 
substantial amendment to the legislation may be required. 
 
o The extension of an entity approach CFC legislation may require a 
revised classification, too. The reason is that the income from inter-
company services is typically treated as tainted income and, therefore, 
might lead to a complete income allocation if it encompasses a 
substantial part of the overall income of the CFC.  
 
o The transactional and entity approach CFC legislation which applies to 
resident and non-resident entities - without focusing on the income tax 
rate - does not solve the problem of income allocation which is related 
to the activity component and the risk component of capital. The 
contrary is true: the extension of the system to medium- and high-tax 
countries increases the amount of “critical” income allocation.  
 
o The increase in income allocation which is related to the activity 
component and the risk component is not limited to tainted income, but 
also “infects” non-tainted income if the CFC legislation follows an entity 
approach. This would lead to a massive extension of the taxation of 
income components which should be - based on the principles outlined 
in earlier chapters - exempt from current taxation. 
 
o The extension of the CFC taxation would by no means solve the 
problems which are caused by the inconsistent application of the tax 
credit system, the asymmetrical allocation of income, the inclusion of 
the income in the tax base of the shareholder, et cetera. It might even 
lead to additional conflicts. The latter can be the case, for example, if 
the domestic legislation provides a system of fiscal unity (fiscal 
consolidation) only for domestic entities: the exclusion of negative 
income of a non-resident CFC from an offsetting with positive income of 
the shareholder, on the one hand, but an offsetting of negative income 
of a resident CFC under the fiscal unity regime, on the other hand, 
would lead to a situation which, in my view, is not in line with the 
concept and the idea of an internal market. 
 
o A simple extension of CFC rules to resident entities is, in essence, not 
sufficient to fulfil the needs and the requirements of an internal market - 
even if the extension is implemented in a manner which leads to a non-
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the shareholder, on the one hand, but an offsetting of negative income 
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would lead to a situation which, in my view, is not in line with the 
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o A simple extension of CFC rules to resident entities is, in essence, not 
sufficient to fulfil the needs and the requirements of an internal market - 
even if the extension is implemented in a manner which leads to a non-
   
 
Part IV - Concluding Observations 
 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
 
10.1. Purpose of the Study 
 
10.1.1. Working in the field of international taxation, questions related to CFC 
legislation (which, in the following, also encompasses FIF legislation - if the latter 
legislation is not mentioned separately) are of great practical relevance. International 
investments and restructurings can become less attractive - or even unattractive - 
just because of the application of CFC regimes. This is not only true for the 
generation of typical “passive” income like interest and royalties, but also for the 
relocation of group operations to other states which may lead to “base company 
income.” It is therefore apparent that the application of CFC regimes can have a 
major impact on the international activities of a taxpayer. It is equally apparent, in my 
opinion, that it is unacceptable that the state of the shareholder taxes all of the 
income derived through a foreign entity on a current basis. One has to keep in mind 
that the income usually also encompasses elements of income which are produced in 
the CFC state or where the CFC takes over substantial risks. Moreover, in an 
European Union context it is obvious, based on the case law of the European Court 
of Justice, that Member States cannot - at least not without justification - restrict the 
foreign activities of their residents. The outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case 
clearly shows that this is also of great importance for the application of CFC regimes.  
 
10.1.2. The fact that a number of Member States still follow the “typical” CFC regimes 
makes the research in the European context particularly interesting. This became 
already clear when I was working on my Master thesis at the European Tax College 
in Leuven, which was mainly focused on the comparison of European CFC regimes. 
From my perspective, it is obvious that the typical CFC regimes are “outdated” and 
not ready for an application in an internal market. The CFC regimes require 
alternatives which accept the (limited) necessity of an anti-deferral approach but 
which are, at the same time, acting within certain legal and economic parameters. 
With this PhD thesis I would like contribute to the ongoing discussion on the changes 
or even the abolition of CFC regimes and would like to provide an alternative concept 
to the existing regimes.   
 
10.1.3. One of the decisive questions in this context is the question whether the 
principle of capital import neutrality or the principle of capital export neutrality should 
be the prevailing principle in the taxation of foreign source income. If one comes to 
the conclusion that the principle of capital import neutrality should be the prevailing 
principle not only for the taxation of income from direct investments but also for 
income from portfolio investments, there is an obvious conflict with the excessive 
current taxation of income under most of the existing CFC regimes. The problem, 
though, is the fact that the OECD-MTC, as one of the most important international 
patterns for the conclusion of double tax conventions, is fostering the residence-
based taxation of certain passive and base company income. Such an approach is 
therefore rather supporting the relocation of certain capital intensive activities to 
states and territories which provide for a lower taxation of income. Thus, the general 
acceptance of the principle of capital import neutrality does not necessarily mean that 
there is no need for a “limited” taxation according to the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, not all of the income components have to be treated identically, 
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relocation of functions and risks which are mainly related to capital-intensive services 
- with a separable interest component - and which are utilised by another  party, i.e. 
the capital is not directly employed for an income-producing activity of the subsidiary, 
but for an income-producing activity of the recipient of the services (which can be a 
related or unrelated party). The subsidiary, of course, realises income from the 
provision of capital, but not from the direct utilisation of capital in an income-
producing process (of the subsidiary).  
 
10.2.4. Also in case of hybrid investments, the general conclusion should be that the 
interest income is to be taxed in the state in which the latter is produced. However, 
this is very often not the case, especially where the double tax convention between 
the state of the service company and the state of the recipient of the services is 
based on the OECD-MTC. In such a non-optimal scenario of a residence-based 
taxation the question arises whether all or part of the interest component included in 
the income should be taxed in the residence-state of the subsidiary (service) 
company or whether it could be equally taxed in the residence-state of the parent 
company. This question does not arise for additional functions exercised and risks 
taken by the respective parties. The income related thereto is clearly allocable - from 
an economic point of view - to the respective company which exercises the functions 
and which takes over the risks directly. The income which is related to the separable 
financing element, however, has to be split up into a basic interest component and a 
risk component.  
 
10.2.5. The basic interest component consists of the actual real interest rate and the 
actual inflation rate on a “rolling” basis, i.e. on the basis of permanent adjustments. In 
my opinion, the basic interest component is the minimum interest rate which can be 
achieved by an investor. It reflects a totally flexible investment which does not include 
any expectations and any risks related to the debtor and the time of investment. The 
basic interest component is strongly connected to the capital itself, even though it 
must be produced - just like any other income - by the recipient of the capital 
investment. Essentially, this component increases the wealth of the investor by the 
permanently adjusted real interest rate of a variable investment, because the inflation 
premium covers, in this situation, exactly the devaluation of money. In general, the 
basic interest component can be seen as an isolated component or as a component 
which is embedded in the total amount of interest income (together with the risk 
component). 
 
10.2.6. The risk component encompasses the elements which are based on 
expectations, e.g. the premium for an expected increase in the real interest rate and 
the expected increase in the inflation rate (in case of an investment which binds the 
investor for a certain period of time and where the interest rate is fixed). In case of an 
expected decrease in the latter elements, this may  result in a reduction of the 
existing basic interest component (within the fixed interest rate). The risk component 
also includes the liquidity premium and the premium which is required to cover the 
risks related to the debtor. Theoretically, there should be a balance between the risks 
assumed by the investor and the compensation for those risks included in the interest 
income. The coverage of the risk does not necessarily require the direct connection 
to the capital investment, i.e. the risk coverage could theoretically be separated (or 
“stripped”) from the latter investment. This is particularly true for the risks which are 
related to the debtor, e.g. by way of a guarantee.  
 
   
 
since not all of them have to be safeguarded from a competitiveness point of view. It 
is quite important, under the circumstances outlined above, to deviate from the 
existing transactional and entity based CFC regimes towards a new concept which is 
much more linked to the principle of capital import neutrality and the aim of fostering 
competitiveness. It is apparent, in my opinion, that this cannot be achieved by a mere 
horizontal separation of income, like in case of the transactional regimes, but 
requires, in addition, a vertical separation of income. In order to determine such a 
new concept, it is important to identify and to determine the economic and legal 
basis, the possibilities and limits from an EU law perspective and the basic 
requirements from an anti-avoidance point of view. It is also important to examine the 
various types and the specific elements of the existing CFC rules as well as the 
interrelation with double tax conventions. 
 
10. 2. Economic Principles in International Taxation 
 
10.2.1. From an economic point of view, the basic question is whether the principle of 
capital export neutrality should prevail over the principle of capital import neutrality, 
i.e. the concept of efficiency over the argument of competitiveness, or vice versa. It 
can be concluded that the efficient allocation of capital is distorted by several factors 
and it seems to be obvious that complete neutrality cannot be achieved. Therefore, 
the principle of export neutrality not only fails to achieve complete neutrality but does 
also have a negative effect on competitiveness. In a world of globalisation and of 
different tax rates and tax systems it seems to me that the creation of an environment 
which clearly fosters competitiveness, i.e. a tax policy which allows companies to 
compete at equal terms in a respective market, would probably be the best and most 
realistic way to maximise global welfare. Such an environment can be achieved by 
following the principle of capital import neutrality and the application of a source-
based taxation - in contrast to a residence-based taxation which reflects the principle 
of capital export neutrality. In general, this is not only true for foreign direct 
investments but also for portfolio investments.  
 
10.2.2. The safeguarding of competitiveness is especially relevant in two cases. First, 
where an international company operates in a foreign market and has therefore to 
compete with local companies and subsidiaries of other multinational enterprises 
and, second, where an international company separates and relocates functions and 
risks to other foreign companies. In both cases it is important that the profits related 
to those functions and risks are not taxed more heavily in comparison to third party 
activities in the respective foreign market.  
 
10.2.3. The case of a relocation of functions and risks may result in the establishing 
of services which are mainly based on the provision of capital such as financing 
services, leasing services, and licensing services. As a consequence thereof, inter-
company income streams are created which include a separable interest component 
related to the capital provided and this interest component is one of the most 
important components of the overall compensation. For this reason, I consider the 
creation of capital-intensive inter-company services by allocating those functions and 
risks to separate legal entities to be a kind of “hybrid investment.” It is called hybrid 
investment because it combines the elements of a direct investment - by 
incorporating a subsidiary (service) company in another state - and the elements of 
an indirect investment (portfolio investment) - by focusing on the provision of capital 
in return for (indirect) interest payments. In other words, such investments lead to a 
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10.2.9. The basic interest component should be taxed in the state of the shareholder 
(parent company) on a “rolling” basis, i.e. not just the basic interest rate which is 
applicable at the moment of making the investment (or the stipulation of a fixed 
interest rate) but also any subsequent increase or decrease. Of course, any 
subsequent development is part of the risk which is covered by the risk component 
and one might argue that this results in a kind of “overlapping” of the taxation of the 
basic interest component and the risk component. However, in this respect it is 
important to note that any premium included in the (fixed) interest rate in order to 
cover such a risk is, in principle, only taxed in the state of the service company. The 
fact that any increase or decrease in the basic interest component is subject to 
current taxation in the state of the shareholder does not influence the taxation of the 
premium. Moreover, it has to be accepted that - with regard to the basic interest 
component - there are two different perspectives: the perspective of the state of the 
service company, where the expected increase or decrease has to be stipulated 
within the (fixed) interest rate, and the state of the shareholder which focuses on the 
taxation of the risk free component of the capital investment (minimum taxation). Both 
perspectives have to be recognised and accepted. However, it is important, as 
already outlined above, that (i) the taxation in the state of the (subsidiary) service 
company and the state of the shareholder (parent company) is limited to the tax rate 
applicable in the state in which the interest income is produced and (ii) that any 
current taxation of the basic interest income is limited to the amount of actual income 
derived in the state of the (subsidiary) service company.    
 
10.2.10. It has to be emphasised that a distinction is to be made between functions 
where the interest component can be considered to be a separable part of the 
activity, e.g. finance and leasing activities, and functions where the interest 
component is only theoretically included in the overall economic output. In the latter 
case, the interest component is just a part of a - more or less - complex process of 
exercising a certain function. A theoretical separation of the interest component and 
a partial allocation to a parent company is therefore economically not justifiable and 
not required. The interest component in the latter case is a necessary element to 
“create” the services or produce a certain amount of income but it is not a separable 
part of the services itself. The portion of income which is theoretically related to the 
basic interest component is - in this particular case - produced in the state of the 
intermediate (service) company. In other words, the income produced by the 
exercising of functions should be taxed in the respective state. Any other solution 
would negatively influence competitiveness. This is irrespective of the “way” how the 
income is created and the elements which are necessary to produce the income. 
 
10.2.11. In case of portfolio dividends and capital gains of portfolio investments in 
shares the taxation should be limited to the taxation of the underlying profit realised 
by the foreign company which produces the income. Any deviating residence-based 
taxation of a foreign intermediate company does not justify a residence-based 
taxation of the shareholders in the intermediate company on a current basis. In 
contrast to interest income, the underlying income is already taxed in the source state 
and there should be no additional taxation in the residence state. In other words, 
even if the intermediate company taxes the dividends and capital gains with a 
relatively low income tax, this will not justify any additional taxation on a current 
basis. Moreover, the idea of a “basic interest component” does not play any role in 
this context. In contrast to the taxation of interest income the taxation of the 
underlying business profits actually occurred “at the right place” from a 
   
 
10.2.7. Overall, it can be concluded that the interest income encompasses two very 
different types of components: the basic interest component, which can only be 
derived because of the provision of capital - and which is therefore strongly 
connected to the capital itself - and the risk component, which has to cover all of the 
potential risks which are caused by the debtor and the period of investment. 
 
10.2.8. The risk component included in the interest income is to be treated in the 
same way as other functions and risks and is therefore - in the non-optimal scenario - 
allocable to the company which takes over the risks directly and should therefore be 
taxed in the respective state. In contrast thereto, the basic interest component 
included in the income is strongly connected to the capital itself. Thus, there is no 
preference whatsoever for a taxation of the basic interest component in the residence 
state of the finance or leasing company from an economic point of view. The 
residence state of the shareholder (parent company) should therefore, from an 
economic perspective, have the right to currently tax the basic interest component. In 
the absence of a strict source-based taxation, the safeguarding of competitiveness 
requires that the overall tax burden does not exceed the result which would 
theoretically be achieved in an optimal economic scenario. The taxes imposed on the 
basic interest component should therefore be restricted to the theoretical tax burden 
in the income-producing state. Of course, the allocation of taxing rights deviates from 
the optimal economic scenario and this cannot be corrected. However, the overall tax 
burden on a group level - not on the level of the separate legal entity - would be 
comparable and would therefore not worsen the position of the group from a 
competitiveness perspective. In my opinion, there is no economic necessity to 
provide for a lower taxation of the basic interest component than the taxation in an 
optimal economic scenario of a source-based taxation. Such a lower taxation would 
even exceed what is actually required by the argument of competitiveness. One 
could even go one step further: the low-taxation on the level of an intermediate 
company in hybrid structures could have a distorting effect on the allocation of 
capital. In theory, this requires the basic interest income to be taxed in the hands of 
the low-tax company at a rate which is as high as the comparable tax rate in the 
source-country. If this is not the case, the higher taxation in the state of the parent 
company can have a positive effect with regard to the efficient allocation of capital 
and therefore also on competitiveness in general. However, this requires the 
limitation of the taxation of the basic interest component in the state of the parent 
company to the rate applicable in the source country. In addition, the state of the 
parent company has to provide for a crediting of the taxes levied on the income of the 
subsidiary company in order to avoid any double taxation. Thus, any taxation of the 
basic interest component in the state of the parent company may therefore be 
regarded as a partial and strictly limited application of the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, such a current taxation in the state of the parent company - in 
addition to the taxation in the state of the intermediate service company - should not 
result in an “over-taxation” of income. For this reason, there should be a strict 
limitation to the actual income derived from the respective activities in the state of the 
intermediate service company (as a maximum). For example, if the (net) interest 
income from the financing activity of the service company is only 2 percent, e.g. 
because of the revaluation of the loan receivable or the interest receivable, the 
maximum amount of current taxation should be 2 percent - even if the basic interest 
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residence state of the shareholder (parent company) should therefore, from an 
economic perspective, have the right to currently tax the basic interest component. In 
the absence of a strict source-based taxation, the safeguarding of competitiveness 
requires that the overall tax burden does not exceed the result which would 
theoretically be achieved in an optimal economic scenario. The taxes imposed on the 
basic interest component should therefore be restricted to the theoretical tax burden 
in the income-producing state. Of course, the allocation of taxing rights deviates from 
the optimal economic scenario and this cannot be corrected. However, the overall tax 
burden on a group level - not on the level of the separate legal entity - would be 
comparable and would therefore not worsen the position of the group from a 
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provide for a lower taxation of the basic interest component than the taxation in an 
optimal economic scenario of a source-based taxation. Such a lower taxation would 
even exceed what is actually required by the argument of competitiveness. One 
could even go one step further: the low-taxation on the level of an intermediate 
company in hybrid structures could have a distorting effect on the allocation of 
capital. In theory, this requires the basic interest income to be taxed in the hands of 
the low-tax company at a rate which is as high as the comparable tax rate in the 
source-country. If this is not the case, the higher taxation in the state of the parent 
company can have a positive effect with regard to the efficient allocation of capital 
and therefore also on competitiveness in general. However, this requires the 
limitation of the taxation of the basic interest component in the state of the parent 
company to the rate applicable in the source country. In addition, the state of the 
parent company has to provide for a crediting of the taxes levied on the income of the 
subsidiary company in order to avoid any double taxation. Thus, any taxation of the 
basic interest component in the state of the parent company may therefore be 
regarded as a partial and strictly limited application of the principle of capital export 
neutrality. However, such a current taxation in the state of the parent company - in 
addition to the taxation in the state of the intermediate service company - should not 
result in an “over-taxation” of income. For this reason, there should be a strict 
limitation to the actual income derived from the respective activities in the state of the 
intermediate service company (as a maximum). For example, if the (net) interest 
income from the financing activity of the service company is only 2 percent, e.g. 
because of the revaluation of the loan receivable or the interest receivable, the 
maximum amount of current taxation should be 2 percent - even if the basic interest 





   
 
corporations. A direct comparison between resident individuals and resident 
corporations can only lead to an appropriate result if the differences in tax treatment 
between individuals and corporations are taken into account. 
 
10.3.5. In a non-optimal scenario, the equal treatment of taxpayers makes it 
necessary to currently allocate the basic interest component to the resident taxpayer. 
In general, this should be the ultimate individual shareholder who  provides the 
capital for the investment. Any other approach supports the sheltering of the risk-free 
interest component of capital. This might even be true in case of an interposition of a 
resident intermediate (holding) company. In my opinion, the absence of a current 
taxation of income in case of an identifiable basic interest component - within the 
aforementioned described hybrid structures - would result in an unequal treatment of 
resident individual investors. However, it is equally clear that the current taxation of 
income should not encompass any other income components apart from the basic 
interest component. The reason is that the other income components are either 
related to functions carried out or to risks assumed by another taxpayer. This 
conclusion is not dependent upon the fact whether, for example, an intermediate 
(holding) company actively carries out business activities or whether the individual 
shareholder has a decisive influence on the activities of the holding company and 
any other subsidiary companies.  
 
10.3.6. The taxation of the basic interest component should follow the concept 
described above with regard to the economic principles in international taxation. 
Based on these principles, the basic interest component should be taxed on a 
“rolling” basis, i.e. the increase or decrease over the period of investment is to be 
taken into account. This ensures the taxation of the risk-free (minimum) income in the 
state of the shareholder. However, the taxation of the basic interest component must 
be limited (as a maximum) to the positive income derived by the intermediate service 
company. Any other approach might lead to the taxation of income which is not 
existent.    
 
10.3.7. Royalty and leasing income has to be separated into four different parts: a 
compensation for write-offs of the property concerned, a compensation for 
maintaining the property, a compensation for bearing the risks, and an interest 
component. Consequently, the income related to the first three components should 
be taxed in the country where the service company carries on the income-producing 
activity. The interest component included in the payments should be treated in the 
same way as the interest income outlined above. Theoretically, a separation of the 
interest component from the other components could be made by stipulating a certain 
percentage of the payments which should reflect the interest component and which 
should be taxed in the source state. The percentage could be stipulated by protocol 
or mutual agreement or, alternatively, a standard could be included in the double tax 
convention. However, the OECD-MTC provides for a residence-based taxation of the 
total amount of income without separating the income into the different elements. 
 
10.3.8. In case of dividends and capital gains derived from portfolio investments in 
shares, the taxation should be limited to the source state. Contrary to the interest 
component included in interest payments, royalty payments or leasing payments, the 
profit underlying the dividends and capital gains is already taxed in the source state. 
Thus, a subsequent taxation of the dividends or capital gains is not required by equity 
aspects.  
   
 
competitiveness point of view, i.e. in the country where the business activities are 
carried on. This is true for the whole profit generated and there is - in my opinion - no 
room and no necessity to calculate any theoretical basic interest component in this 
situation. 
 
10.3. Legal Principles in International Taxation 
 
10.3.1. Equity aspects require a source-based taxation rather than a residence-
based taxation of direct investments. The same should be true with respect to 
portfolio investments.  
 
10.3.2. The OECD-MTC generally provides for a residence-based taxation of 
dividend income, interest income and royalty income. In case of dividend and interest 
income the OECD-MTC provides for a limited taxation at source. Business profits are 
taxable in the residence state as long as no permanent establishment exists in the 
other contracting state.  
 
10.3.3. The allocation of taxing rights based on the OECD-MTC supports, in my view, 
the creation of hybrid structures in which service companies of any type are 
implemented in an international group structure. Those service companies are often 
incorporated in low-tax countries, i.e. the international group can take advantage of 
the lower level of taxation which is generally possible because of the residence-
based taxation in the low-tax country and the limited source-based taxation in the 
high-tax country. Those service companies should in general be taxed in the state in 
which the business functions are exercised. This is typically the residence state of the 
service company as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other 
contracting state. The functions have to be measured on an arm’s length basis. This 
should be in line with equity considerations.  
 
10.3.4. Interest income should be taxable in the source state. In this respect, the 
source state has to be seen as the state in which the income-producing activity is 
carried on and in which the income which is the basis for the interest payment is 
actually “created.” If this is the case, the income related to an equity investment and 
the income related to a loan investment are treated in a comparable manner for tax 
purposes. This would also lead to an equal treatment of resident and non-resident 
investors which would both be subject to tax in the state of source. Both types of 
investors would be taxed according to the benefits received and both would be in a 
comparable position to compensate for the risks inherent in the business activities 
carried on in the source state. However, since the OECD-MTC provides for a 
residence-based taxation of interest income (and a limited taxation at source), this 
can be considered - in my opinion - to be a non-optimal scenario from an equity point 
of view. In such a non-optimal scenario, the interest income has to be split-up into a 
risk component and a basic interest component (risk-free component). The income 
which is related to the risk component should be taxable in the same way as the 
exercising of business functions, i.e. in the state where the risk is taken directly, 
which is typically the state in which the service company carries on its activities (e.g. 
in case of a hybrid investment). The basic interest component, however, should be 
allocable to the state where the invested capital comes from. The reason is that in the 
absence of an optimal scenario of a source-based taxation, the comparison between 
resident investors becomes decisive. In this respect, equity aspects require a 
comparison either between resident individuals or a comparison between resident 
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be taxed in the country where the service company carries on the income-producing 
activity. The interest component included in the payments should be treated in the 
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interest component from the other components could be made by stipulating a certain 
percentage of the payments which should reflect the interest component and which 
should be taxed in the source state. The percentage could be stipulated by protocol 
or mutual agreement or, alternatively, a standard could be included in the double tax 
convention. However, the OECD-MTC provides for a residence-based taxation of the 
total amount of income without separating the income into the different elements. 
 
10.3.8. In case of dividends and capital gains derived from portfolio investments in 
shares, the taxation should be limited to the source state. Contrary to the interest 
component included in interest payments, royalty payments or leasing payments, the 
profit underlying the dividends and capital gains is already taxed in the source state. 
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implemented in an international group structure. Those service companies are often 
incorporated in low-tax countries, i.e. the international group can take advantage of 
the lower level of taxation which is generally possible because of the residence-
based taxation in the low-tax country and the limited source-based taxation in the 
high-tax country. Those service companies should in general be taxed in the state in 
which the business functions are exercised. This is typically the residence state of the 
service company as long as no permanent establishment exists in the other 
contracting state. The functions have to be measured on an arm’s length basis. This 
should be in line with equity considerations.  
 
10.3.4. Interest income should be taxable in the source state. In this respect, the 
source state has to be seen as the state in which the income-producing activity is 
carried on and in which the income which is the basis for the interest payment is 
actually “created.” If this is the case, the income related to an equity investment and 
the income related to a loan investment are treated in a comparable manner for tax 
purposes. This would also lead to an equal treatment of resident and non-resident 
investors which would both be subject to tax in the state of source. Both types of 
investors would be taxed according to the benefits received and both would be in a 
comparable position to compensate for the risks inherent in the business activities 
carried on in the source state. However, since the OECD-MTC provides for a 
residence-based taxation of interest income (and a limited taxation at source), this 
can be considered - in my opinion - to be a non-optimal scenario from an equity point 
of view. In such a non-optimal scenario, the interest income has to be split-up into a 
risk component and a basic interest component (risk-free component). The income 
which is related to the risk component should be taxable in the same way as the 
exercising of business functions, i.e. in the state where the risk is taken directly, 
which is typically the state in which the service company carries on its activities (e.g. 
in case of a hybrid investment). The basic interest component, however, should be 
allocable to the state where the invested capital comes from. The reason is that in the 
absence of an optimal scenario of a source-based taxation, the comparison between 
resident investors becomes decisive. In this respect, equity aspects require a 
comparison either between resident individuals or a comparison between resident 
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exist which is created in the host Member State. The mere holding of assets or 
shares cannot be seen as the pursuing of an economic activity, but assets and 
shares can be seen as an “instrument” which may be utilised to carry out economic 
activities. 
 
10.4.4. The economic activity must be pursued through a fixed establishment. Based 
on the case law of the ECJ, such an establishment requires (i) the appearance of 
permanency, (ii) a management and (iii) has to be materially equipped for the 
carrying out of the respective functions. Essentially, the establishment must be 
sufficiently equipped (premises, management, staff, equipment) in order to provide 
the respective services or any other functions on its own and without being a mere 
tool of execution of, for example, the parent company. 
 
10.4.5. In order to have a definite influence over the company’s decisions and to 
determine its activities it is not necessarily required that a single shareholder has a 
majority interest in the company. In the SGI case a shareholding of 34 percent was 
sufficient to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment. The ECJ case 
law shows that even a combination of relatively low minority holdings of about 10 to 
12.50 percent per shareholder, like in Columbus Container, can be sufficient if further 
elements are existent which show that a definite influence exists. This is the case, for 
example, if shareholders act together, e.g. by a common representative, and the 
(combined) shareholding confers such a definite influence. In general, no clear 
percentage of shareholding or voting rights can be derived from the case law. In my 
opinion, the national commercial and company law has to be referred to, but it seems 
to be apparent that a definite influence may also exist on a factual or contractual 
basis. 
 
10.4.6. The freedom to provide services requires the actual pursuit of an economic 
activity from either within the Member State of primary establishment towards the 
recipient in another Member State or with a temporary link to the Member State of the 
recipient of the services. Apparently, the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services both require the actual pursuit of an economic activity. Hence, 
there is a certain overlapping of the requirements to come within the scope of the 
latter two freedoms. Nonetheless, it is unlikely - at least for investments in the context 
of this study - that two activities will be covered simultaneously by the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. 
 
10.4.7. The scope of the free movement of capital is much broader than the scope of 
the freedom of establishment (and basically also the freedom to provide services) 
and also encompasses any type of portfolio investments. A significant difference to 
the freedom of establishment is therefore the fact that - in order to come within the 
scope of Article 63 of the TFEU - the investment in a company in another Member 
State neither requires a definite influence over the company’s decisions nor the 
actual pursuit of an economic activity. Moreover, it is important to note that the scope 
of the free movement of capital is not limited to investments in other Member States 
but Article 63 of the TFEU is equally relevant for investments in non-member states. 
 
10.4.8. The decisive question in a situation in which the basic freedoms are 
theoretically affected simultaneously is whether there is a certain form of order 
among these freedoms and whether there is a prevailing freedom which takes 
preference over another freedom (or other freedoms). The outcome of the 
   
 
 
10.3.9. Overall, the concept of a current taxation of the basic interest component in 
the hands of the resident taxpayer is supported by economic and equity principles. 
Both, economic and equity aspects, require - in principle - that the foreign income 
should be taxed in the state in which the income-producing activity is carried on. 
However, if this optimal result cannot be achieved, other aspects have to be taken 
into consideration. Therefore, if a residence-based taxation leads to a shifting of 
taxing rights, with the effect that the income is not taxed in the state in which the 
income is produced but in the state in which the capital is legally concentrated, it is 
necessary to separate the basic interest component - which is neither related to the 
exercising of certain functions nor to the taking over of risks in the state of the 
intermediate company - and to allocate this interest component to the state the 
capital comes from. The taxation itself should theoretically be limited to the tax 
burden applicable in the state of source. The latter is true for both, the current 
taxation of the basic interest component in case of an indirect financing structure (via 
an intermediate company) and the taxation in case of a direct loan investment. The 
reason for such a limitation is the fact that this is, in my opinion, the only possibility to 
support the competitiveness of the group within a non-optimal scenario of a 
residence-based taxation. Without such a limitation, the group might be subject to a 
higher taxation than in case of a strict source-based taxation (at least with respect to 
the basic interest income) and would therefore face a competitive disadvantage on a 
group level. In other words, if the optimal result cannot be achieved, the overall tax 
burden imposed on the basic interest component should not exceed the income tax 
rate which would be applied in case of a taxation at source. In this case, the resident 
investor would be treated in the same way (with respect to the overall tax burden 
imposed on the basic interest component but not with respect to the countries 
imposing the income taxes) no matter whether the financial means are provided 
through (i) a direct loan investment, (ii) an indirect loan investment (or a similar 
investment which contains a separable financing element) - through the interposition 
of an intermediate company - or (iii) an equity investment in the company which 
produces the income (with respect to the comparable amount of income). In my 
opinion, this is - from an equity perspective - the most preferable result within a non-
optimal scenario of a residence-based taxation. Such an approach is therefore not 
only supported by the economic principles, but is also supported by equity 
considerations. In essence, it leads to a partial and strictly limited application of the 
principle of capital export neutrality. 
 
10.4. European Union Law 
 
10.4.1. The case law of the ECJ shows that the investment in another Member State 
may be protected, in principle, by the freedom of establishment, the freedom to 
provide services and the free movement of capital. 
 
10.4.2. The concept of establishment was described by the ECJ as the actual pursuit 
of an economic activity through a fixed establishment in another Member State for an 
indefinite period. The case law of the ECJ shows further that - in order to come within 
the scope of the freedom of establishment - the secondary establishment (e.g. in a 
legal entity) must confer definite influence over the company’s decisions. 
 
10.4.3. Not each and every activity can be considered an economic activity. In order 
to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment, an economic output must 
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and also encompasses any type of portfolio investments. A significant difference to 
the freedom of establishment is therefore the fact that - in order to come within the 
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10.3.9. Overall, the concept of a current taxation of the basic interest component in 
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Both, economic and equity aspects, require - in principle - that the foreign income 
should be taxed in the state in which the income-producing activity is carried on. 
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income is produced but in the state in which the capital is legally concentrated, it is 
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burden applicable in the state of source. The latter is true for both, the current 
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higher taxation than in case of a strict source-based taxation (at least with respect to 
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rate which would be applied in case of a taxation at source. In this case, the resident 
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opinion, this is - from an equity perspective - the most preferable result within a non-
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is, in my opinion and in the context of this study, related to the free movement of 
capital: the latter freedom is the only basic freedom which can also be invoked in 
case of investments in non-member states. Thus, if another freedom prevails over 
the free movement of capital - with the effect that Article 63 of the TFEU cannot be 
invoked anymore - the door for a protection of the investment in a non-member state 
(based on the TFEU) is closed. However, what is clear from the more recent case 
law is the fact that the purpose of the national legislation remains the decisive 
element for the decision whether the freedom of establishment or the free movement 
of capital will be examined. Consequently, if the national legislation is not linked to 
the objective of exercising the freedom of establishment and the ‘free movement of 
capital aspect’ prevails, there will be an exclusive examination of the free movement 
of capital. 
 
10.4.10. Given the importance of the basic freedoms for individuals and entities, it is 
obvious that situations exist in which the basic freedoms are abusively invoked just 
for the purpose of taking advantage of these freedoms without being entitled to do 
so. It is equally obvious that Member States apply rules in order to prevent such 
situations. However, the case law of the ECJ shows that the abuse of the basic 
freedoms must be determined case-by-case and cannot be generalised. In my 
opinion, the case law with respect to VAT does not lead to another outcome. 
 
10.4.11. There are a number of justifications for a restriction on the exercising of the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital. The justifications are either included in the TFEU itself or can be derived from 
the case law of the ECJ. The latter justifications are recognised under the rule of 
reason as overriding reasons of public interest and are of great importance, 
especially in cases dealing with direct taxation. The examination was mainly 
concentrated on justifications based on the rule of reason which have already come 
up in previous decisions and which might somehow be relevant in the context of this 
study. 
 
10.4.12. The examination shows that there are limited possibilities for the Member 
States to justify restrictions on the aforementioned basic freedoms. Some 
justifications have never been accepted, especially those which were merely based 
on budgetary or economic reasons, including justifications based on the erosion of 
the tax base and the loss of tax revenue, as well as the general compensation for 
advantages. Administrative inconvenience was rejected by the ECJ in earlier cases, 
but from the more recent case law one might have the impression that the ECJ is 
more open now for arguments which are linked to administrative inconvenience. A 
justification based on a different taxation in another Member State must be seen in 
the context of the respective national legislation. If it comes close (or is even 
identical) to the argument based on the erosion of the tax base, the loss of tax 
revenue or the general compensation for advantages, it cannot be accepted as a 
valid justification. The principle of territoriality and the protection of a balanced 
allocation of power to impose taxes between Member States were both accepted by 
the ECJ and might play a role in future decisions as well. Other justifications, like the 
cohesion of the tax system, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision or the aim of 
preventing tax avoidance, can be acceptable under certain - very limited - 
circumstances. The reason is that restrictive measures applied by the Member States 
have to be appropriate for the protection of the recognised public interest and 
proportionate to the aim pursued. They cannot go beyond what is necessary to 
   
 
examinations of the TFEU and the case law of the ECJ can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
o The freedom of establishment vs. the free movement of capital: the more 
recent case law of the ECJ provides a better understanding of the relationship 
between these two freedoms. Based on this case law, the purpose of the 
national legislation must be considered for the decision which of the basic 
freedoms is affected. If the purpose of the legislation is the application to 
investments which confer a definite influence over a company’s decisions, it is 
the freedom of establishment which is to be exclusively examined. The 
purpose of the legislation can be identified not only by quantitative elements 
(e.g. percentage of participation), but also by qualitative elements (e.g. 
collaboration of shareholders to achieve a definite influence). If the purpose of 
the legislation is the general application to all types of portfolio and 
entrepreneurial investments, the freedom of establishment and the free 
movement of capital can, in principle, both be affected. However, if the actual 
investment confers definite influence over a company’s decisions and the 
purpose of the legislation is linked to the objective of exercising the freedom of 
establishment, the ECJ - in its examination - gives preference to the freedom 
of establishment. In contrast thereto, if the link does not exist and the ‘free 
movement of capital aspect’ prevails, the ECJ gives preference to the free 
movement of capital. If the examination results in the conclusion that a 
restriction on one of the freedoms exists which cannot be justified, the ECJ 
refrains from additionally examining whether the TFEU provisions on the other 
freedom also preclude the respective legislation. 
 
o The freedom of establishment vs. the freedom to provide services: the case 
law of the ECJ made it clear that the freedom of establishment does not 
necessarily prevail over the freedom to provide services. In Fidium Finanz the 
ECJ held that Article 57 (1) of the TFEU relates to the definition of the notion 
of ‘services’ and does not establish any order of priority between the two basic 
freedoms. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the ECJ concluded that - with 
respect to the UK CFC legislation - the restrictive effects on the freedom to 
provide services are an unavoidable consequence of any restriction on the 
freedom of establishment. 
 
o The freedom to provide services vs. the free movement of capital: In the 
relationship between Article 56 of the TFEU and Article 63 of the TFEU it is - 
again - the more recent case law of the ECJ which provides a clearer picture. 
Based on this case law, it seems that the purpose of the national legislation is 
decisive. If the national legislation clearly focuses on services, e.g. the 
supervision of services, there is apparently no room for any (additional) 
examination of the free movement of capital. On the other hand, one should 
also conclude from this jurisprudence that national legislation which is 
foremost directed towards the investment (as such) - and not the services 
provided by the investment (e.g. the respective legal entity) - the prevailing 
freedom should be the free movement of capital and not the freedom to 
provide services. 
 
10.4.9. It is obvious that the fact that one basic freedom may prevail over another 
basic freedom can have important consequences. The most important consequence 
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is, in my opinion and in the context of this study, related to the free movement of 
capital: the latter freedom is the only basic freedom which can also be invoked in 
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identical) to the argument based on the erosion of the tax base, the loss of tax 
revenue or the general compensation for advantages, it cannot be accepted as a 
valid justification. The principle of territoriality and the protection of a balanced 
allocation of power to impose taxes between Member States were both accepted by 
the ECJ and might play a role in future decisions as well. Other justifications, like the 
cohesion of the tax system, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision or the aim of 
preventing tax avoidance, can be acceptable under certain - very limited - 
circumstances. The reason is that restrictive measures applied by the Member States 
have to be appropriate for the protection of the recognised public interest and 
proportionate to the aim pursued. They cannot go beyond what is necessary to 
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10.5.4. The CFC rules can be seen as anti-avoidance measures in order to target the 
deferral of domestic taxation on foreign source income (anti-deferral measures). The 
CFC taxation leads to a limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality. 
 
10.5.5. The deferral of domestic taxation can only partially be seen as a “privilege.” 
The income which is related to the functions exercised and the risks taken by the 
foreign entity should be taxable in the residence state of the CFC. At least, this is 
required by economic and equity aspects. However, this can be different with respect 
to the risk-free interest component of capital included in the passive income. To the 
extent that the risk-free interest component is theoretically separable from the total 
income, there is no necessity for a deferral of domestic taxation. Thus, the deferral 
which is related to the (theoretically separable) risk-free interest component of capital 
can be seen as a privilege rather than a necessity.  
 
10.5.6. The deferral of domestic taxation is, of course, of particular relevance where 
the income distribution is subject to tax in the state of the shareholder, e.g. where the 
residence state of the shareholder applies the credit method for the avoidance of 
double taxation. However, even if the distribution is exempt from taxation, a 
significant difference in tax rates can lead to the outcome that financial means are not 
repatriated to the parent company but retained on the level of the subsidiary 
company and are used for other activities, e.g. the financing of other group 
companies (including the parent company). Therefore, the non-distribution of 
financial means reduces the possibility of the parent company to create and increase 
taxable domestic income.  
 
10.5.7. Other existing anti-avoidance measures do not have an effect comparable to 
CFC taxation. Some of the alleged alternative measures can in fact limit the 
advantage of foreign passive investments in low-tax countries and can create an 
obstacle for abusive investments, but none of the measures really targets the deferral 
of domestic taxation and therefore they cannot be considered a substitute for CFC 
taxation.  
 
10.5.8. The income allocation as such is - in my opinion - in line with the ability-to-pay 
principle. This should even be true for minority shareholdings. The increase in value 
of the property which leads to passive income improves the ability of the shareholder 
to pay taxes. However, this is only true if the income allocation is equally relevant for 
positive and negative income. If the attribution is legally or factually limited to positive 
income, the CFC taxation cannot be in line with the ability-to-pay principle.  
 
10.5.9. From a technical point of view, the CFC taxation is quite similar to the taxation 
of permanent establishments (PE) and partnerships (PS) according to the credit 
method. It seems to be necessary that a country which applies a CFC taxation to 
foreign legal entities requires a comparable system for the taxation of PE and PS if 
the income is otherwise exempt from taxation. However, countries may deviate from 
the OECD principles of an unrestricted functional allocation of property and income, 
which might be particularly relevant for passive investments and intra-group activities. 
For example, the German concept of what is called the central function of the head 
office clearly restricts the relocation of holding, financing and licensing activities to a 
PE. Under the German approach it is basically impossible to allocate the property of 
the latter activities to a PE. If these activities are carried out by the PE, the income 
allocation will be limited to a (service) fee for the coordination and the handling of the 
   
 
achieve the aim of the provision. Thus, Member States are required to apply those 
measures which are the less restrictive to achieve the aim pursued. 
 
10.4.13. With regard to the justifications, it is clear from the case law of the ECJ that 
it can be necessary to make a differentiation between an investment in a Member 
State and an investment in a non-member state. In other words, it may be the case 
that a restriction on the free movement of capital to or from third countries is justified 
for a particular reason in circumstances where that reason would not constitute a 
valid justification for a restriction on capital movements between Member States. The 
movement of capital to or from third countries takes place in a different legal context 
from that which occurs within the EU, e.g. with respect to the application of the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC. Nevertheless, a Member State may have concluded 
double tax conventions and / or other agreements with third countries which may 
result in legal obligations which are comparable to those which are existent in the EU. 
In this case, it may be difficult for a Member State to demonstrate that a justification 
is to be “weighted” differently. Therefore, the differentiation is not limited to the 
question whether the country of investment is a Member State or non-member state, 
but also requires a differentiation among the non-member states. However, it is clear 
that the national measure must still be proportionate in relation to the aim pursued, 
no matter whether it is related to Member States or non-member states. 
 
10.4.14. From the perspective of secondary EU law it is the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive which might be of general importance. In my opinion, the examination of the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and the jurisprudence of the ECJ in this respect shows 
that the classification of dividends - in the sense of the latter Directive - must be 
made according to objective characteristics and irrespective of the classification of 
dividends under the national legislation of the Member States. In principle, this covers 
regular and hidden dividend distributions.  
 
10.5. General Aspects of CFC and FIF Legislation 
 
10.5.1. The current taxation of income which is derived by a non-transparent foreign 
legal entity in the hands of the resident shareholder is the basic feature of CFC 
taxation in all of the countries which apply such a regime. Such an approach is 
somehow “unique” and - in substance - a deviation from the principle that a foreign 
legal entity is to be considered a separate taxpayer.  
 
10.5.2. Almost all of the countries which follow a typical CFC legislation apply three 
basic requirements which have to be fulfilled for the application of their rules: (i) the 
foreign entity must derive certain passive income, (ii) there must be an ownership in 
the foreign entity, and (iii) the foreign income must be subject to low-taxation.  
 
10.5.3. The FIF rules can basically be seen as a part of (or a supplement to) the CFC 
rules. The main differences can be described as follows: (i) FIF rules already apply to 
very small and insignificant shareholdings, whereas the CFC rules require in most 
cases a participation of at least 10 percent or more, and (ii) FIF rules are often only 
applicable to certain types of passive investment income but not generally to the wide 
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10.5.6. The deferral of domestic taxation is, of course, of particular relevance where 
the income distribution is subject to tax in the state of the shareholder, e.g. where the 
residence state of the shareholder applies the credit method for the avoidance of 
double taxation. However, even if the distribution is exempt from taxation, a 
significant difference in tax rates can lead to the outcome that financial means are not 
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Germany, Spain and Lithuania. The Danish approach is a bit different from the other 
transactional countries since it is strongly connected to financial income without 
having separate base company rules. 
 
10.6.4. The entity approach goes even further and covers not only the situations 
which lead to tainted income and base company income under a transactional 
approach, but also covers the income related to an active business which is 
exercised by the CFC as a minor activity (“all-or-nothing” approach). An activity-
based exemption from CFC taxation typically requires that the foreign company 
carries on mainly an industrial or commercial activity and mainly on the local market. 
Of course, this excludes most of the inter-company services which are normally 
directed towards the country of the shareholder and the countries in which other 
group companies are established. The entity approach is therefore - similar to the 
base company activities - completely unconnected to the question of capital intensive 
or non-capital intensive services. The entity approach is the predominant system of 
CFC taxation and all of the countries which follow an entity approach have - in one 
way or another - such a link to the activity of the foreign entity. 
 
10.6.5. The requirement of low-taxation is a common feature in all of the European 
countries with a typical “pre-Cadbury Schweppes” CFC regime - no matter whether 
they follow a transactional or an entity approach. From the perspective of these 
countries, the current taxation of CFC income seems to be necessary only in cases 
where the effective foreign tax rate is below a certain threshold and the income is 
therefore considered to be low-taxed. If the income is subject to a taxation which is 
comparable to the domestic taxation or even higher than the domestic taxation, an 
immediate income allocation to the resident shareholder will not take place. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the determination of the effective foreign tax 
rate is usually based on a taxable income which is adjusted according to the 
domestic tax rules. Overall, the low-tax requirement ranges from less than 1/1 of the 
domestic corporate income tax rate (like in Germany) to less than 1/2 of the domestic 
corporate income tax which would theoretically be applied on that income (like in 
France). The remaining countries are in-between these two fractions. 
 
10.6.6. Another basic requirement for the application of CFC rules is the ownership in 
the CFC: in order to attribute the CFC income to a resident taxpayer, a certain - direct 
or indirect - shareholding is required. It is important to recognise that “control” in the 
sense that a resident shareholder or a group of related shareholders own more than 
50 percent in the CFC is in most cases not required. A strict “more than 50 percent” 
requirement exists in Lithuania, where the resident entity (or individual) together with 
related parties has to hold - directly or indirectly - more than 50 percent. That means, 
in nearly all of the countries there is either a lower threshold or other - alternative - 
criteria exist which can trigger the application of the CFC rules. The examination of 
the ownership requirements in the countries shows that often not even a “substantial” 
or “qualified” shareholding is required, either. The requirement of control often refers 
to a certain (minimum) percentage of related or unrelated resident shareholders. 
Hence, if a substantial percentage is held by totally unrelated resident shareholders, 
the minimum threshold for the individual shareholder is extremely low, e.g. 5 percent 
in France if 50 percent of the share capital of the foreign company is directly or 
indirectly held by French residents, or 10 percent in Finland if at least 50 percent are 
held by Finnish residents. A drastic example in this respect is Germany: if the CFC 
exclusively or almost exclusively derives gross revenues of a capital investment kind, 
   
 
activities, but will not encompass the complete amount of income related to these 
activities. The latter is also true if the holding, financing and licensing functions are 
combined with other (active) activities which are carried out by the PE. In my opinion, 
the deviation from the OECD approach of an unrestricted functional allocation in case 
of certain activities is not justified and is to be rejected.  
 
10.5.10. The OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition recommends the 
introduction of CFC and FIF rules as counteracting measures against harmful tax 
competition. The EU Code of Conduct does not provide any specific 
recommendations, but recognises that such counteracting measures against harmful 
tax competition play a fundamental role. It seems that both, OECD and the Council, 
consider the CFC and FIF taxation to be an important tool to target harmful tax 
competition, even though the measures are equally applicable to low-tax regimes 
which are far from being harmful.  
 
10.6. The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF 
Legislation 
 
10.6.1. In principle, the CFC and FIF regimes follow a very similar pattern. It has to 
be noted, though, that based on the Cadbury Schweppes decision of the ECJ, 
several Member States made amendments to their CFC and FIF legislation which 
result in a deviation from the original pattern. These amendments are of particular 
importance from an EU law perspective and, therefore, will be outlined separately. In 
the following, I will typically use the term “CFC”, which covers CFC and FIF 
legislation.   
 
10.6.2. The countries which apply a transactional approach have a similar 
understanding of what is to be considered “passive” income in the context of CFC 
taxation, e.g. rental and leasing income, interest income, and royalty income. The 
common features of these passive activities are, amongst others, the fact that the 
income which is related to these activities is, at least to a large extent, not taxed in 
the state in which it is produced - as it would be required by the economic principle of 
capital import neutrality - but in the state of residence of the CFC. This is due to the 
allocation of taxing rights stipulated in the double tax conventions which follow the 
pattern of the OECD-MTC. Moreover, the activities are usually capital intensive 
activities. The portion of income which is related to the interest element is therefore 
increased. The concept of the transactional countries is the targeting of a direct tax 
base erosion (e.g. in Spain) and sometimes even the indirect tax base erosion (e.g. 
in Denmark, Germany).  
 
10.6.3. The rules related to base company activities are partly different. Here, the 
circumstances for the provision of the services are decisive and not the type of 
services. That means, even non-capital intensive activities are subject to CFC 
taxation if - for example - the services are provided towards the resident shareholder 
or with the involvement of the resident shareholder. However, the economic result of 
the supply of non-capital intensive services may consist to a large extent of income 
which is related to the economic output created by personnel and not, as is the case 
for capital intensive services of the aforementioned types, of income which is largely 
related to the investment of capital, i.e. interest components, amortisation of the 
investment and the risk related to the investment. In principle, this is equally true for 
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Germany, Spain and Lithuania. The Danish approach is a bit different from the other 
transactional countries since it is strongly connected to financial income without 
having separate base company rules. 
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countries with a typical “pre-Cadbury Schweppes” CFC regime - no matter whether 
they follow a transactional or an entity approach. From the perspective of these 
countries, the current taxation of CFC income seems to be necessary only in cases 
where the effective foreign tax rate is below a certain threshold and the income is 
therefore considered to be low-taxed. If the income is subject to a taxation which is 
comparable to the domestic taxation or even higher than the domestic taxation, an 
immediate income allocation to the resident shareholder will not take place. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the determination of the effective foreign tax 
rate is usually based on a taxable income which is adjusted according to the 
domestic tax rules. Overall, the low-tax requirement ranges from less than 1/1 of the 
domestic corporate income tax rate (like in Germany) to less than 1/2 of the domestic 
corporate income tax which would theoretically be applied on that income (like in 
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activities, but will not encompass the complete amount of income related to these 
activities. The latter is also true if the holding, financing and licensing functions are 
combined with other (active) activities which are carried out by the PE. In my opinion, 
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10.6. The Various Types and the Specific Elements of European CFC and FIF 
Legislation 
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several Member States made amendments to their CFC and FIF legislation which 
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circumstances for the provision of the services are decisive and not the type of 
services. That means, even non-capital intensive activities are subject to CFC 
taxation if - for example - the services are provided towards the resident shareholder 
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for capital intensive services of the aforementioned types, of income which is largely 
related to the investment of capital, i.e. interest components, amortisation of the 
investment and the risk related to the investment. In principle, this is equally true for 
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problems can arise if a double taxation of income is avoided by a tax credit of the 
former CFC income tax burden against the subsequent dividend income tax burden. 
Here, the problem lies in the fact that an ordinary tax credit system will often not 
provide for sufficient relief from double taxation (this can be true for income taxes and 
withholding taxes).  
 
10.6.9. The treatment of losses in the context of CFC taxation is inconsistent and 
asymmetric and goes much further than is really necessary from an anti-avoidance 
point of view. One of the main aspects is the fact that positive CFC income is treated 
differently from negative CFC income. Often, the positive CFC income is taxed by the 
residence state of the shareholder in the same manner as domestic income derived 
by the shareholder. In contrast, negative CFC income can usually not be offset with 
positive domestic income of the shareholder but can only be carried forward and 
offset with positive CFC income of the same foreign legal entity in subsequent 
periods. It seems the latter is true for all of the European CFC regimes outlined in this 
chapter. In other words, the utilisation of negative CFC income is extremely 
restricted. However, the reverse situation is equally problematic, i.e. if positive CFC 
income is attributed to the resident shareholder who suffers domestic tax losses or 
has a domestic tax loss carry forward available. The examination revealed several 
problematic aspects, especially where the CFC regimes apply specific time limits for 
subsequent dividend payments and the disposal of shares, and time limits for the 
carry forward of negative domestic income and (or) negative CFC income. From my 
perspective, there is not a single European CFC regime which provides for an 
acceptable treatment of negative CFC income. It shows clearly, in my opinion, that 
the Member States which apply CFC rules are obviously willing to give away a 
symmetric concept of  (international) taxation of income in favour of a strict domestic 
anti-deferral policy. The price for such an approach is the violation of basic freedoms 
- which will be outlined later on. An alternative concept which does not provide for an 
unequal treatment of domestic and international income is therefore necessary.    
 
10.6.10. The examination shows that the CFC regimes have to provide for the 
crediting of taxes imposed on the underlying CFC income. However, an appropriate 
relief from double taxation requires that the crediting does not only encompass the 
corporate income tax in the CFC country but also any other income tax levied in third 
countries (e.g. in case of a permanent establishment) and the withholding taxes 
deducted from the respective income elements, e.g. royalty income, interest income. 
The deduction of taxes as a kind of business expenses is not sufficient and leads to a 
partial double taxation of income. The possibility for a crediting of the income taxes 
imposed in the CFC country exists in almost all of the Member States which apply 
such regimes. An exception, for example, is Hungary where no such indirect tax 
credit exists. The crediting of taxes imposed in third countries is provided for by a 
number of countries, e.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
 
10.6.11. Another very important aspect is the fact that CFC regimes most often do 
not sufficiently provide for the multiple application of CFC taxation and similar anti-
avoidance rules, i.e. in situations where comparable legislation is applicable on a 
lower group level. The examination shows various problems which can arise in such 
a situation. One of the main aspects is certainly the question of an appropriate tax 
credit system. In order to solve the double taxation conflicts caused by the current 
taxation of income the regime must provide for a tax credit system which takes into 
   
 
the tainted income will be allocated to the resident shareholder without applying any 
minimum threshold. This gives the impression that the influence of the shareholder is 
in fact secondary, and the main focus is on the current taxation of CFC income as an 
anti-deferral measure in order to avoid any tax base erosion instead of a clear 
limitation of the CFC regimes to majority shareholdings.  
 
10.6.7. The domestic concepts of income attribution range from a deemed dividend 
approach (e.g. in Germany) and a look-through (or “piercing the veil”) approach (e.g. 
in Estonia, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden) to a re-valuation of the 
shares in the CFC (the latter system exists in the Netherlands which, however, does 
not have a CFC regime in the narrower sense). Some Member States have a regime 
which might be seen as a look-through approach, but which is not completely clear in 
this respect (e.g. in Denmark and Spain). However, none of these concepts is fully 
convincing since the attributed income by no means reflects the result based on the 
commercial accounts of the CFC. This is due to the different CFC approaches 
(transactional approach and entity approach) and the fact that the attributable income 
is in most cases calculated pursuant to the domestic rules of the country which 
applies its CFC taxation. In fact, the income attribution according to the transactional 
approach can rather be seen as a system which solely and directly focuses on the 
separate income elements derived by the CFC from the perspective of the state of 
residence of the shareholder but - at the same time - completely ignores the income 
determination of the foreign legal entity. In contrast, the entity approach takes into 
account all income elements (active and passive) or none of the income elements, 
depending upon whether the active or the passive activity prevails. However, even 
the entity approach does not reflect the actual income based on the commercial 
accounts of the CFC but only the income which is based on the income determination 
rules of the state of residence of the shareholder.  
 
10.6.8. The taxation based on the income attribution according to CFC rules and the 
taxation of subsequent dividends and subsequent disposal of shares can lead - at 
least partly - to a double taxation of income. It is therefore necessary for the CFC 
regimes to provide for some sort of relief from double taxation in these cases. This 
can be done by way of an adjustment of the tax base or a tax credit of the income tax 
levied on the former CFC income attribution against the taxes imposed on the 
dividend payments and the capital gains. Interestingly, the relief from double taxation 
caused by a subsequent dividend payment is provided by all of the regimes in one 
way or another (usually by adjustment of the tax base - with the exception of the 
United Kingdom which provides for a tax credit). In contrast thereto, the relief from 
double taxation caused by the disposal of the shares in the CFC is only granted in 
very few countries, namely in Denmark, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. It 
is quite apparent that there is no justification for a different treatment of dividends and 
capital gains since both transactions contain, in principle, the same profit elements 
and both transactions can lead to a double taxation of income. In addition, the test to 
the principles derived from previous chapters shows that - in order to avoid any 
penalty effects for the investor - the relief from double taxation cannot be restricted by 
CFC specific time limits - like in Finland and Germany - which can make the 
elimination of double taxation considerably more difficult or even impossible (e.g. in 
case of tax losses). Moreover, a double taxation of income can be caused by 
withholding taxes levied on the subsequent dividends. In this case, the withholding 
taxes should - retroactively - be credited against the income taxes imposed on the 
attributed CFC income if the actual dividend payment is exempt from taxation. Similar 
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10.7. CFC Legislation and Double Tax Conventions 
 
10.7.1. Up to now only a few tax courts in Europe have dealt with the question of 
compatibility of double tax conventions and CFC legislation. However, with the 
exception of the French Schneider Case, the case law which has been examined did 
not see a conflict between double tax conventions and the application of CFC rules, 
even if the latter rules are not explicitly preserved in the respective conventions. In 
the Schneider Case, the French Supreme Tax Court concluded that the CFC rules 
cannot be applied if the application is not expressly confirmed in the French tax 
treaties. In contrast, the Finnish Supreme Tax Court did not see any conflict in the A 
Oyj Abp Case between the application of the Finnish CFC regime and the Finland-
Belgium tax treaty which does not contain any specific provision in this respect. The 
same is basically true for the decision in the British Bricom Holdings Case where the 
Court of Appeal did not see any restriction for the application of the United Kingdom 
CFC regime to income derived by a legal entity resident in the Netherlands. The 
Swedish Council for Advance Tax Rulings decided in two cases - which dealt with 
captive insurance companies in Luxembourg and Switzerland - that the application of 
the Swedish CFC regime is not in conflict with the respective tax treaties. Also in the 
Swedish cases, the double tax convention did not explicitly deal with the applicability 
of CFC rules.  
 
10.7.2. The position of the OECD is now made clear since the 2003 update of the 
Commentary. Before the 2003 update, the Commentary solely provided the majority 
and minority opinions of the Member countries. Pursuant to the OECD, the CFC rules 
are part of the basic domestic rules set by domestic tax laws for determining which 
facts give rise to tax liabilities. These rules are not addressed in tax treaties and are 
therefore not affected by them. Thus, the OECD does not see, in principle, a conflict 
between tax treaties and domestic CFC legislation. I agree with the position that CFC 
rules do not have to be specifically preserved in a double tax convention. Those rules 
do not have to be treated differently from any other domestic legislation which can be 
of relevance in the relationship between the respective tax treaty countries. It is not 
the CFC, i.e. the foreign company, which is taxed in the residence state of the 
shareholder, but the shareholder is taxed on income derived through the interposition 
of the CFC. Thus, there are two different taxpayers involved and the tax treaty does 
not prevent the taxation of the shareholder in the state of residence on income 
derived through the CFC. In contrast thereto, the CFC itself may only be taxed in the 
residence state of the shareholder in case of a permanent establishment of the CFC 
in the latter state.  
 
10.7.3. Furthermore, the OECD takes the position that CFC rules should only be 
applied to certain passive activities but not to active businesses. As already outlined 
earlier a separation between “active” and “passive” can be quite difficult. In any case, 
the OECD considers “base company activities” to be passive activities. In my opinion, 
this may have the effect that income from business activities is subject to CFC 
taxation.  
 
10.7.4. Thus, the existing CFC rules are in most cases too broad for a separation of 
abusive and non-abusive activities, i.e. CFC rules target both, the abusive and the 
non-abusive relocation of activities to low-tax countries. Therefore, even if the 
general aim of a double tax convention encompasses, inter alia, the combating of 
international tax avoidance and tax evasion, this must not result in an unrestricted 
   
 
account the taxation on a lower group level and which does not strictly focus on a 
particular taxation period. That means, taxes imposed on the underlying income at a 
later point in time on a lower group level cannot be outside of the scope of the tax 
credit system. Otherwise, and this is very often the case, the CFC regime leads to an 
immense over-taxation of income. Moreover, substantial conflicts can arise, inter alia, 
in cases where tax losses are involved, where limitations exist with respect to tax 
losses and time limits for subsequent profit distributions and capital gains, where the 
income is determined pursuant to the domestic tax rules of the country which applies 
the CFC taxation, where the income is taxed on a intermediate level according to the 
credit method, and in case of classification conflicts. Thus, the application of CFC 
rules in a multiple tier structure can create problems which may only partially be 
solved by - for example - an extended ordinary credit system. Other double taxation 
conflicts may only be solved by mutual agreement procedures among the countries 
involved. In other words, the multiple tier structures can considerably increase the 
already existing double taxation conflicts caused by the application of CFC rules. 
Currently, only Finland and Germany provide for a systematic (ordinary) crediting of 
the taxes imposed according to a lower tier CFC taxation. Other regimes either 
ignore these types of double taxation, rely on mutual agreement procedures (like in 
France), or take the additional (higher) taxation into account for the question of a 
motive exemption (like in the United Kingdom). However, the problem is that even the 
two countries which have a system in place for dealing with such a multiple CFC 
taxation do not provide for more than the simple ordinary tax crediting. That means 
Finland and Germany do not really solve the other problems which may come in a 
multiple tier structure. 
 
10.6.12. Mutual agreement procedures as well as any other solutions which are not 
based on a clear legislative and systematic concept are not, in my opinion, the 
appropriate way of solving the problem of double taxation of income in the context of 
CFC taxation. As already outlined above, what is required is an alternative concept to 
CFC rules which provides for a consistent taxation of domestic and foreign income. In 
my opinion, this can be achieved by a system which accepts the taxation of income in 
the state in which it is produced - and which therefore, in general, follows the 
principle of capital import neutrality - but without ignoring the necessity of an anti-
deferral taxation for part of the income under certain circumstances.  
 
10.6.13. An alternative concept should follow the principles outlined above by 
providing a systematic and symmetrical system of current taxation, i.e. a system 
which is safeguarding competitiveness without creating any penalty effects for an 
investor. In essence, this would result in a deviation from the typical CFC regime 
towards a regime which limits the current taxation of income to the basic interest 
component and which therefore provides for a horizontal and vertical separation of 
income (instead of a merely horizontal separation of income). In any event, the 
economic principles and equity aspects clearly support, in my opinion, such a limited 
taxation according to the principle of capital export neutrality. However, neither a 
CFC regime nor an alternative approach should lead to an over-taxation of income 
and, therefore, have to provide for a consistent relief from any sort of double taxation 
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component and which therefore provides for a horizontal and vertical separation of 
income (instead of a merely horizontal separation of income). In any event, the 
economic principles and equity aspects clearly support, in my opinion, such a limited 
taxation according to the principle of capital export neutrality. However, neither a 
CFC regime nor an alternative approach should lead to an over-taxation of income 
and, therefore, have to provide for a consistent relief from any sort of double taxation 







   
 
which may be distributed to the shareholder is therefore typically different from 
(and unconnected to) the attributed CFC income. 
 
o The CFC rules focus on certain types of income and ignore the actual income 
based on the commercial accounts of the foreign entity. This is particularly true 
for the transactional approach.  
 
o Although the likelihood that the CFC rules cover the same types of income as 
the foreign legal entity is higher in case of an entity approach, it is by no 
means clear that this is the case for a period of more than one year. The 
(partial) change of activities can lead to the result that the income is subject to 
CFC taxation in one year but not in another. 
 
o The attribution of CFC income has no influence on the income based on the 
commercial accounts of the foreign company and it has no influence on the 
net asset value (in contrast to open or hidden distributions of profit). The 
company is therefore in a position to distribute all of the profits derived from its 
activities to the shareholder and this is - and must be - totally unconnected to a 
CFC income attribution.  
 
o The actual profit distribution of the company leads to income from shares 
(dividend income) and reflects the added value of the investment. It is by no 
means comparable to the CFC income attribution - even though they are 
economically related to the same income.  
 
o It follows from the features and the mechanism of CFC rules that the concept 
of CFC income attribution is different to the concept of dividend income. The 
focus on the residence state of the foreign entity and the fact that the term 
dividend means “a distribution of profits to the shareholders” requires - in my 
opinion - a nexus between the income based on the commercial accounts of 
the company and the (open or hidden) distributions to the shareholder. It is the 
(net) profit of the company which is made available to the shareholder by way 
of profit distribution. In contrast, the CFC rules are very specific and only 
attribute the income in certain limited and clearly defined situations. This can 
have the effect that the CFC taxation is not applicable during the entire period 
of foreign investment but only in years where certain requirements are fulfilled. 
The application typically requires that (i) a certain participation threshold is 
exceeded, (ii) a certain low-taxation threshold is not exceeded, and (iii) certain 
income elements are derived by the foreign entity (transactional approach) or 
a certain mixture of income and / or certain circumstances are existent (entity 
approach).  
 
10.7.8. The question arises whether the CFC income can still be qualified as 
“business profits” in case the attributable income also encompasses elements of 
interest income, royalty income or dividend income. In my opinion, the following 
separation has to be made:  
 
o If, from the perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules, the income 
derived by the shareholder through the CFC is to be qualified, in total, as 
“business profits” - despite the fact that also other elements like interest 
income, royalty income, and dividend income are included - there is no 
   
 
application of CFC rules outside the limitations provided by a double tax convention. 
That means, if the residence state of the shareholder stipulates, in the context of the 
domestic CFC legislation, a link to the income which is derived by the shareholder 
through a CFC interposed in the other contracting state, it is required to examine the 
latter income and to determine the type of income in the light of the respective tax 
treaty - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder. Hence, if the 
income classification leads to the outcome that the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right to tax the income of the shareholder under the respective 
tax treaty, there is, in principle, no restriction for the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation. In contrast thereto, if the income classification leads to the outcome that 
the state of residence of the shareholder does not have the right to tax the income of 
the shareholder under the respective tax treaty, the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation will result in a tax treaty override.   
 
10.7.5. The CFC income has to be categorised in the context of the tax treaty. In my 
opinion, it is the actual activity carried on by the CFC which has to be examined and 
which should be the basis for the income qualification of the residence state of the 
shareholder (the state which applies the CFC legislation). Since the OECD-MTC 
does not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term “business profits”, the 
domestic definition of the state which applies its CFC rules has to be referred to. If it 
turns out that the income derived from these activities (e.g. service activities) is to be 
qualified - from the perspective of the state which applies its CFC rules - as “business 
profits,” the income which is allocable to the residence country of the shareholder 
may be taxed in the latter country pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. Thus, it 
is important to note that even though the activity carried on by the CFC is to be 
examined, the qualification is to be made, in my opinion, from the perspective of the 
state which applies the CFC rules. 
 
10.7.6. The residence state of the CFC, of course, has to make its own qualification 
of the income derived by the CFC (in contrast to the aforementioned qualification of 
the income derived by the shareholder through the interposition of the CFC). The 
approach of the residence state of the CFC, however, is of no relevance, in my 
opinion, for the qualification of income under the CFC regime in the state of the 
shareholder. Thus, there are two different states involved which examine the income 
of two different taxpayers. The qualification of the respective income as “business 
profits” does therefore not result in a conflict under the respective tax treaty. 
 
10.7.7. It is often suggested that the CFC income is to be qualified - as a whole and 
in general - as dividend income in the context of the OECD-MTC. One of the main 
arguments for the qualification as dividend income is the inseparable link between 
the holding of shares in the foreign legal entity and the CFC income attribution. 
Furthermore, the definition of the term “dividends” in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC 
requires an autonomous examination in the context of the tax treaty. Dividends 
means “income from shares” and it seems that the definition also encompasses 
hidden distributions of profit without any actual outflow of financial means to the 
shareholder. In my opinion, those arguments do not necessarily require a 
qualification as dividends (or a deemed dividend) and there are a number of aspects 
which do not support such a qualification: 
 
o In nearly all countries which apply such legislation, the CFC income is 
determined according to domestic rules. The income of the foreign legal entity 
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which may be distributed to the shareholder is therefore typically different from 
(and unconnected to) the attributed CFC income. 
 
o The CFC rules focus on certain types of income and ignore the actual income 
based on the commercial accounts of the foreign entity. This is particularly true 
for the transactional approach.  
 
o Although the likelihood that the CFC rules cover the same types of income as 
the foreign legal entity is higher in case of an entity approach, it is by no 
means clear that this is the case for a period of more than one year. The 
(partial) change of activities can lead to the result that the income is subject to 
CFC taxation in one year but not in another. 
 
o The attribution of CFC income has no influence on the income based on the 
commercial accounts of the foreign company and it has no influence on the 
net asset value (in contrast to open or hidden distributions of profit). The 
company is therefore in a position to distribute all of the profits derived from its 
activities to the shareholder and this is - and must be - totally unconnected to a 
CFC income attribution.  
 
o The actual profit distribution of the company leads to income from shares 
(dividend income) and reflects the added value of the investment. It is by no 
means comparable to the CFC income attribution - even though they are 
economically related to the same income.  
 
o It follows from the features and the mechanism of CFC rules that the concept 
of CFC income attribution is different to the concept of dividend income. The 
focus on the residence state of the foreign entity and the fact that the term 
dividend means “a distribution of profits to the shareholders” requires - in my 
opinion - a nexus between the income based on the commercial accounts of 
the company and the (open or hidden) distributions to the shareholder. It is the 
(net) profit of the company which is made available to the shareholder by way 
of profit distribution. In contrast, the CFC rules are very specific and only 
attribute the income in certain limited and clearly defined situations. This can 
have the effect that the CFC taxation is not applicable during the entire period 
of foreign investment but only in years where certain requirements are fulfilled. 
The application typically requires that (i) a certain participation threshold is 
exceeded, (ii) a certain low-taxation threshold is not exceeded, and (iii) certain 
income elements are derived by the foreign entity (transactional approach) or 
a certain mixture of income and / or certain circumstances are existent (entity 
approach).  
 
10.7.8. The question arises whether the CFC income can still be qualified as 
“business profits” in case the attributable income also encompasses elements of 
interest income, royalty income or dividend income. In my opinion, the following 
separation has to be made:  
 
o If, from the perspective of the state which applies the CFC rules, the income 
derived by the shareholder through the CFC is to be qualified, in total, as 
“business profits” - despite the fact that also other elements like interest 
income, royalty income, and dividend income are included - there is no 
   
 
application of CFC rules outside the limitations provided by a double tax convention. 
That means, if the residence state of the shareholder stipulates, in the context of the 
domestic CFC legislation, a link to the income which is derived by the shareholder 
through a CFC interposed in the other contracting state, it is required to examine the 
latter income and to determine the type of income in the light of the respective tax 
treaty - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder. Hence, if the 
income classification leads to the outcome that the state of residence of the 
shareholder has the right to tax the income of the shareholder under the respective 
tax treaty, there is, in principle, no restriction for the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation. In contrast thereto, if the income classification leads to the outcome that 
the state of residence of the shareholder does not have the right to tax the income of 
the shareholder under the respective tax treaty, the application of the domestic CFC 
legislation will result in a tax treaty override.   
 
10.7.5. The CFC income has to be categorised in the context of the tax treaty. In my 
opinion, it is the actual activity carried on by the CFC which has to be examined and 
which should be the basis for the income qualification of the residence state of the 
shareholder (the state which applies the CFC legislation). Since the OECD-MTC 
does not provide for an exhaustive definition of the term “business profits”, the 
domestic definition of the state which applies its CFC rules has to be referred to. If it 
turns out that the income derived from these activities (e.g. service activities) is to be 
qualified - from the perspective of the state which applies its CFC rules - as “business 
profits,” the income which is allocable to the residence country of the shareholder 
may be taxed in the latter country pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the OECD-MTC. Thus, it 
is important to note that even though the activity carried on by the CFC is to be 
examined, the qualification is to be made, in my opinion, from the perspective of the 
state which applies the CFC rules. 
 
10.7.6. The residence state of the CFC, of course, has to make its own qualification 
of the income derived by the CFC (in contrast to the aforementioned qualification of 
the income derived by the shareholder through the interposition of the CFC). The 
approach of the residence state of the CFC, however, is of no relevance, in my 
opinion, for the qualification of income under the CFC regime in the state of the 
shareholder. Thus, there are two different states involved which examine the income 
of two different taxpayers. The qualification of the respective income as “business 
profits” does therefore not result in a conflict under the respective tax treaty. 
 
10.7.7. It is often suggested that the CFC income is to be qualified - as a whole and 
in general - as dividend income in the context of the OECD-MTC. One of the main 
arguments for the qualification as dividend income is the inseparable link between 
the holding of shares in the foreign legal entity and the CFC income attribution. 
Furthermore, the definition of the term “dividends” in Article 10 (3) of the OECD-MTC 
requires an autonomous examination in the context of the tax treaty. Dividends 
means “income from shares” and it seems that the definition also encompasses 
hidden distributions of profit without any actual outflow of financial means to the 
shareholder. In my opinion, those arguments do not necessarily require a 
qualification as dividends (or a deemed dividend) and there are a number of aspects 
which do not support such a qualification: 
 
o In nearly all countries which apply such legislation, the CFC income is 
determined according to domestic rules. The income of the foreign legal entity 
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income and dividend income on the one hand and income from immovable 
property on the other: the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC requires a 
source based taxation of the rental income and is by no means limited to a 
withholding taxation of the gross amount of income. The taxation is therefore 
based on a net concept. However, this should not lead to the outcome that the 
income from immovable property is treated differently from the other types of 
income outlined above. The CFC rules do not tax the direct owner of the 
immovable property but the (direct or indirect) shareholder in the company 
which carries on the rental activities. The classification of income is therefore 
to be made separately for two different persons by two different states. Hence, 
Article 6 of the OECD-MTC does not directly restrict the taxing rights of the 
state of the shareholder. For this reason, a limitation of taxing rights which 
follows the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC could only be made by 
analogy. In my opinion, the only justification for such an analogous application 
might be derived from the concept of a strict source-based taxation of the net 
income from immovable property, i.e. if both contracting states follow a strict 
source-based taxation of rental income - not only in relation to each other but 
also in relation to third states - and the double taxation is avoided solely by the 
application of the exemption method. In such a situation, it is not only 
questionable whether a CFC taxation of rental income is actually required from 
an anti-avoidance perspective, but one might also argue that the application of 
those rules is in contradiction to the purpose and the idea of the respective tax 
treaty. However, the OECD-MTC does not provide for an analogous 
application of Article 6 and I do not see, therefore, any legal basis for such an 
approach. That means, even the classification of the attributed income as 
rental income - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder - 
would not restrict the right to tax the attributed income. 
 
10.7.9. The principles are equally relevant for the taxation of capital gains under a 
CFC regime: if the activity is to be qualified as business activity, the capital gains are 
part of the allocable business income. In all other cases, the qualification is to be 
made with reference to the domestic legislation of the country which invokes the 
respective double tax convention. The wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 13 (5) 
of the OECD-MTC is no obstacle for the taxation of CFC income, because there are 
two different taxpayers involved.  
 
10.7.10. Based on the argumentation above, there is not much room for the 
application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC. However, even if one takes the position 
that the CFC income attribution falls within the scope of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC, 
the outcome would not be different. The taxing rights related to other income are 
allocable to the residence state of the shareholder which applies its CFC taxation.  
 
10.7.11. In my opinion, the qualification of income should not be dependent upon the 
respective CFC system (entity approach or transactional approach). The domestic 
methodology of creating a nexus to the income of the CFC and the limitation to 
certain types of income cannot be of any influence for the qualification of income 
under the respective tax treaty. If the income has to be qualified pursuant to the 
actual activity carried out in the CFC country (e.g. business activity), any limitation of 
the income attribution to a certain part of the net income, e.g. interest income under a 
transactional system, should not lead to a qualification of the attributable income as 
interest income instead of business income. Otherwise, it would be the domestic 
   
 
necessity for any subdivision of the business profits. In other words, it is 
decisive whether the elements included in the income can result in a different 
qualification of the respective activity and the respective income. If this is not 
the case, the whole income is to be qualified as business income. Here, the 
different elements become an integral part of the business activity and the 
business income. It can also be described, in my opinion, as an amalgamation 
of elements which might be, on a “stand-alone basis”, separate types of 
income. The outcome of the qualification should not be dependent upon 
whether the resident shareholder in the CFC is an individual or a legal entity. 
The qualification should solely be made on the basis of the activity of the CFC 
and is therefore unrelated to the (legal) status of the resident shareholder. The 
domestic differentiation in the state of residence of the shareholder between 
income derived by individuals and income derived by legal entities has no 
influence on the qualification, because it is the activity of the CFC itself which 
should be relevant in this respect.   
 
o The residence state of the CFC has to make its own qualification of the 
income derived by the CFC. Here, the residence state of the CFC has to take 
into account the different types of income for the allocation of taxing rights 
under the double tax conventions concluded by the latter state (e.g. with 
respect to withholding taxes) - even though the different income elements may 
finally also become an integral part of the business income of the CFC from 
the perspective of the residence state of the CFC (similar to the approach 
which was outlined above with respect to the residence state of the 
shareholder). 
 
o If the activity carried on by the CFC is solely limited to a passive activity, such 
as the deriving of interest income (or dividend / royalty income), and the 
activity itself does not contain any substantial service element (or any other 
substantial element of a business activity), the reference to the domestic law 
of the residence state of the shareholder (the state which applies the CFC 
rules) might lead to the outcome that the income is to be determined as 
interest income (or dividend / royalty income) and not as business income. 
The definition of “interest” included in Article 11 (3) of the OECD-MTC is of no 
importance in this respect. The latter is only relevant in the context of Article 
11 of the OECD-MTC for the allocation of taxing rights related to the gross 
amount of interest payment (withholding taxation) between the country of 
source and the country of residence of the CFC (and not the shareholder). 
Based on the domestic definition of the residence state of the shareholder, the 
CFC income may be qualified as interest income (dividend / royalty income) 
for tax treaty purposes. This would also lead to a taxation of the CFC income 
in the residence state of the shareholder. The different qualification does not 
restrict the right to tax the income in the country of the shareholder which 
applies its CFC taxation. This is not only true for interest income but also for 
dividend income and royalty income. 
 
o The income from immovable property is not equally flexible and subject to 
disposal of the shareholder, and therefore less often subject to CFC taxation 
compared to the aforementioned types of passive income, but this does not 
mean that this type of income is completely outside of the scope of CFC 
taxation. However, there is a major difference between interest income, royalty 
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income and dividend income on the one hand and income from immovable 
property on the other: the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC requires a 
source based taxation of the rental income and is by no means limited to a 
withholding taxation of the gross amount of income. The taxation is therefore 
based on a net concept. However, this should not lead to the outcome that the 
income from immovable property is treated differently from the other types of 
income outlined above. The CFC rules do not tax the direct owner of the 
immovable property but the (direct or indirect) shareholder in the company 
which carries on the rental activities. The classification of income is therefore 
to be made separately for two different persons by two different states. Hence, 
Article 6 of the OECD-MTC does not directly restrict the taxing rights of the 
state of the shareholder. For this reason, a limitation of taxing rights which 
follows the concept of Article 6 of the OECD-MTC could only be made by 
analogy. In my opinion, the only justification for such an analogous application 
might be derived from the concept of a strict source-based taxation of the net 
income from immovable property, i.e. if both contracting states follow a strict 
source-based taxation of rental income - not only in relation to each other but 
also in relation to third states - and the double taxation is avoided solely by the 
application of the exemption method. In such a situation, it is not only 
questionable whether a CFC taxation of rental income is actually required from 
an anti-avoidance perspective, but one might also argue that the application of 
those rules is in contradiction to the purpose and the idea of the respective tax 
treaty. However, the OECD-MTC does not provide for an analogous 
application of Article 6 and I do not see, therefore, any legal basis for such an 
approach. That means, even the classification of the attributed income as 
rental income - from the perspective of the residence state of the shareholder - 
would not restrict the right to tax the attributed income. 
 
10.7.9. The principles are equally relevant for the taxation of capital gains under a 
CFC regime: if the activity is to be qualified as business activity, the capital gains are 
part of the allocable business income. In all other cases, the qualification is to be 
made with reference to the domestic legislation of the country which invokes the 
respective double tax convention. The wording “shall be taxable only” in Article 13 (5) 
of the OECD-MTC is no obstacle for the taxation of CFC income, because there are 
two different taxpayers involved.  
 
10.7.10. Based on the argumentation above, there is not much room for the 
application of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC. However, even if one takes the position 
that the CFC income attribution falls within the scope of Article 21 of the OECD-MTC, 
the outcome would not be different. The taxing rights related to other income are 
allocable to the residence state of the shareholder which applies its CFC taxation.  
 
10.7.11. In my opinion, the qualification of income should not be dependent upon the 
respective CFC system (entity approach or transactional approach). The domestic 
methodology of creating a nexus to the income of the CFC and the limitation to 
certain types of income cannot be of any influence for the qualification of income 
under the respective tax treaty. If the income has to be qualified pursuant to the 
actual activity carried out in the CFC country (e.g. business activity), any limitation of 
the income attribution to a certain part of the net income, e.g. interest income under a 
transactional system, should not lead to a qualification of the attributable income as 
interest income instead of business income. Otherwise, it would be the domestic 
   
 
necessity for any subdivision of the business profits. In other words, it is 
decisive whether the elements included in the income can result in a different 
qualification of the respective activity and the respective income. If this is not 
the case, the whole income is to be qualified as business income. Here, the 
different elements become an integral part of the business activity and the 
business income. It can also be described, in my opinion, as an amalgamation 
of elements which might be, on a “stand-alone basis”, separate types of 
income. The outcome of the qualification should not be dependent upon 
whether the resident shareholder in the CFC is an individual or a legal entity. 
The qualification should solely be made on the basis of the activity of the CFC 
and is therefore unrelated to the (legal) status of the resident shareholder. The 
domestic differentiation in the state of residence of the shareholder between 
income derived by individuals and income derived by legal entities has no 
influence on the qualification, because it is the activity of the CFC itself which 
should be relevant in this respect.   
 
o The residence state of the CFC has to make its own qualification of the 
income derived by the CFC. Here, the residence state of the CFC has to take 
into account the different types of income for the allocation of taxing rights 
under the double tax conventions concluded by the latter state (e.g. with 
respect to withholding taxes) - even though the different income elements may 
finally also become an integral part of the business income of the CFC from 
the perspective of the residence state of the CFC (similar to the approach 
which was outlined above with respect to the residence state of the 
shareholder). 
 
o If the activity carried on by the CFC is solely limited to a passive activity, such 
as the deriving of interest income (or dividend / royalty income), and the 
activity itself does not contain any substantial service element (or any other 
substantial element of a business activity), the reference to the domestic law 
of the residence state of the shareholder (the state which applies the CFC 
rules) might lead to the outcome that the income is to be determined as 
interest income (or dividend / royalty income) and not as business income. 
The definition of “interest” included in Article 11 (3) of the OECD-MTC is of no 
importance in this respect. The latter is only relevant in the context of Article 
11 of the OECD-MTC for the allocation of taxing rights related to the gross 
amount of interest payment (withholding taxation) between the country of 
source and the country of residence of the CFC (and not the shareholder). 
Based on the domestic definition of the residence state of the shareholder, the 
CFC income may be qualified as interest income (dividend / royalty income) 
for tax treaty purposes. This would also lead to a taxation of the CFC income 
in the residence state of the shareholder. The different qualification does not 
restrict the right to tax the income in the country of the shareholder which 
applies its CFC taxation. This is not only true for interest income but also for 
dividend income and royalty income. 
 
o The income from immovable property is not equally flexible and subject to 
disposal of the shareholder, and therefore less often subject to CFC taxation 
compared to the aforementioned types of passive income, but this does not 
mean that this type of income is completely outside of the scope of CFC 
taxation. However, there is a major difference between interest income, royalty 
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true in cases where the services of the CFC are directed towards the shareholder in 
the CFC, but also in cases where the services are provided to a recipient in another 
state who does not have any investment in the CFC. The freedom to provide services 
is therefore of no particular relevance in the context of this study.  
 
10.8.5. The free movement of capital plays a less important role in the case law of 
the ECJ than it could be expected from its very broad scope of application. The 
reason is that - based on the case law of the ECJ - there are important situations 
where the freedom of establishment prevails over the free movement of capital. The 
following differentiation can be made: 
 
 
A. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
requires definite influence over       the following basic 
the decisions of the CFC        freedoms are affected:  
       
 
a.) CFC in another Member State      Article 49 TFEU 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state        --- 
 
 
B. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
does not require definite influence 
over the decisions of the CFC (e.g.      the following basic 
FIF type legislation)         freedoms are affected: 
 
 
a.) CFC in another Member State 
 
aa.) definite influence (actually)        Article 49 TFEU      
 
ab.) no definite influence (actually)       Article 63 TFEU 
 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state 
 
ba.) definite influence (actually)          Article 63 TFEU (uncertain)
  
bb.) no definite influence (actually)        Article 63 TFEU       
 
 
10.8.6. The question whether the CFC legislation can result in a restriction on the 
exercising of the aforementioned basic freedoms can be answered in the affirmative. 
In fact, there are a number of possible restrictions which can be caused by the 
application of CFC rules and which are dependent on the situation of the shareholder 
who is subject to CFC taxation. Most of the disadvantages were already identified in 
the case law of the ECJ as restrictions on one or more of the basic freedoms. The 
restrictions may range from liquidity and administrative disadvantages to a massive 
double taxation of income. 
 
   
 
structure of the CFC legislation which is solely decisive for the qualification of the 
attributed CFC income by the mere fact that it refers to certain income components 
which are indirectly included in the net income.  
 
10.7.12. In principle, the general application of CFC rules to all types of income 
instead of a limitation to certain types of income and / or certain circumstances might 
lead to a circumvention of tax treaties. At least, this might be true in cases where the 
respective tax treaty otherwise provides for the exemption of dividend income and the 
income from capital gains on the disposal of shares, and where the application of the 
CFC regime results in a complete and unrestricted taxation of the whole CFC 
income. On the other hand, it should not be overlooked that in case of a credit 
country the main consequence is the immediate taxation of CFC income and the 
avoidance of tax deferral. The business profits derived by the foreign legal entity are 
still taxable in the source country and as long as the country which applies the CFC 
rules provides for a crediting of the foreign income tax an international economic 
double taxation would be avoided. 
 
10.7.13. The conclusions are equally relevant for an alternative regime which is 
based on the economic and equity principles described earlier, i.e. a regime which 
focuses on the taxation of the basic interest component. The latter approach does 
not result in a juridical double taxation - just like the regular CFC regimes. In other 
words, the basic interest approach would be in line with double tax conventions if the 
scope of such conventions is not explicitly extended to international economic double 
taxation. 
 
10.8. CFC Legislation and European Union Law 
 
10.8.1. The primary EU law has a significant influence on the CFC regimes of the 
Member States. The investment in companies which trigger the application of CFC 
rules may be in the scope of the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital. Theoretically, the activities of the CFC might also be - 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case - in the scope of the freedom 
to provide services.  
 
10.8.2. In order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment the CFC 
must pursue a genuine economic activity through a fixed establishment in another 
Member State for an indefinite period. The mere holding of assets cannot be 
considered an economic activity, but a certain (minimum) economic output is required 
in the host Member State. In principle, the mobile activities which were described in 
previous chapters are also covered by the freedom of establishment as long as the 
aforementioned requirements are fulfilled. In essence, the investment in a CFC is not 
to be seen differently from any other investment in a foreign company. 
 
10.8.3. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the first case dealing with CFC legislation, 
the ECJ made it clear - based on settled case law - that an activity cannot be 
considered a wholly artificial arrangement if the CFC is genuinely established in the 
host Member State and has the premises, staff and equipment necessary to carry out 
the services.  
 
10.8.4. The examination shows that the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital prevail over the freedom to provide services. This is not only 
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true in cases where the services of the CFC are directed towards the shareholder in 
the CFC, but also in cases where the services are provided to a recipient in another 
state who does not have any investment in the CFC. The freedom to provide services 
is therefore of no particular relevance in the context of this study.  
 
10.8.5. The free movement of capital plays a less important role in the case law of 
the ECJ than it could be expected from its very broad scope of application. The 
reason is that - based on the case law of the ECJ - there are important situations 
where the freedom of establishment prevails over the free movement of capital. The 
following differentiation can be made: 
 
 
A. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
requires definite influence over       the following basic 
the decisions of the CFC        freedoms are affected:  
       
 
a.) CFC in another Member State      Article 49 TFEU 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state        --- 
 
 
B. (Part of) CFC legislation which 
does not require definite influence 
over the decisions of the CFC (e.g.      the following basic 
FIF type legislation)         freedoms are affected: 
 
 
a.) CFC in another Member State 
 
aa.) definite influence (actually)        Article 49 TFEU      
 
ab.) no definite influence (actually)       Article 63 TFEU 
 
 
b.) CFC in a non-member state 
 
ba.) definite influence (actually)          Article 63 TFEU (uncertain)
  
bb.) no definite influence (actually)        Article 63 TFEU       
 
 
10.8.6. The question whether the CFC legislation can result in a restriction on the 
exercising of the aforementioned basic freedoms can be answered in the affirmative. 
In fact, there are a number of possible restrictions which can be caused by the 
application of CFC rules and which are dependent on the situation of the shareholder 
who is subject to CFC taxation. Most of the disadvantages were already identified in 
the case law of the ECJ as restrictions on one or more of the basic freedoms. The 
restrictions may range from liquidity and administrative disadvantages to a massive 
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structure of the CFC legislation which is solely decisive for the qualification of the 
attributed CFC income by the mere fact that it refers to certain income components 
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focuses on the taxation of the basic interest component. The latter approach does 
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scope of such conventions is not explicitly extended to international economic double 
taxation. 
 
10.8. CFC Legislation and European Union Law 
 
10.8.1. The primary EU law has a significant influence on the CFC regimes of the 
Member States. The investment in companies which trigger the application of CFC 
rules may be in the scope of the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital. Theoretically, the activities of the CFC might also be - 
depending on the facts and circumstances of the case - in the scope of the freedom 
to provide services.  
 
10.8.2. In order to come within the scope of the freedom of establishment the CFC 
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Member State for an indefinite period. The mere holding of assets cannot be 
considered an economic activity, but a certain (minimum) economic output is required 
in the host Member State. In principle, the mobile activities which were described in 
previous chapters are also covered by the freedom of establishment as long as the 
aforementioned requirements are fulfilled. In essence, the investment in a CFC is not 
to be seen differently from any other investment in a foreign company. 
 
10.8.3. In the Cadbury Schweppes case, the first case dealing with CFC legislation, 
the ECJ made it clear - based on settled case law - that an activity cannot be 
considered a wholly artificial arrangement if the CFC is genuinely established in the 
host Member State and has the premises, staff and equipment necessary to carry out 
the services.  
 
10.8.4. The examination shows that the freedom of establishment and / or the free 
movement of capital prevail over the freedom to provide services. This is not only 
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this reason, the structure can be considered abusive from a VAT perspective despite 
the fact that economic objectives exist. In contrast thereto, if a CFC is genuinely 
established in another state, it does not play a role whether or not the saving of 
(income) taxes was the principal aim of the relocation. With respect to the Oy AA 
decision - a case dealing with a provision of the Finnish corporate income tax system 
- I have made it clear that, in my opinion, the fact that the ECJ accepted a system 
which was not specifically designed to target wholly artificial arrangements is only 
due to the fact that the justification was (also) based on the protection of a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. From my 
perspective, it was completely misleading to put forward the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance in a situation where another justification requires a much broader scope - 
and which may therefore also require an acceptance in case of genuine economic 
activities.      
 
10.8.11. The requirement of giving the taxpayer the possibility of submitting evidence 
that the CFC carries out a genuine economic activity should be equally relevant for 
investments in non-member states. However, based on the case law of the ECJ, the 
Member States may require that a legal basis exists for information exchange 
between the competent tax authorities of the respective Member State and the non-
member state where the investment was made, e.g. based on a double tax 
convention. Such an additional requirement is needed because of the fact that the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC is not applicable in case of non-member states. An 
information exchange clause ensures, therefore, that the information provided by the 
taxpayer can be verified. Overall, there are some cases dealing with the latter aspect 
in relation to non-member states and it is obvious that the existence or non-existence 
of an information exchange clause may be decisive for the question whether a 
restriction can be justified or not. However, it is my understanding that the existence 
of an information exchange clause on a bilateral basis is to be taken into account as 
well and - depending on the situation - may have the same relevance for the ECJ as 
the Council Directive 77/799/EEC.   
 
10.8.12. The CFC regimes can be directly and indirectly influenced by secondary EU 
law. A direct influence exists, in my opinion, in case of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive. The amended version of the latter Directive not only covers profit 
distributions but also the current taxation of income derived through a hybrid entity. In 
my opinion, it would be neither logical nor consistent to consider the CFC income 
attribution to be outside of the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive determines that either the exemption method or the credit 
method has to be applied for the elimination of double taxation. In case of a hybrid 
entity, the subsequent profit distribution - which was already subject to a current 
taxation of income - should be exempt from domestic taxation. In general, the latter 
mechanisms are already offered by almost all CFC regimes and I do not expect 
substantial changes which are based on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. However, 
the Directive becomes an additional limitation for changing the structure of CFC 
regimes. 
 
10.8.13. An indirect influence of secondary EU law exists in case of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive. The examination shows that the abolition of a limited source-based 
taxation (withholding taxation) may clearly support the structures which are typically 
in the focus of CFC regimes. The non-existence of a withholding tax credit (due to the 
fact that there is no withholding tax) on the level of an intermediate finance company 
   
 
10.8.7. In order to identify a restriction which is caused by the application of CFC 
rules, it is important to determine the appropriate pair of comparison. The 
examination shows that the pair of comparison has to be limited to a mere vertical 
comparison and cannot be extended to a horizontal comparison.   
 
10.8.8. The examination further shows that the theoretical acceptance of a horizontal 
comparison would not result in an obligation for the Member State of primary 
establishment to provide for a “most-favoured nation” treatment. Firstly, up to now the 
most favoured nation treatment has not been accepted by the ECJ and, secondly, 
the CFC rules are solely national legislation - and not tax treaty provisions - which do 
not provide any basis, in my opinion, for such a far-reaching obligation.  
 
10.8.9. A number of possible arguments for the justification of a restriction on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms can come up in a CFC case. The following 
arguments were identified and examined in this context:  
 
o the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
o the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base; 
 
o the lower taxation in the CFC country, 
 
o the principle of territoriality; 
 
o the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States; 
 
o the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
o the aim of preventing tax avoidance;  
 
o the principle of world-wide taxation. 
 
10.8.10. The examination shows that the above arguments cannot be accepted as a 
valid justification in a CFC case. Given the fact that the CFC regimes are usually 
structured as anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation, the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance is certainly one of the most obvious arguments. However, it is clear from 
the Cadbury Schweppes case and previous decisions that such legislation must 
focus on wholly artificial arrangements. Clearly, this is not the case for the CFC 
regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 and which have not been amended after - 
and according to - the Cadbury Schweppes decision. These CFC regimes are 
applicable in an undifferentiated manner to different types of low-taxed income and 
are actually intended to be applicable to income derived from genuine economic 
activities. For this reason, the aforementioned CFC concepts will not be proportional 
as long as they do not provide the shareholder with the possibility of submitting 
evidence that the activity carried out in the other state is a genuine economic activity 
- and to be exempt from CFC taxation in such a situation. From my perspective, the 
outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case is neither mitigated through the VAT case 
law of the ECJ nor the subsequent Oy AA decision. In VAT cases, the national court 
has to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the tax motive is 
essential compared to the non-tax explanations (such as economic objectives). For 
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this reason, the structure can be considered abusive from a VAT perspective despite 
the fact that economic objectives exist. In contrast thereto, if a CFC is genuinely 
established in another state, it does not play a role whether or not the saving of 
(income) taxes was the principal aim of the relocation. With respect to the Oy AA 
decision - a case dealing with a provision of the Finnish corporate income tax system 
- I have made it clear that, in my opinion, the fact that the ECJ accepted a system 
which was not specifically designed to target wholly artificial arrangements is only 
due to the fact that the justification was (also) based on the protection of a balanced 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States. From my 
perspective, it was completely misleading to put forward the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance in a situation where another justification requires a much broader scope - 
and which may therefore also require an acceptance in case of genuine economic 
activities.      
 
10.8.11. The requirement of giving the taxpayer the possibility of submitting evidence 
that the CFC carries out a genuine economic activity should be equally relevant for 
investments in non-member states. However, based on the case law of the ECJ, the 
Member States may require that a legal basis exists for information exchange 
between the competent tax authorities of the respective Member State and the non-
member state where the investment was made, e.g. based on a double tax 
convention. Such an additional requirement is needed because of the fact that the 
Council Directive 77/799/EEC is not applicable in case of non-member states. An 
information exchange clause ensures, therefore, that the information provided by the 
taxpayer can be verified. Overall, there are some cases dealing with the latter aspect 
in relation to non-member states and it is obvious that the existence or non-existence 
of an information exchange clause may be decisive for the question whether a 
restriction can be justified or not. However, it is my understanding that the existence 
of an information exchange clause on a bilateral basis is to be taken into account as 
well and - depending on the situation - may have the same relevance for the ECJ as 
the Council Directive 77/799/EEC.   
 
10.8.12. The CFC regimes can be directly and indirectly influenced by secondary EU 
law. A direct influence exists, in my opinion, in case of the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive. The amended version of the latter Directive not only covers profit 
distributions but also the current taxation of income derived through a hybrid entity. In 
my opinion, it would be neither logical nor consistent to consider the CFC income 
attribution to be outside of the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive determines that either the exemption method or the credit 
method has to be applied for the elimination of double taxation. In case of a hybrid 
entity, the subsequent profit distribution - which was already subject to a current 
taxation of income - should be exempt from domestic taxation. In general, the latter 
mechanisms are already offered by almost all CFC regimes and I do not expect 
substantial changes which are based on the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. However, 
the Directive becomes an additional limitation for changing the structure of CFC 
regimes. 
 
10.8.13. An indirect influence of secondary EU law exists in case of the Interest and 
Royalty Directive. The examination shows that the abolition of a limited source-based 
taxation (withholding taxation) may clearly support the structures which are typically 
in the focus of CFC regimes. The non-existence of a withholding tax credit (due to the 
fact that there is no withholding tax) on the level of an intermediate finance company 
   
 
10.8.7. In order to identify a restriction which is caused by the application of CFC 
rules, it is important to determine the appropriate pair of comparison. The 
examination shows that the pair of comparison has to be limited to a mere vertical 
comparison and cannot be extended to a horizontal comparison.   
 
10.8.8. The examination further shows that the theoretical acceptance of a horizontal 
comparison would not result in an obligation for the Member State of primary 
establishment to provide for a “most-favoured nation” treatment. Firstly, up to now the 
most favoured nation treatment has not been accepted by the ECJ and, secondly, 
the CFC rules are solely national legislation - and not tax treaty provisions - which do 
not provide any basis, in my opinion, for such a far-reaching obligation.  
 
10.8.9. A number of possible arguments for the justification of a restriction on the 
exercising of the basic freedoms can come up in a CFC case. The following 
arguments were identified and examined in this context:  
 
o the cohesion of the tax system; 
 
o the loss of tax revenue and the erosion of the tax base; 
 
o the lower taxation in the CFC country, 
 
o the principle of territoriality; 
 
o the protection of a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States; 
 
o the effectiveness of fiscal supervision; 
 
o the aim of preventing tax avoidance;  
 
o the principle of world-wide taxation. 
 
10.8.10. The examination shows that the above arguments cannot be accepted as a 
valid justification in a CFC case. Given the fact that the CFC regimes are usually 
structured as anti-avoidance (anti-deferral) legislation, the aim of preventing tax 
avoidance is certainly one of the most obvious arguments. However, it is clear from 
the Cadbury Schweppes case and previous decisions that such legislation must 
focus on wholly artificial arrangements. Clearly, this is not the case for the CFC 
regimes which were outlined in chapter 6 and which have not been amended after - 
and according to - the Cadbury Schweppes decision. These CFC regimes are 
applicable in an undifferentiated manner to different types of low-taxed income and 
are actually intended to be applicable to income derived from genuine economic 
activities. For this reason, the aforementioned CFC concepts will not be proportional 
as long as they do not provide the shareholder with the possibility of submitting 
evidence that the activity carried out in the other state is a genuine economic activity 
- and to be exempt from CFC taxation in such a situation. From my perspective, the 
outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case is neither mitigated through the VAT case 
law of the ECJ nor the subsequent Oy AA decision. In VAT cases, the national court 
has to make an overall assessment and has to decide whether the tax motive is 
essential compared to the non-tax explanations (such as economic objectives). For 
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from the ECJ case law. The exception applies to participations held by French 
corporations, but not by French individual shareholders. 
 
o Germany: the amended CFC regime grants an exemption from CFC taxation 
for EU/EEA state if the taxpayer can provide evidence that the CFC carries out 
a genuine economic activity in the host state. In addition, it is required that an 
appropriate procedure for collaboration and exchange of information is 
established between Germany and the other state. It remains unclear what is 
actually meant by genuine economic activity. Moreover, it is stated that only 
income which is derived through the activity of the CFC itself can be allocated 
to the genuine economic activity and only to the extent that the arm’s length 
principle is taken into account.  
 
o Italy: the CFC regime does not result in a current allocation of income if it can 
be demonstrated that the entity carries out an “effective business activity.” 
However, it has to be noted that the latter activity is not necessarily the same 
as the “genuine economic activity” which was described in the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision. Moreover, the exemption from CFC taxation is 
completely dependent on a positive ruling of the Italian tax authorities.  
 
o The United Kingdom: different proposals for an amendment of the CFC regime 
have been discussed. The proposals range from the rather innovative system 
of a deduction of the “net economic value” from the allocable amount of 
income (which essentially results in a vertical separation of income) to the 
switch from the exemption method to the transactional method and the 
application to resident and non-resident entities. A concrete proposal for a new 
CFC regime was published in June 2011 which, however, seems to be an 
amendment to the “CFC type” rules but not the introduction of an innovative 
system. In my view, it is more than questionable whether the proposed regime 
really restricts the application to wholly artificial arrangements. 
 
o Denmark: the revised regime is now applicable to resident and non-resident 
entities without any link to the effective tax rate. The regime shall apply to 
participations of more than 50 percent and only to subsidiaries which derive 
more than 50 percent financial income and which have at least 10 percent 
financial assets. The undifferentiated and non-discriminatory approach does 
not provide an exemption for genuine economic activities carried out by the 
respective entity.  
 
o Sweden: the new Swedish regime grants an exemption from CFC taxation if 
the foreign entity “constitutes an actual establishment from which activities 
conducted for business reasons are carried out.” In this regard, several factors 
shall be taken into account for the assessment. According to the preparatory 
work of the revised legislation, the provision must not be interpreted as more 
far-reaching than what is allowed by the Cadbury Schweppes decision. The 
revised legislation will be relevant for establishments within the EEA.  
 
10.8.17. From my perspective, the strict limitation of an exemption from CFC taxation 
to EU Member States and EEA States should not be acceptable from an EU law 
perspective. Depending on the situation, the free movement of capital may require an 
unrestricted access to non-member states. Of course, the requirements for 
   
 
may considerably improve the situation of the state where the latter company is 
established. Moreover, the abolition of a withholding taxation in the country where the 
income is produced is, despite all administrative simplifications, contrary to the 
economic and equity principles described in this study. 
 
10.8.14. In my opinion, the case law of the ECJ results in a dilemma for those 
Member States which apply CFC regimes: either they provide an “escape clause” for 
genuine economic activities or the CFC regimes, in their current structure, will not be 
in line with the freedom of establishment and / or the free movement of capital. The 
examination in previous chapters shows that it is the intention of the CFC regimes to 
currently tax income derived from genuine economic activities and not necessarily 
from wholly artificial arrangements. The latter arrangements are usually covered by 
other anti-abuse measures. For this reason, I do not think that the implementation of 
an escape clause for genuine economic activities is an appropriate solution for a 
great number of these Member States.  
 
10.8.15. In principle, it is understandable that Member States with a comparably high 
tax rate want to protect their tax revenues and want to stop the erosion of the 
domestic tax base in favour of low-tax countries and territories. However, it is equally 
clear that “tax competition” should be supported as long as it is sound competition 
among states which leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Such competition is 
clearly supported by the economic and equity principles outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
However, this has to be separated from harmful competition which is triggered by 
countries and territories which have an over-proportional advantage from the inflow of 
capital and mobile investments to the detriment of other states. In the latter case, the 
state or territory which attracts the capital is usually merely an intermediate location 
and the income - based on the employment of such capital - is produced outside of 
this state or territory. The latter situation is not supported by the economic and equity 
principles outlined earlier and the Member State should have the possibility of 
applying legislation which - directly - targets the structures which result in such 
harmful competition. In my opinion, the taxation of the basic interest component of 
capital for certain mobile investments - without making a differentiation based on the 
place of investment - could be a very efficient approach without restricting sound 
competition.    
 
10.8.16. The approaches of the Member States in order to comply with EU law and, 
in particular, the Cadbury Schweppes decision are different. This can be shown by 
the following country examples:  
 
o Finland: the amended CFC regime provides an exemption from CFC taxation 
for entities which are established in an EEA state or a tax treaty state whose 
tax system does not differ substantially from the Finnish tax system, provided 
that an exchange of information is possible with the other state. In addition, it 
is required that the entity is actually established and carries on a genuine 
economic activity in the host state.  
 
o France: the French CFC regime provides for an EU entity exemption to a 
shareholding in the foreign entity which does not constitute a wholly artificial 
arrangement intended to escape French tax. The notion of a wholly artificial 
arrangement must be assessed with regard to the objective criteria arising 
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from the ECJ case law. The exception applies to participations held by French 
corporations, but not by French individual shareholders. 
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for EU/EEA state if the taxpayer can provide evidence that the CFC carries out 
a genuine economic activity in the host state. In addition, it is required that an 
appropriate procedure for collaboration and exchange of information is 
established between Germany and the other state. It remains unclear what is 
actually meant by genuine economic activity. Moreover, it is stated that only 
income which is derived through the activity of the CFC itself can be allocated 
to the genuine economic activity and only to the extent that the arm’s length 
principle is taken into account.  
 
o Italy: the CFC regime does not result in a current allocation of income if it can 
be demonstrated that the entity carries out an “effective business activity.” 
However, it has to be noted that the latter activity is not necessarily the same 
as the “genuine economic activity” which was described in the Cadbury 
Schweppes decision. Moreover, the exemption from CFC taxation is 
completely dependent on a positive ruling of the Italian tax authorities.  
 
o The United Kingdom: different proposals for an amendment of the CFC regime 
have been discussed. The proposals range from the rather innovative system 
of a deduction of the “net economic value” from the allocable amount of 
income (which essentially results in a vertical separation of income) to the 
switch from the exemption method to the transactional method and the 
application to resident and non-resident entities. A concrete proposal for a new 
CFC regime was published in June 2011 which, however, seems to be an 
amendment to the “CFC type” rules but not the introduction of an innovative 
system. In my view, it is more than questionable whether the proposed regime 
really restricts the application to wholly artificial arrangements. 
 
o Denmark: the revised regime is now applicable to resident and non-resident 
entities without any link to the effective tax rate. The regime shall apply to 
participations of more than 50 percent and only to subsidiaries which derive 
more than 50 percent financial income and which have at least 10 percent 
financial assets. The undifferentiated and non-discriminatory approach does 
not provide an exemption for genuine economic activities carried out by the 
respective entity.  
 
o Sweden: the new Swedish regime grants an exemption from CFC taxation if 
the foreign entity “constitutes an actual establishment from which activities 
conducted for business reasons are carried out.” In this regard, several factors 
shall be taken into account for the assessment. According to the preparatory 
work of the revised legislation, the provision must not be interpreted as more 
far-reaching than what is allowed by the Cadbury Schweppes decision. The 
revised legislation will be relevant for establishments within the EEA.  
 
10.8.17. From my perspective, the strict limitation of an exemption from CFC taxation 
to EU Member States and EEA States should not be acceptable from an EU law 
perspective. Depending on the situation, the free movement of capital may require an 
unrestricted access to non-member states. Of course, the requirements for 
   
 
may considerably improve the situation of the state where the latter company is 
established. Moreover, the abolition of a withholding taxation in the country where the 
income is produced is, despite all administrative simplifications, contrary to the 
economic and equity principles described in this study. 
 
10.8.14. In my opinion, the case law of the ECJ results in a dilemma for those 
Member States which apply CFC regimes: either they provide an “escape clause” for 
genuine economic activities or the CFC regimes, in their current structure, will not be 
in line with the freedom of establishment and / or the free movement of capital. The 
examination in previous chapters shows that it is the intention of the CFC regimes to 
currently tax income derived from genuine economic activities and not necessarily 
from wholly artificial arrangements. The latter arrangements are usually covered by 
other anti-abuse measures. For this reason, I do not think that the implementation of 
an escape clause for genuine economic activities is an appropriate solution for a 
great number of these Member States.  
 
10.8.15. In principle, it is understandable that Member States with a comparably high 
tax rate want to protect their tax revenues and want to stop the erosion of the 
domestic tax base in favour of low-tax countries and territories. However, it is equally 
clear that “tax competition” should be supported as long as it is sound competition 
among states which leads to an efficient allocation of resources. Such competition is 
clearly supported by the economic and equity principles outlined in chapters 2 and 3. 
However, this has to be separated from harmful competition which is triggered by 
countries and territories which have an over-proportional advantage from the inflow of 
capital and mobile investments to the detriment of other states. In the latter case, the 
state or territory which attracts the capital is usually merely an intermediate location 
and the income - based on the employment of such capital - is produced outside of 
this state or territory. The latter situation is not supported by the economic and equity 
principles outlined earlier and the Member State should have the possibility of 
applying legislation which - directly - targets the structures which result in such 
harmful competition. In my opinion, the taxation of the basic interest component of 
capital for certain mobile investments - without making a differentiation based on the 
place of investment - could be a very efficient approach without restricting sound 
competition.    
 
10.8.16. The approaches of the Member States in order to comply with EU law and, 
in particular, the Cadbury Schweppes decision are different. This can be shown by 
the following country examples:  
 
o Finland: the amended CFC regime provides an exemption from CFC taxation 
for entities which are established in an EEA state or a tax treaty state whose 
tax system does not differ substantially from the Finnish tax system, provided 
that an exchange of information is possible with the other state. In addition, it 
is required that the entity is actually established and carries on a genuine 
economic activity in the host state.  
 
o France: the French CFC regime provides for an EU entity exemption to a 
shareholding in the foreign entity which does not constitute a wholly artificial 
arrangement intended to escape French tax. The notion of a wholly artificial 
arrangement must be assessed with regard to the objective criteria arising 
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10.9.3. The taxation of the basic interest component requires a vertical and horizontal 
separation of income components instead of a merely horizontal separation of 
income. The latter approach of a horizontal separation is the typical approach under 
the existing CFC regimes.  
 
10.9.4. The vertical separation of income components seems to be particularly 
interesting from an anti-avoidance perspective, because not all of the income 
components are equally relevant in this respect. Therefore, I propose the separation 
into three different components: 
 
o income related to an activity physically conducted in the state of the service 
company (activity component); 
 
o income related to the compensation of risks which are related to the capital 
investment (risk component); 
 
o income related to the basic interest component of capital (basic interest 
component). 
 
10.9.5. The activity component should be taxed strictly according to the principle of 
capital import neutrality and should therefore be subject to income taxation in the 
state where the income is actually produced. If this is the residence state of the 
service company, it should be subject to income taxation in the latter state only. The 
income should not be subject to any current taxation in the hands of the shareholder.  
 
10.9.6. The risk component should be taxed in the state where the income is 
produced, too. However, most often the risk component is allocated - based on the 
underlying double tax convention - to the residence state of the service company 
which provides the capital (e.g. in the form of loan agreements, licensing 
agreements, leasing agreements, and similar agreements). In this case, the risk 
component is a compensation for the increased risks involved in the capital 
investment and the taking over of these risks. Any current taxation of this income 
component would take away part of the risk coverage in the state of the service 
company. Theoretically, this makes it necessary that the negative income - caused 
by the realisation of these risks - is taken into account in the state of the shareholder 
in the same way in order to avoid any asymmetrical taxation of income. In my 
opinion, a consistent approach would require the immediate offsetting of this negative 
income with other - positive - income of the shareholder. The net result related to the 
risk component is therefore difficult to predict, at least over a longer period of time, 
and seems to me less attractive for any tax based relocation. From the perspective of 
the Member States which apply the anti-avoidance regime, the uncertainties related 
to this particular income component reduce the effect of a current income allocation 
and make the system less efficient. Overall, the conclusion in such a non-optimal 
scenario of a taxation of the risk component in the residence state of the service 
company is to exclude the latter component from any current taxation in the hands of 
the shareholder.  
 
10.9.7. The basic interest component is, in the same way as the other two 
components, an income element which should be taxed, in general, in the state 
where the income is produced. However, the allocation of the taxing rights to the 
   
 
investments in non-member states may partially deviate from those which are 
needed in case of investments in other Member States, e.g. with respect to the 
existence of an information exchange between the respective states, but this cannot 
lead to the outcome that an exemption from CFC taxation, for example based on the 
existence of a genuine economic activity, is - in general - not granted to the 
shareholder (i.e. even if the additional requirements are fulfilled).  
 
10.8.18. The examination shows that the principle of capital import neutrality fits the 
idea and the concept of an internal market much better than the principle of capital 
export neutrality. The Member State which provides the benefits for the income 
production should have the right to tax the “fruits” of the activities. If it is a Member 
State with a low level of taxation, it will be rewarded for its improvement of the overall 
efficiency. Otherwise, i.e. if the Member State with the low level of taxation does not 
receive the sole right to tax the income, this might seriously distort the capital 
investments among Member States with the effect of hampering (sound) tax 
competition. Any protectionist approach followed by the Member State of primary 
establishment, e.g. through the undifferentiated application of CFC rules, would 
hamper the overall improvement of efficiency. 
 
10.8.19. However, the (theoretical) preference for the principle of capital import 
neutrality is one thing, the existing legal environment in the light of the OECD-MTC 
another. Thus, as long as the residence-based taxation is the prevailing system for 
income from capital intensive mobile activities, there is still the possibility of shifting 
income from the latter activities to intermediate companies in low-tax states - with the 
effect that the right to tax the total amount of income is also shifted to the latter 
states. This, however, is neither in line with the conclusions drawn in this study nor 
with the idea and the concept of an internal market.  
 
10.8.20. In my opinion, the conclusions clearly support, in my opinion, the concept of 
a “limited” capital export neutrality approach, i.e. an approach which focuses on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component. It seems to me that this is the only 
possibility of bringing together the essential elements of an internal market with the 
previous conclusions and the needs of Member States for an acceptable anti-
avoidance (anti-deferral) regime.  
 
10.9. Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation 
 
10.9.1. The idea and the concept of an internal market do not, in general, preclude 
the limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality by taxing the basic 
interest component on a current basis.  
 
10.9.2. The residence-based taxation of the basic interest component in the state of 
an intermediate service company can have a “clustering effect” in favour of low-tax 
states. That means the positive tax effect can attract equity investments in low-tax 
states which will subsequently, on the level of the service company, be transformed 
into capital services, i.e. a switch from equity investments to all types of capital 
services in order to take advantage of the allocation of taxing rights under double tax 
conventions which follow the pattern of the OECD-MTC. The current taxation of the 
basic interest component - and therefore the limited application of the principle of 
capital export neutrality - can target the “clustering effect” and can therefore support 
an efficient allocation of capital among states. 
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interesting from an anti-avoidance perspective, because not all of the income 
components are equally relevant in this respect. Therefore, I propose the separation 
into three different components: 
 
o income related to an activity physically conducted in the state of the service 
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another. Thus, as long as the residence-based taxation is the prevailing system for 
income from capital intensive mobile activities, there is still the possibility of shifting 
income from the latter activities to intermediate companies in low-tax states - with the 
effect that the right to tax the total amount of income is also shifted to the latter 
states. This, however, is neither in line with the conclusions drawn in this study nor 
with the idea and the concept of an internal market.  
 
10.8.20. In my opinion, the conclusions clearly support, in my opinion, the concept of 
a “limited” capital export neutrality approach, i.e. an approach which focuses on the 
current taxation of the basic interest component. It seems to me that this is the only 
possibility of bringing together the essential elements of an internal market with the 
previous conclusions and the needs of Member States for an acceptable anti-
avoidance (anti-deferral) regime.  
 
10.9. Alternative to the Existing CFC and FIF Legislation 
 
10.9.1. The idea and the concept of an internal market do not, in general, preclude 
the limited application of the principle of capital export neutrality by taxing the basic 
interest component on a current basis.  
 
10.9.2. The residence-based taxation of the basic interest component in the state of 
an intermediate service company can have a “clustering effect” in favour of low-tax 
states. That means the positive tax effect can attract equity investments in low-tax 
states which will subsequently, on the level of the service company, be transformed 
into capital services, i.e. a switch from equity investments to all types of capital 
services in order to take advantage of the allocation of taxing rights under double tax 
conventions which follow the pattern of the OECD-MTC. The current taxation of the 
basic interest component - and therefore the limited application of the principle of 
capital export neutrality - can target the “clustering effect” and can therefore support 
an efficient allocation of capital among states. 
Chapter 10
634
   
 
respect to the development of the interest and inflation rate. From my 
perspective, the 12 months Euribor which is determined, as an average, for 
the month preceding the financial year for which the rate should be applicable 
can be an appropriate benchmark.  
 
o The risk component is to be excluded from the current income taxation - as 
outlined above - if it can reasonably be assured that the system may not be 
circumvented or otherwise significantly manipulated to the detriment of the 
Member State which applies such legislation. Normally, this is not the case, 
but it may depend on the legislative framework of the Member State which 
applies such legislation. If necessary, the latter Member State has to amend 
its legislation in this respect. 
 
o A consistent approach makes it necessary, in my opinion, that such legislation 
is not only applied to the direct shareholder in the company which carries on 
the tainted activities, but also to the ultimate resident - direct or indirect - 
shareholder. This can be an individual shareholder, a permanent 
establishment of a non-resident shareholder, or a corporate shareholder.  
 
o The question has to be answered whether the alternative anti-avoidance 
legislation should only be applied to non-transparent entities or whether it 
should also be applied to transparent entities and permanent establishments. 
The reason is that the application of the exemption method for income derived 
by foreign transparent entities and permanent establishments can have an 
effect which comes close to the sheltering of income. However, the extension 
of the legislation to non-transparent entities and permanent establishments - 
with the consequence of a switch from the exemption method to the credit 
method - may result in a tax treaty override which, of course, has to be 
avoided. From an anti-avoidance perspective, the problem is reduced by the 
fact that the alternative legislation is also applied to indirect shareholdings - 
and therefore to the individual or corporate taxpayer behind the company 
which has a permanent establishment - and by the fact that the allocation of 
tainted activities to a transparent entity or permanent establishment is more 
difficult than in case of a non-transparent entity which is to be considered a 
separate legal entity.  
 
o The alternative legislation should not be applied to each and every resident 
shareholder. A certain minimum threshold is necessary to ensure that the 
shareholder has sufficient influence on the activities of the respective company 
and to gather the information required for the current taxation of income. Here, 
it is important to find an appropriate balance between the necessity of an anti-
avoidance legislation and the administrative burdens for the taxpayer. The 
percentage which was identified as an appropriate threshold is 25 percent. 
The threshold should be linked to the percentage of shareholding and the 
percentage of voting rights. Thus, if either the percentage of shareholding or 
the percentage of voting rights is reached or exceeded, the legislation should 
be applicable. The legislation does not require, in my opinion, an additional 
“absolute” financial threshold. In this respect, exemption provisions for minor 
investments can be provided. 
 
   
 
residence state of the service company - based on double tax conventions - leads to 
the result that the basic interest component is neither taxed on the level of the 
company which produces the income nor in the state where the income is produced - 
at least in those cases where the state of residence of the service company is 
different from the state where the service recipient carries on the income-producing 
activity. In contrast to the activity component, the basic interest component can quite 
easily - and without any serious obstacles - be relocated from one state to another 
and to the place where the income taxation is most favourable. It is therefore by far 
the most flexible and mobile component. In contrast to the risk component, the basic 
interest component is not a compensation for the risk coverage and the taking over of 
risks. It is just the basic interest element which is related to the capital investment 
and can therefore be taxed, theoretically, and in the absence of the taxation in the 
state of income production, in the residence state of the service company as well as 
in the residence state of the shareholder. The current taxation of the basic interest 
component is therefore, in my opinion, an efficient tool in order to target the erosion 
of the tax base which is related to this particular income element.  
 
10.9.8. Such an anti-avoidance approach is supported by transfer pricing principles 
(e.g. the OECD transfer pricing guidelines), but it is obvious that the transfer pricing 
principles cannot be seen as a substitute for an anti-avoidance legislation which 
focuses on the current taxation of income. 
 
10.9.9. An alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the current 
taxation of the basic interest component has to take into account a number of 
aspects, especially the following: 
 
o The legislation must be applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to income 
generated by resident and non-resident entities in order to be in line with EU 
law. 
 
o The determination of “tainted activities” in order to limit the application to 
capital services which entail an increased risk of tax avoidance. This reduces 
the scope of application to the activities in which the basic interest component 
plays an important role and reduces, at the same time, the administrative 
burden which may be caused by such legislation. The tainted activities should 
encompass financing activities, licensing activities, leasing and renting 
activities related to movable and immovable property, and any other activities 
which are related to the provision of capital which is utilised not by the 
company itself but by another party and which includes a financing element.  
 
o The separation of the basic interest component from the total amount of 
income derived from the activities is quite complex and difficult. A simpler and 
more practical approach is the determination of a percentage which can be 
applied on the capital invested in tainted property. The benchmark for the 
determination of the basic interest component might be derived from the yield 
of high quality state bonds, inter-bank rates (e.g. Euribor) or European Central 
Bank basic rates. In my opinion, a compromise is required to bring together 
the requirements based on economic and equity principles and the anti-
avoidance aspects. Such a compromise can be the determination of a rate 
which is applicable for the whole year instead of a rate which is adjusted 
regularly. Of course, such a rate will also include expectations, e.g. with 
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perspective, the 12 months Euribor which is determined, as an average, for 
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but it may depend on the legislative framework of the Member State which 
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legislation should only be applied to non-transparent entities or whether it 
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The reason is that the application of the exemption method for income derived 
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method - may result in a tax treaty override which, of course, has to be 
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which has a permanent establishment - and by the fact that the allocation of 
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difficult than in case of a non-transparent entity which is to be considered a 
separate legal entity.  
 
o The alternative legislation should not be applied to each and every resident 
shareholder. A certain minimum threshold is necessary to ensure that the 
shareholder has sufficient influence on the activities of the respective company 
and to gather the information required for the current taxation of income. Here, 
it is important to find an appropriate balance between the necessity of an anti-
avoidance legislation and the administrative burdens for the taxpayer. The 
percentage which was identified as an appropriate threshold is 25 percent. 
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percentage of voting rights. Thus, if either the percentage of shareholding or 
the percentage of voting rights is reached or exceeded, the legislation should 
be applicable. The legislation does not require, in my opinion, an additional 
“absolute” financial threshold. In this respect, exemption provisions for minor 
investments can be provided. 
 
   
 
residence state of the service company - based on double tax conventions - leads to 
the result that the basic interest component is neither taxed on the level of the 
company which produces the income nor in the state where the income is produced - 
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and to the place where the income taxation is most favourable. It is therefore by far 
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interest component is not a compensation for the risk coverage and the taking over of 
risks. It is just the basic interest element which is related to the capital investment 
and can therefore be taxed, theoretically, and in the absence of the taxation in the 
state of income production, in the residence state of the service company as well as 
in the residence state of the shareholder. The current taxation of the basic interest 
component is therefore, in my opinion, an efficient tool in order to target the erosion 
of the tax base which is related to this particular income element.  
 
10.9.8. Such an anti-avoidance approach is supported by transfer pricing principles 
(e.g. the OECD transfer pricing guidelines), but it is obvious that the transfer pricing 
principles cannot be seen as a substitute for an anti-avoidance legislation which 
focuses on the current taxation of income. 
 
10.9.9. An alternative anti-avoidance legislation which is based on the current 
taxation of the basic interest component has to take into account a number of 
aspects, especially the following: 
 
o The legislation must be applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to income 
generated by resident and non-resident entities in order to be in line with EU 
law. 
 
o The determination of “tainted activities” in order to limit the application to 
capital services which entail an increased risk of tax avoidance. This reduces 
the scope of application to the activities in which the basic interest component 
plays an important role and reduces, at the same time, the administrative 
burden which may be caused by such legislation. The tainted activities should 
encompass financing activities, licensing activities, leasing and renting 
activities related to movable and immovable property, and any other activities 
which are related to the provision of capital which is utilised not by the 
company itself but by another party and which includes a financing element.  
 
o The separation of the basic interest component from the total amount of 
income derived from the activities is quite complex and difficult. A simpler and 
more practical approach is the determination of a percentage which can be 
applied on the capital invested in tainted property. The benchmark for the 
determination of the basic interest component might be derived from the yield 
of high quality state bonds, inter-bank rates (e.g. Euribor) or European Central 
Bank basic rates. In my opinion, a compromise is required to bring together 
the requirements based on economic and equity principles and the anti-
avoidance aspects. Such a compromise can be the determination of a rate 
which is applicable for the whole year instead of a rate which is adjusted 
regularly. Of course, such a rate will also include expectations, e.g. with 
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the tainted property has to be determined based on the ratio of the total 
average amount of equity to the total average amount of equity plus the total 
average amount of interest-bearing debts. The equity-percentage has to be 
applied to the calculation basis in order to end up with the net calculation 
basis. 
 
o The CSC legislation is to be applied to direct and indirect participations in non-
transparent legal entities and to permanent establishments of those entities as 
well as to the participations of the latter entities in transparent partnerships. 
The allocation of tainted and non-tainted property between the state of the 
headquarter company and the state of the PE (PS) follows the allocation which 
has to be made for income tax purposes.  
 
o The CSC legislation applies to direct and indirect shareholdings of at least 25 
percent (percentage of shareholding or, alternatively, percentage of voting 
rights). The requirement of a 25 percent threshold applies to the investment in 
the CSC itself, i.e. even in case of multiple-tier structures the shareholder is 
required to hold a participation of at least 25 percent in the CSC.   
 
o The basic interest income is allocable to the shareholder after the end of the 
financial year of the CSC. 
 
o The current allocation of income requires the application of an ordinary tax 
credit system which ensures a consistent relief from double taxation. The 
income attribution should not lead to a “penalty effect” for the shareholder, but 
should solely provide for the current taxation of the basic interest component. 
It is therefore required that the income attribution is separated from the regular 
domestic taxation of the shareholder and that the tax credit mechanism is 
modified. Without the latter separation and modification, the system might lead 
to a treatment which is, at least in some situations, less favourable compared 
to the treatment of income which is either derived directly by the shareholder 
or by a legal entity which is not subject to current taxation. This is particularly 
true in case of losses (of the shareholder, the CSC, or intermediate 
companies) and multiple-tier structures if different systems are applied 
simultaneously. Therefore, the proposed CSC legislation follows a concept 
which provides for the possibility of a preliminary tax determination and a 
postponement of tax payments in certain situations and under certain 
circumstances. 
 
o The attributed income is subject to tax at the highest domestic (group) level. 
This can be a legal entity, an individual shareholder, or a permanent 
establishment of a non-resident investor (which therefore also encompasses 
transparent partnerships). 
 
o If the income is attributed to an individual shareholder, it will be taxed at a flat 
rate which is derived from the domestic corporate income tax rate and not 
according to the (progressive) personnel income tax rate of the shareholder. 
 
o The taxation according to the “regular” personnel income tax system of the 
individual shareholder will be made as soon as the income is actually 
distributed - with a full crediting of the previously imposed (preliminary) flat 
   
 
o There is a need to define the persons who have to be classified as ‘related 
parties’ to the shareholder. In my opinion, the following persons have to be 
within in this category: (i) persons who are related through family membership, 
(ii) persons who are related through factual or contractual arrangements and 
(iii) persons who are related through shareholding structures. 
 
o The stipulation of a minimum threshold makes it necessary to implement 
constructive ownership rules in order to avoid that the minimum percentage of 
shareholding or voting rights is circumvented. 
 
10.9.10. Therefore, based on the conclusions drawn in this study, I propose an anti-
avoidance legislation which is based on the current taxation of the basic interest 
component. The main elements can be summarised as follows: 
 
o The proposed concept shall be named “capital service company legislation” or 
“CSC legislation” since it is applied to capital service activities (tainted 
activities). 
 
o The tainted activities are financing activities, licensing activities, leasing and 
renting activities related to movable and immovable property, and any other 
activities which are related to the provision of capital which is utilised not by 
the entity itself but by another party and which includes a financing element. 
 
o The CSC legislation is applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to resident 
and non-resident entities which carry on tainted activities. 
 
o The basic interest rate is to be derived from the 12 months Euribor which is 
determined, as an average, for the month preceding the financial year for 
which the basic interest rate should be applicable. This rate should be 
applicable for the whole financial year of the entity which carries on the tainted 
activities.  
 
o The basis for the calculation of the attributable income is, in general, the 
average book value of the tainted property in the balance sheet of the CSC 
(calculation basis). However, adjustments have to be made if the book value 
deviates from the average economic value - based on the expected economic 
lifetime of the property concerned. Adjustments are also required in case of 
extraordinary write-downs and similar measures as well as in case of 
contractual provisions which lead to an increase or a decrease in the average 
amount of capital provided during the contractual period. The underlying 
assumption is that the economic value reflects the amortisation in an 
agreement which is based on the arm’s length principle. The taxpayer has the 
possibility of providing the evidence that the value after amortisation is lower 
than the average economic value. The calculation basis does not necessarily 
reflect the fair market value of the respective property. What is important for 
the determination of the calculation basis is not a ‘mark-to-market’ value at 
specific points in time, but a value which reflects, as much as possible, the 
average amount of capital provided during the contractual period. 
 
o In case the activities are (partly) debt-financed, the calculation basis has to be 
reduced. The percentage of equity-financed investments which are related to 
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rate which is derived from the domestic corporate income tax rate and not 
according to the (progressive) personnel income tax rate of the shareholder. 
 
o The taxation according to the “regular” personnel income tax system of the 
individual shareholder will be made as soon as the income is actually 
distributed - with a full crediting of the previously imposed (preliminary) flat 
   
 
o There is a need to define the persons who have to be classified as ‘related 
parties’ to the shareholder. In my opinion, the following persons have to be 
within in this category: (i) persons who are related through family membership, 
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(iii) persons who are related through shareholding structures. 
 
o The stipulation of a minimum threshold makes it necessary to implement 
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renting activities related to movable and immovable property, and any other 
activities which are related to the provision of capital which is utilised not by 
the entity itself but by another party and which includes a financing element. 
 
o The CSC legislation is applicable in a non-discriminatory manner to resident 
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o The basic interest rate is to be derived from the 12 months Euribor which is 
determined, as an average, for the month preceding the financial year for 
which the basic interest rate should be applicable. This rate should be 
applicable for the whole financial year of the entity which carries on the tainted 
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o The basis for the calculation of the attributable income is, in general, the 
average book value of the tainted property in the balance sheet of the CSC 
(calculation basis). However, adjustments have to be made if the book value 
deviates from the average economic value - based on the expected economic 
lifetime of the property concerned. Adjustments are also required in case of 
extraordinary write-downs and similar measures as well as in case of 
contractual provisions which lead to an increase or a decrease in the average 
amount of capital provided during the contractual period. The underlying 
assumption is that the economic value reflects the amortisation in an 
agreement which is based on the arm’s length principle. The taxpayer has the 
possibility of providing the evidence that the value after amortisation is lower 
than the average economic value. The calculation basis does not necessarily 
reflect the fair market value of the respective property. What is important for 
the determination of the calculation basis is not a ‘mark-to-market’ value at 
specific points in time, but a value which reflects, as much as possible, the 
average amount of capital provided during the contractual period. 
 
o In case the activities are (partly) debt-financed, the calculation basis has to be 
reduced. The percentage of equity-financed investments which are related to 
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clearly supports, in my opinion, the efficient allocation of capital among 
Member States and other countries and is therefore fully in line with the idea 
and the concept of an internal market. 
 
o The main aspects to ensure the effectiveness of the legislation and the 
compliance with primary EU law are the following: 
 
• The limitation to tainted activities which entail - from the perspective of 
the state which applies the legislation - an increased risk of tax 
avoidance (capital service activities). 
 
• The application of the system in a non-discriminatory manner to tainted 
activities carried on through resident and non-resident entities. 
 
• The strict limitation of the current taxation of income to the basic 
interest component. 
 
• No difference in the treatment of the basic interest income which is 
caused by the tax credit system, existing tax losses, multiple-tier 
structures et cetera.  
 
• The granting of non-discriminatory exemption provisions. 
 
o Secondary EU law does not play a comparably important role. However, if the 
(revised) Parent-Subsidiary Directive is applicable to the current attribution of 
income under a CFC or CSC system, the respective system is required to 
provide for the elimination of double taxation either by applying the exemption 
method or the credit method. This is clearly the case for the proposed CSC 
legislation.  
 
10.9.11. The outcome of the Cadbury Schweppes case can provoke different 
reactions of Member States and may lead to an increased political pressure for the 
introduction of an EU wide minimum income tax rate or for comparable measures of 
harmonisation. The final outcome from a political perspective, however, is difficult to 
estimate and it is quite likely that a common European approach can only be 
achieved in the long run. The immediate unilateral reactions which can be expected - 
and which can already be noticed - are either the adjustment of CFC rules in a way 
which complies with the requirements derived from the Cadbury Schweppes case, or 
the extension of existing CFC rules to comparable domestic investments and 
investments in other (high-tax) countries. However, due to the fact that a concept 
which is based on the conclusions of the Cadbury Schweppes decision would 
change the scope of the legislation significantly, it can be expected that some of the 
regimes will rather be extended to resident and non-resident entities instead of 
providing an “escape clause”. The Council of the European Union published a 
Resolution on the coordination of CFC rules which recommends that Member States 
adopt some guiding principles for the application of these rules. However, the 
Resolution only presents a list of indicators for the identification of artificial 
arrangements. This can be helpful to align the approach of the Member States with 
respect to the separation of artificial structures from non-artificial structures - but not 
more than that. 
 
   
 
income tax. Finally, this ensures an identical treatment of currently attributed 
income and non-currently attributed income. 
 
o The CSC legislation also provides for a consistent relief from double taxation 
in case of subsequent profit distributions and the subsequent disposal of 
shares.  
 
o The system provides for a number of exemptions from the current taxation of 
income in order to reduce the administrative burden and to limit the scope of 
such legislation, as much as possible, to the situations and structures in which 
the risk of tax avoidance - from the perspective of the state which applies the 
CSC legislation - is increased. The exemption provisions have to be seen 
individually, i.e. if the conditions for one of the exemption provisions are 
fulfilled, there will be no income allocation under the CSC regime. The 
following exemptions have been proposed: 
 
• Exemption based on a property-ratio: an exemption should be granted if 
the non-tainted property in the balance sheet of the CSC - based on 
book value - prevails. I have proposed a percentage which should be in 
a range between more than 50 percent (minimum) and more than 75 
percent (maximum).  
 
• Exemption based on an income ratio: similar to the property-ratio, an 
exemption should be granted if the income from non-tainted activities 
encompasses more than 50 percent (minimum) and more than 75 
percent (maximum) of the total income of the CSC. 
 
• Exemption based on the classification of the service recipients: the 
tainted activities should be exempt from current taxation of income if the 
services are provided - to a significant percentage - to unrelated parties. 
This should be the case if more than 75 percent of the income from 
tainted activities is related to services provided towards unrelated 
parties.  
 
• Exemption based on a general financial threshold: in order to avoid that 
each and every minor amount of tainted investment is subject to current 
taxation, it seems to be acceptable to stipulate a financial threshold as 
an absolute amount. In my opinion, the threshold should refer to the net 
calculation basis of the tainted property (in total) and should be within a 
range of 100,000 Euro to 500,000 Euro. Thus, if the net calculation 
basis of the tainted property does not exceed the threshold, no income 
attribution is required.  
 
• Exemption based on income taxation at source: in those cases in which 
the basic interest component is not subject to taxation in the state of 
residence of the service company, but in the state of source, there is no 
necessity to calculate the basic interest component. 
 
o It is of utmost importance that the proposed CSC legislation complies with the 
idea and the concept of an internal market and primary and secondary EU law. 
The current taxation of the basic interest component under the CSC system 
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asymmetrical allocation of income, the inclusion of the income in the tax base 
of the shareholder, et cetera. It might even lead to additional conflicts. The 
latter can be the case, for example, if the domestic legislation provides a 
system of fiscal unity (fiscal consolidation) only for domestic entities: the 
exclusion of negative income of a non-resident CFC from an offsetting with 
positive income of the shareholder, on the one hand, but an offsetting of 
negative income of a resident CFC under the fiscal unity regime, on the other 
hand, would lead to a situation which, in my view, is not in line with the 
concept and the idea of an internal market. 
 
o A simple extension of CFC rules to resident entities is, in essence, not 
sufficient to fulfil the needs and the requirements of an internal market - even if 
the extension is implemented in a manner which leads to a non-discriminatory 
legislation and may therefore theoretically be in line with the basic freedoms of 
the TFEU.  
 
o The CFC legislation often focuses on the lowest domestic group level, i.e. 
does not allocate the income to the ultimate domestic shareholder. This opens 
the possibility for structures which minimise the anti-avoidance effect. In 
contrast thereto, the proposed CSC legislation focuses on the shareholder on 
the highest domestic group level, be it an individual shareholder or a corporate 
shareholder. 
 
o The mechanism of CFC legislation can result in significant distortions, with the 
effect that the overall tax burden caused by the CFC income allocation is 
higher than a comparable dividend distribution. The CSC legislation is based 
on a two-step approach: first, the current allocation of the basic interest 
component and, second, the regular dividend distribution (or the disposal of 
shares). Both steps are linked closely in order to avoid any double taxation of 
income.  
 
o The proposed CSC legislation follows an approach which is “softer” compared 
to CFC legislation, but without being less effective. The system focuses on the 
direct and indirect shareholder, but taxes the basic interest income only if the 
income is finally subject to tax in the CSC state. The system provides for 
postponements of tax payments and preliminary assessments to ensure the 
avoidance of double taxation, and to ensure that currently attributed income is 
not treated worse than any other income which is not subject to current 













   
 
10.9.12. The CSC legislation only results in a conflict with a tax treaty which is based 
on the OECD-MTC if (i) the legislation is applied to income generated through a PE 
in the other contracting state and (ii) the tax treaty explicitly provides for the 
application of the exemption method (and not the credit method) in order to avoid the 
double taxation of PE income. Only in this case, it is required to explicitly refer to the 
application of the CSC legislation in order to avoid a tax treaty-override. However, it 
is apparent that the application of the CSC taxation is less “aggressive” - also in the 
light of the relationship with the other contracting state - than the typical CFC regimes 
which usually focus on all (vertical) income components. Together with the clear 
economic and equity reasons behind such legislation it seems to be less likely that 
the application of the CSC taxation results in serious conflicts with the other treaty 
partner. This should not be understood as a suggestion or a justification for a tax 
treaty-override, but it shows that the overall impact of such an override is very limited. 
One may even see it from a different angle: the fact that the CSC regime solely 
focuses on the basic interest component might open the door for an argument - 
supported by economic and equity reasons - to amend the respective double tax 
convention and to explicitly include the possibility of applying the CSC regime. 
 
10.9.13. It is important to understand and to highlight the main differences between 
CFC legislation - which is extended in the manner described above - and the 
proposed CSC legislation. The most significant aspects can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
o The extension of a transactional approach CFC legislation to resident entities 
may lead to an extraordinary administrative burden, especially in those cases 
in which all types of income from inter-company services are in the focus of 
the respective legislation. For this reason, a substantial amendment to the 
legislation may be required. 
 
o The extension of an entity approach CFC legislation may require a revised 
classification, too. The reason is that the income from inter-company services 
is typically treated as tainted income and, therefore, might lead to a complete 
income allocation if it encompasses a substantial part of the overall income of 
the CFC.  
 
o The transactional and entity approach CFC legislation which applies to 
resident and non-resident entities - without focusing on the income tax rate - 
does not solve the problem of income allocation which is related to the activity 
component and the risk component of capital. The contrary is true: the 
extension of the system to medium- and high-tax countries increases the 
amount of “critical” income allocation.  
 
o The increase in income allocation which is related to the activity component 
and the risk component is not limited to tainted income, but also “infects” non-
tainted income if the CFC legislation follows an entity approach. This would 
lead to a massive extension of the taxation of income components which 
should be - based on the principles outlined in earlier chapters - exempt from 
current taxation. 
 
o The extension of the CFC taxation would by no means solve the problems 
which are caused by the inconsistent application of the tax credit system, the 
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